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MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES THESIS

Turkey in the EU

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## **Introduction**

Europe turned 50 on March 25 this year. As one of the world's most powerful bodies and most successful alliances, it has reason to celebrate. Its soft power approach to enlargement has left countries vying to join its ranks and has given it an exceptional opportunity to recreate a new Europe in its image. As with any 50 year old, it is beginning to show its age. Enlargements four and five were challenging additions. While the EU pours money and attention into its newest states, it is also dealing with a constitutional crisis that threatens to incapacitate the expanded union. Now it faces its greatest challenge and largest prize ever- the accession of Turkey and its 70 million Muslims.

Since Ataturk banned veils and changed its alphabet, Turkey has been moving inexorably toward the West. The road has been long and winding. Like picking teams for schoolyard games, the EU has left Turkey waiting on the sidelines while stronger players were selected for play. Since indicating its interest to accede in 1987, Turkey has watched while the EU accepted 13 other, more desirable, countries into the union. Finally after implementing nine sweeping reform packages in six years, Turkey was offered the opportunity to join the union.

Turkey made enormous advances in the years leading up to the 2005 commencement of membership talks but since then has made little progress. While the EU views Turkey as lacking the will to proceed, Turkey accuses Europe of looking for

ways to derail the talks by inventing ever-more-difficult demands to meet. For the Turkish public, the adage: “Even if you catch a bird with your mouth, they will invent another trick,” rings true.<sup>1</sup>

It’s no surprise that Turkey’s progress is faltering. The realities of transforming a distant, poor, large, Muslim country into a modern effective player on an international team makes Turkey’s work highly challenging. Turkey is an unstable democracy in a volatile region. There is a constant underlying threat from Islamists that has led the military to remove its government four times in the past and even the current Prime Minister has spent time in prison for his Islamic rhetoric. Its human rights violations and suppression of individual freedoms are well entrenched. It faces numerous internal and external security threats which make reform of its military difficult to implement.

On top of these challenges, a strong anti-Turk sentiment pervades Europe. Even in countries where political support is strongly behind Turkey, its citizens are not, and behind the diplomacy, the political support is suspect or not present. The German government has been a strong supporter of Turkey throughout the process but the Foreign Minister was overheard reassuring his Danish counterpart not to worry about the Turks, “[they] will never make it to the EU; we will lull them and then forget them.”<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Philip Shishkin, and Marc Champion, “Politics and Economics: Turkey’s EU Bid Quietly Loses Steam.” *Wall Street Journal* 2 November 2006, 3. Mr. Cadore sums up the feeling of the Turkish public regarding their view that the EU is doing everything that it can to keep Turkey out of the EU.

<sup>2</sup> Hakki, 400.

## **Thesis**

This paper will assess the complex issue of Turkish accession to the EU. It will argue that Turkey will fall short of full membership, but will achieve a lesser status such as a privileged partnership. There are several reasons for this pessimism. It is unlikely that Turkey will be able to successfully adopt all the reforms necessary for eventual accession. Even if successful, Turkey will be blocked by at least one member country because of the potential influence that Turkey could exert on the collective and the financial burden that this struggling and backward country would become for the EU. The paper will end on a hopeful note that through persistence and a real transformation of the country, Turkey could one day hope for full membership status, possibly staged through an intermediary step of a privileged partnership.

## **Road Map**

This paper will address Turkey's accession in five chapters. The first chapter will provide a background of Turkey's history and accession efforts up to 2005. The second chapter will explain why accession would be good for Europeans. The third chapter will describe why Europeans do not want Turkey to accede. The fourth chapter will outline the obstacles to Turkey's accession. Finally, chapter 5 will lay out the possible paths accession will follow and attempt to evaluate the most likely outcome.

## Chapter 1. The road to accession

### Introduction

Turkey's current struggle to join the EU can be explained in part by events in its long history. Its culture and values have been shaped by its early rulers and conquerors, and continue to evolve as it adapts to the influences of the modern day.

### Early history

Anatolia, the Asian land mass of modern day Turkey was inhabited as early as the seventh millennium B.C. by an advanced Neolithic culture. In its early history, the region came under the control of various conquering groups such as the Hittites, the Phrygians, the Lydians, and the Persians. Beginning in 1050 B.C., Ionian Greeks began founding cities along the Aegean coast of Anatolia and in the eighth century B.C. Armenians and Kurds moved into eastern Anatolia. In the fourth century B.C., Alexander the Great conquered Anatolia and founded Pergamum which became the center of a Roman province and a cultural center for several centuries.<sup>3</sup>

In 330 A.D., the Roman emperor Constantine established Constantinople, the capital of the Greek-speaking half of the Roman Empire. The empire remained powerful until the eleventh century when Seljuk Turkish forces, migrating from China and Central Asia, defeated the Byzantine army and occupied Anatolia. The Seljuk pushed westward until Christian forces mounted the Crusades and reclaimed part of Anatolia. Over the

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<sup>3</sup> United States, Library of Congress-Federal Research Division, *Country Profile: Turkey*; available from <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Turkey.pdf>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2007, 2.

next two centuries, the empire fragmented and was eventually replaced by the Osmanli Dynasty who established the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans captured Constantinople in 1453. Renamed to Istanbul, it then became the capital of the new empire and the home of Sunni Islam as well as Greek Orthodoxy. Under Suleyman, the empire expanded across North Africa to Morocco, into southeastern Europe and across the Middle East to Mesopotamia. In 1683, the empire reached Vienna before being pushed back in the following years. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Russia fought several wars with the Ottomans to diminish their power and to gain access to warm-water ports. By the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had become known as the “sick man of Europe”.<sup>4</sup> Ataturk saw his country’s future in the West and undertook a massive redesign of his county’s Ottoman past into a modern day. He replaced the strict Islamic Shariah law with the Swiss civil code, abolished state religion, secularized the classrooms and discouraged women from wearing the veil.<sup>5</sup>

Turkey has its origins in ancient civilizations with a long history of deep rooted traditions. Located on a strategic crossroad between two continents, Turkey has been the home of several vast empires. The peoples with whom Turkey currently finds itself in conflict, the Greeks, Kurds, Armenians, can trace their roots to the land spanning back to the eleventh century B.C. and only in recent history have been removed from the country. This long history cannot be easily erased from the hearts and minds of the displaced

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<sup>4</sup> United States, Library of Congress-Federal Research Division, *Country Profile: Turkey*.; available from <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Turkey.pdf>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2007, 2.

<sup>5</sup> Handan Satigoglu, “Is Turkey Deviating From Ataturk’s Path? Elections Will Tell,” available from <http://www.worldpoliticswatch.com/article.aspx?id=648>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2007.

peoples and complicates efforts to resolve ongoing disputes. On the other hand, Turkey shares a common heritage with its neighbors which can serve as a positive connection between the peoples of the region. The vast reach of its earlier empires has intertwined the histories of all its peoples and created a far reaching base of commonality that can serve as a foundation of influence as Turkey reaches out to Europe, Asia, and Africa.

### **Current history**

Turkey has been pursuing closer links with Europe since the 1950's, beginning with the European Economic Community (EEC), which was the precursor organization to the European Union.<sup>6</sup> Turkey signed an Association Agreement with the EEC in 1963, then signed an Additional Protocol in 1970 outlining the rules for a customs union between the two parties.<sup>7</sup> After almost 20 years of strained relations between Turkey and the European community, Turkey applied for membership in the EC in 1987. Turkey's application was rejected but relations continued to improve. In 1996, Turkey joined the European customs union. In 1997, Turkey was refused candidate status at the EU Luxembourg Summit in spite of the fact that numerous other states from East Central Europe and the Mediterranean were granted status. However, in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit, the EU accepted Turkey as a candidate state. In December 2004 at the EU Summit, Turkey's persistence was finally rewarded with the unanimous consent of the EU members to commence accession negotiations starting on 3 October 2005.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Ioannis Grigoriadis, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Debating the Most Difficult Enlargement Ever," *SAIS Review* vol. 26, iss. 1 (Winter 2006), 149.

<sup>7</sup> Ioannis Grigoriadis, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Debating the Most Difficult Enlargement Ever," *SAIS Review* vol. 26, iss. 1 (Winter 2006), 149.

<sup>8</sup> Ioannis Grigoriadis, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Debating the Most Difficult Enlargement Ever," *SAIS Review* vol. 26, iss. 1 (Winter 2006), 149.

On its way to accession talks, Turkey continued to introduce Western-friendly reforms. Its political liberalization efforts have brought about the most significant political transformation since the introduction of multi-party politics in 1945. It has amended its 1982 constitution eight times between 1995 and 2004 to bring it more in line with the European Union's accession criteria. Four reform packages were approved by the Turkish Parliament between 1998 and 2003, then five more packages in the next year.<sup>9</sup> Today, however, the rapid forward momentum building up to the accession talks has sizzled out just when the hard climb has begun.

### **The Future**

Accession negotiations are a long and demanding process. Turkey's negotiations will be longer and tougher than any before it. With five accessions under its belt, the EU has refined its process and has become a more discerning suitor with each round. Turkey itself is the EU's most challenging applicant and is being closely observed by an ever expanding group of members.

The Copenhagen Criteria set out the conditions that potential members must meet to be accepted into the EU:

Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market

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<sup>9</sup> Andrea Gates, "Negotiating Turkey's Accession: the Limitations of the Current EU Strategy," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10 (2005), 389.

economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.<sup>10</sup>

Prospective states must demonstrate their capacity to take on the obligations of EU membership by adopting the *acquis communautaire*, the complete body of EU laws, rules, and agreements. There are 35 chapters in the *acquis*. Turkey must demonstrate for each chapter that it is ready to undertake the provisions contained within. Once opened Turkey is expected to enact legislation and pass laws necessary for compliance with the provisions. Throughout this process, which is expected to last 15 years or more, the EU makes regular reports on Turkey's reform efforts. In accordance with the EU's commitment to openness the process is fully documented on its website for its citizens to see.

Once the candidate country has satisfied the European Commission that they have met the pre-conditions for accession, the member states must agree by unanimous vote in Council to accept the candidature. The European Parliament then must agree by absolute majority. Finally, each member state must ratify the accession treaty in accordance with their constitutional procedures.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> European Commission, "EU Enlargement: From Six to Fifteen and Beyond," available from [http://www.europa.eu.int/information\\_society/activities/atwork/documents/dgenlargementbrochure/sld005.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/information_society/activities/atwork/documents/dgenlargementbrochure/sld005.htm); Internet; accessed 13 March 2007, 5.

<sup>11</sup> Pascal Fontaine, "Europe in 12 Lessons." European Commission; Available from [www.http://ec.europa.eu.htm](http://ec.europa.eu.htm); Internet ; accessed 12 December 2006, 9.

Turkey has come a long way in a short hundred years from the Sultans ruling a vast Ottoman empire to a secular democracy seeking permission to join a united Europe. In a much shorter period Turkey must again recreate itself, now in the image of a modern European state reaching out to assert itself on the world stage. Before moving onto the enormous challenges that lie ahead for Turkey, it is useful to discuss why the effort is worthwhile in the first place.

## **Chapter 2. Why is it good to have Turkey in the EU?**

### **Introduction**

The EU speaks of enlargement as overcoming the division of Europe, contributing to the peaceful unification of the continent, consolidating democracy, human rights and stability. Economically, enlargement creates prosperity and competitiveness and allows it to better respond to globalization. Finally, Europe, under enlargement, has grown into a major international player.<sup>12</sup> All of these goals have been attained by the EU over its past enlargements, but what will Turkey bring?

Every strategist, academic or layman can come with a few good reasons why the EU would be richer with Turkey in its ranks: its large market, its regional connections, its Muslim heritage, its young, resourceful workforce, its military might, and its geo-

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<sup>12</sup> European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges...,” 1.

strategic position, to name a few.<sup>13</sup> This section will have a closer look at what Turkey might contribute to the collective.

