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**STATE-BUILDING IN THE COUNTERINSURGENCY ENVIRONMENT:
TRANSLATING TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL VICTORY INTO
STRATEGIC SUCCESS IN THE GLOBAL OPERATIONS AREA**

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ABSTRACT

State building and counterinsurgency share complementary end states. One seeks to create capacity and the other to create security to produce a functioning society free from violence. Within that construct, one cannot be achieved without the other. A host of examples show testament to failed exercises where counterinsurgency was the only focus or half hearted state building was the other. Such partial endeavours do not produce success. A comprehensive inclusive approach however, which focuses on counterinsurgency warfare and state building activities concurrently, will yield the best results.

The end of the Cold War ignited what we now call the contemporary operating environment. This has seen the development of low intensity operations of irregular warfare where counterinsurgency is now the single most type of operation dominating the spectrum of conflict. Add to that the plethora of failing states that have caused nations-states to intervene in their national interests and a very complicated security environment develops. This security environment is dominated by contemporary insurgency, which is struggling to maintain the failed state environment with no intention of establishing a central government in the place of its host nation. Instead, they fight to maintain the Hobbesian state where the Leviathan rules and where their microcosm of power is secure. Consequently nation states struggle against this type of insurgency in the current strategic environment and by default in the new battle space of today, which is crowded with dynamic elements that modern armies are trying to cope with controlling.

The practitioner and theorists of irregular warfare offer their lessons learned and their frameworks for the modern counterinsurgent to start from. The experiences of state building in the context of insurgency also provide insight as to which major factors affect the ability to create capacity in a failing state. Together, the theories and lessons of counterinsurgency will be fused with state building lessons in order to create a new start point for the future counterinsurgent state builder to succeed in the new battle space and future security environment.

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INTRODUCTION

Conflict is omnipresent in the world today. There are as many as thirty wars ongoing and likely up forty failed or failing states in the world at present. In many of these states internal conflict contributes to their failure and invariably failure of the state contributes to conflict. This deadly cyclical loop is a catalyst to regional destabilization, safe areas for terrorism, a haven for transnational crime and the genesis for more conflict. These dynamics form part of the construct of the current strategic environment. Within that environment are the stable nation states whose foreign policies and direct influence in the form of economic, political and sociological influences help shape how the dynamics of the current strategic environment will contribute to maintaining states free from violence.

In the main, failed states and intra national conflicts will not auto resolve themselves. A change agent is necessary to either set conditions for stability or for total resolution. In either case the intervention of a third party will be required. The interventionist will require skills and resources for state building and combat operations simultaneously. In this way he will reduce friction in his ability to operate in the battle space while imposing more resistance than the insurgent can handle. Having said this, the counterinsurgent state builder is no longer fighting the battles of Malaya or Vietnam. He is fighting contemporary insurgency which seeks to preserve the failed state in order to preserve power. Today's counterinsurgent state builder must come fully equipped with resources, arms and political will in order to solve the problem. "Armed state building" is the way of the future. Critical is the mindset of the international community to see state building and counterinsurgency as two related actions taking place in the

battle space at the same time. One might ask if the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan are synchronizing operations with the combat elements to achieve synergy. Strong alliances ready to combat this new contemporary insurgency are required for long term commitment which will challenge the domestic populations of the counterinsurgent state builder. Lastly the culture of the counterinsurgent state builder may help or hinder success. It has been said that one cannot escape from one's past. Nations with histories of application of hard power may not be as successful as those who have taken a soft power approach to foreign policy. This must factor in mission success.

This paper will focus on three areas which are crucial for understanding how counterinsurgency and state building can be reconciled. Firstly, one must understand the current strategic environment and the battle space to understand where the fight and the state building fit in, and why these things impact how they success be achieved. Secondly, the understanding of insurgency and counterinsurgency from the practitioners and theorists will set the foundation in terms of lessons learned and comprehensive knowledge from analysis can begin. Thirdly, a study of state building from a historical perspective of past experiences and a structural review in terms of alliances are necessary to put this in the context of counterinsurgency. These three chapters are meant to give the reader fidelity for the last chapter which reconciles these two ideas and their lessons in order to give the nascent counterinsurgent state builder food for thought.

There is no cure all, no model, no framework here. State building and counterinsurgency are unique operations which deserve unique solutions. However understanding the strategic environment, counterinsurgency, and state building as connected concepts may help frame the next operational design in our next war.

CHAPTER 1 – UNDERSTANDING THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Failed institution-building results, at best in the division of states into sub-national units with security the purview of warlords and militias. At worst, the outcome is anarchy and a Hobbesian war of all against all...the trend toward anarchy will eventually win out and much of the Third World will see the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war.¹

Dr. Steven Metz

The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan were not, in truth, the wars for which we were best prepared in 2001; however they are the kinds of wars we are fighting and clearly are the kind of wars we must master... The object that lies beyond the war is the restoration of civil order which is particularly essential in a counterinsurgency where the government's legitimacy has been weakened or destroyed.²

LGen David Patraeus

The term “nation building” is a term oft incorrectly used to describe post conflict activities of capacity building after hostilities. It has been used to describe imposing foreign concepts of government such as democracy to indigenous populations in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. The label of “nation” is more conceptual in nature and implies historical, social, and cultural ties that bind people together, which critics would argue is not possible to impose through third party intervention.³ “Nation” implies an orderly management and application of instruments of national power that are aligned with

¹ Steven Metz, “A Flame Kept Burning: Counterinsurgency Support After the Cold War,” *Parameters*, (Autumn 1995): 31.

² Lieutenant General David H. Patraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” *Military Review*, (January-February 2006): 2.

³ “Critics of nation-building point out that outsiders can never build nations, if that means creating or repairing all the cultural, social, and historical ties that bind people together as a nation.” Francis Fukuyama, “Nation-Building 101,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, January-February 2004, 159.

national values and interests.⁴ More philosophically, nation hood is about identity not about capacity. Capacity however, is the domain of the “state”. Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan define a state by ten functions that are institutional in nature and achievable through intervention, assistance or stabilization.⁵ In that vein, state building will be defined as “creating or strengthening such government institutions as armies, police forces, judiciaries, central banks, tax-collection agencies, health and education systems, and the like” and will be considered the baseline of the discussion.⁶

Civil and military agencies alike recognize the importance of concurrent state building and fighting counterinsurgency within the same battle space. In the first quote Steven Metz, an expert in counterinsurgency and nation building, paints an ominous picture of the consequences of failed institution building. The second comment by the current U.S. Commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, illustrates the challenges presented by state building in the context of the new security environment. Yet, neither of these authors articulates counterinsurgency and state building as two symbiotic concepts within the same battle space conducted at the same time. All too often, it is believed that certain conditions need to be met first; like security and force protection before any kind of development or capacity building can begin. This can lead to failure like the mission in Somalia in 1992. The author asserts that security operations in the

⁴ Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Lessard, “Reuniting Operational Art with Strategy, and Policy– A new Model of Campaign Design for the 21st Century.” (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Advanced Military Studies Course paper, 2005), 7.

⁵ According to the authors, a state is capable of carrying out 10 functions: legitimate monopoly on the means of violence, administrative control, management of public finances, investment in human capital, delineation of citizenship rights and duties, provision of infrastructure services, formation of the market, management of the state’s assets (including the environment, natural resources, and cultural assets), international relations (including entering into international contracts and public borrowing) rule of law. Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, Michael Carnahan, “Closing the Sovereignty Gap – An Approach to State Building,” Overseas Development Institute (Working Paper 253, September 2005),6.

⁶ Fukuyama, *Nation-Building* 101, ...,160.

form of counterinsurgency and state building activities contribute to one another's success if they are done concurrently. Is General Krulak's Three Block War achievable?⁷ This paper will explore the reconciliation of these two concepts in order to present it as a force multiplier to offer the future state builder and counterinsurgent a strong foundation to aggregate these two activities within the nexus of operations.

Robert Tomes contends that as we get farther from the end of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear warfare will diminish and conflict will continue to be characterized by irregular warfare such as insurgency operations.⁸ The contemporary cure for insurgency has become counterinsurgency and by default, state building. Insurgency has become the weapon of choice of small groups hoping to achieve their political aims in a favourable asymmetric environment resulting from global uni-polarity provided by the post Cold War world.⁹ In today's environment where it seems that state building can only occur within a climate of conflict, the modern state builder will be challenged in reconciling his desire to stabilize a failing state through the deliberate re-construction of political, economic and judicial frameworks; with his need to eliminate forces trying to prevent him from doing it. It is within this context where the challenge of state building within a counterinsurgency environment lies.

Despite the permanency of warfare in humanity, we continue to struggle to adapt to new conflict environments, and in doing so have learned about the need for restoring

⁷ General Charles Krulak was the former Marine Corps commander who coined the term Three Block War. The idea was that a force could be conducting three different types of operations from one another within the span of three city blocks. On one block troops would be conducting humanitarian operation, on the second peacekeeping between warring tribes, and on the third conducting highly lethal mid intensity operations. Robert F. Hahn and Bonnie Jezior, "Urban Warfare and the Urban Fighter of 2025," *Parameters*, (Summer 2004) [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99summer/hahn.htm>; Internet; accessed 2 April 2007.

⁸ Robert R. Tomes, "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare," *Parameters*, (2004): 16.

⁹ John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 24.

normalcy after conflict. Why statistically do state building experiences show a marginal level of success when we try to state build in the midst of conflict?¹⁰ There is no doubt that state building and counterinsurgency are happening simultaneously in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan but whether they are complementary and interdependent as a system is not yet universally accepted.¹¹ If conflict and state building are conducted exclusive to one another and we do not fully appreciate the benefit of stabilization, especially as we fight, we are not setting conditions for lasting peace. B.H. Liddell Hart summed it up appropriately on this point – “if you concentrate exclusively on military victory with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing germs for another war.”¹² The synergizing of conflict knowledge of counterinsurgency with state building knowledge is key when they are done concurrently. In fact they each give the other purpose.

The future state builder and counterinsurgent must work hard in order to understand the new system in which he finds himself. This system, comprising of the new battle space and the current strategic environment is unique. Understanding how we arrived there, facing the current enemy will be key in understanding how we transitioned from conventional war followed by state building to counterinsurgency and state building at the same time.

¹⁰ Of 51 case studies of nation building within an environment of conflict statistically almost 75% failed to meet their strategic objectives. James L. Payne, “Does Nation building Work?,” *The Independent Review*, no.4, (Spring 2006): 601-602.

¹¹ Nagle discusses two approaches – The Direct Approach (War) and the Indirect Approach (Limited combat). Nagle, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* ...,27-28.

¹² B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, (New York: Praeger, 1967), 366.

In today's asymmetric warfare environment, the infusion of combat terrorism on a global scale, especially in failing states, no longer follows the predictable cycle of pre and post conflict intervention principles. Instead, it has become protracted, messy and bloody. This evolution is indicative of the contemporary operating environment (COE).¹³

It is not uncommon for historians to claim that armies prepare for the last war.¹⁴ While this may have characterized the last two World Wars, it is impossible to ignore the evolution of the battle space and our understanding of it in the last 40 years since the end of the Vietnam War. Despite the anti communism efforts in Vietnam, the failure of the United States to emerge victorious from it was the genesis of a renaissance in military thinking about how the environment in which armies find themselves operating shapes the way they fight instead of the contrary. Notwithstanding the overtones of the Cold War at the time, the U.S. defeat in Southeast Asia was a sure catalyst shaping how they operate today. In fact, much maligned General Westmorland did understand what he was facing in 1965 when he became Commander Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). Despite wide range thinking that he was totally focussed on kinetic operations he did understand the need to state build.¹⁵

¹³ The past 15 years have seen profound changes in the missions and environments for U.S. military operations, with the potential for equally profound effects on the things that Army leaders must know and do. What we now call the "contemporary operating environment" began to emerge with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Henry A. Leonard, J. Michael Polich, Jeffrey D. Peterson, Ronald E. Sortor, S. Craig Moore, *Something Old Something New – Army Leader Development in a Dynamic Environment*, Report Prepared for the United States Army (Santa Monica: Rand, 2006), 2.

¹⁴ Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn and Regan G. Reshke, "Defying Definition: The Future Battle Space". Chapter 8 in *Towards a Brave New World: Canada's Army in the 21st Century*. (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2003), 87-112.

¹⁵ In September 1965, Westmorland issued his Theory of Victory, which outlined to his senior commanders in MACV his vision of how the war in Vietnam should be won. It was progressive in nature because it not only emphasized the need for kinetic operations to kill the insurgent VC but also understood that development would be key if they were to have any chance to succeed. His thoughts on nation building in terms governance, police and reconstruction issues speak greatly to the issues of today. John M. Carland, "Winning the Vietnam War: Westmorland's Approach in Two Documents," *The Journal of Military History*, 68, (April 2004): 568.

The battle space is reactive and has changed little with time. It changes however, when something is injected in to unbalance its equilibrium – such as our forces, the enemy, populations and technology. We try to shape it, but the elements within it shape how we do operations. It is an ever expanding and contracting, living breathing volumetric environment which armies have sought to control, yet the only way to do so is to control the elements which we inject.¹⁶ Only when we accept that we can affect the battle space, but can never totally control it, are we able to function within it, ultimately increasing our chances for success in the strategic environment.

What makes up the current battle space? The U.S. manual for Joint Urban Operations, JP-306 defines it as:

“the environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest.¹⁷

This is a very narrow military definition that does not adequately describe the new battle space if we are to reconcile state building with military action. This definition does not seem to reflect the changes in the contemporary environment nor how the various parts of the battle space interact and integrate to form a complex network which we must strive to master if we are to gain the initiative. The new enemy has learned about the battle space also and is using it effectively. The above definition is too military if we are

¹⁶ Robert J. Bunker, “Advanced Battlespace and Cybermaneuver Concepts: Implications for Force XXI,” *Parameters*, (Autumn 2004) [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96autumn/bunker.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 April 2007.

¹⁷ Headquarters Department of the Defence, JP-306 Joint Operations, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations (Washington: DOD, 2006), II-6.

to consider the implications of a mindset that merges state building with military operations. A search for a more contemporary inclusive definition of the battle space did not yield results beyond the military definition in JP 3-306. A better definition would also include the elements key to insurgencies, their causes, host nation interests, the host nation population and the domestic population of the counterinsurgent, etc. The battle space is not just military terminology, but more about thinking how the various parts of a system into which we, as the catalyst for change, must integrate ourselves to our advantage.

Spatially, the battle space is a conglomeration of many things that we must now come to grips with. Within the COE there are no longer absolute fronts or concrete operational areas where the joint force will deploy to fight the enemy. Yes, it is true a joint force may deploy to an area, but while we are physically fighting the enemy in the Joint Operations Areas (JOA) he is preparing to strike on other fronts which do not necessarily include the traditional targets. The late terrorist Musab al-Zarqawi gave testament to this assertion when he said:

“...I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.”¹⁸

Lines between operations in the JOA are blurred and overlapping; and our success depends on our ability to come to terms with facing and overcoming many dispersed challenges simultaneously instead of a concentrated few in a sequential order. When we attempt to establish a core philosophy to illustrate the difficulty in visualizing where and when we will fight the enemy in the new battle space, the answer belies this

¹⁸ Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, Lieutenant Colonel James E. Hutton, Lieutenant Colonel Mark W Garrett, and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy W. Bush, “Massing effects in the Information Domain – A Case Study in Aggressive Information Operations,” *Military Review*, (May-June 2006): 2.

new challenge – anytime and anywhere. There are no contiguous boundaries or lines from where we can coordinate our movements to gain obvious advantage. Advantage will have to be gained in other ways. These boundaries are as wide and as deep as the enemy determines them to be, and could extend to include the whole globe making focussing on the enemy difficult. Given the geographical and philosophical size of the new Joint Operations Area (JOA), this ubiquitous space is more appropriately a Global Operations Area (GOA) where targeting the enemy who opposes peace and security presents another challenge to the counterinsurgent state builder. For example, if anti-coalition forces are working to discredit reconstruction operations in Afghanistan by focussing information operations on the domestic front, they may disrupt our ability to achieve the mission and do so without firing a shot. In our current political climate this will have a significant affect on our ability to execute the mission.

