The Strategic Advisory Team

A new capability in nation-building for the Government of Canada - A new role for the Canadian Armed Forces

by / par

Major Michel-Henri St-Louis

14 May 2007

Table of Contents

Abstract

This research paper demonstrates the value of a Strategic Advisory Team in the fight against insurgency or in support of failing and failed states. The study suggests some changes to our mission design in order to use this capability in present and future areas of Canadian involvement. It demonstrates that the Canadian Armed Forces have the ways and the means to participate in nation building in order to accomplish the government's ends. It argues that a small, adaptable and professional group of planners from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of National Defence, the Canadian International Development Agency and other relevant agencies, working together in moving a host country towards good governance helps Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces achieve its aims. More importantly, such a model makes a significant contribution to the overall nation building effort and, as a consequence, helps in defeating insurgencies and bolsters the odds against a regression to state-failure.

> **Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan or SAT-A**
> **What it is?**
> *A Team of military and civilian planners working to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRA) in developing key national strategies. The team, in consultation with the Canadian Ambassador, the Head of Aid and with senior representatives of the Afghan government, provides direct planning support to the government ministries and working groups in the development and governance realms.* [1]

Introduction

Canada's and the Canadian Armed Forces' (CF) involvement on the world stage underwent dramatic change in 2006. That year saw the completion of our withdrawal from the United Nations (UN) mission to the Golan Heights and our quasi-simultaneous deployment of a Task Force (TF) and a Brigade headquarters to Southern Afghanistan, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This apparent shift in the employment of Canada's soldiers was not quite so recent. It actually started at the turn of the 21st Century [2] and forced the CF to re-evaluate its doctrine, training and mission design in order to ensure success on the modern battlespace. This evolution was accelerated by the events surrounding 9/11 and the more recent realities of Canadian operations in Afghanistan.

> This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and

---

[1] Government of Canada, "Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan - Why Are we There?" http://news.gc.ca/cfmx/view/en/index.jsp?articleid=266449; Internet; accessed 10 March 2007.

[2] Dr. Douglas Bland argued, in a conference on the 3D Approach sponsored by the Canadian Forces Land Staff, The US War College and Queens University (22 June 2006), that it actually started in 1992 with the decision to repatriate the 4th Mechanized brigade from Germany to Canada, and its employment in the Ex-Yugoslavia conflict at the same time. The transformation of our Cold War stance to modern 3D stance started when our mechanized assets in Germany were moved to Ex-Yugoslavia. But, according to Dr. Bland, the policies and government institutions did not immediately realize this paradigm shift. Conference, *Canadian and US Approaches to 3D*, Queens University, USWC and LFDTS, Kingston, 22-23 June 2006. With permission.

> exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him . . . It requires in those situations where we must counter it . . . a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.[3]

As John F. Kennedy observed, in respect to the Vietnam War in 1962, the CF in Afghanistan has found itself in the middle of a counter-insurgency campaign that calls for new strategies, inspired by old lessons. This type of campaign, while not new, is now being referred to as Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW). This type of warfare best described "as any war in which one of the major participants is not a state but rather a violent ideological network"[4] is now at the centre of the present and future operating environment.

On this modern battlefield, Canada made its policy known in April 2005 by publishing the *International Policy Statement* (IPS) that had components of diplomacy, development, defence, and commerce. It clearly stated that our approach to intervention on the international stage would be rooted in a 3D + C approach (Diplomacy + Development + Defence and Commerce). This approach is one in which diplomacy, defence and development worked together to synchronize efforts, improve effectiveness and maximize the impact of Canada's contribution. After a change in government in January 2006, this approach was ratified by the new Conservative government, albeit under the term Whole of Government approach, or Team Canada. For the purpose of this study, the whole of government approach (WGA) will be the term used to represent this concept. WGA refers to the practice by which governments mount international actions involving all departments responsible for security, political and economic

---

[3] John F. Kennedy, "Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy," June 6th, 1962. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8695; Internet; accessed on 15 March 2007.

[4] William Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation War." http://antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702; Internet; accessed on 15 March 2007.

affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance. This approach demands a coherent policy and integrated activities by all elements of government.

In Afghanistan, Canada's efforts, both in the Kandahar region and in the capital, Kabul, are one example for this WGA. More specifically, in Kabul at the national level, the CF worked in consultation with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) and with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to employ the Canadian Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A) since 2005. This team comprised of a small group of military members, a defence scientist and a CIDA co-operant who worked in consultation with the Canadian Embassy towards strengthening the national government of Afghanistan, and ultimately, served as a tool on the road to success at the operational and strategic level.

This research paper will demonstrate the value of a SAT in the fight against insurgency or in support of failing and failed (FF) states. The study will suggest some changes to our mission design in order to use this capability in present and future areas of Canadian involvement. It will show that the CF has the ways and the means to participate in nation building in order to accomplish its ends. To achieve this, the paper will be structured in three parts: an overview of the present body of knowledge that deals with nation building, the future security environment and 4GW; a discussion and analysis of the genesis and impact of SAT-A in contrast with the lack of a SAT capability in Canadian interventions in Haiti; and lastly an assessment of the replicability of such capability and how best it could be included in future operations.

The evolution of warfare and Canada's commitment on the world stage demands some new and innovative tools in the fight against insurgents and our support to failing states. This paper will conclude that a small, adaptable and professional group of planners from DFAIT, DND, CIDA and other relevant agencies, working together to support good governance, will help the host nation, Canada and the CF achieve its aims. More importantly, such a model would make a significant contribution to the overall nation building effort and, as a consequence, help in defeating insurgencies and bolster the odds against a regression to state-failure.

Given the recent advent of the SAT-A, there is as yet no comprehensive published assessment of the effectiveness of such a team, let alone a reflection on the need to pursue this capability and replicate it in future Canadian interventions. On the other hand, there is a large body of work that deals with 4GW, nation-building efforts, Canadian foreign policy and counter-insurgency theories. Building on the literature from the four latter topics, using primary sources from the authors recent participation in the SAT-A, and reflecting on the effectiveness of such a capability, this paper will contribute to the present debate on Canada's role in foreign operations. It will capture the short history of this mission, while attempting to assess the role it could play in the future. It is by no means a Canadian Foreign Policy paper or the analysis of competing views as to the modern nature of war. It is a focused attempt at persuading decision makers that in a SAT-like model, they have a relatively inexpensive, low risk, highly effective, publicly appealing way by which Canada can take significant action in states vulnerable of collapse and make a vital difference.

In the early 1990s, armies all over the world started using the term Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC). Largely as a result of the international intervention in the Balkans, the CIMIC function now has become an integral part of most military operations. In a similar light,

this paper will suggest that a SAT-like function should become a new integral part of future interventions in the Contemporary Operating Environment (COP). In conjunction with other new capabilities like the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and the Operational Mentor Liaison Team (OMLT)[5], the SAT gives Canada a new capability with which it can be directly involved in supporting fragile states.

The OMLTs are the NATO model of the American Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) which are groups of servicemen who are attached to the Afghan National Army at company, *kandak* (battalion), and brigade level to assist with the development of their capability in both carrying out operations and being able to support those operations. OMLT will be mentoring Afghan troops in how they go about their daily business and developing the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) so that in the future it will be able to conduct training and operations on its own. Canada has one OMLT working with the ANA in the Kandahar Province. As for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), they are units working in Afghanistan, consisting of small operating bases from which groups of civilians and military specialists work to perform small reconstruction projects, provide security for others involved in aid and reconstruction work, as well as contribute to the capacity building efforts with the regional Afghan institutions.

---

[5] Lisa Tankaria-Clifford, Capt UK, "Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams," *ISAF Mirror* issue 36, (December 2006): 17. As seen in: http://www.nato.int/isaf/isaf_mirror/ISAF_Mirror_Dec_2006.pdf; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007. For PRTs see: Government of Canada, "The Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team" http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/kprt-en.asp; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

Chapter 1 – Nation building, the Future Security Environment and 4th Generation War

> **Nation building –** *Efforts carried out after major combat or civil turmoil to underpin a transition to peace and democracy. Nation building involves the deployment of military forces, as well as comprehensive efforts to rebuild health, security, economic, political and other sectors.*[6]

Section 1 - Nation building

> Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.[7]

In the *IPS*, published in 2005, the Government of Canada made it very clear that nation building would be among its top foreign policy priorities. This emphasis on nation building would further blur the line between military and political affairs, and reinforce the notion highlighted by Mao Tse-tung's 1937 quotation cited above. The policy statement declared that the primary concern for Canadian involvement would be intervention in fragile states. This type of intervention would have a number of lines of operations, but would ultimately aim towards a similar objective of nation building, that is "creating or strengthening such government

---

[6] Definition from an interview with James Dobbins. Mr. Dobbins' résumé on nation-building is unparalleled in American policy circles. In the 1990s, he served as the Clinton administration's special envoy for Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, supervising the peacekeeping and post-conflict operations. After Sept. 11, 2001, he served as the Bush administration's special envoy for Afghanistan, working to form and install the new government and reopening the U.S. embassy in Kabul. Now the director of the International Security and Defence Policy Center at the RAND Corporation, Dobbins has co-authored a book with his RAND colleagues, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (2003), about America's nation-building record, and the lessons learned, from 1945 to today. Interview with PBS Frontline's Wen Stephenson on Sept. 26, 2003. See text at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/stake/dobbins.html; Internet; accessed 16 March 2007.

[7] Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 1937. Quoted in Peter G. Tsouras, *Warriors' Words: A Dictionary of Military Quotations* (London: Cassell Arms & Armor, 1995), 470.

institutions as armies, police forces, judiciaries, central banks, tax-collection agencies, health and education systems… and overall government apparatus."[8]

Ashraf Ghani, Finance Minister of Afghanistan between July 2002 and December 2004, in conjunction with Clare Lockhart and Michael Carnaham made the compelling case for the need for a new approach to nation building. In their paper "Closing the Sovereignty Gap: an Approach to State-Building" they argued that a state has ten core functions:

1. Legitimate monopoly on the means of violence

2. Administrative control

3. Management of public finances

4. Investment in public finances

5. Delineation of citizenship rights and duties

6. Provision of infrastructure services

7. Formation of the market

8. Management of the state's assets (including the environment, natural resources, and cultural assets)

9. International relations (including entering into international contracts and public borrowing)

10. Rule of law[9]

---

[8] "Nation-building 101 : Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan", edited excerpts from an article by Francis Fukuyame, in the *Atlantic*. http://www.sfu.ca/casr/ft-fukuyama1-1.htm; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

[9] Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart and Michael Carnaham, *Closing the Sovereignty Gap: an Approach to State-Building*, Working Paper 253 (London: Overseas Development Institutes, September 2005), 6. Ashraf Ghani was recognized as the best finance minister of Asia in 2003 by the journal, *Emerging Markets*, half way through his tenure in that ministry. While in that office he was instrumental in a number of institutional reforms while coordinating donor intervention in Afghanistan. His long-term program for the rebuilding of Afghanistan, *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, served as the basis for the Afghan Compact that was signed at the London Conference in January 2006. In the last year his name has been rumored to be in the running for such prestigious positions as Secretary General of the UNSC, and President of the World Bank.

When nation states are able to perform the above mentioned functions, they generate a sense of trust, legitimacy and opportunity that solidifies the state. On the other hand, the inability to deliver in a number of these functions is what categorizes failing states. As for failed states, they have completely lost the ability to deliver on any of these functions. This inability leads to the creation of competing centers of power, a loss of trust, de-legitimization of institutions and possibly spirals into violence. For Canada, this notion of nation building translates into the use of military power and all other relevant agencies of the government to stabilize the situation and simultaneously assist in the reconstruction of infrastructure and the rebuilding of capability. [10] This assistance would therefore be done in the view of halting and reversing the situation.

The United States (US) has also recognized this shift. In the 2002 version of their *National Security Strategy* (NSS), the White House stated that: "America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones."[11] This realization was expanded upon in the 2006 version:

> Regional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal rivalries, and ethnic or religious hatreds. If left unaddressed, however, these different causes lead to the same ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists. The Administration's strategy for addressing regional conflicts includes three levels of engagement: conflict prevention and resolution; conflict intervention; and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.[12]

---

[10] Xavier Hamonic, *The Canadian Armed forces: not just for peacekeeping* (Hamilton: Brock Press, 2007), 3. As seen in: www.brockpress.com; Internet; accessed 17 March 2007.

[11] United States, White House, *The National Security Strategy of The United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, September 2002), 1.

[12] United States, White House, *The National Security Strategy of The United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, September 2006), 15.

Accordingly, their declared national security policy now depends more on their ability to rebuild or support failed and fragile nations, than in their ability to defeat enemy forces.[13] Stabilizing and rebuilding fragile societies is now widely viewed as the main challenge for western nations, because these fragile societies can quickly become breeding grounds for trans-national terrorism. The US government is very specific in its *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. This policy, updated in September 2006, described a strategy that intends to deny terrorists the use of safe havens. They recognized that the risk of terrorists finding safe havens was greater in failing states or states that were emerging from conflict. Insurgents and terrorists alike can take advantage of this instability to create conditions they can exploit to their advantage. In order to mitigate this risk, the US "…will continue to work with foreign partners and international organizations to help prevent conflict and respond to state failure by building foreign capacity for peace operations, reconstruction, and stabilization."[14] All of this in order to help countries in such situations embark on the path to sustainable peace and prosperity.