### **Instrument of change**

Smith considers the enlargement policy as the EU's most successful foreign policy because of the powerful ability that it has provided the EU to shape the target country's domestic and foreign policies and encourage political and economic reforms.<sup>14</sup>

The reward of EU membership is a strong motivator for countries who want to join Europe's powerhouse union or who want to align themselves with the West. The accession framework is an organized and supported manner in which to implement fundamental change. A team of specialists are available to assist in the transition and the EU provides essential funding to help the country restructure. Benchmarks and clearly identified steps are mapped out for the country to follow and yearly assessments by EU officials provide the country feedback on their progress. Rewards and penalties keep the country on track and motivated.

### **European Values**

Much of the debate on Turkey's accession centers round whether the country could be considered European. The European Commission has wrestled with the question of final borders and has stated that the European Union is first and foremost defined by

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<sup>13</sup> Hakki, 397.

<sup>14</sup> Karen Smith, "Enlargement and European Order," In *International Relations and the European Union*, edited by Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, 271-291. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, 271.

its values.<sup>15</sup> Regardless of the debate of the extent to which Turkey currently shares EU values, the reforms mandated by the accession instruments ensures that Turkey moves closer to the values and ideals of the EU. Addressing the treatment of prisoners or the suppression of the Kurdish minority, for example, promote the priorities of the community and align the values of the EU and Turkey.<sup>16</sup> But the rapid modification of national values can only be undertaken with the support of a strong incentive such as European accession and funding.

## **Peace**

The founders of the European community, Maurice Schumann and Konrad Adenauer, believed a conflict-free zone could be achieved through an association of members sharing the same common values.<sup>17</sup>

It is generally accepted that the EU enlargement policy is effective in bringing stability among applicant states, thus contributing to peace in the region.<sup>18</sup> One of the conditions for accession is that candidates must resolve any outstanding disputes. The prospect of EU membership has motivated Turkey to seek solutions to its outstanding

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<sup>15</sup> European Commission, "Questions and Answers of the Union's Enlargement Strategy and its Integration capacity," 2.

<sup>16</sup> Gates, 392.

<sup>17</sup> Donald Payne, "Turkey and the European Union," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 17, no.2 (Spring 2006), 6.

<sup>18</sup> Stelios Stavridis, "The European Union's Contribution to Peace and Stability in the Eastern Mediterranean," Draft working paper (November 2005); available from <http://www.seipaz.org/documentos/1finalSIPworkingPaperNov2005stavridis.pdf>; Internet; accessed 22 March 2007, 1.

problems with its neighbors.<sup>19</sup> Emerson and Tocci suggest that Turkey is undergoing a fundamental transformation of its security concept from brinkmanship to communal security through multilateral decision-making.<sup>20</sup> Prime Minister Erdogan suggests that the best way to keep the Eastern Mediterranean balance and security is to gather Turkey, Greece and Cyprus within the EU as member states. He believes that the region's conflict could be resolved within the EU on an equal footing as partners, instead of as adversaries.<sup>21</sup>

Turkey and Greece long-standing animosity dates back to Greece's independence from the Ottomans in 1832. Since then they have opposed each other in four wars and have had recent disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. However, relations have improved over the past several years. Turkey has entered into a dialogue with Greece to solve the Cyprus dispute and find agreement over rights to the Aegean Sea. Greece is a supporter of Turkey's EU Bid.<sup>22</sup>

The EU has been exerting pressure on both Turkey and Cyprus to resolve their differences. Aware that establishing relations with Cyprus is a major pre-condition of

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<sup>19</sup> Seiju Desai, "Turkey in the European Union: A Security Perspective- Risk or Opportunity," *Defence Studies* 5, no.3 (September 2005): 366-393, 376.

<sup>20</sup> Michael Emerson, and Nathalie Tocci, "Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead. Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy," *Centre for European Policy Studies EU-Turkey Working Papers*, no. 1 (August 2004), Journal on-line; available from [http://shop.ceps.be/BookDetail.php?item\\_id=1143](http://shop.ceps.be/BookDetail.php?item_id=1143); Internet; accessed 11 December 2006, 15.

<sup>21</sup> Recep Erdogan, "Why the European Union Needs Turkey?" *South East European Studies Programme Newsletter* 2 (July 2004); available from <http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/esc-lectures/SEESox-newsletter2004.pdf>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007, 7.

<sup>22</sup> S. Andoura, "EU's Capacity to Absorb Turkey," Available from [www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/06/eu/EU-Turkey.pdf](http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/06/eu/EU-Turkey.pdf); Internet, accessed 2 April 2007, 5.

accession, Turkey has been working to bring about a peace. In 2004, it initiated negotiations with Cyprus which resulted in a UN-sponsored referendum to settle the Cyprus dispute. Although the Greek-Cypriots eventually voted against the proposal, it showed Turkey's willingness to come to a settlement of the island's dispute. Recently, the Greek Cypriots have shown movement on the issue. In March 2007, the Greek Cypriots pulled down a checkpoint on the Greek side of the island and called for the Turkish Cypriot North to withdraw their troops from the area. The move was timed to proceed the EU Spring Summit in Brussels and is part of an effort to open up trade between the two sides and to bring a peace deal.<sup>23</sup>

## **Security**

Turkey played a key role in the Cold War and is now positioned to take on the security challenges of the future. Turkey's geo-strategic positioning, extensive military resources and western alignment make it a key ally for the Common Foreign and Defense policy, and an essential link in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and drug trafficking.

Turkey fits into the EU's plan to develop a strong common foreign and security policy. The geographic priorities listed in the Common Foreign and Defense Policy are all in Turkey's area: the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Mediterranean

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<sup>23</sup> "Cyprus Inches Closer to Reunification as Symbolic Wall is Razed," available from <http://www.euractiv.com/en/constitution/cyprus-inches-closer-reunification-symbolic-wall-razed/article-162350?Ref=RSS>; Internet; accessed 22 March 2007.

area.<sup>24</sup> Turkey's membership strengthens the Union's position and provides a key component of a separate European security arrangement. Turkey has the largest NATO force in Europe with significant combat experience. This force could be used to project power in the region with the aim of promoting EU objectives. There are several major NATO facilities located in Turkey which would serve as excellent forward operating bases for European operations in the region.

Although Europe already has access to military assets through NATO, including Turkey's resources, the relationship between the EU and NATO is not seamless. Turkey has blocked Cyprus and Malta from participating in EU-NATO strategic cooperation and opposes Cyprus' accession to the Wassenaar Arrangement.<sup>25</sup> The accession of Turkey would remove any blocking actions through NATO by Turkey such as currently exists to pressure Cyprus.

Turkey's close participation with the EU is essential for its many security issues. The strategic importance of Turkey has resurged with the war on terrorism. The USA, in particular, has been very clear that a strong, modern Turkey in the European Union would be a strong ally in the war on terrorism. Turkey's role against terrorism is multi-level. Since much of today's terrorism falls along the lines of Islam versus the West, Turkey

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<sup>24</sup> Can Buharali, "Turkey's Foreign Policy towards EU Membership: A Security Perspective" *Turkish Policy Quarterly* vol 3, no. 3 (Fall 2004) [journal on-line]; available from [http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi\\_turkey\\_tpq\\_id\\_6.pdf](http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_6.pdf); Internet; accessed 12 December 2006, 13.

<sup>25</sup> "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges...", 58.

provides an opportunity to show that the West is inclusive of Muslims. Turkey as a stable and successful Muslim democracy is a model for other states to emulate.

Turkey is a transit country for third-nation immigrants, human trafficking, drugs arms smuggling and other organized crime. Its borders are easy to cross and difficult to protect. For these reasons, the EU must extend the Schengen area to Turkey only after strict assessment of Turkey's suitability to restrict these illegal activities. Acceding Turkey to the EU through the *acquis* process will give the EU certain oversight regarding control measures and influence over issues in justice and home affairs.<sup>26</sup> Although the Schengen area has been extended to non-EU members, Turkey may find this option unacceptable. As an EU member, Turkey would be gain synergy with the EU by dovetailing their techniques and know-how on border control and management.<sup>27</sup>

## **Stability**

Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004, has stated that "lasting and sustainable stability in the European region has been the crowning achievement of the European Union."<sup>28</sup> The EU, through incremental enlargements, has spread its stabilizing influence across a united Europe. Past enlargements have shown

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<sup>26</sup> S. Andoura, 5. According to the European Commission, Schengen measures "provide for the abolition of controls at the internal borders of the Schengen Member States, establish common rules on checks at the external frontiers, provide for a common visa policy."

<sup>27</sup> Henri Barkey, and Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, "The Strategic Implications of Turkey's Integration in the European Union," In *The Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement*, ed. Esther Brimmer and Stefan Frohlich, 127-150. Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, John Hopkins University, 2005, 146.

<sup>28</sup> Romano Prodi, "A Wider Europe- A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability," available at [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/news/prodi/sp02\\_619.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/news/prodi/sp02_619.htm); Internet; accessed 9 April 2007.

that bringing in members to the union have had a stabilizing effect on the joiner states. Both the Southern rim of Europe and the Central European countries prospered and developed, economically and politically.<sup>29</sup> As Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy states:

Regional conflicts continue to foster instability, disrupt economic activity and reduce opportunities for the people concerned. . . .Bad governance is often at the heart of these problems. Corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions, and lack of accountability corrode states from within and contribute to regional insecurity.”<sup>30</sup>

As in previous enlargements, admitting Turkey into the EU will help stabilize several shaky elements in Turkey.<sup>31</sup> For the state, it will secure a secular society. For the government, it reduces the possibility of military intervention by reducing the military’s power over governance. For business, it will solidify its market reforms initiated under the common market and will open up efficient markets in Turkey. For the repressed, like the Turks and women, it will guarantee protection of human rights and ease limits on their abilities to influence change in the country.

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<sup>29</sup> Barkey, 141.

<sup>30</sup> Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” The Council of the European Union (June 2003), Report on-line; available from [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf); Internet; accessed 13 December 2006, 3.

<sup>31</sup> “The Turkish Train Crash,” *The Economist* 381, iss. 8506 (2 December 2006), 50.

In many ways, Turkey will be its largest prize. The day following Turkey's application for EU membership was accepted, Prime Minister Recep Erdogan stated: "If the EU is not a Christian club, this has to be proven. What do you gain by adding 99% Muslim Turkey to the EU? You gain a bridge between the EU and the 1.5 billion-strong Islamic world. An alliance of civilizations will start."<sup>32</sup>

Bringing domestic stability to a moderate Islamic neighborhood country is very important for the European Union and an important strategic objective of the USA. For many Europeans, the main aim of enlargement to Turkey is to consolidate the country's democratic process.<sup>33</sup> Establishing a stable, successful European Muslim country would help break down the feeling of the West against Islam. Turkey could serve as an example for other Muslim countries of the benefits of espousing democracy and Western ways. Although the Turkish model is not likely to be exported across the region,<sup>34</sup> Turkey could have a positive influence on other Islamic states and prove that it is possible for Muslim countries to maintain their beliefs but within a modern society.<sup>35</sup>

Turkey has a multi-layered relationship with its regional neighbors, including commercial, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and historic. Turkey could facilitate interactions

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<sup>32</sup> Oliver, Mark. "Turkey's Future Lies in EU, says Blair." *Guardian Unlimited*, 30 September 2005. Available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,7369,1581981,00.html>; Internet; accessed 8 March 2007.

<sup>33</sup> Barkey, 143.

<sup>34</sup> The Economist, "Europe: The Ever Lengthening Road....", 39. The article notes that Turkey is not an Arab country so its ability to bridge between civilizations may be overstated. A Palestinian commentator states that "Turkey has no real connection to the Arab world, so whether Turkey gets into Europe or not doesn't really matter to the ordinary guy in Amman or Riyadh.

