CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
JCSP 33 / PCEMI 33

Master of Defence Studies

The European Security and Defence Policy – Europe's Role on the World Stage

By /par Korvettenkapitän Matthias Seipel, Deutsche Marine

<u>Abstract</u>

Due to its weight of population, its enormous economic power and its growing influence today the European Union has to be considered as a global player on the world stage. By implementing the European Security and Defence Policy the European Union has managed to strengthen its Common Security and Foreign Policy and is able to carry out complex military operations. Nevertheless, the EU is still far from being on a par with the US in terms of security and defense policy. Intra European constraints make it still difficult to make out a common European position. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Iraq war relations with the US, who have always had hesitant attitudes to a military strong and united Europe, have cooled down. Washington has to realize that Europe has become a capable partner while the Europeans have to overcome their discords. Only then Europe will be able to make a contribution to world's security policy.

The European Security and Defence Policy – Europe's Role on the World Stage

Outline

Abbreviations

CSFP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EC	European Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
ESDI	European Defence and Security Initiative
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESDU	European Security and Defence Union
ESCS	European Coal and Steel Community
ESS	European Security Strategy
EPC	European Political Community
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Military Staff
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
GNP	Gross National Product
HR	High Representative
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRF	NATO Response Force
NSS	United States National Security Strategy
PSC	Political and Security Committee
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. Introduction

The idea of speaking with one European voice in world affairs is as old as the European integration itself. But due to national interests and reservations, the European Union has made less progress in forging a Common Security and Defence Policy than in creating a single market and the single currency, the Euro.[1]

Nevertheless, major geopolitical developments led to Europe's intensified effort towards a common, single European voice for security: the fall of the Berlin Wall, which initiated the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, together with the outbreak of regional crisis in the Balkans, as well as the terror attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. on 11 September 2001 all contributed to the European collective desire for a Common Foreign and Defence Policy (CSFP).[2]

Still, the public picture of Europe as an international actor remains ambiguous or even negative, because sometimes it is unclear if de facto the Union is able to act as a protagonist on the world stage. It is still difficult to make out a common European position. The war in Iraq that began in March 2003, which had created doubt that European countries are willing to put their own interests last, and the EU's complicated decision making process and its military capability gap with the US, are constraints CFSP is facing today.

Global terrorism brought the concepts of the Cold War and its threat perception – which had been anyway withering quietly away after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 – to a definite end. The overall nature of global security has been undergoing dramatic changes; the world has become much more complex. Because traditional approaches to security are increasingly seen as inadequate to deal with the new security agenda, it is necessary to develop a much broader and complex approach to security. Some of the most threatening new risk factors

---

[1] Although historically incorrect for events earlier than 1993-the Treaty of Maastricht- the term European Union will be used throughout this paper, because the term European Union dominates European Community in literature.

[2] Europa, the portal of European institutions, "Overviews of the European Union activities Foreign and Security Policy," http://www.europa.eu/pol/cfsp/overview_en.htm; Internet; accessed 18.01.2007.

the world community is facing in the early 21st century include large scale, homicidal terrorism, instability and chaos that are the consequences of failed and failing states plus the proliferation of both weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional weapons as well as regional conflicts, all of which might have a direct or indirect impact on European interests. They can lead to extremism and terrorism and provoke state failure. Further menaces include the increasing barbarism of war-torn societies, the return of war lordism, uncontrolled and illegal mass migration, and genocidal ethnic conflicts.[3] These new threats blur both the traditional distinction between internal and external security, as well as also those between the various individual sectors, military, political, economic, social, and environmental that together go towards making up the new security.[4]

Facing a complex and unpredictable world after the fall of the bi-polar system, the EU has managed to make some spectacular progress since 1999 when the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was proclaimed. Today, the Union has direct responsibility for crisis management: it has a military committee and a military staff and is responsible for military operations; it has an armaments agency; a solidarity clause in the event of a terrorist attack; and above all, a common security strategy, which means a common view on today's challenging threats and the appropriate responses to them.[5] The Union is bringing together all facets of international action, trade, economic aid and military, to reduce sources of conflict and to prevent confrontation. From a European standpoint, coherence is the key to success. It stands for the coordinated use of military means in interplay of all political dimensions.

While Europeans and Americans often have similar threat perceptions, they sometimes have different views on the best methods how to respond to them, especially the question of how

---

[3] Additional threats are: the explosive growth of sophisticated and murderously ruthless international crime , political and financial instability, caused by corruption, but also the impact of climate change, the spread of infectious diseases and continuing poverty.

[4] Heinz Gaertner and Ian M. Cuthbertson, "Introduction," in *European Security and transatlantic Relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War*, ed. Heinz Gaertner and Ian M. Cuthbertson, 1-15 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 5.

[5] Javier Solana, "Preface," in *EU Security and Defence Policy, The first five years (1999-2004)*, ed. Nicole Gnesetto, 5-10 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 5.

to use force, when and under what auspices. Although willing to use force in certain scenarios, Europeans are much less willing to use force to maintain peace or obtain justice, and they are broadly unwilling to use force without multilateral approval than the US seems to be willing.

The world after 11 September 2001 is not more unipolar than before, but 9/11 made its unilateral contours much more visible. American unilateral actions are well known: they reach from military measures such as large increases in defence spending, to the abandonment of arms control agreements[6], and the decision to go to war in Iraq without a United Nations mandate, through to the rejection of the Kyoto protocol and the assertion of the exemption of US personnel from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. In any case, a closer transatlantic cooperation would offer benefits for both sides. In order to gain such cooperation, it would be worth paying closer heed to the views of European friends. Europeans would have much fewer reservations about a strategy of pre-emption, the approach laid out in the US National Security Strategy (NSS), if there was at least some form of multilateral consultation and assessment involved. Such steps would grant more legitimization than a single government's decision. After all, Europeans do not reject the use of military force per se; on the contrary, in face of a clear threat, the European Security Strategy (ESS) itself speaks of "preventive engagement" involving both military and civilian means. The caveat, however, is, that the Europeans continue to stress the United Nations Charter as fundamental framework. The primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the world lies in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Another point that will be discussed in this essay is the question of the impact the new threats and Europe's Foreign Policy have on the EU's relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Will NATO lose its weight; must it be changed radically, or will NATO be degraded to a toolbox for the United States to dip into when constructing a coalition of the willing? And what might be future prospects for creating an effective and worthwhile European Security and Defence Policy, one that would enable Europeans to play a major role internationally as partners of the US?

The leading question for this essay will be which global role the EU plays in terms of foreign and security policy. Is the Union already on a par with the US? In order to answer this overarching question, the essay will examine current developments in the ESDP, consider the Union's history, and discuss some selected constraints and problems the EU is facing today. The main focus will be on intra European constraints as well as on the transatlantic relationship. In order to achieve the comprehensive capacity for the action required of a global actor, it is urgent that the EU reforms its CFSP as well as the ESDP. Therefore, the last chapter of this essay will deal with how Europe might overcome its actual problems in the future.

---

[6] Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, the Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, the Anti Ballistic Missile treaty.

2. European Integration and the Development of a Common Foreign Policy

2.1 Fifty Years of European Integration

Since the fall of the Roman Empire, the idea of unity has been present in European culture[7]. Throughout the centuries, politicians and visionaries made proposals for unions of European states in some form. But it was not until the recent past that these ideas led to some results.

Following the disaster of the First World War, Aristide Briand, the French prime minister, suggested the idea of a federation of European nations based on solidarity in the pursuit of economic prosperity as well as political and social co-operation. But the Great Depression, the rise of fascism and finally World War II prevented further support for this inter-war movement.

The catastrophic course of World War II with its immense death toll gave a strong impetus to plans for some form of union in Europe in order to prevent future wars and to facilitate post-war reconstruction. The whole continent lay in ruins. The fathers of European integration searched for mechanisms that would bring European countries together and move them beyond their ancient rivalries. Rather than commemorating a noble past, cooperation should ensure that the past would never be repeated.[8] But the division of Europe between two rival blocks effectively limited these proposals for unity to Western Europe.

The iron curtain between the Soviet-dominated East and the West on the other side led to a rising threat of a third even more brutal and lethal world war. European countries were rebuilding their military before rebuilding their cities and their destroyed infrastructure.[9] In

---

[7] The first proposal for peaceful methods of unifying Europe against a common enemy emerged in 1453, after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks. George of Podebrady, a Hussite king of Bohemia recommended the creation of a union of Christian nations against the Turks in 1464.

[8] Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream* (New York: Penguin Group, 2004), 200.

[9] T.R. Reid T.R. and Joanne Myers, "The United States of Europe: The new Superpower and the End of American Supremacy," http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/5077.html; Internet; accessed 10 April 2007.

September 1946, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill gave a speech in Zurich, calling for a "United States of Europe":

> "… We have had these three brutal wars and we are going to do it again. Anybody can look and see we are going to do it again unless we reorganize our continent, and the model is going to be the great republic across the shining sea… We have to build a sort of United States of Europe."[10]

The principal result of his speech was the foundation of the Council of Europe in 1949, a rather restricted organization.[11]

The history of the European integration finally began 1951 with the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as the first milestone to an economically and politically united Europe.[12] Created by the Treaty of Paris, its six founding members were Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg (the so called Benelux countries), West Germany, France and Italy.[13] The aim was to combine the steel and coal resources of the member states under supranational authority, making another European war technically impossible. Besides the control on armament industry, the union would simultaneously increase economic development by the creation of a common market in order to increase production and employment in the heavy industry sector. There is no doubt that control of the Saar and Ruhr region with its huge mineral resources and heavy industry at the Franco-German border was at the heart of lingering conflict in Europe. Thus integration and cooperation of German and French industries would cause an element of trust between the two greatest rivals on the continent.[14] The ECSC was the brainchild of Jean Monnet, a French civil servant, and was publicised by Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister. Schuman presented his proposal on May 9, 1950. It is known as the

---

[10] Ibid., 4.

[11] Although through the European Court of Human Rights the Council of Europe has developed some powers in that specific area.

[12] Europa, the portal of European institutions, "The history of the European Union," http://www.europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.html; Internet accessed 19 January 2007.

[13] The British were invited to participate as well, but refused on grounds of national sovereignty.

[14] Of course this also meant a kind of armament control mainly over Germany.

"Schuman Declaration" and is considered to be the beginning of the creation of what is today known as the European Union, which later chose to celebrate May 9 as Europe Day. For the very first time in history, the six member states were willing to accept restrictions on parts of their sovereignty in favour of the community.[15] [16]

Following the success of the ECSC, further efforts towards integration were undertaken. An attempt was made to create a European Defence Community (EDC) as well as a European Political Community (EPC). While the purpose of the latter was to establish a federation of European states – including a bicameral parliament, executive organ and a European Court – the aim of the EDC was the creation of a common European army, with a joint high command. The purpose was to face the Soviet threat by allowing troops to be raised from Germany, while at the same time overcoming French fears of German rearmament. Both attempts – the European Defence Community as well as the European Political Community – proved to be overambitious. In 1954 the French National Assembly refused to ratify the EDC treaty and after that failure, the EPC, too, was quietly shelved. [17] The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was given priority as a common defence system against the Soviet threat.[18] Nevertheless, the ideas behind both of these institutions lived on.

