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JCSP 33 / PCEMI 33

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES (MDS) RESEARCH PROJECT

THE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH:
"NOTHING ENDURING CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED INSTANTANEOUSLY"

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ABSTRACT

Failed states are not a new phenomenon. What is new is the threat that they pose to the security and prosperity of western nations. With no choice but to assist failed states that pose the largest threats, Canada and her allies adopted the whole of government approach as a means of deploying multi-disciplinary teams to rebuild failing states such as Afghanistan. By adopting the whole of government approach, Canada has moved beyond the stovepipes of traditional peacekeeping and beyond mere development missions to more holistic state-building operations.

After examination of the whole of government approach and its application by Canada and her allies in Afghanistan, it is apparent that not only is security and development intertwined, but that an over-arching governance structure is required at the national level. Additionally, overall better coordination is required at the International Security Assistance Force Team (ISAF), SAT and PRTs team levels as well. Canada is not alone in these problems, however it is clear from this review that the UK whole of government approach model is the best developed to date. As a result, it is one that Canada should emulate. It is also clear that while much the whole of government approach is sound, further refinements are necessary to make the whole of government approach enduring and more successful.

This paper discusses the rationale behind the adoption of the whole of government approach by western governments, examines the coordination problems between defence and development workers and makes recommendations for improvements. This paper also examines also the factors that comprised successful reconstruction missions in the past and proposes a framework from which to benchmark modern reconstruction missions. Due to the multifaceted nature of reconstruction missions a number of aspects must be addressed by the intervening nations, such as governance, the rule of law, economic, social-cultural and technological systems due to the fact that because most or all of these systems must be rebuilt. Consequently, reconstruction missions can easily use the analytical tool employed in business known as PEST in order to assess potential markets. PEST is the acronym for political, economic, social-cultural and technological factors. The PEST model can also be used with either a business planning process or with the CF Operational Planning Process (OPP) to link the overall vision of the operation to success factors. Indeed, the models provided in the paper can be modified to plan and to assess the progress of all reconstruction missions.   It also outlines the huge financial, personnel and time commitment required by the contributing nation in order to achieve success. Successful reconstruction missions have lasted up to ten years.

A review of the success factors as they compare to Afghanistan revealed that remarkable progress has been made since 2003 and with the continued presence of ISAF, much more is possible.   As the paper argues, studies of past reconstruction missions demonstrated that without a lasting commitment on behalf of the contribution nation, the intervention will fail.

CHAPTER ONE – WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH

INTRODUCTION

In April 2005, Paul Martin's minority liberal government released a new International Policy Statement (IPS). The IPS proclaimed that Canada's defence and diplomatic capabilities would be rebuilt, promised to focus Canada's development money in fewer areas in order to achieve better results in the selected countries and to field multi-disciplined teams to reconstruct failed states by deploying defence, diplomacy and development assets together in joint manner or "whole of government approach." The whole of government approach was further described by then Prime Minister Martin as: "a doctrine of activism that over decades has forged our nation's international character that will serve us even better in today's changing world."[1] The policy became known as defence, diplomacy, development and commerce or 3 D plus C, but is also known as the whole of government approach. For the purpose of simplicity, this paper will refer to it as the whole of government approach. It should be noted that this paper focuses on defence and development and has not examined the interface with diplomacy.

The evolving nature of security and threats to Canada provoked the Government of Canada to follow the lead of the UK and develop a policy stating that the government of Canada would respond to failed and failing states with a multi-department, integrated ,whole of government approach. The IPS explains that Department of National Defence (DND), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) would contribute jointly to

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[1] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World - Overview* (Ottawa: Canada, 2005), Forward.

Canada's response to failed states. The IPS attributes the need for the whole of
government policy to the changes in global security, explaining that state collapse,
terrorism, poverty, and oppression are threats to Canada. Thus, in order to protect the
security and prosperity of Canada and her allies, Canadians must be prepared to
contribute to the reconstruction of failed and failing states in an alliance construct if
necessary.[2]

The Origins of the Concept

The British government is seen to have been the catalyst for a whole of
government approach with British BGen Chris Day claiming credit for coining the phrase
"three D plus C."[3] The UK model for whole of government approach was implemented
in 2000, and came after the government reviewed development work and concluded that
the UK development initiatives would be more effective if cooperation between the three
main departments were increased.[4] As a result, it linked the Ministry of Defence (MOD),
Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department of Foreign and International
Development (DFID) into the Global Conflict Prevention Pool.

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[2] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World - Overview* (Ottawa: Canada, 2005), 5.

[3] E-mail from BGen Chris Day to Andy Tomas, dated 2 December 2006.

[4] Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus: Implications for Joined-Up Government," *Policy Matters* 5, no. 5 (2004), 13.

In the joint United Kingdom DFID, FCO and MOD document entitled "The Global Conflict Prevention Pool," the British government professes a need for a joined-up approach with the three government departments in order to "increase the impact of what they do through better coordination and common strategies."[5] Additionally, the UK government set up a number of conflict prevention pools that are overseen by Cabinet Committees comprising the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for International Development and the Chief Secretary for the Treasury. In terms ofsupervision, the FCO chairs the global conflict prevention pool and at the tactical level the pools are run by officials from each department who provide common directions and priorities.[6] The Global Prevention Pools focus on three key areas: analysis and policy, development, technical assistance and capacity building.[7] The UK pools have two main geographical groupings, one for sub-Saharian African and a Global prevention pool for the remainder of the world.[8]

Canada's Requirement for the Whole of Government Approach

After years of mounting peacekeeping missions, it is natural to wonder why the shift to the whole of government approach. Indeed, peacekeeping has proved to be a single purpose activity and was often the result of "stovepipe planning that was not

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[5] United Kingdom joint publication of DFID, FCO and MOD, The Global Conflict Prevention Pool: a joint UK Government approach to reducing conflict, August 2003, 6.

[6] *Ibid.*, 7.

[7] *Ibid.*, 30.

[8] Fitz-Gerald, "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus…, 13 .

coordinated or linked to other goals or initiatives."[9]   It is better to view peacekeeping as one of a government's many tools to rebuild failed and failing states, rather than to view peacekeeping as a panacea.[10]   As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two, the security and development challenges posed by failed states demands more than a peacekeeping response.

In his article entitled "A Grand Strategy for a Small Nation," Hugh Segal amplifies the requirement for the whole of government approach explaining that the Canadian government has a responsibility to protect it citizens at home and abroad from the threat of terrorist attacks requiring Canada to establish "an integrated geopolitical strategy that unifies diplomacy, foreign aid, intelligence and military deployment to address the sources – the causes of terrorism."[11]   Indeed, the "…Canadian military mission must be coordinated with partners and should be accompanied by Canadian diplomatic and aid intervention."

Hugh Segal calls for a "framework that integrates military, diplomatic and foreign aid instruments"[12] in a manner that protects Canadians at home, increases our allies confidence in our abilities and meets the security threat from abroad. Allied experiences in East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti and Iraq point to a requirement for combined military, civil, private sector skills in order to bring security and democracy to failing

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[9] *Ibid*., 12.

[10] *Ibid*., 21.

[11] Segal, "A Grand Strategy…, 4.

states.[13] Thus we need "real plans and models" to make the whole of government approach a reality such that we have "integrated and rapidly deployable task groups composed of military, police, private sector" known as civil and military cooperation (CIMIC) components that can deploy rapidly either independently or our allies.[14]

In a report written by the North-South Institute for Mr. Martin in October, 2003 just before he became Prime Minister, the report recommended that the Prime Minister "ensure that DFAIT and DND support CIDA's efforts on long-term structural conflict prevention" in order to coordinate "their contributions to international protection operations." [15] In a bolder more emphatic statement, the report implores the Prime Minister to bring together all departments and agencies under a single and coherent, national development policy umbrella. To ensure consistent implementation of the policy, the Prime Minister was urged to exert leadership and to set clear objectives. The report cites precedence in both the UK and Sweden and recommends that Canada review the successes and failures of their policies.[16]

The whole of government approach has been adopted by both Canada and various allies with varying results. It is the contention of this writer that while the whole of

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[12] *Ibid.*, 5.

[13] *Ibid.*, 5.

[14] Ibid., 5.

[15] Roy, Culpeper, et al, North-South Institute report: Architecture without blueprints; Opportunities and Challenges for the Next Prime Minister in International Development Policy, October 2003, 17.

[16] *Ibid.*, 26.

government approach works, a strong governance structure is required along with further refinements to the workings of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) to ensure the successful application of the concept in Canada. Indeed, the UK model is widely viewed at the most effective to date, due to its better overall governance structure and better military and civilian cooperation. Canada should emulate their model.

This paper will review how the whole of government concept has been implemented the UK, US and in Canada with a view to making recommendations for improvements. It will then make suggestions for success factors that can be employed in modern interventions and compare those success factors to the work that has been done to date in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER TWO – THE SECURITY DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

> In the past, security was often thought of as largely a military affair. In today's complicated and sometimes bewildering world, security has become a much broader issue.[17]

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

In 2003, United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan set up a High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change to address UN involvement in a more secure world, stating that we must …" address the security concerns of all States — rich and poor, weak and strong because modern threats are interrelated and we cannot "treat issues such as terrorism or civil wars or extreme poverty in isolation." [18] The UN lists the current threats to state security as: internal state conflict, inter-State conflict, terrorism, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, poverty, infectious diseases and trans-national organized crime.[19] Essentially all of these threats have the potential to cross borders. In order to combat these contemporary threats, the UN established an intergovernmental body entitled the Peace-building Commission that would assist member states; upon their request, in strengthening their own capacities during post conflict transition and longer-term reconstruction.[20] As a parallel initiative, the UN launched its peace-building fund in

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[17] Andrew Leslie, "The 2004 Haycock Lecture - Boots on the Ground: Thoughts on the Future of the Canadian Forces," *Canadian Military Journal* 6 (2005) www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol6/no1/06-Visions_e.asp; (Internet accessed 1 April 07), np.

[18] United Nations Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *Executive Summary*, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (New York: UN, 2004) www.un.org/secureworld; (accessed 29 March 2007), 2.

[19] *Ibid*., 25.

[20] United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, "*Questions and Answers on the Peacebuilding Commission.*" http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/index.html; (Internet accessed 17 April 2007), np.

October 2006 to "Help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial investment over the medium to longer-term.[21] It also states that its goal is the development of holistic strategies for reconstruction of failed states and a desire to "extend the period of commitment" by the international community."[22] These initiatives have a long-term impact for the UN and will require a similar vision, commitment and structures from UN contributing nations.