These propositions are apparently evolutionary in as much as the governments and their armed forces are realizing that the lack of host nation capacity in future theatres of operation will force them to simultaneously conduct counter-insurgency and nation building operations. Or, as the Merrill Center for Strategic Studies suggested in 2005: "…one may [now] conceptualize nation building as part of the counterinsurgency effort."[15] This idea is at the center of this

---

[13] Katherine McIntire Peters, "Building Stability." In the Special section on "Redefining National Security." As seen in: www.GOVEXEC.com, http://www.govexec.com/features/0106-01/0106-01securityS1.htm; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

[14] United States, White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, DC: White House, September 2006), 16.

paper's thesis. The new capability that a team like SAT brings enables policy makers to embark

on nation building as part as the counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign, almost simultaneously.

The goal that the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs has laid out for such

operations is very ambitious but speaks to the herculean task that developed nations face when

embarking on nation building. It now requires much more than security and stabilization.

> The stabilization of post-conflict societies needs to be followed by the re-establishment of effective public institutions – law enforcement and judicial systems, education and health care, functioning legislatures and regulatory regimes. This will set the stage for long-term economic development, through international assistance and private sector initiatives.[16]

Canada's experiences in the Balkans, Haiti, and East-Timor demonstrate the importance of

having an integrated and holistic approach towards the completion of the above stated goal,

through focused nation building efforts.

This lofty Canadian objective is nested in the goal of an enduring peace laid out by the

Secretary General of the United Nations in his remarks to the General Assembly. "Peace within

a failed state becomes sustainable, not when all conflicts are removed from society, but when the

underlying sources of instability are resolved through the exercise of state sovereignty and

generally, participatory governance."[17] Achieving state sovereignty and participatory

---

[15] Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, "Workshop on Irregular Warfare, The Afghan and Iraq Case," 10. As seen in http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:w8ahlJDp868J:www.sais-jhu.edu/merrillcenter/Panel1.pdf+nation+building+and+counterinsurgency&hl=en&gl=ca&ct=clnk&cd=26; Internet; accessed, 14 March 2007.

[16] Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada in the World: Canadian International Policy, "Diplomacy, Canada's International Policy Statement, A role of Pride and Influence in the World. Building a more secure world." As seen in: http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/overview-en.asp; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007.

governance encompasses the whole range of core functions of the state that were presented earlier. States at risk of collapse, therefore, need the unrelenting assistance of the international community (IC) in rebuilding or strengthening those core functions, if they aspire to such a sustainable peace. A sustainable peace ensures that the state avoids becoming a source of instability and possible threat to other nations.

With regards to Afghanistan, these challenges can be effectively divided in four areas with three underlying requirements. The challenges are a secure environment, good governance, poverty alleviation and economic development. They require security systems reform (SSR), institution building and a counter-narcotic campaign. In order to tackle this, the Prime Minister of Canada categorized the operation in the following terms: "Together, diplomats, aid workers and soldiers from thirty-five countries are working with the Government of Afghanistan in an integrated international effort to support the country's reconstruction. Diplomacy, development and defence are inextricably linked."[18] This statement to the House of Commons underscored the need for the IC to work together towards a sustainable peace and focus their efforts in nation building. Accepting the fact that nation building is a vital part of interventions in vulnerable states (see Fig 1)[19], it is now necessary to see how it fits into a counter-insurgency.

---

[17] "No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," *Report of the Secretary-General 0134362* (New York: United Nations, April 20, 2001). Quoted in David Carment's monograph: David Carment, *Effective Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing States*, CDFAI Research Paper Series (CDFAI: Calgary, June 2005), 16.

[18] Stephen Harper, "Prime Minister stands by Canada's commitment to Afghanistan." http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1165; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

[19] This model comes from, The Center for Domestic and International Health Security, Seth G. Jones *et al*, *Securing Health, Lessons from Nation-Building Missions* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006), xvii, figure RAND MG321-S.1.

In an interview with the Chairman of the Independent Administration Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) of Aghanistan, Dr. A. Mushahed stated simply, that "…a government that is efficient in delivering services to its people will help establish security and ultimately defeat the terrorists [insurgents]."[20] Given that by its nature,

Fig. 1. Model for Nation-Building [Note 18]

COIN operations aim at intervention in a chaotic system in order to alter its character, it has become evident over the last four years that sustainable antidotes to insurgencies include the build-up of the core functions of the state. The corollary then is that capacity building and development have become tools in a modern COIN campaign. "The development work required in counter-insurgency… seeks specific results: strengthening the governance, reducing support and hospitality for insurgents, protecting the population and increasing the flow of reliable intelligence about insurgent activity to govt forces."[21] A second corollary from this realization is that nation building and development need to be conducted in a more or less simultaneous

---

[20] Dr. A. Mushahed, Chairman of the IARCSC, interviewed for research paper on SAT-A by Major MH St-Louis while he was a member of the SAT-A and working in the Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate of the IARCSC, 5 May 2006. The IARCSC is an independent commission that is ultimately responsible on behalf of the GIRA for all of the public servants. They are the lead agency in implementing Public Administration Reform (PAR) in Afghanistan, a key component of the nation building efforts by the international community and the host nation (HN).

[21] Andy Tamas shared his thoughts and his unpublished essay with the author on the commonalities and differences between Canadian aid workers and Canadian military members, working alongside civil servant in Afghanistan. Andy Tamas, "Development and the Military in Afghanistan: Working with Communities," (Kabul: SAT-A, 2006).

manner, in sharp contrast to the previous experiences in the 1990s, where there was a clearly defined phase for war fighting, stabilization and reconstruction.

Without conducting a complete review of COIN theories, it is useful to reflect on some key elements of the literature as they pertain to the realization that military and non-military aspects of state power need to be integrated in order to succeed. Roger Trinquier's important monograph, *Modern Warfare: A French view of Counterinsurgency* was first published in 1961. Surprisingly relevant today, he has influenced the vast majority of authors on the subject. In his book, Trinquier accurately described what we now refer to as the 'modern war', a war that pits nation-builders against non-state organisations using terrorist tactics in order to defeat the nation. 'Modern War', as he saw it in 1961, would no longer be fought between mechanized forces of warring nation-states.[22] On the contrary, COIN required "…an interlocking political, economic, psychological, military that aims at the [insurgent's intended] overthrow of the established authority in a country…"[23] The French author recognized the need for an integrated approach to COIN.

His thoughts were further developed by David Galula, who in 1964 produced a guide on how to conduct COIN, a guide that would still be useful today in the hands of platoon commanders in Kandahar, as much as in the hands of policy makers. *In Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice,* Galula recognized that only military and non-military operations working together can defeat the insurgents. This requires the central coordination and

---

[22] Robert R. Tomes, "Relearning counterinsurgency warfare," *Parameters* (Spring 2004). http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBR/is_1_34/ai_115566394/print; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

[23] Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare. A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (New York: Praeger, 1964), 6.

integration of political, social, economic and military elements of the intervention. Furthermore, he had already come to the realization that "military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population."[24] These two theorists captured, thirty years ago, that the pursuit of victory in a COIN campaign by military means alone would be unsuccessful.

Canada's ex-Ambassador to Afghanistan, Christopher Alexander, recently observed that if Canada and other international agencies only concentrated their efforts on security in Afghanistan, the intervention would be destined to fail. Nation building, in any present and future involvement, needs to be undertaken along side the COIN efforts. This approach was crucial in order to secure the host-nations legitimate governments' hold on power, and in the long term, ensure mission success.[25]

Mission success is the point at which the government is able to provide basic needs, rehabilitate its economy and improve on the welfare of its people. Once the government and its own security forces are stable, the intervening forces can start their withdrawal and the transition to the civilian agencies and non-governmental institutions which can embark on the delivery of long-term development progress.[26] But to achieve this mission success as quickly as possible,

---

[24] David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964), 88.

[25] Christopher Alexander, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, Pillar1-Political Affairs, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), interviewed on the 6th March 2006 for research paper on SAT-A by Major MH St-Louis. After serving as Canada's Head of Mission to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, Christopher Alexander was selected to serve as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General of the U.N. He was instrumental in the integration of SAT-A Rotation 0 and gave interesting insight as to the need to integrate political and military actions.

[26] Karl C. Rohr, "Progressive Reconstruction: A Methodology for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations" (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 77. In his thesis that suggested a methodology for future forcible interventions in the affairs of failed, failing or rogue and terrorist sponsoring states, Karl Rohr argued convincingly for the integration of nation building tools and functions in the overarching

the integration of all nation building tools into a strategic campaign is needed. Intervening

nations have to combine combat operations with stability operations while simultaneously

embarking on the path towards transition of authority to civilian agencies and host nations

institutions.

---

campaign. The key part of his methodology is the combination of rapid decisive combat and stabilization operations with simultaneous state building leading to governmental transition. His paper lent credence to the need for strategic planning help at the national level of the country where the intervention is being conducted.

Section 2 - Present and future security environment

This discussion on nation building is necessary in order to support the argument that more than modern military power, be it kinetic or non-kinetic, was needed in current COIN campaigns. But if we are to ensure that the CF has the appropriate capabilities to operate effectively in the years to come, a discussion as to the present and future security environment is needed.

As explained by the Defence Planning and Management Directorate of the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND), the department needs to reflect on the future security environment in order to make the appropriate decisions today with regards to the capabilities they need tomorrow. "The analysis… of the future security environment does not attempt to capture all possible developments in the world of 2025. Rather, it has been created and shaped from the outset with a view to assist the process of strategic planning for the CF."[27] This assessment of the future operating environment is divided in four main parts. They cover War and the International System, Globalization, US Economic and Military Predominance, and Emerging Threats to Stability. Arguably, the last portion of the study is the most directly relevant to this thesis.

Assuming that most rational policy-makers will always attempt to avoid conflict,[28] the DND study recognized that the future is fraught with chaos, crisis and conflict. In the last

---

[27] Peter Johnston and Dr. Michael Roi, "Future Security Environment 2025," http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ord/fse2025/fse1_e.asp; DND Intranet; accessed 12 March 2007.

[28] Michael Mandelbaum, *The Ideas that Conquered the World. Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 122-128. Michael Mandelbaum made the case that traditional rulers have always seen war as a calculation of costs and benefits. But in the second half of the 20th century, the conditions changed towards the costs were too high for the benefits, and therefore, war had become undesirable.

portion of the document it stated that "the magnitude of some of the social, environmental and economic problems currently afflicting large parts of the developing world suggest that there is a strong possibility that they will not only cause much instability in the future but may, in fact, generate security threats to Canada and its allies."[29]   This, compounded with the rise of non-state actors and the threat they pose to state sovereignty, was deemed to be the most important trend to emerge.

These threats could eventually lead to resource conflicts, and trans-national criminal activity, they could also facilitate the spread of infectious disease, accelerate environmental degradation but, more importantly, these factors are magnified when they are found in a state that is on the verge of collapse. Johnston and Roi accurately remarked that:

> …Failed states have become a dominant security concern. A strong case can be made that they represent the primary source of international instability today and will probably continue to do so in the years ahead. Failed and failing states provide a potential refuge for transnational terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, pirates as well as drug and human smugglers. They are breeding grounds for refugee crises, political and religious extremism, environmental degradation and organized criminal activities… thus, even if a failed state has little significance in the traditional sense of strategic resources or geographic position, it will take on greater strategic importance in the future by virtue of the potential base it offers to powerful non-state-actors.[30]

Their concerns lie in the fact that FF states might trigger civil wars but might also degenerate into broader regional conflicts, which in turn could lead to mass migration. In the

---

[29] Johnston and Roi, "Future …," http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ord/fse2025/fse15_e.asp; DND Intranet; accessed 12 March 2007. See also: National Intelligence Council, "Global Trends 2015: A dialogue about the Future with Non-government Experts NIC 2000-02," (US: United States Central Intelligence Agency, December 2000), 16.

[30] Johnston and Roi, "Future …," http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ord/fse2025/fse21_e.asp, DND Intranet; accessed 12 March 2007. See also: http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ord/fse2025/fse22_e.asp; DND Intranet; accessed 12 March 2007. Strong support for these arguments can be found in an article by Jeffery Record, "Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War," *Parameters* (Summer 2002): 5-7.

conclusion of the document, the authors recognized that operations in FF states have dramatically changed the emerging operating environment, to the point that it has replaced the traditional concept of the battlefield with a battlespace that requires an integrated multi-agency and multinational effort. In their conclusion, the reader can find a strong endorsement for WGA approach, "thus the key to success… is to develop strong linkages with other govt depts and agencies, utilising unique competencies and capabilities that each provide with the aim of applying the vast resources of nation states asymmetrically against the vulnerabilities of non-state adversaries."[31]

In order to conclude the review of the present and future security environment, it is also worth looking at the results of a UN panel that reflected on future threats, challenges and change. In *A More Secure World: Our shared Responsibility*, the UN High Level Panel On Threats, Challenges, and Change, offered the following list for the most pressing dangers for national and international security: terrorism, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons proliferation, emerging pandemics, environmental degradation, and poverty traps.[32] These threats are especially present in states that are failing. Accordingly, as the list of FF states continues to grow[33] the pressure of these dangers on functioning states increases. Further demonstrating that this idea is not a completely new one, as early as 1992, Boutros Boutros Ghali, then Secretary

---

[31] Johnston and Roi, "Future …," http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ord/fse2025/fse23_e.asp; DND Intranet; accessed 12 March 2007.

[32] UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, "A more secure world: Our shared responsibility," (New York: UN, 2004), 14-16. Available at: http://www.un.org/secureworld; Internet; accessed 14 March 2007.

[33] At the present time, the estimate is around 25. http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/vcds-exec/pubs/strategic-symposium/intro_e.asp; DND Intranet; accessed 14 March 2007. A comparative list can be found in David Carment, John Gazo and Stewart Prest, "State Failure and Risk Assessment," *Global Society (*January, 2006). See also David Carment, "The Struggle for Peace," *Harvard International Review* (June, 2001).