The battle space is nothing new. It has always existed in some form. What have changed are the variables within it that will affect our ability to conduct operations to achieve a desired objective like a productive state. Rather, we must understand its component parts and how they form a system. Our challenge as state builders if we are to understand the complexity of these moving parts is to make sense of them so we can dominate this space at the expense of our enemies.

We are about as far away from the post World War II experiences of state building as we could be.¹⁹ The exercises carried out following the end of the War in Japan and Germany are unlikely to ever be repeated at least in the short term. Gone also are the Cold War experiences of retaining a status quo or a zero sum game with two super

¹⁹ Steven Metz, and Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Re-conceptualizing Threat and Response,” *Special Warfare*, 17, no 3 (February 2005): 6.

powers counterbalancing themselves and in effect keeping the world in balance.²⁰ In fact, the COE finds us in an unbalanced (asymmetric) system where the West is involved in fighting or managing small wars all over the globe. Since 1945 the United Nations has mounted 55 peace operations of which 41 began after 1989.²¹ This is significant because it illustrates the level of volatility on the globe, which has been unequalled in recent memory but requires the attention of stable nation-states to control. With the upsurge in conflict, this has necessitated increased intervention by members of the international community. These interventions often take the form of peace support, stabilization operations, regime changes, or combat operations, inevitably bringing about physical destruction, societal disruption, and civil unrest in host-nations. This results in further security operations to stabilize the country after hostilities end.²² This is the story of Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The end of the Cold War and the rise of ideological extremism have shaped and complicated today's strategic environment because the moving parts within the battle space are more volatile as they come into contact with each. Globalizations, information technology, transnational crime, weapons of mass destruction, and extremism have all taken on a new prominence.²³ These issues and others have come together to form a hub of complexity, which has challenged the most democratic free societies in maintaining global security and stability. The joining of these elements in the battle space is making it difficult not just in determining where the battle space starts and ends but also where

²⁰ Ibid. 6.

²¹ James Dobbins, *et al*, *America's Role in Nation Building – From Germany to Iraq*, (Santa Monica, Rand, 2003),xiv.

²² Iraq is a case in point. Bruce Hoffman, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,"(Santa Monica:Rand,2004),2.

²³ MGen A.S.H. Irwin, "The Buffalo Thorn: The Nature of the Future Battlefield," *Military Power: Land Warfare and Practice*, edited by Brian Holden Reid,(Portland: Frank Cass,1997), 3.

the conflict itself has its beginnings and ends. Western nations think in terms of time and space. Their enemies do not. Consequently it is not hard to imagine how a 9/11 might take place when the United States may not have fully understood it was already at war with the radicals of fundamentalism. The end of the Cold War, which saw the United States free to extend its foreign policy objectives in the absence of a credible deterrent like the Soviet Union, could have been an impetus for war to be declared against it by those who objected to their increased influence and hegemony. One might hypothesize that if the United States had better understood the new strategic environment they might have avoided 9/11. Had they more carefully managed the transition from a bipolar to a uni-polar world, history might tell a different story. The major events involving at the United States of the post Cold War world together tell a story also: the United States abruptly cutting aid to Afghanistan following Soviet withdrawal with no follow on support (1989), establishing bases in Saudi Arabia the heart of Islam (1991), the first attack on the World Trade Centre (1993), the bombing of the U.S. military barracks in Saudi Arabia (1996), the attacks on United States embassies in Africa (1998), the attack on the USS Cole (2000) and finally 9/11. They tell a story of response to action and inaction to a response. These examples are not laying blame on the United States for their actions because they too must act in their interests within the Global Operating Area but they do illustrate the point that every action must be calculated carefully to determine how much risk and blowback is acceptable in response to what is acted upon in the strategic environment. That risk assessment will shape the strategic environment. A better understanding of the strategic environment will illuminate danger areas to permit an appropriate response in the new battle space against the new enemy.

War may be declared on us without ever knowing. Foreign policies have the power to create enemies who will plan and devise operations against us without our knowledge.²⁴ Knowing he cannot meet us in conventional battle he will choose methods he knows will attack our vulnerabilities when we least expect it at the place of his choosing. In their simplest form, the non-state trans-national actors of today, called “spoilers”, make state building more difficult especially in the context of counterinsurgency.²⁵ Since the end of the Cold War the United States has had no real challenger in the field of conventional warfare therefore the trend has become to meet it on the “minimalist”²⁶ battlefield in the form of insurgency. The impetus to end such conflict is a more stable globe with available resources able to respond to other trouble spots. Such is the challenge of reconciling conflict and stabilization efforts simultaneously.

* * *

Firstly, state building and counterinsurgency are part of one system. If military operations become the focal point of the unconventional battle at the expense of stabilization, then the seeds for destabilization will follow, perhaps not immediately, but they will follow eventually. Counterinsurgency is one part of the stabilization.

²⁴ This is a macrocosm of Robert Thompson’s theory that the biggest problem with fighting insurgency is that the counterinsurgent is not aware of the machinations going on against him or if he notices events and actions fails to respond and he does not recognize the problem until it is too late. Post Cold War America is that example. Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency- Experiences From Malaya and Vietnam*, (London: Chatto and Windus Limited, 1966), 20-21.

²⁵ ...the factors that obstruct conflict settlement by focusing on the phenomena of “spoilers” and “spoiling”: groups and tactics that actively seek to hinder, delay, or undermine conflict settlement through a variety of means and for a variety of motives. Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006), 1.

²⁶ MGen A.S.H. Irwin, *The Buffalo Thorn: The Nature of the Future Battlefield, ...*, 2.

Secondly, state building is a continuous process that begins when the conflict begins and perhaps before it starts. In this way it becomes a line of operation towards the centre of gravity - the population, at the expense of the enemy. State building is the only constant in the process of stabilization. It will carry on even after hostilities end lest B.H. Liddell Hart's prediction comes true.

Thirdly, we must shape the elements within the battle space in order to be more effective. Because the space is physically larger with more elements in it, we are challenged to bring some balance to it in order to apply force at the right places at the right time. This is not simple when the enemy has become adept at manipulating it himself. In the instance where the enemy is difficult to control we must look to the other parts of this battle space, which will disempower him while we are empowered. We must control more of it than he can. This is the "new" battle space.

Fourthly, we have no hope of winning against any enemy or building any states if we do not understand the current strategic environment. It too, like the battle space, is a complex system in which our actions as nations will shape it. While we have more control here, equally what we do directly affects us as much as it does the enemy. As we purely serve our national interests we fulfil Liddell Hart's prediction of setting conditions for more conflict. The key is finding the balance between meeting our national interests while not imposing them on others. We must be cognizant that the current strategic environment dictates what will happen in the Global Operations Area.

The fifth is that the first four truths are all linked together to form their own system. Each level of this network per se is nested into the next at some level. The current strategic environment shapes the battle space which shapes how and when

conflict will be fought so that we can try and stabilize it through operations such as counterinsurgency and state building. In short, just as the end of the Cold War was an impetus for the increase in conflict and insurgencies, so too must it be for a regionally and globally stable world to stem the spread of asymmetrical conflict which threatens our own security.

CHAPTER 2 – COUNTERINSURGENCY

Counterinsurgency operations by far dominate the type of conflict Western forces face in the contemporary operating environment today. It is not generally the kind of warfare professional soldiers feel comfortable facing because of the complexity of the environment. The familiar elements that give the modern conventional fighter a sense of assurance and security are absent in this battle space. Gone are the linear battle lines, the uniformed opponent, the legal and ethically regulated foe, respectful of international norms in whose actions we can count on to fall within our paradigm of predictability to fight war soldier to soldier. To the contrary, we find the demographically blended fighting soldier, sometimes utilizing inferior weapons and duplicitous illegal immoral tactics, bleeding his opponent slowly for a cause that is sometimes known only to him. The insurgent is often a simple but deadly clandestine foe who rarely meets the counterinsurgent face to face on the field for fear of defeat from an overmatched enemy. How then, can one fight and win against such an opponent?

This chapter will build on Chapter 1 by inserting the historical insurgent and the counterinsurgent into the battle space and the strategic environment. In this way we can view the fight from the both perspectives. Some key practitioners of irregular warfare will be reviewed in order to understand the challenges this battlefield presents. This will be followed by an overview of modern Western philosophies of fighting counterinsurgency in order to understand various doctrinal perspectives. To summarize this chapter, that information will be synergized into some useful conclusions which will be combined with those in Chapter 3 on state building so that some determinations can be made for the final chapter.

Insurgency

No study of conflict would be complete without the view from the other side. It has been said that one cannot understand counterinsurgency unless they understand insurgency first. Therefore, while insurgency permeates the entire paper, this section will look at insurgency from a generalist viewpoint in order to set the background to the full discussion on counterinsurgency.

It has been said the insurgent has the initiative, and in many ways this is true. He has been described as the “minimalist” seeking to achieve his goals through the time proven methods of Mao and the “Peoples War”.²⁷ Classical counterinsurgency theory says the insurgent is the challenger to an established functioning system.²⁸ The status quo is his target – his weapons: revolutionary war and insurgency. Robert Thompson says the greatest challenge to the counterinsurgent is knowing when the insurgent is organizing.²⁹ Robert Taber’s appropriately named work *War of the Flea* accurately describes the insurgent in the battle space in relation to the counterinsurgent.³⁰ These views characterize the complexity and elusiveness of the insurgent in irregular warfare today.

Contemporary insurgency is different. In contemporary insurgency the insurgent does not initiate the campaign. The examples of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chechnya came about because coalition forces invaded, causing an armed response from groups internal to the host country. While this is termed resistance, it still is fought as insurgency. In

²⁷ Warrior Publications, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*” http://itwillbethundering.resist.ca/warrior_publications/insurgencyandcounterinsurgency.html; Internet; accessed 7 April 2007.

²⁸ Davis Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen1.pdf>; Internet; accessed 7 April 2007.

²⁹ Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency...*, 20-21.

³⁰ Robert, Taber, *The War of the Flea*, (London, Granada Publishing Ltd., 1965) 25.

this way, contemporary insurgency fights to keep the status quo.³¹ Contemporary insurgency is fought in the Global Operations Area using the sophisticated means offered easily by globalization. Information operations, where the media is the medium, has become the weapon of choice to attack domestic fronts. In the past, classic insurgency was limited geographically to where the war was being conducted with limited extension beyond the borders through analogue media. Today, contemporary insurgency in the form of extremism and radical movements has spread globally through digital media.

In classical insurgency the insurgent sought to gain control of the state to seize power. The movements were labelled under traditional insurgency theories so an appropriate response could be measured.³² In contemporary insurgency the insurgent does not necessarily seek to seize power. He seeks to disrupt efforts to stabilize failing nations because his power base is the environment of the failed state. Keeping the status quo means power is retained. Iraq and Afghanistan are examples.

Classical insurgency saw small cellular groups operating in a limited battle space but with little interconnectivity and limited synchronization. Synchronizing activities and efforts was difficult in an environment where the counterinsurgent was pervasive and listening. In contemporary insurgency groups are self-synchronizing using the media, the Internet and other technologies to align their ideals and their actions for more efficacy. Insurgent operational art is not only compressed but it is also more effective in this way.³³

³¹ Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency Redux*, ...accessed 7 April 2007.

³² O'Neill refers to 7 types of insurgencies: Anarchist, Egalitarian, Traditionalist, Pluralist, Secessionist, Reformist, and Preservationist. Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism – Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, (Dulles: Brassey's Inc, 1990),17-20.

³³ Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency Redux*, ...accessed 7 April 2007.

Insurgency has both in theory and practice. The astute counterinsurgent must recognize the difference between classic and contemporary insurgency because each provides a different challenge that require different responses. The contemporary environment is very complex when insurgents are fighting not to seize power but to maintain the status quo and oust those helping to stabilize failing nation state. It is a struggle between those who wish to live in the Hobbesian world and those who wish to live in prosperity.

Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency has a long and bloody history of pitting strength against weakness. Notwithstanding post 9/11, most modern armies are well acquainted with it historically and experientially where it was either is a bi-product of colonization exercises or a result of support to a failing state.³⁴

The latest U.S. Manual of counterinsurgency defines it as: “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by the government to defeat insurgency.”³⁵ Doctrine manuals commonly articulate simple definitions of counterinsurgency because they want to keep the focus on insurgency so strategies are focussed on the insurgent and not on the counterinsurgent. The definition of insurgency from the same manual is articulated as: “organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”³⁶ The paradox, as the manual states, is that while they are both subsets of irregular warfare, they are distinctly different types of operations. In spite of strength and power, the

³⁴ Nagle, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* ...,27-28.

³⁵ Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 *Counterinsurgency* (Washington: DOD, 2006), 1-3.

³⁶ Ibid 1-3.

asymmetric label attached to this kind warfare is in large part because one is far less restrictive (insurgency) than the other (counterinsurgency). Insurgency has wide arcs of operation while counterinsurgency by the very nature of the restrictive definition is narrow and reactive. It does not have to be that way.

From an historical perspective, there is an abundance of evidence to suggest that armies of different epochs found themselves mired in the business of fighting these complex subsets of irregular warfare. From 166-164 BC, the Jews successfully fought an insurgency and succeeded against the Seleucid Empire; only to be defeated 100 years later when the Romans annexed Judea in 66 AD.³⁷ Napoleon fought costly counterinsurgencies after winning conventional wars of attrition in Bavaria in 1806 and in the Iberian Peninsula in 1807 after his forces became an army of occupation.³⁸ The British fought counterinsurgency after both the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars in 1839 and 1897 respectively.³⁹ The end of World War II launched many wars of liberation like Algeria and Indochina.⁴⁰ When the Cold War ended and loosened its grip on the bipolar world, many nations were dropped into internal conflict characterized by counterinsurgent operations. More recently, the counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 and 2003 are no less bloody and as costly to fight as they were to the armies of Caesar, Napoleon, Lord Roberts or Challe. Counterinsurgency in the historical sense was more about application of force against the insurgent than it

³⁷ LCol William T. Sorrells, "Insurgency in Ancient Times: The Jewish Revolts Against the Seleucid and Roman Empires" (Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, Course Paper 2005), 2.

³⁸ Maj Mark A. Reeves, "The Iberian Leech: Napoleon's Counterinsurgency Operations in the Peninsula, 1807-1810" (Leavenworth: Master of Military Art and Science, Course Paper 2004), 3.

³⁹ Matthew W. Williams, "The British Colonial Experience in Waziristan and its Applicability to Current Operations" (Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, Course Paper 2005), 4.