This chapter will briefly describe the evolution in the global security situation that prompted the development of the whole of government approach. It will also discuss the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) findings, UK, US whole of government approaches and the illustrate the requirement for a proper governance structure for Canada's whole of government approach.

According to the UN, prevention of terrorism, internal state conflict and state collapse must be the central focus of future collective security.[23] The UN and capable states must be able to contribute to prevention. Where necessary, intervention to these threats that know no boundaries, are connected and need, global, regional and national attention. It is no longer the case that one state alone can fight these issues, nor can it be assumed that every state will always be willing or able to protect its citizens or that during times of strife, no harm will spill over its borders. Thus the new collective security deal is that all nations share a responsibility for one another's security.[24] What is

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[21] *Ibid*.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] United Nations Secretary General's High Level Panel …, 3.

[24] *Ibid.*, 16..

equally clear is that the economic vulnerability of all nations to terrorist attacks is such

that there is virtually no other alternative to security sector reform (SSR). In fact, the

World Bank estimates that the attacks of 11 September 2001 alone increased the number

of people living in poverty by 10 million and the total cost to the world economy

probably exceeded 80 billion dollars.[25]

SSR is multifaceted. In the narrowest context it is thought to comprise

organizations established to confront external and internal threats to a nation and its

population. As a result, it will include as a minimum, military, police, borders, customs

and intelligences services.[26] In the most comprehensive sense, western nations view SSR

as a strategy to bring responsible security forces to mitigate the risk of conflict, provide

security for the population such that the right environment is created for development to

be sustained.[27] Therefore, it can include "political, military, economic, policing, judicial,

communications, financial, foreign policy, and intelligence components, all of which are

interrelated."[28] As failed states are viewed as threats to security rather than solely

development projects, they require more holistic response mechanisms or the whole of

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[25] *Ibid.*, 19.

[26] Suzanna Bearne et al, *Technical Report on National Security Decision-Making Structures and Security Sector Reform* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2005); http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR289.sum.pdf (Internet accessed 17 April 2007); III.

[27] United Kingdom joint publication …, 30.

[28] Bearne, et al, *Technical Report ...,* III.

government approach in order to establish "…effective and sustainable economic growth to support continued security and stability."[29]

9/11 certainly reinforced the view held by the US and its allies that failed states pose a global threat. In fact, most modern wars are a result of conflict between state and non-state actors or as a result of conflict within the nation state itself. The main countries thought to be havens for terrorist groups are Afghanistan, Sudan and Algeria.[30] Indeed, "only a handful of the world's 191 nation states can be categorized as failed. Several dozen more however, are weak and are serious candidates for failure."[31]

Reasons for Failed States

Failed states are characterized as conflicted and dangerous places that feature insurgents battling government troops, communal discontent and rival factions. It should be noted that it is not the intensity of the violence that "defines" the failed states but whether the violence is an ongoing and unsolvable problem without outside intervention. States collapse when the violence is out of control, when the quality life and government services drop and when corruption abounds. Moreover, failed states often harbour ethnic and or religious factions that stimulate the discontent.[32]

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[29] *Ibid.*, III.

[30] David Carment, *Effective Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing States* (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2005), 6.

[31] Robert I. Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (2002), 85.

[32] *Ibid.*,86.

Western Governments such as the US, Canada and Great Britain recognize that there are a variety of ways in which to address the terrorist threat without military intervention. Activities such as training armies and police forces in states faced with terrorist cells, delivering more robust aid programs, establishing good governance and focusing on international trade and finance with these countries.[33] However, it is now largely accepted that military intervention, peace-building and development are intertwined and that stand-alone training projects usually produce short-lived results in nations facing a wider spectrum of problems. As a result, intervening governments and their militaries play an important role in peace building and development.[34]

OECD Study of Whole of Government Approach

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has studied the whole of government approach to fragile states and its case studies reveal the following three things. Firstly the differences in organizational culture between departments and agencies needs to be overcome since development and humanitarian assistance departments have traditionally been more process oriented whereas defence and foreign affairs have been more output oriented. Secondly, there are strong disincentives for government departments to work closely together because departments

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[33] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement*,…, 3.

[34] David Pratt, *Retooling for New Challenges: Parliaments as Peacebuilders* (Ottawa: Parliamentary Centre, 2005), 1-3.

must work horizontally rather than vertically due to number of departments involved. This requires more consultation and is more time-consuming. The whole of government approach also requires negotiation and concession along with a willingness to temper individual policy agendas and may even result in the loss of visibility for certain departments. In addition, institutional, budgetary and functional walls can hamper integrated planning. Thirdly, the OECD case studies show that there is no one size fits all solution for all interventions. Intervention is undermined when departments do not have a joint strategy for the failed state. Improvements to the whole of government approach can be made by developing priorities for the intervention that are linked to broader combined objectives after a joint analysis of capabilities and requirement has been conducted.[35]

Effectiveness of the whole of government approach can be improved with an overall framework for managing multi-department intervention in fragile states. This framework can include: clear definition of fragile states, joint policy providing reasoning for joined up interventions, goals to be achieved and commitment to establish effective dialogue between responsible departments and agencies. The purpose of the framework is to provide a common approach rather than to provide either a checklist or a list of constraints.[36] Once the decision has been made to intervene, a clear vision, mission statement and set of objectives is required. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.

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[35] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States* (Paris: OECD Publishing,[2006]); 8-11.

[36] *Ibid*., 39.

Whole of Government Approach in the UK and US

The UK developed the model for whole of government approach and upon implementation faced problems with competing desires of partnered departments where all departments tended to implement whole of government initiatives against their particular vision, rather than the strategic vision of the government. For example DFID sees SSR as conflict prevention and poverty eradication rather than simply defence and diplomacy work. This results in the department producing a separate budget with different priorities than that of the FCO or MOD. As well, to have an effective whole of government approach requires a lot of consultation and is time-consuming. It also requires negotiation and concession along with a willingness to temper individual policy agendas and may even result in the loss of visibility for certain departments. In addition, institutional, budgetary and functional walls can hamper integrated planning. Thus, without a joint and cohesive department or agency to direct the process, the whole of government approach is ineffective.[37]

In the US efforts have been limited to implementation at the operational level and no formal interdepartmental coordination exists.[38] In addition, the US development and assistance agency known as USAID is not a cabinet level department and does not have the same clout as defence, for example. As a result, it is much more difficult to develop

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[37] Fitz-Gerald, "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus…, 15.

[38] *Ibid.*, 17.

interagency cooperation.[39] Moreover, only a small amount of the USAID budget is discretionary. Due to the fact that the bulk of the US budget requires congressional approval, pork barrelling is often a problem. That is to say some return on the investment must be linked to the supporting congressman's constituency. Rather than training locals and leaving them with long-term skills, often US ex-patriots are hired, again circumventing the local populace and economy. Instead of aid money remaining in the host country then, most of it returns to the US.[40] Another problem with the US whole of government approach is that priorities are likely to change from one administration to another. For example the Bush administration was running the national security strategy through policy instruments called Presidential Directives on National Security (PDNS). These documents are shorter-lived than white papers and often only last as long as the administration that wrote them**.**[41]

The Whole of Government Approach in Canada

Canada is particularly well positioned as a middle power to act on the whole of government policy. A nation that since its inception, has fought in alliance constructs, and in recent decades has prided itself on a variety of peacekeeping interventions, the Canadian military has the flexibility, interoperability and willingness to interact with other government departments (OGD), other agencies and other nations to effectively

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[39] *Ibid*., 17

[40] *Ibid*., 18.

[41] *Ibid*., 18

intervene in the security and rebuilding of failing nation states. Canada's "all hazards"

approach to security and more particularly, human security, lends itself to multifaceted

deployments such as Bosnia and Afghanistan. While the deployment to Bosnia was pre-

release of the whole of government approach, it too involved military development and

coordination thus proving the requirement for security reform and an integrated response

to failed states.

According to the IPS, Canada will intervene in failed and failing states in a

reasoned manner based on whether the mission matches Canadian foreign policy, has a

mandate that is clear and enforceable, has effective command and control, has clear rules

of engagement and has international financial and political support. It also stipulates that

a consultation process between all involved parties is needed along with a clear exit

strategy.[42] In addition, the Canadian whole of government approach is described as

follows:

> …the best way for Canada to make a difference in post-conflict situations
> is to pursue a "3D" approach, undertaking Defence efforts to strengthen security
> and stability, pursuing diplomacy to enhance prospects for nation-building and
> reconstruction and making certain that development contributions are brought to
> bear in a coordinated and effective way.[43]

The IPS correctly states that the Canadian Forces (CF) is a vital element of

Canada's response to failed and failing states; however, the CF cannot be the only

contribution. Many benefits can result from CF missions to states in crisis yet Canada

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[42] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement…*, X.

[43] *Ibid.*, Forward.

need to realize the benefits from a coordinated inter-governmental response. While the CF can continue to develop response capabilities for failing states, it must also work with other agencies and departments to provide a more comprehensive, rapid, interoperable and independent response.[44] The basic rationale behind the whole of government approach is that if military, diplomacy and development initiatives are properly linked, stability can be restored in failed states therein preventing the spread of terrorism.[45] The IPS further elaborates by saying that military and police forces would be employed to assist in rebuilding the social, economic aspects of a country with development and private sector assistance in a targeted approach to foster Canada's national interests because once hostilities have been quelled, it is Canada's duty to re-establish infrastructure and conduct post conflict transition operations.[46] However, no framework exists to support this premise, especially if the whole of government approach is a long-term way ahead for Canada.

While not widely known, Canada has been involved in assisting failed nations without formal intervention. By way of the Military Training and Assistance Program (MTAP) Canada has been delivering English language training to members of the former Eastern Bloc states for some time. It is a noteworthy step in developing the professional

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[44] Carment, *Effective Defence Policy…,* 3.

[45] Eric Lerhe, "Is the 3-D Construct at Work in Kandahar Or are we just Kidding Ourselves?" *The Dispatch* IV, no. III (2006), 1.

[46] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement…*, 13.

forces of failed, or emerging states and is an area that Canada could expand without significant resources while providing niche services for struggling nations.[47]

However, prior to providing additional service or agreeing to intervene in failed stated, Canada needs to determine which failed states are important to her. Discussions are required between policy analysts, NGO's and academics. Canada needs to identify the risks and the rewards of not intervening at the outset of a state collapse should it decide to do so and of taking preventative measures.[48] While, the government produced a list of fifty countries of interest, it only contained a few failed states. The lesson from Haiti is that Canada can help in a small country but that we did not stay there long enough. If Canada were to select a few failed states and make a long-term commitment to provide a full reconstruction mission, we could reduce our requirement for repeat engagements to locations such as Haiti and establish credibility for taking care of specific problems as well as making a credible contribution to global security issues. Indeed, Canada could choose to become a regional expert in an area such as the Caribbean and relieve the already over- burdened US, permitting it to concentrate on post-conflict resolution in other theatres.

