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The Evolution of Army Collective Training: Pasts Trends and Future Requirements Within Canadian Forces and Army Transformation

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ABSTRACT

The Canadian Forces is currently undergoing transformation which will see the three operational environments integrated into a level beyond that of joint. Concurrently, the army is also undergoing a transformation of its own, but in three phases and over a longer period of time. Military change is complex, and the Canadian Forces has embarked in a more complex process as cycles of change within the army are embedded within another higher level transformation for the Canadian Forces. An examination of the evolution of Army collective training from the Cold War, peacekeeping and the first phase of army transformation, within the framework of a military change model, are used to identify some doctrinal considerations concerning training for the next phase of transformation – the Army of Tomorrow. Two themes are identified: the requirement for the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) to evolve into becoming the Joint-CMTC; and the necessity for the soldier of the Army of Tomorrow to train to a common set of skills consisting of a blend of General-purpose Combat and peace support skills. It is shown that after analysing collective training over four periods of time that Army culture is the one common thread that brings all of these elements to the forefront and army culture may be the catalyst to successful transformation to the Army of Tomorrow.

INTRODUCTION

Today it is a common axiom that to be successful in operations, armies should train as they expect to fight. In his book, The Challenge of Change, Harold C. Winton described the process through which this occurs, proposing a series of common steps that armies follow to prepare for war. This paper examines the origins and evolution of post-Cold War collective training in the context of Winton's model, with a view to specifically identifying training considerations for the Army's second cycle of transformation – The Army of Tomorrow. As this paper will show, to train as we expect to fight, the Army of Tomorrow must be a fully Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP)[1] capable organization in order to be effective in the comprehensive "Whole of Government Approach"[2] to expeditionary operations. Furthermore, this paper will also show that in the future soldier will be required to know a single common set of skills that consists of a carefully balanced blend of both General-purpose Combat and Peace Support skills in order to function effectively in the *Contemporary Operating Environment*.[3]

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[1] JIMP is a term used to describe an array of agencies (military, government and non-government) that soldiers interact with on operations in the contemporary operating environment. There is no official Canadian Forces or government definition for this term.

Department of National Defence, *Strategic Operations Resource Directive 2007, Draft 2* (Ottawa: DND, 2007), 3-1-G-1-1.

[2] As defined in the Government of Canada International Security Policy – see page 3 of this study.

Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, www.pco-bcp.gc.ca; Internet; accessed 13 April 2007.

[3] The operational environment for Full Spectrum Operations is known as the *Contemporary Operating Environment*. It is described as, an environment with representative infrastructure and urban areas, extended lines of communications, forward operating bases, that is populated with a modern threat and offers the ability to provide cause and effect from inter-actions with JIMP actors – see page 6 of this study.

Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, www.pco-bcp.gc.ca; Internet; accessed 13 April 2007, 6.

Background

The sight of two civil passenger airlines impacting into the World Trade Center at 8:46 and 9:02 AM on 11 September 2001 left an indelible mark on humankind. For the first time in history, the political wing of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - the North Atlantic Council, invoked article 5 of the Washington Treaty, that an armed attack against one or more Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.[4] The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have etched in time the first conflict in what one author has coined: the fourth generation of warfare[5] during a period where a significant change in the nature of warfare is also occurring. To the United States military, the asymmetrical threat of international terrorism has had an impact on their security environment, their approach to war and their transformation within the revolution of military affairs.[6] Within Canada, the consequences of 9/11, amongst others, resulted in the review and release of a new a National Security Policy,[7] which in turn provided the guidance for the Canadian Forces (CF) to evolve in order to confront the new threats to the global security environment.[8]

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[4] *Statement by the North Atlantic Council*, NATO Press Release, 2001/124, (12 September 2001); http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm; Internet; accessed 12 April 2007.

[5] William S.Lind, "Fourth-Generation Warfare's First Blow: A quick Look," Marine *Corps Gazzette* (November 2001):72.

[6] Elinor C. Sloan, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), xi.

[7] Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, www.pco-bcp.gc.ca; Internet; accessed 13 April 2007.

[8] Department of National Defence, *Chief of Defence Staff, The Way Ahead for Our Canadian Forces*, briefing, available from http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/00native/pdf/cds-vision_e.pdf; Internet; accessed 21 March 2007.

One of the Government's priorities within the National Security Policy was a review of International Security Policy and the introduction of a new integrated approach to defence, diplomacy and development.[9] In April 2005, the Government revealed its new International Security Policy Statement called: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. It consisted of four components that make up the new integrated approach to international security – Diplomacy, Defence, Development and Commerce, also known as 3D+C. The policy statement outlined the integrated approach as:

> …the best strategy for supporting states that suffer from a broad range of interconnected problems…This requires government departments to work more closely together – from planning through to execution… Canadians will also be essential to ensuring coherence on the ground.[10]

While the new International Security Policy defined the new goals for the military in it's Whole of Government Approach to operations, it also contributed to the necessity for the CF to change or transform to meet these objectives. Harold C. Winton wrote in his book, The Challenge of Change, that the process of military change is extremely complex, and although there is no magic formula for success, there are common steps that it generally follows. He defined these steps (outlined in Figure 1 below) as a cycle consisting of *the appreciation of the battlespace*, *the development of doctrine*, and *the implementation of change through training* and other measures.[11] In particular, he asserts that when the cycle is followed correctly the military institution has a reasonable chance of beginning the next war adequately configured. Conversely, if any of the steps are mis-appreciated, the army may

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[9] Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, www.pco-bcp.gc.ca; Internet; accessed 13 April 2007, 47.

[10] Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, available from www.international.gc.ca; Internet; accessed 13 April 2007, 20.

[11] Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets, eds. *The Challenge of Change* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), xii.

find itself perfectly prepared to fight the wrong type of war.[12] Although an argument can be made from Winton's model that the West, Canada included, was prepared to fight the wrong type of war on September 11th, it is more important to understand what changes are needed to fight this new type of war.



Figure 1 – Winton's Military Change Model
Source: Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets, eds. *The Challenge of Change* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), xii.

Applying Winton's Military Change Model to the CF in its current organizational and doctrinal posture makes an already complex matter even more complicated. As stated above, the new International Security Policy generated the need for the CF to undergo rapid and

[12] *Ibid*.

almost immediate transformation. When this procedure began at the strategic level, transformation within the Army was already in progress. In essence, transformation was nested within transformation. Specifically, the CF embarked on its transformation initiative in 2005, while the army was already three years into its 13-year plan. The majority of the strategic military organization was restructured and operationally ready in 2006.[13] It consisted of establishing a new integrated, beyond joint, organization and structure to include a unified command and control system.[14]

From the Army's perspective, CF transformation was an initiative that started well after army transformation had already begun. In fact, Army transformation began in 2002 as a direct consequence of the need to modernize. As Lieutenant-General Jeffery, the Chief of Land Staff put it; "[W]e have too much army for our budget and too little army for our tasks."[15] In fact, the Army was following suit to at least 68 other nations who were also modernizing prior to 9/11.[16] The army's 13-year plan transformation model consisted of three distinct phases: the Interim Army, the Army of Tomorrow and the Army of the Future.[17] By the time CF transformation had stood-up its new organization, army

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[13] General R.J. Hillier, 1950-9 (CT) CDS *Planning Guidance – CF Transformation* (Ottawa: DND Canada, October 2005), 7.

[14] *Ibid*, 3.

[15] Lieutenant-General M.K. Jeffery, "Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy," Presentation, Land Staff – National Defence Headquarters, (Ottawa, October 30 2002), available from http://www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/strathome.asp; Internet; accessed 21 March 2007.

[16] Emily O. Goldman, and Leslie C. Elias, The *Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003), 371.

[17] Department of National Defence, *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy*, (Kingston, May 2002), available from http://www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/resourcestrat.asp; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007, 8.

transformation had just completed an operational pause, entered its second phase, the Interim Army and began to plan for – The Army of Tomorrow.

Despite Army transformation being nested within CF transformation, the battlespace in which the CF is operates is complex, overlapping and integrates a significant number of traditional operational environments into one. Canada's International Policy Statement defines this battlespace as the Three-Block-War. [18] This operational concept is also known as Full Spectrum Operations[19] and is comprised of:

> …[O]ur land forces … engaged in combat operations against well-armed militia forces in one city block, stabilization operations in the next block, and humanitarian relief and reconstruction two blocks over. Transition from one type of operation to another often happens in the blink of an eye, with little time to react. At the same time, our naval forces in adjacent coastal areas might be supporting troops ashore while enforcing a maritime exclusion zone, and our air forces could be flying in supplies and humanitarian aid, while standing by to directly engage a determined opponent.[20]

The operational environment for Full Spectrum Operations is known as the Contemporary Operating Environment. It is described as, an environment with representative infrastructure and urban areas, extended lines of communications, forward operating bases that are populated with a modern threat and offers the ability to provide cause and effect from inter-actions with JIMP actors. For an individual soldier on operations, there is the potential to work at the tactical level not only with fellow soldiers from all of the

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[18] Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, available from www.international.gc.ca; Internet; accessed 13 April 2007, 8.

[19] Full Spectrum Operations is also defined as the simultaneous conduct of operations by a force across the spectrum of operations.

P. Gizewski, "The Future Security Environment- Threats, Risks and Responsibilities," www.igloo.org/ciia; Internet; accessed 18 April 2007.

[20] Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, available from www.international.gc.ca; Internet; accessed 13 April 2007, 8.

military services and Branches of their nation, but also with other soldiers from all of the services represented by foreign nations, including personnel from other government agencies, and members of non-government or public agencies. General Charles C. Krulak, the former Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, describes this young soldier as – "The Strategic Corporal." In his article, The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War he describes the demands full spectrum operations places on the soldier as:

> …without the direct supervision of senior leadership… they will be asked to deal with a bewildering array of challenges and threats. In order to succeed under such demanding conditions, they will require unwavering maturity, judgement, and strength of character. Most importantly, these missions will require them to confidently make well-reasoned decisions under extreme stress – decisions that will likely be subject to harsh scrutiny of both media and the court of public opinion. In many cases the young marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and the strategic levels as well.[21]

The phrase "In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military," is just as appropriate today as it was when General Douglas McArthur wrote it almost 75 years ago.[22] The challenges associated with training soldiers to fight in complex battlespaces under full spectrum operations are extensive. Moreover, in order to prepare "the strategic Corporal" and the remainder of the institution to fight the next war, what impact will the Whole of Government approach to operations have on training? Will there be a need to integrate operational expeditionary training beyond that of the current concept? What effects will concurrent transformation being undertaken at both the Canadian Forces and the Army levels have on the next stage of transformation development? To answer, this research paper will to take an

[21] General C.C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marine Corps Gazette* (January 1999): 20-21.

[22] Lieutenant-Colonel (ret) Peter, G. Tsouras, *The Greenhill Dictionary of Military of Military Quotations* (London: Greenhill Books, 2000), 486.

evolutionary approach in examining collective training for expeditionary operations from the Cold War, the peacekeeping era, the Interim Army and look forward to some training considerations required in the next phase of Army transformation – the Army of Tomorrow.

This research paper will therefore examine the nature of doctrine for collective training over three specific periods with a view to identifying new training requirements as the Army plans to emerge from the next round of transformation in 2015. It is anticipated that the evolution of collective training through the three periods of time will lead to the development of two training themes for the Army of Tomorrow. The first concerns the necessity, as outlined in the Whole of government Approach to expeditionary operations, for the Army of Tomorrow to become a fully Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP)[23] capable organization in order to be effective. This will require the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) to evolve into becoming the Joint-CMTC. The second theme identifies that Army of Tomorrow soldiers will be required to train to one common set of skills consisting of a blend of General-purpose Combat and peace support skills in order to function effectively in the *Contemporary Operating Environment*. Finally, this paper will conclude with comments identifying the common linkage throughout the evolution of collective training as- an army culture. Specifically, it will identify that Army culture must also change in step with the environment in which it operates and that it must evolve if the Army of Tomorrow is to be perfectly ready for the right battle. Shaping this culture, is the second object to Army transformation and could be the catalyst to the success of not only the Army of Tomorrow, but also for the Army of the Future.

[23] JIMP is a term used to describe an array of agencies (military, government and non-government) that soldiers interact with on operations in the contemporary operating environment. There is no official Canadian Forces or government definition for this term.

Department of National Defence, *Strategic Operations Resource Directive 2007, Draft 2* (Ottawa: DND, 2007), 3-1-G-1-1.

THE COLD WAR

General-purpose Combat Training

Military training during the Cold War simply stated was training for World War III – a General-purpose Combat Capability. In order to understand the context of training in this era, it is necessary to briefly outline the context of the Cold War. The Cold War started shortly after the Second World War and ended with a formal declaration on 1 February, 1992 four weeks after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December, 1991.[24] It was a conflict about power and ideology.[25] While some believe the Cold War began with Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech, others contend that the Cold War began in Canada with the disclosure of a Russian spy ring in 1945. Igor Gouzenko ushered in the Cold War to Canada when he defected from the Russian Embassy and revealed that the Russians were trying to get technological information, including highly sensitive scientific findings to develop the atom bomb.[26] Distrust between the west and East began to polarize both sides. The Marshall Plan and the Russian equivalent – the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance led to the Berlin blockade which irrevocably divided the east and west. Russia exploded an atomic device, which started a nuclear arms race and contributed to the formation of NATO in 1949. Six years later in 1955, the Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact in response to West Germany joining NATO. A race for space began in 1957 when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first artificial communications satellite. Tensions for nuclear war heightened in 1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Finally, a second arms race began in the

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[24] Michael Dockrill, and Michael F. Hopkins, *The Cold War*. 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 168.

[25] *Ibid*., 164.

[26] Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "Soviet Spy Scandal: News of Widespread Spy Ring in Canada Cools Relations With the Soviet Union," http://history.cbc.ca/history; Internet; accessed 20 April 2007.

1980s as the Americans introduced the Strategic Defence Initiative and deployed cruise missiles into Western Europe. Overall, the Cold War established distrust between the East and West. A front was established along the Berlin Wall, an iconic symbol of the Cold War, where armies massed weapons and prepared to go to war on a massive scale in extremely short notice.

From a Canadian perspective, the country committed a division to Supreme Allied Commander Europe's (SACEUR) integrated Force from 1951 until 1993.[27] It consisted of three brigades, one of which was forward deployed in Germany, and the remaining two others were to be mobilized from the rear in Canada. It was also foreseen that a second Division would to be raised from the ranks of the Militia and deployed to Germany within 180 days.[28] Remarkably, mobilization plans to form and sustain the units of the Canadian Corps were similar to those used for World Wars I and II.[29] Throughout this 42-year deployment, the Canadian contribution to SACEUR continued to ebb and flow, based on the Government's commitment to fund and equip the CF. In 1968, the Trudeau Government reduced the size of 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (CIBG) by 50% and consolidated it with the Air Force in the south of Germany. As a result, 4 Brigade could not ensure a sustainable defence greater than five days and had no realistic hope of mobilizing sustainability forces back in Canada, as there was not enough strategic lift to move them.[30]

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[27] Sean Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany 1951-1993 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 491.

[28] *Ibid*.

[29] *Ibid*.

[30] Sean Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany 1951-1993 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 491.

The late 1980's were characterized by consolidating CF efforts to support SACEUR. In 1986, the Army withdrew its Canadian Air Sea Transportable Brigade Group (CAST) from support to Northern Norway and tasked it to support the SACEUR Integrated Force.[31] In 1989, the 1st Canadian Division Headquarters was formed in Kingston with a forward deployed element in Lahr, West Germany. Other combat support and combat service support units stationed in Canada were tasked to support the Division rounding out its order of battle.[32] Once deployed into Germany, the plans called for the 1st Canadian Division to be augmented with a third manoeuvre brigade from either the United States or Germany. Changes such as these necessitated modification of Canada's mission in SACEUR. In the 1960s, Canada's mission was forward defence in the North of Germany. To conduct this task, the Brigade had specialized equipment such as tactical nuclear capable surface-to-surface missiles.[33] Upon moving from the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) to the Central Army Group (CENTAG), the Canadian mission changed from that of forward defence to that of a one time only blocking force.[34]

Training doctrine up to the end of the Cold War is best described by Brigadier-General Ernest Beno in his pamphlet Training to Fight and Win: Training in the Canadian Army:

> Years ago I wrote a paper entitled "Training To be Sound Soldiers and Good Gunners". Twenty years later on, I was surprised to see it still being used at the Field Artillery School, some twenty years later, as a reference for the Instructor-In-gunnery Course and other courses. This is not a credit to me; rather, it is a reflection of the

[31] *Ibid*., 441.

[32] *Ibid*., 443.

[33] *Ibid*., 494.

[34] Sean Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany 1951-1993 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 495.

> dearth of thought and writings on this vital subject, or more importantly, the lack of coherence and relevance of the doctrine that does exist.[35]

Training doctrine in B-GL-304-001/PT-001, Training For War[36] released on 12 November 1992, lacks the depth of knowledge required to design and conduct training at all levels. Despite these shortfalls, it does outline key training fundamentals that surmise the Cold War era. The central theme for the training philosophy in Training for War was cooperation amongst the combat arms, combat support arms and combat service support arms, identifying them all as integral and essential elements of the combined arms team including air which must always be exercised together under realistic conditions.[37] Peacetime concentrations were the preferred method of collective training to ensure that units and formations at all levels were being practiced and that the highest training standards were being achieved.[38]

Furthermore, Training For War identified that the traditional reliance on the regimental system, a great source of strength and cohesion in the past, would continue to create the environment that produces individual professionalism and inter-arms cooperation – thus forming well-trained units and coordinated formations.[39] Training policy identified the requirement to train at the General-purpose Combat capability level, as it is easier to adapt to

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[35] Brigadier-General Ernest B. Beno, *Training to fight and Win: Training in the Canadian Army* (Kingston: E.B. Beno, 1999), ix.

[36] Despite being released just after the Cold War ended, the timeline to write, edit, and approve this publication would have clearly been during the final stages of the Cold War.

[37] Department of National Defence, B-GL-304-001/PT-001 *Training for War* (Ottawa, 1992), 1-3-1.

[38] Department of National Defence, B-GL-304-001/PT-001 *Training for War* (Ottawa, 1992), 1-3-1.