⁴⁰ Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations- Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), 16.

was about winning the peace. From post World War II until pre 9/11 the application of force in counterinsurgency was predominantly the purview of special operations and not those of conventional forces. The experiences of Malaya, Algeria, and Viet Nam, were all experiments using Special Operations Forces (SOF) to fight insurgents.⁴¹

Counterinsurgency is non-linear warfare in which the demands to the conventional force or special operations force are high in terms to achieve lasting success.⁴²

Irregular warfare is about resistance and friction. It is about creating resistance to the opponent's operational capability and removing friction from ones ability to operate. He who creates more resistance for the other with the least amount of friction to himself is more likely to succeed. Imbedded in the following discussion will be how this is done.

Theory and Practice

There are benefits in studying the real counterinsurgency experiences of others that do not include doctrinal manuals of standing armies. These observations can validate or invalidate doctrinal principles. While lessons observed have permeated back from Iraq and Afghanistan and have yet to be collectively turned into lessons learned, it is useful to look at some observations and lessons learned from those who have recorded their experiences from different wars so historical counterinsurgency can give insight into modern counterinsurgency.

This section focuses on the experiences of David Galula, a counterinsurgent, T.E. Lawrence an insurgent, Frank Kitson, a practitioner and theorist, and Bard O'Neil, a

⁴¹ The author of this article also acknowledges that methodologies must be flexible enough to adapt to changing situation. Vietnam, Algeria and Malaya had a conventional force component also. Captain Paul Toolan, "Afghanistan's Rocky Road to Stability," *Special Warfare*, 19, No 3, (May/June 2006): 2.

⁴² Lieutenant-Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, "Winning the War of the Flea – Lessons from Guerrilla Warfare," *Military Review, Special Edition, Counterinsurgency Reader*, (October 2006): 42.

scholar and theorist of irregular warfare. Together their views will help consolidate a comprehensive understanding of counterinsurgency

While it would be impossible to synthesize Galula, and Lawrence in this paper, the remainder of the section will focus on their major conclusions as they apply to the counterinsurgent and insurgent. The Galula section will focus on the application of force, winning the support of the population and the application of non-kinetic force to win counterinsurgency. T.E. Lawrence will represent the insurgent view from his experiences during the Arab Revolt in 1917. Bard and Kitson will round up the review by inserting the theory into the practice. These men strived to understand what irregular warfare was from an experiential, historical and predictive perspective in order that it could be road mapped to victory. For the purposes of this paper counterinsurgency and insurgency together will be referred to as irregular warfare as they are subsets of it.

Galula

One of the best sources available today to understand counterinsurgency is from David Galula.⁴³ His book, “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice”, based on his experiences in many irregular wars, is still a seminal work sought out by those fighting this kind of warfare. The U.S Manual FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 “Counterinsurgency” integrates many of Galula’s ideas into modern U.S. doctrine.⁴⁴ It still stands as a compass to Western armies on how to understand and fight counterinsurgency.

⁴³ He was a career soldier whose experiences took him to conventional war in North Africa, Italy, and France in World War II and irregular war in China, Greece, Indochina, and Algeria. He wrote his work when he was a LCol after he had time to reflect on his experiences. He died in 1967 as the Americans were becoming mired Viet Nam. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice* (London: Praeger Security International, 1964), vii.

⁴⁴Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 *Counterinsurgency*,(Washington: DOD 2006).

The population is generally recognized as one of the most important factors in irregular warfare. It is viewed as a source of power for both the insurgent and counterinsurgent; and for Galula is the center of gravity because it can provide the ways and the means to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment.⁴⁵

Galula separates the population into three groups: the active minority for the cause; the active minority against the cause; and the majority neutral to the cause.⁴⁶ The goal of the counterinsurgent should be to leverage and rally the as many people to the cause and against the insurgent. This means relying on those who are neutral. In this way, the insurgent will face three-fold resistance than if he was fighting just the counterinsurgent. A major element of counterinsurgency warfare is to leverage the undecided before the insurgents can.

The counterinsurgent has to work harder to ensure that the neutral majority does not turn active or passive against the cause. The insurgent holds the initiative because for the most part he decides when and where battle will be joined and who and what gets targeted.⁴⁷ This forces the counterinsurgent to be reactive within this complex environment rather than proactive. As long as the insurgent continues to prove the counterinsurgent cannot protect the population and maintain law and order, it is much more difficult for the counterinsurgent to succeed. In the event that the neutral “fence sitters” become an active majority against the counterinsurgency, then the fight is likely

⁴⁵ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*...,4.

⁴⁶ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*...,54.

⁴⁷ “In counterinsurgency, the enemy initiates most attacks, targets you unexpectedly and withdraws too fast for you to react.” David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency” Written from fieldnotes compiled in Baghdad, Tajji and Kuwait City (Washington, D.C., 29 March, 2006) http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/kilcullen_28_articles.pdf; Internet; accessed 7 April 2007.

to be lost.⁴⁸ It is therefore incumbent on the counterinsurgent to perform demonstrative actions to ensure the insurgents do not capture the neutrals or silence the supporters. In doing so, if he is successful, friction on his operations will decrease but will increase for the insurgent. Therefore a key element of winning “fence sitters” lies in two areas: protection of the population by establishing security and disrupting activities against them; and acting directly against the insurgent and his cause instead of reacting to his actions. The question is how is this done?

One element of establishing the two conditions above is through the application of force. It has a dual role: it can be used to protect the population by creating a secure environment; and by targeting the insurgent can remove his initiative.

One of Galula’s beliefs is that areas must be cleared of insurgents in order for normalcy to entrench itself to create a lasting safe and secure environment.⁴⁹ Counterinsurgent forces are the means in which to do this initially. Galula contends that in time and with training, security is a task that must be assumed by the host nation forces and its population. This is because counterinsurgent resources and manpower are limited, and as soon as the population is engaged in their own security then the counterinsurgent can move elsewhere and start the process again. This serves two purposes: by investing the population and its forces in their own protection, the likely hood of winning over the fence sitters increases and the insurgent now has to deal with another force whose strength is their collective security and consistency of operations.

The term “clear” also refers to the desired effect against insurgent. Insurgent power is derived from the population because without them his cause is useless.

⁴⁸ Another term for the undecided.

⁴⁹ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare...*, 55.

Proximity to the population will give the insurgent moral and psychological strength but that strength may come through intimidation, active support, and even passive support. The strength of the fabric between the counterinsurgent and the population will become the primary target for “congenitally weak” insurgent whose aim is to separate the people from the protection and support of the counterinsurgent.⁵⁰ Conversely the counterinsurgent is attempting to ensure he separates the insurgent from the population also. This dichotomous relationship with the population can effect a tremendous strain on this most valuable asset and as a result must be managed accordingly. The counterinsurgent therefore must be prepared to apply measured force in order to protect that relationship. In cases where the insurgent succeeds in getting close to the population or the fabric of connectivity is stronger with the population, separating him from them requires much effort and resources; and some application of force with other initiatives – like state building. To that end security will produce many bi-products not the least of which is support of the population.

The application of force is an essential element needed to defeat the insurgent. It must be applied in conjunction with force applied by the host nation in order to ensure that physical separation occurs between the insurgent and the population. With a host nation engaged in armed conflict against the insurgent, notwithstanding the strain this will put in the internal national system, the physical application of force can be one basis to begin to defeat the insurgent militarily, yet set conditions for his ideological defeat as well through state building. Force application will create resistance against the insurgent.

Application of kinetic force can only be one half of the solution in fighting insurgency. In fact the ideological and moral plane is where the insurgent is truly

⁵⁰ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare...*,51.

weakest only because the population is the center of gravity.⁵¹ Galula introduces spatial and temporal concepts in terms of time and space. He combines these concepts with resource allocation and enabling operations to create conditions for the counterinsurgent to win. He seeks to increase resistance in the enemy and reduce friction for his operations. Those enablers for Galula are intelligence and psychological operations in the non-kinetic fight and together these will act as force multipliers or resistors against the insurgent.⁵²

Galula says that one very essential ingredient for success is the demonstration of *means* and *vastness*.⁵³ Money, economic development, social reform, good governance combined with time constitutes the *means*. *Vastness* applies to the counterinsurgent's ability to engage those means throughout the host nation's system for as long as is required. If the counterinsurgent cannot fulfill both conditions by having means and vastness, he should not be committing the force to the fight. Often nations have the means and not the vastness or vice versa. Herein lies the dilemma of the strategic assessment if intervention from a third party is under consideration.

Initially the insurgent will not have the means to conduct low or high intensity operations for extended periods but he can compete in vastness and time.⁵⁴ This must be exploited because the insurgent knows if he is to be successful, at some point he will also have establish the means, therefore he will unmask himself eventually to do so. The counterinsurgent will have to prevent the insurgent from building the means to operate.

Means however is often expressed in terms of cost and expenditure. Galula

⁵¹ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*...,4.

⁵² Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*...,55.

⁵³ Ibid. 55.

⁵⁴ Subversion usually takes years time it turns to insurgency and goes to combat operations. Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*...,58.

estimates that the cost ratio of the counterinsurgent to the insurgent is 20 to 1 or perhaps higher. During the counterinsurgency in Algeria between 1954 and 1962 the rebels at their peak expended 40 million dollars annually; the French Army was spending that amount every two weeks. Chapter 3 notes the costs in Iraq have been 257 billion (USD) since 2003. In contrast, the counterinsurgent must leverage the advantages of being able to promote economic development, social and governmental reform, which he can provide and the insurgent cannot. More money and resources however, do not necessarily equate to success, rather they can create resistance to the ability of the insurgent to operating in ways in which he cannot reciprocate.

Intelligence collection is a tenet of irregular warfare because it will mitigate the elusiveness of the insurgent and assist in his identification. Once he identified then the task of separating him from the population can begin.⁵⁵ Galula's observations are based on the practices of the time (1960s) yet offer some lessons of use to operations today. Galula sees intelligence focused around information gathering from informants who are potential allies or by leveraging the population by applying pressure as required to force compliance and cooperation from them.⁵⁶ Intelligence, he says can also be achieved not just by infiltrating the insurgent groups but presenting "pseudo" insurgents to the population in order to exploit the enemy to identify those within the population who are not friendly to the cause. Today, those methods still work but they are combined with more sophisticated means such as technology and modern human intelligence practices. Collecting intelligence within the insurgency environment will be difficult and there is no question that unconventional means will have to be used in order to exploit insurgency

⁵⁵ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare...*,32.

⁵⁶ This can be dangerous depending on how that control is applied. Ibid. 84.

weaknesses especially in built up areas. The counterinsurgent will be protecting himself from the same.⁵⁷ Without accurate and timely intelligence, the application of force is useless. Consequently, no rational means to collect it should be dismissed unless it falls outside the legal confines of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Intelligence will reduce friction on the side that has the timely abundance of it.

Psychological operations or propaganda as Galula calls it, has significance.⁵⁸ He sees these types of operations to be conducted for three reasons: to protect the counterinsurgent; win the population; and discredit and de-unify the insurgent. Nullifying propaganda against the counterinsurgent means living and working with the population where close constant contact with them will reap permanent benefit. Secondly, propaganda against may be exercised against population by a simple face-to-face soldier to citizen relationship.⁵⁹ Thirdly, propaganda applied to the insurgent from the operational and strategic levels to exploit the fissures within his organization will create friction causing his cohesiveness to be challenged.⁶⁰ As a result he will have to sacrifice time, resources and effectiveness of his own organization to remain cohesive instead of dedicating them to the insurgency. Therefore the focus of propaganda directed at the insurgent will be to the dissidents who are not sure the cause is worthy and between the leaders and followers.

From this we can surmise three conclusions in which the application of non-kinetic force will affect the counterinsurgent: non-kinetic action is a costly affair in terms

⁵⁷ CNN recently reported a story detailing that Iraqi soldiers would not be briefed by American soldiers on future operations due to OPSEC and force protection issues. Their aim was to try and prevent the insurgents from gathering intelligence on coalition operations through sympathetic Iraqi troops. The key is finding the balance in this kind of operating procedure of letting the host nation take the lead while force protection is maintained.

⁵⁸ Ibid 85.

⁵⁹ Ibid.86.

⁶⁰ Ibid.86.

of money, and resources and must be applied judiciously; third party intervention must be centered around commitment until the task is done, intelligence efforts must be calculated and additive to other enablers such as psychological operations to increase our ability to operate and reduce the same in the insurgent.

Some key conclusions can also be stated from Galula: population as the center of gravity has 3 facets: the population must be invested in the issue so they become part of the solution: the application of force is necessary to separate the insurgent from the people; and if the people's lives are improved through economic, sociological, and political stability they are likely to support the counterinsurgent. Intelligence and psychological operations run together as a force multiplier to compliment the use of force. Without them force is a blunt instrument.

The counterinsurgent then has three roles: to fight the insurgent to incubate the population from relating to him and his cause; initiate activities which will benefit the life style of the people; and be prepared to live, fight, and work with the population in order to exploit enabling operations in order to target the enemy. These will take time and effort as the counterinsurgent competes for vastness and the application of these three means.

T.E. Lawrence

This seemed unlike the ritual of war of which Foch had been priest, and so I began to hope that there was a difference of kind between him and us. He called his modern war "absolute." In it two nations professing incompatible philosophies set out to try them in the light of force. A struggle of two immaterial principles could only end when the supporters of one had no more means of resistance.⁶¹

T.E. Lawrence on Insurgency

⁶¹ T.E. Lawrence, "The Evolution of a Revolt," *Army Quarterly and Defence, Journal*, (1920),6.

T.E. Lawrence in many ways is the father of modern insurgency and can offer some lessons and observation from his experiences. Having been tasked by England to lead an Arab Rebellion against the Turks in 1917, the stage had been set for him to develop insurgency as a means of warfare which would serve as the template for many who came after him.⁶² He saw irregular warfare as struggle of means and vastness also. The importance of the populace was one of 6 Fundamentals of Insurgency developed by Lawrence.⁶³ While he seems not to have elevated any one above the other, it is clear he did understand the importance of the population. His writings show he believed that an insurgency required minimum passive support from the population to be successful.⁶⁴ He saw their involvement as key to mobilizing rebellion in terms of building the moral support required for the cause. In fact he saw the population support as part of his conceptual framework of insurgency, which comprised of the algebraical (time and space with respect to enemy troops sizes); biological (wearing down an army through direct attacks on their materiel); and psychological (the battle within the minds of the opponents). Lawrence used the population as part economy of force operations. The size of the army he had in the Arabian Desert in 1917 was no where near enough to defeat the better equipped, better trained and better disciplined Army of Turkey. He calculated that with passive support of the population that a rebellion can be created with 98 percent passive support and only 2 percent striking force.⁶⁵ While some might question the

⁶² I was sent to these Arabs as a stranger, unable to think their thoughts or subscribe their beliefs, but charged by duty to lead them forward and to develop to the highest any movement of theirs profitable to England in her war. T.E. Lawrence, "Seven Pillars of Wisdom" (Ebooks, 2006).
<http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/l/lawrence/te/seven/index.html>Internet; accessed 16 April 2007.

⁶³ James J. Schneider, "T.E. Lawrence and the Mind of an Insurgent", *Army*, (July 2005), 34.

⁶⁴ Ibid 34.

⁶⁵ Lawrence, *Evolution of a Revolt...*,24.

statistic, the fact remains that it is reflective of his conclusions on the importance of the support from the people.