A formal whole of government structure that specifies the linkages necessary for intergovernmental coordination is not detailed in the IPS. Yet, the IPS documents give the impression that a synchronized approach exists through statements like: "Effective

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[47] Pratt, *Retooling for New Challenges…*, 6.

[48] Carment, *Effective Defence Policy…,*1.

multilateral governance, is essential for Canadian security and prosperity."[49] Indeed no centralized control exists, but it is known that the Department of National Defence (DND) through the Canadian Forces Expeditionary Command (CEFCOM), currently has the lead in organizing coordination meetings, on an as required basis for Canada's mission in Afghanistan.[50]

While the Martin government had intended to establish a coordinating agency in the form of Canada Corps, it never got off the ground. Instead, tactical level coordination is done by the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force or START Team that is an expanded version of the old Peacekeeping Division in DFAIT.[51] While START manages the Global Security Fund, it has a more on technical working group coordination focus and does not provide global governance of the whole of government approach.[52] Naturally for this initiative or any other joined up arrangement to be successful, overall oversight and policy is required. This could come in the form of a council or committee for oversight and governance.

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[49] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement…*, 5.

[50] J.H.G. Lizotte, LCol, CEFCOM, conversation with author, 7 March 2006, with permission..

[51] Marina Laker, conversation with author Deputy Director Peacekeeping and Peace Operations, Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) , DFAIT, 17 April 2007, with permission..

[52] *Ibid*.

As Hugh Segal has so eloquently stated; "intellectual and political linkages are necessary to make the policy work."[53] Since DND is making the policy work without a centralized coordinating agency or department, it is unlikely that this arrangement will survive a change in government. Without a lead agency or governance structure, the longevity and success of the concept is thus very questionable. In addition for an effective whole of government approach, it cannot be expected that DFAIT, DND, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) or CIDA will coordinate with each other because of a few vaguely worded Liberal policy statements. Nor can we expect the START team to issue direction to National Defence, the RCMP or CIDA. Instead, a government coordination agency is required to spearhead the mounting of defence and security operations such that are coordinated effectively with development initiatives.

Certainly the organization of military, RCMP, CIDA, non-governmental (NGO) assets into "multi-disciplinary task-groups" is a legitimate way for the Canadian government to mount intervention missions on either a permanent or as required basis. Naturally, none of the involved government departments can be expected to have the entire infrastructure necessary to coordinate and provide the necessary personnel for such complex missions in their current constructs. Accordingly, START does the coordination for the mounting of whole of government missions. START also seeks the volunteer specialists such as police forces for deployments and has no problem meeting its current

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[53] Segal, "A Grand Strategy…, 4.

commitments, but it does not have a "hammer" if other departments cannot meet their tasking numbers.[54]

While the whole of government approach makes sense and the series of strategic doctrinal statements is indeed a starting point, it is clear, that a governance framework in the form of a government agency or department must be established in order to properly implement the whole of government approach. While some good steps have been taken with the coordination meetings chaired by CEFCOM and the overall coordination being done by the START team, we will see throughout the paper where better coordination at all levels is required. Essentially, Canada must establish a governance structure that works at the strategic level to provide the interoperability framework and oversight to National Defence, DFAIT, CSIS, CIDA and the RCMP so that they can enact the whole of government approach by providing well-trained and integrated rapidly deployable task groups made-up of combat forces, police and private sector CIMIC components that can deploy rapidly either independently or our allies.[55]

In terms of a structure for command and control, the North South Institute report written for Paul Martin before he became Prime Minister recommended that a Cabinet committee on international development be chaired by the International Cooperation Minister and comprise key ministers.[56] Failing that, it recommended a sub-committee of

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[54] Laker, conversation, with author.

[55] Segal, "A Grand Strategy,…,5.

[56] Culpeper, et al, North-South Institute report…, XX.

DFAIT be established to accomplish the same thing and that interdepartmental coordination be centered around the countries receiving aid so as to coordinate programs and projects, implement consistent and coherent policies and exchange information. The report made one other recommendation stating that the government could coordinate the aid and assistance of several countries, should it wish. Notwithstanding that goal could be seen to be grandiose; it would make sense for the receiving country. Taking this one step further, and having a whole of government approach that is coordinated among donor nations and allied militaries, would bring even better results for the receiving country. [57]

Some, like David Pratt, recommend that a separate government department be formed. He proposes that Canada establish a Minister of State for Democratic Development. This ministry could implement the whole of government approach by coordinating policy, budgets, tasks, targets and by advising government.[58] He further recommended that the Ministry reside within the Department of Foreign Affairs and be comprised of senior representative from DND, CIDA, PCO and finance. When required, task teams could augment the department to deal with a specific problem or geographical crisis. As well, he recommended that the ministry be given a special joint fund in order to encourage the various departments to work together.[59] While the formation of a separate government department may be extreme and a subcommittee of DFAIT may be too limited, no one has the "hammer" should direction be contested, nor is there a central

[57] *Ibid.*, 27.

[58] Pratt, *Retooling for New Challenge…*, 15.

point of contact if things go wrong. As a minimum, oversight should be provided by the

Privy Council Office. Regardless of how it is done, some form of central coordination is

required.

To date commendable progress has been made in Canada in that the START team

has been formed and regular meetings are held by CEFCOM. As with any evolving

concept, not all of the problems have been addressed.   Since it is likely that the demand

for a comprehensive military-civil intervention in failed states will be required for some

time, it behoves Canada to properly address the whole of government approach by

matching doctrine and resourced to a viable governance framework.

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[59] *Ibid*., 15.

CHAPTER THREE – SUCCESS FACTORS FOR RECONSTRUCTION

Historical Perspective

Reconstruction of failed states is not a new phenomenon. Accordingly, it is instructive to examine notable historical reconstruction missions such as Japan and Germany after World War II where the US employed military forces to reconstruct and fundamentally change those societies. Both interventions involved massive political, economic and social rebuilding as well as the establishment of democracy.

This chapter will provide a quick review of historical interventions with a view to determining the success factors for reconstruction. It also provides a framework to link the nation-building vision to performance measures in order to properly plan for success. In fact both Japan and Germany "…demonstrated that democracy was transferable; that societies could, under certain circumstances, be encouraged to transform themselves; and that major transformations could endure."[60]

Following the reconstruction of Japan and Germany, US policy emphasized containment, deterrence, and maintenance of the status quo. Limited efforts were made to promote the adoption of democratic and free-market values. However none of the countries concerned was compelled to adopt democracy and free market values as had

Japan and Germany. Essentially, US military forces and the international community

preserved the status quo and were not employed in transformation exercises or to solve

the root problems leaving countries such as Germany, Korea, Vietnam remained divided.

When the US intervened in countries like the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Grenada,

and Panama it was to conduct regime change and was not a full scale rebuilding of the

political economic or social systems.[61]

During the Cold War, both the US and Soviet Union had financially assisted a

number of weak states due to their geopolitical importance. This support ceased with the

dissolution of the Soviet Union, as no further money came from Moscow and the US no

longer had a reason to counterbalance the power of the Soviet Union. Cut-off from

foreign support, states like Yugoslavia and Afghanistan soon collapsed.[62]

The successful transformation of Japan and Germany is due largely to factors that

do not exist in current day transformations. Firstly both Japan and Germany had well

developed economies and societies. Secondly both had been crippled by the allies and

were willing participants in the reconstruction. Thirdly, the consequence of failure was

high during the Cold War providing impetus for the two war weary countries to comply

with western wishes. More importantly, the transformations succeeded due to the level

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[60] Dobbins et al, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation,[2003]), XIII.

[61] *Ibid.*, XIV.

[62] *Ibid.*, XIV.

of effort put into them by both the international community and the US. For example,

military presence was maintained in both Japan and Germany for ten years, in

comparison to Bosnia, Haiti and Somalia which averaged three year engagements.[63]

Even though nation building is often conducted by multinational coalitions, it is

still a risky and expensive endeavour. As a result, Western states are more cautious about

becoming involved in these missions, especially after the disasters experienced in

Rwanda and Somalia.   To wit, the US after its experience in Somalia, was not eager to

enter Bosnia to create a multi-ethnic state or to agree to the Kosovo mission to establish

"democratic polity and a market economy virtual from scratch."[64] As you would expect

then, state-building is a complex exercise that requires a significant financial and

resource commitment from the intervening government.

Stabilization and Reconstruction

> The demands of conflict and post-conflict intervention are one of the leading
> security challenges of our time. Improving the development dimension of
> intervention is intrinsically interrelated to doing the other facets of the
> intervention well.[65]

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[63] *Ibid*., XIII.

[64] *Ibid*., XIII.

[65] Joseph Siegle, "Changing the Definition of Success in Military Intervention" (Carleton University, Council on Foreign Relations, 3-5 October 2003, 2003), 8.

Stabilization and reconstruction is an evolving concept that should be described as "military-led stability operations and civilian-led reconstruction operations."[66] US Army doctrine states that stability operations include counter-insurgency operations, peace operations, security assistance and combating terrorism whereas reconstruction activities include improving governance, training the public service, promoting the rule of law, rebuilding infrastructure and the economy.[67] Stability and reconstruction is essentially the coordination of both activities within a failed state with internal conflict that requires military intervention.[68] To wit, the combined issues of stability and reconstruction have commanded enough attention in the US, that the State Department has plans to establish a civilian cadre of reserve and regular force personnel to conduct the reconstruction activities in the domains of education, legal and engineering.[69] Basically a longer-term strategic view, that encompasses political, development and economic aspects rather than just security, is necessary to produce more lasting results.

For most people, "intervening" means a military intervention alone and does not conjure images of rebuilding a nation's government, civil, or economic infrastructure. However, in these failed states, that is exactly what is required. The Canadian Oxford English Dictionary defines intervention as "the act of intervening especially by one

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[66] Michael J. McNerney *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model Or a Muddle?* (Carlisle: US Army War College,[2005]) . *Paramenters* , Winter 2005-6, 34.

[67] US Department of the Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations Field Manual 3-07* (Washington: Department of the Army, 2003). 1-2.

[68] McNerney, *Stabilization and Reconstruction…,* 34.

[69] Ibid., 34.

country in another's affairs" and "to improve a situation"[70] For the purposes of this paper, intervening in failed states means the use of military force when required to establish conditions where reconstruction of the political, economic, social-cultural and technological systems can occur.