<sup>35</sup> Barkey, 143.

and give an accurate interpretation of actions and events. The Solana document comments that “dealing with situations that are more distant and more foreign requires a better understanding and communication.” “Better understanding and communication is the essence of success in most cases. With the deep-rooted linkages she has with neighboring countries, Turkey is well positioned to help EU understanding and communications.”<sup>36</sup>

Turkish integration could have a large positive impact on domestic European stability. There are more than 15 million Muslims living in the EU and their numbers are increasing.<sup>37</sup> The riots in France in the fall of 2005 and the increasing incidence of home-made Islamic terrorism are signs of unrest from Europe’s disaffected youth. With the eventual accession of Albania and the increased growth in the Muslim immigrant community, it is only a matter of time before the EU deals with the simmering clash of cultures. Turkey has an opportunity to take a leadership role and help move Europe away from its Christian-dominant orientation and validate the importance of Muslims to the European community.

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<sup>36</sup> Can Buharali, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards EU Membership: A Security Perspective” *Turkish Policy Quarterly* vol 3, no. 3 (Fall 2004) [journal on-line]; available from [http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi\\_turkey\\_tpq\\_id\\_6.pdf](http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_6.pdf); Internet; accessed 12 December 2006, ?.

<sup>37</sup> Seda Domanic, “The Turkish Accession to the European Union: Mutually Beneficial? Mutually Possible?” *European Institute for European Policy*, Available from [http://www.europeum.org/disp\\_project.php?pid=23](http://www.europeum.org/disp_project.php?pid=23); Internet; accessed 16 March 2007, 6.

Prime Minister Erdogan points out that blocking Turkey's membership hinders the integration of the Muslims who already live in the EU.<sup>38</sup> He acknowledges differences between Turkey and the EU but stresses the differences signify strength and wealth for both sides. He suggests, the full membership of Turkey, which "has reconciled its traditional Islamic culture with its secular and democratic structures," will "reinforce the desire and will for co-habitation between the Christians and Muslims."<sup>39</sup>

### **Prosperity**

A stable and vibrant Turkish economy is in the best interest of all Europeans. The EU has benefited enormously from expansion, through larger markets and business efficiencies<sup>40</sup> Prime Minister Erdogan stated that in the future, Turkey would offer the EU much wider export and investment opportunities once it completes its structural reforms and reinforces the competitiveness and flexibility of its market.<sup>41</sup> As the country becomes stronger and incomes rise, its 70 million consumers will create a huge market for European goods. With increased investment and a robust business environment, Turkey will become a regional economic workhorse, supplying Europe with inexpensive goods. Recent enlargements support this optimism.

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<sup>38</sup> Recep Erdogan, "Why the European Union Needs Turkey?" *South East European Studies Programme Newsletter 2* (July 2004); available from <http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/esc-lectures/SEESox-newsletter2004.pdf>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007, 7.

<sup>39</sup> Erdogan, "Why the European Union Needs Turkey," 8.

<sup>40</sup> "Europe: Enlargement Troubles," *The Economist* 381, iss. 8508 (16 December 2006), 48.

<sup>41</sup> Erdogan, "Why the European Union Needs Turkey," 8.

The 2004 enlargement of 10 countries provides an excellent example of enlargement increasing prosperity for both new and old states. The predictions of a significant boost in economic growth in the new states and a positive but more modest growth for the old states have occurred. The market reforms undertaken by the acceding states created dynamic economies. Increased direct investment and trade has created business opportunities and increased employment. Advocates state that accession is the only way to keep Turks in Turkey. They state that immigration fears have been overstated.<sup>42</sup> There has not been a significant drain in investment from the old states to the new states nor has there been a significant inflow of workers to the old countries from the new states.<sup>43</sup> While challenges remain, the overall assessment is that the union has become stronger and more prosperous from the 2004 enlargement.

Welcoming Turkey into the EU will spread European prosperity all the way to the Middle East. Implementing the full *acquis* package will create a fully functional modern economy, encourage foreign investment, and increase the standard of living.

## **Conclusion**

Turkey holds an abundant wealth of opportunity that the EU has the ability to tap into with their enlargement program. It is a country of 70 million people situated at the strategic crossroads of continents and cultures. Europe will gain from stabilizing and modernizing Turkey's society and economy. It will bring peace to a volatile region,

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<sup>42</sup> Missiroli, 1. Examples from the late 1980s with Spain and Portugal support the same findings.

<sup>43</sup> European Commission, "Enlargement, Two Years After: An Economic Evaluation," available from [http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/index_en.htm); Internet; accessed 10 April 2007, 5.

increase security in a major transit area, build a bridge to the Muslim world and build stability from which wealth and civil society can grow. Turkey has much to offer the union, but is it worth the effort? The next section will look at why Europeans may not want Turkey in the EU.

### **Chapter 3. Why doesn't the EU want Turkey in the EU?**

#### **Introduction**

Turkey has major hurdles to cross on its way to compliance with the *acquis communautaire*. However, an even more difficult challenge may be to win the hearts and minds of the European community by convincing them that they will be better off with Turkey in the union and not just in the neighborhood. In a study of opposition to EU expansion, scholars identified that the level of perceived cultural threat from an applicant and its size and relative poverty were the main sources of opposition to a prospective applicant.<sup>44</sup> Domestic concerns such as unemployment and the integration of Muslim minorities have a major influence on European's attitudes towards Turkey.<sup>45</sup>

Opposition to accession can serve as a rallying cry for domestic political support. Turkey's human rights and democratic record, domestic difficulties with Muslim immigrants, and broad religious and cultural prejudices have led to a Turco-phobic European public who is ready to accept negative messages regarding Turkey's accession.

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<sup>44</sup> Paul Kubicek, "Turkish Accession to the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities," *World Affairs* 168, iss. 2 (Fall 2005), available from <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-139521236.html>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2007, 73.

<sup>45</sup> Barkey, 139.

Politicians are able to use this predisposition to turn membership into a scapegoat for all of Europe's ills and deflect criticism from ineffective EU programs.<sup>46</sup>

### **Not part of Europe**

Many question whether Turkey even qualifies for membership in the EU.<sup>47</sup> The Rome Treaty specifies that membership can only be extended to countries geographically located in Europe. Turkey, which straddles the Bosphorus, lies on the dividing line between Europe and Asia. Only 8% of the country's land mass lies in Europe.<sup>48</sup> While the geographic question may serve more as a technical reason to exclude Turkey from the Union, its strategic location does create a valid set of concerns (and opportunities).

Sandwiched between the Caucasus and the Middle East, Turkey is surrounded by dangerous neighbors in a very unstable region of the world. Its accession would make the EU more exposed and vulnerable to the tensions in the area.<sup>49</sup> At the same time, Turkey could set an agenda for the region that does not reflect the interests of the rest of the EU. Turkey would increase the Mediterranean's representation to 40% of the EU and readjust the EU's focus southward and eastward.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Ioannis Grigoriadis, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Debating the Most Difficult Enlargement Ever," *SAIS Review* vol. 26, iss. 1 (Winter 2006):147-161, 157.

<sup>47</sup> Donald M. Payne, "Turkey and the European Union," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 17, no.2 (Spring 2006), 1.

<sup>48</sup> United States, Library of Congress-Federal Research Division, *Country Profile: Turkey*; available from <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Turkey.pdf>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2007, 1.

<sup>49</sup> Payne, 2.

<sup>50</sup> Emerson and Tocci, "Turkey as a Bridgehead..." 8.

## Too Muslim

Turkey's Muslims account for 99.8 % of its population.<sup>51</sup> Although the EU insists that membership will be judged through the Copenhagen criteria, Europeans are worried about the impact that 70 million new Muslims will have on the character of the EU. This concern has increased in recent years with the escalation of Islamic terrorist attacks in the world and the intensification of extremist religious fervor within Europe. The attacks of 9/11 on the United States and the transit bombings in Madrid and London have deeply affected the European community.

In spite of Ataturk's efforts to create a secular society by purging Islam from state institutions, Islam has remained a force in Turkey, particularly in the country-side. In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the role of Islam in Turkish political and social life.<sup>52</sup> Beginning in the 1950's the democratization of Turkey allowed the creation of Islamic political groups and then in the 1980's Islamic values were promoted by the military and politicians as a defense against Marxist and leftist ideas. As large numbers of Turkish peasants moved to the cities, they brought with them their strong traditional Islamic values. Congregating in shanty towns on the borders, poor and disaffected, they rallied behind the religious parties. In the 1990's, when the Islamists positioned themselves as the clean, efficient alternative to the mainstream parties, they

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<sup>51</sup> European Commission, "Enlargement. Turkey. Political Profile," [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkey/political\\_profile\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkey/political_profile_en.htm); Internet; accessed 1 December 2006.

<sup>52</sup> Stephen Larrabee, "The Troubled Partnership: Turkey and Europe, Santa Monica: Rand, 1998, 60.

attracted both the traditionalist as well as those protesting the failure of government to solve the country's growing social and economic problems.<sup>53</sup>

Prime Minister Erdogan has emphasized Turkey's determination to be part of the EU and noted Turkey's willingness to make the "European values, Ankara values." Certain actions belie that assertion. The 2004 revisions to the Turkish penal code included a proposal to criminalize adultery. Although the provision was eventually scraped, it was done so only after EU pressure. In response to a call to have more women serving in the government, an official stated "Parliamentarianism is a hard task. We often work after midnight. A woman returning that late from work will not be looked upon with decency."<sup>54</sup> The government also drew criticism when it moved to ban an organization supporting homosexual rights. Actions such as these fuel European suspicions that Turkey's values are a great distance away from their own.

There is a growing uneasiness about the ability of Europe's Muslims to integrate into the European secular culture.<sup>55</sup> Examples which have shocked the European and international community include the brutal killing of Theo Van Gogh in The Netherlands by a Muslim upset with criticisms of Islam,<sup>56</sup> and the honor killing of women in

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<sup>53</sup> Larrabee, 61.

<sup>54</sup> Handan Satigoglu, "Is Turkey Deviating From Ataturk's Path? Elections Will Tell," Available from <http://www.worldpoliticswatch.com/article.aspx?id=648>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2007, 1.

<sup>55</sup> Shishkin, 3.

<sup>56</sup> "Islamist held in Van Gogh Case," BBC News, 3 November 2004, available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3978787.stm>; Internet; accessed 9 March 2007.

Germany.<sup>57</sup> These incidents have caused them to question whether the accession of Turkey would make their domestic minority concerns worse. These local experiences generate doubts with the public whether Turkey will be able to integrate as a country with the rest of Europe.

### **Too Big**

Whenever countries engage in international cooperation, they lose a certain amount of control or sovereignty-like powers over matters falling under the purview of the international agreement. The EU is a super international organization and therefore claims a large degree of control from its member states. This loss of jurisdiction is seen in many facets of the EU organization.

Turkey has a population comparable to Germany, the largest EU state.<sup>58</sup> According to the United Nations, in the next 20 years, Turkey will have 89 million people and have the largest population in Europe. By 2050, Turkey's population is projected to be at 100 million, matching the population of France and Germany combined.<sup>59</sup> This has broad implications for the institutions, the member states and the EU representatives and has created a base of resistance to Turkey's accession.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Barkey, 139.

<sup>58</sup> Library of Congress, 8.

<sup>59</sup> Hakki, 399.

<sup>60</sup> Gates, 392.

The EU is an institution like no other. The EU is controlled through an institutional triangle consisting of the Council (representing the national governments), the European Parliament (representing the people) and the European Commission (an independent body upholding the collective interest).

The Council is the main decision-making body and is comprised of one representative from each EU country. Decisions are taken by a simple majority, qualified majority, or unanimously, depending on the subject. The votes are allocated by population size. In most cases, decisions are arrived through a qualified majority of 72.2%. In accordance with the Nice Treaty, the vote must also be supported by at least 50% of the states and at least 62% of the EU population.<sup>61</sup> Unanimous decisions are required for important decisions such as launching of a new common policy or admitting a new member.<sup>62</sup>

The European Parliament represents the EU's citizens. Members of the European Parliament are elected directly by the people every five years. Parliament holds equal legislative weight with the Council in many important fields. It can reject proposed Council legislation with an absolute majority vote. It gives opinions on draft directives and regulations proposed by the European Commission. It gives assent to international

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<sup>61</sup> Richard Baldwin and Mika Widgren, "The Impact of Turkey's Membership on EU Voting," Available from <http://www.ceps.be>; Internet; accessed 2 April 2007, 1. Fontaine quotes 255 out of 345 votes in EU27.