Lawrence viewed insurgency as an offensive means of warfare, which was to be conducted over protracted periods of time. Swift and speed of action in small numbers are all tactics applied by the insurgent.⁶⁶ Application of force was a precision tool because the insurgent functions off precise information. His thinking was progressive and imaginative and even in 1917 Lawrence understood the impact of enablers like the media and psychological operations as a tool to apply force to his opponents.⁶⁷ He understood that if one can manipulate the media then he owns it. He knew that the enemy's greatest fear was uncertainty and as a result exploited that on the moral and psychological plane. Lawrence accepted that he could never win conventionally therefore he would need to offset his weakness through enabling operations. He sought to create psychological resistance to his enemy because he believed this would increase friction down to the individual soldier in essence creating inertia.

T.E Lawrence gives an interesting brief insight into the mind of the insurgent. He introduced in 1917 the aspects of time and endurance in this genre of warfare with analytical flair. He introduced the use of enablers before they were in vogue. It is no wonder that Vo Nguyen Giap architect of the French defeat in Indochina and Americans in Vietnam considered T.E. Lawrence a master of insurgency. Giap carried Lawrence's book *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* with him for 25 years.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ This work of Lawrence is full of his exploits of striking in small groups at specific Turkish targets. T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*... accessed 16 April 2007.

⁶⁷ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*...,24.

⁶⁸ Lawrence, *Evolution of a Revolt*..., 31.

With these writers in mind, one must remember some dictums to be drawn from the brief lessons above: the counterinsurgent is restricted to operating within a doctrinal, legal and ethical framework; to deviate will result in failure;⁶⁹ the counterinsurgent must have a cohesive structure to protect the population and isolate them from the less organized insurgent; and the burden of effort is on the counterinsurgent initially but that burden will eventually have to be undertaken by the insurgent if he hopes to take the legitimate place of the counterinsurgent.⁷⁰ These experiences must now be viewed in the context of some theory.

While Galula professes to discuss irregular warfare in a theoretical manner, the fact remains that his writings are pervasive with his personal experiences despite their sometimes-academic feel and sound. Bard O'Neill, an academic in his own right and life long student of irregular warfare, discusses counterinsurgency from a distance in the theoretical sense using a framework to understand insurgency. Frank Kitson, a former counterinsurgent with extensive experience in fighting insurgency, takes a more intuitive view but for the purposes of this work is considered a theoretical writer of the study of insurgency and counterinsurgency.⁷¹ Together, the works of these men will be considered as the foundation for this section's review of insurgency and counterinsurgency for theoretical conclusions.

⁶⁹ Galula's theory is to stay rational. The counterinsurgent cannot be tempted to fight as the insurgent does. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*...,51.

⁷⁰ This will become a weakness to exploit by denying the means from the insurgent to do usurp the initiative and take the place of the counterinsurgent.

⁷¹ Kitson had experience in Kenya, Malay, Muscat, Oman and Cyprus. He was also the commander of 39 Airborne Brigade in Northern Ireland when the infamous "Bloody Sunday" incident took place in 1972 where 26 protesters were shot by the 1st Bn of the Parachute Regiment. 14 people subsequently died as a result of the shooting. Colonel Fred A. Lewis, "The Ability To Do Old Things In New Ways—Counter-Insurgency And Operational Art," *Canadian Army Journal* Vol. 9.3 (Winter 2006), 11.

Theoretical models of insurgency and how to fight it are often believed to be inadequate to account for the asymmetrical aspect of irregular warfare. Regardless, the scholar and more importantly the counterinsurgent of such warfare must find some lens to look at insurgency in order to understand something about it so he can fight it. Consequently, models can be helpful. Understanding insurgency is more than a group of disgruntled political radicals whose wish it is to overthrow their host nation government in the interest of some obscure cause. Instead, it is a system deeply connected at many levels that has nuances of leadership, cause, struggle, organization, and violence. Insurgency is the genesis of change within different political systems within the larger international system. It is the vehicle for the realism of a vision and the choice for the weak desirous in achieving that vision. Insurgency is a clandestine foe whose origins and existence are often not known until it is too late to eliminate the wave of discontent and the under currents of distress have gained too much momentum to go to the negotiating table. Enter the counterinsurgent.

There does not seem to be consensus amongst writers about how insurgencies should be fought. Part of that reason is because no two insurgencies are alike and various writers contrast in their definition of it. O'Neill for example, sees insurgency as a "struggle between a non-ruling group and ruling authorities in which...political resources and violence destroy...the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics."⁷² This definition implies that insurgency, if synchronized properly, has powerful connectivity to achieve a greater effect than the sum of its parts and therefore, greater efforts will be required by the counterinsurgent to rupture his opponent's ability to carry on his struggle. This is interesting because it views insurgency as an all encompassing system in which

⁷² O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*...,13.

the counterinsurgent will have to choose whether he attacks the whole system at once or strikes at elements of it in order to cause catastrophic failure.

Kitson actually sees insurgency as an outcome of exhausted subversion and thusly sees them as chronological events that will take place as part of the framework in which the ruling group will be attacked.⁷³ In this framework the counterinsurgent if astute enough has time to begin the fight before it goes violent.⁷⁴ Kitson's theory is that insurgencies do not automatically go violent but instead simmer over a period of years until the insurgent decides that subversion is no longer working towards the desired effect.

Counterinsurgency is viewed as a linear framework by O'Neill and a looser system by Kitson.⁷⁵ O'Neill's framework is useful in terms of dissecting the essential elements of insurgency. The framework is centered on some key overarching themes which show he sees the nature of the insurgency in terms of its goals and origins; the means by which insurgents achieve them; the environment they function in; and the enablers such as population, and external support as complete system. From this linear relationship he has devised the counterinsurgent response.⁷⁶ O'Neill offers an external view of the insurgent and portrays the many complexities he faces. While it is agreed that the insurgent possesses the initiative and that initially he has enough strength to fight, the burden to maintain his strength and reduce the same in his opponent rests solely on

⁷³ Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*..., 20.

⁷⁴ Thompson points out that often the counterinsurgent does not know about the insurgency until it is too late. Not because he didn't know about it but because he chose to do nothing. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*..., 21.

⁷⁵ Kitson articulates a loose framework of 4 pillars – “establish good coordinating machinery; create a political atmosphere in which government measures can be introduced with the maximum likelihood of success; establish an effective intelligence network at every level in order to conduct operations; and adhere steadfastly to the rule of law.” Lewis *The Ability To Do Old Things In New Ways—Counter-Insurgency and Operational Art*..., 11.

⁷⁶ O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*..., 125-154.

him. It is the insurgent who also has the power to make or break his insurgency as much as the counterinsurgent has the power to destroy it. Consequently the real burden of the insurgent is to find a good cause.⁷⁷

Kitson however does not express insurgency in the form of so structured a framework. He differs because his theory is based on a more fluid approach to insurgency because of the fluid nature of this type of warfare.⁷⁸ His theory is based on a loose evolutionary approach to insurgency where events and actions happen gradually when conditions are right. Kitson sees insurgency evolving from failed subversion and emphasizes how difficult it is to not just set conditions for subversion but even more complicated to transition to insurgency. It is in this transition he believes the counterinsurgent is strongest and must act quickly in order to disrupt the insurgent. Kitson looks to the leadership of insurgency to carry the burden of success or failure. They must take on a dual responsibility in the cause; to win over the population and to impose their will on the government. As a result Kitson's view is strongly focussed on targeting the leadership of the insurgent and their relationship with the organization.

There can be no question the population holds one of the keys to success in irregular warfare. It is one of three hinge joints in the counterinsurgency fight with application of force as the second and stabilization activities being the third joint. The population is an element of sway because it is here where the efforts of the other two hinge joints will makes the most difference. By focussing on the population and not the insurgent, the chances of success naturally increase as life improves and the population

⁷⁷ Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*...,29.

⁷⁸ Ibid. 57.

sees less of a reason to fight and more of a reason to live in peace.⁷⁹ In the theoretical sense it is easy to say but much more difficult in application. The key message by both O'Neill and Kitson is that without the population the fight is lost.

O'Neill categorizes the population in three categories: passive (those who sympathize but do not support); active (those who directly support insurgents); and intellectuals (influential leaders).⁸⁰ For O'Neill, it is about understanding the component parts of the insurgency that to him the role of the population has prominence. He recognizes that the support of the population is what will offset government strength in favour of the insurgent as it moves from the counterinsurgent to the insurgent. Support of the population in his view will come if methods of inducement are used.⁸¹ These will be linked to the higher elements of his framework and further become part of the government response. O'Neill's breakdown of the population is useful much like Galula because it offers two insights. First it allows the targeting process to be focussed. For instance, if the passive majority are influenced somehow by the counterinsurgent using various non-kinetic methods, the active part will lose its recruit and support base. By targeting the intellectual elite who are not leaders in themselves of the movement but "voices" for the insurgent cause, they are more likely to accept negotiation in rational discussion in order to answer grievances, and in turn influence the insurgent leadership in favour of the government. Secondly, it allows focus on the application of force into the active movement. There are many examples in Iraq and Afghanistan to show that

⁷⁹ Ibid. 50.

⁸⁰ O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*..., 72.

⁸¹ The seven methods are: charismatic attraction, esoteric appeals, exoteric appeals, terrorism, provocation of government repression, and demonstration of potency, coercion. Ibid. 74-85.

application force against the wrong part of a movement will only degrade counterinsurgent power.

Kitson's view is much simpler. Winning the population comes from economic prosperity and killing the insurgent or his cause.⁸² In effect Kitson believes economic prosperity will kill the insurgents cause. He sees more leeway for the counterinsurgent than following a step-by-step model. It allows the counterinsurgent to develop more fluid adaptive strategies and validates the assertion that state building and counterinsurgency must be simultaneous. The prime task is ensuring that the efforts to develop economic prosperity and killing the insurgent or his cause complement one another in terms of linkage and focus. In Kitson's theory the longer the insurgent is allowed to ascend in the eyes of the population the more difficult it will be to defeat him. While this may not add much to the counterinsurgent looking for strategies it gives the fight some context within the spectrum of conflict.

Both Kitson and O'Neill offer some excellent food for thought as the importance of the population is considered. There is merit to deconstructing the elements of population in order to understand what the response should be. But there is also merit in not attaching oneself to a structured approach to warfare that is tied to an unstructured environment. Every environment has structure; even asymmetric warfare.

The first and most important assertion is that there is no model to fight counterinsurgency. Both Kitson and O'Neill take similar approaches yet the nuances are different. Kitson takes a more intuitive approach while O'Neill remains true to the step-by-step approach to defeating insurgency. Kitson's theories are based more on long term applications of force and more population and state centric activities while not shying

⁸² Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations...*, 50.

away from killing the insurgent. O'Neill who does acknowledge the need for activities beyond the military solution focuses on the insurgent and takes a linear approach to analysis. Interestingly the two approaches represent two different cultures; O'Neil is an American and Kitson is British.

O'Neill calls his approach the *Government Response*. The name is apropos because it does clearly emphasize that the response should be more than a military one. Like Kitson the counterinsurgency effort will take the form of some delineated activities that will preclude the actual application force. Kitson sees phases as the means to govern the response but he calls it the "Army's Contribution".⁸³ The name is indicative of the time his book was written and the experiences of the writer. In looking at counterinsurgency this way, his implied meaning is that others too must contribute to the effort. Presumably there other contributors would complete Kitson's theory. Therefore stabilization operations must also take place concurrently. He follows tenets instead of steps. Kitson believes as a first tenet that as the insurgent organizes he must be disrupted immediately. This attacks his unity and cohesion and in doing so when the insurgent is focussed on organizing his cause he cannot focus on other aspects such as violence or influencing the population. Secondly the application of force is something only to be used when all else fails; but is something to be managed and not to be avoided.⁸⁴ The escalation of the use of force by one side could be interpreted as on side losing ground. What is being targeted is as important as how many attacks are occurring. The deliberate attacks on certain types of development projects like schools or community leaders like teachers can be viewed as measure of success of the counterinsurgent despite the external

⁸³ Ibid 65.

⁸⁴ Ibid 68.

view. While they may appear to be losses to the counterinsurgent by the outsider they are an indicator that the counterinsurgent activities are having the desired effect on the insurgent and his cause. Conversely if the counterinsurgent is involved in a higher percentage of combat operations because he cannot keep areas “clean” it might be an indicator the insurgent is gaining advantage.⁸⁵ Kitson, O’Neill, Galula and even General Petraeus agree that losses can be temporary just as victories. This is acceptable but when this happens, the counterinsurgent must be very careful to manage this phase because of its effect on the population.⁸⁶ Trying to make up a loss by applying more force can detract from the end state. The third tenet is that the use of force must be decisive and measured. His definition of force also includes non-kinetic aspects. Kitson sees the gathering of information and the use of intelligence as keys. Once this is developed he argues that psychological operations are a necessity if one is to exploit the intelligence for kinetic and non-kinetic uses.⁸⁷ Lastly, Kitson discusses a practice that is today practical and measured. The placement of military officers in host government agencies similar to what Canada has been doing with the Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan is a useful exercise.⁸⁸ This was a practice in Malaya, which was a successful counterinsurgency operation in the 1960’s.

However it is viewed, be it a system, a framework, or a set of tenets from a theoretical perspective, there are four common threads to counterinsurgency: focus on

⁸⁵ Some have questioned Canada’s escalation of force by the employment of tanks for counterinsurgency in Afghanistan as sign we are not as effective as the insurgent.

⁸⁶ The war of perceptions—winning a battle of ideas, influencing other cultures, countering the virulent message of hate and intolerance promoted by our enemies—is a bitter conflict fought out every day in an environment of 24/7 news coverage and a continuous global news cycle. David W. Barno, “Challenges in fighting a Global Insurgency,” *Parameters* (Summer 2006),21.

⁸⁷ Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations...*, 77.

⁸⁸ Colonel M.D. (Mike) Capstick, *Strengthening the Weak: The Canadian Forces in Afghanistan*, Concept Paper from Roto 0 Canadian SAT Team Op ARGUS (2005).5.

the population and their welfare; use alternate methods of force to neutralize the insurgent or his cause; and be prepared to kill him if necessary. Most importantly be prepared to do all of the above simultaneously. Again friction and resistance principles apply. O'Neill and Kitson both offer unique views despite the similarities. In both cases each author is about trying to establish criteria for success without saying so. Kitson wants an increase in economic prosperity of the population in order to attack the insurgent cause and O'Neill looks to incorporate a government approach to the problem. The most important tenet of success for these men is application of force alone will not defeat an insurgency. Only when we can see the effort as comprehensive and collective can we hope to have any success.

Doctrine

It is useful in order to understand national doctrinal approaches to counterinsurgency in order to put into context experience and theory. This section will cover the doctrines of the United State, Britain and Canada to illustrate that while they all sound and read similarly the real difference lies in the cultural and historical approach to warfare.

The combined Marine and Army Manual FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is the compilation of 25 years of work on behalf of the United States.⁸⁹ Before this latest doctrine, U.S. counterinsurgency was based on experiences of the Vietnam Communist insurgency.⁹⁰ While many of the fundamentals remain constant, the manual recognizes

⁸⁹ The U.S. have counterinsurgency doctrine dated 2004 but it was an interim doctrine implemented to meet the demand of the new COE. Headquarters Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22 *Counterinsurgency Operations*, (Washington: DOD 2004).