Success Factors

When embarking on reconstruction missions in a failed state, political, economic, social-cultural and technological systems need to be addressed.   Once initiatives from each of these areas have been selected and agreed upon by both the intervening nation and failed state, success factors should be developed and performance measures drafted. Too often the goals for reconstruction are not well understood and communicated. A look at possible intervention success factors for the reconstruction of failed states using a business planning model will now be conducted.

As most recent interventions have occurred in failed states, it is helpful to analyze the factors required for success. Outwardly, security and humanitarian issues generate the intervention, however beneath the surface deeper problems exist and point to the more complex problem of political disintegration. At first blush, the intervening governments, militaries and aid agencies may believe that the mere separation of the belligerents and distribution of aid will bring peace and stability to a failed state. Security and aid are of course vital but will only provide short-term relief from the

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[70] *Canadian Oxford English Dictionary*, second edition, "intervention" 790.

hostilities and poverty. Long-term relief will come from the provision of legitimate governance, establishing an economy, reinstating social and education systems and providing basic technology and lines of communication. This section will describe a framework for linking a strategic vision to suggested measurable success factors for successful intervention.

Governments looking at intervention often couch the mission in terms such as "regime change," "securing a capital city" or in terms of the development to be provided to the nation in question. These limited objectives give the impression of a single purpose and easily obtainable short-term goal. Broader, loftier and potentially vague statements such as state-building are more likely to suffer from "mission-creep."[71] Mission success is thus harder to define, as is a firm cease-date and exit strategy for the intervention. However, when we review the reasons for the intervention, it is clear that single-focused mission statements are inadequate and should be broader in scope in order to encompass all of the aspects to be addressed.[72]

Successful intervention is much like successful business planning and military campaign design in that a strategic vision, clear mission statement and success factors are required. Moreover, the success factors must in turn link back to the mission and vision. Thus using a business measurement tool as a framework for the intervention permits the development of success factors and performance measures that support the selected end

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[71] Siegle, "Changing the Definition…, 2.

[72] Ibid., 3.

state.[73] As a result, when deciding whether to develop or invest in a new market, some

businesses use a framework called PEST, the acronym for the analysis of political,

economic, social and technological factors influencing the market or country in

question.[74] Once these factors have been developed, an action plan can be drafted as well

as performance measures for the assessment of progress and identification of required

adjustments. It is easy to see that this process can be helpful in interventions as it

provides a framework for an action plan and more importantly, the development of

performance measures. It should be noted that some PEST models are expanded to

include additional success factors such as legal, environmental and external whereas for

this paper legal is considered under political and environmental and external influences

are not discussed.

Four Figures appear on the next pages. Figure 1 below shows how the strategic

vision can be linked to the mission, to success factors, enablers and limiting factors.

Figure 2 provides a sample strategic vision chart for a generic reconstruction mission

where the strategic vision is "peace and stability" in the target nation. This is linked to

the desired end-state which is to create a stable government, but to do so, several success

factors or in CF Operational Planning parlance; critical capabilities are required to

achieve that end state.   The critical capabilities are based on the PEST model.   This

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[73] End state is defines as the political and/or military situation which needs to esist when an operation has been terminated on favourble terms. See Canada *Canadian Force College Combined and Joint Staff Officer's Handbook* (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2005), VI-2-6/14.

[74] www.businessballs.com/**pestanalysis**freetemplate.htm; (accessed 08 April 07). It is also explained in detail in http://www.thomsonlearning.com.au/higher/management/hanson/2e/media/Ch02_uncorr.pdf, (accessed 08 April 07).

model further shows that infrastructure is a critical enabler for all success factors as it is the underlying requirement for rebuilding the political, economic and ultimately social structure of a nation. As well, improvements need to be prioritized because if quick improvements to the health, safety and economic sectors are not realized, the locals will withdraw their support for the intervening military forces.[75] As a result, public support is seen to be the critical vulnerability to any intervention plan.

Figure 3 contains a suggested list of items that makeup each of the success factors and Figure 4 rounds out the model with possible performance measures for the success factors. While the success factors can be broken out in many ways including more tactical level detail, the illustrations provided in Figures 3 and 4 are starting points only with Figure 4 showing possible performance measures. While there are other performance measurement models available, this one demonstrates the linkages from the strategic to tactical levels. It should be noted that success factors can be adapted to individual missions and are not a one size fits all solution. Based on the PEST models Figures 1-4 provide an example of possible success factors and are not exhaustive.

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[75] Lerhe, "Is the 3-D Construct…, 1.

Linking Strategic Vision to Success Factors

Vision

Mission

Product/End State

Success Factors/Critical Capabilities

Enablers/Critical Requirements

Limiting Factor/Critical Vulnerabilities

Figure 1 Linking Strategic Vision to Success based on business planning models and the CF Operational Planning Process[76]

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[76] www.businessballs.com/**pestanalysis**freetemplate.htm; (accessed 08 April 07) and
Canada *Canadian Force College Combined and Joint Staff Officer's Handbook* (Toronto: Canadian Forces

Sample Strategic Vision chart

Vision
Peace and stability in target nation

Mission
Rebuild target nation

Product/End State
Create stable government

Success Factors/Critical Capabilities
Political, Economic, Social, Technological

Enabler/critical Requirement
Infrastructure

Limiting Factor/Critical Vulnerabilities
Support of population

Figure 2 Sample Strategic Vision Chart

College, 2005).

Sample Success Factors for Intervention

Political Situation stabilized/government established

Elections held (if government is democratic)
Establish effective national ministries and government departments
Establish local level of governance
Population involved in national, provincial and municipal governments
Government Services delivered:
- Equip and train police forces
- Equip and train army units
- Establish independent and impartial judiciary
- Construct rule of law infrastructure (police stations, courts, army bases)
- Establish control of borders and immigration services
- Increased in crime reported by citizens
- Increase in crimes solved by police
- Reduction of public support for insurgents and criminal elements

Economy Established

Unemployment reduced
New jobs created (specify a timeframe)
GDP increased
Attract foreign investment
Net exports increased and net imports decreased

Social-cultural and education foundation established

Aid delivered
Public Support intervention initiatives gained
Trained and employ teachers
Children attending school
Training established for tradesmen, doctors, dentists, lawyers etc

Technological/ Lines of Communication established

Electricity available throughout the country
Roads and bridges built
External and internal rail and air links established
Radio stations established
Telecommunication network established (cellular phone usage)
Information technology network established (computers)

Figure 3 Sample Success Factors for Intervention based on PEST Framework

PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Political Situation stabilized/government established

Elections held (if government is democratic)
Establish effective national ministries and government departments
Establish effective local level of governance
Population involved in national, provincial and municipal governments
Government Services delivered:
- Number of police forces equipped and trained
- Number of Army units equipped and trained
- Oversight established with courts and judges
- Necessary infrastructure in place: police stations, army bases, courthouses
- Number drop in insurgent incidents
- Increased security at border crossings and immigration control
- Number of reported crimes
- Number of solved crimes
- Reduction of public support for insurgents and criminal elements

Economy Established

Unemployment rate
Number of new jobs created (specify a timeframe)
Gross domestic product (GDP)
Amount of foreign investment
Net exports versus net imports

Social-cultural and education foundation established

Amount of Aid delivered
Public Support gained for intervention initiatives
Number of teachers trained and employed as teachers
Number of children finishing school
Number of tradesmen, doctors, dentists, lawyers trained and employed in those areas

Technological/ Lines of Communication established

Number of communities that have electricity
Number of Roads and bridges built
Number of external and internal rail and air links
Number of cellular and land phones in use
Number of Radio stations established and amount of country that receives coverage
Number of internet service providers

Figure 4 Performance Measures

Political Success Factors

Given that the requirement to intervene in failed states will continue for the foreseeable future, continued improvement to interventions are necessary to create long-lasting political stability that meets the local and national needs of the state concerned. Enduring success in rebuilding a nation will be more likely if the rule of law is re-established. This is multifaceted as it involves re-establishing a non-partisan military, a ministry of defence, a judicial system, police forces, border security, customs and immigration control. Often the police and military are corrupt and no real change will occur unless oversight is provided. This supervision naturally must be linked to local government and civil institutions that are capable of rebuilding the nation's governance structures.[77] Moreover, in some cases, embryonic governments will need to be mentored on everything from memo writing to proper governance. To fully establish the full range of government services will require a large commitment on behalf of the intervening governments.

Common to most state failures is the fact that their governments are largely run by paranoid bullies, who employ fear and violence to inspire conformity and loyalty to their tightly controlled regimes. In short, their regimes lack legitimacy and are characterized by corruption, power and greed. Those who surround them are thus caught in the web of power, influence and kickbacks spun by their leader. Because they are usually against any reforms that would disturb their power base, intervening forces need to consider resistance from those who profited from the toppled regime along with armed resistance

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[77] Fitz-Gerald, "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus…, 9.

from militias and police forces.[78] Consequently counter-insurgency capability and intelligence gathering will be important instruments to achieve security.

It is vital therefore to dismantle the old power structures throughout a state in question and to decentralize the power base, not only at the national level but in order to be more inclusive, local, municipal or regional structures also need to addressed.[79] Dispersal of power is a key way in which to dismantle the previously existing over-centralized authority. The longevity of the intervention ultimately hinges on indigenous participation, for once the development staff has departed, the local population must be able to lead themselves in a stable and transparent manner, otherwise a reversion to corruption and violence is likely. In addition, starting with local or regional government, gives the population a chance to influence any new state framework prior to finalizing the overall structure, to learn proper governance, and to implement a culture of responsibility and transparency from public officials.[80]

Resistance to change is more noticeable when trying to change how governments operate no matter how modern and democratic. More difficult still is implementing change in governments characterized by corruption and nepotism. In this case, intervention and change needs to be well-planned and phased in incrementally.[81] Here

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[78] Siegle, "Changing the Definition …, 3.

[79] *Ibid*.., 6.

[80] *Ibid*.., 7.

[81] Andy Tamas, *Development and the Military in Afghanistan: Working with Communities* (Almonte: Tamas Consultants, 2006), 5.

the intervening powers must determine how things "work around here." Then they must

begin the process of slowly build confidence and trust amongst the population in the

revamped institutions. This is clearly not a quick-fix project.

Quickly establishing the rule of law is important prior to aid or reconstruction

work being conducted. Development workers need to be able to freely distribute aid and

reconstruction work will be for naught if the country is not free from violence. This

sentiment is echoed in the *Voice of the Poor Study* which noted that a top concern of the

impoverished is physical security.[82] That is to say, people must feel secure otherwise

they will not get on with their lives. Neither will they send their children to school, nor

will teachers report for work.[83] Indeed, in Bosnia the schools that were built have

remained empty because of insecurity and ethnic imbalance in the area.[84] We must be

cognizant therefore of the local situation and tailor a solution that fits the requirements of

the population.[85]

Economic, Social-cultural and Technological Success Factors

There are a number of ways to secure public support and largely come from the

remaining PEST factors of restoring the economy, social-cultural and technological

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[82] World Bank, "Voices of the Poor," http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/poverty/voices/reports/lands/lanconcl.pdf (97 World Bank); accessed 16 April 2007.