<sup>62</sup> Pascal Fontaine, "Europe in 12 Lessons,"

agreements and any proposed enlargement. It also shares with the council the authority to approve the EU budget.

The European Commission is the executive arm of the EU triangle. The commission ensures that the regulations and directives are implemented by the member states. The Commission is made up of a representative from each country. It manages the programs and budgets of the EU through a civil service of 36 directorates-general. In areas such as trade, the Commission has the authority to negotiate on behalf of the member states.

Decisions reached in the Council and Parliament are binding on its members. In specific areas, EU law overrides national law.<sup>63</sup> The European Commission has the authority to bring non-compliant states in front of the Court of Justice to enforce its rules.<sup>64</sup> In areas such as agriculture, the environment, and competition, policies are driven more by the EU than the member states.

The accession of Turkey will have a significant impact on voting power in the EU. Along with Germany, Turkey would be the largest member in the EU, with the most votes in the Council. In a 28 state union, Turkey and Germany would have 14.5% of the vote each.<sup>65</sup> It would also hold the most seats in the Parliament.<sup>66</sup> With the current

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<sup>63</sup> John McCormick, *Understanding the European Union*, The European Union Series. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 4.

<sup>64</sup> Fontaine, 14.

<sup>65</sup> S. Andoura, 8.

populations and seats, in a 28 member union, Turkey and Germany would each hold 82 of the 786 seats, or 11.2% each.<sup>67</sup>

Modeling has shown that Turkey would be the second most powerful member state in the expanded union, substantially more powerful than France, Italy and the UK.<sup>68</sup> If the members accept Turkey into their union, they will be conceding an important part of their autonomy to the Turkish people and their government. Turkey would have an important voice in the decision-making process although it would be unable by itself or in a coalition with Germany to move or block proposals.<sup>69</sup> Nevertheless, Turkey as the newest member, coming from a very different tradition, culture, religion, and region would move to the top of the power chain and would have a significant impact on the decisions that shape the shared future of the 28 or more countries.

Interestingly, the countries who have had the greatest voting power have also been the greatest contributors to the EU budget. The admission of Turkey will change that power/funding relationship since Turkey will have one of the lowest per capita incomes of all EU states.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> "The Turkish Train Crash," *The Economist*, December 2, 2006, Vol.381, Iss. 8506, 49.

<sup>67</sup> S. Andoura, "EU's Capacity to Absorb Turkey," available from [www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/06/eu/EU-Turkey.pdf](http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/06/eu/EU-Turkey.pdf); Internet, accessed 2 April 2007, 8.

<sup>68</sup> Baldwin and Widgren, 8. The model studied the impact of enlargement from 25 to 29 states. Under the Constitutional Treaty rules, power was reduced on an even basis except for Germany which loses twice as much as any other state. Under the Nice rules, the power loss is skewed towards the larger states.

<sup>69</sup> S. Andoura, 8. Hakki notes that with Turkey's large and growing population, accounting for 15 to 20% of Europe's total, some have argued that Turkey would be able to single-handedly block 76% of the decisions of the Council.

<sup>70</sup> Ioannis Grigoriadis, 157.

Turkey's diversity will slow down an already lumbering decision-making structure,<sup>71</sup> but also impact the EU's capacity to act.<sup>72</sup> The historical passage rate of legislation through the Council has steadily dropped with each enlargement. The passage rate for the original six members was 21.9% but dropped to 7.8% with the 15 country union. Modeling under voting game theory shows that the passage rate drops to 2.8% for EU27 and 2.3% with the enlargement of Turkey and Croatia.<sup>73</sup>

### **Too Poor**

The impact that Turkey will have on the European budget is a major concern for Europeans. Turkey's low GDP guarantees that its contribution to the EU budget would be minor relative to its voting potential and its demand on EU resources. Its agriculture-dominant economy has hindered relations with the EU since Turkey submitted its formal application in 1987.<sup>74</sup> Its poor economic status would qualify the entire country for financial support under the Structural Funds instrument. For these reasons, Europeans are correct to be wary if not completely pessimistic. As this section will describe, Turkey's accession will come at a significant cost.

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<sup>71</sup> Emerson, 8.

<sup>72</sup> Richard Baldwin, and Mika Widgren, "The Impact of Turkey's Membership on EU Voting," Available from <http://www.ceps.be>; Internet; accessed 2 April 2007, 3.

<sup>73</sup> Baldwin and Widgren, 3.

<sup>74</sup> Stephen C. Calleya, "EU-Turkish Relations: Prospects and Problems." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 17, no.2 (Spring 2006), 41.

The European Union holds a limited budget which it uses to support its various programs according to a seven-year plan. Its annual revenue is approximately €100 billion drawn primarily from member states but also from taxes, duties and other sources collected by the EU.<sup>75</sup> Members contribute 1% of their GNP to the European budget.<sup>76</sup> The five richest countries contribute 70% of the EU budget.<sup>77</sup> The budget is spent in seven policy areas: agriculture, regional aid, internal policies, external actions, administration, and accession aid. The first two areas receive the majority of the funds at 46% and 30% respectively.<sup>78</sup>

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) came into force in 1962 to increase agricultural productivity, ensure a fair standard of living for farmers, and stabilize markets. The original CAP paid farmers a fixed price for their produce and established a system of tariffs and subsidies to equalize world prices with the common market price. This highly interventionist policy has been extremely expensive and very controversial.

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<sup>75</sup> European Parliament, "A €115 Billion Question: Making Sense of the 2007 EU Budget," available from [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/public/focus\\_page/034-12348-31](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/public/focus_page/034-12348-31); Internet; accessed 10 April 2007. The budget for 2007 is €115 billion. 65% comes from EU countries, 15% from VAT, 13% from own resources, and 7% from other revenue. Revenue for 2005 was €105 billion. For simplification, calculations in the following section will be based on a rounded revenue of €100 billion.

<sup>76</sup> Kemal Dervis, Daniel Gros, Faik Oztrak and Yusuf Isik, "Turkey and the European Budget: Prospects and Issues," *Center for European Policy Studies WU-Turkey Working Papers no. 6* (August 2004), Available from <http://aei.pitt.edu/6760/>; Internet; Accessed 9 April 2007, 2. 2004 rate. The maximum contribution rate is set at 1.25% of GDP.

<sup>77</sup> European Parliament, "A €115 Billion Question: Making Sense of the 2007 EU Budget," Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Spain were the main contributing nations at 20%, 16.%, 14.%, 12%, and 9% respectively.

<sup>78</sup> European Parliament, "A €115 Billion Question: Making Sense of the 2007 EU Budget,"

CAP has met its major goals of rural support and agricultural self-sufficiency, but also created undesirable second order effects which necessitated a reform of the program. The fixed price encouraged over-production, and the direct subsidies were considered as unfair trade practices by the international community. In 1992, price support was replaced by direct payments based on cultivated area and historical yields. In 1999, at the Berlin European Summit, members agreed to a concept of multifunctionality as one of the CAP's main objectives. This new policy incorporates non-production aspects, which in practice translates into an allocation of 10.5% of total CAP expenditure to these initiatives. The Berlin summit also decentralized some of the direct payments to the states under national envelopes for distribution according to each country's priorities.<sup>79</sup>

The Doha Development Round in 2001 carries the reforms further. Doha attempted to reduce tariff barriers, export subsidies, and domestic agricultural support. A system was introduced to classify policies by the degree to which they distort trade, using "boxes." Since that time, countries have been positioning to classify their system in the "blue box" as non-distorting to avoid dismantling their support structure for domestic producers.<sup>80</sup> The EU is under pressure to eliminate the Common Agricultural Policy subsidies by 2013 in compliance with the World Trade Organization Doha Round provisions.

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<sup>79</sup> Eve Fouilleux, In *European Union Politics*, edited by Michelle Cini, xxx-xxx. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003, 258.

<sup>80</sup> Eve Fouilleux, In *European Union Politics*, edited by Michelle Cini, xxx-xxx. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003, 259.

The EU and public remain firmly committed to the financial support of the agricultural sector but changes are required to ensure that the EU is not bankrupted by agricultural-heavy countries.<sup>81</sup> The spending on CAP has already been reduced several times since its inception 40 years ago. In its first years, it accounted for up to 66% of the EU budget. In 2000, it dropped to 54% and by 2013, the commission expects it to fall to 33%.<sup>82</sup>

The EU has recently legislated CAP transitional provisions that phase in the level of payments over a number of years. CAP payments to members who joined in 2004 started at 25% and increase to 100 % by 2013. The phase-in period is meant to insulate the current members from excessive payments to highly agricultural-dependent states and encourage the new members to restructure their economies away from agriculture. Overall limits have been imposed on CAP expenditures which freeze levels in real terms until 2013, at which time it is expected that further agricultural reforms will be in place to restrict CAP spending.

Regional aid is the second largest financial commitment of the EU. It supports the EU's economic and social cohesion objective by encouraging sustainable economic development, creating employment and contributing toward environmental protection and equality between men and women. Financial support is directed through Structural

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<sup>81</sup> European Commission, "EU Public Strongly Endorses Recent Changes in European Agricultural Policy," available from <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07433&t>; Internet; accessed 8 April 2007.

<sup>82</sup> European Commission, "The Common Agricultural Policy Explained," available from [http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/capexplained/cap\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/capexplained/cap_en.pdf); Internet ; accessed 10 April 2007, 28.

Funds, to support the poorer regions of Europe, and Cohesion Funds, to integrate European infrastructure. The vast majority of funding (60%) is focused on Objective 1 of the Structural Funds, which promotes the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging. Objective 1 regions are those areas whose per capita GDP is less than 75% of the EU average. In the period 2000-2006, 50 regions, representing 22% of the EU population, received assistance. The 2004 and 2007 enlargements have decreased the EU average GDP and as a result many of the poorer EU-15 regions no longer meet the minimum qualifying amounts.<sup>83</sup> This of course has caused dissatisfaction in the countries who no longer qualify for subsidies and resentment toward the new recipients.<sup>84</sup>

Turkey would be a major beneficiary for both CAP and Structural Funds. Turkey's weak economy, low per capita income and huge agricultural sector suggest that Turkey's financial support will be significant. Its per-capita income is the lowest of any joiner.<sup>85</sup> Its entire territory would be eligible for support under Objective 1 of the Structural Funds. Agriculture plays an important economic and social role in Turkey just in terms of its absolute size and its impact on the budget. In 2004, one third of the workforce was employed in agriculture compared to 5% for EU25 states.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> European Commission, "General Provisions on the Structural Funds," available from <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/160014.htm>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2007.

<sup>84</sup> Transitional provisions have been established to ease the change.

<sup>85</sup> Barkey, 131.

<sup>86</sup> Huran Ucak, "Monitoring Agriculture of Turkey Before Accession process for EU Membership," *Journal of Central European Agriculture* (2006) Vol 12, n.o 3; Available from [http://www.agr.hr/jcea/issues/jcea7-3/pdf/jcea73-19\\_proc\\_p\\_05.pdf](http://www.agr.hr/jcea/issues/jcea7-3/pdf/jcea73-19_proc_p_05.pdf); Internet; Accessed 8 April 2007, 546.

It's uncertain what the exact impact of Turkey's accession will have on the financial health of the union. In many ways, Turkey's accession will resemble the 2004 and 2007 accessions. Turkey's per capita GDP and weight of employment in agriculture is similar to the Central East European Countries who joined in 2004. In terms of economic mass and population, it is roughly double the 2007 enlargement.<sup>87</sup>

Daniel Gros has attempted to quantify the potential financial impact on the EU budget from two perspectives: one if Turkey joined today under current rules and second if it joined in 2020 under assumed conditions.<sup>88</sup> If Turkey were to join the EU today, its Structural Funds allocations would be around € 8 billion annually.<sup>89</sup> CAP payments to Turkey would be around € 9 billion annually, based on per hectare payments and current yields.<sup>90</sup> Turkey's contribution to the European budget would be € 2 billion based on a 1% contribution rate and its current GDP of 2% of EU-28's GDP. Turkey, therefore, would be a net beneficiary of approximately €15 billion annually.