General of the UN Security Council, had concluded that, "Failed, failing, and rogue states are havens for international criminals and terrorists, and although international norms of state sovereignty prohibit intervention by one state in the domestic affairs of another, the international community can no longer ignore these internal conflicts."[34]

In light of that danger, the Government of Canada mandated the DND, in *The Defence Policy Statement*, to maintain combat-capable Canadian Forces, focused on the challenge of restoring peace and stability to failed and fragile states.[35] In today's and tomorrow's security environment, this paper suggests that the department will need to add the capabilities that SAT brings in order to respond to this mandated focus. If it is accepted that state building is and will continue to be at the center of Canada's international interventions, then a capability specifically involved in enabling good governance would facilitate strategic success.

> There is an increased recognition that failure to intervene to halt rogue states, to stem the spread of anarchy and chaos caused by failed states negatively affects world peace… Because of the theory that instability and chaos can and do spread where there is a lack of good governance, there [will be] an increased proclivity towards state building interventions.[36]

---

[34] Boutros Boutros Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping," *Report of the Secretary General pursuant the Summit meeting of the Security Council* (New York: UN, 31 January 92). http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

[35] Department of National Defence, A-JS-005-000/AG-001 *Canada's International Policy Statement. A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, *Defence* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005), 5.

[36] Rohr, "Progressive…," 79.

Section 3 – The Evolution of Warfare and 4th Generation War

> *4th Generation War*
> *What it is?*
> *A modern form of insurgency that seeks to convince enemy political leaders that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. The fundamental precept is that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power.* [37]

If we are to believe Clausewitz, "The first, the supreme, and the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and Commander have to make is to establish… the kind of war on which they are embarking;… this is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive."[38] It is therefore not surprising that a significant portion of academic military literature is concerned with the categorization and modelling of war and warfare. The types, the nature and the evolution of war have been at the center of a hundred years of military and strategic studies. Present practitioners of the art of war are bombarded by competing theories on the subject: network-centric warfare, effects-based operations, modern counterinsurgencies, fourth generation warfare, among others. In order to place the argument of this study in the context of the present understanding of the kind of wars being waged, the model of the four generations of war will be discussed. Arguably, this model is not perfect and has some detractors. Therefore, the main tenets of the model will be reviewed and some time will be spent on the weaknesses underlined by the critics. This will be useful in view of a better understanding of the present and future operating environment and will further support the need for new capabilities in this type of war.

---

[37] Thomas X. Hammes, "Insurgency: modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation," *Strategic Forum*, no 214 (January 2005): 1.

[38] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.

The model of the four generations of war appeared in 1989, when William S. Lind, Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton and Gary I. Wilson first reflected on modern and future wars. As William Lind explained, he was trying to introduce manoeuvre warfare to the Marine Corps, and a model was required in order to better understand the context of future interventions. In "The changing Faces of War: Into the Fourth Generation," the original paper on the topic, the idea that war had evolved in four distinct steps from 1648 to today was first presented.[39]

In the mid 90s, Lind, Schmitt, Wilson and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas X. Hammes revisited the model in order to integrate the ideas presented by Martin van Creveld in *The Transformation of War*. Using van Creveld argument that there are new, nontrinitarian types of wars, wars that do not revolve around the Clauzewitzian notion of the population, the military and the government,[40] the theorists of 4GW refined their work. In "Fourth Generation Warfare: Another look," Lind and his collaborators wrote "…future war will increasingly be nontrinitarian and waged outside the nation-state framework."[41] They also built on the importance van Creveld gave to the treaty of Westphalia of 1648, in order to argue that the "nation-state [was] losing its monopoly on war."[42]

---

[39] William S. Lind, Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton and Gary I. Wilson, "The changing Faces of War: Into the Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette* (October, 1989).

[40] Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005): 6, 7. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=632; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007. Also see, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 78, No. 9 (September, 1994): 35-44. As well as the arguments in William S. Lind, Major John F. Schmitt, and Colonel Gary I. Wilson, "Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 78, No. 12 (December, 1994): 34-37.

[41] Lind, Schmitt and Wilson, "Fourth Generation…," 36.

Following the events of 9/11, theorists of 4GW saw Al-Qaeda's attacks as the

validation of their theory,[43] and entered what Antulio J. Echevarria III has penned as 4GW's

third incarnation. This incarnation included the work from Lind, but more importantly the

contribution Thomas Hammes made in refining the construct by including the ideas of

globalization into what he called super insurgencies or evolved insurgencies, all part of this new

generation of warfare. "With the spread of information and communication technologies and the

rise in travel opportunities, all of which have become associated with globalization, terrorists and

other nonstate actors enjoy enhanced access to their adversary's political will."[44]

In a recent discussion about the challenges of fighting a global insurgency, David W.

Barno (US Ret. LGen) made extensive use of the ideas articulated by Thomas Hammes, and

presented one of the best synthesises of the model advocated by 4GW theorists.[45] The 4GW

model contends that there has been four generations of war since the Treaty of Westphalia. Each

of them covering separate periods and evolving based on key characteristics, distinct to one

another. Today, some of the generations might be overlapping.

First Generation Warfare (1GW) covers the advent of gunpowder, a generation of

warfare that was focused on offensive action led by men. In this generation, manpower was the

most important factor. While it started after the Treaty of Westphalia, it culminated with the

---

[42] Lind, Schmitt and Wilson, "Another Look…," 34, 35. But also pertinent is, William S. Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation War," *Military Review*, Vol. 84, No. 5 (September/October 2004): 12.

[43] William S. Lind, "Fourth-Generation Warfare's First Blow: A Quick Look," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 85, No. 11 (November, 2001): 72.

[44] Echevarria, *Fourth-Generation War…*, 10. See also, Thomas X. Hammes, "4th-generation Warfare: Our Enemies Play to Their Strengths," *Armed Forces Journal* (November, 2004): 42. 40-44. Also see his acclaimed narrative, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St.Paul, MN: Zenith, 2004).

[45] David W. Barno, "Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency" *Parameters* (Summer 2006): 16, 17.

Napoleonic Wars. Developments in transportation and communications transformed the characteristics of war and a new model emerged, Second Generation War, 2GW.

2GW was marked by the growing speed of communications and transport and saw the US Civil War as its first incarnation. This generation also covers the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War and, ultimately, the carnage of World War I (WWI), a war in which the leaders took some time in understanding the folly of pitting huge massed armies, akin to 1GW, against deadly rapid small arms fire and massed artillery. In order to breakout of the stalemate of WWI, Third Generation War (3GW) called upon manoeuvre to defeat the enemy.

Relying on manoeuvre, 3GW units bypassed strong points and sought to destroy the enemy's will by attacking in depth. First exemplified by the English in Cambrai at the end of WWI, it became the dominant characteristic of warfare during the Second World War, the Arab-Israeli wars, Gulf War I and the most recent advance into Baghdad in 2003. This brings the model to today, 4GW.

This type of war is characterized by the "…use of all available networks - political, economic, social and military – to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency."[46] The enemy looks to defeat you by putting intense pressure on the political will, independent of military success on the battlefield. Even if the literature on insurgencies can be traced back as far as Sun Tzu and they have been present alongside the first

---

[46] Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone…,* 2.

three generations, modern access to information and transportation, key aspect of globalization, make this a major evolution in the characteristics of the war. "[4th Generation Wars] have now evolved, taking advantage of the political, social, economic and technical changes since World War II. In short, 4GW has evolved along with society to make use of the opportunities it provides."[47]

Part of the criticism levelled at this model was best captured by Antulio J. Echevarria II in *Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths*. He argued that the proponents of 4GW have made great errors in their assessment of history and that the evolution of warfare cannot be neatly separated into four distinct generations. According to Echevarria, 4GW theorists would be better off discarding the theory and retaining the traditional concepts surrounding insurgencies, and concentrate on modifying them to include the greater mobility and access afforded by globalization. He found fault in the way the theory had evolved from vague out-of-the-box thinking in 1989 to the validation of its apparent prescriptive nature by the acts of 9/11 and subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.[48] The main points in the theory he criticized were the vagueness of the original writings, a misinterpretation of the trinitarian/nontrinitarian construct of van Creveld and the use of the Treaty of Westphalia as the building block for the whole assertion. He also took exception to the use of 'generations' as the divisions in the model, for it implied that each one evolved directly from the other. This, in his opinion, was wrong because it dismissed the whole body of knowledge that covered the history of guerrillas, small wars and terrorist activity.

---

[47] Hammes, "4th-generation Warfare…," 40.

[48] Echevarria, *Fourth-Generation War…*, V, VI.

Notwithstanding the logic behind the criticism raised by Echevarria, the construct proposed by 4GW is appealing to academics and military professionals because of its simplicity, its logic and prescriptive nature. It fits well in the literature that discusses failed and failing states as well as in the future security environment construct. Therefore, the ideas found in 4GW will be carried on in the later portion of this paper in order to support the argument for the inclusion of strategic planners dedicated to capacity transference as part of future operations. While this is not thorough critique or endorsement of the 4GW model, it is presented in order to bring light to the need for an integrated approach. To highlight the critical requirement for building the capabilities of the government fighting an insurgency and by extension the usefulness of a SAT-like capability.

Other models could have been used to underline the argument. For example, the construct presented by General Rupert Smith in 20005, in his book: *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, would have been useful. Gen Smith theorized convincingly that modern warfare could be divided in three profoundly different periods: the interstate industrial wars, the Cold War confrontation and the present period, 'war amongst the people.'[49] Akin to the arguments made by Lind, Hammes, Schmitt and Wilson, Gen Smith draws from history the applicable lessons needed for understanding the current reality of state *versus* non-state warfare. Interestingly, towards the end of the discussion on the implications for modern western armies of fighting 'amongst the people,' he accurately observed that: "The difficulty with the conduct of our modern operations is in harnessing the efforts of all the agencies in theatre to the single

---

[49] General Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Penguin Books, 2005).

purpose."[50] 'War amongst people', or 4GW, both demand an integrated approach. Therefore,

both models would benefit from teams of planners dedicated to strengthening the government

and the governance of the host nation.

---

[50] *Ibid*., 387.

Chapter 2 – Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A)

In 2003, General Rick Hillier served as the commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Working out of Kabul, Afghanistan, Gen Hillier came to realize the magnitude of the task required to ensure stability and ultimately success. The complexity of the challenges facing Afghanistan called for an integrated, long-term approach to nation building. Part of that approach included the work done with the GIRA by the members of the military planning staff in the ISAF Headquarters (HQ). This work centered on the development of a comprehensive roadmap for the strategy that Afghanistan needed to pursue in order to embark on the path of sustainable development and enduring stability.

Working with the Finance Ministry, this group of officers used military campaign planning tools to formulate a viable framework for investment in Afghanistan and proceed with the rebuilding of the country, its infrastructure and institutions. This group of officers left the theatre in 2004, not too long after Gen Hillier returned to Canada. In 2005, Gen Hillier then Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) responded to a request from the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, to provide another group of planners similar to the one that had assisted his government in 2003-2004.

This chapter will focus on the story of the SAT-A and how it got started in 2005 following queries from President Karzai. It will present the genesis of the SAT as well as an analysis of its effectiveness. It will do so by using some primary sources that cover the mounting, deployment and initial year of operation for the team. It will then contrast that operation, OPERATION (OP) ARGUS, with a number of Canadian interventions in Haiti over

the last fifteen years and argue that a capability such as SAT would have been an effective addition to Canadian efforts.

Section 1 - Origins of SAT-A

The question President Karzai had asked Gen Hillier in the spring of 2005 triggered the CDS into launching the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan. Colonel M.D. Capstick, an artillery officer working in the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) at the time, received an email in mid-June 2005, which directed him to lead the deployment of a small group of military and civilian personnel destined to the capital of Afghanistan in support of the GIRA. Following that direction, Col Capstick met directly with the CDS. During that meeting, Gen Hillier explained to Col Capstick, that he was to form, deploy and command a team of a dozen people and go to Afghanistan to "help president Karzai build a democratic and stable government."[51] To fulfill this ambitious mission, he was to deploy at the end of the summer for one year. As this initial direction was being given, links with the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency were being pursued in order to make this an integrated multi-agency initiative. That being said, this initiative on the CDS' part led to criticism as to the way in which this team was launched.

A sense of improvisation plagued this mounting phase of the mission. Nonetheless, Col Capstick immediately set about forming the team and preparing for a reconnaissance trip to Afghanistan in order to plan the deployment. He was able to select a group of military officers and civil servants that brought military planning skills, scientific research experience and development work background to the team. The original SAT was made up of fifteen members.

---

[51] Colonel Michael D. Capstick, Commander OP ARGUS (SAT-A Roto 1), interviewed on the 16th May 2006 for research paper on SAT-A by Major MH St-Louis.

Twelve were military, two were civilian public servants of the DND and one was a co-operant from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The military members were a mix from the three components air-naval-land, as well as regular and reserves. One of the public servants was an operational research scientist, whereas the other was a strategic planner from the central staff.

While putting the team together in Ottawa, there was growing concern that the DND was duplicating efforts from other governmental agencies. Initially intended as an integrated 'whole of government' team, Col Capstick faced some challenges in securing representation from CIDA and aligning efforts with the Department of Foreign Affairs. Mounting such a team for the first time proved to be a significant test that required flexibility and patience with regards to the intricacies of departmental and intra-governmental politics. Ultimately, the ability of the Department of National Defence to field elements, on short notice, enabled the team to be assembled and eventually deploy as directed.