[39] *Ibid*.

a lower intensity level of combat than the reverse.[40] In 1972, Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds explained this concept in the following manner:

> The armed forces should primarily be trained and equipped for the possibility of conflict with a first-class power – the most severe testing they may have to face. It has been proven over and over again, that well trained and well disciplined military forces, trained primarily for major warfare, can easily and effectively adapt to lesser roles of aid to the civil power or peace keeping. The reverse is not the case.[41]

Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery said, "Training is a great art: there are principles of training just as there are principles of war."[42] The principle of training written in Training for War were: good organization; realism and intent; simplicity; availability of equipment and training aids; flexibility and challenge; realistic umpiring; practical field training; economy; Tactical Exercises Without Troops; and use of training aids.[43] An examination of these principles reveals that they provide limited guidance to commanders considering various training design, but to some degree, they can be used as tenants to judge the effectiveness of training. Nevertheless, they tell little of and offer no concrete guidance on the system and approach to training.

The highest level of collective training in Training for War was defined as the grouping of all combat, combat support, combat service support, air and other services on a formation level exercise.[44] This level of collective training represents the culmination of the

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[40] *Ibid*., 2-1-1.

[41] Brigadier-General Ernest B. Beno, *Training to fight and Win: Training in the Canadian Army* (Kingston: E.B. Beno, 1999), 6.

[42] *Ibid*., 21.

[43] Department of National Defence, B-GL-304-001/PT-001 *Training for War* (Ottawa, 1992), 2-3-1.

[44] *Ibid*., 2-4-2.

training within a formation and must be progressive, starting at the sub-sub-unit level. The publication provided little additional detail regarding training design from the individual level, progressing up to formation level collective training. This concept however, is fully explained in Brigadier-General Beno's pamphlet and his model for training progression for a unit is included at Annex A to this paper.

General-purpose Combat Capability Training with 4 CIBG, in Germany was comprised of a training cycle that progressed from individual to collective training and that culminated with the Exercise Reforger or Fallex each autumn. Exercise Reforger presented some excellent training opportunities for 4 CIBG that did not exist in Canada. Formation and higher-level training focused on interoperability of nations making up the division and followed proposed changes to SACEUR's deployment plan.[45] Interoperability became an important factor in the development of standard operating procedures between Canada and the United States and subsequently, between Canada and Germany. By 1988, the Germans, Americans and Canadians had joint field standard operating procedures, conducted joint planning as well as training and exchanged liaison officers.[46] The degree of interoperability between 4 CMBG and 4 Panzer Grenadier Division had been so finely tuned that the Germans held the Brigade in high such esteem that they treated it quite differently from any of the other NATO formations:

> Our role in the multi-national alliance brought lots of possibilities, and the necessity to compare the doctrines of each single country. We had been in discussion with the British on doctrine, with the Americans and with the French and always with the intention to adapt as far as possible. We have not had these discussions with the Canadians. Not at all. The reason for this was that the understanding of the

[45] Sean Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany 1951-1993 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 368.

[46] *Ibid*., 424.

> Canadian land forces [of tactical operations and command and control]is so close to our understanding, and the understanding between German and Canadian commanders is so close, that there was absolutely no need for theoretical seminars of doctrine comparison. We could resolve any problems, attach any battalion to 4 CMBG or accept a Canadian battalion. It worked the same way, only in another language. This did not happen with any other nation of the NATO alliance.[47]

Exercising interoperability was also important for communication and codes. Valuable lessons were learned on Exercise Reforger III in 1971, as 4 CMBG did not have the proper codes and means of communications to call for tactical nuclear fire from the Americans.[48]

Exercise Reforger had a considerable amount of realism injected into it, as it was a free-play exercise with elements manoeuvring over the countryside over which they were expected to fight. Exercises would start by practicing the recall mechanism, nicknamed 'snowball', to test the readiness of the formation.[49] Free-play exercises allowed for independent freedom of action between both opposing sides that was closely controlled by umpires assessing the battle damage.

4 Brigade also had the opportunity to leverage advanced training aids and facilities that were not available in Canada. On numerous occasions, they were afforded the opportunity to use Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) at the United States' training facility in Hohrnfels.[50] This system allowed soldiers to simulate direct force-on-force training using eye safe laser "bullets," which removed the ambiguity of using umpires. MILES equipment was only purchased in limited quantities for troops exercising in

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[47] *Ibid*., 426.

[48] *Ibid*., 309.

[49] Sean Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany 1951-1993 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 303.

[50] *Ibid*., 382.

Canada many years after the Americans had introduced it.[51] 4 Brigade also made good use of Fighting-In-Built-Up-Area (FIBUA) ranges designed by the Germans. FIBUA training combined with MILES equipment, according to Major Bob Near of 3 RCR, this was some of the best training that 3 RCR did in Germany:

> The Bundeswehr had taken this typical German village, Bonnland, complete with church, gastof, castle, houses, barns, streets, alleys – the works, and used it to practice troops in both attacking and defending… The training covered everything – how to get into second story windows by running a soldier up a pole, preparing rooms for defence, booby traps, room-clearing, mouseholing, street crossing, etc. On the last day we practiced a full battalion dismounted attack at dawn on Bonnland – three rifle companies against the Administrative Support Company, who were defending. We had MILES equipment… borrowed from our American *partnershaft* battalion… Everybody in the rifle companies thought this attack would be a piece of cake, over in an hour, but instead the battle raged all day… Our MILES receivers were sounding off all the time, indicating we were taking a lot of casualties. Some really good lessons were learned, especially about fire and movement and use of cover…[52]

In contrast, Canada has only recently begun to develop an urban operations capability.[53] The current existing facilities are all smaller and less complex than those described above.

Another example of leveraging training opportunities that did not exist in Canada was Nuclear Biological Chemical Defence (NBCD) decontamination. In 1983, Exercise Reforger was strictly a United States exercise and as a result, 4 CMBG exercised on its own. Attached to the Brigade was the United States 11th Chemical Company for decontamination and chemical reconnaissance tasks. The American company reported the following:

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[51] As an Officer posted to 2 RCHA from 1986 – 1992, 1997-2001 and an Instructor-In-Gunnery posted to the Royal Canadian Artillery School from 1992-1997 and 2001-2003, MILES equipment was not used on any field training exercises.

[52] Sean Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany 1951-1993 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 367.

[53] Major G.J. Burton, "An Urban Operations Training Capability for the Canadian Army," (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff College Masters in defence Studies Paper, 2005), 6.

> The Canadians were anxious to experience progressing through a chemical company for two reasons; they have no organic decontamination of their own … The Canadians also placed in their scenario an impressive demonstration of integrated training… not only did [Brigadier] General Evraire [Comd 4 CMBG] emphasize use of chemical defence themes throughout the exercise but he also integrated activation of an alternate command post with a tactical decontamination of the Brigade Headquarters![54]

The training opportunity and experience acquired, even at the Brigade Headquarters level was invaluable considering Canada had no dedicated NBCD decontamination units.

The largest Fallex/Reforger in which 4 CMBG participated on occurred in 1988. According to press releases, over 125,000 NATO troops, 7,000 tracked vehicles, 15,000 wheeled vehicles, 400 guns and 630 helicopters simulated a Corps versus Corps battle.[55] This scale of exercise was greater than the size of the entire Canadian Army. Major Peter Devlin (now Brigadier General) recalled the scope of the exercise:

> …It was a Corps exercise and it was huge! The number of troops and equipment was unbelievable…To be able to exercise in the German countryside after having recently arrived and exercising along side NATO allies was tremendously rewarding. We talk about [exercising] a division on the RVs [Rendez-vous exercises in Canada] but here we are talking about Corps…I was 2IC Administration Company at the time and I was supposed to do a hide recce of the echelon…I came upon the red route on the map, but there were tanks as far as I could see in both directions and they were nose to tail.[56]

The responsibility to conduct formation and higher level collective training became the responsibility of the 1st Canadian Division Headquarters when it was created. In 1990, 1st Canadian Division Headquarters and elements of headquarters 5 BMC deployed to Germany

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[54] Sean Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany 1951-1993 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 371.

[55] Sean Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany 1951-1993 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1997),420.

[56] *Ibid*.

on exercise fallex with the goal of developing standard operating procedures for the division.[57] The following year, 1 Canadian Division conducted a Command Field Exercise involving 4 CMB and included 5 BMC as well as 10 Panzer Grenadier Brigade Headquarters who were also deployed for a Command Post Exercise as lower control. Headquarters II German Korps played higher control. This exercise was the last fallex conducted by Canadian troops in SACEUR, as the Gulf War broke out in 1992, and Canada subsequently pulled out of the Western European theatre in 1993.

Notwithstanding, the redeployment of 4 CMB back to Canada, 1 Canadian Division continued to play a significant role in formation level training. Specific roles and responsibilities outlined in the 1996 five –Year Training Plan included:

> Training Role. The primary peacetime responsibility of 1 Cdn Div HQ is to plan and conduct training of the field force at brigade group level and above as directed by the LFTD. While doing so, there is a responsibility to monitor the OPRED of brigade groups to ensure they are prepared to execute general-purpose combat missions; since 1995, this training role includes the responsibility to evaluate collective training of brigade groups, and to establish the procedures for the evaluation of battle group training. Using Battle Task Standards, as promulgated in field Training Regulations (to follow), these evaluations will not only assist in the measurement of the state of operational readiness, but will also identify any required training enhancements.
>
> [Task] Div 5. Plan and conduct training at brigade group and above on exercises such as rendezvous (RV) series, as outlined in the LFTD.
>
> [Task] Div 6. Monitor the OPRED of the field force manoeuvre troops, with regards to training and command and control (OPLANS, SOPs etc) in concert with the training task above.
>
> Evaluate the collective training of brigade groups and advise or assist them in the evaluation of battle group training.[58]

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[57] *Ibid*., 447.

[58] Department of National Defence, *1st Canadian Division Five Year Training Directive*, (1st Canadian Division, Kingston: file 4980-1 (Comd)), January 1996.

The divisional headquarters established a clear methodology for formation level collective training to include establishing priorities, directing certain types of training to include the allocation of resources. It further created collective combined arms Battle Task Standards that it used as a baseline for justifying training and activity levels in order to maintain operational readiness.[59]

In contrast to 4 Brigade's collective training exercises in Europe where units trained on the terrain in which they were to fight, collective training in Canada in the 1980's and 1990's consisted of the Rendez-Vous (RV) series of exercises. These exercises were designed to conduct formation level collective training, for all mobile command units at the divisional level, approximately every other year. They were all based on General-purpose Combat skills, but were not on the same scale as those conducted in Germany because there were shortages in personnel, equipment and ammunition. Post Exercise Reports from RV-92 show that 5 Brigade did not have enough units to effectively have the depth and flexibility to conduct its tasks during the exercise. In order to afford the opportunity to develop interoperability skills, they had to be placed under operational control of an American Task Force for a period of time. While the training was judged successful, it was conducted on a much lower level than what had previously been practiced in Germany. RV-92 did have aviation support, thus introducing a joint element to the exercise. MILES equipment was also used on the exercise, but it was of limited values as there was not enough equipment made available for all weapons systems and personnel involved in the training. Similar to exercises in Germany, umpires were used for the force-on-force component of the exercise,

[59] Department of National Defence, *1st Canadian Division Five Year Training Directive*, (1st Canadian Division, Kingston: file 4980-1 (Comd)), January 1996.

but shortages in blank ammunition and umpire training had a negative effect on the training.[60] RV-92 included a live, indirect fire and movement component where three regiments of artillery were able to form a division and conduct fire and movement with mechanized infantry and armour elements.[61] This live fire training was an enhancement that could not be achieved in Germany, as the live fire ranges are insufficient in size to conduct this scale of training.

In summary, collective training during the Cold War was exclusively General-Purpose Combat Training. Clearly, 4 Brigade in Germany had the priority to obtain resources in the CF, as it's components were fully manned and equipped. Unlike it's counterparts stationed to the rear in Canada, this Brigade's elements had the opportunity to train in a multi-national context, leveraging other nations training resources. Interoperability was the Brigade's key training goal at the formation level as its staff focused on developing clear standard operating procedures between nations at the divisional level. In contrast, collective training in Canada was conducted in a divisional context, but by training less frequently and suffering chronic shortages in equipment, personnel as well as in ammunition. There was a negative effect on the quality of training which was not offset by the ability to conduct live fire and manoeuvre training using the vast training ranges. There was also a significant and problematic gap in the training standard between 4 Brigade in Germany and the remainder of the Army stationed back in Canada.

PEACEKEEPING

[60] Colonel C. Couture, *Post Exercise Report – 5GBC Exercise Rendez-Vous 9* (Quartier general 5e Groupe-brigade mécanisé du Canada, Base des Forces Canadiennes Valcartier: file 3340-165/R16, July 1992).

[61] Personal experience. The author attended the exercise.

First Generation Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping was a product of the Cold War era. Initially, the intent of peacekeeping was not to resolve conflicts but to constrain or deter any further outbreaks in hostilities. It was also used as a mechanism to assist in the implementation of a negotiated agreement between nations or factions involved in an armed conflict. Peacekeeping gained its origins from the United Nations Charter where two measures were created to prevent any nation from starting another world War. Chapter six of the Charter outlines the settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, arbitration and judicial procedures. Conversely, should those mechanisms fail, Chapter seven outlines peace enforcement by military means.[62] The end of the Cold War signified a shift from a bi-polar structure of international relations, where the United Nations Security Council was often at an East vs. West stalemate, to a multilateral global structure. It also represented a change in paradigms from traditional to second-generation peacekeeping.

Traditional peacekeeping began as "third party conflict control" where unarmed military observers would monitor and report on events and/or functions. Their missions invariably were expanded to include monitoring ceasefires and reporting on human rights situations.[63] The first UN Observer missions began in 1948, where observers were placed into Palestine and Kashmir.[64] By 1956, UN Observer missions had evolved into what is now known as the Pearson - Hammarskjold model of interpositional peacekeeping. This model is

[62] Department of National Defence, B-GL-301-303/FP-001 *Peacekeeping Operations*, (Ottawa, June 1992), 1-3-1.

[63] United Nations, Department of Public Information, The *Blue Helmets, a Review of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information. 1996), 8.

[64] The Senate of Canada, *Meeting New Challenges: Canada's response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping* (Ottawa, 1993), 28.

synonymous with traditional peacekeeping and refers to the non-interventionist, buffer zone deployment of a military force interpositioned between two belligerent parties.[65] Their mandate was to monitor and enforce truce agreements. Weapons were used for self-defence only, and they had highly restrictive rules of engagement and guidelines for the use of force.[66] Characteristics of the type of force employed and the deployment of peacekeeping troops were based on a number of criteria- which, over time have been referred to as the UNEF II rules, the 1973 rules and the Hammarskjold doctrine.[67] They are:

1. Deployment of a force will take place only with the full confidence and backing of the United Nations Security Council.

2. Deployment will take place only with the full consent of the host country(ies).

3. Once deployed, the force will come under the command of the United Nations through the Secretary General.

4. The force should enjoy the complete freedom of movement in the host country(ies).

5. The force should be international in composition and the national contingencies involved should be acceptable to the host country.

6. The force should act impartially.

7. Armed force should only be used in self-defence (or in defence of the mandate).[68]

Other characteristics of traditional peacekeeping over the period of 1950 - 1985 include: a conclusion to a political agreement, usually a cease fire; and the peacekeeping

[65] Kenneth Eyre, "The Need for a Standardized Peacekeeping Education and Training System," in *The Changing Faces of Peacekeeping*, edited by Russ Tychonick and Susan McNish, 155-162 (Toronto: The Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993) 156.

[66] The Senate of Canada, *Meeting New Challenges: Canada's response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping* (Ottawa, 1993), 30.

[67] S. Cumner, "The Challenges Faced by the Military Adapting to Peacekeeping Missions," Peacekeeping *and International Relations* (January/February 1998), 13.

[68] S. Cumner, "The Challenges Faced by the Military Adapting to Peacekeeping Missions," Peacekeeping *and International Relations* (January/February 1998), 13.

force was in place at the request of the countries involved to oversee the observance of the agreement.[69] Finally, those conflicts that have produced traditional peacekeeping missions were predominately inter-state involving national armies, a clear area of separation (a buffer zone deployment) and an underlying political agreement that mandated the peacekeeping force.[70]

Traditional peacekeeping at the political level can therefore be summarized as a stopgap measure that fell short of the full collective enforcement measures afforded by Chapter seven of the United Nations Charter. Traditional peacekeeping during this era was based on Chapter six of the charter due to bi-polar, Cold War divisions within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The exception to this trend was the Korean War in 1950, where UNSC resolutions 83 and 84 were passed authorizing armed force to restore international peace and security. These resolutions passed because the Soviet Union boycotted the meetings and as such did not use their veto.[71]

From 1948 to 1998, during the period of the Cold War period, 80,000 CF personnel had participated, either as unarmed observers or as armed peacekeepers, in twenty-one international peacekeeping operations sanctioned both within and outside of the United Nations framework.[72]

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[69] *Ibid*.

[70] *Ibid*.

[71] United Nations Security Council, *United Nations Security Council Resolutions- 1950*. (New York: UN, 1950) available from http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1950/scres50.htm; Internet, accessed 22 April 2007.

[72] General P.D. Manson, "Peacekeeping in Canadian and Foreign Defence Policy," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (August 1989): 7.

During the period of 1956 until 1966, Canada played a key role in the development of peacekeeping policies and practices while conducting a significant amount of peacekeeping training.[73] This interest in peacekeeping operations was most likely follow-on action to Prime Minister Pearson's interpositional peacekeeping model being adopted by the United Nations. Un-coincidentally, training for peacekeeping operations was predicated on General-purpose Combat Training. There is no shortage of quotes from flag officers offering their opinion on the requirement for General-purpose Combat Training as a basis for peacekeeping operations.

Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds' quote stated earlier in this paper is but one example that stresses when training for combat operations, it is easier to adapt to "lesser roles of aid to the civil power or peacekeeping."[74] In contrast, the opposite case of training for a peacekeeping operation and having to revert to combat operations could be disastrous as troops would not be prepared for this more difficult task and the severe demands of these operations. Major-General Brian Vernon, the former Commander of Land Forces Central Area in 1993 put it this way:

> The blunt fact of life is that the most effective peacekeepers are those who are prepared to fight; otherwise, the blue berets become just additional victims. If we have troops prepared and equipped for combat they may be used, effectively, for peacekeeping duties. The reverse definitely does not apply.[75]

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[73] G.R. Harper, Captain (N) M.H. Tremblay and Colonel R. Thacker, *Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation E1/81 DND Policy/Capability in Support of Peacekeeping Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1981), 28.

[74] Brigadier-General Ernest B. Beno, *Training to fight and Win: Training in the Canadian Army* (Kingston: E.B. Beno, 1999), 6.

[75] Major-General W.B. Vernon, "The First Mission of the Army," Garrison, Volume 2, (6 August 1993), 2.