⁹⁰ Actually their last real doctrinal manual on counterinsurgency was *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*. After Vietnam there absence of any official doctrinal development in counterinsurgency. In reality only a few books were written to capture the lessons learned but no new doctrine until after post 9//11. Maj Jonathan K. Graff, Jr, "United States

that counterinsurgency in the COE is not solely based on resurrecting practices from previous wars. The manual identifies that counterinsurgency is a conglomeration of offensive, defensive and stability operations conducted along lines of operation.⁹¹ It accepts that counterinsurgency is no longer the domain of military agencies but non-military agencies also. This is one of the first manuals which admits that soldiers in the counterinsurgency environment will require the skills beyond war fighting in the form of knowledge to facilitate reconstruction, restore law and order, help in training security forces to support the host nation political system, and to work closely with host nation and intergovernmental agencies in order to state build. The fact that doctrine in the counterinsurgency environment has received so much focus and so much effort to evolve so quickly is testament to a revolution in military thinking of sort. While perhaps not a revolution in military affairs the U.S. manual is the renaissance of its doctrinal counterinsurgency.

A quick peruse of its chapters will note a change in approach from its predecessor manual. It focuses more on understanding insurgency than fighting it. With less emphasis on kinetic application of force, the current doctrine emphasizes a shift from previous doctrine prior to 9/11 that had not envisioned the kind of global religious based contemporary insurgency discussed in the beginning of this chapter.

American doctrine focuses on interagency cooperation, intelligence, designing campaigns and executing them. It is a document that has applicability from the tactical level up, yet it understands that this kind of warfare is not a comfort zone for U.S. forces. In fact this manual goes against many of their principles of conventional warfighting

Counterinsurgency Doctrine And Implementation In Iraq,” Leavenworth, Master of Military Art and Science, (Course Paper 2004), 8.

⁹¹ Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 *Counterinsurgency...*, Forward.

which is what they are truly masters of. It recognizes the Mao approach and other historical references of other nations and other successful insurgent activities but for the most part this is a how to manual on how to plan and execute counterinsurgency. The manual's greatest weakness is the "how to" of being an occupying force.⁹² Arguably this is the state building part of the campaign. This manual is dated December 2006.

Some then would argue that with such a comprehensive manual on counterinsurgency they should be more successful in Iraq. Part of the answer lies in the actual execution of the doctrine, the impact of culture, and American experience in counterinsurgency itself.⁹³ They have limited exposure to such activities and have spent the better part of the Cold War enhancing their conventional warfighting experiences while supporting insurgencies against its enemies.⁹⁴ As such the historical and cultural mind set is not yet present in American culture in order to support highly successful counterinsurgency operations yet.⁹⁵ Being a global hegemony with a history of extensive conventional military power, counterinsurgency might seem counter-intuitive to how they have been conditioned to fight.

The British Manual dated 2001; *Counterinsurgency Operations – Strategic and Operational Guidelines* is very similar to the U.S. manual in its quest to understand

⁹² Graff, *United States Counterinsurgency Doctrine And Implementation In Iraq...*,12.

⁹³ The United States has been involved in fighting only 4 major insurgencies prior to post 9/11: Philippines, Hukbalahap Insurrection (Philippines), Vietnam and El Salvador. Not extensive experience. To Ibid. 33.

⁹⁴ If U.S. military culture has traditionally exhibited a preference for a big, conventional-war paradigm, and if this preference has impeded its capacity to adapt to small wars and counterinsurgencies, then there might be something to gain or learn from examining the cultural characteristics of another army with a greater propensity for counterinsurgency. Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army, "The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Saliency of Military Culture," *Military Review*, (May 2005), 1.

⁹⁵ "One of his main concerns is that US Army officers and soldiers are not sufficiently culturally aware to avoid unintentional alienation of the indigenous population." Ibid. 28.

insurgency.⁹⁶ While they both cover relatively the same headings the British experiences in small wars comes through in the detail; and the level of understanding of counterinsurgency follows a more flexible approach based on experience and knowledge. Britain has more experiences fighting irregular warfare than any other country and thus has developed an extensive understanding of planning and executing counterinsurgency.⁹⁷ The British doctrine accepts that overall campaign may be designed by the government, and executed by the military with either or both of these agencies working together to make collaborative decisions. The need for centralized control is a tenet of their counterinsurgency implementation strategies making sure that whatever military commander is in charge understands that his level of autonomy in this type of environment will be limited due to the strategic nature of the environment and the implications of making mistakes in them.

British doctrine is also intelligence and psychological operations driven with an aim to sway population support in their favour. These sections are significantly more developed than the American manual even considering the British one is designed and aimed at the operational and strategic level.

The British doctrine while it has a healthy dose of kinetic application, like the U.S. manual understands that force is not the only answer.⁹⁸ In fact the cultural mindset is imbedded in the manual because of the British experience as former empire and

⁹⁶ Army Field Manual Volume 1 – Combined Arms Operations, Part 10 Counterinsurgency Operations – Strategic and Operational Guidelines, (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2001).

⁹⁷ Historically, British Army culture has influenced its approach to counterinsurgency. The British Army's experiences in small wars and counterinsurgencies during the 19th and 20th centuries remain topical and salient. Cassidy, *The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture*,...53.

⁹⁸ Years of experience in small wars and counterinsurgencies have over time imbued the British Army as an institution with certain principles about the use of force in such operations. As a result, the British have wholeheartedly accepted that they should use minimum force, but only when required. *Ibid.* 59.

colonizer which has fought counterinsurgency abroad and at home for long periods of time. It has never had any catastrophic failures of counterinsurgency and has shown great flexibility and efficacy when operating.⁹⁹

The Canadian DRAFT counterinsurgency doctrine dated 2007, the first of its kind in this country, is more closely related to the British doctrine. It espouses the same principles as the other two manuals but what is missing is historical and cultural context. The manual on the surface does not read well nor does it establish a comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency. Canada's manual is not based on lessons it has learned but on those of others. While this is perfectly acceptable, the doctrine writers within the Canadian Forces Training System would also argue that doctrine is culturally based and thus must reflect our culture and values. One might ask then why take someone else's doctrine? Our military connection to Britain is perhaps one explanation to this and that Britain has enjoyed more success in this field.

Canada supports a multi agency approach to operations and directly aims at what to do once the insurgency is defeated. It fails to emphasize a concurrent approach that has the fight and the development happening simultaneously. While we are living it Afghanistan at the moment, it is not a tenet of our current doctrine.

Canadian doctrine is new and at the time of the writing of this paper is in draft. It has been questioned in recent days about the reference to the two of three insurgency type operations this country has ever faced. Both the 1970 FLQ crisis and the Mohawk Movement in 1991 were types of insurgency groups that resorted to violence and civil disorder to impose their will on the government. The fact the government has agreed to

⁹⁹ History and an insular geography have helped shape a pragmatic, indirect British approach to strategy. Imperial policing, intrastate security, and counterinsurgency have been considered normal roles for the British Army. Ibid. 59.

remove the references from the manual after public outcry speaks volumes about the Canadian approach to counterinsurgency operations. It has not been inculcated in our culture yet.

* * *

Counterinsurgency is about overcoming and imposing resistance and friction. Armies prefer to fight conventional warfare to the complex restrictive environment of countering insurgency. While the tactics have remained constant, the insurgent has evolved into the new battle space to the point where he not only competing effectively for control of it but enough that he can effectively impact the current strategic environment. Contemporary insurgency is the culprit of this development. Who would have thought that insurgents would be fighting to keep the status quo of a failed state? In the current strategic environment where failed states provide opportunities outside the legal confines of statehood is not surprising. This should not deter the counterinsurgent; instead it should galvanize his determination to remove this phenomenon for not only the greater interest of the host nation whose population is either being oppressed or exploited, but also in the interest of his own eventual domestic security

Galula died in 1967 but few match his legacy in the field of counterinsurgency. His durability as a writer, practitioner and theorist is testament to his ideas and concepts, which by no small measure can be applied even today fighting contemporary insurgency in Iraq. T.E. Lawrence, whose ideas and experience served as the basis for Vo Nguyen Giap, has also stood the test of time. His forward thinking ideas on enabling operations form part of the foundation for understanding of many theorists and scholars including every author of irregular warfare in this paper.

Counterinsurgency is about protecting the population and setting conditions for their prosperity. It is about finding ways to fight the insurgent without excessive force application. Rather successful operations against the insurgent will separate him from his cause, his followers, and above all the population by other means.

Counterinsurgency doctrine is culturally based. It has been said the doctrine is a reflection of the values of a military. Those values are not simply made up; they are earned through strife, through experience, through failure and successes. As we look at the differences between U.S., British, and Canadians we can see that although they sound and look the same they are not. These three nations share many values, beliefs, democratic ideals etc. What sets them apart is their history, the culture and their social ties – all the things that make them nations. These things have been earned over time, and could never have been taught or imposed on them in a “nation building” exercise. More importantly these precepts, which identify them as Americans, Britons, and Canadians are what comes through in both the approach and execution of counterinsurgency. The United States has spent almost 45 years of the last 60 learning and mastering Cold War despite short interludes of countering insurgency here and there. The fact remains they are a massive military, which regardless of what their counterinsurgency doctrine says, is culturally reflective of a “hard power” society and therefore will turn to that as a default. Iraq is an example of the execution of American counterinsurgency. The British on the other hand have had their hands full of this kind of warfare since they began colonizing and de-colonizing their empire including some domestic type insurgency in Northern Ireland. Their cultural makeup is reflective of their experiences and consequently they have a better track record of results in this type of

warfare. The Canadians do not have the “hard power” or the historical background to make us world-class counterinsurgents yet. The removal of our early insurgency experiences from our manual is testament Canada is not ready to embrace the concepts of counterinsurgency. What is clear is that the three nations in question are conducting counterinsurgency, some with more success than others. The doctrine is sound for all three and it appears they each follow it to their own degree of comfort. The author posits that it matters not how much you fight the war in accordance with your doctrine, but who you are (culturally and historically) and who is fighting it with you (and their culture and history) does; because you will be judged by the international community on what you have done in the past and how that affects what you are doing now within the current strategic environment.

Having said that, counterinsurgency is still about resistance and friction. All of the above provide both to the counterinsurgent and the insurgent. How they are each distributed is a matter of the lessons of counterinsurgency, the moving parts of the battle space and how one manages their actions in the current strategic environment.

CHAPTER 3 – FROM NATIONS TO STATES

State re-building is rarely at the forefront of diplomacy when conflict is imminent. The single-mindedness of a nation focused on the “first” campaign (conventional war) often obfuscates any thought of what will have to be done in the “second” (counterinsurgency) and “third” (state-building) campaigns.¹⁰⁰ While the lessons of history are there to show the devastation of war, they can be forgotten or ignored in a hope that the collateral damaged will be minimal and only enemy military objectives will be targeted. The reality is that conflict brings physical, political, institutional, economic and societal destruction, which will inevitably require rebuilding. And in the new asymmetrical battle space, military objectives as we came to know them during the Cold War no longer exist. In fact, application of force within the counterinsurgency environment has a direct and immediate impact on the ability to state build because it often most negatively affects the real center of gravity – the host nation population. It therefore behoves those seeking to understand state building to get a sense of how might counterinsurgency might affect it.

State Building – An Overview

Historically it was not unusual for vanquished nations to have their borders altered where land was ceded to form new states. These trends continued into the 20th century most recently following the First World War.¹⁰¹ The idea of creating and un-

¹⁰⁰ VADM (Ret) Yedidia Yaari, Haim Assa, “Dynamic Molecules: The Theory of Diffused Warfare,” *Pointer* – Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, Vol 31, No. 3 (2005). Journal on-line; available from <http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2005/v31n3/features/feature1.html>; Internet; accessed 24 January 2007.

¹⁰¹ One must only look at the difference in European Middle Eastern borders between 1914 and 1920. President Wilson was astonished once he arrived in Europe to see how many people of different ethnic backgrounds were seeking autonomy. Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919, Six Months that Changed the World*, (New York: Random House, 2001), xxx.

creating states by the manipulations of borders was a common practice. This has ultimately created more conflict than it has solved because due to ruptured historical, cultural and social lines – the Middle East and Africa are examples. This is not the type of state building referred to here however it does have some applicability in this discussion.

Notwithstanding the political efforts of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in Paris in 1919 to “state build” following the First World War, state building as it is defined in Chapter 1 took hold after World War II.¹⁰² True state building in the historical and definitional sense is based on the post World War II experiences in Japan and Germany where the focus was on creating and maintaining democratic institutional capacity after their defeat.¹⁰³ With its economic and military system in shambles, Germany for example was still a functioning nation state; what were absent were the enablers allowing them to function as one. Consequently the Allies embarked on an intensive 5 year capacity building exercise. In today’s battle space however, where asymmetry is prevalent and domestic tolerance is less accepting of large-scale-long term deployments, state building has become a necessary concurrent activity. In other words the “second” and “third” campaigns are being combined into the “second” campaign only and actually overlapped into the “first” (combat operations) to save lives, resources and time to

¹⁰² The efforts to carve out nation states after World War I was a crude form of nation building however it resembled more the colonization style of nation building than that which was experienced in Japan and Germany in 1945. In effect while the Germany and Japan were quite successful, the experiences of 1919 today are contributory to some of the asymmetrical warfare we see today i.e. Both Ho Chi Minh and Syngman Rhee both lobbied the 1919 conference for independence of their countries of Viet Nam and South Korean respectively. Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919, Six Months that Changed the World*, (New York: Random House, 2001), 12.

¹⁰³ James Dobbins, *et al*, *America’s Role in Nation Building – From Germany to Iraq*, (Santa Monica, Rand, 2003),xiii.

preserve public confidence in the cause. In essence it is the Krulak definition in terms of the thread, but for different reasons.¹⁰⁴

Historical

The modern state builder cannot hope to be successful without a sense of the historical accomplishments of both past and present. Each experience offers something to take away provided it is taken in context with other factors already discussed such as the new battle space, the current strategic environment and the omnipresent conflict, which exists in those environments.

This section will look at post World War II Germany, Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq to provide insights into the challenges of state building. These overviews will give the reader a comprehensive idea of the lessons and complexities associated in doing such exercises.

Historically, state building has been mistaken for nationalism, colonization and annexation.¹⁰⁵ Colonization exercises in the last 500 years considered to be state building exercises by Europeans to create provincial and territorial allies were really exercises to provide additional security and exploit raw natural resources.¹⁰⁶ This kind of state building is rife with failure. British, French, Spanish, and Dutch Empires ultimately failed in their effort to create states in their own image.

¹⁰⁴ Krulak discusses three block war in terms of the environment but does not expand on the reasons for doing so. Conducting the 3 campaigns simultaneously fulfils 2 imperatives: it encourages stability for the host nation institutions to stand up more rapidly and it supports a more efficient exit strategy for the intervention force.

¹⁰⁵ Marina S. Ottawa, "Think Again: Nation Building," *Foreign Policy* (September October 2002) [journal online] available from <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1094&prog=zgp&proj=zdr1> ; Internet accessed 14 March 2007.

¹⁰⁶ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife...*,24.

A cross section of success to failure will be the focus of this study. Germany will represent success, Somalia failure, Bosnia partial success, and Afghanistan and Iraq as ongoing.

Germany – Post World War II

The lessons of post World War II West Germany still permeate modern state building. In 1945 the unconditional surrender of Germany to the Allies set in motion an endeavour which would consume them for another five years – the rebuilding and civil administration of West Germany.¹⁰⁷ When the “first” campaign ended in May 1945, the victors were faced with destroyed infrastructure, a disorganized ineffective security force, only indigenous personnel for civil administration and a collapsed economy. The Allies feared an insurgency, a humanitarian crisis, an implosion of the remaining civil administration structure, and a return to hostilities if the Germans were permitted to re-arm as part of the reconstruction process. A similar challenge confronts the United States in Iraq today.