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<sup>87</sup> Daniel Gros, "Economic Aspects of Turkey's Quest for EU Membership," *Center for European Policy Studies CEPS Policy Brief no. 69* (April 2005), Available from [www.shop.ceps.be](http://www.shop.ceps.be); Internet; accessed 9 April 2007, 1.

<sup>88</sup> Daniel Gros, 2.

<sup>89</sup> Kemal Dervis, Daniel Gros, Faik oztrak and Yusuf Isik. "Turkey and the European Budget: Prospects and Issues." *Center for European Policy Studies WU-Turkey Working Papers no. 6* (August 2004). Available from <http://aei.pitt.edu/6760/>; Internet; Accessed 9 April 2007, 2.

<sup>90</sup> Dervis, 2.

If Turkey were to join the EU in 2020, at its current growth rate and anticipated reforms, its GDP could realistically double to 4%.<sup>91</sup> This would mean that Turkey would be eligible for €16 billion in Structural Funds. CAP funding is more difficult to estimate, but based on an “equivalent rate of support” for Turkish agriculture, Turkey would receive .08% of EU GDP, or €8 billion.<sup>92</sup> These total receipts of €24 billion would be offset by a contribution of €4 billion based on a 1% contribution rate and its projected GDP of 4%.<sup>93</sup> Turkey, therefore, would be a net beneficiary of approximately €20 billion annually.

The cost of Turkey has been a significant accession concern. Based on the two scenarios above, the liability ranges between €15-20 billion a year, or at most 0.2% of EU GDP. But is this amount unmanageable for the union? For national governments who spend in the range of 40-50% of GDP, this expenditure is insignificant. But the EU is not the national government; the contributing nations are sensitive to where the funds are being directed and which countries are net beneficiaries. Spending 20% of the common budget on the needs of one contributing state carries a powerful and unwelcome political message. Turkey’s allocation would decrease over time as economic reforms and restructures took place but the change would be gradual.

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<sup>91</sup> Daniel Gros, “Economic Aspects of Turkey’s Quest for EU Membership,” *Center for European Policy Studies CEPS Policy Brief no. 69* (April 2005), available from [www.shop-ceps.be](http://www.shop-ceps.be); Internet; accessed 9 April 2007, 2.

<sup>92</sup> Dervis, 3. Changes are likely in the CAP methodology and Turkey’s industry is in flux. Between 1980 and 2004, the percent of the workforce employed in agriculture dropped from 50% to 34%<sup>92</sup> Agriculture currently accounts for 12% of GDP. Within the next decade, that percentage is likely to drop to 10%. Turkey would receive .08% of EU GDP (.2\*.1\*.4), or €8 billion. 20% of value added based on the rate that EU farmers now receive.

<sup>93</sup> Dervis, 3.

## **Worker migration**

Under EU rules, citizens from member countries have the right to travel, live, and work freely in any of the member states. Europeans are fearful that Turkish workers would stream into other EU countries. The movement would increase immigrant populations over a short period of time and put downward pressure on wages and increased competition for scarce jobs. This concern appears substantiated by surveys showing that 44% of Turks (the bulk being young people) would try to find work elsewhere in Europe if Turkey were let into the EU.<sup>94</sup> However, as discussed earlier, actual experiences from previously acceding countries show that worker migration would be minimal.

## **Human Rights record**

Turkey made the international headlines in January 2007 when Hrant Dink, the editor of a Turkish-Armenian newspaper was shot dead outside his office by a Turk. His killer was infuriated by the editor's criticism of the treatment of Armenians, in particular the mass killing of Ottoman Turks in 1915. His death was the 19<sup>th</sup> in the past 15 years, making Turkey the 8<sup>th</sup> most dangerous country in the world for journalists.

Isolated acts of violence carried out by extremists are not uncommon in other parts of Europe or the world. However, the pattern of violence in Turkey occurs in a backdrop where citizens are jailed for speaking out against Turkey, its government or its national character. Dink himself had been prosecuted several times for, among other

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<sup>94</sup> David Scott, "Turks Ready to Move," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 16 December 04, available from <http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1216/p06s01-wogn.html>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007.

things, criticizing the wording of the national anthem.<sup>95</sup> Subsequent photos of the shooter posing with police and a Turkish flag in the background hint how deep the roots of nationalism run and the level of institutional intolerance to dissenting views.

Turkey has resisted removing article 301 from the penal code, which makes it a crime to “insult” Turkey because it helps to control dissent from destabilizing groups such as Kurdish Turks. However, freedom of expression and the liberalization of society are key issues that must be corrected before Turkey is allowed into the EU. In the meantime, nervous Europeans see these repressive practices and fundamentalist actions as evidence that Turkey’s values are fundamentally different from Europe’s.

## **Security**

According to Emerson and Tocci, the most important challenge posed by Turkey’s accession is the EU’s ability to control its external borders and to act beyond them.<sup>96</sup> Turkey will add 2949 km of land borders, mostly crossing through mountains and 8330 km of sea borders.<sup>97</sup> On the other side of these borders reside fledgling states with repressed civil societies and ongoing violence.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> “Haunted by the Past.” *The Guardian*, 23 January 2007. Available from <http://www.guardian.com.uk/turkey/story/0,,1996565,00.html>; Internet; accessed 27 February 2007.

<sup>96</sup> Emmerson, 8.

<sup>97</sup> Barkey, 140.

<sup>98</sup> Barkey, 140

Unlike some of the previous accessions, Turkish accession would bring the EU into the backyard of some of the world's most volatile neighbors. These countries vary drastically from Europe in religion, political structure, values, language and orientation. Some argue that Turkey would be of better service to the EU as a buffer zone between the EU and the volatile Middle East rather than as the South Eastern border of the EU. Turkey is already embroiled in conflicts with Cyprus and Armenia. Their border with Iraq is vulnerable. If Iraq disintegrates into its constituent ethnic components, there could be a significant migration across its borders and intense pressure from its Kurdish minority for unification with their Iraqi brothers.<sup>99</sup>

## **Conclusion**

There are many and varied reasons why Europeans do not want Turkey in the EU. With each successive enlargement, the EU has become stronger and wealthier, but progressively unmanageable. While enlargement flows across Europe, bureaucrats work to deepen the integration of the states and consolidate control in Brussels. This double effect takes the decision-making power from the states and spreads it to far-flung, unfamiliar governments.

The prospect of yielding jurisdiction to Turkey is too much to contemplate for most Europeans. The last enlargements to the East European countries brought new democracies, broken economies, more languages and a hundred million needy people into the union; however, no one doubted their European credentials, their shared culture and common heritage. Turkey, who had lined up for accession long before the East

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<sup>99</sup> Barkey, 138

Europeans, shares all the problems that the East Europeans brought but few of the common European threads. What's more, once Turkey steps in the halls of power in Brussels, with 70 million citizens they move into the upper echelons of power. On their own or in combination non-federalist states like the UK, they will be able to immediately begin shaping a new Europe reflecting their unique cultural values and their geo-strategic location in the world. For Europeans already in throes of unprecedented change, that's too much, too fast.

## **Chapter 4. The obstacles to accession.**

### **Introduction**

Since Turkey's application for EU membership in 1987, 13 other countries have applied and been accepted to the EU.<sup>100</sup> The road to accession will not be an easy one for Turkey and it can expect to come across a few ambushes along the way. There is no question that Turkey will have to transform if it hopes to gain accession to the EU. It will have to control powerful groups within its political and military organizations as well as placate the fears of those within Turkey and the EU who see reforms either going too far or not far enough to meet the comprehensive requirements in the EU *acquis*. Strong resistance to Turkey joining the EU from many fronts is further complicated by factors such as the long accession time frame, the number of reforms required and the power of the parties to foil the agreement.

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<sup>100</sup> Smith, 277.

## External opposition to Turkish Accession

### *Introduction*

Turkey has been pursuing the European community since the 1950's. Finally, in 2005, the conditions became favorable long enough to gain political consensus on Turkey's accession. Italy, Finland, Spain, Sweden and the UK are Turkey's main supporters while Austria, France, Germany and Cyprus are either opposed to Turkey or hold reservations. The European public, in contrast to many of their leaders are against accession. This section will outline the position of key states and the European public regarding Turkey's accession.

### *Austria*

The Austrian government is strongly against Turkey joining the EU. Their position is backed by eighty percent of its citizens who oppose accession.<sup>101</sup> At the 3 October 2005 EU meeting, Austria fought hard to grant Turkey a lower status than full EU membership and only conceded their position under intense pressure from the British and the Americans.<sup>102</sup> The following day, the UK's Guardian paper wrote: "Austrian opposition to Turkish membership is a toxic blend of historical prejudice and contemporary fear, of Ottoman janissaries at the gates of Vienna, of Hapsburg nostalgia, and Muslim gastarbeiter flooding in from deepest Anatolia."<sup>103</sup> The German paper Die

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<sup>101</sup> "EU and Turkey Agree Terms," *Guardian Unlimited* 3 October 2005, available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/turkey/story/0,12700,1583966,00.html>; Internet accessed 27 February 2007.

<sup>102</sup> Payne, 1.

<sup>103</sup> "Time to Talk Turkey," *Guardian Unlimited*, 30 September 2005, Available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,5297791-106710,00.html>; Internet; accessed 8 March 2007.

Tageszeitung agreed, stating that Austria's position was the result of a wish to keep Muslim countries out of the EU.<sup>104</sup>

Even though Austria finally acquiesced, other EU countries accuse Austria of acting with an ulterior motive, of using its agreement on Turkey to negotiate the opening of talks on Croatian accession.<sup>105</sup> While withdrawing their opposition and allowing the application to proceed, Austria secured a guarantee that member states may halt Turkey's membership if during the negotiation process they conclude that it is impossible to comfortably absorb Turkey.<sup>106</sup> This provision adds another avenue, in addition to a member veto, for a dissenting country to halt Turkey's accession.

### *France*

In 2004, both the French government and public were united in their opposition to Turkey. 2004 public opinion polls in France showed an 80% rejection rate of Turkish accession.<sup>107</sup> In 2002, just prior to the Copenhagen European Council meeting, the Convention Chairman Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France stated that Turkey has "a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life...Its capital is not in Europe, 95% of its population lives outside Europe, it is not a European country...In my

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<sup>104</sup> Lucy Jones, "Austria Wants to keep Muslim Countries Out of the EU," According to German Paper," *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* 24, Iss. 9 (December 2005), 40.

<sup>105</sup> Jones, 40.

<sup>106</sup> "EU and Turkey Agree Terms, *Guardian Unlimited* 3 October 2005, Available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/turkey/story/0,12700,1583966,00.html>; Internet accessed 27 February 2007, 2.

<sup>107</sup> "The EU-25's View of Turkey's Membership Bid," *EurActiv.co.*, Available from <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-25-view-turkey-membership-bid/article-133328>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2006, 2.

opinion it would be the end of the EU”<sup>108</sup> Turkey could face stiffer opposition if Nicolas Sarkozy becomes France’s president in the spring of 2007 since he is fiercely against Turkish membership.<sup>109</sup>

The French government’s resistance may be explained by the power dynamics that will evolve at Turkey’s accession. At the end of WWII, France was humiliated and relegated to the status of minor power. Charles de Gaulle convinced France that in uniting with Germany, the two countries could become global players again and use the other European countries to their advantage. With the accession of Turkey, this balance of power could be lost to Turkey and its ally of choice. The former French Minister of Justice, Toubon, suggested that Turkey in the EU might cause a break in the “Berlin-Paris axis, which is the most effective axis in the decision-making mechanism of the EU, and its replacement with the London-Ankara axis.”<sup>110</sup>

Although the French government spoke strongly in support of Turkey during its 2005 accession discussions, it has since been erecting hurdles to Turkey’s plans.<sup>111</sup> At the end of 2006, the French Parliament passed a law making it a crime to deny that Turks committed genocide against the Armenians.<sup>112</sup> The government has stated that it will hold

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<sup>108</sup> Nathalie Tocci, Henri Barkey, Natalia Oultchenko, Kuseyin Bagci, and Saban Kardas; “Turkey’s Strategic Future.” *European Security Forum Working Paper*, no. 13 (May 2003) [Journal on-line]; available from [http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article\\_id=318](http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=318); Internet; accessed 12 December 2006, 5.