Even earlier,the military culture supporting the requirement for General-purpose Combat Training as a basis for peacekeeping operations could perhaps find its roots to Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Tuker's writings after the Second World War. He wrote:

> Train hard: fight easy. On the day of battle every officer and every man will bless the leader who has held fast to this motto and lived up to it. They will grumble in peace and rejoice in war, but in both peace and war they will have the self-respect that all men have who are true masters of their craft.[76]

In 1993, prior to the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of CF to Somalia, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs interpreted the military view on General-Purpose Combat Training as follows:

> Military officials who testified before the committee emphasized that their ability to perform peacekeeping duties efficiently stems to a large degree from their basic military training. In their view, apart from updating their general knowledge of peacekeeping and the specific characteristics of the conflict or region where they are to carry out their mission, leadership, discipline, and general practical knowledge in a combat situation developed during basic training and the experience acquired afterward are all that is necessary to carry out a peacekeeping operation effectively and safely.[77]

Despite the utility of training to a General-Purpose Combat level, there have also been protectionist undertones to cease the erosion of Canadian military forces and resistance to any change in culture to prevent it from becoming a constabulary. In 1966, prior to CF unification, Brigadier-General Wilson-Smith, a former commander of UNFICYP termed peacekeeping as, "no real job for a soldier but only a soldier can do it."[78] As such, if UN

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[76] Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Tuker, *Approach to Battle* (London: Cassell, 1963), 391.

[77] House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs, *The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper: Canada and the Renewal of Peacekeeping* (Ottawa: DND, June 1993), 21.

[78] Brigadier-General N.G., Wilson-Smith, "UN Peacekeeping – The Military Aspects of Field Operation," *Brooking Institute Seminar* (16 June 1966): 11. Quoted in F.R. Cleminson, "Canadian Experience and Perspective in Peacekeeping," Master's thesis (University of Maryland, 1967), 69.

operations become the main objective and if personnel are trained and equipped for that specific mission only, they will lack the ability and equipment to act as a normal fighting unit within the context of national policy.[79] The study commissioned on Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers for the Somalia Inquiry confirmed this concern. It states that some Canadian Military have not wanted to see their combat readiness eroded by what they thought might become an unbalanced focus on relatively benign Cyprus – style peacekeeping operations.[80] The report also paradoxically states that other second-generation peacekeeping missions have emphasized the absolute need for combat readiness for peacekeeping.[81]

The key training distinction for the first generation of peacekeeping was the requirement to conduct additional peacekeeping training as the exception rather than the rule. Excluding reservists, and the Cyprus rotations, no other training (specifically designed for peacekeeping operations) was conducted.[82] Furthermore, it was judged that members of the CF, trained to meet the requirements as well as standards of their particular trade and classification have acquired the discipline, expertise and military operational skills necessary

[79] F.R. Cleminson, "Canadian Experience and Perspective in Peacekeeping," Master's Thesis (University of Maryland, 1967), 69.

[80] Paul LaRose-Edwards, Jack Dangerfield and Randy Weekes, Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers: A Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Ministry of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), 2.

[81] Paul LaRose-Edwards, Jack Dangerfield and Randy Weekes, Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers: A Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Ministry of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), 2.

[82] G.R. Harper, Captain (N) M.H. Tremblay and Colonel R. Thacker, *Report on NDHQ Program Evaluation E1/81 DND Policy/Capability in Support of Peacekeeping Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1981), 28.

to operate effectively in most peacekeeping scenarios.[83] In retrospect, it was the norm that no collective training was conducted to prepare for peacekeeping operations.

In June 1992, new peacekeeping doctrine was published in B-GL-301-303/FP-001 Peacekeeping Operations. Despite the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 44/49 on December 8, 1989, encouraging member nations to establish national training programmes for military and civilian personnel assigned to peacekeeping operations, Canada did not follow the resolution as the CF general-purpose training was deemed to meet the guidelines set by the United Nations.[84] The training concept for peacekeeping training remained ad-hoc as general military, specialist trades, annual refresher and collective training was considered enough to adequately prepare soldiers for peacekeeping tasks. Moreover, doctrine established that it was the Contingent Commander's responsibility to determine the priorities for training prior to deployment.[85] This publication did not provide any details on how to conduct peacekeeping training beyond a simple checklist of topics in subject areas that could be considered for training. Training guidelines were provided in five areas that included: qualities of an observer/staff officer, qualities of a soldier, normal, special and unique to mission training.[86] Unique to mission training consisted of a laundry list of general topics about the mission and did not include the requirement to conduct any higher level of training beyond that of briefings. Some of these topics included: background of the conflict,

[83] *Ibid*.

[84] Department of National Defence, B-GL-301-303/FP-001 *Peacekeeping Operations*, (Ottawa, June 1992), 10-1.

[85] *Ibid*., 10-2.

[86] *Ibid*.,10-1.

history of the UN and peacekeeping operations, use of force, investigations, negotiations/liaison, SOPs, language and security training.[87]

An example of a first generation peacekeeping mission was Operation Snowgoose, the CF peacekeeping mission to Cyprus. Over the life of the mission, there have been fifty-nine Canadian peacekeeping rotations to Cyprus in a twenty-nine year period ending in 1993.[88] The mission was considered a textbook first generation peacekeeping mission, as there was a ceasefire, a mechanism to resolve the disputes and the United Nations had been invited to assist in putting an end to the conflict by both countries involved. The Second Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery was tasked as the last unit to close-out the mission and their predeployment training plan consisted of an eight-week schedule divided into four phases: basic soldier skills, unique to Cyprus operational training, a unit level Command Post Exercise and a Field training Exercise.[89]

The Unit Commanding Officer, who was also the Contingent Commander, devised his training plan in consultation with his superior, the Commander 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group.[90] The unique to mission training consisted of crack and thump, cultural and crowd control training.[91] The unit level Command Post Exercise consisted of incident reporting and the passage of information. It progressed into the three-day final Field

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[87] *Ibid*., 10-28.

[88] Colonel V.W. Kennedy, *After Action Report – Operation Deliverance* (Special Service Force, Petawawa: file 3350-52-19 (COS)), 4 November 1993, 1.

[89] *Ibid*.

[90] *Ibid*.

[91] *Ibid*., 4.

Training Exercise where a series of observation posts and a live opposing force scenarios were used to confirm the training conducted to date. The aim of this exercise was to practice the mission standing operating procedures, namely the opening fire policy and reports and returns.[92] Although there was no doctrinal basis to conduct this collective training exercise, the Brigade Commander influencing this training was Brigadier-General Beno, the author of Training to Fight and Win that has been noted earlier in this paper. The Second Regiment's training plan broadly resembles General Beno's model for specific to mission training at Annex B of this paper.

Using the mission in Cyprus as a backdrop, it can be summarized that Canadian peacekeeping training had no set standards or controls placed upon it other than the requirement to conduct specific to mission briefings. The training that was conducted was of ad-hoc scenarios as units had to design their own training without the help of any established doctrine. However, 2RCHA's training plan for Operation Snowgoose in 1992 was the exception to the rule for this mission. At the other end of the spectrum in 1978, 1 PPCLI conducted only three days of work up training prior to deploying to Cyprus.[93] Nearing the end of the cold War, the limitations on peacekeeping training did not go unnoticed, as they became the subject of discussion in a number of scholarly publications. For example, in his paper aimed at justifying the requirement for a centralized Canadian peacekeeping centre, Major, now Brigadier-General, Peter Devlin identified a number of areas where the CF approach to peacekeeping training was lacking. They were:

[92] *Ibid*., 5.

[93] Major-General L. MacKenzie, *The Road to Sarajevo* (Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre, 1993), 75.

1. Peacekeeping training lacks central coordination, is ad-hoc in nature and resources are not employed efficiently;

2. Peacekeeping training lacks standardization because many different organizations conduct the training and this causes a lack of continuity; this potentially results in problems for the peacekeeper, his unit and the belligerent forces as different ways of operating are experienced;

3. There is insufficient attention paid to the difference between war and peacekeeping, given the recent increase in the threat to peacekeepers; limitations, such as the rules of engagement placed on peacekeepers, are not consistent with a soldiers trained response;

4. The training of navy, army and air force personnel is not centrally coordinated or controlled and there is no means of sharing the knowledge and experience that are acquired by personnel from all three environments;

5. The reservist is inadequately trained for the demands of peacekeeping today.

6. There is no effort to integrate the training of military personnel with other organizations (NGOs, electoral officials, etc) to create a greater understanding and foster cooperation; and

7. There is no centre of peacekeeping knowledge and experience, which could be consulted to ensure continued high levels of ability.[94]

Second Generation Peacekeeping

The end of the Cold War marked a switch from a bi-polar to a multilateral structure of international relations. This has resulted in a significant change in the nature of peacekeeping and the types of conflicts to which international forces have been deployed.[95] Between 1988 and 1992, the CF has deployed over 5,000 personnel on all fifteen new,

[94] Major P.J. Devlin, "An international Peacekeeping Training Centre," (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course New Horizons Paper, 1994), 16.

[95] S. Cumner, "The Challenges Faced by the Military Adapting to Peacekeeping Missions," Peacekeeping *and International Relations* (January/February 1998): 13.

second-generation peacekeeping operations.[96] Second generation peacekeeping is classified as:

1. Situations involving peacekeeping forces entail factions as opposed to governments or regular armed forces.

2. The driving force behind the conflict tends to have a different rational, often based on ethnic violence, hatred or revenge.

3. A change in the nature of the war-zone.

4. There is often a wider regional dimension, in that elements of each belligerent faction tend to establish sanctuaries in the surrounding states.

5. The operational environment into which the peacekeeping force is sent is dynamic rather than stable, due to the absence of a political agreement prior to the deployment of the force.

6. The response is increasingly multi-lateral, involving not only military forces, but also non-governmental organizations, bilateral donors, United Nations agencies, political negotiators and the media.

7. There is often a humanitarian dimension either included in the mandate or apparent on the ground.[97]

A rudimentary comparison between traditional and second generation peacekeeping establishes a clear dichotomy in the political and security environments in which the peacekeeping forces operate. Recognizing a new era for peace, the United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali set out to transform peacekeeping in Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping:

> ...The nations and the peoples of the United Nations are fortunate in a way that those of the League of Nations were not. We have been given a second chance to the world of our Charter that they were denied. With the cold war ended we have drawn back

[96] The Senate of Canada, *Meeting New Challenges: Canada's response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping* (Ottawa, 1993), 38.

[97] The Senate of Canada, *Meeting New Challenges: Canada's response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping* (Ottawa, 1993), 38.

> from the brink of confrontation that threatened the world and, too often, paralysed our organization...[T]here is a need to ensure that the lessons learned of the past four decades are learned and that the errors, or variations of them, are not repeated.[98]

The report described a new approach to maintaining peace and security along the following framework:

1. Preventive Diplomacy
   a. Measures to build confidence
   b. Fact-finding
   c. Early warning
   d. Preventive deployment
   e. Demilitarized zones

2. Peacemaking
   a. The World Court
   b. Amelioration through assistance
   c. Sanctions and special economic problems
   d. Use of military force [Chapter 7 of the UN Charter]
   e. Peace-enforcement units

3. Peacekeeping [Chapter 6 of the UN Charter]

4. Post-conflict peace building[99]

From a military perspective, the changing security environment in the post Cold War era, along with the new framework for peace outlined above there is a clear difference in approach that has to be reflected in the nature of tasks associated with second generation peacekeeping. As a result, the military skills, training methods and mind-set are very

[98] United Nations, A/47/277 – S/24111 *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992) available from http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html; Internet; accessed 17 March 2007.

[99] United Nations, A/47/277 – S/24111 *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992) available from http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html; Internet; accessed 17 March 2007.

different from that of conventional general-purpose combat.[100] These military skills became and are now known as Operations Other Than War.[101]

After the Cold War, peacekeeping training during the second generation of peacekeeping initially remained unchanged. The nature of training for Operation Deliverance, the Canadian Joint Task Force Somalia from December 1992 to June 1993, was based on General-Purpose Combat and Specific to Mission Training.[102] Specific Guidance was issued to the Canadian Airborne Regiment from both Land Forces Command regarding Specific to Mission Training and from the Commander Special Service Force, Brigadier-General Beno, in two comprehensive training directives.[103] In fact, a military Board of Inquiry conducted at the end of the operation recommended that the practice of supplementing General-purpose Combat training with specific [to Mission] training to support the special requirements of each mission be continued.[104] Nevertheless, the federal government's Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of CF to Somalia made a number of observations regarding the state of peacekeeping training.

> To our surprise, we found that in 1992, there was no formalized or standardized training system for peace operations, despite almost 40 years of intensive Canadian participation in international peace operations. No comprehensive training policy, based on changing requirements, had been developed, and there was an absence of doctrine, standards, and performance evaluation mechanisms respecting the training of units deploying on peace operations. This situation existed even though

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[100] S. Cumner, "The Challenges Faced by the Military Adapting to Peacekeeping Missions," Peacekeeping *and International Relations* (January/February 1998), 13.

[101] Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-000/FP-000 *Canada's Army – We Stand on Guard for Thee* (Ottawa: 1 April 1998), 73.

[102] Colonel V.W. Kennedy, *After Action Report – Operation Deliverance* (Special Service Force, Petawawa: file 3350-52-19 (COS)), 4 November 1993, E-2-7.

[103] *Ibid*.

[104] *Ibid*.

> deficiencies in training policy, direction, and management had been clearly identified in internal CF reviews and staff papers well before 1992.[105]

The commission also commented on the nature of the traditional approach to peacekeeping training.

> In preparing its forces for peace support mission, the CF relied almost exclusively on general-purpose combat training, supplemented by mission specific training during the pre-deployment phase. This traditional approach to training was not adequate to provide military personnel with either a full range of skills or the appropriate orientation necessary to meet the diverse and complex challenges presented in post-Cold War peace support missions. There was a failure to incorporate the required generic peacekeeping training, both in the individual training system and in the regular operational training schedule… [T]he CAR [Canadian Airborne Regiment]received little or no ongoing generic peacekeeping training to prepare it for UN [United Nations] operations, despite having been designated for many years as the UN standby unit. This typified the traditional DND/CF [Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces] dictum that general-purpose combat training provides not only the best, but also a sufficient basis for preparing for peacekeeping missions.[106]

Finally, the commission also commented on the Canadian Airborne Regiment's ability to design a training plan for the operation.

> The absence of CF [Canadian Forces] peacekeeping training doctrine, together with a lack of guidelines for the development of training plans for UN [United Nations] deployments or a standard package of precedents and lessons learned from previous missions, placed an undue burden on the CAR's [Canadian Airborne Regiment's] junior staff in the initial stages of designing a training plan…

With respect to training, the Commission of Inquiry subsequently commissioned the Human Rights Research and Education Centre at the University of Ottawa to produce a study and recommendations on non-traditional military training for Canadian military preparations for peacekeeping operations. In its report, this highly focused study made sixty training

[105] Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonest Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*, Executive Summary (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), ES-26.

[106] *Ibid*., ES-26-27.

related recommendations to the Commission of Inquiry.[107] In turn, the Commission of Inquiry made forty-seven findings and twenty-one recommendations regarding the state of training that encompassed the entire CF. Summaries of the commission's findings and the recommendations from the non-traditional training study relevant to this paper are respectively at Annexes C and D.

The Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of CF to Somalia had a profound effect on the nature of military training in Canada. However, even before the Commission of Inquiry had completed its final report in 1997, the CF was already reforming the process to train for second-generation peacekeeping operations. In recognition that the nature of peacekeeping was changing, on 29 December 1993, Vice-Admiral Murray issued specific direction on the training requirement for peacekeeping operations.[108] This directive provided specific direction to all levels of the CF, strategic through tactical, on the development and execution of training for peacekeeping operations.[109] Moreover, it provided a framework for training, recognizing the different requirements between first and second generation peacekeeping. Specifically, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff's directive outlined two different training regimes, one for United Nations Military Observers, staff officers and small units, and a second for formed unit pre-deployment training.[110]

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[107] Paul LaRose-Edwards, Jack Dangerfield and Randy Weekes, Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers: A Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Ministry of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), xxxiii.

[108] Vice-Admiral L.E. Murray, *Training Requirements for Peacekeeping Operations*. National Defence Headquarters (Ottawa: file 4500-1 (DCDS)), 29 December 1993.

[109] *Ibid*., A-1

[110] Vice-Admiral L.E. Murray, *Training Requirements for Peacekeeping Operations*. National Defence Headquarters (Ottawa: file 4500-1 (DCDS)), 29 December 1993. A1 and A2.

Formed unit pre-deployment training in the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff's directive consisted of basic guidelines on the sequence and conduct of training. It was comprised of a twelve week or ninety day training period that encompassed both individual and collective training, by recognized groups within the unit, of both General-purpose Combat and Mission Specific Peacekeeping Training elements.[111] Although Vice-admiral Murray's directive is general in nature, it follows very closely the concept of Brigadier-General Beno's Model for Training Progression –Specific to Mission Training included at Annex B.[112] As such; Vice-Admiral Murray's direction is the first formal recognition of a structured, progressive approach to peacekeeping training in the CF. This structure represents a change in methodology to peacekeeping training now known as peace support training.

In 1995, Lieutenant-General Ray instituted a study on peacekeeping that was aimed at evaluating the peace support training requirements in addition to normal combat and occupational training.[113] This study would also identify the training requirements that could be best met by the newly formed Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. This Centre was established as a private venture mandated to provide research and education on peacekeeping while

[111] *Ibid*.

[112] Although Brigadier-General Beno published his pamphlet in 1999 after Vice-Admiral Murray's document, the concept for his pamphlet was developed in 1976 from his paper "Training To Be Sound Soldiers and Good Gunners". Notably the author of this paper was the Instructor-In-Gunnery that invited Brigadier-General Beno to the Artillery School to critique unit level training plans developed by student Instructor's-In-Gunnery attending the school. It was this occasion that caused him to put together his pamphlet. General Beno's 1976 paper and his 1999 training pamphlet continue to be used as the basis unit level training plan development at the Royal Canadian Artillery School.

Brigadier-General Ernest B. Beno, *Training to fight and Win: Training in the Canadian Army* (Kingston: E.B. Beno, 1999), ix.

[113] Lieutenant-General A. Roy, *DCDS Study Directive: Peacekeeping Training and the Canadian Forces*, National Defence Headquarters (Ottawa: file 4500-1 (DCDS)), 14 September 1995.

serving as a uniquely Canadian point of contact for peacekeeping information.[114] In September 1995, a Training Development Services Project on peacekeeping was initiated to further scope the peacekeeping requirements for the CF.[115] In July 1996; the Peace Support Training Centre was established to provide specific peace support training to the CF. Specifically, the centre is responsible for the development of peace support techniques, training methodology, training standards, and the provision of training and training support.[116] The centre provides individual training for members deploying on operations and assistance to units and formed contingents with the execution of their training.