The Allies established a five-point strategy, which they would implement as individual nations but synchronize together. They would: demobilize and de-Nazify the German military; hold war crimes tribunals as quickly as possible; help construct democratic institutions; provide substantial humanitarian assistance; and provide economic assistance and support.¹⁰⁸

Following the end of the war and prior to demobilization, Allied troops in theatre were employed as the occupation force during the most critical time in the process – the

¹⁰⁷ James Dobbins, *et al*, “Germany” Chap. 2 in *America’s Role in Nation Building – From Germany to Iraq*, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003), 3.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid* 8.

immediate cessation of hostilities or what has been called the *Golden Hour*.¹⁰⁹ Following the end of the war the Americans had 1.6 million men under arms in Germany who inundated the country conducting various duties not the least of which was to establish deterrence against anti Allied groups thought to be organizing.¹¹⁰ Within 18 months the American occupying force would be drawn down to 200K with commensurate drawdown from the other four occupying nations avoiding insurgency. Within the year war crime tribunals were taking place in such numbers that the Allies had to delegate some of this responsibility to the nascent West German government under their supervision. While by 1949 the Allied military governments were still administering West Germany and conditions had been set for the Germans to slowly regain their sovereignty, Russian machinations sped up the stabilization as the Cold War began to heat up.¹¹¹

Rebuilding Germany was a success not because it was able to get back on its feet but because it has adopted democracy, became an ally to other nations seeking democratic enlargement, and assumed its rightful position as a productive member of the global community.¹¹² It has felt no need to increase its power by perpetuating further conflict in Europe or anywhere else. It has institutional capacity, a stable political system, a working judicial system, a strong economy, and a strong social network. Its cultural, historical and social ties as Germans were not affected by the War. The state, not the nation was the focus of effort.

¹⁰⁹ It is also the term used to describe when a soldier has the best chances to survive after being wounded in battle. The golden hour says that if a soldier receives medical care in the first 60 minutes after being wounded he has the best chance to survive. A Guide to Nation-Building, National Security Research Division, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2007), 1.

¹¹⁰ Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation Building...*,9.

¹¹¹ Competing interests between West and East over trying to maintain control of the German tradition was the reason for the divisiveness of Germany.
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1422&fuseaction=topics.publications&doc_id=18855&group_id=7427 accessed 6 April 2007.

¹¹² Democracy is not a necessary precursor to successful state building. Authors note.

The Germany experience offers some lessons for state building: following cessation of hostilities, large numbers of troops are required to stabilize and secure the entire country; planning for state building must take place long before the end of the conflict;¹¹³ the system of government must be acceptable to the people of the nation;¹¹⁴ visible exercises in accountability are useful demonstrations to the population that justice will be served;¹¹⁵ unified effort is important because in the absence of it there will be a delay in exiting the task;¹¹⁶ and state building is a costly affair.¹¹⁷

These lessons still offer insight today to the novice state builder. They not only provide a lesson in “how to” but also a warning against what challenges he will face. Germany however is an experience which is unlikely to be repeated in the near future. State building in contemporary insurgency has no troops in place in the scale that the Allies had in Germany in 1945. Further, reconstruction was easier because after 6 years of World War. Most nations’ populations were weary of war and looking to move forward. It still offers useful lessons for modern state building.

¹¹³ The Allies had been planning the Germany’s reconstruction as early as 1944 following the D-Day invasion. Dobbins, *America’s Role in Nation Building*, ...,12.

¹¹⁴Germany is an example where democracy was transferred to a society with unsatisfactory experience with it. In fact Germany’s exposure to it was not well received by the German population previously. Germany had experimented with federal democratic structure as early as 1840s Wilhelm Liebknecht and the Founding of the German Social Democratic Party by Raymond H. Dominick III (JSTOR) <http://www.jstor.org/view/00028762/di951432/95p0797p/0> accessed 17 April 2007.

¹¹⁵ There are numerous examples of this working following conflict most notably the South African “Truth and Reconciliation Commission. While bearing some similarity to the Nuremberg Trials the idea is that public confidence in the process will enhance the efficacy of nation building strategies. South Africa is a positive example however similar efforts have failed. Martha Minnow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness – Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 90.

¹¹⁶ Germany was managed by the four occupying nations who often set different policies and priorities thus delaying achieving a desired collective end state.

¹¹⁷ The United States by 1947 had committed almost (USD) 5 billion dollars to not only Germany but also other countries working the nation building part of the exercise. This money was directed at reconstruction, some reparations to other countries and focussed on getting the economy going again. James Dobbins, *et al*, “Germany” Chap. 2 in *America’s Role in Nation Building – From Germany to Iraq*, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003),19.

Somalia – Post Cold War Failure

Somalia was the first post Cold War state building exercise undertaken by the United States and it was a failure. Despite its small scale there are some interesting conclusions to be made which will re-emerge later in similar exercises such as Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq.

In 1991 when the government of Somalia was overthrown by warlords, a bitter struggle ensued for power. As a result, the country broke apart and fighting broke out between various factions that competed for control of the capital city of Mogadishu.¹¹⁸ Concurrently, a massive countrywide drought had inflicted hardship and a massive humanitarian crisis resulting in launching the United Nations Mission in Somalia, (UNISOM I) in April 1992 to monitor a ceasefire and supervise humanitarian efforts in Somalia particularly in Mogadishu. Not a very robust force, its mandate was eventually expanded to support humanitarian relief efforts throughout the country. This effort was met by violence causing the UN Security council to authorize a second mission by the U.S. to deploy a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) whose mission was to safeguard the relief effort¹¹⁹ They would be also called upon to enforce an agreement between the UN Special Representative and the Somali government in exile in Ethiopia to disarm heavy weapons from the warring factions.

Translating this into action was a very difficult task. There was no clear direction on who would disarm and where. As UNITAF deployed, fighting intensified in Somalia, creating a very unstable environment. UNITAF was forced to under difficult conditions to secure main air and sea ports, protect food distribution centers and humanitarian

¹¹⁸ James Dobbins, *et al*, "Somalia" Chap. 4 in *America's Role in Nation Building – From Germany to Iraq*, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003),

¹¹⁹ Ibid 56.

convoys with little ability to fight the insurgents. From a humanitarian perspective they were successful but they did not defeat the insurgency or set conditions for institutional capacity or permanency.¹²⁰ UNITAF lasted 6 months and transitioned into UNISOM II following the infamous Black Hawk Down incident where 18 American soldiers were killed in an armed confrontation with Somali Rebels following the downing of an American Black Hawk helicopter.¹²¹

In neither UNISOM I, UNITAF nor UNISOM II was the mandate beyond the humanitarian aspect Operations Other Than War (OOTW). In essence this was not a state building exercise though it was characterized as one. In the absence of political reform, infrastructure rebuilding, economic activity and an unbalanced approach to achieving security, Somalia as a U.S. and United Nations mission was doomed to fail as the first post Cold War state building attempt.¹²²

Somalia provides the most important lessons: state building will fail without clear civilian mandates;¹²³ it will fail without clear operational military objectives;¹²⁴ proper planning before the force arrives will set conditions for successful state

¹²⁰ The Force deployed with 28,000 soldiers and had difficulty achieving success in the humanitarian mission. Ibid 61.

¹²¹ Ibid 57.

¹²² Even today Somalia is deep in internal conflict. Perhaps the implications of failed state building still reverberate after 15 years.

¹²³ Evaluation of UNOSOM at all levels has concluded that the Operation's mandate was vague, changed frequently during the process and was open to myriad interpretations. The mandate changed from protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, to encouraging and assisting in political reconciliation, to establishing and maintaining a "secure environment", to capturing a leader of one of the factions at one stage and, later, to encouraging negotiations with that same leader. These mandates were, in many respects, contradictory, and most often the changes were decided upon with little explanation to Member States, troop-contributing countries, and the humanitarian community operating in Somalia or the Somali people. The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) April 1992 - March 1995.

¹²⁴ A clearly defined and attainable objective—with a precise understanding of what constitutes success—is critical when the United States is involved in operations other than war. Military commanders should also understand what specific conditions could result in mission termination as well as those that yield failure. Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, CCRP Public Series (1994),5.

building;¹²⁵ without even attempting to secure the country through a cohesive program of gradual disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR) a secure environment cannot be the impetus for reconstruction, and institution building;¹²⁶ unity of command in very unstable intra group conflict environments like Somalia where there is a complete absence of law and order or any government institutions in waiting is essential.¹²⁷

Somalia, while officially labelled “nation building” was not. As a state building exercise it was a failure. While it partially succeeded in conducting successful humanitarian operations, the insurgent power base was not neutralized, the population did not become an ally and neither the UN nor the United States was eager to stay for long term state building. Testament to the failure of Somalia is the fact that at the writing of this paper Somalia is still a want-to-be state in crisis engaged in a civil war.

Bosnia – Post Cold War Partial Success

Bosnia is a partial success in state building. Twelve years after the Dayton Accord the chances for lasting peace increase each day. The former republic of Yugoslavia is an excellent example of a country whose national unity was dependent on Cold War dynamics. That is to say that when the Cold war ended, a great internal rise in nationalism caused it to implode and fragment geographically and ethnically over long

¹²⁵ The force deployed on all three missions was inadequate in size to complete the mission. As an example the 28K troops in UNITAF could only secure the delivery facilities for humanitarian aid and protect them in between such facilities. There was not sufficient force to do other things like fight, like build, like democratize etc. Ibid 80.

¹²⁶ Removing or limiting the major weapons of an inferior or defeated military force can be thought of as a form of arms control. Ibid. 80.

¹²⁷ The principle of unity of command in war is difficult to attain in operations other than war. In these operations, other government agencies may often have the lead, with nongovernmental organizations and humanitarian relief organizations playing important roles as well. Command arrangements may often be only loosely defined and many times will not involve command authority as we in the military customarily understand it. Commanders must seek an atmosphere of cooperation to achieve objectives by unity of effort. Ibid 54.

term differences between Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs.¹²⁸ One fragment that did not settle as peacefully as the others was Bosnia; mostly because of the close balance of the three ethnic groups within it that did not allow anyone one group to dominate. After its declaration of independence in 1992, Bosnia immediately fell into a very bloody civil war started by Serbia.¹²⁹ While initially Serb forces had met with great success, by 1995 after the Croats and Bosnian Muslims had been Western trained and equipped, a stalemate followed which became the impetus for the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) or what has become known the Dayton Accord.¹³⁰ It ended the fighting in Bosnia by appointing a United Nations High Representative and formally recognizing two official entities thus dividing up the territory: the Bosniac-Croat Federation which controls 51 percent of the territory and the Republic of Serbia which controls 49 percent.

Under UN Security Council approval, an International Force (IFOR) under a UN Chapter VII mandate was deployed in January 1996, controlled by NATO, with a strength of 60,000 troops to enforce the agreement. Originally it had a narrow mandate to stop hostilities, protect itself, and support disarmament. This was eventually expanded to articulate very generally, without specificity, that it should also support other agencies in their tasks. IFOR's responsibilities never included law enforcement tasks or any non-military missions. This created clear divisions between military and civil agencies.¹³¹ When IFOR's one-year mandate ran out in December 1996, many of the military tasks had been completed and the decision was made to transition into Sustainment Force

¹²⁸ James Dobbins, *et al.*, "Bosnia" Chap. 6 in *America's Role in Nation Building – From Germany to Iraq*, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003), 87.

¹²⁹ "Ethnic Cleansing" was introduced. It was the terms referred to when one side cleaned an area of one particular ethnic group by killing or displacing them. From 1992 to 1994 it is estimated 200,000 people were dead or missing from the conflict. *Ibid* 88.

¹³⁰ *Ibid* 88.

¹³¹ *Ibid* 96.

(SFOR), whose original mandate of 18 months ended after 9 years when in 2005 it transitioned into EUFOR, a mission taken over by the European Union. The fact that the mission matured from UNPROFOR to EUFOR and that there have been no further outbreaks of conflict in the last 13 years is a mark of success for the idea of state building.

Bosnia was a complicated exercise which implemented many of the lessons from Somalia as well as previous exercises like post World War II Germany. From the lessons perspective it reinforces several new ideas: security is *a* major factor in establishing enough momentum to state build; interconnectivity between civil and military agencies is necessary for success;¹³² the military is the only organization that can do the work that needs doing during the *Golden Hour*;¹³³ if democratization is the political system of choice then elections are essential;¹³⁴ the mission has more chance to succeed with United Nations Security Council and international community approval; and lastly if tasks are assigned to an someone they must be given the resources to carry them out.¹³⁵

Bosnia is a partial success. Despite the lack of violence it is still a mission where 7,800 troops are deployed. When hostilities broke out it Bosnia was still very well developed in terms of state like capacities like economy, infrastructure, civil administration yet 16 years after the first shot was fired troops are still in theatre. State

¹³² There was limited connectivity between IFOR and the Office of High Representative (OHR) during its year in theatre. As a result while the military missions were accomplished little was done on the civil side to nation build.

¹³³ they can provides provide security but also deploy the and work with agencies that will synergize their respective efforts.

¹³⁴ In the race to democratize nations there is often an emphasis on getting elections done quickly thinking this will bring the process online. Elections must be timed because they can often reinforce the already existing divisions amongst the population.

¹³⁵ In the case of policing and law enforcement the OHR had the responsibility for war criminals but had neither the appropriate resources nor the people to carry it out. When the mission matured into SFOR this issues was resolved but for the first two years after Dayton no war criminals were apprehended which goes to the heart of the justice and accountability issue in the Germany example.

building takes time. Until all forces are out and Bosnia can handle its own internal security issues it must still be considered a work in progress.

Ongoing Nation building

Afghanistan – Post 9/11 Undecided

Afghanistan is the first post 9/11 attempt at state building and its fate is still uncertain. The question surrounding Afghanistan is centered on what measures of effectiveness produce success¹³⁶ In the case of Afghanistan, a deeply Muslim nation whose history is replete with religious extremism, tribal divisions, cultural lines, and a long history of decentralized government control pervasive with corruption, finding the right institutional balance will take time.¹³⁷ On many levels, missing functions described in the Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan definition will hinder Afghanistan from achieving statehood in the long term. For those doing the state building (NATO dominated by the United States) the end results may not be what was envisioned. The level of knowledge and expertise to run institutions and government bureaucracy particularly under a democratic system simply does not exist now nor did it exist even under the Taliban when Afghanistan was more stable than any other time in its history.¹³⁸ Any democratic ideas in Afghanistan have been tenuous at best or non-existent in their history. President Bush II wrongly summed up the Afghan story of democracy when he said in 2003: "We've witnessed, in little over a generation, the swiftest advance of freedom in the

¹³⁶ The author of this article acknowledges that methodologies must be flexible enough to adapt to the changing situation of Afghanistan as long as it is successful. Captain Paul Toolan, "Afghanistan's Rocky Road to Stability," *Special Warfare*, 19, No 3, (May/June 2006): 11.

¹³⁷ It will take time because democracy is being introduced in nation that has little or any connection to it.

¹³⁸ James Dobbins, *et al*, "Afghanistan" Chap. 8 in *America's Role in Nation Building – From Germany to Iraq*, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003),132.