Despite the failure of the EDC and the EPC, the members of the ECSC soon tried again to further their integration. In 1957 the same six nations signed the Treaty of Rome, founding the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community

---

[15] Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream, pp 201, Europa, the portal of European institutions, "From the ECSC Treaty to the Constitution," http://www.europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/eec/en.html; Internet; accessed 29 March 2007.

[17] Rene Pleven, French Prime Minister in 1950 argued that the aim of a common European Defence was closely linked to the rearmament of Germany. Possible German military formations should be kept as small as possible, with all forces above brigade level being multinational. His plan failed in the French Parliament, and the EU remained only loosely committed to a common defence through the Western European Union (WEU), which in turn was closely linked to NATO. Additionally the plans for the EDC collapsed due to the need for a transatlantic alliance, and the demands for national sovereignty in Europe. American pressure on Europe allowed the Germans to rearm and NATO was founded.

[18] This allowed West Germany to rearm and simultaneously control its army by NATO means in order to consider France's fear of Germany's gaining new strength.

(EURATOM).[19] The EEC would establish a customs union among the six states, based on the "four freedoms": the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and people. Two objectives were achieved: first the transformation of conditions of trade and manufacture in Europe and second, more politically, the contribution towards a functional construction of a political Europe, which constituted a step towards closer unification.[20] EURATOM was created to combine the non-military nuclear resources of the member states. Three institutions now existed, the ECSC, the EEC, and EURATOM. Of these three, the EEC was by far the most important one, and so much so, that it was later renamed simply as the European Community (EC).[21]

The growth of these European Communities into what is today known as the European Union consists of two parallel processes. On the one hand there is a deepening of the Union, a structural evolution into a tighter bloc with more competences given to the supranational level, and on the other hand, there is an enlargement of the European Communities (or later EU) from its original six to its today's 27 member states.[22] [23]

The nineties had been characterized as a Europe without frontiers. The collapse of the Eastern European communism and the German reunification made Europeans even closer neighbours. European milestones in this period were the signings of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997[24], which changed the name from European Community to European Union and committed the Europeans to the single currency, the Euro.[25]

---

[19] In fact it had been two Treaties of Rome – one for each organization.

[20] Europa, the portal of European institutions, "The Treaty of Rome, Preamble," http://www.europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/eec_en.htm; Internet; accessed 19 January 2007.

[21] EC was the name given to the three together, after they were merged by a treaty in 1967.

[22] Since 1973 the EU grows steadily, the first joining countries had been Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, Europe's youngest member states are Bulgaria and Romania who joined the Union on 1 January 2007.

[23] Europa, the portal of European institutions, "The history of the European Union."

[24] Due to ratification processes the treaties had been signed in 1992 and 1997, and came into force in 1993 and 1999.

Furthermore, the member states agreed on extending intergovernmental cooperation, including a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as an additional pillar of the Union, aiming to assert the European identity on the international scene.[26]

The most ambitious enlargement of the European Union came in 2004. Motivated by the desire to reunite Europe after the end of the Cold War, ten candidate countries became full members on 1 May 2004, most of them countries coming from what had been the Eastern bloc: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, known as the A8 countries.[27] Never before had an enlargement round included so many countries and, much more important, countries with such completely different historical and cultural backgrounds, as well as different levels of economic and domestic political development. In fact, most of the countries had only just begun to build their democracies and had not yet finished their transition to a free market economy. With about $US 840 Billion, their combined gross domestic product was similar to that of Spain. All these facts led to an increasing level of diversity in the European Union.

With the latest expansion on 1 January 2007, the EU now consists of 27 countries and a population of about 500,000,000 residents[28]. It is the world largest economic area; the EU's aggregated GDP in 2004 was $US 12.86 Trillion with a robust growth of about 2.5 percent, which represents a quarter of the world's GDP. The EU economies are among the worlds most advanced and diverse.[29] Given just this weight of population and economic power and its

---

[25] On 1 January 1999 the Euro was introduced to 11 Countries (meanwhile Greece and Slovenia joined as well) , this also means that EU Governments run their economies according to similar principles of economic management. Thee coordinate their policies in order to deliver steady growth, more jobs and a competitive economy across the EU on which will at the same time preserve the European social model and protect the environment. It is not understatement to mention, that the Euro is a key part of the European project of political integration.

[26] Article J.4 of title V of the Treaty of the European Union states: The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. Europa, the portal of European institutions, "Treaty on European Union," http://www.europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title5.html; Internet; accessed 21 January 2007.

[27] The other two who joined the European Union at this time were Malta and Cyprus (Greece part).

[28] The last joining members so far were Bulgaria and Romania.

[29] U.S. Department of State, "European Union Economic Overview," http://www.State.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/58969.htm; Internet; accessed 21 January 2007.

steadily growing influence, the EU subsequently became "…an actor on the world stage in its own right, acting as a single unit…"[30]

Thus far, Europe's story of success has meant more than 60 years of peace between the European nations, and at this stage of integration, it is hard to believe that there might be another war. However, security in Europe does not mean security for Europe and security in the world. Europe today may itself be a stable, wealthy and prosperous region, but it is facing various threats in a globalized world. Nevertheless, Europe is more than willing to shoulder its part and responsibilities of the overall global burden. The EU today is on a challenging path to identify its own foreign and security policy, and be ready to cope with future challenges and threats.

2.2 History of European Security and Defence Policy

Already in the early 1950s, the member states of the ECSC tried to agree on basics of a European Defence Community (EDC) and a political union (EPC). But they also still followed national interests and feared a loss of sovereignty, particularly as foreign and defence policies are two genuine characteristics of national sovereignty. As mentioned above, these early attempts to establish a common political or security policy failed.

As a result of this failure, the Western European Union (WEU) was established in 1954, based on the Treaty of Brussels.[31] Its main objectives were to create a firm basis for European economic recovery, to afford assistance to each other in resisting any policy of aggression, and to promote unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe. But due to the enormous significance of NATO, the importance of the WEU remained limited. Today, most of the functions of the WEU are in the process of being merged into the European Union.

---

[30] Trevor C. Salmon and Alister J.K. Shepherd, *To a European Army: Military Power in the Making?* (London, UK and Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 25.

[31] Joining countries were the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy and West Germany.

Consequently, in the beginning of the Cold War, it was mainly NATO which was conceived as the common military defence system for Europe against the Soviet threat.[32] NATO provides "…immediate defence and security for its member countries…"[33] Whereas in the very beginning of the European Integration Germany was supposed to be the main threat, the European security context had been changed dramatically by the onset of the Cold War and the emergence of Russia as the main threat to peace. Soon, it became clear that Europeans, still weakened by the Second World War, could not guarantee security for themselves. The defence of Europe was closely linked to the transatlantic partnership and friendship with the US. The American military power and nuclear arsenal acquired a key role in NATO doctrine and security policy. The American influence on Europe became significant and it seemed that the US emerged as the undisputed hegemon in NATO, "…*the one* which was considerably *more equal* than all the others."[34] Therefore, within the framework of the EU, defence was not an active subject.

In addition, the national positions of the key actors – France, the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany – varied substantially, a fact that undoubtedly prevented major changes in common European policy. While France preferred a European balance to the American power in NATO, the UK feared NATO could collapse if the EU should develop a capacity to manage its own security affairs. [35] From the UK point of view, this could have had unforeseeable consequences for a free and democratic Europe.[36] Germany as the divided country was – although very powerful on its economical sector – still redefining its role. The inhibitions to national power due to the Second World War led to a realistic foreign policy approach with regards to the limits of

---

[32] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO, 2001), 29.

[33] Ibid., 30.

[34] Jolyon Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: the ultimate Challenge* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2000), 10.

[35] The French policy, widely known as Gaullist approach, laid strong emphasis on its own ability to prosecute national interests. Stability should be created by a balanced, multi-polar security system. Of course this was diametric to an US dominated NATO policy and ended in the tricky situation that France left the military part of NATO in 1966.

[36] W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe* (Leicester: Leicester University press, 1984), chapter 5.

its influence. Solutions were sought in a so called "back door diplomacy" rather than through loud proclamations. Although German interests were closely linked to Europe, Germany constantly tried to balance these natural interests with those of the dominant transatlantic partner, the US, because the Americans had been the driving country in reintegrating Germany into the world community and a generous partner in rebuilding its economy and prosperity. So as long Europe was threatened by the Cold War nuclear holocaust, US hegemony reigned supreme.[37]

It was not before the collapse of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) and the resulting new world order and the civil war and genocide in the Balkans – on the European continent – that the EU started to render its own common foreign and security approach and to improve its weight in international affairs. But there were still ambiguities towards a single European foreign policy. In 1991, Jacques Delors' keynote speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies played on the apparent dichotomy of an EU capacity being either a bridge between Europe and the US or a new separate defence arm of Europe – France's real idea of a future CFSP.[38] [39] The UK still was not willing to compromise NATO for an unsure endeavour such as an EU–led security and defence policy. Given these diametrically opposing interests of France and the UK, it is worth analysing the situation in the early nineties.

There were three main issues which led later on to the Franco-British summit of   St Malo in December 1998, where the main breakthrough for a European way was achieved and where the European Council was given the responsibility for framing a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) under the European CFSP:

- First, the inability of European nations to deal with the conflict and civil war on the Balkans because of a lack of military capabilities.[40]

- Secondly, an ongoing budget discussion in the US reflected Congressional concerns in dealing with burden sharing and cost cutting in the alliance.[41] From the American

---

[37] Jolyon Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate challenge?*, 12.

[38] Jacque Delor is a French politician and was at that time President of the European Council.

[39] Jolyon Howorth, European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate challenge?, 19.

[40] Those were: independent command and control, planning and serious stabilization operations.

standpoint, Europe was to take more responsibility for its own security. A result and also driving factor for the development of an own European approach was NATO's European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI), which basically conceived of a technical military arrangement: it allowed the Europeans to assume a greater share of the burden for security missions through access to those assets and capabilities which European member states did not possess.[42] But ESDI also had a transformative political dimension in it that posited a willingness on the part of NATO as an institution and also of the United States, as the foremost NATO member state, to countenance a greater security role for the EU.[43]

- Finally, the UK demanded a role within Europe that played to its strength. Although Britain was still sceptical of EU capabilities, political leaders made the decision that it would be better to stay within the EU than outside. Because the UK still had not introduced the Euro, its influence on the Union seemed to decrease compared to France, Germany or Italy. Britain saw ESDP as an issue where it could expose its leading function, pursuing both power and prestige in the EU.[44]

All of this led to an alteration in the UK's attitude towards EU defence and its lifted its decades-long objections to the EU's acquisition of an 'autonomous' military capacity, at the Franco-British summit in St Malo, 3 - 4 December 1998. St Malo is widely considered as the start of the European defence project. The new opportunity presented by St Malo was very rapidly followed up by a multitude of farther-reaching declarations and proposals, including an autonomous military capability both in decision making and force structures.[45]

Already in 1992, as a direct result of the human disaster on the Balkans, for the first time measures had been introduced to enable proactive actions to emerging crises. The so-called "Petersberg Tasks" were set out at the Ministerial Council of the WEU. Today, they are an

---

[41] Jolyon Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate challenge?*, 19.