<sup>109</sup> “Europe: The Ever lengthening Road...” 39.

<sup>110</sup> Hakki, 399.

<sup>111</sup> “EU and Turkey Agree Terms,” 3.

<sup>112</sup> Shishkin, 3.

a referendum on Turkish accession, but not on Croatia's, even though both began negotiations at the same time.<sup>113</sup> With public opinion strongly against Turkey, a vote would end in a No and foil Turkey's bid.

### *The Netherlands*

The public is largely against Turkey's accession and is increasingly supported by the government.<sup>114</sup> There has been significant unrest in the Muslim community in the Netherlands, noted by the slaying of Van Gogh. Dutch hostility towards the new Eastern European members from the 2004 enlargement played a role in the Dutch rejection of the EU constitution. The Dutch foreign Minister Bot suggested that a Netherlands referendum would not go well for Turkey.<sup>115</sup>

### *Germany*

Germany is supportive of Turkey at the highest levels. The German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, spoke strongly in favor of Turkish accession at the 2005 commission meeting.<sup>116</sup> However, Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, wants Turkey to be offered a "privileged partnership" rather than full membership.<sup>117</sup> Germany has the largest community of Turkish immigrants.<sup>118</sup> Three million have migrated to Germany

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<sup>113</sup> Shishkin, 3.Hakki, 395 as well.

<sup>114</sup> "EU-25's View...", 2.

<sup>115</sup> Hakki, 396.

<sup>116</sup> "EU and Turkey Agree Terms," 3.

<sup>117</sup> "Europe: the Ever Lengthening Road...", 39.

<sup>118</sup> "EU-25's View...", 2.

over the past 40 years.<sup>119</sup> In September 2002, Schroeder won the general election by a slim margin with the help of the Turkish population. Germany is by far Turkey's largest trading partner.<sup>120</sup>

### *Greece*

Greece is Turkey's historic adversary. However, at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Greece changed its obstructive stance to one of support for Turkish membership.<sup>121</sup> During the accession talks in 2005, it spoke strongly in favor of Turkey.<sup>122</sup> It's viewed that Greece's support is linked to the resolution of a number of outstanding disputes between the two countries. In 2004, 45% of Greek citizens rejected the idea of Turkey in the EU.<sup>123</sup>

### *Cyprus*

Cyprus is one of the hardest critics of Turkey.<sup>124</sup> Cyprus has very few incentives to smooth the way for Turkey into the EU. When agreeing to Turkey's application in

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<sup>119</sup> Hakki, 400.

<sup>120</sup> Robert Fulford, "A Nation in Denial," *National Post*, 3 February 2007, available from <http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/story.html?id=389d82ff-786e-43ab-a997-8732fea34a34>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2007.

<sup>121</sup> Ioannis Grigoriadis, 148.

<sup>122</sup> "EU and Turkey Agree Terms," 3.

<sup>123</sup> "EU-25's View...," 2.

<sup>124</sup> Shishkin, 3.

2004, the Cypriot leader, Tassos Papdopoulos, stated that while giving up one “big veto”, he retained 62 “small vetos.”<sup>125</sup>

### *Britain*

Britain is Turkey’s principle champion in the EU.<sup>126</sup> Turkey’s entrance would constitute a strategic gain for Britain.<sup>127</sup> The full entrance of Turkey into EU politics could shift the power base from Germany and France to the UK and other middle powers and position the UK as the European powerhouse. Turkey could have the ability to form alliances with anti-federalist countries such as the UK and Denmark to block any legislation or foreign policy initiatives.<sup>128</sup> For this very reason, Turkey’s accession poses a concern for both France and Germany.

### *United States*

The United States strongly supports the accession of Turkey to the EU and has been a vocal advocate for the country. Turkey’s accession to the EU serves American foreign policy interests in the Middle East and Europe. The United States views Turkey as a strategic ally in the fight against Terrorism.<sup>129</sup> Accession pre-conditions require Turkey to reform its economy and domestic policies that currently create instability in the country and region. The US believes that the reforms demanded by the EU will lead to

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<sup>125</sup> Barkey, 133.

<sup>126</sup> “EU and Turkey Agree Terms,” 2.

<sup>127</sup> The EU-25’s view...,” 2.

<sup>128</sup> Hakki, 399.

<sup>129</sup> F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser. *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003, 69.

an improved economy and a liberalized society that is less likely to support radical political movements. The conditions for EU membership also require Turkey to resolve its outstanding conflicts with its neighbors, offering the hope of reconciliation with Cyprus, Armenia and Greece.<sup>130</sup>

Support from the US may become more of a liability than an asset for Turkey. The US's vocal support for Turkey's candidacy caused friction between the US and Europe.<sup>131</sup> European countries such as France, are incensed by the Americans' intrusion in European affairs. As the US continues its fight against terrorism and remains focused on Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Israel, Turkey will figure with increasing prominence in its strategic plan and invoke even stronger support from the US.<sup>132</sup>

"Global Trend 2015" notes that the EU, led by Germany, is becoming an important strategic rival to the US.<sup>133</sup> Opponents to Turkish accession believe that the US is supporting Turkey so that the EU will become destabilized or to weaken the Union so that it cannot challenge the US on the world stage politically or economically.<sup>134</sup> Hakki suggests that Turkey would dilute the political unity of the EU and make it "softer."<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> Tocci. "Anchoring Turkey to Europe," 11.

<sup>131</sup> Larrabee, "Age of Uncertainty," 68.

<sup>132</sup> Larrabee, 69.

<sup>133</sup> Hakki, 399.

<sup>134</sup> Hakki, 399.

<sup>135</sup> Hakki, 399.

### *Popular Support for Accession*

The European public has complained that the community's elite have been steering them down the path to Turkish integration without respecting the wishes of the people. Even while the politicians were brokering the deal for Turkey, the European public was clearly not behind them. Polls at the time showed that 54% of EU citizens, and 73% of Austrians, opposed Turkey's accession.<sup>136</sup>

The constitutional crisis is a sign of the mounting dissatisfaction and could serve as a rallying point for all of other European woes. As with the constitution treaty, it will not suffice that the elite back Turkey's accession; if the people are not behind it, it will not pass. The right-wing populist Geert Wilders links the constitution with Turkey's accession:

“The political elite want to admit Turkey into the union...an Islamic country of millions that will have an enormous influence on the federal super-state. Because of the new European constitution, Turkey will have more influence on Dutch legislation than the Netherlands itself.”<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>136</sup> “EU and Turkey Agree Terms,” 3.

<sup>137</sup> Victor Jorg and Martin Kreickenbrum, “Netherlands: Referendum Revealed Broad Opposition to EU Constitution,” available from <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/jun2005/neth-j04.shtml>; Internet; Accessed 19 March 2007.

## *Roadblocks*

For the first time in EU history, the full accession of a candidate member is not guaranteed.<sup>138</sup> The road to accession for Turkey is a long one and there are many obstacles that can be placed in its way to halt its progress or hinder its momentum. And this seems to be exactly what is happening. The Economist concludes that France, Austria and Cyprus are making demands that seem aimed at frustrating and delaying Turkey's efforts to conform to the EU's guidelines.<sup>139</sup>

Since negotiations began in 2005, only two of the 35 chapters have been opened. The Turkish ambassador to the EU blames obstructionist tactics by EU states opposed to Turkey's membership.<sup>140</sup> The EU blames Turkey's failure to meet commitments it made when negotiations began.

The first paragraph of the 17 December 2004 declaration stated that accession depended not only on the candidate's performance during the negotiations but also on the capacity of the EU to absorb new members.<sup>141</sup> This condition provides an easy out for the EU if Turkey manages to comply with the conditions of accession but fails to win over all the states. If the Ukraine and the Balkans become EU members before Turkey, or if the

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<sup>138</sup> Murat Metin Hakki, "Will the European Union Allow Turkey In?" *American Foreign Policy Interests* 27 (2005), 395. The organization emphasized in writing that full accession of a candidate member is not guaranteed.

<sup>139</sup> "The Turkish Train Crash."

<sup>140</sup> Philip Shishkin and Marc Champion, "Politics and Economics: Turkey's EU Bid Quietly Loses Steam," *Wall Street Journal* 2 November 2006.

<sup>141</sup> Hakki, 396.

recent enlargements prove too cumbersome for the EU, Turkey could be shut out indefinitely.<sup>142</sup>

Submitting the question of accession to a referendum significantly compounds Turkey's problems. There is a significant difference between the level of support for Turkey at the political level and the public. It is more difficult for the general public to understand the complex economic and political reasons behind the EU's expansionist program. Rather the public takes a more pragmatic view of how enlargement may impact their daily lives. They tend to rely on their intuition and have strong reservations about Turkey's impact on local employment, European values, etc. While many of Europe's leaders view Turkey as a challenging but interesting opportunity, their citizens see Turkey as too big, too poor, too distant and too Muslim. It is broadly believed that regardless of Turkey's performance against the *acquis*, a referendum on the issue in any major state would fail.<sup>143</sup> So far, Austria and France have publicly stated that a referendum will take place but others could opt to put the accession to a popular vote.<sup>144</sup> Public opinion in both these countries is strongly in opposition to its accession.

The Constitutional Treaty was scheduled to enter into effect on 1 November 2009 but the initiative has been stalled in the constitutional crisis.<sup>145</sup> Both France and the

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<sup>142</sup> Hakki, 396.

<sup>143</sup> "The EU-25's View of Turkey's Membership Bid," *EurActiv.com*, available from <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-25-view-turkey-membership-bid/article-133328>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2006.

<sup>144</sup> Gates, 390.

<sup>145</sup> Ioannis Grigoriadis, 157.

Netherlands have rejected the constitution during a referendum on the treaty. Twenty-two percent of the French who voted “No” to the constitution cited opposition to Turkey as the reason for their vote.<sup>146</sup> Along with a backlash to recent enlargements, the support for Turkey accession in spite of public disapproval has played a role in the defeat of the vote.

The rejection of the Constitution in France and the Netherlands could greatly hamper the effectiveness of the EU.<sup>147</sup> The European constitution forges a tighter political union among its members and creates a stronger European identity.<sup>148</sup> It addresses power allocation, decision-making and vote weighting to account for past and future enlargements. Proposals would require the support of at least 55% of the EU member states and 65% of the EU population. Modeling shows that with an alignment of the voting rules proposed in the Constitutional Treaty would increase the passage probability to 12.2%, or comparable to the rate for EU10.<sup>149</sup>

### **Internal opposition**

There are many forces at play in Turkey contriving to foil the government’s plan for Turkey to join the EU. The number of reforms and level of conformity mandated by the EU has turned the accession process into a tight-wire act for the government. The military, a major force within the country, shifts between support for the Westernization

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<sup>146</sup> Paul Kubicek, 71.

<sup>147</sup> Ioannis Grigoriadis, 157.

<sup>148</sup> Paul Kubicek, 68.

<sup>149</sup> Baldwin and Widgren, 3.

of the country and opposition to the reduced role that the alignment entails. Factions ideologically opposed to association with the EU play at the government's weak spots to spread dissent among the population. Ideological confrontations between these groups or action against the government could escalate into violence, halt the accession process and flood political refugees and economic migrants into Europe.<sup>150</sup>

The Turkish public was solidly in favor of accession at the beginning of negotiation but has become jaded by what they consider a one-sided negotiation. In December 2006, polls suggested that Turkish support for the EU dropped well below 50% from its high of 80% in 2004.<sup>151</sup> They believe that Europe does not want a large, Muslim country in the union and that they are erecting roadblocks so that Turkey walks away from the EU.<sup>152</sup> "First they tied our arms, now they are going to tie our legs," sums up the feeling of Turks as leaders prepared to discuss the suspension of accession chapters in December 2006.<sup>153</sup>

Turks are looking for rewards from the EU to match what they feel are the many concessions that they are making toward the union. What they are getting instead are provocative measures from the European Commission and the member states. On 28 September 2005, the EU Parliament issued a declaration setting the acknowledgment of a

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<sup>150</sup> Desai, 376.