Similar to the Peace Support Training Centre, reforms to the Army's training system continued with the opening of the Army Lessons Learned Centre on 1 September 1995. This centre became an integral part of every facet of army operations from training, organization, equipment, doctrine and the actual conduct of operations.[117] The army lessons learned process consists of: the collection of information, its analysis in conjunction with Land Forces Command and National Defence Headquarters Staffs, an action plan and the dissemination of information through two publications: the Bulletin and Dispatches.[118] The Army Lessons Learned Centre was the first institution of this nature in the CF.

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[114] *Ibid*.

[115] Colonel P.J. Holt, *Training Development Services Programme: Peacekeeping training in the Canadian Forces*, National Defence Headquarters (Ottawa: file 4979-8 (DMTE 5-2)), 18 September 1995.

[116] Peace Support Training Centre, "Mission Statement," http://armyapp.dnd.ca/pstc-cfsp/main.asp; Internet; accessed 1 April 2007.

[117] *The Bulletin*, Volume 1, Number 1 http://armyonline.kingston.mil.ca/LFDTS ; Internet; accessed 1April 2007, 1.

[118] Army Lessons Learned Centre, http://armyonline.kingston.mil.ca/LFDTS/143000440000999/Default.asp; Internet; accessed 17 April 2007.

From an organizational perspective, opening the Army Lessons Learned and the Peace Support Training Centres, along with other already established training institutions such as the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College necessitated the establishment of the Land Forces Doctrine and Training System. This formation level headquarters is responsible for all individual, collective and professional development training for the Army. This training function had formerly been the responsibility of the Headquarters 1 Canadian Division.[119] On 30 August 2001, the newly formed Land Forces Doctrine and Training System released its capstone publication B-GL-300-008/FT-001 Training Canada's Army. This publication superseded B-GL-304-001/PT-001 Training for War, and represents a completely new approach to training in the Army. Major-General Arp surmised the army's training focus in the early 1990's as:

> … [N]arrowed steadily toward current operations. Skills at brigade and combined arms battle group level have eroded, and collective training as a whole has centred around pre-deployment training events. There have been no commonly applied standards, and few training events have caused the Army to reconsider or change its doctrine. The Army has failed to make maximum use of training to facilitate learning. At the same time, our individual training system – while delivering excellent training- has become very inefficient and unsustainable.[120]

He also established how this capstone manual would address these deficiencies:

> Training Canada's Army attempts to correct these imbalances and provides direction regarding the evolving individual and collective training systems. It seeks to identify the exact role of the Army training in force generation and operational readiness. It describes the manner in which the Army training in force generation and operational readiness. It describes the manner in which the Army will manage readiness through balanced apportionment of tasks and resources. It also articulates how the Army will facilitate both training for current operations and training for war.[121]

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[119] Department of National Defence, *1st Canadian Division Five Year Training Directive* (1st Canadian Division, Kingston: file 4980-1 (Comd)), January 1996.

[120] Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-008/FP-001 Training *Canada's Army* (Ottawa, 30 August 2001), iii.

[121] *Ibid*.

The doctrine within this publication uses a new methodology towards training along two central themes called the Army Systems Approach to Training (ASAT).[122] The first theme is based on the premise that training and command are inextricably connected, as Commanders are duty bound to train their personnel to successfully execute the tasks they have been given. The second theme reinforces the requirement to train as a system, integrating professional development, individual and collective training and employ experience to meet operational requirements. The ASAT provides direction on training to ensure resources are not squandered and that there is consistency of purpose from the strategic to the tactical level. The main difference between this publication and Training For War is that Training Canada's Army is exclusively focused on the way to train. A direct comparison of the principles of training between both manuals in table 3 show the complete change in focus within the Army to the conduct of training.

Table 1 - Comparison of the Principles of Training

Training for War	Training Canada's Army
Good organization	Training is command driven
Realism and intent	Train within the law
Simplicity	Train to one standard
Availability of equipment and training aids	Train safely
Flexibility and challenge	Train progressively
Realistic umpiring	Train to need
Practical field training	Resources must follow tasks
Economy	Training must facilitate learning
Tactical Exercises Without Troops	Training must be confirmed
Use of training aids	

Sources:

Department of National Defence, B-GL-304-001/PT-001 *Training for War* (Ottawa, 1992), 2-3-1.

Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-008/FP-001 Training *Canada's Army* (Ottawa, 30 August 2001), 4.

Peacekeeping doctrine also changed in the 1990s to reflect second generation peacekeeping. On 15 September, 1995, B-GL-301/003/FP-001 Peacekeeping Operations was

[122] *Ibid*., 1.

released updating a previous version dated June, 1992. It recognized the spectrum of conflict and continuum of operations synonymous with second generation peacekeeping by distinguishing between war fighting and Operations Other Than War.[123] Chapter eleven, training, has not been updated from the 1992 draft and does not reflect any changes in the approach to training despite the numerous investigations and inquiries emerging after Operation Deliverance. This publication remains the Army's most current official publication on peacekeeping used for the preparation, training, mounting, and conduct of peacekeeping operations.[124]

CF Joint Doctrine on peace support operations was released on 6 November, 2002. B-GJ-005-307/FP-030 Peace Support Operations was prepared specifically in response to the Somalia Inquiry and is particularly aimed the multi-disciplinary requirements of second-generation peacekeeping.[125] This publication takes a unique approach to peace support operations, as it does not categorize them into generations of peacekeeping, but as traditional and complex operations.[126] It further elaborates on peace support operations removing them from the continuum of operations contrary to B-GL-301/003/FP-001 Peacekeeping Operations, but it does state that their tasks are on this continuum.[127] Despite a lack of detail

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[123] Department of National Defence, B-GL-301-303/FP-001 Peacekeeping *Operations* (Ottawa, 15 September 1995), 1-1-2.

[124] A search of the LFDTS Electronic Library revealed that this publication is the most current volume to date.

Army Electronic Library – Publications Search, http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ael/database_base_de_donnees.asp; Internet; accessed 1 April 2007.

[125] Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FP-030 Peace *Support Operations* (Ottawa, 6 November 2002), i.

[126] *Ibid*.

[127] *Ibid*.

concerning the Peace Support training, this publication does outline the training responsibilities of the environmental commanders as force generators.[128]

To summarize this outline of the second generation of peacekeeping, Operation Deliverance and the other numerous inquiries and studies that occurred afterwards, had a profound effect on the nature of training within the Army as well as the CF as a whole. The establishment of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, the Army Lessons Learned Centre, the Peace Support Training Centre, and the Land Forces Doctrine and Training System have all served to refocus the CF at all levels to better support operations. A good example of an operation that was conducted throughout this period of change was Operation Palladium, the deployment of a peace enforcement contingent to the former Yugoslavia.

Operation Palladium was a NATO led peace enforcement initiative in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1997 until 2004. Including the two UN operations in the theatre of operations prior to NATO's involvement, more than 40,000 Canadians have served in this country.[129] Also during this same period, fourteen Battle Group rotations, each approximately six months in duration, deployed into the Canadian area of operations in Multinational Division Southwest.

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[128] *Ibid*., 9-1.

[129] Department of National Defence, *Backgrounder: Canadian Operation in Bosnia – Herzegovina*, available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=992 Internet; accessed 5 April 2007.

Operation Palladium was a classical second-generation peacekeeping operation. This assertion is based on the criteria expressed earlier in this paper, as Operation Palladium's second generation peacekeeping qualities were:[130]

1. Bosnian – Serb, Croat and Muslim factions were involved in the conflict and were split into the Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2. The nature of the violence was ethnically related along religious and cultural grounds. Genocide and ethnic cleansing were elements of the conflict.
3. The war zone comprised of the break up of the former Yugoslavia into smaller culturally based nations.
4. Belligerent factions established sanctuaries in neighbouring states. For example, many Bosnian Croats lived and got support from Croatia further to the west, and Serbs from the Republic of Srpska did the same from Serbia further to the east.
5. The operational environment was dynamic as the zone of separation between the two factions was irregular. There were also many cultural enclaves throughout Bosnia – Herzegovina.
6. Multilateral responses totalling thirty-six nations have contributed troops to the mission.[131] Billions of dollars for foreign aid from governmental and non-governmental organizations were given to Bosnia – Herzegovina.
7. There was a humanitarian component to the mission as many people were classified as Displaced Persons, Refugees or Evacuees (DPREs).

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[130] See footnote 64.

S. Cumner, "The Challenges Faced by the Military Adapting to Peacekeeping Missions," Peacekeeping *and International Relations* (January/February 1998), 13.

[131] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Stabilization Force*, available from http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/sfororg.htm Internet; accessed 6 April 2007.

With respect to training, Operation Palladium also represents a unique period of time in Canadian military history between the Somalia Inquiry and the operational pause in army transformation. During this time, training became more focused, as senior staff took action and carried out many of the recommendations from both the Somalia Inquiry and the Non-Traditional Training Study commissioned for the inquiry. Concurrently, as the army training system was changing, the mission and the individual soldiers with increasing numbers of tours under their belts also matured throughout the fourteen Battle Groups that deployed.

By the time 1 CMBG received their guidance to mount rotation twelve of the operation, the 2 PPCLI Battle Group, had very detailed training guidance concerning how they would plan, conduct and execute training. Guidance promulgated by Headquarters Land Forces Western Area to mount rotation twelve included the following:[132]

1. General-purpose Combat Training
    a. Minimum Level Of Capability (MLOC) 5 standards; and
    b. MLOC 6 in a Brigade context.

2. Mission Specific Training.
    a. Rules Of Engagement (ROE);
    b. Low Level Radiation;
    c. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS);
    d. Civil Military Affairs (CIMIC);
    e. Crowd Confrontation Training;
    f. Pepper Spray Training;
    g. Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Warfare Training; and
    h. Mine Awareness Training.

3. Theatre Specific Training.
    a. Contractor Support Project;

[132] OOTW Training direction was to be included in Annex B to the document, but was missing.

Brigadier-General J.I. Fenton, *Land Forces Western Area Mounting Guidance – Operation Palladium Rotation 12* (Land Force Western Area Headquarters: file 300-2/12 (Comd)), 15 November 2002, 5.

b. Canadian Forces Personal Support Agency;
c. Canadian International Development Agency; and
d. Media Awareness Training.

4. Operations Other Than War Training.

Within the context of this training, the 2 PPCLI Battle Group had support from the Peace Support Training Centre.[133] They also had assistance from training assistance teams who were currently deployed on rotation eleven, assist with the collective training exercises.[134]

Over the course of the operation, the Army Lessons Learned Centre provided a significant amount of support capturing information and producing lessons learned in three formats; a journal named Dispatches, a newsletter named The Bulletin and lessons learned posters. Volume 4, issue number 1 of Dispatches consisted of an entire volume of lessons learned in the former Yugoslavia. One particular section of this pamphlet concerned training deficiencies in individual training. It was reported that the common denominator in these deficiencies was the scarcity of expertise and resources as well as the lack of intensity, practicality and realism in the related training.[135] The training deficiencies were: combat first aid, small arms instructor training, mine awareness training, CIMIC, the conduct of meetings and negotiations, conflict resolution, foreign weapons familiarization, intelligence briefings (political, cultural and economic background, NBCW, EW, forces within the AOR,

[133] Brigadier-General J.I. Fenton, *Land Forces Western Area Mounting Guidance – Operation Palladium Rotation 12* (Land Force Western Area Headquarters: file 300-2/12 (Comd)), 15 November 2002, 6.

[134] *Ibid*., 8.

[135] Department of National Defence, Dispatches – *Operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia*, Volume 4, no.1. [Journal on-line]; available from http://armyonline.kingston.mil.ca/LFDTS/143000440000999/Default.asp; Internet; accessed 5 April 2007.

personalities), observation post, checkpoint and bunker construction, and local languages.[136] This volume of Dispatches was produced just prior to the NATO Stabilization Force mission. When compared to the specific training direction provided by headquarters LFWA for Operation Palladium rotation twelve, many of these topics were identified as areas for specific training, thus demonstrating that the lessons learned process was having a positive effect on training.

Second generation peace support training at the closeout of Operation Palladium had taken into account most of the relevant training recommendations for the non-traditional training study conducted for the Somalia Inquiry. Annex C, contains a detailed account of each of the recommendations from the perspective of Operation Palladium rotation twelve. Of the twenty recommendations made in the non-traditional study, eleven were addressed in the mounting guidance, six were not applicable, two were unknown and one had not been addressed. The two unknown points, recommendation 20 and 21, involve the necessity to incorporate peace support training as a part of both normal unit training, and individual training conducted at schools and area training establishments. At the end of rotation eight in 2001, this had not occurred.[137] Despite these recommendations, a comparison between the training observations made by Brigadier-General Devlin in 1994 and the situation in 2001 show that although formal peace support training has made a number of gains, there are still a number of shortfalls. They are:

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[136] Department of National Defence, Dispatches – *Operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia*, Volume 4, no.1. [Journal on-line]; available from http://armyonline.kingston.mil.ca/LFDTS/143000440000999/Default.asp; Internet; accessed 5 April 2007, 12.

[137] Personal experience. I deployed on Operation Palladium rotation 8, as the Light Gun Battery Battery Commander for the 3 RCR Battle Group. Prior to mounting for the operation, peacekeeping training was not a specifically incorporated into the Battery or the 3 RCR Battalion training plans. Upon completion of the rotation, I became the Chief Instructor-In-Gunnery of the Royal Canadian Artillery School, and as of August 2003, peacekeeping training had not been adopted into any of the course packages within the school..

1. The collective training skills associated with peace support operations have not been institutionalized beyond the development of tactics, techniques and procedures. These skills were captured in the form of vignettes that were passed on from rotation to rotation and from brigade to brigade.

2. Standardization of the collective peace support raining skills did not exist. In rotation 12 for example, Minimum Level Of Capability 5 and 6 Battle Task Standards were directed for individual and collective General-Purpose Combat Training but there were no standards stated for collective peace support operations training. Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) is the Centre of Excellence for individual peace support training. The scope of the individual skills taught at PSTC differs from some of the individual and collective training skills that are being taught at the units. PSTC training supplements the training being conducted within formed units.

3. More attention has been made to differentiate between training for war and peace support training. Specific Rules Of Engagement training is being conducted, but only during pre-deployment training. Units were not conducting regular peace support training as a part of their normal training plans.

4. Training for Army, Navy and Air Force personnel, on an individual basis is being conducted by PSTC

5. The reservist is more adequately trained for deployment than in 1994, as they conduct all of the same pre-deployment training as the regular force. Reservists arrive at units prior to MLOC training.

6. Peace support collective training did not directly integrate military personnel with other government or non-government agencies.

7. PSTC and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre are the two centres of excellence for peacekeeping training.

In summary, peace support training since Operation Deliverance has changed dramatically. General-purpose combat training remains a key component of pre-deployment training but OOTW and mission specific training now play a significant role in mounting a Battle Group for operations. Training for operations is now command driven with detailed guidance being promulgated through the entire chain of command. Training establishments such as the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, the Peace Support Training Centre and the Army Lessons Learned Centre were all created to improve the standard of peace support training. As a result, it is clear that the standard of training and the degree of success that the CF has had since Operation Deliverance has increased significantly. At the same time, it is also clear that not all of the training recommendations made through the Somalia Inquiry have been accomplished as peace support training has yet to be fully engrained into military culture. Peace support training was still only conducted in preparation for deployment on operations and gaps in training existed between the individual and collective training systems. Nevertheless, the operational tempo, a resource constrained environment, and the revolution

in military affairs at the end of the twentieth century would necessitate further changes that would take the Army into transformation.

ARMY TRANSFORMATION: THE INTERIM ARMY

The period of 1992-2002 marked a decade of challenges for the army. The Cold War had ended, and the forces in Europe were redeployed to Canada to face an era of frequent, complex and demanding deployments in support of domestic and peace support operations. The Army faced severe restructuring, budgetary constraints, a Force Reduction Program, the Military Command and Control Reengineering Team, a doctrinal review, the outsourcing of support services, and the Somalia Inquiry. Yet at the same time it was deployed on thirty-nine expeditionary operations[138] as well as a number of domestic operations such as the Manitoba floods, the Ice Storm, and the Swiss Air disaster. As an institution, the army has had to deal with personnel and resource reductions, organizational re-engineering and cultural upheaval.[139] As the Commander of the Army, Lieutenant-General Jeffery put it; "We have too much army for our budget and too little budget for our tasks."[140] Therefore, in order to better the manage the pressures on the Army as an institution and prepare for more

[138] Army Lessons Learned Centre, http://armyonline.kingston.mil.ca/LFDTS/143000440000999/Default.asp; Internet; accessed 17 April 2007.

[139] Department of National Defence, *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy*, (Kingston, May 2002) available from http://www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/resourcestrat.asp; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007, 3.

[140] Lieutenant-General M.K. Jeffery, "Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy," Presentation, Land Staff – National Defence Headquarters, (Ottawa, October 30 2002), available from http://www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/strathome.asp; Internet; accessed 21 March 2007.

uncertainty in the future, Lieutenant-General Jeffery embarked on a forward looking strategy to reshape the Army towards the departmental long-term goal- Strategy 2020.[141]

Similar to Winton's Military Change Model expressed earlier in this paper, the Army Strategy also used three conceptual steps to implement change. Winton's three steps were: the appreciation of the battlespace, the development of doctrine and the implementation of change through training and other means.[142] The three steps to the Army Strategy were: a review of the strategic environment, strategic objectives along key thrust lines over time and the implementation linking the 'ends' to the 'means.' By comparing the two change systems, the Army Strategy vs. Winton's Military Change Model, it is not intended to begin a debate over the systemic methodology of change, but to reinforce the complexity of military change. Specifically, through out the duration of the Army Strategy, the cycle of change will occur three times: the Interim Army, the Army of Tomorrow and the Army of the Future.

Expressed in other terms, there are three cycles of Winton's Military Change Model within the Army Strategy reinforcing Winton's position that military change is an extremely complex affair.[143] These changes are intended to take place over a twenty-year period of time, as it must be accomplished with no additional resources.[144] Figure 2 below is a

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[141] Department of National Defence, *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy*, (Kingston, May 2002) available from http://www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/resourcestrat.asp; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007, 3.

[142] Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets, eds. *The Challenge of Change* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), xii.

[143] Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets, eds. *The Challenge of Change* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), xii.

[144] Level one business plans will show that the army has not been earmarked additional funding for transformation.

schematic representation of the timelines for Army Transformation linking each phase of transformation with the concurrent planning for the next phase in development.