In mid-summer, Col Capstick completed his reconnaissance of Kabul and was able to establish first contact with the Head of Mission (HoM) and the Head of Aid (HoA) for Canada, Christopher Alexander and Dr. Nipa Banerjee respectively. His team was finally assembled in July and started deploying on the 22nd of August 2005. The initial focus of the SAT commander was to ascertain the specific areas where his group of planners could be most beneficial to the GIRA. Greatly facilitated by the reputation and interventions of the HoM and HoA, it became clear that the SAT team could be useful in the conception of the Interim - Afghanistan National Development Strategy and eventually the actual Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS and ANDS). With the support of the Canadian Ambassador and the HoA, Col Capstick very quickly developed a working relationship with Dr. Ishaq Naderi, Senior Economic Advisor

to the President and ultimately responsible for the production of the ANDS.[52] The ANDS is the overarching document that serves as the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the initial step in the coordinated reconstruction of the state.[53] This document and the process for its production were of crucial importance in the ratification of the Afghanistan Compact in 2006, the commitment of the International Community and Afghanistan towards a long term solution to the crisis. While the Compact, signed in London in January 2006, is the commitment between the Afghan Government and the international community, the ANDS is the plan for how the GIRA and the donors are going to respect the commitment and accomplish the vision agreed at the London Conference.

In parallel to the work that was needed with the production of the ANDS, the SAT found the need to support Public Administration Reform (PAR). As a key enabler of the ANDS, PAR faced a significant capability gap challenge and was in urgent need of support. Therefore, the CIDA co-operant immediately headed a number of capacity building programs in the IARCSC, the Commission that was responsible for PAR at the national level.

The team faced a number of challenges. Some parts of the IC representatives in Kabul were suspicious as to what a group of military planners could bring to the nation building effort.

---

[52] Dr. Ishaq Naderi is an economist who took leave from a faculty position at New York University in order to contribute to the rebuilding of his country. As the Senior Economic Advisor to the President he played a key role in developing the I-ANDS / ANDS and securing support from the IC.

[53] Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). http://www.ands.gov.af/; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy lays out the strategic priorities and mechanisms for achieving the Government s development vision. An interim version (I-ANDS) of this strategy was presented to the international community in January 2006. After further development and consultation a full ANDS will be published by mid-2008. The Afghanistan Compact is a political agreement between the Government and the international community to work together towards five year benchmarks of progress across the three pillars of the ANDS: (1) security, (2) governance, rule of law and human rights, and (3) economic and social development. This paper will often refer to the ANDS, when in fact it is only the I-ANDS that is complete and the ANDS is still being finalized. For the benefit of clarity, ANDS will be used in this study to refer to the I-ANDS.

Some benign rivalries with other agencies were also felt at the mid-manager level. Thirdly, there was always the concern that someone else was already doing the same work. With the high number of technical advisors (TAs), international agencies and personnel from ISAF and the US HQ (Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan, CFC-A) in Kabul, it was common to meet someone working on exactly the same issues as the SAT. Nonetheless, the initial work done by the team, "made the clear demonstration of the potential of military staff 'skills transfer' to the civil sector in a post-conflict society that has had little time to develop viable public institutions and a culture of good governance."[54]

The HoM at the time, Christopher Alexander, recalled this initial period and remarked that the success of SAT rested on Canada's integration of all of its elements of power. By the time SAT arrived in Kabul, Canada had showed its resolve by deploying an important military contingent, assuming command of the Multinational Brigade in Kabul (KMNB) and the ISAF mission as a whole in 2003. It had re-opened its embassy, energized its development program through CIDA and contributed to nation building efforts with assistance from the RCMP and other governmental agencies. When the group of strategic planners from the SAT arrived in 2005, all the key elements of Canada's WGA were in place in Kabul, and the sheer desire to communicate with each other in order to help the legitimate government of the HN, made the integration of this new capability possible.[55] Also important in this early stage was the

---

[54] Colonel M.D. Capstick, "Strengthening the Weak: The Canadian Forces in Afghanistan." Paper presented at the Canadian Institute Of International Affairs conference on "Foreign Policy. Building Global Prosperity: Canada's Engagement with the Developing World." 9-10 March 2006, 7. As seen in: http://www.uregina.ca/gspp/news/IntInsight_capstick.pdf; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007.

[55] Christopher Alexander, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, Pillar1-Political Affairs, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), interviewed on the 6th May 2006 for research paper on SAT-A by Major MH St-Louis. These thoughts on the genesis of SAT were echoed in a subsequent interview

credibility the team had because it deployed under the request of the President of the GIRA. This endorsement opened a number of doors in the Afghan government and was instrumental in ensuring middle and top level manager support.

Recognizing that the extremely difficult task of state building rests at the heart of the Afghanistan challenge, the SAT team was immediately put to the task of supporting the construction and reconstruction of the governance institutions capable of providing the citizens with the physical and economic security they required.[56]

As the first rotation found its footing and capacity building with the Afghan counterparts progressed, some rigor was put to the mission statement. The commander laid out the SAT-A mission as:

> [the team] will, in consultation with the Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan and IAW CDS intent, assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in the development of the human capacity and processes needed to design the strategic plans necessary to attain the objectives of the Afghanistan's National Development Strategy (ANDS).[57]

---

with Dr. Nipa Banerjee, Canada's Head of Aid in Afghanistan, Canadian International Development Agency interviewed on the 10th May 2006 for research paper on SAT-A by Major MH St-Louis.

[56] Gordon Smith, *Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working?* Report prepared for the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute – CDFAI (Calgary: CDFAI, 2007), 19. In this report, Gordon Smith and his team of researchers made a compelling case for poverty alleviation as a primary strategy for achieving security in Afghanistan. They discussed the need for a coordinated leadership in the public service for the integration of government's efforts.

[57] Colonel M.D. Capstick, "OP ARGUS – SAT-A Rotation 0" (lecture, Canadian Forces College, ON, May 9, 2006), with permission, slide 2. During the course of then following rotation, OP ARGUS Rotation 1, the mission statement was clarified as: "To conduct credible and accountable capacity building operations in direct support of the senior leadership of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan that ensures strategic coherence and results in good governance, peace and security in support of the Afghan Compact." It is interesting to note the emphasis placed on the credibility and accountability of the activities SAT-A will undertake. This clarification was needed in order to give some rigour to the intervention SAT-A makes in Afghanistan. Lieutenant-Colonel F. Aubin, "Strategic Advisory team - Afghanistan," (lecture, Canadian Forces College, ON, April 4, 2007), with permission, slide 18. Lcol Aubin was the Chief of Staff (COS) of the SAT-A, OP ARGUS Roto 1.

More specifically, the strategic level intent became,

1. Assistance to the GIRA in closing capacity/capability gaps in terms of realizing the ANDS objectives

2. Assist GIRA in developing organic strategic planning capability

3. Work to GIRA national interests, not any specific Canadian (CA) agenda.[58]

During this initial phase of OP ARGUS Roto 0, the bi-lateral nature of the mission constantly needed to be emphasized. The team did not fall under the command and control architecture of either ISAF or CFC-A. As the mission statement said, it answered to the HoM, the CDS, the Afghanistan President's office and the different Afghanistan ministries it was involved in.

As the first year went by, the mission matured and the work done with the ANDS and the IARCSC led to further expansion into the President's office, other PAR initiatives, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and the Civil Service Gender Equity Policy.[59] It also served as a key enabler in the alignment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) activity at the operational level and the ANDS objectives at the strategic level. The SAT-A was able to operationalize the strategic objectives in order to facilitate the campaign design of each of the PRT commanders.

---

[58] Colonel M.D. Capstick, "OP ARGUS – SAT-A Rotation 0" (lecture, Canadian Forces College, ON, May 9, 2006), with permission, slide 3. This intent was also clarified by the CDS as the mission went into its first rotation. The new intent reads: "The SAT-A will work directly with the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) to identify the critical paths required to established efficient and durable Afghan institutions. The SAT-A will assist the GOA in the identification of the enabling capabilities, resource requirements, critical activities/milestones and a performance measurement framework. The scope of the team's activities will be determined through consultation with the GOA and the Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan." Lieutenant-Colonel F. Aubin, "Strategic Advisory team - Afghanistan," (lecture, Canadian Forces College, ON, April 4, 2007), with permission, slide 17.

[59] Government of Canada, "Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan - Why Are we There?" http://news.gc.ca/cfmx/view/en/index.jsp?articleid=266449; Internet; accessed 10 March 2007.

As the SAT-A progressed and completed its first rotation in the end of the summer 2006; it also expanded the scope of its work and went on to support The Ministry of Justice, The Ministry of National Communications, The Ministry of Education, The Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation, The Ministry of the Interior and The Ministry of Finance.[60] These efforts in capacity and capability building were all being done in light of the desired effects that move Canada's intervention towards the strategic end-state articulated by the CDS as: "The development of an organic Government of Afghanistan (GOA) strategic planning capability that enables them to make effective use of their resources."[61]

---

[60] Lieutenant-Colonel F. Aubin, "Strategic Advisory team - Afghanistan," (lecture, Canadian Forces College, ON, April 4, 2007), with permission, slide 8.

[61] *Ibid*., slide 17.

Section 2 - Impact of SAT-A

What did the Afghan people get out of OP ARGUS? What did the Canadian public get out of this operation? Did the GIRA improve its capacity because of SAT-A? What was its impact? One, debatably partial answer, can be found in Christie Blatchford's journalist assessment, "The smallest and arguably most influential group of Canadians [SAT-A] working in Afghanistan was born about a year ago in an informal meeting in the Chief of Defence Staff Rick Hillier's car." [62] Christie Blatchford spent a significant amount of time with Canadian soldiers in Southern Afghanistan as an embedded journalist. While focusing on the tactical and operational side of the mission in Kandahar, she was able to witness and report on some of the achievements of SAT-A during the spring of 2006. Notwithstanding this praise, the team generated some discomfort with regards to duplication of effort, appropriateness of the military's involvement in state building and this apparent new role DND was playing in giving advice on governance issues.   Prior to discussing the opportunities that were missed in Haiti for a SAT-like mission or looking at the inclusion of SAT in future operations, an analysis of its impact is necessary.

This analysis will start with some of the opinions of key Afghan officials who worked closely with the SAT-A. Wahid Waissi was the Senior Process Manager for the ANDS. Under his supervision, the ANDS Working Group (WG) had to produce the final version of the ANDS and develop the basis for the Afghanistan Compact that was signed at the London conference in January 2006. This monumental task benefited from SAT-A involvement as of September 2005. From that point on, a group of four planners were embedded in the ANDS WG. They concentrated their efforts on capacity transfer and mentoring the production of the capstone

---

[62] Christie Blatchford, "Small Strategic Team making big difference," *The Globe and Mail*, 8 May 2006, A1.

documents. They also worked on effective communications strategies for the Office of the Senior Economic Advisor to the President of Afghanistan. The Senior Economic Advisor was ultimately responsible for the Compact and the ANDS.

In Waissi's opinion, the ANDS WG benefited from SAT's structured advice that helped focus their work. Even if SAT members were not development specialists, their capacity to envision strategies, align plans with objectives and manage effectively, contributed to the overall performance of his WG.[63] In other words, the ability of the SAT to work in terms of ways-ends-means and to work as enablers had a significant impact on the preparation for the London Conference. With no subject matter experts in the field of development on the team helping in the development of the ANDS, the SAT planners had to concentrate their contribution on the integration of processes and alignment of strategies. The approach taken was therefore drastically different than what the ANDS WG was accustomed to seeing from highly paid technical advisors. By the mere willingness of the Canadian team members to participate in the work and not dictate what Afghanistan needed, the SAT established some credibility and increased the abilities of the WG as a whole.

In March 2006, Professor Ishaq Naderi, Senior Economic Advisor to the President and the supervisor of Wahid Waissi, was quoted praising the work of SAT-A. "… The team has done invaluable work, particularly in organizing the country's economic development plan, which was recently approved at the London conference on Afghanistan's future."[64] He added,

---

[63] Wahid Waissi, Senior Process Manager, ANDS, interviewed on the 9th May 2006 for research paper on SAT-A by Major MH St-Louis.

[64] International & War CKA Canadian Forums, "Canada helps to shape Afghan bureaucracy," http://www.canadaka.net/modules.php?name=Forums&file=viewtopic&t=13191; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007.

"We are counting on their contribution. As a member of this government I want to express my appreciation for this help. It will not be forgotten."[65]

Near the halfway mark of the first rotation of SAT, an opportunity to help the President's office offered itself. By that point the contribution of SAT to the ANDS and IARCSC was well established and the perception that the team had some key abilities was recognized in the capital. SAT was asked in early 2006 to take a look at the organisation and structure of the Office of the President (OoP). The OoP is a crucial part of the Center of Government in Afghanistan, and was undergoing significant change.

Ershad Ahmadi, Deputy Chief of Presidential Programs, admitted that SAT helped energize the path to change and gave momentum to the implementation of some badly needed reforms in the OoP.[66] The team's particular ability to talk in terms of strategy, vision and mission were of particular use in the restructure of Afghanistan's executive branch. When time came to work in the OoP, SAT's experiences in the ANDS WG and the IARCSC were of particular use in creating some coherence to the changes required in the OoP. The team's ability to work with the government in pursuing Afghanistan's goals put them in sharp contrast to some of the expert advice TAs were giving. It became clear, during the first rotation, that Kabul was replete with well intentioned advisors, who are sometimes very highly paid. This advice is sometimes given from a position of unequal partnership. SAT, on the other hand, had adopted a sense of reciprocity and suggestion versus an attitude of experts giving solutions to novices. This attitude was important to the success of the team and their ability to get some of the

[65] *Ibid*.