[83] Fitz-Gerald, "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus…, 1.

[84] *Ibid*., 10.

[85] *Ibid*., 10.

necessities for a stable nation.   The first vital factor in securing public support comes

from re-establishing daily life is that of getting people back to work as soon as possible.[86]

This is a great stabilizer and helps prevent public support of the insurgents. In some

cases, the militia will need to be downsized, but due to the lack of education of its

incumbents, alternate source of employment will need to be found. In states where

autocratic governments existed, most of the new jobs will come through the public

service. While in others, agriculture will continue to be a primary source of employment.

Building up technical infrastructure such as radio stations, cell phones and internet

connections therefore become critical enablers as they permits diversification of the

economy and job creation. In the short-term some financial backing may be required so

that new economic opportunities can be pursued, but foreign investment will only be

generated when the country is stable and secure from insurgency. Regardless,

employment is a great stabilizer and will be a great source of public support, but can only

occur if the local situation is quickly improved.[87] Once employment is secure, social-

cultural aspects of daily life can resume once again adding to the population's support of

the intervention.

An additional consideration for successful interventions is "maintaining the

momentum" achieved by intervention. Time is a critical after the initial intervention. To

capitalize on success, intervening agencies can benefit from on the positive response

from the population who generally realize that old ways were not working and who for a

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[86] Siegle, "Changing the Definition…, 4.
[87] *Ibid*., 5.

short period of time will display a positive attitude towards a regime change. If however, security is not provided or too much time elapses, those previously in power are likely to resume their old habits and establish the conditions necessary to regain power. "Furthermore in contexts that have been defined by autocratic rules, political control is synonymous with personal security and prosperity. Political exclusion amounts to constant vulnerability and hardship."[88] Removing the impetus for a reversion to "familiar norms" can be done by quickly re-establishing community policing, by creating fair aspect to economic prospects and by rebuilding institutions that previously operated in a corrupt and circumspect manner.[89] In typical interventions, the momentum can easily be lost by taking gradual and deliberate steps vice intervening in a multi-faceted and coordinated manner. This important factor needs to become part of the planning considerations for future missions and can be charted by use of a timeline.

By the time a state has collapsed and reconstruction is required, military intervention alone is insufficient. Instead, a state-building exercise is also necessary wherein valid and workable political, economic, social and technological structures are established so as to assure long-term stability of the country because basic services and infrastructure is usually absent.[90] Electricity, roads, and communication networks are but three examples of the basic infrastructure necessary to establish anything more than an agrarian economy.

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[88] *Ibid.*,4.

[89] *Ibid.*, 4.

As we have seen, the Japanese and German reconstruction missions were successful due to the level of effort made by the intervening nations in their reconstruction missions. These countries were willing participants.   In the modern context, local populations in failed states are not always supportive of the intervention. Creating opportunities for local input and decentralization of power will help gain the will of the people.

However, full political and public support on the part of the contribution nation is also required or the mission will be withdrawn prior to fully establishing political, economic, social and technological systems in the failed state. By using the success factors, monitoring progress and in turn keeping the population of the contributing nation engaged, enduring commitment will be generated. Unfortunately as soon as support dwindles in the contributing nation, military forces are often withdrawn too quickly for the fragile state. Departing too soon circumvents the success of the intervention and permits insurgency forces to regroup and overwhelm the newly established or re-established civilian authority.

In short, successful intervention requires a long-term commitment from the intervening governments along with significant resources. Since state collapse threatens regional and world security and appears likely to continue, an increase in development money and an increased focus on intervention will continued to be required. Due to the danger posed by these collapsed states not only is a strong commitment required from the intervening nation or nations, but a long-term international commitment is vital as well.

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[90] *Ibid*., 1.

As Robert Rotberg wrote in "The Washington Quarterly," "Preventing state failure is imperative, difficult, and costly."[91] In other words, there is no choice but to conduct reconstruction missions. How to best to conduct these missions is what needs to be decided.

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[91] Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure…, 96.

CHAPTER FOUR – THE ALLIES IN AFGHANISTAN

Historical Synopsis of Afghanistan

Throughout its history, Afghanistan has suffered invasion and the complications of colonialism of its neighbours.[92] In recent times, the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan for ten years until 1989. Following the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan plunged into a civil war until the Taliban assumed power in 1996. This ushered in a period of relative order to the country until such time as al-Qa'ida established a base of operations in Afghanistan which prompted the American invasion post 9/11. As a result of foreign invasions and the resulting disorder and chaos, Afghans do not readily welcome newcomers. Complicated by a flawed policy towards poppy production implemented by the British, Americans and Afghan government; dissent and suspicion have resulted. Moreover, the policy of poppy crop destruction has backfired in that it has deprived the poppy farmers of earnings causing them to back the Taliban vice NATO forces.[93] The warlords and the Taliban benefit extensively from the drug trade to the point that "the drug traffickers have revenues of six or seven or eight times that of the

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[92] CIA World Book, "Afghanistan," https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.html (accessed 08 April 2007).

[93] Gordon Smith, *Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working?* (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2007), 14.

national government, making it hard for the government to institute reforms on its

own."[94]

In order to create order from this disarray, good security is needed. In fact, Kabul

is a good example where security has allowed economic activity to flourish. Conversely,

outside Kabul, robberies and murders are commonplace. Humanitarian workers have

been threatened, attacked and killed in the southern provinces.[95] Consequently, both

local and international non-governmental (NGO) organizations are reluctant to work

outside of Kabul. In addition, Afghanistan suffers from acute poverty. One in four

Afghan children will die prior to reaching five years of age and that seventy percent of all

children are mal-nourished, development for the area is critical requirement. The allies

have successfully brought aid, reconstruction and government reform to some of

Afghanistan with the PRTs and the whole government approach. However NGOs have

received little or no protection from ISAF troops, likely because of other priorities.

Clearly this is an area where development and defence can be better coordinated.

This Chapter will examine the allied application of the whole of government

approach in the form of the PRTs against the success factors described in Chapter Three

to illustrate that overall the strategic objectives for reconstruction in Afghanistan are

being met. It will also show that PRT model is a good approach for whole of government

intervention and that the UK PRT model is the most successful, making it the model to

emulate. It should be noted that criticism of the PRTs model abounds, but with improved

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[94] Brian MacDonald, Col (ret'd), Television Ontario. *Canada's Mission in Afghanistan*. Appearance on The Agenda hosted by Steve Paikin Toronto: 20 February 2007.

[95] Smith, *Canada in Afghanistan…,* 18.

coordination in the teams and at operation level in ISAF, these difficulties can be overcome.

PRTS

The PRTs are an embryonic concept employed not only as security forces but to bring an international presence to the provinces. Initially, PRTs comprised military and civilian elements such as soldiers and State Department representatives from the contributing nation to work together to bring the whole of government approach to a failed state. PRT composition in Afghanistan has evolved to include representation from the Afghan govennment.[96] Often times their mission seemed to be confusing and ever changing, such that they had a collection of vague mission statements containing verbs like "monitor, assist, coordinate, facilitate" that were linked to a variety of initiatives without meeting specific political or military objectives.[97] The general impression was that they were to try to please everybody. Moreover, mixing defence and development work is delicate and not easy since most development organizations claim to be neutral.

PRTs were established to further security and stability, to strengthen and extend the authority of the central government, to enable reconstruction and the work of NGOs as well as mentor the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA)

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[96] McNerney *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan…,* 32.

[97] *Ibid.,* 35.

forces.[98] In terms of being a "force multiplier," the PRTs are successful in that they provide a light inter-agency military and civilian footprint able to contribute to security and stability in a more significant way than their manning would imply.[99]

Differences exist between Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) due to the differing policies of the contributing nations and due to the varying circumstances in the provinces where they are employed. Some require more security and are employed in more violent sectors while others enjoy a more stable situation such that more NGO and development can be conducted.[100] As well, due to the differences in country policies, some teams are involved in security, reconstruction and development work while some like the German PRT in the Kunduz is not permitted to do the same. Regardless, without the PRTs, reconstruction and development would be limited or non-existent as the military component provides the security necessary for work to continue. While the PRTs are flexible, able to adapt to varying political, environmental and security situations and have a common strategic purpose, it cannot be said that they have a common "look and feel."[101]

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[98] Senlis Council, *Canada in Kandahar: No Peace to Keep A Case Study of the Military Coalitions in Southern Afghanistan* (London: Senlis Council, 2006), 14.

[99] Craig T. Cobane, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Security Assistance: Comments on an Evolving Concept," *Journal of International Security Assistance Management* 27, no. 4 (2005), 96.

[100] *Ibid..*, 93.

US PRT Experience

The US PRTs grew out of their civil affairs teams that were dispersed throughout Afghanistan. They were established to complete short term "quick hit" humanitarian and development" projects in order to gain the confidence of the Afghan people. Initially, mandates and resource allocations between the military and civilian service providers were not clear. For instance, the military used the Department of Defense Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDCA) funds to build schools, and build wells but the fund with its limited application was similar to NGO funds. Moreover, OHDCA authorities would not expand the fund limits to include building police stations or prisons or for training and equipping police forces for example, leaving the PRTs with no resources for their projects. Competing demands for the vehicles and military personnel necessary to escort the civilian personnel impeded development work overall.[102]

Typically, the US PRTs activities are well-coordinated between the US and Afghan entities in Kabul; but at the local level coordination and negotiation with local leaders falters. PRTs need to be able to discern who at the local level can be trusted, how local leadership occurs and in turn marginalize those who are corrupt. The most difficult task facing PRTs is systematically discerning the "good actors from the bad."[103] Another widely recognized yet difficult task for PRTs is that of building good

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[101] *Ibid.*, 93.

[102] *Ibid.,* 35.