Figure 2 - Army Transformation – Phases and Planning Timelines

Source: Timelines are based on planning horizons found at:

Department of National Defence, The *Army of Tomorrow – Assessing Concepts and Capabilities for Land Operations Evolution* (Kingston: DND Canada, 2006) available from http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/dlsc-dcsot/main.asp; accessed 13 April 2007, 12.

This chapter of the paper will focus on the Interim Army and the series of changes to the collective training system that will take the army into the Army of Tomorrow. In order to accomplish this, it is first necessary to briefly explain the concept of the Interim Army and how these changes came to the forefront.

The Interim Army

Within army transformation, the first target was to transform from the Army of Toady to the Interim Army. Essentially, the Interim Army is a useful starting point for a capability gap analysis, which in turn can influence the longer-term plan for the Army of

Tomorrow.[145] In other words, the Interim Army is a strategic re-alignment aimed at creating the conditions to build the Army of Tomorrow. To General Hillier, shortly after he succeeded Lieutenant-General Jeffery as the Army Commander, transformation:

> …[S]ets out how we will build sustainable combat forces by bringing in new capabilities, updating some legacy capabilities and using others "as is," while merging them all as a "system of systems" to give a value greater than the sum of the individual parts. Transformation is our means of implementing our strategy, and soldiers will see concrete evidence that we are moving forward-with real, state-of-the-art kit and real, positive change.[146]

The backbone to build the Interim Army consists of three key components: the Strategic Operations Resource Direction (SORD), the Managed Readiness Plan, and Whole Fleet Management. The SORD is the army's authoritative reference for all of its strategic plans. It is the key document that links the 'ends', 'ways' and 'means' to achieving transformation. The SORD contains the Army Commander's specific direction such as his vision, mission, intent and tasks to his subordinate commanders that are expressed in the form of a campaign plan with five-year objectives. Two key components to develop the Interim Army that are contained in the SORD are the Managed Readiness System and Whole Fleet Management.

The Managed Readiness System is an Infantry-centric cyclical approach to training and force generation within the Army. It matches resources in priority to forces designated for high readiness in order that they can train for full spectrum operations in the *Contemporary Operating Environment*. A schematic diagram of the Managed Readiness System is enclosed with this paper at Annex E. It is a three-tiered model comprised of

[145] Department of National Defence, *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy*, (Kingston, May 2002), available from http://www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/resourcestrat.asp; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007, 8.

[146] General R.J. Hillier, 1950-9 (CT) *CDS Planning Guidance – CF Transformation* (Ottawa: DND Canada, October 2005), 3.

support, high readiness training and high readiness superimposed on a framework of a six-phase training plan. All army units follow this cyclical system and are allocated training resources pertaining to their position in the cycle. For example, units in the support tier are recovering from operations, regenerated and are a source of support to provide assistance to other units conducting high readiness training. Specific resources allocated from the SORD direct these units to train to a lower standard of readiness such as MLOC-3. Units in the high readiness tier receive a high priority of resources as they are training to a level to become declared operationally ready to deploy. These units also receive a higher priority resources detailed in the SORD in order that they can train to the standard for their operational task. Should the unit not have an operational task, they will be prioritized resources to achieve a common army training standard. Finally, units in high readiness are either deployed or allocated resources to conduct continuation training to maintain their state of high readiness.

The Managed Readiness System Plan in Annex F is the schematic model for all of the Battalion Groups and Brigade Headquarters within the Army. This schematic is a ready reference displaying the level of readiness for each Battalion Group and Brigade Headquarters for the next five years. Forecasting the readiness of units in this manner is important for two reasons. Firstly, it allows advanced warning for soldiers and their families of upcoming operational deployments and periods of intense training where they will be away from home. This plan is a significant change from past practices where units could receive little advanced warning of an upcoming deployment, which was a factor in lowering the morale of the troops.[147] Secondly, resources follow tasks and in a resource constrained

[147] Human Relations (HR) strategies to fulfill recommendation from the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs are contained in the following publication. The Managed Readiness Plan reinforces these HR strategies.

environment resources must be prioritized and shared. The Managed Readiness System allocates those resources accordingly.

In order to develop the Managed Readiness System, the army did not have enough equipment or funding to maintain different fleets of equipment for operations, training and administration. In the past, units would initiate a new mission, move their equipment into the operational theatre and have to leave it there for the next rotation when their tour of duty was complete. Upon return to Canada, they would have to do without equipment until the mission was complete.[148] In addition, it costs $7 million dollars to move a brigade's worth of equipment across the country to train in Wainwright, an expense the army cannot afford to do several times a year.[149] The answer to these equipment and funding shortfalls is to "Whole Fleet Manage" the Army's equipment.

Whole Fleet Management is a resource management strategy employed to balance the Army's equipment amongst three priority fleets: operations, individual and collective training.[150] The first priority is to operations. Two fleets of equipment based on a Task Force[151] organization that will either be deployed or prepared for deployment. The second priority is a collective training fleet in Wainwright, Alberta. Units travelling to the Canadian

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Department of National Defence, *Military HR Strategy 2020- Facing the People Challenges of the Future;* available from www.forces.gc.ca/hr; Internet; accessed 18 April 2007, 9, 21, 25.

[148] General R.J. Hillier, 1950-9 (CT) CDS *Planning Guidance – CF Transformation* (Ottawa: DND Canada, October 2005), 4.

[149] *Ibid*.

[150] *Ibid*.

[151] A Task Force is new terminology for a combined arms team that has been task tailored for an operation. Its foundation is an Infantry Battalion, which additional combat support, and combat service support equipment is added to make up the Task Force.

Manoeuvre Training Centre will fall-in on pre-positioned equipment limiting the amount of resources moving across the country for each training event. Finally, the third priority is individual training. Equipment will be distributed on a ratio of one company of equipment per infantry battalion. The intent is to distribute the equipment within the brigade in conjunction with managed readiness direction. This equipment would also be used within each Land Force area for domestic operations, should the need arise.

The Collective Training System

Just as is accomplished with the SORD, the Managed Readiness System and Whole Fleet Management approach established the strategic framework required for the Interim Army, the training system continued to evolve as the framework for collective training had to be re-designed to fill institutional gaps that emerged in the 1990s. According the Directorate of Army Training, the focus on peace support operations has had a drastic effect on the Army's ability to generate multi-purpose combat capable forces.[152] Specifically, in the 1990s, units tasked for operational deployments received priority resources for training, and as a result, collective training was mission focused and limited in scope. As such, combined arms and brigade-level training has been limited to Command Post and Computer Assisted Exercises.[153] According to Major Walsh from the Directorate of Army Training:

> Canada's collective training system as a whole has grown stagnant. Standards are applied with varying degrees of rigour and no true system of confirmation and validation exists. Resources are often secured by surreptitious means, with the best intentions, but with a lack of corporate vision. The Canadian Army has not as an

[152] "Redefining Army Training," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* Volume 3 Number 1, (Spring 2000): 12.

[153] Major J. Walsh, "From the directorate of Army Training – Preparing for War: Revamping Collective Training in the Canadian Army," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* Volume 5, Number 2 (Summer 2002): 10.

> institution, exploited collective training events to examine and refine our tactics, doctrine, equipment needs and the manner in we prepare for war.[154]

The decline in the Army's war fighting ability resulted from a lack of collective training at in higher war fighting skills. For example, in order to meet Defence Planning Guidance, a minimum of 124 days of collective training are required at the brigade level, whereas units were averaging less than twenty-one days collective training when not committed to operations.[155] Furthermore, even when units have a priority of resources to train for operations, large portions of their 90 day pre-deployment training are used for Operations Other Than War and Theatre Mission Specific Training instead of war fighting.

After years of neglect resulting from a lack of resources, the challenge for the Land Forces Doctrine and Training System (LFDTS) was to restore the collective training system in time for the launch of the Interim Army.[156] The Commander LFDTS leveraged the creation of the CMTC, a new unit with state-of-the-art equipment to facilitate training, as the backbone to a new Collective Training Management Framework. This new framework encompasses governance, policies, processes and resource management for all collective training matters in the army.[157] It links the resources in the SORD, the units in the Managed Readiness Plan, and whole fleet managed equipment together with CMTC to create a new and focused collective training experience to prepare soldiers for operational deployments.

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[154] *Ibid*.

[155] "Redefining Army Training," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* Volume 3 Number 1, (Spring 2000): 12.

[156] Department of National Defence, *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy*, (Kingston, May 2002), available from http://www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/resourcestrat.asp; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007, 23-24.

[157] Department of National Defence, Canadian *Manoeuvre Training Centre – Master Implementation Plan*. (Ottawa: DND, April 2005), 3-1

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In essence, the Collective Training Management Framework provides an eighteen-month road-map for units preparing to deploy on operations.[158]

The 2005 Defence Policy Statement outlined the CF transformation goal of integrated operations made-up of maritime, land, air and special operations elements trained for combat and peace support operations.[159] The Chief of Land Staff's primary objective in the SORD 2007 is to deliver effective land forces in a sustainable manner for full spectrum operations at home and abroad.[160] Full spectrum operations are expressed in figure 3 as the CF vital ground. Soldiers trained for full spectrum operations are known as *multi-purpose combat capable forces*.[161] The nature of these forces is consistent with the training recommendation emerging from the Somalia Inquiry included at Annex D to this paper as they possess a mixture of General-purpose Combat and peace support skills.

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[158] Department of National Defence, Strategic *Operations Resource Directive 2007, Draft 2* (Ottawa: DND, 2007), 3-1-B-1-1.

[159] Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*. available from www.international.gc.ca; Internet; accessed 13 April 2007, 13.

[160] Department of National Defence, *Strategic Operations Resource Directive 2007, Draft 2* (Ottawa: DND, 2007), 1-1.

[161] Department of National Defence, *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy*, (Kingston, May 2002), available from http://www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/resourcestrat.asp; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007, 6.



Figure 3 – The Operational Environment
Source: Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-008/FP-001 Training *Canada's Army* (Ottawa, 30 August 2001), 14.

The Interim Army is mandated in the Defence Policy Statement to provide two Mission-Specific Task Forces of approximately 1,200 soldiers each. In addition, the Army must be capable of providing a Brigade Headquarters capable of commanding a multinational formation as a part of a larger Canadian international effort.[162] The Chief of Land Staff's intent for collective training is to develop and enhance full spectrum operations as they are found in the c*ontemporary Operating Environment*, creating a sustainable JIMP integrated combat ready team.[163] Therefore, all units conducting collective training must be capable of operating in a combat and/or peace support role and be able to work in a JIMP environment.

Operational readiness must be measurable and according to the principles of training, it must also be progressive. Therefore, the collective training in the Army is seen as a series

[162] Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*. available from www.international.gc.ca; Internet; accessed 13 April 2007, 31.

[163] JIMP - Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and Public is defined at footnote 1.

Department of National Defence, *Strategic Operations Resource Directive 2007, Draft 2* (Ottawa: DND, 2007), 3-1-3.

of progressive, measurable levels. Figure 4 shows seven levels of training, of which collective training is conducted from levels 2-7. Level 5, 6 and 7 are the most complex levels of collective training established by the Army and involve larger numbers of troops from more than one unit, more resources (equipment and funding) and more terrain to exercise over. Based on the SORD, the Managed Readiness Plan and Whole Fleet Management, collective training from levels 5 through 7 will be conducted at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre where all of the resources will be centrally located to optimize opportunities as well as obtain the best results.



Figure 4 – Levels of Training
Source: Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-008/FP-001 Training *Canada's Army* (Ottawa, 30 August 2001), 19.

The Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre

The Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre is a collective training unit subordinate to the Commander Land Forces Doctrine and Training System. It is the cornerstone training institution that will provide world-class, simulated, force-on-force collective training and is considered essential for the Army Strategy.[164] In particular, CMTC will prepare task forces

[164] Department of National Defence, *Strategic Operations Resource Directive 2007, Draft 2* (Ottawa: DND, 2007), 3-1-D-1.

to operate, fight and win across the full spectrum of operations, and within an increasingly complex battle space where asymmetric threats both dominate and alter the global security environment.[165] CMTC opened its doors as a unit on 19 October, 2005 but did not begin to support collective training until the following year on 18 April, 2006.[166] CMTC is equipped with a unique training enabler, which is revolutionizing the way soldiers are prepared to deploy on operations. Weapons Effects Simulation (WES) is a laser based system using radio frequency communications and the Global Positioning System (GPS) to permit live, force-on-force combat training up to the formation level. CMTC includes facilities to electronically collect, analyse and develop WES information to facilitate learning through the after action review process.

CMTC holds two types of WES systems: direct fire and area WES. Direct fire WES replicates the fire of all direct line of sight engagement weapons systems on the battlefield. Area WES is a system that electronically generates area weapons effects such as: artillery, mines, fighter ground attack and weapons of mass destruction from the exercise control facility to the player units specifically effected in the field.[167] WES is a key enabler for higher level collective training as it optimizes the learning environment – something that could not be accomplished with more traditional exercises using umpires in the past.

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[165] *Ibid*.

[166] Department of National Defence, *Sophisticated Training Facility Opened At Wainwright*, available from http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/1f/English/6_1_1.asp?id=906; Internet; accessed 11 March 2007.

Department of National Defence. *Open for Business*, available from http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/1f/English/6_1_1.asp?id=1039; Internet, accessed 11 March 2007, 1.

[167] Major S. Demato, "Weapons Effects Simulation – DCS Briefing," Presentation, Army Collective Training Authority – Wainwright, Alberta, 25 February 2005.

CMTC conducts five training exercises per year; four Regular and one Reserve Force. The Regular Force serials consist of a thirty-seven day rotation designed to practice and confirm level 5 and 6 collective training. One of the four serials will also be used to confirm level 7 formation collective training. The Reserve training serial is conducted over a twelve day period in the summer, and will practice up to level 5 collective training.

There are seven pillars to collective training at CMTC. They are:

1. Mission Characteristics. Each unit training at CMTC will train to a scenario characteristic of the operational mission they are tasked with. For units attending CMTC without an operational task, they will train to a common army training scenario involving full spectrum operations in the C*ontemporary Operating Environment*.
2. Contemporary Operating Environment. CMTC replicates the *Contemporary Operating Environment* with a number of complex terrain training facilities especially built for unit collective training.
3. Combined Arms Live Fire. Regular force training serials conduct level 5 live fire training prior to using WES. CF Base Wainwright has a vast training area which can support field firing exercises that can not be conducted at many other bases in Canada. The conduct of live fire training prior to using the WES system will also help to reduce the potential for blue-on-blue casualties in a simulated environment.
4. Combined Arms Force-On-Force. WES equipment enables real, unrestricted force-on-force training that provides instantaneous feedback to the players when they have been wounded or killed. Information is recorded by the system,

processed and played back in a simulated environment as a learning tool to support the after action review process.

5. Operational Environment Forces. CMTC uses a live, thinking opposing force to replicate a variety of threats. They include: contemporary threats, conventional threats, irregular militias, terrorists, insurgents, organized crime, host nation security forces, local civilians, local leaders, and international organizations. CMTC also incorporates two types of civilians on the battlefields in speaking and non-speaking roles. Non-speaking role players are similar to extras on a movie set.

6. Weapons Effects Simulation. See above.

7. Observer Controller Trainers. Observe controller trainers primarily observe the training audience and conduct after action reviews to facilitate training. CMTC has just leveraged soldiers returning from operations as observer controller trainers in order to maximize their experience to teach, coach and mentor the soldiers that are about to deploy.[168]

In order to ensure that CMTC would be operational for the stand-up of the Interim Army, the development of the institution would be phased over two periods – Initial Operating Capability (IOC) by April 2006, and Full Operating Capability (FOC) sometime in the future. Capabilities that would be excluded from the initial operating capability that were drafted into the 2004 Master Implementation Plan were: operations in a digital environment, medical training above role one, combat service support training above the unit level, level 7

[168] Colonel C.R. King, "Exercise Maple Guardian Briefing" Presentation, 1 CMBG, Edmonton, February 2007.

formation collective training, urban operations, and instrumented aviation and air operations.[169]

Post exercise reports from the Commander CMTC reveal that the training that has been conducted at CMTC has been beneficial for both the training audience and the cadre at CMTC.[170] Despite minor technical issues, the System Acceptance Test for the WES system was a success and it has proven its utility supporting instrumented after action reviews.[171] The necessity to confirm the operational readiness of the National Command Element (NCE), the National Support Element (NSE)and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) have caused CMTC to plan and execute training for these elements despite not being formally resourced to support their participation as these were all FOC deliverables.[172]

The SORD, the Managed Readiness Plan, and Whole Fleet Management are three key pillars to the Interim Army. The establishment of CMTC is the capstone piece of the model that rests on these three pillars. With respect to training doctrine, the second component of Winton's Military Change Model, there are three factors that are effecting change. They are the emergence of a gap between the individual and collective training

[169] Department of National Defence, Canadian *Manoeuvre Training Centre – Master Implementation Plan*. (Ottawa: DND, April 2005), 1-4.

[170] Colonel C.R. King, *Maple Guardian 0603 – Commander CMTC Post Exercise Report* (CFB Wainwright, Alberta: file 4500-3(Comd)), 10 October 2006.

Colonel C.R. King, *Maple Guardian 0604 – Commander CMTC Post Exercise Report* (CFB Wainwright, Alberta: file 4500-3(Comd)), 20 November 2006.

[171] *Ibid*.

[172] Colonel C.R. King, *Maple Guardian 0603 – Commander CMTC Post Exercise Report* (CFB Wainwright, Alberta: file 4500-3(Comd)), 10 October 2006.

Colonel C.R. King, *Maple Guardian 0604 – Commander CMTC Post Exercise Report* (CFB Wainwright, Alberta: file 4500-3(Comd)), 20 November 2006.

systems within the Army, the context of training for JIMP enabled operations and the effects of concurrent transformation for both the Army and the CF.

First, the Chief of Land Staff's training direction in SORD 07 reveals that gaps exist between individual and collective training skill sets for full spectrum operations.[173] The Army Training Working Group was tasked to conduct a gap analysis to ensure that all soldiers are deploying on operations with the proper training. In the past these individual soldier skills were usually picked up during unit collective training. With the emergence of new collective training doctrine in the collective training management framework, gaps could emerge between the two systems.

As such, it is the CLSs intent to ensure that all soldiers, regardless of their affiliation or service, have the necessary core skills to react in the appropriate manner when faced with adversity.[174] According to Lieutenant-Colonel Matheson, the Director of the Army Lessons Learned Centre, lessons learned sent from an operational theatre can be rapidly developed into tactics, techniques, and procedures and incorporated into collective training exercises at CMTC in approximately one week.[175] The core aspect of this problem concerns how these lessons learned being institutionally captured into both the individual and collective training systems. What standards, doctrine and tactics techniques and procedures are associated with each of the lessons learned and how are they being disseminated across the Canadian Forces in order that all individuals and units can receive the required training?