[66] Ershad Ahmadi, Deputy Chief of Presidential Programs, Presidential Palace, interviewed on the 8th May 2006 for research paper on SAT-A by Major MH St-Louis.

recommendations for change accepted. "TA's come to Afghanistan for two months, three months, six months, produce a report and then leave. That does not make a lasting impact."[67] SAT's presence for a year and renewed commitment for two more one-year rotations, until 2009, made for a completely different dynamic. It inspired confidence in the dedication of Canada's contribution and facilitated the establishment of the trust that was needed in order to embark on such important state building tasks.

The Chairman of the IARCSC, Dr. A. Mushahed, supported the use of military planners in an advisory role for purely civilian governance issues. In his view, "…concentration on security operations is not the only way to defeat the terrorists. Service delivery of the government, when it is efficient, is another way."[68] Military campaigns and the personnel waging them need to be as concerned with security as they are with the strengthening of the country in which they are deployed. Military skills enabled the SAT to do that. Col Capstick, who had experienced stability and peacekeeping operations as a commander in Cyprus and Bosnia, reinforced that idea in an interview he gave on the 27th of March 2006. "Planning Afghanistan's national economic development strategy or civil service is not a heck of a lot different than planning General Fraser's campaign in terms of the skills needed and the steps."[69] While military planners are not expected to know the answer to a governance problem, they can act as enablers in the weak national institutions of the host nation. By facilitating the

---

[67] *Ibid*.

[68] Dr. A. Mushahed, Chairman of the IARCSC, interviewed on the 10th May 2006 for research paper on SAT-A by Major MH St-Louis.

[69] International & War CKA Canadian Forums, "Canada helps to shape Afghan bureaucracy," http://www.canadaka.net/modules.php?name=Forums&file=viewtopic&t=13191; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007. These comments were made in reference to the military campaign General Fraser had laid out to stabilize the southern region of Afghanistan in 2005, when he was commander of Regional Command SOUTH.

developments of strategies, ensuring capacity transfer and the adherence to rigorous processes, the skills brought to bear by military planners can play a role in creating the conditions for success.

One of the directors of the IARCSC, Homayoun Seddiq , observed that one of the key qualities of the members of the SAT was their willingness to adapt to HN constraints and work within that environment. The fact that the team was not being directly paid by the IARCSC also made a significant difference. Without the monetary connotation, the support given by team members took a whole different nature. The sense that SAT was not working to any other agenda than the one of supporting PAR and Afghanistan's objectives also facilitated the labour. As far as using military personnel in tackling civil service problems, he did not see an issue. There are enough development and governance experts willing to give you 'how to' advice, but what the SAT brought was the ability to use critical thinking, set up strategies, but more importantly pass on that knowledge to the young public servants they were working with.[70] The work done by the SAT was in part possible because the team had no funds to manage and distribute to the host nation. It was also different than all other technical advice in as much as it was a bi-lateral agreement between Afghanistan and Canada without any need for payment. Lastly, Canada bears little or no negative historical links with the HN.

Towards mid-2006, and more significantly in the later portion of that year, the SAT became heavily involved in the improvement of strategies in the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). They were specifically concerned with transferring the skills

---

[70] Homayoun Seddiq, Acting Director of Monitoring and Evaluation, IARCSC, interviewed on the 10th May 2006 for research paper on SAT-A by Major MH St-Louis.

needed to plan strategically. The MRRD oversaw the National Solidarity Program (NSP), one of the most important poverty reduction initiatives in the country. The NSP received $13M from Canada last year, which brought CIDA's contribution to Afghanistan to $109.5M.[71] This contribution made Afghanistan Canada's largest recipient of aid.

> "The ministry has proven an excellent conduit for Canada to make a real difference in improving the lives of our people… [but] you can't turn this country around in a couple of years. We need partners like Canada to stay the course or Afghanistan risks falling back into lawlessness and despair."[72]

Seen from an American perspective, the team also made a contribution in as much as it was involved in building the governance, legitimizing the government and ultimately countering the insurgents in the eyes of the people. Colonel Fred Solis (US) was the Team Chief for Governance in the Civil Military Affairs Division (CJ-9) of CFC-A. He was in Kabul when the team arrived and was instrumental in the expansion of the work into the IARCSC. In his view, the team was effective because of the way it was embedded. By working alongside their Afghan counterparts, emphasizing capacity transfer and indirect mentoring, the team had a strategic effect.[73] By building up good governance, the team was working towards achieving the end-state of a legitimate and functioning nation. Lastly, according to Col Solis, a team such as SAT has to constantly remember that their success will hinge on capacity transfer and not capacity

[71] Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation ad Development, "Senior Afghan Government minister Visits Canada 28th Nov – 10th Dec, News Release," http://www.mrrd.gov.af/ENGLISH/home/NextC.htm; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007. See also figures from "RPP 2006-2007 Canadian International Development Agency," http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/0607/cida-acdi/cida-acdi01_e.asp; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007. These figures show projected aid funding in order of $2.7B for 2006-2007. But Afghanistan, with $109M, is the single most important beneficiary of Canadian development funds.

[72] Quote from MRRD Minister Mohammad Ehsan Zia, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation ad Development, "Senior Afghan Government minister Visits Canada 28th Nov – 10th Dec. News Release," http://www.mrrd.gov.af/ENGLISH/home/NextC.htm; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

[73] Colonel Fred Solis, Team Chief for Governance, Civil Military Affairs Division (CJ-9) CFC-A, interviewed on the 2nd May 2006 for research paper on SAT-A by Major MH St-Louis.

replacement. The ultimate goal of the donors and intervening agencies is to leave the host nation, not be there indefinitely.

However there was one constant danger with such work, that was the possibility of becoming involved in the internal politics of the organisation you are assisting. In a recent piece aired by the CBC on the SAT team, in March 2007, the journalist raised the point that Canada's, and the military's involvement at such a political level, caused some suspicions amongst other intervening countries and agencies.[74] This suspicion was quickly quelled by clarifications from Afghanistan's government officials as to usefulness and pertinence of such a Canadian team. Still, the relationships that are built when conducting mentorship or capacity transfer can be easily politicized, and there lies some of the more pertinent criticism of the SAT. How does it avoid being identified with the administration or ruling body of the host nation? In its first year, while being involved in the IARCSC, the team came to be closely linked to some of the key personnel in the structure. This, in turn, resulted in the team being dragged into internal bickering and factional rivalries. Ultimately, such tensions were partly responsible for the SAT reducing its involvement in the IARCSC and expanding their work with the MRRD.

The last point in the analysis of the impact of SAT-A needs to be the financial costs of such an undertaking, in light of the apparent benefits previously mentioned. Based on internal figures from May 2006 the approximate costs of running the team for the first year were assessed

---

[74] CBC News, "Brian Stewart reporting from Kabul on the SAT-A," March 8, 2007, 12min video. As seen in: www.cbc.ca/clips/rm-hi/stewart-afghanistan070308.rm; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007. This news cast gives a concise, but effective, overview of the work being done by SAT-A, how the team was formed and some of the political tensions it has generated. Gen Hillier, Col Capstick and a current member of the SAT-A are interviewed in this news piece.

to be $1.04M.[75] These costs included the rental of all housing and office facilities for the team near the Canadian Embassy in Kabul, the support in theatre needed to run the operation and the transport requirements of the team. These costs do not cover military salaries, contract for a CIDA co-operant or other public servant salaries. The question then becomes, what return was Canada and Afghanistan getting from that million dollar investment?

This research suggested that the team increased Canada's influence in the capital. While it was unable to make a profound difference outside of Kabul, the team contributed to the development of some key capabilities in the government. It raised Canada's visibility in the GIRA, helped shape the intelligence picture of the conflict and participated in elevating the status of Canada in the region. If we are to believe Christopher Alexander, SAT is one of the reasons Canada was "punching above its weight."[76] Furthermore, it can objectively be stated that capacity transfer took place, processes and strategy development were facilitated, and lastly some critical steps and documents required on the road towards stability were influenced by SAT's work. Despite the fact that it generated some criticism from other contributing nations and that it brought to the forefront some inter-governmental intricacies, SAT's contribution was largely appreciated by the host nation.

---

[75] Numbers estimated for SAT-A Roto 0, financial documents. Sgt Kennedy, "Financial Forecast Report, Strategic Advisory Team, OP ARGUS," May 7, 2006. With permission.

[76] Christopher Alexander, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, Pillar1-Political Affairs, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), interviewed on the 6th May 2006 for research paper on SAT-A by Major MH St-Louis.

Section 3 - Previous Canadian interventions in Haiti

Could this type of team have made a positive difference in Haiti? It can be argued that Canada has missed an opportunity for leadership in the international efforts to help Haiti out of the last fifteen years of turmoil. Haiti constitutes the most fragile state in the Americas and according to a recent study by the RAND Corporation, it is an example of a failed nation-building effort.[77] It presently ranks 154 out of 177 on the 2006 UN Human Development Index.[78] In the last decade, Haiti has become the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, it is a destabilizing force in the region and, it has become a growing narcotic and trans-national crime base. At the moment, the UN is involved in peace support operations for a fifth time in twelve years. The current, Brazilian led, eight thousand strong United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) marks the latest effort to bring stability and order to this country.[79] This mission has achieved, at best, mixed results, providing a degree of security in key areas while ceding control of the slums to criminal gangs. The security conditions do not allow large international investment or significant economic development. Despite efforts to control illegal

---

[77] Jones *et al*, *Securing Health…,* 117.

[78] UN Human Development Index 2006. http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007. According to its authors, the UN Human Development Report is a product of research and analysis by international experts and staff across the UN system that intendeds to stimulate debate and dialogue around a set of issues that have a profound bearing on progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals and human development. Unfortunately, Afghanistan has not been included in the index since 1996 due to the unavailability of data. A properly working census apparatus is one of the objectives in the ANDS for the GIRA.

[79] United Nations, "United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti," http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007. Having determined that the situation in Haiti continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1542 of 30 April 2004, decided to establish the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and requested that authority be transferred from the Multinational Interim Force (MIF), authorized by the Security Council in February 2004, to MINUSTAH on 1 June 2004.

migration from the government, Haitians fleeing economic privation and civil unrest continue to cross into the Dominican Republic and risk sailing to neighbouring countries or the US.

Not surprisingly, Canada has been involved in almost all aspects of development and aid in Haiti in that same period. It has played an important role in the international efforts to re-establish security and stability in Haiti and to assist in longer-term reform and reconstruction efforts. The GOC is presently concentrating its efforts in judicial reform, reform of the police, and poverty reduction, it has pledged $520M over the next five years (2006-2011).[80] This constitutes Canada's longest standing commitment of aid in the Americas and is only second in size to our present level of aid in Afghanistan.

Canada has worked on all of the UN missions to Haiti in the 1990s[81], and aid co-operants have worked there since 1970. The two societies are also connected by emigration. In the 1960s, there was a significant exodus of Haitians to Canada that resulted in an important Haitian *diaspora*, primarily in Montreal.

More specifically, Canada's interests in Haiti can be divided in five categories: regional demographics, diplomatic ties, the Haitian *diaspora*, trade interests and cultural links. Haiti's population of more than eight million people makes it the largest population in the Caribbean. Instability in Haiti has always resulted in problems for the region. Mass and illegal migration,

---

[80] At the international donor conference held on July 25th 2006 in Port-au-Prince, the Government of Canada announced its contribution of $520M for the 2006-2011. This amount included the $15 million (Global Peace and Security Fund) contribution for governance, security and justice initiatives announced in Port-au-Prince on June 3rd 2006 by Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter MacKay. In total, the international community has pledged $840M in funding for Haiti for the period ending December 2007. http://geo.international.gc.ca/latin-merica/latinamerica/country_info/haiti_relations-en.asp#7; Internet; accessed 11 March 2007.

[81] In the last fifteen years, the UN has mounted the following missions to Haiti: UNMIH (1993-1996), UNSMIH (1996-1997), UNTMIH (1997), MIPONUH (1997-2000), and now MINUSTAH (2004-present). United Nations, "United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti," http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007.

the traffic of drugs, people and arms, compounded with the possible spread of infectious diseases represent concerns for the whole region and also for Canada.

On the diplomatic front, Canada has maintained uninterrupted diplomatic relations and development assistance with Haiti through all these periods of turmoil. With no colonial history towards Haiti, Canada is seen as a moderate but effective voice amongst international actors. Canada has also benefited from a sizeable Caribbean immigration and now counts more than 100 000 Haitian families. These families are a significant driver for Canadian involvement. Lastly, Canada has interests in the stability of Haiti for its important trade potential in the area, and its cultural ties to Québec and Canada as a member of the *francophonie*.[82] These five areas of national interest have served to encourage Canada's engagement, but have not been strong enough to result in an integrated commitment towards rebuilding Haiti's capability to govern itself.

Unfortunately, past attempts to improve governance and quality of life in Haiti have largely failed through a combination of Haitian truculence, corruption, donor fatigue and impatience. Haiti's three main challenges have always been: security and justice reform; social and economic reconstruction; as well as national reconciliation and the strengthening of democratic institutions. In all of our previous interventions, Canada has not been able to focus on stability and security in a manner that enabled peace building to take place. Institution building and enduring socio-economic development were never able to flourish because there never was a concerted effort by donors, international agencies and troop contributing nations to

---

[82] Canadian International Development Agency, "Canadian Cooperation with Haiti: Reflecting on a decade of difficult partnership," *CIDA Report* (Ottawa: CIDA, December 2004), 11. In this document, CIDA makes an effective argument for the five key factors that support Canada's sustained engagement in Haiti. It describes five key interests that give Canada a comparative advantage and contribute to our impact in the region. They are: regional demographics, diplomatic ties, the Haitian *diaspora*, trade interests and cultural links.

ensure long term effects. The focus has always been the stabilization of the current political crisis with no plan for systemic reform. This led to short sightedness and repeated occurrences of failure in Haiti.