2,500-year story of democracy."¹³⁹ As we enter the mid point of 2007, achieving a western style democracy in Afghanistan is still a long way off. Perhaps the Afghan's greatest strength is their durability to survive despite the many foreign attempts to import various centralized political systems into their decentralized structure. When the regime change was made in Kabul, unlike Iraq, the vacuum created had less of an impact because Afghanistan does not function off a centralized government. This allowed the Afghans to adjust to the situation more easily, if it was even noticed by the rank and file. If the focal point in Afghanistan is the population, then efforts should be directed at building connectivity amongst the population by building on Afghan government institutions concentrically from Kabul with the Afghans in the lead guiding the process; including fighting the insurgency. In this way the rank and file of Afghanistan will see results. This is probably the closest one will come to "nation" building vice state building because in effect what is also being attempted in Afghanistan is to unite culture, history and social ties – the roots of a nation hood. The insurgency is less about war against the government than it is against modernization and Western intrusion in their culture; in other words contemporary insurgency.¹⁴⁰ It is one thing to create something where the start state was austere in Afghanistan and quite another to work within a system like Iraq where institutions existed and were organized but were disbanded when the regime change was made. Afghanistan is a long term effort. The author posits that it has the most chance to succeed because it has support from the international community.

¹³⁹ International Information Programs, "Road To Democracy- Afghan Elections," <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/afgelect/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 March 2007.

¹⁴⁰ Captain Paul Toolan, "Afghanistan's Rocky Road to Stability," *Special Warfare*, 19, No 3, (May/June 2006): 7.

Iraq – Post 9/11 Undecided

After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the U.S. “swept clean” the Saddam regime removing the entire existing government, civil administration and security forces leadership before taking over the administration of Iraq with an interim government with themselves as the lead.¹⁴¹ Unlike Kabul, the vacuum created was noticeable when whole parts of government at various levels were disappeared – and in effect will hinder the state building process.

The United States strategy of intense commitment of resources for the rebuilding of Iraq is an effort to make up for their mistake. They are focussed on reconstruction projects; infrastructure modernization; capacity building in the government at national, provincial, and municipal levels; training security forces; assisting in writing a constitution; and a whole host of concurrent activities.¹⁴² The Government Accountability Office, however, in its report of January 2007 reports that the security situation in Iraq has deteriorated significantly since December 2005.¹⁴³ Parts of government are ineffective or resigning on a daily basis and civil servants cannot and do not want to go to work in some of the major cities. The chart at Figure 1 shows how much money has been allocated to the War in Iraq since 2003.¹⁴⁴ The total amount for the Iraq war is approximately (US) 257 billion dollars with approximately (US) 29 billion

¹⁴¹ James Dobbins, *et al*, “Iraq” Chap. 10 in *America’s Role in Nation Building – From Germany to Iraq*, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003),190.

¹⁴² United States, Government Accountability Office, *Report to Congressional Leadership and Committees Securing, Stabilizing, And Rebuilding Iraq* Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2007), 18.

¹⁴³ United States, Government Accountability Office, *Report to Congressional Leadership and Committees Securing, Stabilizing, And Rebuilding Iraq* Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2007), 10.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid* 15.

dollars allocated to reconstruction.¹⁴⁵ Since 2003 the total number of U.S. forces has fluctuated from 120K to its highest at 160K. In July 2005, 174K Iraqi security forces had been trained and by Sept 2006 they had reached a strength of 323K yet security deteriorated.¹⁴⁶ Attacks have increased from 80 per day in January 2006 to 180 per day in October 2006 with the number on the rise.¹⁴⁷




Figure 1 – Cost Expenditures in Iraq

One might imagine a commensurate security line moving in a downward direction as more money is invested in Iraq. Iraq, like Afghanistan is structured along some very rigid ethnic and religious lines though less tribal. Prior to the invasion of 2003 it was a strong central dictatorship with well-developed government institutions, well-organized

¹⁴⁵ Ibid 13.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid 23

¹⁴⁷ Ibid 25

security forces and a working civil bureaucracy. Infrastructure was modern and natural resources abundant from which the country could draw revenue despite rife nepotism and corruption in terms of Western standards. The coalition however changed that by removing all the administrative and bureaucratic mechanisms, and in the process removing any chance for quick and early state building successes.

In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan the future is uncertain. As we have seen in Bosnia, durability and permanence will be indicators of success of state building. The idea is to “build” as they are attempting to do in Afghanistan rather than “demolish” as they did in Iraq. Whether either mission succeeds is still in question, however if by keeping the philosophy of building as a tenet for goal setting the chances for success will increase.

Principles

There exists today a plethora of literature on nation and state building yet there is a notable absence of principles to guide the nascent state builder. Consequently, principles or tenets must be created.¹⁴⁸

Security will set conditions for state building. Achieving security requires a strong capable robust force. Safety and stabilization move into the realm of state building because they have an implied focus on the people and the environment where the intervention is taking place. State building must be coupled with security operations.

¹⁴⁸ For the purpose of this paper we will define principle as: “understood truths or propositions so clear that they cannot be proved nor contradicted, unless by propositions which are still clearer. Further we will refer to first principles as the foundation for our understanding to be defined as: “these principles that have known marks by which they may always be recognized. These are, 1. That they are so clear that they cannot be proved by anterior and more manifest truths. 2, That they are almost universally received. 3. That they are so strongly impressed on our minds that we conform ourselves to them, whatever may be our avowed opinions Legal Definition of Principles - <http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/p159.htm>, Internet: Accessed 13 March 2007.

State building is not a cost benefit exercise. State building comes at a cost that may never be recovered monetarily. This leads critics to determine criteria for success based on expenditure. The cost could even be credibility in the international community or loss of confidence from its domestic population as is happening to the United States today over Iraq. The cost is often part of the risk assessment, which plays importantly in the ability of supporting nations to endure throughout the process. When the risk is high the return on investment is more difficult to see yet it is never guaranteed directly to the benefactor. The return however, if successful, is an enhancement of domestic and international security.

State building is about the people being supported. This is not questioning one's military capacities; it is about moral and physical strength. If the focus is on those who oppose the state building then we return to Liddell Hart's observation about fighting the conflict again later. The people, the civilian institutions, the economy and society must be the end state and main effort. This does not eliminate the requirement to neutralize the threat to those efforts however. Focusing on the enemy in state building is tantamount to fighting a threat with only half your weapons.

State building is unique to each situation. Applying the template from the last exercise to the latest one may answer some questions but will ignore others. Each question demands a unique solution.¹⁴⁹ In this way it assures that efforts will be focussed on the unique problems presented by the supported "nation" from cultural, economic, political and religious lines etc. Similarly, counterinsurgency also requires unique solutions.

¹⁴⁹ Iraq and Afghanistan are similar in that in both cases the regime was removed along with key civil and government leaders. Elements of the same template were used in both exercises.

State building is a collective activity. No one nation has the assets, can assume all the risk, or have the endurance to undertake a state building exercise on its own. Not even the United States with all its wealth can do it all alone. Support of the international community in both resources and will is key. The major contrast between Afghanistan and Iraq is that Afghanistan is supported by the international community and Iraq is not. Iraq is deteriorating and Afghanistan is not.

Every state building exercise requires a unique solution, which will be focused on the people and the environment and not just on the enemy. A dual focus on the security will allow the people and the environment to be nurtured and shaped. The only way to achieve these objectives is to invest in the situation by committing resources and people to it, accepting that the risk is high, and that return will depend on the investment.

Alliance State Building

The Cold War was an impetus for two things: the creation of Alliances and the adoption of state building as core missions for Western militaries.¹⁵⁰ Consequently, residual issues from that era will permeate the state building process. This section will focus on four different alliances used in state building to understand which might be best employed in this regard.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – Intercontinental Alliances

NATO is the “heavy” option for state building. It was a blunt instrument originally designed to confront the Soviets and Warsaw Pact countries. NATO is a conglomeration of nations that agreed to a military alliance in 1949 signalling the start of

¹⁵⁰ James Dobbins, “NATO’s Role in Nation building,” *NATO Review*, (Summer 2005): 1

the Cold War.¹⁵¹ It is still a good option for the new type of state building exercises making up the contemporary operating environment where small wars and counterinsurgency reign. Besides the questions of its utility in the COE, its greatest weakness is that it does not hold integral to its organization the necessary elements to support civil implementation and capacity building. NATO still works in partnership with the UN for such capabilities, which is why exit strategies for NATO are always dependant on the measures of success of others.¹⁵² In many ways NATO is the Cadillac of force employment options for state building because it has the staff, the resources and the troops to get most jobs done. Its greatest strength and weakness is the Alliance itself. Its cumbersome chain of command, its ability to mount few diverse operations and its lack of endurance to long term risky missions makes it an option which must only be called upon when the mission at hand is serious enough. To date NATO has only ever agreed to three interventions: Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. The North Atlantic Council is a political animal, which is as vulnerable to geopolitics as the troop contributing nations are.¹⁵³ Therefore NATO while it has some of the tools and the troops required for state building, it is far from the surest and best option for success in this milieu.

United Nations (UN) – Global Alliances

The United Nations is the best-known state building institution in the world. It has lead more state building endeavours than any other alliance. It has legal authority to

¹⁵¹ NATO in response to the expansion of Communism. The Truman doctrine of 1947 espouses the idea of supporting nations threatened by Communism if only to increase U.S. security. The Truman Doctrine, 1947 <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1947TRUMAN.html>, Internet accessed 13 April 2007.

¹⁵² Dobbins, *NATO's Role in Nation building...*, 2.

¹⁵³ *Ibid* 3.

compel compliance, though credibility issues have often produced less than the desired results. Due to its diverse structure, mandate and track record, however, it does carry the most legitimacy for state building of all four types of alliances discussed in this paper.¹⁵⁴ Its decision-making practices are the most flexible, yet not hindered by political process as much as the NAC or EU because troop-contributing nations have no formal voice. The UN specializes in capacity building and can tap into other agencies; many of which are not related to the military, and it has the ability to integrate civil and military chains of command without difficulty. Why then is the UN not the instrument of choice for state building? One reason is that a majority of the troop contributing nations are from Third World countries in missions where other members of the UN are unlikely to deploy large numbers because their national interests are not affected. Troop contributing nations also exercise less positive control over their soldiers and where the risk is high governments prefer to have the option of having positive control for force protection and mission success. From a practical perspective the UN has the ability manage only about a division's (20K) worth of troops as an expeditionary force and requires permissive entry into an area of operations. This would make them highly unsuitable in for high-risk missions where combat operations would be required in addition to state building. While the UN would appear to have many advantages to being used for state building, its limitations hinder the employment and control of large number of troops.

European Union (EU) – Continental Alliances

The EU is an emerging option to meet the contemporary needs of state building. The EU is interesting because it somewhat characterizes the middle ground between the UN and NATO. It has a much leaner organization because it can call upon NATO for

¹⁵⁴ Ibid 2.

planning and other staff functions, yet it has access to the military forces of Europe and possesses the necessary civil implementation tools needed for capacity building.¹⁵⁵ It has many of the same advantages and disadvantages as does NATO in terms of committing forces and has often been criticized for timidity and adversity to risk. David Pratt former Canadian Defence Minister had this to say about the European Union:

The role of outside players such as the EU and the United States in the recent efforts at democracy promotion have suffered from excessive timidity in the case of the Europeans and inconsistency and credibility problems on the part of the United States.¹⁵⁶

In this statement he has also identified a critical flaw in Coalition operations where inclusion of the United States may hinder rather than help. In this way when the EU chooses to undertake a mission without the NAC, it runs the risk of the problems stated above in David Pratt's report.¹⁵⁷ Unlike NATO and the UN however, the EU is seeking some major reform in order to meet future interventions

This report is about how to make the European Union more capable. The approach is 'bottom-up', that is to say, it is concerned with how to increase the security of individual human beings in different parts of the world. The report elaborates both a set of principles on which Europe's security policy should be built, and the capabilities it will need to make a credible contribution to global security, on which depends the security of

¹⁵⁵ Ibid 4

¹⁵⁶ David Pratt, *Retooling for New Challenges: Parliaments as Peace builders*, Parliamentary Center Working Paper, (June 2005), 8.

¹⁵⁷ Additionally, from June to September 2003, the EU led an international peacekeeping force of 1,400 in the Congo that sought to stop rebel fighting and protect aid workers. The Congo mission was requested by the United Nations and headed by France in a "lead nation" capacity. This mission came as a surprise to many EU observers, NATO officials, and U.S. policymakers because it was geographically farther afield than they had thought the EU would venture, and because it was conducted without recourse to NATO assets. The Congo operation was planned by French military planners in national headquarters. Some NATO and U.S. officials were annoyed, asserting that the EU should have first formally asked NATO whether it wished to undertake the Congo operation. EU officials did consult with NATO about the mission, but maintain they were not obliged to ask NATO for its permission given that the EU was not requesting to use NATO assets. Kristen Archik, Paul Gallis, "NATO and the European Union," Congressional Research Service Report, (April 2004).16.

Europe itself. In effect, it proposes a new doctrine for implementing the European Security Strategy.¹⁵⁸

What progress has been made is not yet available for assessment. Only its actions in the field of state building like Bosnia and the Congo will be the measure of success of the EU unless it chooses to involve in Iraq.

Ad Hoc Coalition – Informal Mission Specific Alliances

Short term informal coalitions are not the optimal choice for state building exercises. While nations are free to go it alone without UN approval or NATO support, they do so at their own calculated risk. Iraq is good example of a mission in jeopardy where a small mission-specific coalition went alone; and Bosnia is a good example of an internationally supported mission that is showing success. Informal mission-specific coalitions are the most fragile and the least desirable for state building for a number of reasons. Firstly the coalition is likely to be limited in size which means access to diverse skill sets and robust forces will also be limited. Secondly the coalition will only be as good as that nation which takes the lead. In today's battle space it is unlikely that any nation other than the United States, unless there is a common threat to a national interest, will assume the lead nation status for large high-risk missions. Having the United States as lead nation however, does not guarantee success. Thirdly, it is unlikely that mission-specific coalitions will have durability in high-risk missions. Coalitions are unlikely to hold together for long as domestic issues begin to erode support for a mission. In the case of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) the common threat that brought nations together just after 9/11 no longer exists or is no longer a concern for them, as was it in

¹⁵⁸ The Barcelona Report on the Study Group of Europe's Security, Capabilities, Human security Doctrine for Europe, (September 2004), 8.

2001. As a result they are more likely to refocus on domestic and economic issues which were their priorities before the attack. As more casualties emerge and there is a lack of return on the investment, support wanes. In short only a regional or continental crisis less the GWOT scenario is likely to generate an ad hoc response with durability.

* * *

The Cold War was an impetus for the upsurge in state building. It was a time where the status quo was the objective and where superpowers faced off and focused on one another with their security as their *raison d'être*. Now that the world has only one super power, for the time being, those who see the West as their enemy have chosen to fight asymmetrically to avoid direct confrontation on the conventional battlefield. This asymmetric threat is an inhibitor to state building.

State building has evolved to become quite a sophisticated undertaking since its genesis after World War II. From colonization to nationalism to reconstruction it has become a core mission for today's Western Armies instead of a political tool to gain more territory.

Today's contemporary state building is well known to us but usually expressed in military terms to describe interventions in Bosnia, Somalia Afghanistan and Iraq. While there definitely a military piece to this puzzle it would not be complete without the state building piece which is in fact more important because it serves longer terms solution.