[42] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Handbook*, pp 97.

[43] Jolyon Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate challenge?*, 22.

[44] Georg M. Pazderski, *The development of the European Security and Defence Policy and the transatlantic relationship* (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2004), 19.

integral part of CFSP and are explicit in Article 17.2 of the Treaty of the European Union. They cover humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The three types of missions envisaged at Petersberg, Germany, cover the complete range of military measures, from low intensity operations to most robust ones.[46]

The first practical step towards CFSP had been the decision on the Helsinki Headline Goals in 1999. The EU started building both military capabilities through ESDP and civilian capabilities for crisis management. The goal was to develop military European capabilities built on forces that were to be able to deploy rapidly and be capable of the full range of the Petersberg declaration, including operations up to corps level (up to 60,000 soldiers). Forces were to remain under national responsibility but were supposed to be commanded by the EU. They were to be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, and other combat support services. Member states were to be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and in a shorter period of time to provide smaller rapid response elements that were to be available and deployable at very high readiness. They had to be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. For civilian aspects of crisis management, the EU agreed to provide police officers who could be deployed rapidly as well.[47]

In December 2003, EU politicians finally adopted a European Security Strategy (ESS), a strategy that for the first time set rules for basic missions in priority areas such as the fight against terrorism included a Middle East strategy, and a comprehensive policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

---

[45] Maartje Rutten, "From St Malo to Nice: European defence: core documents," http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.html#3; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007.

[46] Martin Ortega, "Petersberg tasks, and missions for the EU military forces," http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp.04-mo.pdf; Internet; accessed 26 January 2007, 1.

[47] Europa, the portal of European institutions, "Overview of the European Union activities – Foreign and Security Policy".

When in 2003 the so called "Berlin Plus" agreement between NATO and the EU guaranteed European access to NATO planning, logistics and intelligence for operations in which NATO is not involved, Europeans finally had the capability, bodies and mechanisms in place to conduct its own military operations.[48]

2.3 Main Actors and Structural Bodies

The institutional world of the European Union is complex. In general, the EU's decision-making process involves three main institutions.

- The European Parliament (EP): it is elected every five years by the citizens of the European Union to represent their interests. Thus, it expresses the democratic will of the Union's citizens (approximately 500 million people), and represents their interests in discussions with the other EU institutions.[49]

- The Council of the European Union: it is the EU's main decision-making body. It represents the member states, and its meetings are attended by one minister from each of the EU's national governments.[50] Up to four times a year, the presidents and/or prime ministers of the member states, together with the President of the European Commission, meet as the "European Council". These 'summit' meetings set overall EU policy and resolve issues that could not be settled at a lower level (i.e. by the ministers at regular Council meetings).

---

[48] Although usage of NATO assets by the EU remains dependant on the decision of all NATO members, so also those who are not members of the EU, this arrangement is sufficient and acceptable because it gives the EU the chance to develop its own assets and capabilities as laid down in the EU's Headline Goal 2010.European Union-NATO Declaration on ESDP, Brussels, 16 December 2002: Remarks by Javier Solana, EU Representive for the CSFP, in : From Laeken to Copenhagen: European Defence: Core documents ed. Jean Yves Haine(Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union 2003), pp178 .

[49] Europa, the portal of European institutions, "European Union Institutions and other bodies," http://www.europa.eu/institutions/inst/parliament/index_en.htm; Internet; accessed; 10 April 2007.

[50] Which ministers attend which meeting depends on what subjects are on the agenda. The EU's relations with the rest of the world are dealt with by the 'General Affairs and External Relations Council'. But this Council configuration also has wider responsibility for general policy issues, so its meetings are attended by whichever Minister or State Secretary each government chooses. Ibid.

- The European Commission: the Commission is independent of national governments. Its job is to represent the interests of the EU as a whole. It drafts proposals for new European laws, which are presented to the European Parliament and the Council. The Commission is also the EU's executive arm, which means it is responsible for implementing the decisions of the Parliament and the Council.[51]

This 'institutional triangle' produces the policies and laws that apply throughout the EU. In principle, it is the Commission that proposes new laws, but it is the Parliament and the Council that adopt them.

Toward third nations and international institutions, Europe is represented by the Presidency of the Council. As a driving force in the legislative and political decision-making process, it plays a vital part in the organization of the work of the institution. It organizes and chairs all meetings and works out compromises capable of resolving difficulties. This is a key role in CFSP where decisions are taken by unanimity. The Presidency of the Council is held for a period of six months by each Member State in turn.[52]

The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a new office, the High Representative (HR) for CFSP. The office is fused with that of the Council Secretary General.[53] The HR shall support the Council in matters coming within the scope of the CFSP, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with other nations or international organizations.[54]. The HR assists the Presidency in the external representation of the EU and assists the Council in the implementation of policy decisions in CFSP matters.[55] The CSFP is strengthened by the close cooperation of the High

---

[51] The day-to-day running of the Commission is done by its administrative officials, experts, translators, interpreters and secretarial staff. There are approximately 25 000 of these European civil servants.

[52] Europa, the portal of European institutions, "External Relations," http://www.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm#2; Internet; accessed; 10 April 2007.

[53] The position is currently held by Javier Solana, Spanish politician and former General Secretary of NATO.

[54] Europa, the portal of European institutions, "External Relations."

Representative, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the nation holding the Presidency and the Commissioner responsible for external relations – known as the Troika in foreign affairs.

At the European Council in Helsinki in 1999, EU leaders decided to establish "…new political and military bodies and structures […] to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such (military) operations, while respecting the single institutional framework."[56] One year later, the Nice European Council approved the creation of three new permanent political and military bodies in order to assume its responsibilities for crisis management:

- The standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) is charged with keeping track of the international situation in the areas falling within the common foreign and security policy, as well as with defining policies and monitoring implementation. It maintains a privileged link with the High Representative. It sends guidelines to the Military Committee and, at the same time, receives its opinions and recommendations. Furthermore, the PSC takes responsibility for the political direction of the development of military capabilities. In the event of a crisis, the PSC will examine all options that might be considered as the EU's best response. It exercises political control and strategic direction of the European military response. In particular, the PSC evaluates strategic military planning to be submitted to the council.[57]

- The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body established within the council. It is composed by the Chiefs of Defence represented by their military representatives in Brussels. It gives advice and makes recommendations to the PSC on all military matters within the EU, including the development of the overall concept of crisis management in its military aspects, the risk assessment of potential crisis as well as the review and assessment of European military capabilities and potential gaps in comparison to the US. In actual crisis management situations, upon PSC's

---

[55] Ibid.

[56] Official Journal of the European Communities, "Council Decision of 22 January 2001," http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/l_02720010130en00010003.pdf; Internet; accessed; 03 March 2007.

[57] The Council of the European Union, "EU Military Committee," http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cm3_fo/showPage.asp?id=en&mode=g; Internet; accessed 03 March 2007.

request, the EUMC draws upon its European Union Military Staff (EUMS) to develop strategic military options for crisis response. On council decision, it authorizes the Operational Commander to start initial planning of a military campaign. During eventual operations, EUMC monitors, as superior command, the proper execution of their military guidelines.[58]

- The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) provides military expertise and support to ESDP, including the conduct of EU military crisis operations. The EUMS is to perform situation assessment and early warning as well as strategic planning for possible EU led military operations, including the identification of European national or multinational forces. Furthermore, the EUMS assures the link between the EUMC and the national military resources, which member states offer to the Union.[59]

Another agency which is worth mentioning briefly is the European Defence Agency, which was set up in 2004 to coordinate European armament programmes. Its main functions relate to defence capabilities development, armaments cooperation between member states, the European defence technological and industrial base and defence equipment market as well as research and technology.[60]

Other structures that play a role in shaping ESDP are the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management and the Situation Centre. The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management is a consultative body of officials from different ministries across the Union, which underlines again the comprehensive European approach to crisis situation. The Situation Centre's task is to monitor potential crises situation and report directly to the Council.[61]

---

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] The Council of the European Union, "European Defence Agency," http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cm3_fo/showPage.asp?id=277&lang=EN; Internet; accessed 03 March 2007.

[61] Antonio Missiroli, "ESDP bodies," http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/08-bodies.pdf; Internet; accessed 03 March 2007, 2.

3. European Security and Defence Policy

3.1 A Secure Europe in a better world – the European Security Strategy

On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS). It is the latest component of ESDP and marks the next stage of its development.[62] Without doubt, this is one of the most exciting, but certainly also one of the most important projects the EU has recently undertaken. By adopting the ESS, the member states agreed on a common interpretation of the global changes in international policies after the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 as well as on common threat perceptions. Being a broad document, the ESS is based on the ambition of turning Europe into a powerful global player, which is willing to take responsibility for security and peace. The introduction of the Strategy highlights, that Europe

> "…has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free. And as a union of 25 [27] states with over 450 million [approximately 500 million] people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player."[63]

Therefore, it has to share responsibility for global security and for building a better world.[64]

Compared to the NATO Strategy and the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the US, the ESS is much shorter, more analytical and far more general.[65] It addresses the challenges of the 21st century in a distinctly post-modern approach, which combines observations from political, social and economic as well as from traditional strategic dimensions. [66] The ESS pays attention to various threats, arising from inter as well as from intra state processes.

---

[62] Council of the European Union, "A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy," http://www.ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/doocs/2004/4/29.'European%20Strategy.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 January 2007, 1.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Alyson J.K. Bailes, *The European Security Strategy, An Evolutionary History?*, pp12.

The best way to describe the European approach to today's world order is *Effective Multilateralism*, the last of three strategic objectives explicitly named in the ESS.[67] *Effective Multilateralism* is defined as "The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order…"[68] It identifies the global level of European security policy, the world system itself, and the long-term, underlying factors determining peace and security. By using the term "multilateral" the approach seeks to cooperate internationally through intergovernmental as well as through non governmental organizations. This is essential, as from a European point of view no nation is able to tackle today's complex problems by its own.[69]

The other two European objectives are *building security in Europe's neighbourhood* and *addressing the threats*. Each will be discussed briefly:

Building security in our neighbourhood is the Union's interest that countries beyond European borders are well governed.[70] The task is to promote a "…ring of well governed countries…" to the east and on the shores of the Mediterranean with whom close and cooperated relations could ensure European security. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, or dysfunctional societies all might pose serious problems for Europe. The resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict therefore becomes automatically a European issue of strategic priority. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with the problems in the Middle East. The aim of building security in the neighbourhood implies effective

---

[66] Related to Robert Coopers theory there are three types of countries: pre-modern, defined by chaos and lack of state control, such as pre was Afghanistan; the modern nation state within clear boundaries, such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq; and post modern, in which the nation state is collapsing in a bigger order – the EU for example. The post modern world, which prefers diplomacy to war, has therefore to realize, the use of military force as a last resort. Robert Cooper, *the post-modern state and the world order* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2nd edition 2000), pp22.