More specifically for Canada, its efforts in Haiti for the last decade have been uncoordinated. DND, CIDA, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), DFAIT and a number of other governmental agencies have been involved in that country without any real interagency agenda. This lack of integration has arguably resulted in wasted efforts, wasted taxpayers dollars and lacklustre results. Even if over the past four decades, Canada has committed significant human resources to Haiti on five different missions, none of these deployments have achieved anything beyond local and transitory successes. In essence the CF and the GOC achieved, at best, tactical successes devoid of any strategic or long-term effect. An integrated effort would have increased Canada's influence in the area, ensured better results and avoided wasted funds.

In its 2006 study of the lessons learned from nation building missions, the RAND Corporation came up with some insightful observations. Their research, even though focused on the health sector, concluded that the failures in Haiti proved that the government must have a basic ability to administer aid programs, and that aid must be planned with a long term perspective.[83] The lack of capacity in the government would ultimately lead to failure. In Haiti, decades of unrest have atrophied its human capital. The result was that the "…remaining personnel were often poorly trained and educated, with little experience in administration and

---

[83] Jones *et al*, *Securing Health…,* 144

government."[84] Without the capacity to implement the programs that nation building initiatives

require, the donors and Haiti were unable to invest in the future.

When CIDA assessed Canada's aid effectiveness in Haiti, it found that throughout its

history Haiti has been paralysed by a number of sources of internal instability. Canada has been

witness to more than a decade of crises in governance exemplified by institutional weakness,

inefficiency and decay resulting in failure to implement a viable economic system and to provide

public services to the population.[85] Without a minimal level of effective governance, no other

effort could have succeeded. This reality then generates a self-fulfilling failure loop, in which,

aid cannot succeed because of the lack of minimal capability, lack of results in turn caused donor

fatigue and disinterest, which ultimately ensured that little improvement took place and the gap

of incapability widened.   For Canada, the varying degree of interest towards Haiti in the last

fifteen years resulted in engagement followed by disengagement. Each time Canada, and the

international community disengaged, the instability was exacerbated and the ruling government

was undermined. [86]

According to Tony Keller in *Maclean's Magazine*, "Haiti is…the one place on earth

where Canada behaves and is treated almost like a superpower."[87] Because of a shared language,

large *diaspora*, economic links and most recent history, he argued that there is no country better

---

[84] Jones *et al*, *Securing Health…,* 145. See also, L.M. Davis, S.D. Hosek, M.G. Tate, M. Perry, G. Hepler, and P. Steinberg, *Army Medical Support for Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance*, *MR-773-A* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1996).

[85] Canadian International Development Agency, "Canadian Cooperation…," 5.

[86] *Ibid*., 15.

[87] Tony Keller, "What About Haiti," *Maclean's Magazine*, December 19, 2005. http://www.macleans.ca/shared/print.jsp?content=20051219_117934_117934; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

equipped then Canada to help Haiti. Not withstanding this apparent justification for decisive

Canadian involvement in the region, Canada's interventions remained uncoordinated through the

1990s and early 2000s.   It is only now that Canadian cooperation in Haiti has benefited from

significant operational coherence in the field. In the last two years, representatives from CIDA,

DFAIT, Elections Canada, DND, and the RCMP have been working closely together in order to

make significant advances in integrating their approach. This coordination has been steadily

improving through the establishment of an inter-departmental committee for Haiti.[88]

Prior to the present enhancement in Canada's involvement in Haiti, the GOC deployed

CF personnel in 1993-1996 to the United Nation Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), 1996-1997 as part

of the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), August-November 1997 with the

United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), 1997-2000 with the United Nations

Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), and more recently since 2004 it contributes to the

United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).[89] Each of these deployments

focused on the security and stability aspects of the operation, and very little coordination and

integration took place between with the other elements of Canada's power. More importantly,

there was no concerted effort to improve the capability for good governance of the Haitian

authorities. As early as 2002, The UN's International Peace Academy admitted that

"…development in Haiti [had] been slow due to inadequate national institutions and little sense

---

[88] Canadian International Development Agency, "Canadian Cooperation…," 14. See also, "Canadian Parliament Report on Haiti, 10th January 2007." http://thwapshoolyard.blogspot.com/2007/01/canadina-parliament-report-on-haiti.html; Internet; accessed 14 March 2007.

[89] United Nations, "United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti," http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007. For details on the actual number of personnel that participated in those missions, see: "Past Canadian Commitments to United Nations and other Peace Support Operations (as of December 2003)," http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content.asp?id=%7b4433D831-9230-4572-B297-CEA4F4C1DA3D%7d; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

of national ownership of economic programs."[90] But no real effort had been made by Canada or other international agents towards a systematic rebuilding of these national institutions.

While a team such as SAT could not have solved this crisis on its own, it is arguable that Canada's involvement during that period could have tackled more capacity building initiatives. With each deployment of CF personnel, Canada could have had enough influence to propose a team of planners to the Haitian government, a team that would have concentrated on capacity transfer and facilitated the alignment of government initiatives. Contrary to the piecemeal approach of international actors seen in the 1990s, a SAT could have been leveraged to enable the unity of effort that was so desperately needed according to the UN lessons learned on peacebuilding in Haiti.[91] The frustration felt by the international donors with the lack of progress, forced the use of NGOs *in lieu* of government agencies. The RAND Corporation effectively argued that this practice stunted the development of the Haitian government and ultimately was part of the overarching problem, which was the lack of local capability.[92]

Admittedly, Canada alone, with or without a SAT-like intervention, could not have remedied the situation. A more sober look might point to the fact that no state or supra-state actor has been able to intervene effectively in Haiti. The conditions might not have been ripe for effective and enduring change. Clearly, the Canadian approach was not the cause of those conditions, and the integration of all aspects of the intervention, with a focus on capacity building, might not have been enough to make a difference.

---

[90] United Nations International Peace Academy, *Seminar Report, Lessons Learned: Peacebuilding in Haiti* (New York: UN, January 2002), 2

[91] *Ibid*., 4.

[92] Jones *et al*, *Securing Health…,* 145, 146.

Nonetheless, a recent study of existing WGA conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) used recent Canadian efforts in Haiti as examples. After fifteen years of un-coordinated intervention, according to this study, Canada is now making marked progress in synchronizing its desired effects. "In Haiti, Canada puts a premium on harmonisation by working through the Interim Cooperation Framework."[93] These efforts towards harmonisation are facilitated by "…providing the embassy with a key role in the strategic planning process and by making the ambassador accountable."[94] CIDA also noted that, "… representatives from CIDA and Foreign Affairs Canada … [now] share a good sense of division of responsibility. This has enabled smoother adjustment to changing circumstances and has complemented each other's work."[95] In light of these progresses towards an integrated multi-agency intervention, a renewed interest should be placed on direct capacity building in the governance sector. Arguably, a SAT-like capability could have been put to good use in Haiti during the last fifteen years, but now the situation appears fitting for such an effort.

With a minimal commitment of funds and personnel, and building on the lessons from capacity building in Kabul, the GOC could now establish an integrated team with expertise in planning which would focus on enabling a long term strategy for the government. Our credibility in the region, our longstanding history and our clear interests would facilitate the establishment of such a team.

---

[93] Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, *Whole of Government Approaches To Fragile States* (Paris: OECD, 2006), 34.

[94] OECD, *Whole of Government…,* 32.

[95] Canadian International Development Agency, "Canadian Cooperation…,"14.

Through all this research the importance of a long-term perspective has been clearly highlighted. The report from the UN International Peace Academy mentioned that "you cannot have a one year solution to a ten-year problem."[96] James Dobbins, from the RAND Corporation, studied seven American historical cases of nation building: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. From his review of the historical data, he derived a number of overarching conclusions. The last one in a list of eight key observations was, "there is no quick fix for nation-building. None of our cases was successfully completed in less than seven years."[97] Arguably the successive interventions in Haiti lacked a common vision and a sustained commitment. No unity of effort, compounded by little collaboration and cooperation, have been the staple of interventions in Haiti by international actors, and until now by Canada.

---

[96] United Nations International Peace Academy, *Seminar Report…,* 4.

[97] James Dobbins, "Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the Worlds Only Superpower," http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/nation1.html; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007, 2. See also, James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq MR-1753-RC* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003). Both these sources make a solid argument for the requirement for a long term approach and the need for a common vision. These studies were conducted in order to advise on possible courses of action in Iraq. It found that every time nation-building failed, the commitment had been too short.

Chapter 3 – Strategic Advisory Teams, a new capability in nation building for the Government of Canada

Canada has a clear purpose in Afghanistan. If it fails to secure and rebuild the country, Afghanistan will slide back down the path towards failed status. The constant possibility of Afghanistan reverting to a neo-Taliban fundamentalist regime is grave. This would threaten regional stability and Canada's own national interests.[98] Therefore, Canada has been actively involved in the efforts to support the GIRA as it stabilizes and rebuilds Afghanistan. For this to be successful, Canada's strategy in Afghanistan and in any other fragile state needs to "…build trust, engage in development and reconstruction, and ensure the rule of law…"[99] This demands that Canada adopts an integrated counter-insurgency strategy that focuses on innovative local interactions.

The SAT-A, together with the PRT and the OMLT, are all elements of this innovative interaction with the locals. Such teams might not have been envisioned in the 1990s, but as we have demonstrated for the SAT, it would have been useful in cases such as Haiti. Today, this new capability is helping to strengthen Afghan capacity to deliver quality governance, both centrally and locally. It is working in conjunction with the GIRA to develop the human capacity critical to achieving the objectives of the ANDS and moving towards a stable and secure Afghanistan.[100]

---

[98] Taylor Owen and David Eaves, "Afghanistan: Getting back on track," *Toronto Star*, 23 February, 2007, A17.

[99] *Ibid*.

According to recent testimony to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development on the 20th April 2007, by the Executive Director of The Conference of Defence Association (CDA), Colonel (Retired) Alain Pellerin, and Colonel (Retired) Brian MacDonald, Senior Defence Analyst CDA,

> … Canadian responsibilities as the PRT in Kandahar, and the critical assistance in developing the governance capabilities of the elected government of Afghanistan provided by the Strategic [Advisory] Team in Kabul, are part of the tangible Canadian contribution, as is the assistance provided to the training of the Afghanistan National Army, and especially of the training of the Afghanistan National Police.[101]

Canada's Task Force Afghanistan 3-06 included all these capabilities in its campaign plan. While the campaign plan had three distinct lines of operations, security, governance and reconstruction, not all elements of the CF were given tasks in all of these sectors. Figure 2 illustrates how the four main elements of the CF's mission in Afghanistan contributed to the execution of the campaign plan and in which line of operation they intervened.[102]

---

[100] Notes for an address by Peter Harder, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the London Conference on Afghanistan, January 31, 2006. In "Canada rebuilding Afghanistan," http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/london-conference-en.asp; Internet; accessed 13 March 2007.

[101] Testimony of Colonel (Retired) Alain Pellerin, Executive Director, and Colonel (Retired) Brian MacDonald, Senior Defence Analyst, Conference of Defence Associations to the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, 20 April, 2007. See: http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Parliamentary_Presentations/Testimony%20To%20FAAE%202007.pdf; Internet; accessed, 2 May 2007.

[102] Lieutenant-Colonel Simon Hetherington, "Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team," (lecture, Canadian Forces College, ON, April 17, 2007), with permission, slide 14. LCol Hetherington was the Canadian PRT commander in Kandahar during the summer and autumn of 2006.

**Fig. 2. Canada's Task Force 3-06
Lines of Op and areas of influence of the
different teams** [note 102]

Section 1 - Inclusion of a Strategic Advisory Team capability in future operations

Current political direction for the Canadian Forces calls upon all soldiers, airman and sailors to become more effective, relevant and responsive.[103] As part of this increase of profile and ability, the CF will become more relevant by "… [adapting] their capabilities and force structure to deal, in particular, with threats that arise from the kind of instability that we have seen abroad, especially in failed states."[104]

In light of this direction from the GOC to the CF, the inclusion of strategic advisory teams in future operations appears fitting. But is a team such as the SAT in Afghanistan a replicable model? It might be argued that the conditions Canada faced in Afghanistan in 2005, were conducive to the creation of this new capability, but such conditions would not likely be found again.

In addition to the argument that a SAT-like capability would have been perfectly tailored for Canada's last fifteen years of intervention in Haiti, the majority of the research conducted in Kabul in the spring of 2006 on this topic suggested that this capability could and should be replicated by the GOC. Canada's Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005 remarked that a capability such as SAT would be duplicable in future interventions if the following conditions were found: a host nation that is in desperate need of capacity building, Canada was making a significant contribution in that country, Canada had no negative historical ties with the host nation and lastly, strong links with the legitimate government of that country existed. Furthermore, this type of intervention could be possible only if the host nation requested

---

[103] Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy…,* 11.

[104] *Ibid.*

Canada's contribution in this fashion and the involvement had an important development piece.[105]

Wahid Waissi, from the ANDS WG, emphasized the fact that for a team like SAT to work, it has to have high level support. Without it, most mid-level civil servants would be reticent to heed the advice given by such a team. In Afghanistan, the support of the President was crucial. The same support could arguably have been found in the years of intervention in Haiti, and might still be found in the future.