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[173] Department of National Defence, *Strategic Operations Resource Directive 2007, Draft 2* (Ottawa: DND, 2007), 3-1-5.

[174] Department of National Defence, *Strategic Operations Resource Directive 2007, Draft 2* (Ottawa: DND, 2007), 3-1-5.

[175] Lieutenant-Colonel Matheson, Director of the Army Lessons Learned Centre, conversation with the author, 17 April 2007.

A second example of a training gap concerns the integration of new skills and knowledge into the remainder of the field force from three new courses at PSTC. The CIMIC, PSYOPS and Information Operations courses offered at PSTC educate individuals in these three skill areas, but the remainder of the field force has not had any exposure on how to integrate these skills into operations.[176] From an institutional perspective, these three skill sets need to be integrated into the doctrine across all disciplines within the field force.

The establishment of Interim Army's new collective training management framework could have been one of the contributing factors to the emergence of the gaps between the two training systems. Systemic changes in the manner in which training must be conducted prior to deploying CMTC and the centralized nature of level 5 through 7 collective training are contributing factors to gaps in training. Post Exercise Reports for CMTC Exercise Maple Guardian 0603 and 0604 identify these gaps in training as personnel and units arrived at CMTC without completing the prerequisite training.[177] Therefore, as the collective training management framework begins to mature, there is a requirement to synchronize the individual and collective training systems together with the lessons learned process to minimize gaps in the future.

The second point concerns the context of training for JIMP enabled operations. In his guidance for high readiness training for 2007, the Army Training Authority, Major-General

[176] Captain Brad Elms, Training Officer PSTC, telephone conversation, 20 April 2007.

[177] Colonel C.R. King, *Maple Guardian 0603 – Commander CMTC Post Exercise Report* (CFB Wainwright, Alberta: file 4500-3(Comd)), 10 October 2006.

Colonel C.R. King, *Maple Guardian 0604 – Commander CMTC Post Exercise Report* (CFB Wainwright, Alberta: file 4500-3(Comd)), 20 November 2006.

Beare, provided direction for CMTC exercise design in the context of JIMP enabled operations as:

1. To confirm Task forces as full spectrum operations capable within a JIMP framework within the contemporary operating [or] mission environment.

2. To confirm Task force Headquarters as JIMP enabled and full spectrum operations capable in structure, knowledge and skill.

3. To confirm the competent application of full spectrum operation skills based on a formation led JIMP intervention campaign plan within a failed [or] failing state that replicates the assigned mission area.

4. To practice [and] confirm Task Force integration within a 'Team Canada' and under a CEFCOM command [and] control model.[178]

The criteria used to track-plan the development of the exercises in the JIMP context are:

1. Exercise design is to replicate vice duplicate specific missions in terms of Geo and met data, centre of excellence actors (Joint Forces, International Organizations, Non-Government Organizations, Other Government Departments, and domestic and host nation civil and military authorities), campaign design and tactical actions.

2. Exercise design is to practice and confirm the application of combat power at level 5 and 6 in terms of effects based, intelligence led 'sustained and focused operations', military and JIMP enabled.

3. The primary training audience incorporates the entire Canadian Forces generated land operations package that makes up the Task Force, including the National Command Element and National Support Element and Canadian Forces – assigned mission elements.[179]

A key concept in training design at the tactical level is to replicate specific functions to achieve specific training objectives without having to go to the expense of duplicating the exact conditions the soldiers would face in a theatre of operations. For example, the front gate to a camp can be replicated by a simple barrier, some wire and some mine tape and

[178] Major-General S.A. Beare, *Army Training Authority Direction and Guidance for Army High Readiness Training -2007* (Land Forces Doctrine and Training System Headquarters, Kingston: file 4500-1(ATA)), August 2006, 5.

[179] Major-General S.A. Beare, *Army Training Authority Direction and Guidance for Army High Readiness Training -2007* (Land Forces Doctrine and Training System Headquarters, Kingston: file 4500-1(ATA)), August 2006, 6.

achieve the same training objectives as a completely enclosed camp with hesco-bastion and other defensive obstacles. Replicating resources such as centre of excellence actors at the operational and strategic levels in paragraph 1 above is counter productive to achieving the exercise objectives. Participation from these players in the operational planning process at the operational level and the provision of advice at the tactical level is critical to establishing relationships, developing standard operating procedures, and learning to become interoperable. Replicating these functions with replacement actors who do not have the expertise in these areas is a missed training opportunity.

JIMP enabled operations are much more complex than peace support operations as they add different layers of interoperability. According to the recommendations from Howard Coombs and General Hillier in their article Planning for Success: The Challenge of Applying Operational Art in Post-conflict Afghanistan, that in order for the Afghan Transitional Authority to take the lead in re-establishing Afghanistan as a functioning state, the utilization of overarching joint planning and coordination mechanisms, with inclusive multi-agency representation to oversee its implementation is necessary.[180] This top-down, cohesive and unified approach would enable all of the JIMP resources to be marshalled towards regional development at the operational level. Clearly, this strategic concept with operational level participants is something that cannot be replicated for higher level 5 through 7 field training exercises at CMTC, especially if an operational level headquarters is being exercised. Simply stated, it is imperative that JIMP centre of excellence actors be present to conduct operational level planning while on exercise at CMTC.

[180] H.G Coombs and General R. Hillier, "Planning for Success: The Challenge of Applying Operational Art in Post-conflict Afghanistan," *Canadian Military Journal* (Autumn 2005): 11.

Since the publication of the Army Training Authority's direction, the Operational Training Section in Land Forces Doctrine and Training System Headquarters has sought to integrate Canadian agencies into the development and execution of CMTC exercises. For example, exercise Maple Guardian 0701 will have direct participation from representatives of the Canadian International Development Agency, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Corrections Canada as well as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. It is important to note that these agencies are providing representation only as those personnel participating on the exercise will not be the same people who will be deploying and fulfilling those roles in theatre.[181]

The final point concerns the effects and consequences of Army transformation occurring within CF transformation. As previously explained, the transformation process within the Army began well before the CF transformation. The mechanisms to construct the Army systems approach to training were developed at the end of the 1990s and applied to the collective training management framework as CMTC finally opened its doors in 2006. The Master Implementation Plan for CMTC was developed and executed over a three year period - while CF transformation began its process at the latter end of this time frame. The force generation and mission requirements for operations in Afghanistan, coupled with the momentum from Army transformation have resulted in the Army taking the lead within the CF in expeditionary collective training for full spectrum operations in the c*ontemporary Operating Environment*. This has been characterized by 'Army pull' of resources from the remainder of the CF to develop CMTC. The following examples amplify this phenomenon:

[181] Major Tom Newton, Operational Training Section, HQ LFDTS, telephone conversation with author, 13 April 2007.

1. Army operations and maintenance funding was used to build CMTC less the private married quarters that were constructed in CF Base Wainwright.[182] Although CMTC serves a strategic purpose to train not only Army personnel, CMTC also serves as a training centre to confirm the training of Air Force, CEFCOM, and CANOSCOM established units that will be deploying on operations.

2. The Army sought-after the participation of other strategic organizations within the CF to participate in the CMTC project. While the Air Force, CANOSCOM to include the Health Services Group and CEFCOM all play a essential roles in the CMTC as other level 1 headquarters organizations, it is interesting to note they do not have specific obligations to support this training. For example, from a force generation perspective, other level 1 headquarters failed to generate over 400 personnel required for CMTC Exercise Maple Guardian serial 0604. This resulted in not all of the training audience arriving at CMTC with the required threshold training completed to begin the exercise. As a result the scope of the exercise had to be changed in order make up for the deficit in training.[183]

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[182] The Land Forces Funding Model from 2004 -2006, line 4c10 shows CMTC army O&M funding. Department of National Defence, *Land Forces Funding Model – 2004* (Ottawa: DND, 2004), Line 4c10.

Department of National Defence, *Land Forces Funding Model – 2005* (Ottawa: DND, 2005), Line 4c10.

Department of National Defence, *Land Forces Funding Model – 2006* (Ottawa: DND, 2006), Line 4c10.

[183] Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Jordan, Project Manager CMTC, DLSP 5-3, telephone conversation with author, 13 April 2007.

3. It took the Air Force chain of command three years to approve the principle of the Air/Aviation chapter of the CMTC Master Implementation plan.[184]

4. The National Command Element and the National Support Element deployed to train at CMTC for Exercise Maple Guardian 0601 at the request of their force generators, as they had no means to train or confirm the units they were responsible to generate. As of 2007, the Commander of the Army, Lieutenant-General Leslie has directed that Land Forces Command will be responsible for confirming the readiness of the National Command Element and the National Support Element.[185]

5. Prior to 2007, the Strategic Joint Staff had little overarching influence on collective training within the Army. Since the publication of the Strategic integrated Operating Concept, the Strategic Joint Staff has started develop a higher Canadian Forces Systems Approach to Collective Training with a new draft Defence Administrative Order and Directive 5030-9.[186] This draft document appears to contain the necessary mechanisms required to properly integrate higher levels of collective training centrally at the Canadian Forces level.

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[184] *Ibid*.

[185] Department of National Defence, *Strategic Operations Resource Directive 2007, Draft 2* (Ottawa: DND, 2007), 3-1-21.

[186] Department of National Defence, DAOD 5031-9 *Canadian Forces Collective Training* Framework. (Ottawa), 2.

With respect to training doctrine and transformation both internally within the Army and externally to the CF, gaps are emerging between training systems. Internally within the Army, the emergence of new collective training doctrine has created gaps between the collective and individual training systems that will require adjustment in the future in order to maximize efficiencies. Concurrently, the Army is leading the way in the development of expeditionary collective training in JIMP enabled operations, creating a gap between the Army and the CF. There is however, an indication that as the CF transformation continues the gap will close as there will be a coordinated, national system that will 'push' national assets and direction down to each of the environmental commands.

As stated earlier in this paper, transformation is occurring concurrently within two echelons of the CF organization at the same time. These changes are occurring at different rates, as CF transformation will be complete in a single cycle. Conversely, Army transformation is taking place in three cycles over a much more considerable length of time. The key challenge for the future is synchronization, both internally within the Army and externally to the CF as transformation continues to evolve. To place this into context of Winton's Military Change Model, training doctrine must be synchronized if transformation is going to be successful at all levels. An enabling factor to reinforce the success of Army transformation is the slower pace and multiple cycles of change. This will permit Army transformation to be more adaptable to second and third order effects of change both internally within the Army and externally from the CF and other level 1 organizations. Therefore, Army transformation should be able to minimize doctrinal gaps as time progresses.

ARMY TRANSFORMATION: THE ARMY OF TOMORROW

Looking forward and anticipating the Army's second cycle of change (the Army of Tomorrow in 2015) nine years of planning will have already elapsed. CF transformation will have long since been completed. The blueprint for the Army of Tomorrow will have already been drafted as the construct of the Interim Army sets the pre-conditions for real fundamental change.[187] As previously shown in Figure 2, the development of the Army of Tomorrow has actually already started. The Army Strategy, written in May of 2002 outlines the key conceptual ideas for the Army of Tomorrow in the Army Commander's vision and intent:

> The Army will generate, employ and sustain strategically relevant and tactically decisive medium-weight forces. Using progressive doctrine, realistic training and leading edge technologies, the Army will be a knowledge-based and command-centric institution capable of continuous adaptation and task tailoring across the spectrum of conflict. The cohesion and morale of our soldiers will be preserved through sharing a collective covenant of trust and common understanding of explicit and implicit intent. With selfless leadership and coherent management, the Army will achieve unity of effort and resource equilibrium. The army will synchronize force development to achieve joint integration and combined interoperability with the ground forces of the United States, other ABCA countries and selected NATO allies. As a broadly based representative national institution with a proud heritage, the Army will provide a disciplined force of last resort and contribute to national values and objective at home and abroad.[188]

To achieve this vision, the center of gravity for building the Army of Tomorrow is the institutional credibility, which is supported by four objectives. They are: connecting with Canadians, shaping Army culture, delivering a combat capable sustainable force structure and managed readiness.[189]

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[187] Department of National Defence, *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy*, (Kingston, May 2002), available from http://www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/resourcestrat.asp; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007, 10.

[188] Department of National Defence, *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy*, (Kingston, May 2002), available from http://www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/resourcestrat.asp; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007, 13.

[189] Department of National Defence, *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy*, (Kingston, May 2002), available from http://www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/resourcestrat.asp; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007, 23.

With the conceptual foundation for the Army of Tomorrow in place, the first two steps of Winton's Military Change Model will be used to highlight some of the key factors that will become important as planning for the Army of Tomorrow continues. The first step will be to describe the future security environment as a basis to develop doctrine. The development of doctrine in the second step will be constrained to the discussion of two training concepts for the Army of Tomorrow. They are JIMP enabled operations in the C*ontemporary Operating Environment* and doctrinal convergence between the individual and collective training systems.

The Future Security Environment

The Army and the CF have gone into considerable detail studying the future. Current CF published documents that are used as a source to plan for the future include Future Security Environment 2025[190] and Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020.[191] The latter of these publications was instrumental in designing The Army Strategy.[192] Within the Army, the Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, now known as the Directorate of Land Concepts and Design (DLCD), is responsible for providing advice to the

[190] Department of National Defence, *Future Security Environment- 2025*, *available* from http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ord/fse2025/intro_e.asp; Internet; accessed 18 April 2007.

[191] Department of National Defence, *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence – A strategy for 2020;* available from http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/dda/cosstrat/2020/j-ds2020pdf_e.asp; Internet, accessed 18 April 2007.

[192] Department of National Defence, *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy*, (Kingston, May 2002), available from http://www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/resourcestrat.asp; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007, 3.

Commander on the future of the Army. In support of The Army Strategy, they have developed three publications which provide an appreciation of the future battlespace. Towards a Brave New World: Canada's Army in the 21st Century is a collection of papers presented at the Army Symposium and published in 2003. The second part of this book contains three papers on the global security environment. Secondly, Future Force; Concepts for Future Army Capabilities is a thought piece to identify a conceptual framework that will assist in the construct of the Army of Tomorrow.[193] Chapter 4 of this book concerns the future battlespace. Finally, Crisis in Zefra is a fictional narrative that builds on Future Force to expand it into the Army of the Future.[194] The staff at DLCD has used the concepts within these three publications to develop The Army of Tomorrow: Accessing Concepts and Capabilities for Land Operations Evolution. This document is a primer for the force employment concept for the Army of Tomorrow.[195] A key component of this focused document is the future security environment.

The future security environment for the Army of Tomorrow will continue to follow current trends in an increasingly interconnected, interdependent world, lines between external and domestic will become increasingly blurred.[196] As such, adversaries are likely to become even more adaptive, varied and lethal in the years to come.[197] The characteristics of the future security environment are summarized in Table 2 below.

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[193] Department of National Defence, *Future Force- Concepts for Future Army Capabilities* (Kingston: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2003), ii.

[194] Department of National Defence, B-GL-007-000 AF-001 *Crisis in Zefra* (Ottawa, 2005), xiii.

[195] Department of National Defence, *The Army of Tomorrow – Assessing Concepts and Capabilities for Land Operations Evolution* (Kingston: DND Canada, 2006); available from http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/dlsc-dcsot/main.asp; Internet; accessed 13 April 2007, 9.

[196] *Ibid*., 15.

[197] *Ibid*.

Table 2 - Tenants of the Future Security Environment

Tenants of the Future Security Environment.	
1.	Irregular warfare will still be prominent.
2.	Conflicts will be more protracted.
3.	Emphasis on non-state as opposed to state actors will increase.
4.	Threats will be more trans-national and cross border in character.
5.	The importance of shaping "hearts and minds" will rise.
6.	Use of commercial weapons systems, off-the-shelf and novel technologies will grow.
7.	Defeating armed forces will be less significant than affecting an opponent's will and resolve.
8.	All levels of command and individuals will be networked.
9.	Intelligent, autonomous robotics will be an integral part of every unit and sub-unit.
10.	Attacks on the home nation-state by an enemy will rise.
11.	Operations in complex terrain will increase.
12.	The focus on humanitarian and reconstruction requirements, as part of stabilization operations will rise.
13.	The time-frame for procurement of new equipment will be drastically reduced in the bid to remain technically current and relevant.
14.	The use of non-scripted strategies and tactics to overcome problems, especially in a networked environment, will gain in importance.

Source: Department of National Defence, The *Army of Tomorrow – Assessing Concepts and Capabilities for Land Operations Evolution* (Kingston: DND Canada, 2006); available from http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/dlsc-dcsot/main.asp; Internet; accessed 13 April 2007, 15

JIMP Enabled Operations

The development of doctrine to guide the army in achieving the objectives for the Army of Tomorrow will be complex. First, looking outwards and across to the other environmental and CF Commands, and upwards to the CF strategic level, doctrine must be synchronized. Commander R.K. Taylor in his paper 2020 Vision: Canadian Forces Operational –Level Doctrine, stresses the importance for doctrinal convergence to reduce the gap between written guidance and the reality of operations and force structure.[198]Specifically, he contends that:

> [S]trategic level guidance must be streamlined to maintain the necessary clarity of direction and common understanding of roles, missions, objectives and vision of the Canadian Forces. Tri-service cohesion is founded in the ethos of joint operations that, by extension, fosters effective participation in multinational or combined operations, and which must, therefore, remain the common purpose of the Canadian Forces.[199]

The requirement for doctrinal convergence refers to the gap that has emerged between the CF and army transformation discussed in the previous section. It is essential that this gap be reduced as much as possible if the concept of the Army of Tomorrow is going to function correctly within the context of the remainder of the CF. The two remaining cycles of change within the Army Strategy will provide the mechanism to ensure that this gap is narrowed through repeated reassessment as army transformation continues.

Looking towards the operational level, Commander Taylor contends that operational level doctrinal convergence will:

[198] Commander R.K. Taylor, "2020 Vision: Canadian Forces Operational-Level Doctrine," *Canadian Military Journal* (Autumn 2001): 42.

[199] Commander R.K. Taylor, "2020 Vision: Canadian Forces Operational-Level Doctrine," *Canadian Military Journal* (Autumn 2001): 42.