[67] Council of the European Union, "A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy," http://www.ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/doocs/2004/4/29.'European%20Strategy.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 January 2007, 9.

[68] Ibid.

[69] As the ESS states already in its third paragraph. Ibid., 2.

multilaterism; it is the application of the same principles in proximity of the EU. Although there is no hierarchy between the objectives, but because the EU has the means, and perhaps even the duty, it should take the leading role in its own neighbourhood, rather than acting through the United Nations (UN) or other multilateral organizations. This does not minimize the global role of the UN, but obliges European decision makers to have a closer interest in Europe's direct neighbours.

Addressing the threat, as well, is closely linked to a multilateral approach. Large scale aggression against any member state of the EU today is unlikely; nevertheless, today's globalization poses various outstanding threats to the European and world community. After 11 September 2001, the Union continues to take steps to tackle the key threats with measures that include the adoption of the European Arrest Warrant and steps against terrorist financing. By strengthening international treaties and their verification provisions, the Union continues to pursue its policies against arms proliferation. Restoring good government will promote democracy and stave off organized crime. The policy also states that with today's new threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime, defence likely will be abroad. The EU should act before a crisis occurs. Addressing the threats demands a number of immediate measures in the politico-military field, but can only succeed in the long-term through the root-causes approach of effective multilateralism. [71]

The ESS can therefore best be understood as an effective system of good global governance; a globalized multinational system enabling global access to the core public goods that at the national level the different states provide to their citizens such as stability and security, law order, an open and inclusive economy and global welfare in all of its aspects of public support.[72] In brief, goods to which everybody should have access, including future generations. The different global public goods are inherently related and are producing synergetic effects. In our globalized world, large gaps in access to global public goods are the major threat to security.

---

[70] Ibid., pp7.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Such as access to health, a clean environment, education etc..

Differentials in access to global goods, in quality of life at a certain level, are automatically linked to political instability, extremisms, economic unpredictability and massive migration flows which might be uncontrollable in the future. Consequently, the best source of security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best methods of strengthening international stability.[73]

Implementing the ESS as the strategic framework means therefore undividable links between all the dimensions of Effective Multilateralism. The ESS must be understood as determining the choice of objectives and the development of instruments and means, not just for ESDP and CFSP, but for all EU external actions from trade and development to international environmental and police cooperation. This joint intragovernmental and multilateral approach might be the greatest value of the ESS, as it permits integration and cooperation of all EU external policies. [74]

An international order based on effective multilateralism is the next element of the ESS which is worth analyzing in detail. The idea is to make a significant contribution both to the improvement of mechanisms and institutions for global governance and to support the UN in prevention of conflict, or conflict management by the associated multilateral bodies. This includes also the situation of national governments harming their own populations, when national sovereignty must yield to the international "responsibility to protect."[75] From a European standpoint, the UN also has to act when states do not live up to their commitments towards their neighbours and the international community, such as by violating non-proliferation agreements, by actively supporting terrorist groups or by the illegal use of force. The regular use of such an international framework to judge complex inter or intra state situations ensures that these come to the attention of the Security Council at an early stage, and the earlier the

---

[73] Council of the European Union, "A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy," pp 9.

[74] Sven Biscop, "The European Security Strategy – Coping with Threats in a Comprehensive way," http://www.riq.org/article385.html; Internet; accessed 29 March 2007.

[75] As agreed on the ICSC 2001, a UN campaign driven by the Government of Canada.

intervention, the greater the chances of success without military means.[76] Finally, the political will of the Security Council and of the UN member-states will determine whether action will be taken or not. However, the EU has clearly expressed an interest in launching operations as a "subcontractor" to the UN. Indeed, the EU and UN are already closely cooperating in the field of conflict prevention and early warning; in September 2003, a joint declaration on cooperation on crisis management was signed.

Another core element of the international system highlighted in the ESS is the transatlantic relationship. In the European view, this is not only about the European-US relations. Transatlantic friendship in particular strengthens the international community in an outstanding manner. NATO as a unique alliance is an important expression of this relationship. The significance of NATO therefore must not be under-evaluated, as it is still an institution which contributes decisively to security and freedom in Europe.

The ESS is not such a precise statement as its American brother the NSS. Nonetheless, it is a grand strategy for the EU, because it provides at least five reasons why it is critical for the future of Europe as a global actor. First, the ESS is intended to produce the first of several ongoing efforts to define a common European strategic vision to support the continued evolution of a European strategic culture. Second, it is to provide a basis for dialogue among EU member states that will foster both unity of perception and unity of decision. Third, it is designed to encourage both sides of the Atlantic to resume a strategic dialogue. Fourthly, it is intended to offer a security agenda parallel to the NSS. Finally its purpose is to create a framework for discussion with national parliaments, media and the European public.[77] Therefore, its importance for the European future must not be underestimated.

3.2 Shortfalls and Constraints

---

[76] Sven Biscop, "The European Security Strategy – Coping with Threats in a Comprehensive way."

[77] Susan E. Penska, "EU and US Threat Perception After 9/11," in *European Security and transatlantic relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War*, ed. Heinz Gaertner and Ian M. Cuthbertson, 19-32 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 21.

Today, seven years after ESDP was launched, the Union can boast outstanding results. The legitimacy of its military powers is anchored in the treaties. Its structures for taking decisions and conducting operations are permanent and complete: Political Committee and Military Staff, Planning Unit, Defence Agency, Military Committee, Situation Centre and others. The European Security Strategy has been defined by a consensus of the member states, even though in the mid nineties the very idea of a specifically European concept of security was utterly taboo. The support and expectations of the European public opinion with regard to a common defence policy are steadily growing and gaining ground. Above all, whereas there was no common policy and even approach during the Kosovo crisis, today the Union is in charge of several military as well as police operations in the Balkans. Furthermore, Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 was a credible success as the EU's first external military operation.[78] At the same time though, the EU is still confronted with several tensions and political constraints which will be discussed in the following section.

3.2.1 The Headline Goal 2010

In 2004, the European Council had to renew the Helsinki Headline and Capability Goals by recognising existing shortfalls in European capabilities. The Council therefore emphasized that member states "…have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the full spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the treaty of the European Union."[79] This includes potential

---

[78] Nicole Gnesottto, "Introduction ESDP: results and prospects" in *EU Security and Defence Policy The first 5 years*, ed. Nicole Gnesetto, 11-32 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 11.

[79] Julian Lindley-French, "Headline Goal 2010 and the concept of EU Battlegroups: an assessment of the build up of a European Defence Capability," University of Munich Centre for Applied Policy Senior scholar, http://www.cicerofoundation.org/pdf/lecture_lindleyfrench_dec05.pdf;
Internet; accessed 28 March 2007.

peace-making operations as well as the support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reforms.[80]

In order to push this ambitious aim, the UK, France and Germany outlined the concept of EU battle groups in February 2004. They are designed to improve the capacity of the European Union for rapid reaction and through the Berlin Plus arrangements with NATO they are supported by NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Belgium. The objective was to give the EU greater operational flexibility and responsibility to support UN missions, particularly in Africa. The battle groups are deployable within 15 days and able to undertake high intensive missions. They consist of roughly 2500 troops and are designed as complete force packages with air and naval components. By 2009 it was envisioned to have 13 battle groups available. The Headline Goal 2010 also further developed the Petersberg Tasks, as laid out in the ESS. The military task list was expanded from humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacemaking tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking to include also joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention, post conflict stabilization and support to third countries in combating terrorism in their territory.

As promising as these new ambitions might appear, whichever way one might argue, when compared to the Helsinki Headline Goal, in fact the Headline Goal 2010 is a retreat. Originally, member states had set themselves the goal to deploy and sustain 60000 troops rapidly. In other words, the original Headline Forces was to consist of 15 brigades comprising approximately 4000 troops each. However, there were to be high readiness elements deployable within 48 hours. What Headline Goal 2010 did was to shift the emphasis away from the full force to the component forces thereof.[81] The time required for the realization of a force one third the size was extended by a factor of three. Although it was always envisioned that with force rotation the average size of a single full force deployed under the Helsinki Headline Goal would be not more than 20000, it could be argued that Headline Goal 2010 is a subdivision of a

---

[80] Council of the European Union, "A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy," 9.

[81] Julian Lindley-French, "Headline Goal 2010 and the concept of EU Battle groups: an assessment of the build up of a European Defence Capability," 4

subdivision, and it reflects the reality of European shortfalls in military capabilities; it represents what they have got and are likely to get in the near future.[82]

3.2.2 Intra European Relations and the Constraint of National Sovereignty

What began as a coal and steel union or trading arrangement, has grown from a common market into a globally powerful international community. However, one question for the EU remains: how much authority for vital issues of foreign policy and security should be vested in the EU and its institutions and how much should be retained by the individual member states? Today, the agreed–to formula still requires that key decisions have to be taken by unanimous vote, a challenge hard to achieve in an EU with 27 members.

Besides, the progress made on defence in recent years did not prevent dramatic divisions opening up over the Iraq crisis in 2003. There are still profound national differences of view on the ultimate political purpose of the elements of European integration on security and defence policy. Although the European story is a story of success, especially in terms of economic integration, defence policy remains limited in scale. Nevertheless, it generates a real political dynamic between the member states, and has profoundly modified the image, functioning and approach of the European construct as a whole. However, the incursion of the EU into the military sphere is not free of constraints. At each European decision dealing with the use of military force on behalf of Europe, member states are always facing the same two dilemmas: how can the continuation of the Atlantic alliance – dominated by the US – be reconciled with the emergence of a strategic and political Europe; and secondly, how can respect for national sovereignty be combined with building a structure to share political power? In short, America or Europe, nationality versus integration are the main issues in inter European relations.

The biggest constraint on a truly united Europe lies within Europe itself, in those old European nations which invented and elevated national sovereignty as the principle of political

---

[82] Ibid.

order.[83] Although the European member states have progressively delegated more and more of their economic, commercial and monetary responsibilities to the Union, their reluctance to share their political, diplomatic and military sovereignty in a similar way is considerable. Military Europe still seems to be a sum of sovereign nations that wish to remain so; three examples are particularly revealing this context:

- First, there is the taboo against the concept of "European armed forces". Throughout Europe, the common response is to deny this concept. Member states agree that today the idea of a "European Army" lacks political realism. Reasons are very different and vary from the preference of military integration in NATO, status as a neutral state, or obsession with national sovereignty in terms of political, diplomatic and military means.
- The second example is the process of decision making within the Union and especially within ESDP and military policy. Consensus among 27 nations is difficult to achieve. Theoretically, each member state is able to block decisions by veto.
- Lastly, the institutional arrangement governing the implementation of the ESDP demonstrates the burden of national constraints on its development. In fact, the greatest obsession of member states is to exclude from it any reference to the Community method; in other words to keep ESDP far outside the scope of the powers of European institutions.