[103] *Ibid.*, 34.

governance and security structures in the host nation. Unfortunately, resource allocations fail to provide sufficient funds for both the deployment of a donor country's troops and training for the host nation's forces. Consequently, too few soldiers or policemen are properly trained. Similarly insufficient development workers are available hampering large-scale public service training outside the capital.[104]

A review of US PRTs revealed that tensions were high between US military and civilian personnel assigned to the PRTs, due to the vague mission statements and inadequate funding. Military personnel complained that civilians arrived with no resources or authority to implement programs and only a vague understanding of their role, while civilian personnel felt isolated and unsupported by their military counterparts.[105] To exacerbate matters, the teams often had only one junior level civilian compared to the lieutenant-colonel level of the PRT commander. This civilian was usually on a short ninety day visit which further impeded relationship building or fulfilling a leadership role. Because civilians with sufficient knowledge to assist in re-establishing Afghan culture, education or healthcare, were in short supply, the PRTs had to work with junior diplomats or USAid personnel.[106]

The US noted that civil-military relations were awkward for the PRTs due to the confusion over the civilian role and lack of advanced training with the teams. Indeed the

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[104] *Ibid.*, 34.

[105] McNerney…, 36.

[106] *Ibid.*, 36.

US civilians had only ever attended a few meetings in Washington prior to deployment. Conversely, the British civilian and military members had jointly trained with their teams prior to deploying, and in so doing reduced the confusion over their duties and responsibilities. [107]

After a few rocky months, the US PRTs began to focus on three basic goals: improving security, increasing the influence of the Afghan national government and facilitating reconstruction. In 2003, things improved greatly when each PRT was assigned a civilian from each of the State Department, Agriculture and USAID. These civilians were deployed on one year tours and over time coordination improved between both the military and civilian members of the PRTs.[108] While the US PRTs changed focus in 2004 from development to security, the relationship between the military and civilian members remains strained.[109]

Based on the US experience, NATO established PRTs throughout Afghanistan as a means of extending ISAF's influence in the country. By the end of 2005 nine PRTs were in operation, bringing in more personnel and funding. Given the flexibility of the PRT concept, variances in structure, leadership and operation occurred, however it "created challenges in maintaining a common mission and coordinating an increasingly

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[107]*Ibid.*, 38.

[108] *Ibid.*, 36.

[109] Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies,(2005),20.

diverse group of stakeholders.[110] For example, operations in Northern Afghanistan have focused on reconstruction whereas the UK led PRT in Mazar-e Sharif is concerned with government reconstruction and security sector reform.[111]

German and Dutch PRT's

The German PRT operating in Konduz kept the military and civilian functions separated. This included a different chain of command for the civilians who reported directly to Berlin, since it was felt that mixing the military and civilian missions would tarnish the "softer and gentler" civilian activities.[112] While the German PRT had some success in building relationships with the NGOs as seen in the relocation of several NGOs in Konduz, overall the German preoccupation with security caused them to be seen as less effective than the UK PRT.[113]

The Dutch forces in Uruzgan took a slower less intrusive approach and were able to blend better with the civilian population. Apparently fortunate enough to strike some of sort of deal with the Taliban such that Uruzgan would not be targeted, they have had an easier time that the Canadians in Kandahar.[114] More importantly, they approached local leaders prior to conducting operations in their villages, negotiated truces with them

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[110] McNerney *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan…,* 37.

[111] *Ibid*., 38.

[112] McNerney, *Stabilization and Reconstruction…,* 37.

[113] Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Danish Institute for International Studies…, 25.

[114] Smith, *Canada in Afghanistan…,*18.

when required and avoided local dissidents, thus reducing unnecessary loss of life.[115] It

must be noted that when such arrangements are made duplicitously, they cause the

boomerang effect of permitting insurgents to regroup and recruit followers.

UK PRTs

The UK PRTs are also composed of both military and civilian personnel with

political and development elements, but "The prime difference is that they are led

jointly."[116] As a result, the military is assigned security functions, the FCO office looks

after political matters and the DFID is assigned development tasks. Additionally, the UK

PRTs also have mobile observation teams who patrol surrounding areas for political and

security developments, and work to establish relationships with the local population,

leaders, commanders and warlords. Two main reasons for this are the UK peace support

doctrine and the more peaceful province that UK has been assigned. However, the real

reason for the mobile patrol concept and mandate is likely tied to lessons learned during

operations in Northern Ireland.

The UK PRT focuses on primarily on security but liaises closely with the NGOs

for reconstruction and development. Funding is not given to the PRT for such things as

water provisioning and education or health services for the failed state. DFID projects

tend to be focused on security sector reform such as the refitting of a police station or

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[115] *Ibid.*, 18-19.

[116] Jakobsen, Danish Institute for International Studies…, 21.

conducting training or literacy courses for the police in a small city. The PRT is therefore not funded for the DFID or NGO projects, but is in close liaison with the NGOs so as to divide tasks.[117] Overall the UK PRTs have a better relationship with the NGOs than do the American PRTs.

Reasons for the success of the UK PRT are numerous. Firstly, the UK PRT engaged in comprehensive discussion with the NGOs prior to deployment. Secondly, it followed the recommendations of the NGOs to develop a clear concept of operations that focused on security rather than development. Thirdly, it established effective coordination with the NGOs once in theatre. Fourthly, it developed extensive knowledge of the local conflict in order to establish trust with the Afghans by conducting "soft patrols and by being firm with the warlords. Lastly, the UK PRT has sought alternate crops to poppy growing as a means of livelihood for the locals.[118]

In general, the UK PRT had better civil-military coordination, was better at relationship building and was able to more freely move about in their assigned province. The German PRT had none of those attributes and as a result was limited to a thirty kilometer area of operation and was further accused by UN and NGO staffs of avoiding factious areas.[119] The UK model of PRT operations is considered to be successful since

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[117] *Ibid.*, 23.

[118] *Ibid.*, 33.

[119] McNerney *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan…,* 39.

no projects were undertaken if they did not have government support or if they did not apply to security sector reform. Additionally, decisions were taken by consultation.[120]

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) PRT Coordination

Since the establishment of PRTs in Afghanistan, ISAF has realized that coalition oversight is required.   Accordingly, it established an executive steering group to oversee PRT activities and to ensure that their work met the needs of the Afghanistan's political, military and economic goals.[121] While it is an improvement, evidently, tighter coordination is required, as LCol Lavoie noted during a briefing on Campaign Planning to JCSP 33 students: "There is a tendency for the NATO nations fighting in Afghanistan to develop their own campaign plans…there is no overall coordination of a central campaign plan."[122] There is general agreement among military personnel that coordination between allies was disjointed initially. This is being addressed this summer when ISAF reorganizes and a British Major General will be assigned to Director Constabulary Security in order to provide better coordination and direction of SSR between allies.[123]

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[120] Julian Wright, "Canada in Afghanistan: Assessing the 3-D Approach" (University of Waterloo, Centre for International Governance Innovation, 12-14 May 2005, 2005),7.

[121] McNerney *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan…*, 37.

[122] Richard Lavoie, LCol, *Campaign Planning in Afghanistan*, (presentation to JCSP 33 students at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium), 12 February 07, with permission

[123] Lizotte, LCol, CEFCOM, conversation with author.

Performance Measures as they relate to progress in Afghanistan

Overall, PRTs achieve success in involving local communities, engaging indigenous workers, liaising with the Karsai government and advising local officials. More importantly, PRTs consistently seek feedback and guidance from the Afghan government and were clear at all times that their function was to support the local and national Afghan governments.[124] However, little work has been done in the domain establishing an Afghan civil service.[125] It should be noted that it is not just an issue of reform and rebuilding as some services have never existed. As Janice Stein noted on a recent edition of The Agenda, "…the Afghan government has never delivered services."[126] It is unsurprising then, that further work is required.

In terms of addressing the rule of law, counterinsurgency problems and security in Afghanistan, one noteworthy success involved Canadians last September when they were involved with the NATO brigade that launched Operation Medusa that stopped the Taliban's challenge on Kandahar.[127] The Soviets were pinned down for two years in Kandahar, so this is a significant achievement for Canada and for NATO. While

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[124] McNerney, *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan…,* 41.

[125] *Ibid*., 42.

[126] Janice Stein. Television Ontario. *Canada's Mission in Afghanistan*. Appearance on The Agenda hosted by Steve Paikin Toronto: 20 February 2007.

[127] Chris Alexander. *Interview of Chris Alexander* on The Hour with George Stroumboulopoulos, Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 28 February 2007 http://www.cbc.ca/thehour/video.php?id=1422; accessed on 21 April 07.

counterinsurgency operations have been successful to date in Afghanistan, pockets of

resistance still exist.

Certainly warlords are slowly realizing that a state is back in operation. In 2003,

the warlords often had tanks and led private armies. In 2004, the equipment was returned

to the ANA.[128] In addition, the ANA is being professionalized and are now located

throughout the country. Make no mistake they still face severe challenges in that their

combat rhythm is intense. As well, soldiers only have a three-year engagement, thus

recruitment is an ongoing issue. Naturally, equipment improvements are required.

However, the ANA recently received additional "fire power" and an air corps was

established.[129]   Overall, the ANA is expanding and is becoming more capable. These are

significant improvements for the ANA and for a country that is as poor as Afghanistan.

In terms of the ANP, Germany is the lead nation for training the Afghan police

and since 2005 has received considerable US support. As 2006, the ANP now has a

centralized focus and all new police chiefs. In addition, competitions were held for

positions in the Afghan Ministry of the Interior.[130] While it is early yet, once the ANP is

fully trained, it is suggested that the performance measures to assess the effectiveness of

the Afghan police could be the number of reported crimes and the number of solved

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[128] *Ibid*.

[129] *Ibid*.

[130] Chris Alexander. *Interview of Chris Alexander* at NATO Headquarters, Brussels: 2 November 2006 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061102a.htm accessed 21 April 2007.

crimes as these measures indicate public confidence in the police service and competency of the service.[131]

Currently Afghanistan is experiencing high economic growth. Economics success stories include over seven hundred and fifty thousand farmers receiving best practices training from USAID, a twenty-four percent increase in cereal production and an inflation rate that is less that four percent.[132] To wit, "Ordinary Afghans have seen a doubling of their per capita income since 2003."[133] At the moment it is difficult to attract enough development funds to fully expand the Afghan economy. However, it is likely that this will change as the rate of insurgency decreases.

Under social and health factors Afghanistan is "… starting to see a network of clinics and hospitals emerge. That certainly is unprecedented…it is having an impact on people's lives."[134] USAID supports this statement with statistics that indicate that as of 2005, health care reached over seven million Afghans.[135] In addition, five thousand community health care workers have been trained along with approximately 400 mid-wives.[136] As well, fifty-eight percent of the one hundred and sixty nine thousand students

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[131]Michael D. Maltz. *Measures of Effectiveness for Crime Reductions Programs*. Journal of Operational Research 23, no 3 (June 1975): 454-456.

[132] United States Agency for International Development. *USAID Highlights Progress in Afghanistan's Reconstruction*. Washington: USAID, 16 September 2005, http://usunrome.usmission.gov/UNISSUES/sustdev/docs/a5091904.htm; accessed 20 April 2007, np.