> [W]ill need to embrace the emerging concepts of joint task lists and tactically self sufficient units. It will need to modernize its style and accessibility to attract readers and enhance the retention of information. It will need to be organized in an understandable hierarchical manner that reflects the uniqueness of Canadian Forces joint and combined doctrine. In the pursuit of Canadian doctrinal coherence, remaining 'allied synchronous' in substance is also a critical lifeline to the successful execution of future multinational Canadian Forces missions.[200]

This concept provides a good backdrop to the construction of operational doctrine for the Army of Tomorrow, as it will be necessary to ensure that new doctrine will not be developed in isolation and that it will be synchronized both horizontally as well as vertically in the chain of command. Suffice it to say that this doctrine will encompass all of the targets established for each of the objectives within the construct of the Army of Tomorrow as expressed in The Army Strategy.[201]

Training doctrine to operate in the future security environment in the Army of Tomorrow will also evolve. Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, argued in his 2004 Haycock Lecture that:

> [T]he Canadian forces have to think and operate as a single entity with air, land, and naval assets working as a joint team, both at home and abroad. They have to learn how to work even more closely with all of the elements that can help in achieving the Canadian government's objectives, as well as those of whatever international coalition we may choose to work with. The days of the three traditional environmental services operating in relative isolation from each other, with the air force acting as the supporting bridge between the army and the navy, have to come to and end. This implies changes to the command and control mechanisms, the way the Canadian Forces equips and trains its teams, and even in the way they are educated and view the profession of arms within the larger political and social context in which they will have to operate, both at home and overseas.[202]

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[200] *Ibid*.

[201] Department of National Defence, *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy*, (Kingston, May 2002), available from http://www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/resourcestrat.asp; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007, 17-24.

[202] Lieutenant-General A. Leslie, "The 2004 Haycock Lecture – Boots on the Ground: Thoughts on the Future of the Canadian Forces," *Canadian Military Journal* (Spring 2005): 23.

In this statement, General Leslie is making a point for a more integrated and interoperable CF working in a JIMP enabled environment both domestically and internationally.[203] Moreover, he implies that this will involve cultural change within the CF, which in turn will require new training doctrine to embrace JIMP enabled operations.

The Army of Tomorrow capability document stresses that outwardly focused, integrated and multi-disciplinary approaches must be the norm to address the complex problems posed by an increasingly multi-dimensional security environment.[204] Table 3 identifies some of the tenants of JIMP enabled operations in the Army of Tomorrow.

Table 3 - Army of Tomorrow JIMP Characteristics

Army of Tomorrow JIMP Characteristics	
1.	The adoption of a 'team' approach to develop an integrated campaign plan in order to realize operational objectives in full spectrum operations.
2.	An ability to immediately plug into point battlespace operating systems to interoperate effectively.
3.	The capacity to access key information – so as to identify targets for attack and influence as well as determine JIMP resources required in operations.
4.	An ability to facilitate the building of interagency and multinational interoperability through collaborative planning mechanisms and protocols.
5.	An ability to integrate non-governmental agencies within the operational architecture and provide liaison to support these agencies in the execution of the mission.

[203] JIMP enabled operations could be employed domestically, within Canada if a large scale natural disaster required international humanitarian assistance.

[204] Department of National Defence, *The Army of Tomorrow – Assessing Concepts and Capabilities for Land Operations Evolution* (Kingston: DND Canada, 2006); available from http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/dlsc-dcsot/main.asp; Internet; accessed 13 April 2007, 40.

Army of Tomorrow JIMP Characteristics	
6.	The ability to implement effective communication with joint and other multinational agencies. (This also would include the ability to provide an effective interface between conventional and special forces).
7.	An ability to clearly and effectively communicate mission goals, objectives, and actions to the public and members of the media as required.

Source: Department of National Defence, The *Army of Tomorrow – Assessing Concepts and Capabilities for Land Operations Evolution* (Kingston: DND Canada, 2006); available from http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/dlsc-dcsot/main.asp; Internet; accessed 13 April 2007, 40.

From a 'ways' and 'means' perspective, training doctrine will be developed for the Army of Tomorrow to operate in a JIMP enabled environment. Since JIMP enabled operations involve many other agencies external to both the Army and the CF, the Chief of Defence Staff has provided specific direction for the future in this regard. The Canadian Forces Integrated Operating Concept provides the future vision pertaining to how the CF will operate in a JIMP enabled security environment. Specifically the core idea of the operating concept is that:

> [T]he Canadian Forces shall, from here on in, integrate the force development of its sea, land, air and special operations forces so as to produce a focused and strategically effective, integrated force that will take the Canadian Forces beyond its present degree of jointness. These forces are also to be generated and employed in an integrated manner under clear lines of command authority so as to permit the force to influence the international environment in accordance with Canadian interests and values.[205]

In this regard, integration encompasses not only the activities of two or more CF environments jointly, but also any other partner organization involved in the security activities influencing the conduct and results of military operations.[206] As a result, the CF

[205] Department of National Defence, *Draft - Canadian Forces Strategic Integrated Operating Concept*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1 July 2005), 14.

[206] *Ibid*., 16.

will integrate in four broad domains of interoperability: information, cognitive, behavioural and physical.[207] Interaction with other organizations external to the CF is another key component of this concept. The spectrum of interagency interaction covers the elements or activities of the CF, other Government departments (federal, provincial, and municipal), continental, international, nongovernmental, and commercial organizations engaged in a common effort.[208] Finally, achieving unity of purpose and effort with interagency partners as a 'Team Canada' approach is seen to significantly enhance the chances for operational success.[209]

The parameters identified for JIMP enabled operations in the future security environment in conjunction with the future doctrinal concept of integration and interoperability amongst the CF and its partners will trigger evolutionary change to Army training doctrine for the Army of Tomorrow. The collective training management framework will have to expand to encompass the new operating concept. CMTC is the only training institution that has the capability to provide training in a JIMP enabled environment, as its conceptual design brings all of the CF components of 'Team Canada' together in one place, with the necessary resources and at the right time in the managed readiness cycle. It is conceivable that in the future, CMTC will become Joint-Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre as it will become the CF focal point for JIMP collective training for operations in a 'Team Canada' construct.

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[207] Department of National Defence, *Draft - Canadian Forces Strategic Integrated Operating Concept*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1 July 2005),16.

[208] Department of National Defence, *Draft - Canadian Forces Strategic Integrated Operating Concept*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1 July 2005),16.

[209] *Ibid*.

While it is possible to foreshadow change to CMTC for the Army of Tomorrow, a close look at our allies may add more fidelity to the evolution of change. The United States has two premier training institutions on the continental United States: the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California and the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, Louisiana. Both of these training centers have been in operation for twenty-seven and fourteen years respectively and they are both currently transforming to embrace full spectrum operations in a C*ontemporary Operating Environment*. Transformation taking place at the National Training Center is focused on battle winning capabilities to include: Full Spectrum Operations, Counter Insurgency Operations, cultural awareness, Improvised Explosives Device defeat, increased rigour at the unit level and a greater emphasis on joint enablers.[210]

The next phase of transitional changes earmarked for the future include: larger, more complex urban operations facilities, Interagency and Non-Governmental Organization training for service personnel, the development of training assistance teams to train foreign forces and an exportable training capability.[211] The interagency and non-government organization training does not involve a direct partnership with these agencies, but more as an enabler to develop the battle drills of the unit training at the centre.[212] The transformation occurring at the Joint Readiness Training Center is focused more on the campaign or operational level capabilities as it will integrate Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM) operations into their operating concepts.[213]

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[210] Brigadier-General R.W. Cone, "The Changing National Training Center," *Military Review* (May-June 2006): 71.

[211] *Ibid*., 78.

[212] *Ibid*.

[213] JIIM operations are equivalent to the Canadian term JIMP.

The differences in approach between the two United States training centers suggest a different doctrinal approach to training. According to Lieutenant-Colonel E.M. Jordan, the United States Exchange Officer to the Land Staff and Project Manager for CMTC, there is concern over the future development of the Training Centre. In particular, there is interest that the future development of the strategic and operational components of collective training at CMTC will take place at the expense of the tactical level, battle winning skills for which it was originally designed. The Americans split this concept with one training centre focusing on the tactical skills and the other on operational skills. The concern is Canada could be doing too much with only the one facility. [214]

What is required for the future development of CMTC is a convergence of training doctrine in the form of a CF collective training management framework and a revised Army collective training management framework to reduce a potential gap in training design similar to the concept Commander Taylor suggests above. At the same time the Army must preserve the original concept of operations for which CMTC was built. One possible method to develop training doctrine for JIMP enabled operations is to build a training system similar to that for domestic operations.

Similarly, the Ministry of Public Safety provides centralized, focused training for all emergency response agencies throughout Canada, which members of the CF attend in their

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Brigadier-General M Bednarek, Lieutenant-Colonel T.P. Odom, and S. Florich, "Expanding Jointness at the Joint Readiness Training Center," *Military Review* (January-February 2005): 56.

[214] Lieutenant-Colonel E.M. Jordan, telephone conversation with author, 13 April 2007.

operational capacity for domestic operations.[215] Analogous to the training concept for domestic operations, an expeditionary JIMP focused training centre would provide centralized interagency training to build 'Team Canada' for expeditionary operations. Two possible options for an expeditionary focused training centre would be either to expand the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre to in encapsulate JIMP operations, or expand the Ministry of Public Safety College to train both domestic and expeditionary operations. Nevertheless, clear, converging training doctrine at both the CF and Army levels must be developed for the Army of Tomorrow.

Doctrinal Convergence

A second area of training doctrine development for the Army of Tomorrow concerns a doctrinal convergence between the individual and collective training systems within the Army. As recognized above in the Interim Army phase of transformation, a gap emerged between the individual and collective training systems and Army Council directed a gap analysis be conducted to ensure that all personnel deploying on operations were receiving the required training.[216] Training doctrine is currently dichotomized between general purpose combat training and theatre and mission specific training.[217] Full spectrum operations in a JIMP enabled environment involve both general purpose combat and peace support operations skills. As previously stated in the Cold War and peacekeeping sections of this

[215] This organization was formerly named the Canadian Emergency Preparedness Canada College in Arnprior, Ontario. Personal experience. As a unit training officer in 1998, domestic operations courses were offered to members of the Canadian Forces.

[216] See footnote 163.

[217] Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-008/FP-001 *Training Canada's Army* (Ottawa, 30 August 2001), 40.

paper, training is centered primarily on general purpose combat training with additional mission specific training.

As both Lieutenant-General Simonds and Major-General Vernon contest that it is easier to revert to combat operations from peacekeeping than vice versa.[218] Operations in JIMP enabled full spectrum operations change this paradigm as both types of operation are happening simultaneously. There is no longer a clear cut change in role between combat or peace support operations as previously implied, but rather a blend of both general purpose combat and peace support operations skills. Furthermore, training for current operations does not just involve general purpose combat training with a 'top-up' of mission specific training, but a blur of both skill sets. The indication for the future security environment for the Army of Tomorrow is JIMP enabled operations will continue to mature.[219] Therefore, training doctrine for the Army of Tomorrow should evolve into a common series of skill sets that are inherent to JIMP enabled full spectrum operations and that should be introduced to soldiers as early as the initial recruit training phase. In other words, general purpose combat training should be enhanced to include a number of common peace support skills currently found in JIMP enabled full spectrum operations as a baseline set of combat skills.

Taking steps to formalize peace support training into normal training practices is not a new concept for the Army. Two key recommendations from the non-traditional military training for peacekeepers study for the Somalia Inquiry state:

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[218] See footnotes 39 and 73.

[219] Department of National Defence, *The Army of Tomorrow – Assessing Concepts and Capabilities for Land Operations Evolution* (Kingston: DND Canada, 2006); available from http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/dlsc-dcsot/main.asp; Internet; accessed 13 April 2007, 40.

> Recommendation 20. It is recommended that in light of the finite scope for the pre-deployment training period and the limits that imposes on non-traditional and mission-specific training, a core of peacekeeping subjects be taught in advance at regular stages in unit and individual training. These peacekeeping skills, as with general combat readiness, will be merely refreshed and refined during the annual pre-deployment periods.
>
> Recommendation 21. It is recommended that non-traditional military peacekeeping training be an integral part of most existing military training mechanisms and establishments.[220]

In addition, Brigadier-General Devlin wrote in his 1994 paper:

> Peacekeeping training lacks standardization because many different organizations conduct the training and this causes a lack of continuity; this potentially results in problems for the peacekeeper, his unit and the belligerent forces as different ways of operating are experienced.[221]

According to Captain D. McKeever, the Training Officer for 2RCHA, units force generating for Operation Archer in Afghanistan, have been developing peace support Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) at the grassroots level. There is a comprehensive set of TTP with standards checks list that exist for many peace support skills such as road blocks, check points, cordon and searches.[222] These skills however, are limited to tactics techniques and procedures that are passed off between units and brigades and have not been institutionalized into doctrine. SORD 2007 reveals that LFDTS will be taking measures to institutionalize the standards for these TTP in order provide direction and resources.[223]

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[220] Paul LaRose-Edwards, Jack Dangerfield and Randy Weekes, *Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers: A Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia* (Ottawa: Ministry of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), xvi.

[221] Major P.J. Devlin, "An international Peacekeeping Training Centre," (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course New Horizons Paper, 1994), 16.

[222] Captain Dave McKeever, telephone conversation with author, 16 April 2007.

[223] Department of National Defence, *Strategic Operations Resource Directive 2007, Draft 2* (Ottawa: DND, 2007), 3-1-12.

Training doctrine for the Army of Tomorrow should evolve culturally into a common series of skills inherent to JIMP enabled full spectrum operations that would be taught at all level of training beginning with recruit training. Incorporating these skill sets throughout all levels of both the individual and collective training would have immediate benefits for high readiness training. Soldiers would consequently be more familiar with these skills as they would be exposed to them earlier and more often throughout their careers. It would also result in a savings of time and resources to achieve certain battle task standards as well as reduce the amount of time spent conducting mission specific training as many of these skills would have already been taught and would only need to be confirmed. Furthermore, drafting new common training doctrine will close any potential gaps between the individual and collective training systems in order that they may complement each other. Units would thus be better prepared to pass through the levels of individual and collective training and hence be in a better position to train to their full potential at CMTC.

In summary, planning to develop the Army of Tomorrow is well under way as DLCD has already completed the first step of Winton's three-step Military Change Model – an appreciation of the battlespace. In consideration of the second step of this model, the development of doctrine, two training considerations were discussed. The first of these was the evolution of CMTC to become the Joint Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre in order to champion JIMP enabled operations in support of the Whole of Government Approach to expeditionary operations. In order to accomplish this evolutionary step, a collective training management system must be established at the CF level to coordinate JIMP training both internally across the CF and externally amongst other JIMP participants.

The second training consideration concerned the doctrinal convergence to blend General-purpose Combat and peace support skills into one common skill-set that would satisfy the operational requirements for full spectrum operations in a JIMP enabled C*ontemporary Operating Environment*. By adopting one common set of skills and introducing them to soldiers and officers from the time they begin recruit training, efficiencies could be gained in reducing the amount of high readiness training required prior to deploying on operations as these skills would be more familiar to soldiers. Blending both sets of skills would also close doctrinal gaps that currently exist between the individual and collective training systems. Finally, this concept is not new to the Canadian Forces as it was first introduced as a training recommendation emerging from the Somalia inquiry. As such, it will take real cultural change in the Army to embrace a new training regime for JIMP enabled full spectrum operations in the C*ontemporary Operating Environment*.

CONCLUSIONS

This research paper set out to examine collective training employing an evolutionary approach from a study of training during the Cold War through to the Interim Army period. It also took a look forward to the next phase of army transformation – The Army of Tomorrow. Harold Winton's Military Change Model provided the back-drop for which this evolution of collective training was examined. The key to Winton's model is that if the cycle of change is followed correctly, the nation has a reasonable chance of being well prepared to fight the next war. This model's purpose was demonstrated, when Army training was considered in the post 9/11 era of today to seek an understanding of why Canada, the United States and other Nations were not properly prepared to fight terrorism on September 11, 2001.

The analysis of collective training during the Cold War identified that this period of time was about General-purpose combat training in preparing for World War III. The priority of resources went to 4 Brigade in Germany rather than the elements belonging to the remainder of the Division that remained back in Canada. It showed that 4 Brigade had better opportunities to train as it often trained as a subordinate formation of a fully operational division where interoperability and the development of standard operating procedures were essential. This formation also had the advantage of leveraging this environment to use some of our Allies advanced training facilities and used the opportunity to exercise over the same ground on which they were expected to eventually fight. In contrast, the remainder of the Canadian Division trained less often and with fewer resources as they were not the priority. Nevertheless, the advantage of more open space and larger field firing ranges in country permitted better live fire and movement training. Finally, training methodology during the Cold War was not mature as there was a lack of doctrine outlining specific parameters on how to train.

The peacekeeping era saw the emergence of a new role for soldiers as peacekeeping and peace support skills were included as a supplement to General-purpose Combat training. During the first generation of peacekeeping involving military observer type missions, it was normative not to conduct any collective training whatsoever. The role of peacekeeping changed with the rise of multilateralism after the end of the Cold War and the nature of peace support training also changed with it. As a result, the second generation of peacekeeping that followed was marked by significant changes to the nature of collective training that stemmed from Operation Deliverance and the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. Protectionist undertones were detected in the Canadian military

culture in an attempt to prevent the erosion of military elements from a General-purpose Combat force to a peacekeeping or constabulary type army.

These undertones persisted even though the Somalia Commission concluded that General-purpose Combat training is essential for second generation peace support operations. Despite these findings, peace support training was not fully integrated into the training system on the same level as General-purpose Combat training. The fallout from the Somalia Inquiry and other internal CF investigations marked a period of changes for training systems as LFDTS, PSTC, ALLC and the Pearson Peacekeeping centre were all opened. The Army systems approach to training was also developed revolutionizing the approach to training in the Army.

At the end of the 1990's it became apparent that the Army could not sustain its mandated operational pace with the resources it had at its disposal. Army transformation began and shortly thereafter the CF began its own transformation. In terms of Winton's model, the Army embarked on three cycles of change occurring within a cycle of change at the CF level, making the entire process even more complex. The Interim Army as the first step of Army transformation was a strategic realignment to prepare for the Army of Tomorrow. This involved the development of a system to match priority tasks with resources using the SORD, the Managed Readiness Plan and Whole Fleet Management as key conceptual components of this system. The opening of CMTC was the primary enabler of this system as it centrally provided units with resources to conduct up to formation level collective training.

CMTC also fielded the WES system which represents a revolutionary breakthrough in the delivery of training with state-of-the-art technology being used to promote learning in lieu of soldiers improvising field conditions and acting as umpires. A number of key observations were made regarding training and the Interim Army. There were gaps in the training system as units were not fully prepared to train when arriving at CMTC. Due to the operational necessity the NCE and the NSE trained at CMTC despite these components not being developed and delivered by the project staff until FOC. The CMTC project pulled resources from across the remainder of the CF as there was no top-down push or coordination of resources external to theAarmy. Finally, the Army was replicating JIMP assets without subject matter experts to provide the required interface.