<sup>151</sup> "Europe: The Ever lengthening Road..." 39.

<sup>152</sup> "Europe: The Ever Lengthening Road..." 39.

<sup>153</sup> "Europe: The Ever Lengthening Road; Turkey and the European Union," *The Economist* 381, Iss. 8507 (9 December 2006), 39.

Turkish “genocide” of Armenians between 1915 and 1918 as a condition of accession to the EU.<sup>154</sup>

The military plays a key role in Turkey. Critics call the military a “state within a state.” They are the defenders of the secular state and have been given powers to ensure that they are able to respond effectively against any threat to the nation or its secular nature. Since 1960, the military has removed four governments from power, bringing in military control until a suitable government could be brought to office. While a section of the military supports the EU, a substantial element believes that the liberal reforms and restrictions on national sovereignty will destroy the country. They fear that Ataturk’s vision of a strong country will be endangered by empowered minorities claiming self-determination.<sup>155</sup>

The military exercises control over the government through the National Security Council, a body comprised of military and civilian leaders. The current constitution was created by the military in 1982. In it, cabinet was required to give “priority consideration to the decisions” of the National Security Council (NSC) “necessary for the preservation of the State.” Officers of the Turkish General Staff have held more power than political

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<sup>154</sup> Ahto Lobjakas, “EU: Parliament Registers Displeasure With Turkey Ahead of Expected Accession Talks,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 28 September 2005, available from <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/09/07ac9aa3-68d5-4158-9892-7a72f4546293.html>; Internet; accessed 27 February 2007, 1.

<sup>155</sup> Ioannis Grigoriadis, 150.

leaders to set and advance national goals because the constitution dictated that half the members must be army officers.<sup>156</sup>

Reforms of the military are hampered by the strong support for the military among the public. As Gareth Jenkins states: “The integration of military values into the definition of what it means to be Turkish has resulted in the military being viewed as the incarnation of the loftiest national values and embodying the essence of Turkishness.”<sup>157</sup> He further notes that “For most Turkish males, circumcision and military service remain the two rites of passage into manhood.”<sup>158</sup> The presence of security threats posed by Kurdish and Islamic militants reinforces the need for a strong military.<sup>159</sup> This deep-rooted connection with the military ensures a strong support for the institution and distrust of those seeking the minimization of its role or power.

Recent reforms have limited the powers of the military by changing the composition of the council so that civilians are in the majority and by creating a joint military/civilian chairmanship of the council.<sup>160</sup> The government is only required to

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<sup>156</sup> Shiskin, 2.

<sup>157</sup> Gareth Jenkins, “Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics,” Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, available from [http://www.amazon.ca/gp/reader/0198509715/ref=sib\\_fs\\_top/701-2938176-0041944?ie=UTF8&p=S00A&checksum=ZQaEglwr0kZU53wCC%2FZ%2FMaoyThUWGNh6O1rG6m5Bd70%3D#reader-page](http://www.amazon.ca/gp/reader/0198509715/ref=sib_fs_top/701-2938176-0041944?ie=UTF8&p=S00A&checksum=ZQaEglwr0kZU53wCC%2FZ%2FMaoyThUWGNh6O1rG6m5Bd70%3D#reader-page); Internet; accessed 13 March 2007, 12.

<sup>158</sup> Jenkins, 13.

<sup>159</sup> Andrea Gates. “Negotiating Turkey’s Accession: the Limitations of the Current EU Strategy,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10 (2005), 388.

<sup>160</sup> Andrea Gates. “Negotiating Turkey’s Accession: the Limitations of the Current EU Strategy,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10 (2005), 389.

“evaluate” the body’s decisions, rather than “take them into consideration.” The NSC meets less frequently and although the military still decides on the size of the defense budget the government can now audit military accounts.<sup>161</sup> Military courts are no longer permitted to try civilians.<sup>162</sup>

The European Commission makes it clear in its most recent report that military reforms have a long way to go before they satisfy the EU’s conditions of accession. It notes in the November 2006 report that the military exercises “significant political influence” and criticizes that the military has a wide margin of maneuver within the broad definition of national security. It concludes that that military should limit their public comments about defense matters.

Although the military has vowed to defend secularism, there is a strong Islamic element within the military that has to be monitored. Every year, the High Military Council removes officers whom they view are engaged in “reactionary” activities including religious extremism.<sup>163</sup>

The Islamists have been for decades working towards a Turkish Islamic revival and are fearful the policies that the government is adopting could undermine their efforts. There are suspicious of the EU with their Christian heritage and bias.<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> Paul Kubicek, 70.

<sup>162</sup> Phillips, 2.

<sup>163</sup> Phillips, 2.

<sup>164</sup> Desai, 375.

The Nationalists strongly oppose accession. They feel that the country will cede too much of its sovereignty and would rather see alliances with their eastern neighbors.<sup>165</sup> As Turkey brings in each of their reforms aimed at conforming to the EU policies, the nationalists see Turkey becoming more Westernized and having less and less control over their own policies. They strongly oppose the recognition of Kurdish citizens as a distinct minority group.<sup>166</sup> Many of the reforms are granting the Kurds greater autonomy, and restricting the actions that the government can take against their censure or punishment.

### **Timing and length of Process**

Both Turkey and the EU are sensitive to the vulnerabilities associated with the timing of the negotiations and the length of the process. The last two enlargements, the ratification of a new controversial constitution, and disputes with the Muslim community have left the European public in a foul mood. The overwhelming number of reforms and the time to implement will require a succession of governments to keep a skeptical public engaged and on-track.

### *Political Fall-out*

In past enlargements, members were brought on-line with very little controversy. There were clear gains for both applicants and existing members from expansion. The citizens and parliamentarians both internally and externally were in support. While

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<sup>165</sup> Desai, 376.

<sup>166</sup> Desai, 376

reforms were necessary, there was unity behind the decision and little political fall-out. The recent rounds, however, have become highly politicized and risky for the politicians involved. Enlargement is now viewed as an elitist project that ignores the views of the common person.

### *Enlargement fatigue*

Europe is still adjusting to the entrance of 10 mainly Eastern European countries in 2004 and an additional two in 2007.<sup>167</sup> There is a feeling that it will take some time to fully integrate the members. While the countries have introduced reforms to align with EU policy, the process of aligning values and customs will take much longer. Europeans are dealing with the realities of former-communists block countries trying to assimilate to the modern concepts of a liberal democratic union and the differences are surfacing.

Europeans are tired of pouring money into other countries to raise their standard. The prospect of starting all over again with a country the size of Turkey does not go over well with the European community. It could cost upwards of tens of billions of Euros in addition to the money from the EU for Turkey to implement all the changes demanded in the *acquis communautaire*.<sup>168</sup>

### *Enlargement or integration debate*

In the midst of its rapid enlargement, the EU has been trying to consolidate its position to correct its current weaknesses to improve its governance. At the same time, it has also been dealing with the question of whether the union should integrate further.

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<sup>167</sup> Shishkin, 3.

<sup>168</sup> Hakki, 401.

The uncertainty and disagreement that congregates around change has been spilling over into the enlargement debate. The lack of agreement on the shape of the organization itself makes it more difficult for Turkey to transition smoothly into the union.

### *Length of process*

Turkey has been on the road to accession since 1987. For twenty years it has worked toward meeting the conditions for membership and now faces another 15 years to reach full membership. All throughout this process Turkey has had to deal with changing membership conditions, economic cycles, changing governments, changing public opinion, and changing strategic objectives of its allies and foes. Any one of these variables could unfavorably change Turkey's chances for accession. After so many years of reforming the country to meet the conditions for success, in 2004 the strategic interests of key allies lined up to clear the way for accession talks, only to have Turkey's accession efforts dragged down by sagging public support for enlargement.

Turkey has had five good years of economic growth and each year seems to improve on the last. This steady improvement reassures the public that things are getting better and each year, the general standard of living should marginally improve. Although much of the improving conditions may be a permanent result of restructures that the government is putting in place to conform with the *acquis*, economies are all cyclical and Turkey will undoubtedly face a series of downturns over the life of the negotiations. It will be a challenge at those times for a pro-union party to retain power and to convince the public that all their sacrifices and seemingly endless concessions are beneficial in the long run. Within the EU, Turkey's powerful growth, especially during

periods of poor economic activity in other regions of Europe is a reassuring sign to EU members that Turkey's accession will benefit the whole community. Each year that Turkey's economy improves, Turkey becomes less of a liability in the eyes of the European public. A bad timed turndown could provide a powerful weapon for the foes of Turkey and weigh against its accession bid.

Agreement cleared the way for negotiations because it was in the strategic interests of the members to allow Turkey to begin the process. Full acceptance of Turkey is a different matter for a different time. Strategic interests work in a dynamic environment and are constantly changing. Gaining the unanimous consent of all the members requires the strategic interests of all member states to line up with Turkey's accent. Turkey has come as far as it has by persistence. If it hopes to accede it has to complete its evolution to a modern western state and wait until the conditions turn in its favor.

Because enlargement is so highly politicized, the positions and motivations of political parties, within and without the target country can have an enormous impact on the success of negotiations. Talks on the suspended chapters is not expected to resume any time soon because three important elections are going to take place over the next 18 months. Turkey will elect a new President and Prime Minister, and Cyprus will elect a new President.<sup>169</sup> Over these election periods, politicians will be posturing to gain voter support, which includes avoiding risky issues and promoting policies popular with the

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<sup>169</sup> "The Turkish Train Crash."

public. With popularity for enlargement so low in the polls and pressure from Islamic and nationalistic elements coming into play during elections, the government will likely be hesitant to bring in painful reforms.

### **Capacity to successfully negotiate the *acquis communautaire***

The *acquis communautaire* is the technical mechanism to indicate Turkey's preparedness to join the community. In comparison to Turkey's task, earlier enlargements have been relatively uncomplicated. The Turkish government faces a complete overhaul of the country's status quo if it hopes to meet all the reforms demanded under the Copenhagen criteria and the *acquis communautaire*.<sup>170</sup> Once the country has adopted all the laws contained in the document it will have a solid framework upon which good government can rest.

Olli Rehn, of the EU has expressed frustration at Turkey's lack of progress since negotiations opened in implementing legislative and other changes necessary for reform.<sup>171</sup> Slow forward movement is not a surprise considering the challenges. Given the size of the country, its sluggish bureaucracy and judicial system and the extent of the changes required, implementation is likely going to take a long time. All the while, the government and the EU commission lay open to flak from all sides.

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<sup>170</sup> Andrea Gates. "Negotiating Turkey's Accession: the Limitations of the Current EU Strategy," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10 (2005), 388.

<sup>171</sup> Philip Shishkin, A6.

Although over 20 countries have individually gone through this process, each enlargement round produces an added set of requirements and the bar gets raised. As the community gets larger, more spread out, and more diverse, the community is less open to new membership. During this set of negotiations, Turkey must not only prove that they have adopted the relevant legislation, but show that they are enforcing it as well. This obviously raises the stakes and draws out the negotiating timeframe to enable proof of compliance. While passing unpopular legislation can be dangerous for most governments, dealing with the fallout of enforcement could be its downfall, especially because it doesn't allow the government time to slowly phase-in the changes. This heightened standard will mean that the EU authorities will be more cautious in their confirmation of Turkey's compliance.<sup>172</sup>

The Turks may not be ready, or willing, to change certain policies to conform with the EU acquis. Article 301, although replacing article 159 of the old penal code on 1 June 2005 as part of legislative reforms, continues to be used regularly against citizens who peacefully criticize the government.<sup>173</sup> Orhan Pamuk, Turkey's Nobel prize-winning author was charged under the code for insulting "Turkishness" in 2005. While the charges were dropped under intense international pressure, Turks still hold him in complete contempt. Following Pamuk's receipt of the Nobel Prize, Turkey's most influential newspaper, the Hurriyet, questioned his Turkishness by entitling an article "Nobel to a Turk" then declaring, "we all know this headline will probably satisfy

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<sup>172</sup> Barkey, 132.