Of course, there are plenty of reasons to justify national sovereignty in Europe. One is the significance of decisions regarding the ESDP. In this context, decisions deal with life and death of European citizens. Another point is that not all individual national interests are reflected within the ESDP. And furthermore, member states' democracies are still based on their own political framework, so that the transfer of military sovereignty to a supranational body is simply not acceptable. No nation would accept risking the lives of their soldiers as a result of a vote where it had been on the losing side, which leads back again to the discussion about the consensus principle. Today, the question is whether a consensus of 27 is needed in all areas of security and defence policy with the same degree of credibility, for instance, the implementation

---

[83] The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 at the end of the thirty years war in Europe introduces the principle of sovereignty of states and the right of national political self determination.

of a common armament policy, the final status of Kosovo, or even the question of how to deal with WMD.

In the end, all discussions about more flexibility, including the role and prerogatives of the initiative of the future Foreign Minister of the Union, reveal the same disquiet with regard to unanimity as a founding principle – simply because respect for national sovereignty and the collective effectiveness of the EU are two different aims not necessarily going hand in hand. One of today's problems, therefore, is that member states refuse categorically to take the plunge towards a merging of sovereignty that, in particular, introducing majority voting into ESDP would represent.[84]

The permanent tension between the primacy of national sovereignty and the increased need for European integration is with any doubt the distinguishing feature and also paradox of the EU. French approaches, in particular, underline the theory that a common defence and foreign policy is the essential condition for the emergence of a political Europe and an international role for the EU. This vision of military power as a driving force for Europe's political entity is also at the heart of all transatlantic discussions. In March 2003, when the US invaded Iraq, the crisis over the idea of an independent European military headquarters proposed by Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg arose out of this basic idea that a strong common defence policy automatically leads to a stronger political entity in Europe. On the other hand of course, this means involving more and more military dimensions into Europe which leads back to the subject of national sovereignty. The 2003 division on the US Iraq policy, even though substantial progress on ESDP had been made, merely reflects the fact that European military cooperation does not lead automatically to political integration within the Union. Were it possible to find a solution for the dilemma between keeping sovereignty and integration, the European construction would take on a different dynamic. What the last years have already shown is that there is a third way of integration, neither community based nor intergovernmental. It is the function of the High Representative and probably soon the Foreign Minister. The ESS proposed by Javier Solana and adopted by all 25 Nations in December 2003 has demonstrated

the ability of the High Representative to establish a consensus without passing intergovernmental negotiations or conversely, an impossible vote by qualified majority. Soon, with the creation of the Union's Foreign Minister, the establishment of a European Union diplomatic service and the setting up of an armaments agency, involving member states as well as the Commission, a series of new instruments will be established that will substantially modify the traditional balance between national sovereignty and the assertion of a European security interest.[85]

4. Security Challenges in Transatlantic Relations

After the events on 11 September 2001 and the war in Iraq, the US and Europe seem to be further apart than ever before. On the European side, presidents and prime ministers have become frustrated by the tendency of the Bush administration to act without consulting allies, as for instance before the military campaign in Afghanistan, by its reluctance to be constrained by international treaties and organizations such as the Kyoto Protocol or the International Criminal Court, and by its enthusiasm for deploying hard power, as opposed to the soft power of peacekeeping, economic aid and other contributions to nation building processes.

The Americans on the other side have found the Europeans closed-minded in their world view, careless in their reaction to threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and weak in their military capabilities. Some American analysts even say Europeans felt free to ignore the threat from Iraq its former dictator Saddam Hussein because they had become accustomed outsourcing their protection to the US.[86] On the other hand, the speed of the ESDP's development is being watched closely and critically in the US. Although European integration has always been supported by the US, the idea of an autonomous security policy and independent

---

[84] Nicole Gnesetto, "Introduction ESDP: results and prospects" in *EU Security and Defence Policy The first 5 years*, ed. Nicole Gnesetto, 11-32 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 20.

[85] Ibid., 23.

[86] Charles Grant, "Security Challenges in Transatlantic relations," http:/www.weltpolitik.net/Sachgebiete/Internationale%20Sicherheitspolitik/GASP/Analysen/%22Security%20Challenges%20in%20Transatlantic%20Relations.%22.html ; Internet; accessed 10 April 2007

European decision-making resulted in unambiguous warnings from the US: no duplication, no decoupling and no discrimination.[87]

The US initiative to create NATO's rapid reaction force (NATO Response Force – NRF) may therefore either be interpreted as a test for future prospects of the Alliance or as an intended setback to European foreign policy.[88] Whereas duplication of military capabilities and discrimination against non-EU but NATO member states probably cannot be prevented, no European government is interested in decoupling from NATO and the US. Especially after 9/11, threat perception and basic security policies do not differ seriously between Europe and the US, as contemporary security problems affect both the Europeans and the Americans.

4.1 Role of NATO

From the time when the Cold War ended, NATO's importance in Europe has diminished. But still, it remains the dominant institution for collective European defence. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the risks to the US and Europe have changed significantly.[89] Without any doubt, NATO played a key role in the crisis in the Balkans, but the Kosovo campaign also clearly demonstrated the institutional and military limits of the alliance. The complex decision-making process based on the principle of consensus as well as procedures for political consultations made it difficult for NATO forces to keep the initiative and maintain the operational tempo.[90] Consequently, the concept of a "coalition of the willing" for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US-led invasion in Iraq, was limited not only by the unwillingness of several NATO nations to participate in a war without a clear United Nations Security Council mandate, but even more by

---

[87] Jeane-Yves Haine, "Berlin Plus," Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/03-jyhb+.pdf; Internet; accessed 28 March 2007, 1.

[88] Hans Georg Ehrhardt, "Die europaeische Union, die esvp und das neue Sicherheitsdilemma," Welt Trends Nr 38, Spring 2003, http://www.ifsh.de/dokumente/artikel/118_WeltTrendsESVP-Ehrhart.pdf; Internet; accessed 30 March 2007, 139.

[89] Kenneth Payne, "The European and Defence Policy and the Future of NATO," BBC News Analysis Research, http://www.Nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/payne.pdf; Internet; accessed 7 March 2007.

[90] James P. Thomas, the Military Changes of Transatlantic Coalitions, Adelphi paper 333, IISS, 2000, 59-92, pp59.

the US reluctance to use NATO in a war-fighting situation. The advantage of a coalition of the willing is obvious: time-consuming political discussions can be avoided. On the other hand, and in the aftermath of the operation in Iraq, the danger of potential damage to alliance cohesion is imminent, because coalitions of the willing deliberately neglect the role of NATO as a military alliance.

But the political dimension of NATO must not be underestimated. NATO clearly gives the US the opportunity to stay engaged in European policy debates. Additionally, it provides Washington with the essential political and military instrument to control and even contain Russian ambitions in Europe. Lastly, through the Berlin Plus Agreement, NATO offers the US direct influence on and perhaps even control of, EU decision making and policy.[91] The US attitude to NATO therefore remains ambiguous. On the one hand, Washington wants Europe to develop additional military capabilities, so that the Europeans are not as reliant on US protection; on the other hand, it still wants to preserve US political leadership. However, NATO will remain politically significant although its military importance has diminished and may even continue to do so in the future.[92]

4.2 The Crisis in US - European Relations

The year 2003 was an exceptionally bad time for transatlantic relations. The war in Iraq showed in a very clear manner the divided views on threat perception and alternatives for reactions. As the US dominates today's world order in the military and also the economic sphere, it is worth analyzing the American - European relationship in more detail.

---

[91] Kenneth Payne, "The European and Defence Policy and the Future of NATO," 8

[92] Charles Grant and Robert Asmus, "Can NATO remain an effective military and political alliance if it keeps growing?" Web-Debate, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue1/english/debate.html; Internet; accessed 10 April 2007.

The events of 11 September 2001 defined a new era in US foreign policy and therefore also for transatlantic relations. Initially after the collapse of the USSR, US foreign policy was characterized by an expanded and NATO-interdependent approach. The terror attacks in New York and Washington DC on September 11 with nearly 3000 dead turned American policy back to a traditional territorial and military approach. From that day on, the Bush administration left no doubt that the war on terrorism was perceived as the single most important foreign policy priority by the US. Although the NSS details many other security challenges, its first priority is to combat global terror.[93]

Both the NSS and ESS describe the so-called triple threat: terrorism, proliferation of WMD and failing states. Like the ESS, the NSS acknowledges the panoply of economic, political and military sources of global insecurity which threatens international peace and security. But the NSS outlines a comprehensive understanding of national security and focuses on the war on terror as the most urgent.

The new policy contains innovations that were bound to create a rift between the US and its allies. It is the matter of pre-emptive war not only against terrorist groups, but also against states suspected of harbouring, financing, arming or helping them. But the main reason for the crisis within the alliance was the preparation and prosecution of the war against Saddam Hussein and Iraq. The operation was planned without cooperation in the alliance and with the participation only of Britain, and was actively playing on the divisions between Europeans by exploiting the profound divergence between those who supported America's policy of opposing Saddam Hussein and what former US Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld called "old Europe." Most importantly, the idea was to form ad hoc coalitions of the willing to the disadvantage of NATO and the transatlantic relationship.

From the American point of view, complaints about Europe are based on undeniable realities:
- France has for long been suspected of unrestrained anti-Americanism and its somewhat unrealistic aspiration for an independent Europe.

---

[93] United States of America, "The National Security Strategy," March 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/; Internet; accessed 7 March 2007, Introduction.

- Germany's reluctance to increase its defence budget or to send forces abroad, and therefore triggering other European nations to do the same, coupled with the pacifism of then Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder irritated American strategists.

- Other nations such as Belgium, Holland or Portugal did not exhibit any great desire or ambition for Europe to become a competitive power, and they seemed to consider that American protection should preserve Europe from conflict.

- Italy and Spain, however, while aspiring to great power status, seem more dissatisfied with the Franco - German axis in governance of the Union than anxious to make the Union a sort of diplomatic military federal power.

- The new EU member states, so long under the USSR's yoke have a negative perception of a Western Europe that was accommodating to Russia and the division of the continent. They, in particular, look upon the Americans with friendly gratitude, but which creates simultaneously a rift among the European nations.

The conclusion drawn in the US is that Europe therefore cannot be taken seriously and that it is not speaking with one voice. Or to quote Robert Kagan: "Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus."[94] Of course, there remains the UK. But that country seems to have backed down from its St Malo aspirations, modest as they were. Consequently, the American view on Europe is characterized by paradoxes. Europe is seen as incapable of mounting a major military operation. It has become too hedonistic with its huge emphasis on social security, quality of life, trade union corporatism and being protected by the US and its military capabilities.

On the other hand, whenever the Europeans show any sign of wanting to strengthen their common foreign policy, as they did at St Malo, Washington is quick to point out first that Europe cannot manage given the weakness of their common institutions and their divergences over priorities, and that it will at best be a waste of money given that the US is miles ahead in these areas and more efficient. Secondly, Europe would be better to stick with NATO; own autonomous policies will be interpreted as unacceptable signs of hostility. Therefore, Washington prefers the Europeans to be divided and these divisions are used as an excuse not to

---

[94] Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power America and Europe in the new world order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 3.

complicate US operations by having to consult divergent European partners, as happened over Kosovo or with Britain's assistance over the war against Iraq. [95]

4.3 Defining the Enemy: US/ EU Threat Perceptions

Underlying the EU's and US' world views, one usually finds two elements which make up a security strategy. The first concerns the threat perception and the second part the means to counter these threats. In the context of the terrorist threat in a post 9/11 environment one question is: what is the appropriate relationship between the use of force and legality? Comparing the NSS of the US with the ESS, two things seem to be evident already on the first view: there is a very close convergence between European and American views in identifying today's global threats, even if there may be differences over their relative danger or their origins, and while the US perspective is that the world has become more dangerous, the Europeans stress its greater complexity.