Using the information regarding collective training from the Cold War, peacekeeping and the Interim Army along with the framework from Winton's model, it was possible to look forward to establish some of the collective training implications for the Army of Tomorrow. It was first determined that comprehensive steps have already been taken both at the CF, but especially the Army level to study the future battlespace – Winton's first step. Two doctrinal issues concerning training were then discussed as a part of the second step of the model. The first concerned the evolution of CMTC into Joint CMTC as JIMP operations will become more prevalent in the Army of Tomorrow. This would involve a doctrinal convergence of training systems between the CF and the environmental and functional commands. The second factor discussed was the doctrinal convergence of the individual and collective training systems to blend together General-purpose Combat and peace support skills into one common skill set, something that was recommended from the Somalia Inquiry.

After analysing collective training over these four periods one common thread brings all of these elements together to the forefront – Army culture. It is clear that over time, if the Army is to become successful, that its culture must change with the events that are evolving around it. During the Cold War it was established that Army culture was limited to General-purpose Combat training and no more. Through out the peacekeeping era cultural change eventually occurred to embrace peace support operations, but there is evidence that there were protectionist undertones of resistance to this change and it did not go as far as was originally intended. Nonetheless, the Interim Army has managed to bring forward more cultural change to allow reliance on a priority system and sharing of equipment. Succinctly put, the Interim Army also identified that, if a JIMP enabled Whole of Canada Approach to expeditionary operations is going to be successful, there is a requirement for the CF to exercise cultural change on a broader scale so that a proper collective training management framework can be developed. Furthermore, the Army must culturally embrace peace support operations if there will be one common set of soldier skills to train the Armed Forces for full spectrum operations in a JIMP enabled *Contemporary Operating Environment*.

It is currently too early to determine if the Army has accepted cultural change for the Interim Army, but there are two more cycles of change yet to be conducted within the overall Army transformation. Examining the Army of Tomorrow, it is clear that cultural the current trend of change must continue if CMTC is to evolve into a Joint-CMTC.

To paraphrase Winton, the CF and the Army does not want to be perfectly prepared to fight the wrong type of war after completing transformation. Shaping cultural change is

perhaps the catalyst needed to make transformation successful. Just prior to the release of The Army Strategy, in 2001, Jack Granatstein forewarned:

> If we are to have an army, and we must, then it is a crime to send it into action without the equipment, training, and leadership it needs to fight well and prevail. This nation has done so far too often in the past, paying a high price in lives while the requisite professionalism developed. The present state of the Canadian Forces shamefully suggests that Canadian governments are prepared to do so again in the future.[224]

Uniquely, one last look at The Army Strategy shows that army culture is solidly engrained within this program. Objective 2 of the Strategy: Shape Army Culture is a key component to developing, not only the Army of Tomorrow, but also the Army of the Future. This paper has shown it is therefore unmistakable, that in order to make army transformation a success, the theoretical concepts and ideas that are concurrently being developed must be shaped into normative functions throughout the remaining two periods of evolution and intrinsically linked to cultural change.

[224] J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's Army – Waging War and Keeping the Peace* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 428.

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Annex A – Training Progression for a Unit

Source: Brigadier-General E.B. Beno, *Training to fight and Win: Training in the Canadian Army*, (Kingston: E.B. Beno, 1999.) Appendix 3.



Annex B – Training Progression – Specific to Mission Training

Source: Brigadier-General E.B. Beno, *Training to fight and Win: Training in the Canadian Army*, (Kingston: E.B. Beno, 1999.) Appendix 4.



Annex C – Training Findings from the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia

Serial	Commission of Inquiry Findings
1.	In 1992, there was no formalized and standardized training system for peace support operations. A comprehensive training policy, based on changing requirements, had not been developed, and there was an absence of doctrine, standards, and performance evaluation mechanisms respecting the training of units being deployed on peace support operations. This situation existed even though deficiencies in training policy, direction, and management had been clearly identified in internal Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces reviews and staff papers before 1992. p565
2.	In preparing its forces for peace support missions, the Canadian Forces relied almost exclusively on a core of general purpose combat training, supplemented by mission-specific training during the pre-deployment phase. This traditional approach to training was not adequate to give military personnel either the full range of skills or the appropriate orientation necessary to meet the diverse and complex challenges presented in post-Cold War peace support missions. There was a failure to incorporate the required generic peacekeeping training, both in the individual training system and in the regular operational training schedule. p565
3.	There was no resource centre to provide effective support and assistance to units preparing for deployment, nor was a procedure in place for the systematic compilation and analysis of lessons learned to assist in the planning of and preparation for new peace support missions. p565
4.	Sufficient and appropriate training to accomplish its assigned missions and tasks is an essential component of a unit's preparedness. Training in the CAR was focused on physical fitness, rapid mobility, parachute capability, light infantry skills, and deployment in harsh environments. To fulfil its tasking as the UN standby unit, the CAR should have at all times maintained a proficiency in both general purpose combat skills and generic peacekeeping skills (involving, for example, an understanding of the nature of UN operations and the role of the peacekeeper, conflict resolution and negotiation, cross-cultural relations, restraint in the application of force, and standard UN operations). However, the CAR received little or no continuing generic peacekeeping training to prepare it for UN operations, despite having been designated for many years as the UN standby unit. This typified the traditional DND/CF dictum that general purpose combat training provides not only the best, but also a sufficient, basis for preparing for peacekeeping missions. p569
5.	The absence of CF peacekeeping training doctrine, together with the lack of guidelines for the development of training plans for UN deployments or a standard package of precedents and lessons learned from previous missions, placed an undue burden on the CAR's junior staff in the initial stages of designing a training plan for Operation Cordon. Such absence represents a clear and inexcusable failure by the military leadership, particularly at the senior levels, given Canada's decades of involvement in peacekeeping missions. CAR staff went to great lengths to attempt to compensate for this lack of doctrine, guidelines, and materials. P578
6.	The training plan for Operation Cordon did not adequately provide for sufficient and appropriate training in relation to several non-combat skills that are essential for

Serial	Commission of Inquiry Findings
	peacekeeping, including: the nature of UN peacekeeping and the role of the peacekeeper; the Law of Armed Conflict, including arrest and detention procedures; training on use of force policies, including mission-specific rules of engagement; conflict resolution and negotiation skill development; intercultural relations and the culture, history and politics of the environment; and, psychological preparation and stress management. The failure of the training plan to provide adequately for these non-combat skills arose primarily from the lack of any doctrine recognizing the need for such training, and the lack of supporting training materials and standards. p586
7.	The majority of the CAR's training for Operation Cordon was conducted prior to October 18, 1992. Although most categories of training outlined the training plans for September and October were covered, the lack of training objectives, standards and evaluation criteria made it difficult for anyone involved to assess the levels to which training had been conducted or the proficiency levels achieved. In addition, there were significant shortcomings due to shortages of equipment and other training resources. p589
8.	The CAR did not conduct combat team training or battle group training as a mechanized battalion. p592
9.	Standing operating procedures are crucial to ensure efficiency, standardization and cohesion in the training and operations of a unit. Particularly in the early stages of pre-deployment preparations, the commandos were not training with a uniform set of SOPs. The lateness of the reconnaissance unduly delayed the completion and finalization of the mission-specific SOPs, and adversely affected mission-specific training. p595
10.	CAR staff received insufficient support, guidance, information, and materials to assist them in developing, in a timely manner, the mission-specific SOPs necessary for the conduct of standardized and sufficient training in relation to the tasks governed by those SOPs. p595
11.	There was a lack of standardization in training among the commandos. In part, this was attributable to differences in training needs, expected in-theatre tasks, regimental affiliations and the late development of standing operating procedures. Nevertheless, the commandos were conducting their training activities in a very independent manner, and were largely left on their own to assess the sufficiency of their training. p599
12.	Both prior to and after Exercise Stalwart Providence, the CAR did not train together as a unit and did not develop cohesiveness as a unit. p599
13.	No significant training was conducted by the CARBG after the mission changed from Operation Cordon (Chapter VI) to Operation Deliverance (Chapter VII). Various prerequisites for the proper planning and conduct of training, such as a clear mission, theatre-specific intelligence, mission-specific ROE, training equipment and vehicles, and sufficient time to train, were not available. There was no opportunity for the newly constituted battle group to train together as a group. The CARBG was deployed to Somalia, on a potentially dangerous mission, without adequate training and without the battle group functioning as a cohesive whole. It was a matter of good fortune that they were not challenged by a serious show of force upon their arrival in theatre: the results could have been tragic. p613

Serial	Commission of Inquiry Findings
14.	The CARBG was not operationally ready, from a training point of view, for deployment in Somalia for Operation Deliverance. p613
15.	In 1992, there was insufficient training in the CF generally on the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). This in turn resulted from a lack of institutional commitment within the CF regarding a systematic and thorough dissemination of the LOAC to all its members. As a result, the responsibility by default fell exclusively to those in charge of preparation of the CAR for Somalia to ensure that all ranks received adequate LOAC training. p615
16.	There was a very serious lack of training on the LOAC during the pre-deployment training for Somalia, as evidenced by the soldiers' confusion in theatre over how to treat detainees once they were captured. p615
17.	There was no significant training on the capture and handling of detainees, either during Exercise Stalwart Providence or at any other stage of the pre-deployment training. This resulted from a failure of the chain of command to establish a policy for detainees and to ensure that standing operating procedures (SOPs) were developed for the capture and holding of detainees. p615
18.	There was a failure by the chain of command to provide adequate and appropriate training on the ROE and restraint in the use of force for Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance. Appropriate training must include briefings, scenario-based exercises, and means of assessing in order that personnel have a complete and instinctive understanding regarding the use of force. The inadequacy of training on the ROE constitutes one of the most serious deficiencies in pre-deployment training. p618
19.	Training on the politics, culture, history, and geography of Somalia, as well as training on intercultural relations – essential underpinnings for the performance of most operational tasks in peace support operations – was totally inadequate. This failure resulted from: a lack of peacekeeping doctrine outlining the importance of such training; lack of sufficient support from NDHQ in terms of providing specialist resources; and the inadequacy of intelligence on Somalia available to those responsible for preparing the CAR for deployment. What information was available was not properly conveyed to soldiers at the lowest ranks. p620
20.	Land Force Command (LFC) had clear standards for training related to collective battle tasks, as well as to physical fitness and marksmanship. However, neither NDHQ nor LFC had established clear standards for training for non-combat skills relevant to peace support operations (e.g., familiarity with UN operations, negotiation training, cultural training, the Law of Armed Conflict, use of force). This left the CAR with insufficient direction respecting the level to which training was to be conducted in relation to specific skills. As a consequence, the training plans for the CAR lacked specific standards and evaluation criteria for many of the training activities. p623
21.	The lack of specific evaluation criteria meant that there was no overall framework for the evaluation of training and, therefore, no objective criteria against which to measure the adequacy of training and identify remedial training needs. p624
22.	There was no plan developed for in-theatre training, notwithstanding the numerous shortcomings during pre-deployment preparations – most notably on the ROE –

Serial	Commission of Inquiry Findings
	which had been, or should have been, identified. There was a failure to provide training – as opposed to instructions or orders – in theatre on the ROE, on new SOPs, and on local customs, traditions, politics, and security. Insufficient measures were taken to ensure an understanding on the part of soldiers of the meaning and importance of issues related to the Law of Armed Conflict, cultural differences, and the use of force. This amounts to an inexcusable failure of leadership.p625

Source: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. *Dishonest Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997) 565 - 624.

Annex D – Relevant Recommendations From: Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers

Serial	Recommendation Number	Recommendation	Operation Palladium Rotation 12
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	1	It is recommended that the Canadian Forces overall training philosophy be amended so that general- purpose combat training, while remaining the foundation of training policy, is supplemented by additional non-traditional military training geared specifically for UN peacekeeping operations. p.46	Addressed in LFWA mounting guidance.
2.	2	It is recommended that military and civilian personnel selected for positions involving peacekeeping operations receive training (at the strategic level) on subjects such as UN decision-making, mandate formulation and interpretation, UN and national command and control mechanisms, and rules of engagement formulation and interpretation. p. 49	Addressed in LFWA mounting guidance. This training is conducted at PSTC.
3.	5	It is recommended that Canadian military receive training on dealing with other military and civilian field partners, so as to increase Canadian ability to play a role in enhancing unity of effort by all civilian-military components if a UN field operation. p. 51	Addressed in LFWA mounting guidance.
4.	16	It is recommended that J3 Peacekeeping, as the office of primary interest, create and chair a DND-wide working group to undertake the identification in depth and in detail of non-traditional military skills needed for peacekeeping. p.58	Not directly applicable to rotation 12 training.
5.	17	It is recommended that once DND has identified in greater detail the	Not directly applicable to rotation 12 training.

Serial	Recommendation Number	Recommendation	Operation Palladium Rotation 12
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
		content of nontraditional military training for peacekeeping, that J3 Peacekeeping, as the office of primary interest, create and chair a working group which would include the Director of Military Training and Education (Directorate of Military Personnel), as a key office of collateral interest, to undertake the identification of which components of DND, officers, senior NCMs, all NCMs, and civilians need to receive non-traditional military training for peacekeeping. p. 59	
6.	18	It is recommended that the Canadian Forces develop a core program of nontraditional training that will be received by all components of the Forces, and those civilians of DND who are involved in these operations. p. 60	Addressed in LFWA mounting guidance.
7.	19	It is recommended that the pre-deployment training period should be at least 90 days. This may be reduced if the unit was on UN standby and may need to be increased if the unit is composite or has a lot of augmentees. Training for individuals is more a variable depending on the mission, but needs to be extended beyond the few days now spent on this training to a period of about 14 to 21 days (more for observers, less for staff officers). p.61	Addressed in LFWA mounting guidance.
8.	20	It is recommended that in light of the finite scope for the pre-deployment training period and the limits that imposes on non-traditional and mission-specific training, a core of peacekeeping	Undetermined.

Serial	Recommendation Number	Recommendation	Operation Palladium Rotation 12
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
		subjects be taught in advance at regular stages in unit and individual training. These peacekeeping skills, as with general combat readiness, will be merely refreshed and refined during the annual pre-deployment periods. p.61	
9.	21	It is recommended that non-traditional military peacekeeping training be an integral part of most existing military training mechanisms and establishments. p.62	Undetermined.
10.	23	It is recommended that NDHQ create a single, central and joint peacekeeping training section within its organization with primary amongst the staff matrix. This section would work closely with the soon-to-be-created Peace Support Training Centre to be set up under Land Force Command, but would not be replaced by it. p.62	Addressed in LFWA mounting guidance.
11.	27	It is recommended that the Commands institutionalize a flowing and coherent system of analysis of peacekeeping policy, the originating of peacekeeping doctrine (initially as a single service but inputting into joint, tri-service doctrine), and the creation of peacekeeping training standards. p.64	PSTC is responsible for peacekeeping training standards. To date there are no Canadian Forces published standards for peacekeeping training.
12.	28	It is recommended that the evolution of the Army Lessons Learned Centre and the creation of a Peace Support Training Centre at land Force Command be pursued with vigour and that these centers be tied into the above system to provide both a corporate	Addressed in LFWA mounting guidance.

Serial	Recommendation Number	Recommendation	Operation Palladium Rotation 12
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
		memory based on past experiences, and an input into future doctrine production. It is emphasized that the resourcing of these centres should not be at the expense of a national tri-service focal point. p. 64	
13.	30	It is recommended that the Commands review the mandates given to their staff colleges, warfare schools and similar institutions, with a view to enhancing the peacekeeping training objectives of those institutions. p.65	Not directly applicable to rotation 12 training.
14.	32	It is recommended that Land Force Area Headquarters be the principal interface with non-military organizations, and be the channel for providing training assistance from those organizations (e.g., civilian police, Red Cross, Canadian peacekeeping partners, etc.). p. 66	Addressed in LFWA mounting guidance.
15.	34	It is recommended that unit pre-deployment training time period be evaluated to ensure adequate generic peacekeeping training on subjects such as the law of armed conflict, negotiation procedures, low-level conflict resolution, and stress management, as well as mission-specific training on subjects such as concept of operations, rules of engagement, standing operating procedures, knowledge of theatre environment, and cultural awareness. p.67	Addressed in LFWA mounting guidance.
16.	36	It is recommended that much more effort be made by areas, brigades, and units to integrate non-military aspects of the UN mission (e.g., NGOs, UN agencies, CIVPOL)	Addressed in LFWA mounting guidance. Training Assistance Teams were used from Rotation 11. There

Serial	Recommendation Number	Recommendation	Operation Palladium Rotation 12
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
		into the pre-deployment training, thereby making the peacekeeping partnership a true partnership. p.68	was no specific representation from other agencies except CIDA.
17.	39	It is recommended that the proposed Peace Support Training Centre be created as soon as possible, and that it be provided with sufficient resources to collect, create, or identify where to find a broad range of training modules, resources, subject matter experts, etc., and that all these be offered to individuals and units for permission training. An ancillary role would be to offer these same resources to other training establishments. p.69	Addressed in LFWA mounting guidance.
18.	43	It is recommended that all basic training establishments enhance their training on the law of armed conflict. p. 71	Not directly applicable to rotation 12 training.
19.	44	It is recommended that the area battle schools be formally tasked to conduct peacekeeping training based upon a Land Force Command curriculum. These schools should also have peacekeeping tasks (e.g., helicopter squadrons), based on a curriculum developed by those Commands. p. 72	Not directly applicable to rotation 12 training.
20.	54	It is recommended that the Canadian Forces continue to send its members to all of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre's courses in order to: train CF members; gain additional expertise to develop CF peacekeeping training; train in the centre's unique civilian-military training environment; and contribute to the civilian-military character and content of the	Not directly applicable to rotation 12 training.

Serial	Recommendation Number	Recommendation	Operation Palladium Rotation 12
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
		centre's training. p. 76	

Sources:

Paul LaRose-Edwards, Jack Dangerfield and Randy Weekes, *Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers: A Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia* (Ottawa: Ministry of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), xiii – xxiii.

Brigadier-General J.I Fenton, Land *Forces Western Area Mounting Guidance – Operation Palladium Rotation 12*. (Land Force Western Area Headquarters: file 300-2/12 (Comd)), 15 November 2002.

Annex E – Army Managed Readiness System

Source: Department of National Defence, Strategic *Operations Resource Directive 2007, Draft 2* (Ottawa: DND, 2007), 3-1-A



Annex F – Army Managed Readiness Plan

Source: Department of National Defence, Strategic *Operations Resource Directive 2007, Draft 2* (Ottawa: DND, 2007), 3-1-B-1.