The most useful set of criteria for the replication of such a capability were gleaned from the interviews conducted with the Canadian DND scientist working in SAT-A Roto 0, Dr. Elizabeth Speed and Colonel Andre Corbould, Deputy Commander Civil Military Affairs Division CJ9 (US, CFC-A). They both made the case that there has to be a willingness to reform on the part of the host nation, there has to be a clear lack of capability, a legitimate government that Canada is trying to help, high level support that generates mid-level buy-in, and lastly, key stake holders in the GOC must be willing to integrate inter-departmental efforts.[106]

Without a request from the host nation for Canada to be involved at this level of nation building, a SAT is a non-starter. But one more condition, in addition to the five mentioned above, needs to be found for this type of intervention to succeed. There has to be a minimum level of stability in the area of operation for this type of work to take place. While it has been

---

[105] Christopher Alexander, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, Pillar1-Political Affairs, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), interviewed on the 6th May 2006 for research paper on SAT-A by Major MH St-Louis.

[106] Dr. Elizabeth Speed, Canadian DND scientist working in SAT-A Roto 0, and Colonel Andre Corbould, Deputy Commander of the Civil Military Affairs Division (CJ-9) CFC-A (US), both interviewed on the 15th May 2006 for research paper on SAT-A by Major MH St-Louis.

argued that nation building needs to take place in a quasi-simultaneous manner as all other stability operations, an advisory team cannot operate in chaos or in a condition of allout war. Without a certain level of stability, no capacity building efforts would take root. Canada's intervention would be in vain.

Critics might see the concept of SAT as nothing more than an anomaly that was only possible in Afghanistan because of the personal relationship between President Karzai and Gen Hillier, an anomaly that was only possible because of Canada's political landscape at the time. When the SAT-A was launched, the political landscape had the government and the Defence Minister giving Gen Hillier significant freedom of action. A freedom of action that, some would suggest, he might have taken advantage of. But even if the case can be made that the political realities of 2005 - a minority liberal government, a strong CDS, the US ongoing Global War on Terror and a host of other factors - will never be aligned again. The logic behind a strategic planning team that is dedicated to transferring capability to a weak state cannot be dismissed. Even if the political conditions are never the same again, the GOC now has a new capability with which it can intervene.

But why do this in the first place, and why assume this type of work can be done? Because the CF is able to deploy in this type of unstable environment, it can source a number of professionals with planning experience and is also in a good position to coordinate the involvement of numerous other agencies that might have members that are not used to working in post-conflict situations or in a warring state. While it is recognized that CIDA officers and co-operants, DFAIT field personnel and RCMP officers all have relevant experiences in crises situations, overseas deployments and hardship, DND and more specifically the CF, is pre-

eminently suited to integrate such a diverse team towards a focused intervention with the host nation.

Even if an advisory team in the future would still be based on a core contribution from DND, the counter-insurgency literature confirms that defeating an insurgency is a political problem, not a military one. In the same light, rebuilding a failed state or assisting a fragile one are tasks that require more than stability and security. Canada's approach needs to be based on a collective whole-of-government thinking and planning, with the military acting as part of that effort. This shared role for the military is at the center of James Corum's most recent book, *Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy*. Drawing on the history of a number of COIN operations of the last century, Corum argues very effectively that the knowledge on how to deal with insurgencies can be found in our past. Unfortunately, due to political, cultural and systemic challenges, the US has been unable to learn from that literature to the extent necessary for strategic success.

In the first chapter of his book, Dr. Corum reviewed counterinsurgency theories and concluded that American and British experts had outlined, as early as the 1970s, seven basic principles of COIN warfare. These principles dealt with the importance of the local civilian population as the center of gravity of any action, the need for a comprehensive strategy that included military, social, political and economic actions. The need for unity of effort and coordination of civilian and military interventions was also critical. Good intelligence, use of the media and the discriminate use of force completed the list of the seven basic principles for this type of campaign.[107]

The COIN literature proposes that all interventions of this type require a centralized, integrating political authority. Because insurgencies are described as competitions involving at least one non-state movement using means that include violence against an established authority to achieve political change, they have to be countered in the context of political primacy, unity of purpose and long-term planning.[108] Therefore, a central authority that ensures synergy, coordination and unity of purpose is paramount. Such authority never existed in Haiti and is still lacking in Afghanistan. Some progress has been made in Ottawa, where an Associate Deputy Minister from the DFAIT has been given the coordinating responsibility for the GOC's efforts in Afghanistan, but the complete integration of the work of all agencies remains an objective rather than the current state of affairs.[109]

More important than the appointment of an Associate Deputy Minister, there is an urgent need for the clarification of lead agencies in these types of interventions, as well as the appointment of a single GOC integrating authority in the country of operation. Depending on the level of instability and Canada's involvement in the host nation, that responsibility could be held by the Canadian Ambassador to that country, a politician, an appointed senior civil administrator, or a senior military commander. This person should in turn be made to answer to Ottawa, through a central mechanism that reports to the PCO or a National Security Council type group,

---

[107] James S. Corum, *Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy* (St.Paul: Zenith, 2007), 27, 28.

[108] Lieutenant-Colonel J.M . Rettie, "Directorate of Army Doctrine," (lecture, Canadian Forces College, ON, April 24, 2007), with permission, slide 32. Objective described in the soon to be published, Counterinsurgency Doctrine of the Canadian Army.

[109] Gordon Smith, *Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working?* (Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute: Calgary, 2007), 6. According to Gordon Smith the Canadian Forces and the Canadian International Development Agency are not working effectively together. He argued that they have fundamentally different agenda's that are crippling the 3D approach.

in order for the government to exercise a real WGA. Accordingly, Gen Smith proposed that:

"The directing set of hands may be one man or a few, but they must be of one mind and have the

authority to act to achieve the desired result."[110] Without a lead agency, a single authority in

theatre and a central reporting mechanism, the promise of an effective whole of government

intervention in fragile states, will remain only a promise.

Even if some problems exist in the field with regards to the fusion of Canada's

intervention, a number of GOC capacity building initiatives already exist. They are inclusive of

other departments to varying degrees but merit some attention.

The Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) is located in DFAIT, Ottawa.

With staff originating from Foreign Affairs, DND, CIDA and other departments whose expertise

is needed to ensure coherent government responses to international crises, START conducts

planning and develops government responses to international crises as they occur.[111]   In other

words, START, "… assesses the extent of crises around the world, and, draws on members from

across government and in collaboration with task forces from partner countries, it promotes

faster and more coordinated responses from the Government in support of stabilization and

reconstruction efforts."[112] By advising on the allocation of aid and directing it towards capacity

building, the task force addresses the underlying factors that contribute to a particular conflict,

and acts as a coordinator of government assistance. While it overlaps SAT's objective of

---

[110] Smith, *The Utility of Force…,* 388.

[111] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Building a more secure world," http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-diplomacy6-en.asp; Internet; accessed 18 March 2007.

[112] United Nations Association of Canada, "Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Lessons from the Past Building or the Future The Report on the UNA-Canada 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping International Panel Series 2006 – 2007 United Nations Association of Canada," 69. As seen in: http://www.unac.org/peacekeeping/en/pdf/academic_publication/UN-Report.pdf; Internet; accessed 18 March 2007.

capacity building, START is not a deployed human capability that works directly with the local government towards nation building. It constitutes a forum in Canada's capital, where key civil servants from different agencies can effectively plan GOC responses to crises.

CIDA now has The Office for Democratic Governance. Created on October 30th 2006, this office absorbed the work of the Canada Corps. "With a specialized mandate to promote freedom and democracy, human rights, the rule of law and open and accountable public institutions in developing countries,"[113] this office promotes and funds initiatives that focus on the development of working democratic institutions across developing nations. These initiatives mobilize Canadians to participate in governance projects in these countries. CIDA recognized that improving governance structures was essential for long-term sustainable development.[114] Similar to SAT's focus on improving governance in the host nation, The Office for Democratic Governance is different in as much as it is not an integrated team from the whole of government that improves capacity without a budget or funds to manage.

While there have been a number of conferences, seminars and papers written on Canada's WGA in the last two years, there is of yet no complete narrative or analysis of these types of efforts and how these efforts are being articulated in each department. The WGA concept, as was presented in this paper "…is based on the idea that no single element of national power is, on its own sufficient to deal with all the complexities of failed and failing states and,

---

[113] Canadian International Development Agency, "Office for Democratic Governance," http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CanadaCorps; Internet; accessed 17 March 2007.

[114] United Nations Association of Canada, "Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Lessons from the Past Building or the Future The Report on the UNA-Canada 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping International Panel Series 2006 – 2007 United Nations Association of Canada," 70. As seen in: http://www.unac.org/peacekeeping/en/pdf/academic_publication/UN-Report.pdf; Internet; accessed 18 March 2007.

therefore, a coordinated and concentrated WGA is necessary to secure strategic effects."[115] The START from DFAIT and The Office for Democratic Governance in CIDA address some of these complexities, but are not to be confused with what a dedicated group of strategic planners can bring to a fragile government tackling the challenges of instability.

Canada's present work in Haiti and Afghanistan are showing the potential cost saving benefits of such a coordinated approach, but much more work is needed. Such a paradigm shift in the way departments and ministries work together cannot be done in a couple of years. If the literature on the history of COIN is to be believed, the need for such an approach is not new. Therefore, significant effort from every department will be required for this shift to occur, a shift that has to address some of the deep cultural and institutional differences between each department. Gen Rupert Smith recognized this challenge.

> Presently our institutions are structured like stovepipes… We need to have the ability to bring them together, at least at the theatre level and probably lower, so that their actions are directed by one set of hands and their actions are coherent. This applies to all ministries and military staffs: to persist with institutional thought patterns… is folly.[116]

For the, CF this has to start with some changes to the way troop contribution to missions is planned. Senior planning staffs in the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) and the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) have to consider the value that a team of strategic advisors can add to an operation. At the moment, these senior planning staffs, with the inputs from the Army, Navy and Air Force, devise force structures that respond to political and strategic guidance. By including different elements of Canada's government and working

---

[115] Capstick, "Strengthening the Weak…," 1. As seen in: http://www.uregina.ca/gspp/news/IntInsight_capstick.pdf; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007.

[116] Smith, *The Utility of Force…*, 388.

directly at improving the capacity of the host nation to govern itself, a strategic advisory team has the potential to reap huge rewards for a small investment.

Mission design or troop contribution to specific missions is a very complex process that involves high level political prerogatives, and detailed military planning. While both don't always coincide, the inclusion of a SAT-like capability in considering future operations fulfills the need for action with minimal risk. The type of work given to a team such as SAT, as has been demonstrated, would be relatively inexpensive, appealing to the public and therefore, politically viable.

Conclusion

> In successful counterinsurgency campaigns, victory invariably was the product of a long-term strategy that included major political and economic, as well as military, elements. A successful strategy implies an effective interagency process, in which the non-military and the military branches of the government communicate effectively, [and] cooperate smoothly…[117]

In the present debate over the utility of Canadian intervention in Afghanistan you can find an important aspect of the motivation behind this paper. While the GOC will not publicly admit that it is actively involved in a COIN operation, as part of NATO, it is nevertheless, conducting this type of campaign. Therefore, the need for an effective integrated approach becomes capital. As argued by Dr. Corum, such an approach, if history is correct, has been the only successful tactic against insurgents.

By reviewing the present body of knowledge that dealt with nation building, the future security environment and 4GW, the paper demonstrated the need for an integrated approach, as well as the value of a SAT in the fight against insurgency or in support of failing and failed states. It made evident that nation building initiatives were important aspects of such interventions. These interventions needed long-tern synchronized and coordinated action in order to have a chance of success.

The genesis of SAT-A and the analysis of its immediate results showed the positive impact such a team can have. In contrast, the repeated failures of Canada's un-coordinated interventions in Haiti during the 1990s and early 2000 support the argument that a team like the SAT can be relevant.

---

[117] Corum, *Fighting the War on Terror…*, 238.

Lastly, the question of replicability was answered with a set of conditions for duplication in future operations. These conditions are:

1. There has to be willingness to reform on the part of the host nation.

2. There has to be a clear lack of capability.

3. The government that Canada is trying to help has to be legitimate.

4. There has to be high level support that generates mid-level buy-in, in the host nation.

5. Key stake holders in the GOC must be willing to integrate inter-departmental efforts.

6. There has to be a minimum level of stability in the area of operation for this type of work to take place.

7. Canada was making a significant contribution in that country.

8. Canada had no negative historical ties with the host nation.

9. The Host Nation has to request this type of help, or be made aware that Canada can contribute in this fashion.

This paper has demonstrated the usefulness of the Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan. In the future, a SAT-like team could be deployed in conjunction with other GOC activities and make a critical contribution to our success in intervening in weak states that required Canada's assistance. In order to effectively carry out this type of intervention, four recommendations are made:

1. All senior planning staffs in the CF need to consider the new capability a SAT team brings to a mission. When discussing possible force structure options with outside agencies and commanders, the inclusion of a group of strategic planners working with the local government needs to be considered.

2. Consideration should be given to the integration of START teams from DFAIT, CIDA's governance initiatives and the SAT concept from the CF, into a more robust and systematic WGA to nation building.

3. Officer professional development has to be strengthened in order to include more education in the fields of history, anthropology, sociology and politics. Furthermore, professional development opportunities that integrate other government agencies should be sought.

4. Given the complexity of future interventions, a single integrating authority, as well as a lead department needs to be considered at the outset of any mission design.

Canada's latest International Policy Statement declared that the primary concern for future Canadian involvement would be intervention in fragile states. This type of intervention will focus on creating or strengthening the overall government apparatus of these states. This paper has demonstrated that the Canadian Armed Forces, with a strategic advisory team, have the ways and the means to participate in nation building in order to accomplish the government's ends. In the future, a small, adaptable and professional group of planners from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of National Defence, the Canadian International Development Agency and other relevant agencies, working together in moving a host country towards good governance will help Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces achieve success.