When it comes to the legal use of force, the differences are distinct. Following the events of 9/11 – being as decisive as the attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 – the Bush administration developed a new security strategy which dominates the national American agenda. International terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and 'rogue states' dictatorships are the three major threats to the international system and the western democracies' security.[96] President Bush defined the threat to the US and international community himself in several speeches: the new enemy is supposed to be a lethal combination of terrorist groups, outlaw states seeking WMD, and an ideology of power and domination that targets the innocent and justifies any crime.[97] The war against Saddam Hussein and against Iraq is the classic example of how to apply the new doctrine. All three main arguments of the NSS, terrorism, dictatorship and proliferation of

---

[95] Stanley Hoffmann, "The crisis in transatlantic relations", in *Shift or Rift Assessing the US-EU relations after Iraq*, ed. Gustaf Lindstroem, 13-20 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2003), 18.

[96] United States of America, "The National Security Strategy", March 2006, 8.

[97] George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President to the people of Poland," Krakow Poland, 31. May 2003, http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030531-3html; Internet; accessed 7 March 2007.

WMD, were used to justify the American invasion in March 2003. In fact America is at war, at war against terrorism and the two concepts underlying the US strategy are overwhelming military power in order to carry out pre-emptive strikes and regime change.

The Europeans on the other side of the Atlantic articulate similar views. The ESS states clearly that terrorism and proliferation of WMD are key threats, and that the most dangerous scenario is when terrorist groups get access to WMD.[98] But a close look between the lines shows distinct differences in a number of points. First, the Union concludes that these new threats do not cancel the old ones of regional instability or humanitarian disaster. There are still imminent threats also by a growing number of failing states, which the Union assumes to be more dangerous and certainly more complex and less capable of resolution purely by military means. Moreover, the ESS assumes that threats might evolve from the growing gap between rich and poor, the persistence of conflicts and the bad outlook for political solutions, especially in the Middle East. In the European approach, formulations such as "rogue states" are missing the point; the risk is more focused on failing states and bad governance. There is no axis of evil or terrorism defined as one unique phenomenon that is identical in the world. The ESS distinguishes between traditional and modern international terrorism.

Directly after the events of September 11, no nation questioned the US right of self defence according to the United Nations Charter. Even more, the immediate support shown by NATO in invoking Article 5 of the Washington treaty and considering this event as an attack against all allied nations underlined this common view of being in a defensive situation. The attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan, a regime that directly colluded with international terrorism, was also based on a broad common understanding and supported by several resolutions of the UNSC.[99]

---

[98] Council of the European Union, "A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy," 3.
.

[99] United Nations Security Council, Resolutions 1373, 1378, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm, http://www.daccess.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/638/57/PDF/NO163857.pdf; Internet accessed 9 March 2007.

Divergences between the two sides of the Atlantic arose later because the US still claimed a legitimate self defence situation to the particular event on 9/11 and claimed it to be a kind of permanent right and moral imperative in the name of collective defence of democracy in a western view. From the European point of view, this set the US above international law. [100] The concept of pre-emptive strikes, America's claim to nearly complete freedom of action including the use of military force, is the main difference between the continents. European officials were dismayed by US statements such as: "We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self defence by acting pre-emptively against terrorists,"[101] "The mission must determine the coalition; the coalition must not determine the mission."[102] or warnings as "…either you were with us, or you're against us."[103] Also the concept of "regime-change" was reluctantly heard by Europeans.

A further subject of discussion between Europe and America is the role of international organizations such as the UN. As Richard N. Haass points out, the US reserves its right to act in coalitions of the willing, even when the UN is unwilling or unable to move against threats. Even more, the US claims that no international organization has a monopoly on legitimacy.[104]

---

[100] As already discussed in this paper, it is difficult to argue in a common European way; by nature the 27 European Nations have different definitions of their national security. New members joined the Union also to enter a stable union at the border to a kind of unstable region. France and Germany on the other hand are surrounded by friends. Therefore the positions in this chapter correspond to the middle of the road approach stated and accepted in the ESS.

[101] United States of America, "The National Security Strategy", September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf; Internet; accessed 7 March 2007, 6. Repeated in the NSS 2006 version in a slight softer formulation, United States of America, "The National Security Strategy", March 2006, 18.

[102] Paul Wolfowitz, "Speech at the 38th Munich Conference on Security Policy 01/01/2002, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2002=&menu_konferenzen=en&id=69&; Internet; accessed 10 April2007.

[103] George W. Bush, "President Promotes Citizen Corps for Safer Communities," Knoxville Tennessee, 08 April 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020408-4.html; Internet; accessed 11 April 2007.

[104] Richard N. Haass, "Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities," http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/16648.htm; Internet; accessed 14 January 2003.

Indeed, this philosophy of military power projection and unilateralism is strange in the view of Europe and its strategy of effective multilateralism. The European political experience of struggling for compromise led automatically to the concept of multilateralism, which is seen as a model of good governance.[105] The ESS explicitly points out that no single country is able to tackle today's complex challenges entirely on its own. In a world of global threats, security depends on an effective multilateral system, which is provided by the UN within the framework of the United Nations Charter.[106]

Therefore, from a European point of view, the use of force is strictly restricted to a UNSC resolution as an overall collective legitimate organization. What is more, the use of force is seen by the Europeans in a Clausewitzian perspective: the use of force remains always the last resort of sanctions. "War is not inevitable. [but] force should be used only as a last resort," concluded the European Council in Brussels in February 2003.[107] The essential point is that the main concept of the ESS – multilateralism and a coherent approach to security – means that military force is only one of a wide range of instruments, whose combined use is more suited to the complexity of today's challenges: "…in contrast to the massive visible threat in the cold war, none of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means."[108] Therefore, the European focus is mainly on a preventive coherent approach using all means available in order to stabilize potential areas of conflict or crisis at a very early stage. In other words, the rift between Europe and the US can be summarized as pre-emptive strikes versus preventive engagement, rogue states versus failing states, force-based versus rule-based international systems; regime change versus good governance and national interest versus effective multilateralism.

---

[105] Javier Solana, "Europe and America: partners of choice," speech to the annual dinner of the Foreign Policy Association, http://www.ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/75674.pdf; Internet; accessed 13 April 2007.

[106] Council of the European Union, "A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy," 9.

[107] The Tribune, online edition, "War last resort, says EU," http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030219/world.htm; Internet; accessed 13 April 2007.

[108] Council of the European Union, "A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy," 9.

But this does not mean that America and the EU live on different planets as Robert Kagan claims.[109] The ESS does not ignore profound changes in today's post 9/11 world. "We should be ready to act before a crisis occurs," and "…With the new threats the first line of defence will often be abroad."[110] are statements formulated explicitly in the document. Also mentioned is the need for military force, when international law and rules are broken; only then, international organizations are effective.[111] This leaves little doubt about the need and importance of a credible European military force. The European approach is different but not contrary to the American way.[112]

4.4 The American View of Europe

After World War II and during the Cold War, the American interest in Europe was extremely high, and due to American economic and military power, its influence in Europe was extremely significant as well. As the strongest ally in NATO, the US guaranteed freedom and peace in Europe against the communist threat. Surrendered in this situation, the European strategic culture was formed by an almost guaranteed security by the US. Historians talk about American hegemony in Europe and the entire Western world, but times have changed and Europe has matured in realizing that great economic power and influence affect responsibilities for a secure world. Besides, Europe is now one of the most stable regions in the world and is no longer in the ambit of American direct focus. The end of the Cold War and the upheavals created by international terrorism has shifted the US focus towards other regions.

It seems that the US has two different views of Europe. On the one hand, Europeans are considered as nearly irrelevant, because of their lack of military resources, and on the other hand, Europeans are considered potentially threatening in their political ambitions and quest for more

---

[109] Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, 4.

[110] Council of the European Union, "A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy," 7.

[111] Ibid., 9.

[112] Nicole Gnesetto, "EU, US: visions of the world, visions of the other", in, *Shift or rift Assessing the US-EU relations after Iraq*, ed. Gustaf Lindstrom, 21-42 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2003), pp 25.

autonomy in security issues. So while on the one hand, the Europeans might be assessed as a burden or a constraint, they are seen as competitors on the other hand. Therefore, the Americans have always had hesitant attitudes to a militarily strong and united Europe. Following Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda terror network, the discussion across the Atlantic reflected exactly this perspective. NATO support with troops was refused by the US and the debate was reduced to the military capability gap between the US and Europe.[113]

It seems that America's administration tries to use any opportunity to block Europe's common foreign identity. One example in this context is Galileo, the European Satellite positioning system, a competitor to the US Global Positioning System (GPS), which caused a great degree of consternation. Then again, the Berlin Plus agreement means accepting and encouraging Europe to take over operations in the Balkans, although the European Operation Artemis in the Republic of Congo raised concerns of a more powerful competitor in Europe.[114] It appears that NATO is no longer the only military organization the Europeans are favouring. For the US this means losing influence in Europe through the traditional alliance. So while from an American standpoint, a strong united Europe with a capable military could provide assistance in military means, it could also decrease American influence and raise questions about American hegemony as the last remaining superpower.[115]

4.5 Member States' Bilateral Relationship with the US

Because of America's influence in the world and its huge economic and military power, bilateral relations with the US remain of high importance to nearly any European member state. Although the Europeans grow closer and closer to each other, the bilateral relationship to the US still has a great impact on the European common policy.

---

[113] The Wall Street Journal, "Unmighty Europe," 5 February 2002, http://www.classes.igpa.uiuc.edu/jgiertz/Defense.htm; Internet; accessed 10 April 2007.

[114] Although this is just a very limited military operation in time and number of personal it shows a distinct development in CSFP.

[115] Nicole Gnesetto, "EU, US: visions of the world, visions of the other," pp35.

In general, there are two different groups of member states. One group consists of those countries for which the US is still the sole criterion for determining international relationships and therefore also for the functioning of the Union, and another group, who is more critical in its view of the US. The first group of nations again consists of two subgroups, those which accept the US role as a hegemon and those who act in a kind of pragmatic way; in other words those who share the American interests and strategy, and those who think that they just might not have an alternative than to accept and to support the American way. Their main argument is to keep a close link to the US, because anything is better than a disagreement or crisis in the relationship with the US.

In contrast to this group, there are those European countries who certainly do not want to create a gap between themselves and the US, but who are not afraid to point out differences where they might exist. They agree on the US being a determining factor in both the international as well as the European system, but for them, other criteria have priority in foreign affairs, first of which is building a strong Europe and implementing the ESS.