[133] Alexander. *Interview of Chris Alexander* on The Hour, 28 February 2007

[134] Alexander. *Interview of Chris Alexander* at NATO Headquarters,2 November, 2006.

[135] United States Agency for International Development. *USAID Highlights…,* np.

[136] *Ibid.*

that now attend school are girls. While it is too early to determine how may are graduating, this is certainly a step in the right direction. Additionally, teacher training is progressing by the innovative use of weekly radio broadcasts. In this manner, sixty-five thousand teachers are able to continue their training without having to travel.[137]

One of the most practical technical developments to date is the establishment of thirty-five community based radio stations that reach approximately fifty-two percent of the country.[138] To support these radio stations, over two thousand male and female media professionals have been trained.[139]

In terms of rebuilding infrastructure, returning troops have commented that reconstruction in Kabul has been significant since 2003. Reconstruction is also occurring in Kandahar. However, of Afghanistan's thirty-four provinces, it is the hardest hit by insurgency, making progress slower.[140] President Karzai does recognize that the pace of reconstruction needs to improve. To that end, he leads a Policy Action group which receives strong support from the UN and from ISAF. According to Chris Alexander, reconstruction and development is occurring in two-thirds of the country where the insurgency is not as strong.[141] Even though the pace of change in Afghanistan has been

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[137] *Ibid*.

[138] *Ibid*.

[139] *Ibid*.

[140] Alexander. *Interview of Chris Alexander* at NATO.

[141] *Ibid*.

criticized by the media for not matching the change delivered to Bosnia, overall SSR is progressing well.[142]

While this has not been an exhaustive look at the PEST based performance measures, it does give a sampling of how they can be used by highlighting some of the progress made in Afghanistan to date. Certainly more needs to be done. However, this cursory look demonstrates that the whole of government approach is indeed meeting its strategic objective of delivering multi-faceted and inter-departmental reconstruction to a failed state.

Although military intervention has been a common feature in the initial stages of interventions, well-coordinated military and civil security is a continuing requirement throughout the mission especially during the post-conflict stage if long-term success is to be achieved. As long as a diverse number of states and personalities contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan it will be difficult to have fully coordinated development.[143] At best, coordination between civil-military development, reconstruction and diplomatic functions exists at the national capital level for some of the contributing countries,[144] but can be better coordinated from ISAF centralized oversight, campaign planning to the common local goals. To be truly effective, performance measures are also required.

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[142] *Ibid*.

[143] McNerney. *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan…,* 39.

[144] *Ibid.,* 39

We can conclude from this review, the PRTs are a good mechanism to deliver security and development to fragile nations. Indeed, PRTs are a flexible model that can be readily adapted to a variety of circumstances and requirements. It is heartening to note that NATO has realized that as well. Once the campaign plans are better coordinated in ISAF, the Afghan mission will no doubt proceed more smoothly. While several of our allies have employed PRTs in Afghanistan, the UK is the one nation whose model that is noticeably effective and well coordinated. Therefore, it is their model that we should follow.

CHAPTER FIVE – CANADA IN AFGHANISTAN

Situation facing Canada in Southern Afghanistan

> Canada's whole of government approach in Afghanistan is not effectively working because the forces have a completely different agenda than CIDA. What is needed is coordinating leadership from the Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs to both the forces and CIDA.[145]

The Taliban have their largest support base in the southern areas of Afghanistan where ethnic loyalties are the toughest and a dislike for outsiders prevails, creating powerful resistance to the Canadian PRT. Missions to eradicate the Taliban caused animosity amongst the population due to the large civilian casualty rate.[146] After years of occupation, the net effect is that the Pashtun people "do not particularly distinguish between British, Canadian and American or Soviet forces."[147] Furthermore, al-Qa'ida's ability to recruit support is evidenced by the adoption of the suicide bombing technique here-to-fore unacceptable to the Pashtun and clearly indicating a resistance to foreign influence.[148] The Canadian PRT in Kandahar province faces severe resistance and a number of challenges. As a result, they have achieved less success than expected. Until Canadians scale back their expectations for Canada's mission to Afghanistan, disappointment will prevail. However, once better coordination is achieved between development and defence, then more progress will be made in this difficult and dangerous sector. This chapter will review those challenges with a view to making

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[145] Smith, *Canada in Afghanistan…,6*.

[146] *Ibid.*, 16.

[147] *Ibid.*, 16.

[148] *Ibid.*, 16.

recommendations for improvements to the application of Canada's whole of government approach in theatre.

PRTs are more effective in stable situations where basic infrastructure, and NGOs and local authorities support the mission. Kandahar sports none of these conditions. Instead, local governance is weak and insurgency abounds creating "power vacuums" in a number of areas.[149] Due to the fact that corruption is rampant in Kandahar, no tracking of food aid is done beyond Kandahar city, thus food assistance falls into the wrong hands and contributes to the power-base of the dishonest. Moreover, the local population in the south of Afghanistan is disconnected from the International Security Assistance Team (ISAF) of which Canada is a part. This has caused food distribution efforts to be suspended. Given the critical levels of poverty in Southern Afghanistan, distribution of food needs to resume and once reinstated, better tracking will pave the way for stability of the province and will also provide an opportunity for the Canadian PRT to better connect with the local population.

Much needs to be done to address the corruption at all levels of government in order to redistribute the power base, increase the salaries of civil servants and police and to implement compliance measures throughout.[150] As well, intelligence is a critical success factor for counter-insurgency operations, but it is largely unavailable to the Canadians in Kandahar due to the current lack of Afghan support, since local

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[149] Senlis Council, *Canada in Kandahar…,*18.

[150] Smith, *Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working…,*18.

expectations have not been met by the PRT for poverty relief, and the "provision of vital services and medicine."[151]

In short, "…Canadian soldiers have as yet been unable to win the hearts and minds of the local population: their dominantly military intervention has resulted in significant civilian deaths and local discontent."[152]   Unless, circumstances improve, the Canadian mission in Kandahar will become irrelevant to the indigenous population and effectively places Canada in a time-crunch.[153]

Strategic Advisory Team

Since September 2005, Canada has provided a Strategic advisory Team (SAT) to Afghanistan to work under the direction of the Afghan government and individual ministries. The SAT team is comprised of military and civilian strategic planners who assist the government of Afghanistan in "developing and implementing key national strategies."[154] Development specialists are also part of the team. In terms of the contribution of the SAT team, their work is harder to measure as it is in direct support of

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[151] Senlis Council, *Policy Paper: Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Canada's Leadership to Break the Cycle of Violence in Southern Afghanistan* (Ottawa: Senlis Council,[2006]), 11.

[152] *Ibid.*, 10.

[153] Smith, *Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working…,*12-14.

[154] Government of Canada, "Protecting Canadians and Rebuilding Afghanistan," Canada, http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/governance-en.asp (Internet;accessed 20 April 20 2007).

and conducted at the behest of the Afghan government. However, as we have seen, they too could tighten civil-military integration.

Neither the military nor civilian development workers have the same priority on what has to been done nor do they share the same perspective on how long it takes to effect change. This inherently caused tension between the two groups whether they work on the PRTs or the SAT. Accustomed to short fuses and relatively short deployment timelines, the military expects to see change during their deployment, whereas development workers are accustomed to long-term projects that slowly come to fruition. Whether implementing public sector change or trying to influence the habits and opinions of smaller communities, immediate results are rare.[155] Moreover, while both development and defence have vaguely similar goals, they have diametrically opposed approaches. Development workers will quietly knock on doors to see which one will lead to the necessary contacts to implements programs and projects. The military, on the other hand, is known to be more impatient, kicking down doors if necessary but not always obtaining the information.

The Canadian PRTs in Afghanistan

Critics of the Canadian PRTs in Afghanistan say that it is predominantly military in both manning and approach. While the troops have worked hard in Kandahar province, stabilization remains elusive due to the lack of an integrated humanitarian

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[155] Tamas, *Development and the Military in Afghanistan…*, 4.

assistance, poverty relief and development approach.[156] Canadian troops are reportedly

"overly aggressive, indifferent, militaristic, and lacking in communication skills."[157]

Fighting the insurgents is the likely cause for this unfavourable characterization, never-

the-less it creates a disturbing attitude of distrust and hostility towards the Canadian

troops amongst the indigenous population.[158] The actual effectiveness of the Canadian

mission in Kandahar province is thus questionable.[159]

The Canadian PRT has followed "the US military approach that does not

successfully integrate development aid and has failed to produce sustainable results in

terms of security, stability and reconstruction"[160] Canada's efforts in Kandahar over the

last year have been more military in nature and have not facilitated integrated

humanitarian assistance, poverty relief and humanitarian assistance and as a result have

failed to produce the desired level of stability.[161] As a result of their militaristic

approach, numerous civilian deaths and subsequent loss of local support has resulted

making it difficult for the Canadians to connect with the local population. This in turn

creates a lack of knowledge of the local ways, desires and customs. As a result of their

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[156] Senlis Council, *Policy Paper: Losing Hearts and Minds…,* 10.

[157] Senlis Council, *Canada in Kandahar…,* 17.

[158] *Ibid.,* 18.

[159] *Ibid.,* 18.

[160] Senlis Council, *Policy Paper: Losing Hearts and Minds…,* 10.

[161] *Ibid .,* 10.

inability to combat the significant poverty problems facing the province, the Canadians are perceived to be waging a "war against Afghans."[162]

While development workers have traditionally worked in more stable operations and military personnel have dealt primarily with violence, the current nature of state failure is such that development workers are more likely to encounter violence and military personnel find themselves conducting development work. Consequently, their traditional skill sets limit their ability to function properly in these new conditions. Nor are the skill sets required for development and security the same, necessitating adjustments to the training required for both development and military personnel prior to deployment.

Additionally, continuity is important for PRTs and for development in general. Thus, building integration cannot be sustained over time if players continually change. Traditionally, military personnel have not been left in place for sufficient periods conducive to build lasting relationships with local Afghans nor do they fully understand the inner workings of the communities receiving development nor have they been trained to work through the layers of local protocols. So much of successful development is based on understanding the "social patterns and energies" in individual communities.[163]

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[162] *Ibid* .,10.

[163] Tamas, *Development and the Military in Afghanistan…,* 5.

The military has a fairly robust training system for its personnel, whereas development personnel are not subjected to a series of progressive training phases to "increase their expertise in the field."[164] In general, development workers have acquired some university level training. Unfortunately it usually pre-dates the whole of government approach and is mostly impractical.[165] Thus, development workers are no better prepared to deal with their military counterparts than the military is with them as neither understands the other's approach or methodology. It should be noted that in the Canadian context, CIDA only plans and administers development. Actual field level work done is by a variety of NGOs who each have their own way of preparing for field, their own way of measuring proficiency in the field in turn making standardization of skill sets and outcomes and extremely difficult.