The Strategic Advisory Team model makes a significant contribution to Canada's overall nation building effort and, as a consequence, helps in defeating insurgencies and bolsters the odds against a regression to state-failure.

List of Acronyms

ANDS – Afghanistan National Development Strategy
CA – Canada
CDS – Chief of the Defence Staff
CEFCOM - Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command
CFC-A – Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (United States)
CIDA – Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC – Civil Military Coordination
CJ-9 – Civil Military Affairs Division of CFC-A
COP – Contemporary Operating Environment
COIN – Counter-insurgency
DND – Department of National Defence
DFAIT - Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
FF – Failed and Failing
GIRA – Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GOC – Government of Canada
GW – Generation Warfare
HN – Host Nation
HoA – Head of Aid
HoM – Head of Mission
HQ – Headquarters
IARCSC – Independent Administration Reform and Civil Service Commission
IC – International Community
IPS - International Policy Statement
ISAF – International Security and Assistance Force
KMNB – Kabul Multi-national Brigade
MRRD – Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NSP – National Solidarity Program
NSS – National Security Statement
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
OEF - Operation Enduring Freedom
OMLT - Operational Mentor Liaison Team
OP ARGUS – Operation Argus
OoP – Office of the President
PRSP – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Teams
RCMP – Royal Canadian mounted Police
ROTO - Rotation
SAT-A – Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan
SJS - Strategic Joint Staff
SSR - Security Systems Reform
START - Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force
TA – Technical Advisors
TF – Task Force
WG – Working Group
WGA - Whole-of-Government Approach

Bibliography

Governmental and United Nations Sources

Afghanistan. "Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)." http://www.ands.gov.af/; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

Afghanistan. "Senior Afghan Government minister Visits Canada 28th Nov – 10th Dec. News Release." http://www.mrrd.gov.af/ENGLISH/home/NextC.htm; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping,* Report of the Secretary General pursuant the Summit meeting of the Security Council. New York: UN, 31 January 92. http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

Canada. Department of National Defence. A-JS-005-000/AG-001 *Canada's International Policy Statement. A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence.* Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005.

Canadian International Development Agency. *Canadian Cooperation with Haiti: Reflecting on a decade of difficult partnership. CIDA Report.* Ottawa: CIDA, December 2004.

Canadian International Development Agency. "Office for Democratic Governance." http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CanadaCorps; Internet; accessed 17 March 2007.

Canadian International Development Agency. "RPP 2006-2007 Canadian International Development Agency." http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/0607/cida-acdi/cida-acdi01_e.asp; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. "Building a more secure world." http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-diplomacy6-en.asp; Internet; accessed 18 May 2007.

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada in the World: Canadian International Policy. "Diplomacy, Canada's International Policy Statement, A role of Pride and Influence in the World. Building a more secure world." http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/overview-en.asp; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007.

Department of National Defence. " Strategic Symposium." http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/vcds-exec/pubs/strategic-symposium/intro_e.asp; DND Intranet; accessed 14 March 2007.

Government of Canada. "Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan - Why Are we There?" http://news.gc.ca/cfmx/view/en/index.jsp?articleid=266449; Internet; accessed 10 March 2007.

Government of Canada. "Haiti " http://geo.international.gc.ca/latin-america/latinamerica/country_info/haiti-en.asp; Internet; accessed 11 March 2007.

Government of Canada. "Canadian Parliament Report on Haiti, 10th January 2007." http://thwapshoolyard.blogspot.com/2007/01/canadina-parliament-report-on-haiti.html; Internet; accessed 14 March 2007.

Government of Canada. "The Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team." http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/kprt-en.asp; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

Government of Canada. "Past Canadian Commitments to United Nations and other Peace Support Operations (as of December 2003)." http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content.asp?id=%7b4433D831-9230-4572-B297-CEA4F4C1DA3D%7d; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

Harder, Peter. "Notes for an address by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the London Conference on Afghanistan, January 31, 2006. Canada rebuilding Afghanistan." Available from http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/london-conference-en.asp; Internet; accessed 13 March 2007.

Peter Johnston and Dr. Michael Roi. "Future Security Environment 2025." http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ord/fse2025/fse1_e.asp; DND Intranet; accessed 12 March 2007.

Stephen Harper. "Prime Minister stands by Canada's commitment to Afghanistan." http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1165; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

United States. National Intelligence Council. *Global Trends 2015: A dialogue about the Future with Non-government Experts NIC 2000-02*. US: United States Central Intelligence Agency, December 2000.

United States, White House. *The National Security Strategy of The United States of America*. Washington, DC: White House, September 2002.

United States, White House. *The National Security Strategy of The United States of America*. Washington, DC: White House, September 2006.

United States, White House. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington, DC: White House, September 2006.

United Nations General Assembly. *No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations .Report of the Secretary-General 0134362*. New York: United Nations, April 20, 2001.

United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. "A more secure world: Our shared responsibility." http://www.un.org/secureworld; Internet; accessed 14 March 2007.

United Nations International Peace Academy. *Seminar Report, Lessons Learned: Peacebuilding in Haiti*. New York: UN, 2002.

United Nations. "UN Human Development Index 2006." http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

United Nations. "United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti." http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007.

Monographs

Carment, David. *Effective Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing States*. CDFAI Research Paper Series. CDFAI: Calgary, June 2005.

Corum, James S. *Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy*. St.Paul, MN: Zenith, 2007.

Davis, L.M., S.D. Hosek, M.G. Tate, M. Perry, G. Hepler, and P.Steinberg. *Army Medical Support for Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance, MR-773-A*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1996.

Dobbins, James, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina. *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq MR-1753-RC*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003.

Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. New York: Praeger, 1964.

Hammes, Thomas X. *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*. St.Paul, MN: Zenith, 2004.

Jones, Seth G., and others. *Securing Health, Lessons from Nation-Building Mission*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006.

Mandelbaum, Michael. *The Ideas that Conquered the World*. *Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-first Century*. New York: Public Affairs, 2002.

Smith, General Rupert, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. London: Penguin Books, 2005.

Trinquier, Roger. *Modern Warfare*. *A French View of Counterinsurgency*. Translated by Daniel Lee. New York: Praeger, 1964.

Tse-tung, Mao. *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Translated by Samuel B Griffith. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000.

Tsouras, Peter G. *Warriors' Words: A Dictionary of Military Quotation*. London: Cassell Arms and Armour, 1995), 470.

von Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Primary Sources

Aubin, Lieutenant-Colonel F. "Strategic advisory Team – Afghanistan." Lecture, Canadian Forces College, ON, April 4, 2007, with permission.

Bland, Dr. Douglas. *Conference on Canadian and US Approaches to 3D*, Queens University, USWC and LFDTS, Kingston, 22-23 June 2006, with permission.

Capstick, Colonel M.D. "OP ARGUS – SAT-A Rotation 0." Lecture, Canadian Forces College, ON, May 9, 2006, with permission.

Hetherington, Lieutenant-Colonel Simon. "Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team." Lecture, Canadian Forces College, ON, April 17, 2007, with permission.

Kennedy, Sgt. "Financial Forecast Report, Strategic Advisory Team, OP ARGUS." Document, SAT-A OP ARGUS Roto 0, May 7, 2006.

Rettie, Lieutenant-Colonel J.M. "Directorate of Army Doctrine." Lecture, Canadian Forces College, ON, April 23, 2007, with permission.

Tamas, Andy. "Development and the Military in Afghanistan: Working with Communities," Research Paper, SAT-A, Kabul, 2006.

Interviews with:

Alexander, Christopher Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, Pillar1-Political Affairs, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

Ahmadi, Ershad, Deputy Chief of Presidential Programs, Presidential Palace, Afghanistan.

Banerjee, Dr. Nipa, Canada's Head of Aid in Afghanistan, Canadian International Development Agency.

Capstick, Colonel Michael D., Commander OP ARGUS (SAT-A Roto 0).

Corbould, Colonel Andre, Deputy Commander of the Civil Military Affairs Division (CJ-9) CFC-A (US).

Mushahed, Dr. A., Chairman of the IARCSC, Afghanistan.

Seddiq, Homayoun, Acting Director of Monitoring and Evaluation, IARCSC, Afghanistan.

Speed, Dr. Elizabeth, Canadian DND scientist OP ARGUS (SAT-A Roto 0).

Solis, Colonel Fred, Team Chief for Governance, Civil Military Affairs Division (CJ-9) CFC-A.

Waissi, Wahid, Senior Process Manager, ANDS, Afghanistan.

Other sources

Barno, David W. "Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency." *Parameters* (Summer 2006):15-29.

Canadian American Strategic Review. "Nation-building 101 : Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan." http://www.sfu.ca/casr/ft-fukuyama1-1.htm; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

Capstick, Colonel M.D. "Strengthening the Weak: The Canadian Forces in Afghanistan." Paper presented at the Canadian Institute of International Affairs conference on "Foreign Policy. Building Global Prosperity: Canada's Engagement with the Developing World. 9-10 March 2006." http://www.uregina.ca/gspp/news/IntInsight_capstick.pdf; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007.

Carment, David. "The Struggle for Peace." *Harvard International Review* (June, 2001).

Carment, David, John Gazo and Stewart Prest. "State Failure and Risk Assessment." *Global Society (*January, 2006).

CBC News. "M. Stewart reporting from Kabul on the SAT-A, March 8, 2007." www.cbc.ca/clips/rm-hi/stewart-afghanistan070308.rm; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007.

Blatchford, Christie. "Small Strategic Team making big difference." *The Globe and Mail*, 8 May 2006.

Dobbins, James. "Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the Worlds Only Superpower." http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/nation1.html; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007, 2.

"Interview with PBS Frontline's Wen Stephenson on Sept. 26, 2003." http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/stake/dobbins.html; Internet; accessed 16 March 2007.

Echevarria, Dr. Antulio J. II, *Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=632; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007.

Ghani, Ashraf, Clare Lockhart and Michael Carnaham. *Closing the Sovereignty Gap: an Approach to State-Building*, Working Paper 253. London: Overseas Development Institutes, September 2005.

Hammes, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas X. "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 78, No. 9 (September, 1994): 35-44.

"4th-generation Warfare: Our Enemies Play to Their Strengths." *Armed Forces Journal* (November, 2004): 40-44.

"Insurgency: modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation." *Strategic Forum*, no 214 (January 2005): 1-8.

Hamonic, Xavier. *The Canadian Armed forces: not just for peacekeeping*. Hamilton: Brock Press, 2007. Available at: www.brockpress.com; Internet; accessed 17 March 2007.

International & War CKA Canadian Forums. "Canada helps to shape Afghan bureaucracy." http://www.canadaka.net/modules.php?name=Forums&file=viewtopic&t=13191; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007.

Keller, Tony. "What About Haiti," *Maclean's Magazine*, December 19, 2005. http://www.macleans.ca/shared/print.jsp?content=20051219_117934_117934; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

Kennedy, John F. "Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy June 6th, 1962." http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8695; Internet; accessed on 15 March 2007.

Lind, William S., Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton and Gary I. Wilson, "The changing Faces of War: Into the Fourth Generation." *Marine Corps Gazette* (October, 1989): 22-26.

Lind, William S., Major John F. Schmitt, and Colonel Gary I. Wilson, "Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 78, No. 12 (December, 1994): 34-37.

Lind, William S. "Fourth-Generation Warfare's First Blow: A Quick Look." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 85, No. 11 (November, 2001).

"Understanding Fourth Generation War." *Military Review*, Vol. 84, No. 5 (September/October 2004): 12-16.

"Understanding Fourth Generation War." http://antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702; Internet; accessed on 15 March 2007.

McIntire Peters, Katherine. "Building Stability. In the Special section on Redefining National Security." http://www.govexec.com/features/0106-01/0106-01securityS1.htm; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

Merrill Center for Strategic Studies. "Workshop on Irregular Warfare, The Afghan and Iraq Case." http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:w8ahlJDp868J:www.sais-jhu.edu/merrillcenter/Panel1.pdf+nation+building+and+counterinsurgency&hl=en&gl=ca&ct=clnk&cd=26; Internet; accessed, 14 March 2007.

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. *Whole of Government Approaches To Fragile States*. Paris: OECD, 2006.

Owen, Taylor and David Eaves. "Afghanistan: Getting back on track." *Toronto Star*, 23 February, 2007.

Pellerin, Colonel (Retired) Alain, and Colonel (Retired) Brian MacDonald, "Testimony of Executive Director, Senior Defence Analyst, Conference of Defence Associations to the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, 20 April, 2007." http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Parliamentary_Presentations/Testimony%20To%20FAAE%202007.pdf; Internet; accessed, 2 May 2007.

Record, Jeffery. "Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War." *Parameters* (Summer 2002): 5-7.

Rohr, Karl C. "Progressive Reconstruction: A Methodology for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations," Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006.

Smith, Gordon. *Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working?* Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2007.

Tankaria-Clifford, Lisa Capt UK. "Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams." *ISAF Mirror* issue 36, (December 2006). As seen in: http://www.nato.int/isaf/isaf_mirror/ISAF_Mirror_Dec_2006.pdf, Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

Tomes, Robert R. "Relearning counterinsurgency warfare." *Parameters* (Spring 2004). http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBR/is_1_34/ai_115566394/print; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

United Nations Association of Canada. "Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Lessons from the Past Building or the Future The Report on the UNA-Canada 50th Anniversary of UN

Peacekeeping International Panel Series 2006 – 2007 United Nations Association of Canada." http://www.unac.org/peacekeeping/en/pdf/academic_publication/UN-Report.pdf; Internet; accessed 18 March 2007.