This division in Europe over the relationship with Washington created a deep rift within the EU. Probably the best example of this rift is the European acceptance of the American invasion in Iraq. The discussions in the UNSC demonstrate the difference of opinion between France and UK: while France insisted on multipolarity, the British were favouring the unilateral approach. But not only did France articulate a standpoint opposed to that of the US, so did Belgium and Germany articulate their disagreement with US foreign policy and the war on Iraq. The summit in Tervuren, Belgium, on 29 April 2003 expressed clearly the European autonomy claimed by these nations, but also the severe differences towards the US and even between European countries. Once again, it demonstrated that St. Malo in 1998 actually was a compromise between two different visions of Europe's future role and its common defence policy. However, it did not mean that France and Britain had managed to bypass all their different views on foreign affairs.[116]

---

[116] Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, "'Old Europe' presses ahead with plans for an EU army," Telegraph, 30 April 2003, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml^xml=/news/2003/04/30/weu30.xml; Internet accessed 10 April 2003.

Another point worth mentioning in this context is the impact on decisions concerning the Iraq war on the US side. As already pointed out, Washington is not interested in a strong competitive European partner who questions America hegemony. Therefore, the US may perhaps prefer to deal with a divided Europe. But this also implies that some European nations, in particular those who participated in Tervuren, have abandoned the Cold War paradigm of America being the unlimited shield for Europe. [117]

5. What Future for Europe's Security and Defence Policy?

In the previous paragraphs, some shortfalls and problems for ESDP have been pointed out. In the next chapter possible solutions will be suggested. The planned but not ratified European Constitution is expected to change important instruments, institutions, and policy options.[118] In any case, further progress in European integration remains a necessity and will represent a significant step forward, in particular for CFSP and ESDP. It will place a number of policy developments within a united formal framework, thereby enhancing the profile and credibility of the EU in relation to other international actors.

5.1 EU-American relationship

Facing today's challenging threats, the rift between the Atlantic nations is dangerous and an issue of big concern. Nowadays, the behaviour of the governments of Iran and North Korea represent pressing challenges, particularly in face of these nations' growing nuclear capabilities and uncertain political trends. Such concerns become much harder to solve if the EU and the US do not work together effectively. Were they to pull together in the same direction, Europe and

---

[117] Nicole Gnesetto, "EU, US: visions of the world, visions of the other," 39.

[118] The European Constitution failed referenda in France and the Netherlands.

America could easily encourage other nations or organizations into action, and global problems might be solved more easily.

But how to close the rift between the Atlantic nations, a challenge which is fundamental for the future of ESDP and its success? First steps have to be taken by the Europeans themselves.

The basis for future development of ESDP is European integration itself. Europe has an amazing history of partnership and cooperation, and deeper integration will undeniably lead to an institutional security and defence reform. It must not be forgotten that for ESDP it is still "early days". It is unrealistic to expect the EU to have solved a whole range of problems in such a short time. After all, it took the EU 14 years to harmonize a policy on jam![119] Discussing the subject of America with all member states together is another task almost as urgent. It is surreal that the 27 member states, who are so eager to discuss everything and anything, should refuse to consider possible changes in policy that are absolutely central to the future of the international system.

There can be no question that today it is the EU one has to address when one wants to speak to Europe. It is time that Washington realizes that bilateral relationships and NATO are no longer sufficient to manage the West. Only when the EU is acknowledged as a global player can Europe become what the US needs: namely a strong and capable partner.[120] Washington should support the Europeans to pull together in only one direction. And lastly partnership between the two political giants should be built on persuasion, not on command.

For the Europeans, to be accepted as a partner means to try to become an equal. On defence issues, this clearly means to close the capability gap between European and American military capabilities, and this implies a significant increase in the European military budgets, or an increase in capabilities in other ways, be it closer cooperation or more complementary vice competing European forces.

---

[119] Jolyon Howorth, "Why ESDP is necessary and beneficial for the Alliance," in, *Defending Europe The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy*, Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, 219-239 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 235.

[120] Asle Toje, "A security Strategy for Europe – the Solana Strategy in the Wake of Madrid", The Oxford Journal on Good Governance, panel discussion, http://www.oxfordgovernance.org/fileadmin/Journal/Issue_1/Toje.pdf; Internet; accessed 14 March 2007.

5.2 EU-Military Capabilities

Despite all the results that have already been achieved by the EDA, far-reaching reforms are needed to achieve greater cost effectiveness and increased military capability for Europe. If not the dilemma of budget constraints, then inflation and extraordinarily increasing costs for complex weapon systems will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to close the military capability gap with the US and to improve Europeans' own military capabilities.

The EDA already addresses shortfalls in European military capabilities. However, closing the gaps is still a national responsibility; there is no pressure coming from supranational bodies. Coordinating national capabilities might be a first step. A second milestone could be national niche forces. By comparing national capabilities and reducing duplication of similar military assets, European capabilities could be increased by keeping the budget on nearly the same level. Sharing the burden of military costs, niche forces might be the first step towards a European army.

5.3 European Security Strategy and European Security and Defence Union

The ESS is much more than a formal reconciliation after the divides over Iraq. Building on existing partnerships and policies, the strategy contains an ambitious agenda for the EU as a global actor. In order to implement this agenda, the strategy outlines a distinctive European approach based on the concept of comprehensive security. Aiming to integrate the full range of the EU's policies, instruments and capabilities under the overall objective of effective governance at both, the global and the regional level, the strategy renders a comprehensive approach that was already apparent throughout actual EU policies and partnerships.

It is sufficiently clear that not all necessary choices have already been made. For policy makers the strategy has enormous potential. The next step has to be to develop a strategic culture

within Europe. At all times, decision makers in Europe's various member states must act in accordance with the policy, with its objectives and in keeping with the overall approach of the ESS. This will increase the coherence of the Unions external action and it will harmonize the agendas of all policy fields. Further, it will increase efficiency by putting together available means to better use, and finally, and most importantly, it will increase the value of ESDP by achieving the objectives the EU has set itself.[121]

This also means that the ESS needs to be rapidly transformed into a mechanism that defines when, where, why and how the EU will act in response to an actual crisis. A practicable decision making process has to be developed that respects and supports EU unity. A European Union Security Council that guarantees rapid and balanced decision-making and that takes today's balance of power within the EU into account, might properly be the solution to intra-European decision-making problems. Without offending democratic principles, the council could be responsible for both military and civilian security, and in the future, even for the defence of the Union itself. Such a concept might generate the consensus that will weld all different European security approaches into a single institutional framework that contemporary security demands.[122]

Following the ESS's own rationale of multilateralism and its support of the UN to sustain international peace and security, it seems to be obvious that Europe will increase its influence and importance within the organization and especially within the UNSC. However, a single merged European seat at the table of the most powerful organ within the UN would provide a clear signal of an entirely integrated EU. Merging the French and UK seat would be a clear signal for truly European integration, but it also would mean surrendering national interests and global national influence in favour of the EU.

Another step towards the future development and implementation of the ESS is a pragmatic security concept for Europe, an additional concept that would represent a new general approach in transnational security thinking. It should contain civil and military as well as

---

[121] Sven Biscop, *The European security Strategy – implementing a distinctive approach to security?* (Brussels: Royal Institute for International Relations, 2004), 51.

offensive and defensive efforts. To develop such a concept, proper security and defence missions have to be analyzed using the ESS. A list of detailed military tasks in the ESDP would provide the framework for appropriate transformation and integration of European forces, and for strategic military planning, as well as for development of military capabilities and defence financing requirements.[123]

Closer cooperation in security and defence issues between EU member states as well as the pressure of shrinking national budgets may lead to the further progress in the evolution of ESDP. A European Security and Defence Union (ESDU), a European Army, the role of nuclear forces in a common defence and the role of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, are all logical items for Europe's future, even if they remain controversial for the moment. [124] The idea of an integrated European army might be attractive especially to smaller EU member states as a cost-effective contribution to Europe's security and defence. However, the problem and main question is, whether or when the main European players might be willing to submerge their military identities completely and give up national sovereignty to such an entity.[125]

5.4 Integration of Nuclear Forces

France and the UK are the EU's only member states provided with some nuclear arsenal. Although these forces have no formal ESDP role, the British nuclear capability is embedded in the strategic deterrence of NATO. Thus, the UK already affords an extended deterrence to all European nations. But for a true common defence capability to be successful for Europe, the roles of both France and UK nuclear forces have to be formalized within the EU framework, as it

---

[122] Asle Toje, "A security Strategy for Europe – the Solana Strategy in the Wake of Madrid."

[123] Julian Lindley-French, Franco Algieri, "A European Defence Strategy," 5.

[124] Ibid., 57.

[125] Toby Helm and George Holms, "German plans for Euro Army show Blair is deceiving Britain," The daily Telegraph, 24 October 2003, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/10/24/weu24.xml&sSheet=/news/2003/10/24/ixnewtop.html&secureRefrsh=true&requestid=101856; Internet; accessed 14 March 2007, also Judy Dempsey, German

already is within NATO in the British case. Of course, neither Paris nor London are eager to do so nor can they be pushed to because the integration of their strategic nuclear capability into the EU would mean a tremendous loss of sovereignty. Certainly, given the current strategic environment this integration will clearly not be achieved in the near future, but it is an issue which should be discussed and cannot be avoided forever.[126]

7. Conclusion

In general terms, the Common Foreign and Security Policy is a European story of success. In less than eight years after the decision for the European Security and Defence Policy at St Malo, the EU has created an independent military capability to underline its already impressive power and influence in the economic, diplomatic and humanitarian field. Without doubt, based on its already established instruments and bodies today the EU is able to carry out complex military operations.

But to answer the leading question of the European role in world affairs, it has to be stated that today the EU is still far from being on par with the US in terms of security and foreign policy. The Union's 27 member states are confronted by several challenges in their foreign, security and defence policies. At a basic level, these challenges reflect the need to reconceptualize international relations at the beginning of the 21st century. In this regard, one of the EU's central tasks is to clarify its self-understanding as a global and influential player. This implies a clearer determination of the EU's relationship to other international actors. Yet, relations with the US have cooled down as consequences of unforeseen problems in the nation-building process in the aftermath of the Iraq war.

The EU has to be prepared to speak with one voice to all global actors. Promoting a dynamic process of integration within CFSP in times of crisis requires reform efforts that will help to balance out the increasing heterogeneous interests that are characteristic of an enlarging EU. Reforms must address the complexity of EU decision-making processes. In any case, it would be a mistake to institute supposed developments; they have to be accepted by all member

---

proposes a European Army, The international Harold Tribune, 6 November2006
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/11/06/news/germany.php; Internet; accessed 14 March 2007.

states. Of course this means that there will be limits regarding the transfer of competences to the supranational level. Aside from described internal assessments, it is equally important to consider the external dimensions of reforms to CFSP and ESDP. Through the ESS, EU member states have set a benchmark for themselves that they need to fulfil with regard to the effective implementation of the values and objectives of the foreign security and defence policy. In order for the Union to be accepted by other important international actors, it will need to undertake the institutional, political and actor specific changes discussed in this paper. The credibility and power of the EU as a global actor will depend on the future evolution of the ESDP.