The international community and the various alliances within it still struggle still to find the right solution when it comes to state building. While there are advantages and many reasons to choose NATO as the instrument of choice for state building there are equally as many reasons to choose the UN or the EU. There is no one size fits all choice

to state building or counterinsurgency for that matter. All alliances are subject to the same weaknesses as the other; political machinations, costs, domestic support and risk to the troops are the great equalizers.

What is clear is that each alliance, each nation will take a different approach to state building for different reasons. Some like the U.S. will undertake it to protect their own interests and enhance their own security because they have to. Their empire is so large and pervasive that anything that happens in the world will affect their national interest requiring them to protect it.

The best way to sum up success and lack of success is by comparing and Iraq. Afghanistan is: a large coalition effort with relatively few troops on an internationally sanctioned mission, the United Nations is heavily involved, there is not a country wide insurgency taking place, NGOs operate throughout the country relatively unimpaired except in a few places, and nations are sharing the burden of development such as judicial reform (Italy), Police (Germany), Military (United State).¹⁵⁹ Iraq is: a small coalition mostly United States and Britain with large numbers of troops, a mission not sanctioned by the international community or by the UN, the insurgency is state wide, NGOs and other development agencies do not operate in relative safety and the burden of development is not shared by other nations. In this way we can see how and why different theatres are more successful than other. This is an oversimplification of both missions but it does offer a sense of some of the differences between the two.

In final summation, the principles of state building identified in this chapter must be embedded in the overall strategy. There is no doubt that making states cannot be done

¹⁵⁹ United States Institute for Peace, *Special Report Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan* (Washington: 2004), 5.

without a credible military force. The employment of any force comes with a cost in many forms but this cost must be weighed against the possible returns to the contributing nation. The key take-away is that, as state building must go beyond the national interest of any one nation because it contributes to the security and stability of partner nations and their populations in the longer term.

CHAPTER 4 – RECONCILING STATE BUILDING AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

Reconciling these two ideas under one theory does not seem natural when the core principles of each are diametrically opposed. State building is about creating capacity; and counterinsurgency is about destroying it. The difference lies in the focus of effort and how objectives at different levels are articulated and nested into one another. In Echevarria's "Towards an American Way of War", he discusses America's preoccupation with winning battles and not wars; in effect an inability to translate tactical and operational victories into strategic success.¹⁶⁰ In reality counterinsurgency and state building are harmonious because each supports the same goal – "to make a violent society peaceful."¹⁶¹ This very general definition has wider implications: government control, fully functioning security services and civil administration, provision of basic services to the population, and a stable economic framework designed with durability, etc. This will be accomplished by establishing a political and economic framework acceptable and to the people, a lawful abiding security force, a well trained civil service reasonably capable of meeting modern bureaucratic demands of state hood, establishing a census and tax base to allow the government to function to provide services to the population, and most importantly some framework of basic human services like water, food, and a degree of health support. If they are present in a society then insurgency has no traction. In that respect, the key to killing an insurgency starts at state building.

¹⁶⁰ Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Toward an American Way of War," Strategic Studies Institute, (March 2004), 7.

¹⁶¹ A Guide to Nation-Building, National Security Research Division, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2007), 1.

Killing an insurgency is a tactical or operational objective but state building is a strategic end state.

All very easy to articulate in theory but in the environment of contemporary insurgencies like Iraq, Afghanistan and even Chechnya this is not so easy to realize on the ground. These insurgencies are less about making life better for people than they are about maintaining a Hobbesian state where chaos is a source of power and where a productive legitimate state in the eyes of the international community is unwanted by the “spoilers”. The discussion of statehood and counterinsurgency as indivisible concepts begins here.¹⁶²

Resistance and Friction

Earlier the terms “resistance” and “friction” were introduced as dichotomous terms to describe the struggle for the battle space between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. The side that imposes the most resistance on the other reduces his own friction in the battle space and as such has the better chance to win; but this is not guaranteed. Without synchronization however no amount of force will create conditions for success. Applied haphazardly by individual nations and not in full measure with other alternatives like state building activities will result in failure like Somalia. The war in Iraq is about resistance, not in the revolutionary war sense, but the physical and psychological sense. The United States clearly has Galula’s “means” and is doing well to establish “vastness” and has the ability to apply great resistance on the various groups fighting the insurgency. Why then is violence escalating despite additional American troop commitment? Why are not the British in Iraq facing the same results? In the fourth

¹⁶² Robert J. Ford, “Nation-Building and Counterinsurgency: Indivisible Concepts”, (Canadian Forces College Masters in Defence Studies Course Paper 2006).

year of the war notwithstanding the strategic error of the clean sweep of the Iraqi government system, civil service and security forces at the start of the conflict, there are other factors, which will affect success or failure.

The Current Strategic Environment and the Battle Space

How nations behave in the strategic environment will determine where the battle space is, and how conflict will be fought. Canada has chosen to conduct operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan and as such must be ready to articulate why it is fighting; face criticism from the international community; and be prepared that its actions will have reverberations beyond where its military forces are operating, perhaps somewhere else in the Global Operations Area. The battle space is defined by the current strategic environment, which is driven by our foreign policies, which are driven by our national framework of values and so on until they reach the core values of our national identity. This should not however preclude a nation from acting in its own interests or the interest of others but rather act as a framework to protect vital national interests.¹⁶³ The battle space, a result of all of those things is where a military exercises the most control on the outcome of the strategic environment. It is where military resources such as force, technology, enablers, and soldiers are injected to change the environment around a problem. The non-military resources added to the battle space such as efforts to boost economic prosperity, infrastructure repair, and other means to achieve statehood must not only be directed to helping the host nation but be synchronized with force to achieve a lasting effect.

¹⁶³ The Powell doctrine sees protection of vital national interests as a reason for the employment of military forces. However national interests are not necessarily the sole reason for going to war. Echevarria argues that America for example goes to war for punitive reasons, for protection, for pacification and profiteering. Echevarria. *Toward an American Way of War...*, 5.

The sum total is that in counterinsurgency operations of high risk in failing states cannot be successful unless one understands the environment and battle space in which the force will be operating. Those environments will establish the level resistance, which will be imposed on the force before it arrives. While much of that will be out of the control of the counterinsurgent, knowing what he is facing will allow him to better plan and prepare for the fight. This plan however must include state building within a joint interagency and multinational context. Consequently, a complicated battle space will require an alliance which comprises a formal continental or intercontinental coalition working with the UN which has the approval of the international community. Anything less especially in the contemporary operating environment within the current strategic environment will fail.

The Effect of Cultural on State Building and Counterinsurgency

The United States has evolved into an empire of sorts, which makes full use of its “hard power” to protect national interests.¹⁶⁴ It is something that has not gone unnoticed to the rest of the world. It does so because it has cultivated a global hegemony and no longer has a choice to act or remain neutral. The American Empire is so globally pervasive that when something happens anywhere in the world, it affects them causing them to react. Being an Empire is now part of their culture and in effect governs how they act which reflects how they are perceived by the rest of the international community when they lead or participate in an intervention. In many ways it shares similarities with the Roman Empire of the old current strategic environment.

¹⁶⁴ Hard power is defined as the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will. Joseph S. Nye, “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power”, *The International Herald Tribune*, (January 2003) [journal online] available from http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2003/nye_soft_power_iht_011003.htm ,Internet accessed 13 March 2007.

The Roman Empire after a history of warfare found itself also as a global hegemony to the known world of its time expanding its Empire into Central Europe, Britain, and to the Middle East, far from its center of gravity – Rome.¹⁶⁵ In its infancy, the empire had been welcomed as a symbol of modernity but as it matured, its preoccupation with power and continued expansion turned many other states against it. Consequently, internal strife coupled with continuous insurgencies and wars of conquest eventually caused its collapse. The Roman culture shaped the strategic environment of the time creating conditions for the conflict and civil war it faced. Roman culture was based on warfare which became unpalatable to the international community of the time because they knew that Rome would act unilaterally to achieve its goals through hard power and by dominating the current strategic environment.

While United States is not in anyway about to collapse nor are they experiencing civil war there are some interesting parallels with Rome to show that culture will affect the current strategic environment.

Frederick Kagan says the American way of war is characterized by stunning military victories but are ineptitude at achieving political and strategic goals.¹⁶⁶ Since World War II the U.S. has steadily increased the size of its empire (hegemony) in the world to the point where involvements abroad are considered intrusive. World opinion about the United States actions and culture is often less complimentary because of its pervasiveness and the perception that it has too much influence in the world. Not one inch of the earth escapes being accounted for by “Combatant Commanders” of the United

¹⁶⁵ Robert D. Kaplan, *Imperial Grunts*, (New York: Vintage, 2005), 13.

¹⁶⁶ Frederick W. Kagan, “War and Aftermath,” *Policy Review*, (August-September, 2003): 3.

States Military acting on behalf of their government.¹⁶⁷ In effect these commands are governments in waiting and are considered to be intrusive by the many nations whose territory falls within the American Global Operations area. Consequently when the United States comes to the table to help state build and fight counterinsurgency, the stakeholders are many times already jaded or predisposed in judgement because of what they consider the American culture to be – a pursuit of pure national interest through the application of “hard power”. Often this is how the U.S. state builds and fights its wars including counterinsurgency. This explains to some degree why there is a gap in the reconciliation doctrine of counterinsurgency and its execution. After almost half a century of Cold War conventional warfare the U.S. is challenged in following the Galula, Kitson and O’Neill principles. Culturally, the United States is an Empire whose comfort zone is wide force application.¹⁶⁸ Empires are not comfortable fighting small wars because they are often fighting so many at once they either crumble or resort to isolationism. The United States is not comfortable fighting small wars. John Nagl sums up the American military culture as “a strong temptation to hit someone.”¹⁶⁹

Britain on the other hand is and has a much longer history, which has shaped their cultural framework. It has fought internal conflict and survived multiple exercises of colonization and decolonization.¹⁷⁰ Every experience of small wars is embedded in the

¹⁶⁷ During the Roman Empire they were call Roman Imperators. The globe has been assigned the responsibilities of what is called Combatant Commands : NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM. These are the modern day imperators. Robert D. Kaplan, *Imperial Grunts*, (New York: Vintage, 2005), 4

¹⁶⁸ Echvarria illustrates Max Boot’s study of American Small war experience. There is no doubt that the United State has considerable experience in small war but most of it was pre World War II and prior to its rise as an Empire. The United States has not carried its experience forward into its doctrine and culture. The Cold War caused a major shift in the manner in which it fights wars. Echevarria. *Toward an American Way of War...*, 5.

¹⁶⁹ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife...*,151.

¹⁷⁰ Cassidy. *The British Army and Counterinsurgency – The Salience of Military culture...*,53.

British core values, its foreign policies, its doctrine and its execution of warfare. In essence, they shape the current strategic environment differently than the United States does because of their culture. Because they are not a global hegemony nor are their foreign policies perceived as intrusive, their efforts to state build often meet with different results. Their experiences of counterinsurgency already incorporate state building, as Malaya and Kenya will attest to. The manuals of Kitson and Thompson espouse principles with substance because they have lived it. Their doctrine manuals reflect their values and their experiences also, which translates more closely to the manner in which they execute operations. The difference between the United States and British manuals of counterinsurgency is nuance. While they read the same, one is based on a genuine understanding of small wars and state building exercises and the other on fewer small wars and almost no successful state building.¹⁷¹

How nations behave in the current strategic environment will be dictated by their culture. That culture often is the only thing that others will judge on. Culture will determine action and shape results. Consequently culture will play a significant role in whether a counterinsurgent state builder will be accepted or rejected by the nation they are supporting.

Considerations for Counterinsurgency and State building

There is almost universal agreement that the population is the center of gravity. Their welfare, their, protection, their prosperity and their investment is key. Knowing how the population is structured is as important as knowing how the insurgent organization is structured. Galula and Kitson offer their points of view but what is

¹⁷¹ George Bush said “Super powers don’t do windows.” State building is considered by the U.S. as doing windows. Frederick Kagan. *War and its Aftermath*...,5.

important is to leverage those fissures to ensure the insurgent is separated from his power base, be that through the elites, the fence sitters or even the radicals. A dissection of the population is important. Without a focus on the people, the fight will be lost even in the contemporary environment where insurgents fight to keep the Hobbesian state.

Counterinsurgency is not about the broad application of force to deal with a cause, a structure or an opponent, it is about the selective application of minimal force to destroy enemy capacity so the capacity of the state can be increased. Enablers have always played a role in counterinsurgency. As irregular warfare has evolved so too has the expansion of enablers from early use of intelligence gathering and psychological warfare to full-fledged information operations.

State building is about creating capacity to act in one's own interest.¹⁷² The tenets of statehood should be the focus of the counterinsurgent, and from there the strategy to fight the insurgent can be developed. A counterinsurgent strategy nested within state building principles will have better chances to yield successful synchronization and successful results.¹⁷³

Who you state build with is as important as how you state build. Some countries have niche capabilities, other have financial support etc but all are vulnerable to the strategic environment. In that way if one partner in the Alliance has issues in the international community, that will reflect both in how the mission is supported by not just the world but also the supported nation.

State building is not the purview of lead nation states. It is the coordinated collective effort of a group of capabilities to support and build a state in the manner they

¹⁷² Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, Michael Carnahan, *Closing the Sovereignty Gap – An Approach to State Building*...,48.

¹⁷³ Echevarria. *Toward An American Way of War*...,7.

desire.¹⁷⁴ While no Alliance escapes political manipulations, often the NATO, EU, and Mission Specific alliances lack legitimacy without some kind of United Nations support. The more nations to the problem the less chance one nation can dominate by imposing its system on someone else and the more likely the longevity of the solution. In this way the immense cost and burden of such an endeavour can alleviate the cost return theory to risk operations.

Coordination however of state building activities let alone the counterinsurgency is the difficult issue. The British and Americans have a clear national delineation of civilian control over their military commanders even in Iraq. More complicated is the international coalition with many resources interested only in national objectives. For this reason any state building exercise should involve the United Nations as either an equal partner to the military mission under a shared committee of international presentation in conjunction with host nation structures. Otherwise the danger exists for the likes of Iraq to occur.

* * *

There is no panacea to state building and counterinsurgency. Combining state building and counterinsurgency is a mindset. One that understands they are symbiotic in nature in the COE to defeat contemporary insurgency. There is no point in committing to a counterinsurgency operation if there is no intent to establish long terms solutions.¹⁷⁵

In the end it is about distilling down a system which must be managed. National interests will shape the current strategic environment. The environment will form a battle

¹⁷⁴ Greg Mills, "Ten Counterinsurgency Commandments from Afghanistan," Foreign Policy Research Institute, (April 2007), 2.

¹⁷⁵ This does not negate the responsibility to consider intervening for humanitarian reason in accordance with the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.

space that will reflect coalitions who act based on doctrine, culture and historical experience, and shared interests. How that help is presented will determine how the international community and the insurgents see it. If it is a global hegemony stepping up to the table the insurgents will have a more determined cause. If the coalition is lead by less threatening nations but leading stronger nations the insurgent cause is more attackable. How you fight is as much based on your experiences and how the international community perceives you. These factors come together to complicate the state building exercise.

Modern insurgency has morphed beyond the Seleucid Empire and Vietnam experiences. The modern insurgent is savvy, adaptable, and creative. As we have looked at insurgency and how to fight it one cannot help but wonder if the new type of insurgency is not about maintaining the status quo of failed states. Perhaps it is a punitive action by small groups to cause the West and its allies to crumble under the burden of broken economies as a result of their struggle to many fight small wars in the Global Operations Area.

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