In terms of training for PRTs deployments, at first CIDA did not have enough people to spare for the pre-deployment training. That has now changed and CIDA members now attend the Peace Support Training Course in Kingston. However, no additional training is provided at the moment.[166] CIDA and other government departments such as DFAIT do not have the same personnel strength that DND has, making it difficult for personnel from CIDA to attend meetings and training courses.[167] This in turn creates tension between the military who work in a culture where training is a

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[164] *Ibid*., 8.

[165] *Ibid*., 8.

[166] Lizotte, CEFCOM, conversation with author, 7 March 2007, with permission.

[167] Tamas, *Development and the Military in Afghanistan* …,9.

priority and CIDA who would like to pursue the opportunities presented but are not able

to be made available.

Nor is it just a question of teaching development personnel about military

operations. Military personnel are not familiar with development methods either. As a

result, building an understanding about development is also required. As well as building

relationships with CIDA and development personnel is more complicated. One

suggestion is that the military could learn about development with placements in various

aid agencies in a city like Toronto.[168] It would build on the knowledge that the military

personnel already have and would teach them the valuable lesson of how to conduct low

power interventions. That is to say, they would be work on interventions where people

slowly build relationships that lead to change rather than the in-your-face approaches that

are the military currently teaches its soldiers.

It might be worthwhile, due to the closed nature of the military to give

development workers equivalent rank to military officers in order to be recognized,

welcomed into meetings and be made part of the information loop. It is entirely possible

for the development workers to be ignored by the military even though they are housed in

the same camps.[169] To improve cooperation and pave the way for military recognition of

the development representative, the head of DFID in the UKwas given the rank of

Brigadier General. In Canada, we have no equivalencies for development workers, and

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[168] *Ibid.*, 9.

[169] *Ibid.*, 9.

thus do not accord equivalent rank or status, causing development workers to be excluded from planning and meeting sessions.

While the whole of government approach has development and defence working together to achieve common goals, much coordination is required to assist development workers in collaborating with military. For the military, it needs to broaden its training its order for its personnel to be able to better understand development.[170] In short, the integration of both development and defence approaches is required for successful interventions.

Canada's "dominant military approach" is seen to be copying the US PRT example. This approach has impeded development, poverty relief and humanitarian assistance. Once the poverty and humanitarian portions have been looked after, the Canadian PRT will be able to stabilize the area and deliver much needed aid to this especially poor province.

As noted earlier, security and development are intertwined in the solution for Afghanistan. What is equally important to note is that development without security will cause Afghanistan to revert to a failed state. Yet providing only security without development is also not sustainable.[171] Until Canada effectively links both in Kandahar province security will remain an elusive. Canadians face a tough situation as the area

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[170] Tamas, *Development and the Military in Afghanistan…,* 9.

[171] Senlis Council, *Canada in Kandahar…,*23.

needs to be secured first. While the lesson appears to be that everything needs to be done at once, it is not possible with our current manning levels.

Additionally, the military cannot be left on its own to implement such complicated and lengthy reforms. Establishing the conditions where the military, development and diplomacy staffs work together can bring the requisite change. But as Senator Moore said, "The evidence we heard that it is going to take 20 to 100 years.[172] Consequently not only is a long-term commitment required but a stable and enduring framework so that cooperation between the three departments is increased and maintained.

Rebuilding a failed state does indeed require a long-term commitment and investment. It is a complicated matter involving economic development, public and security sector reforms, and infrastructure replacement. Canada is capable of strengthening Afghan capabilities in all of these areas. What is necessary however, is the political and public will to stay the course. Withdrawal of Canadian assets should not be contemplated until such time as self-sustaining rule-based institutions have been established and accepted by the indigenous population.[173]

Nor can we leave Afghanistan without a "... government that is viewed as legitimate by most Afghans and one that is capable of maintaining security in most areas

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[172] Wilfred Moore, Senator. *Canada's Mission in Afghanistan*. Appearance on The Agenda hosted by Steve Paikin, (Toronto: Television Ontario 20 February 2007).

[173] Smith, *Canada in Afghanistan,...* 19.

of the country." As well, in order to be successful Canada has "… to deal with aspects of the corruption problem because it undermines the perception of legitimacy of the government."[174] Moreover, when Canada withdraws from Afghanistan we will have to "be able to hand over counter-insurgency operation to the indigenous military and police forces."[175] No withdrawal will be successful unless responsibility is transferred to the Afghans. That includes responsibility for police, judiciary and military services which will need to be made stronger and more proficient than they currently are.[176] Accordingly, the commitment required from Canada may be more realistically set at a minimum of ten additional years. If Canada is not prepared to weather a ten year commitment, she must be prepared to convince others to do so.[177]

Certainly, "… the training, mentoring and sustaining of a professional army and a police force [in a failed state] that is strategically deployed and properly paid and equipped is a huge commitment."[178] While it recognized that a long-term commitment is required for the military in Afghanistan, this is not widely understood by Canadians. In addition, we must modify our goals to make them more realistic. Thoroughly trouncing the Taliban is unlikely. Diminishing their effectiveness, span of influence and reducing

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[174] Moore, Senator. *Canada's Mission in Afghanistan*.

[175] Roland Paris, Television Ontario. *Canada's Mission in Afghanistan*. Appearance on The Agenda hosted by Steve Paikin, (Toronto: Television Ontario, 20 February 2007).

[176] Smith, *Canada in Afghanistan…,* 24-25.

[177] Ibid., 18.

[178] Canada. Senate. *Report to Parliament, Canada's Mission in Afghanistan: Measuring Progress* (Ottawa: Senate, February 2007), Internet accessed 15 March 2007; www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca ,10.

them to small pockets of resistance may be more feasible.[179] As said by Senator Moore**,** **"**We have to be modest and clear in our goals." As such we may well have to accept a protracted engagement with the Taliban. It is well-known that the Taliban is attempting to wear down our collective resolve to sustain casualties in Afghanistan and that is the centre of gravity for contributing nations.

"Following the US military approach – which does not successfully integrate development aid – has failed to produce sustainable results in terms of security, stability and overall reconstruction."[180] Canadian soldiers must temper their work once Kandahar is secured. The criticism launched against the Canadian military is likely too severe. It is also likely that the current security situation demands a more severe military approach than some would like. Once the counter-insurgency problems are under control, Canadian soldiers will be able to be less aggressive. Naturally, development cannot progress until the province is made more secure, making these allegations applicable for the moment.

While the Canadian PRT faces severe difficulties in Kandahar province, and little of its work can be measured using the template in Chapter 3, greater success in being experienced by the SAT team. Because the PRT receives more media coverage, Canadians have little familiarity with the SAT team accomplishments. This is mostly due

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[179] Smith, *Canada in Afghanistan…,*, 21-22.

[180] Senlis Council, *Canada in Kandahar…,*10.

to the fact that the SAT team mentors and works along side the Afghan government and
is not designed to take credit for their work.

CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSION

As Robert Rotberg wrote in the Washington Quarterly, "Nothing enduring can be accomplished instantaneously." [181] As with the small steps required during a reconstruction mission, the evolution of the whole of government approach has been steady but incremental. While it is admirable that Canada has embraced the whole of government approach, it must be expanded and institutionalized so that it will endure the changes of government and department heads. Otherwise it is nothing other than an enhanced gentlemen's agreement. Certainly the START and CEFCOM initiatives are good beginnings, but as we have seen a more lasting governance structure is required to properly coordinate the whole of government concept at the national level. Once this is in place, it is likely that the conditions will be set for better tactical level civil-military integration of the PRTs as requisite oversight will be in place. Under the current construct, civil-military tensions persist because the process is personality driven and not institutionalized. Establishing proper governance is also likely to reduce the criticism faced by Canada and her allies concerning civil-military integration.

Certainly more "jointness" can be accomplished in terms of the coordination for training of the military and development workers in order for both groups to better understand their seemingly conflicting mandates. There is no doubt that the military has much to learn about development. Yet reconstruction is not just a security operation either. Development workers need to be better incorporated in the planning and conduct

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[181] Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure…, 96.

of the START and PRTs so that they too understand how to deliver to conduct reconstruction and development under the whole of government construct.

As the look at allied and Canadian progress in Afghanistan revealed, there is no doubt that as Chris Alexander says, the pace of change in Afghanistan does not match missions like Bosnia.[182] However, this should not diminish the accomplishments of the delivery of whole of government services to Afghanistan, nor should it tarnish the tactical level application of the whole of government approach in the form of PRTs and the SAT team. There also is no question that significant changes have been made to the ANA and ANP. As well, rebuilding of the Afghan government following a thirty-year period of war is a massive challenge. Reconstruction of the economic and social systems continues. Although progress has been slow, it is significant as our look at the success factors indicates.

Reflecting back on the progress made in Afghanistan, it is easy to see that much has been accomplished since 2003 and with the continued presence of the ISAF, much more is possible. Critical factors to ensure that steady progress is made in any reconstruction mission apply equally well to Afghanistan. As previously discussed, successful reconstruction takes a firm mandate from the population and government of the both contributing and receiving state. Thus a firm commitment is required in the form of development money and personnel as well as a commitment to stay for as long as necessary. This is not an easy obligation to make much less sustain. However much is at stake if the Afghanistan's of the world are abandoned. A better public awareness

campaign at home in Canada can help overcome this difficulty, but will likely only garner support as long as tangible results are generated in our whole of government mission.

As suggested earlier, the PEST model is an excellent starting point for measuring success. When combined with either a business planning model or the Operational Planning Process (OPP) to define the vision and mission for the operation, it can serve not only as a methodology for planning whole of government reconstruction activity but for tracking results that can be released to the public in Afghanistan and in Canada in order to maintain support. This seemingly small step has tremendous potential for generating and retaining public support.

Now that it is recognized that military intervention, peace building and development are intertwined, it is easy to agree with the whole of government approach. Moreover, this examination has demonstrated that overall the whole of government approach is a sound way ahead for reconstruction. Indeed, failing to adopt the whole of government approach would have jeopardized Canada's ability internationally to contribute to reconstruction projects. In effect Canada did not have a choice but to follow suit. Having embraced the concept, Canada, like her allies is in a good position to make the improvements necessary to make the whole of government approach an enduring mechanism vehicle for addressing nation-building missions. In terms of the contribution of the SAT team, their work is harder to measure as it is in direct support of and

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[182] *Ibid*.

conducted at the behest of the Afghan government. However; as we have seen, they too could tighten civil-military integration.

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