The EU must develop differentiated policy options and instruments, as well as the corresponding operative capabilities, to respond effectively to new security threats. The threats the EU is facing at present have changed dramatically compared to a dangerous but still calculable menace during the Cold War. Today's threats derive from terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and failing or already failed states. As the attacks in Madrid and London have clearly demonstrated, EU member states are already among the targets of international terrorism.

But it is not that Europe is only facing new dangers; it is also facing big opportunities. The future EU has the potential to make a contribution. A capable European Union can have a significant impact on a global scale. In doing so, it will contribute to an effective multilateral system, leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.

---

[126] Julian Lindley French, "A European Defence Strategy," pp57.

Bibliography

Bailes, Alyson J.K. *The European Security Strategy, An Evolutionary History*.
　　Stockholm: SIPRI Policy Paper No.10, 2005.

Biscop, Sven. *The European security Strategy – implementing a distinctive approach to
　　security?* Brussels: Royal Institute for International Relations, 2004.

Bush, George W. "President Promotes Citizen Corps for Safer Communities,"
　　Knoxville Tennessee, 08 April 2002.
　　http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020408-4.html;
　　Internet; accessed 11 April 2007.

Bush, George W. "Remarks by the President to the people of Poland",
　　Krakow Poland, 31. May 2003.
　　http://www. Whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030531-3html;
　　Internet; accessed 7 March 2007.

Robert Cooper, *the post-modern state and the world order*.
　　London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2nd edition 2000.

Council of the European Union. "A secure Europe in a better world:
　　European Security Strategy."
　　http://www.ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/doocs/2004/4/29.'European%20Strategy.pdf;
　　Internet; accessed 16 January 2007.

The Council of the European Union. "EU Military Committee."
　　http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1065&lang=en;
　　Internet; accessed 03 March 2007.

The Council of the European Union, "European Defence Agency."
　　http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cm3_fo/showPage.asp?id=277&lang=EN ;
　　Internet; accessed 03 March 2007.

Dempsey, Judy. "German proposes a European Army," The international Harold Tribune,
　　6 November2006. http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/11/06/news/germany.php;
　　Internet; accessed 14 March 2007.

Ehrhardt, Hans Georg. "Die europaeische Union, die ESVP und das neue Sicherheitsdilemma,"
　　Welt Trends Nr 38, Spring 2003.
　　http://www.ifsh.de/dokumente/artikel/118_WeltTrendsESVP-Ehrhart.pdf; Internet;
　　accessed 30 March 2007.

Europa, the portal of European institutions. "Europa The history of the European Union."
　　http://www.europa.eu/abs/history/index/en.htm;

Internet; accessed 19 January 2007.

Europa, the portal of European institutions. "From the ECSC Treaty to the Constitution."
    http://www.europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/eec/en.html;
    Internet; accessed 29 March 2007.

Europa, the portal of European institutions. "Overviews of the European Union activities-
    Foreign and Security Policy." http://www.europa.eu/pol/cfsp/overview_en.htm;
    Internet; accessed 18 January 2007.

Europa, the portal of European institutions. "Treaty on European Union."
    http://www.europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title5.html;
    Internet; accessed 21 January 2007.

Europa, the portal of European institutions, "The Treaty of Rome, Preamble."
    http://www.europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/eec_en.htm;
    Internet; accessed 19 January 2007.

Europa, the portal of European institutions, "European Union Institutions and other
    bodies." http://www.europa.eu/institutions/inst/parliament/index_en.htm;
    Internet; accessed; 10 April 2007.

Europa, the portal of European institutions, "External Relations."
    http://www.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm#2;
    Internet; accessed; 10 April 2007.

Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose. "'Old Europe' presses ahead with plans for an EU army",
    The daily Telegraph, 30 April 2003.
    http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/04/30/weu30.xml;
    Internet; accessed 10 April 2003.

Gnesetto, Nicole. "Introduction ESDP: results and prospects" in
    EU Security and Defence Policy The first 5 years, ed. Nicole Gnesetto, 11-32.
    Paris: Istitute for Security Studies, 2004.

Gnesetto, Nicole. "EU, US: visions of the world, visions of the other", in,
    Shift or rift Assessing the US-EU relations after Iraq, ed. Gustaf Lindstroem,
    21-42. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2003.

Grant, Charles and Asmus, Robert. "Can NATO remain an effective military and
    political alliance if it keeps growing?" Web-Debate.
    http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue1/english/debate.html;
    Internet; accessed 10 April 2007.

Helm, Toby and Holms, George. "German plans for Euro Army show Blair is deceiving
    Britain," The daily Telegraph, 24 October 2003.
    http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/10/24/weu24.xml&sSheet

=/news/2003/10/24/ixnewtop.html&secureRefrsh=true&requestid=101856; Internet;
        accessed 14 March 2007.
Hoffmann, Stanley. "The crisis in transatlantic relations." in
        Shift or Rift Assessing the US-EU relations after Iraq,
        ed. Gustaf Lindstroem, 13-20. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2003.

Howorth, Jolyon. "Why ESDP is necessary and beneficial for the Alliance," in
        Defending Europe The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy,
        Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, 219-239.
        New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Kagan, Robert. *Of Paradise and Power America and Europe in the new world order.*
         New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.

Lindley-French, Julian. "Headline Goal 2010 and the concept of EU Battlegroups:
        an assessment of the build up of a European Defence Capability,"
        University of Munich Centre for Applied Policy Senior scholar.
        http://www.cicerofoundation.org/pdf/lecture_lindleyfrench_dec05.pdf;
        Internet; accessed 28 March 2007.

Lindley French, Julian. "A European Defence Strategy," Bertelsmann Foundation, 2004.
         http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2004/2004_Venusberg_Report.pdf ;
        Internet; accessed 13.March 2007.

Gaertner, Heinz and Cuthbertson, Ian M. "Introduction." In *European Security and
        Transatlantic Relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War,*
        ed. Heinz Gaertner and Ian M. Cuthbertson, 1-15.
        New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005.

Grant, Charles. "Security Challenges in Transatlantic relations."
        http:/www.weltpolitik.net/Sachgebiete/Internationale%20Sicherheitspolitik/GASP/Analy
        sen/%22Security%20Challenges%20in%20Transatlantic%20Relations.%22.html;
        Internet; accessed 10 April 2007

Haass, Richard N. "Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities."
        http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/16648.htm;
        Internet; accessed 14 January 2003.

Hayne, Jeanne-Yves. "Berlin Plus," Paris: Institute for Security Studies.
        http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/03-jyhb+.pdf; Internet; accessed 28 March 2007.

Helm, Toby and Holms, George. "German plans for Euro Army show Blair is deceiving
        Britain," The daily Telegraph, 24 October 2003.
        http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/10/24/weu24.xml&sSheet
        =/news/2003/10/24/ixnewtop.html&secureRefrsh=true&requestid=101856; Internet;
        accessed 14 March 2007.

Howorth, Jolyon. *European Integration and Defence: the ultimate Challenge*.
    Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2000.

Kagan, Robert. *Of Paradise and Power America and Europe in the new world order*.
    New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.

Lindley-French, Julian, Algieri, Franco. "A European Defence Strategy,"
    Bertelsmann Foundation, (2004).
    http://www.cap.Imu.de/download/2004/2004_Venusberg_Report.pdf;
    Internet; accessed 29 March 2007.

Missirelli, Antonio. "ESDP bodies." http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/08-bodies.pdf;
    Internet; accessed 03 March 2007.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *NATO Handbook*. Brussels: NATO, 2001.

Official Journal of the European Communities. "Council Decision of 22 January 2001."
    http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/l_02720010130en00010003.pdf;
    Internet; accessed 03 March 2007.

Ortega, Martin. "Petersberg tasks, and missions for the EU military forces,"
    Paris: Institute for Security Studies. http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp.04-mo.pdf;
    Internet; accessed 26 January 2007.

Payne, Kenneth. "The European and Defence Policy and the Future of NATO,"
    BBC News Analysis Research. http://www. Nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/payne.pdf;
    Internet; accessed 7 March 2007.

Pazderski, Georg M. *The development of the European Security and Defence Policy*
    and the transatlantic relationship. Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2004.

Penska, Susan E. "EU and US Threat Perception after 9/11", in
    European Security and transatlantic relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War,
    ed. Heinz Gaertner and Ian M. Cuthbertson, 19-32.
    New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005.

Reid, T.R. and Myers, Joanne. "The United States of Europe: The new Superpower
    and the End of American Supremacy."
    http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/5077.html;
    Internet; accessed 10 April 2007.

Rifkin, Jeremy. *The European Dream*. New York: Penguin Group, 2004.

Rutten, Maartje. "From St Malo to Nice: European defence: core documents
    Chaillot Paper 47," Paris: Institute for Security Studies.
    http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.html#3;

Internet; accessed 12 March 2007.

Salmon, Trevor C. and Shepherd, Alister J.K. *To a European Army:*
　　　　Military Power in the Making? London UK and Boulder, Colorado:
　　　　Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.

Solana, Javier. "Europe and America: partners of choice," speech to the annual
　　　　dinner of the Foreign Policy Association, New York 7 May 2003.
　　　　 http://www.ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/75674.pdf;
　　　　Internet; accessed 13 April 2007.

Solana, Javier "Preface," in *EU Security and Defence Policy, The first five years*
　　　　(1999-2004), ed. Nicole Gnesetto, 5-10. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004.

Thomas, James P. "The Military Changes of Transatlantic Coalitions", Adelphi paper 333, IISS,
　　　　2000, 59-92.

Toje, Asle. "A security Strategy for Europe – the Solana Strategy in the Wake of
　　　　Madrid", The Oxford Journal on Good Governance, panel discussion,
　　　　http://www.oxfordgovernance.org/fileadmin/Journal/Issue_1/Toje.pdf;
　　　　Internet; accessed 14 March 2007.

The Tribune, online edition. "War last resort, says EU,"
　　　　http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030219/world.htm;
　　　　Internet; accessed 13 April 2007.

United Nations Security Council. Resolutions 1373,
　　　　http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm;
　　　　Internet; accessed 9 March 2007.

United Nations Security Council. Resolutions1378,
　　　　http://www.daccess.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/638/57/PDF/NO163857.pdf;
　　　　Internet; accessed 9 March 2007.

United States of America, "The National Security Strategy," September 2002.
　　　　http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf; Internet; accessed 7 March 2007.

United States of America. "The National Security Strategy," March 2006.
　　　　http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/; Internet; accessed 7 March 2007.

United States Department of State. "European Union Economic Overview."
　　　　http://www.State.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/58969.htm; Internet accessed 21 January 2007.

The Wall Street Journal. "Unmighty Europe", 5 February 2002,

http://www.classes.igpa.uiuc.edu/jgiertz/Defense.htm;
Internet; accessed 10 April 2007.

Wolfowitz, Paul. "Speech at the 38th Munich Conference on Security Policy 01/01/2002,
http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2002=&menu_konferenz
en=en&id=69&; Internet; accessed 10 April2007.

Young, W. *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe*. Leicester,
Leicester University press, 1984.