<sup>173</sup> Amnesty International. "Turkey: Article 301 is a threat to freedom of expression and must be repealed now!" <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engneur440352005>; Internet; accessed 8 March 2006.

nobody's 'Turkish side'."<sup>174</sup> It's feared the removal of article 301 will take away necessary powers to curb internal political threats.

Even as Turkey moves toward Europeanization, many of Turkey's citizens are questioning whether their Prime Minister is dedicated to a secular society or whether he has a hidden, darker Islamic agenda. 300,000 Turks gathered in April to protest Erdoyan's plans to run for the Presidency. They're fearful that with the party and the presidency under his control, he will move boldly to move the country away from its secular foundation and align government policies with Islamic teachings. The Army which has seen its powers diminished under EU reforms, has warned the PM not to attempt the Presidency out of similar concerns regarding the country's recent trend away from its Kemalist principles.

Although the negotiation process is laid out in great detail, its outcome is actually open to manipulation by the EU. Many of the conditions have standards that are precise and measurable (such as Gross Domestic Product cannot exceed 3%), however, others are not as easily assessed. New chapters, such as environmental protection, the safeguarding of minority rights and the preservation of democratic values, are by their nature more ambiguous, and the determination of success is more arbitrary. This imprecision affords

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<sup>174</sup> Nicholas Birch, "Pamuk's Nobel divides Turkey," *Guardian Unlimited*, 13 October 2006, Available from <http://books.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329600643-99819,00.html>; Internet; accessed 8 March 2007.

the EU with an opportunity to reject candidate countries based on their judgment of the degree of compliance with the chapter provisions.<sup>175</sup>

### **Ongoing Disputes**

Turkey is embroiled in several ongoing disputes with countries in its region. It will have to resolve its differences before it joins the EU but resolution appears years away. Turkey's conflict with Cyprus is one of the main hindrances to closer relations with the EU.<sup>176</sup> Turkey refuses to formally recognize the Greek-Cypriot government and will not extend its customs union to Cyprus. The EU has clearly stated that recognition of all member states is a necessary component of the accession process and that failure to implement this obligation would affect the overall progress of Turkey's negotiations.<sup>177</sup> As a result, in December 2006, the EU voted to close 8 of the 35 *acquis* chapters, stalling Turkey's accession proceedings. Turkey also has outstanding issues with Greece over borders in the Aegean Sea and has its border closed with Armenia.

## **Chapter 5. The future.**

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<sup>175</sup> Andrea Gates. "Negotiating Turkey's Accession: the Limitations of the Current EU Strategy," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10 (2005), 388.

<sup>176</sup> Calleya, 41.

<sup>177</sup> European Commission, "EU Enlargement: Turkey – Declaration by European Community and Member States," [http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article\\_5045\\_en.htm](http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5045_en.htm); Internet; accessed 7 March 2007.

The outcome for Turkey and the EU is far from decided. Although members took an historic step to commence accession negotiations with Turkey, no promises have been made as to the final destination of the talks. The negotiating framework begins with a statement that the outcome can not be guaranteed beforehand. It is clear that, "...if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond."<sup>178</sup> In other words, the EU is keeping their options open and second best, whatever that may end up being, sounds pretty acceptable to them. The parties will strive toward full accession but if that doesn't work, they will settle for closer ties. That's not exactly the marriage proposal Turkey was hoping to receive.

If anyone were to ask whether Turkey were ready to accede to the EU, the answer would be clearly, no. However, the accession of Turkey is not planned for another 15 years or more. While Turkey faces many significant, if not impossible, challenges to accession, it is not the same country that will eventually come to the membership table. Turkey in 2007 is too big, too Muslim, and too backward; it's too much of a lot of things, in fact.

Turkey, the world, and the EU are going to look a lot different in 15-20 years. By that time, Turkey may be a whole lot of everything that the EU wants. It's likely going to be a lot richer, more modern, less agricultural, and it will have gone 30 years (or not) without a coup d'état. Europe is likely going to be a lot more Muslim and a lot older. The EU will have sorted out its constitutional crisis, and adjusted to working with 30-odd

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<sup>178</sup> "Negotiating Framework,"

member countries. The income gap between the old and new states may have closed somewhat and the EU will have a better understanding of the problems and opportunities of welcoming poorer more diverse countries into its union. Globalization will have increased standardization and competition across the globe. Western-targeted terrorism will not be a relatively new phenomenon and be better equipped to assess its implications for modern western societies. In sum, by 2025 (or so), many of the questions will be answered that in 2007 combine to make the accession of Turkey a prospect almost too overwhelming to contemplate.

Given that the field is wide open, what type of arrangement is likely to happen? There are several possible outcomes for Turkey. It could continue with the status quo, continue evolving with reforms and be accepted as a privileged member, or fully comply with the *acquis* and be accepted as a full member. It is hard to predict what factors will conspire to make or break the agreement. However, we will look at several possible outcomes and assess each in turn.

### *Status Quo*

Although many things will have changed, many will be the same. Turkey won't be any smaller, it will have the same neighbors, and it will still be Muslim. There is a good probability that Turkey will continue in same manner as it has over the past 70 years, looking toward the west and conforming to the model as best as it can given its unique circumstances. Turkey wants to be westernized but might not have the staying power and determination to reach the EU. The obstacles to accession are significant and Turkey's opponents are many. In this case, Turkey would surely be brought under the

neighborhood policy and participate in the EU programs that are mutually beneficial to both organizations. Turkey has already integrated with the EU in many significant areas such as trade and is a leading member of NATO.

Turkey is working toward fully implementing the European common market program. The increased economic activity and reforms enacted from this measure alone will raise the standard of living and have significant positive secondary effects in other areas. For security, it will be important that Turkey address its border issues and work toward expansion into the Schengen area. These effects and more will move Turkey toward the European model and increase its desirability as a close partner of the EU.

### *Privileged Partnership*

There is a better likelihood that after working through all the reforms outlined in the acquis, Turkey will have met most of the major conditions for accession. Although Turkey has repeatedly made it clear that it will not countenance a “second class” membership,<sup>179</sup> it will likely seek some preferred status rather than turn away from the political and economic strength of the EU.

Increasing opposition to Turkey’s membership has had politicians looking for other ways to build relationships with Turkey while creating a buffer from Turkish influence. A “privileged partnership” has been floated for Turkey. Parliamentarians from Germany, France and Austria have advocated this partnership. Austria had insisted that Turkey’s Negotiating Framework Protocol include the option of privileged

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<sup>179</sup> “EU and Turkey Agree Terms,” 2.

partnership but eventually removed the demand in return for EU concessions on Croatia's membership application.<sup>180</sup> Although the details have not been flushed out, it would constitute closer strategic, political and economic ties with the EU but would be restricted in the areas such as freedom of movement, access to structural funds and subsidies from the EU Common Agricultural Policy.<sup>181</sup>

A partnership could constitute a step toward accession setting a waypoint that could be more easily attainable than full membership. A partnership would likely be more acceptable to opponents of accession and easier to maintain course because of the more modest goals relative to full membership. This would remove the concerns over all out rejection through veto or referendum. The assurance that reforms were leading to a partnership would make reforms more palatable for an impatient Turkish population. The public would be assured that the tumult that it has had to endure was leading to certain reward. Currently, reforms are being carried out with little guarantee of any satisfactory outcome.

### *Full Membership*

Full accession is the ultimate goal for Turkey. It would allow it to influence policies that are important for Turkey and its region. It would increase its regional stature and allow it to wield its power within the EU to influence the foreign policies of other countries.

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<sup>180</sup> Ioannis Grigoriadis, 155.

<sup>181</sup> Ioannis Grigoriadis, 154.

If Turkey is not accepted as a member of the EU at the end of this negotiation process, it will be the first country to be so rejected. However, it is somewhat unlikely that the other members will permit Turkey to become a major influence in Brussels. Turkey's huge population would enable it to exert too much influence on the common policies that affect all the member states. Turkey's culture and values are too dissimilar to the rest of Europe. EU members will not want Turkey to move its focus toward Turkey's region. Even with all its reforms Turkey will remain an unstable country in an unstable region. Its strong nationalistic movement and Islamic fundamentalist underpinnings will continue to destabilize the government and undermine its efforts to modernize and liberalize. Finally, the country's poverty and agricultural-heavy economy will impose a significant burden on the EU's budget and limit its ability to develop other poor areas of Europe. Although full membership is out of reach for this round of negotiations, Turkey could improve its chances for future accession if it continues to develop and modernize.

## **Conclusion**

Turkey is at an historic juncture in its quest to fulfill Ataturk's dream of a Westernized state for the Turkish people. It is poised to join one of the world's most powerful economic and political organizations. Prosperity, modernity, stability and liberty are close at hand- close at hand but yet possibly out of reach. Turkey's future lies in the hands of its government and its people but also in the hands of its European counterparts. As Turkey embarks on a wholesale transformation of its country, the continent and the world debate the merits of Europe's largest enlargement and wager the outcome.

Unity has been Europe's strength over the past 50 years and Turkey would bring a wealth of benefits to the EU if it were to join the union. Europe has used soft power to pursue peace with its neighbors. The promise of enlargement has been a powerful tool for the EU to push for peace between aspirant countries and their neighbors. The affect on Turkey's neighborhood has already been noticed in Turkey's softer stance towards its historic enemies. A peaceful Mediterranean benefits all of Europe and promotes stability and prosperity. Turkey with the largest NATO force in Europe would be a boost for the European Common Foreign Defense Policy. It would provide a forward base of operations for any European military operation and a foothold in an unstable region. Its relationships with its Middle East neighbors and the Muslim community present a conduit for conflict resolution. As a transit route for illegal activities, it is crucial for the security of the whole of Europe that Turkey has control of its borders and effective police enforcement. Although these goals could be achieved through membership in the Schengen agreement, the best security and cooperation could only be sealed with Turkey as a full member of the union.

The *acquis communautaire* has the power to transform a country. The hope of accession has steeled the government and its people to implement fundamental changes to the structure of their country. With stability and modernity comes prosperity. Turkey has a huge untapped market and a source of inexpensive labor that could be fully exploited through union. As part of the EU, Turkey would help Europe adopt Muslim-friendly policies that would calm tensions at home and improve relations abroad.

In contrast, there are many significant disadvantages of bringing Turkey into the EU. Turkey would be the largest accession in the history of the EU and along with size comes influence. Turkey challenges the EU to welcome the diversity that Turkey has to offer. The Prime Minister assures the Europeans that his 70 million Muslims would bring a bridge to the Muslim world. While this may be true, Turkey would immediately hold the greatest number of votes in Parliament and hold the sway to reshape Europe. It would surely draw Europe's eyes south and eastward. Europeans are concerned that Muslim values are too conservative for their liberal societies and worry about the potential instability generated by Islamic fundamentalists. Turkey is significantly poorer than the rest of Europe. Attending to Turkey's massive needs would divert a significant amount of funds from other needy regions in Europe.

Bringing Turkey into the EU is a long term process which could easily take upwards to 20 years, and in the end, may not even be achievable. There are so many obstacles to overcome, success seems a distant dream. Although Turkey was invited to commence negotiations through a unanimous decision, many governments and an even greater number of its citizens do not want Turkey to become a member of the EU. Austria, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Cyprus have been the most vocal opponents but other governments and their citizens are lukewarm at best toward Turkey. Even countries who favor accession do not necessarily have the support of their citizens. Turkey's accession will be put to a vote and one country could ruin Turkey's chances.

Several countries who have already promised a referendum further reduce Turkey's probability of achieving unanimity.

Turkey also faces opposition from within. The government walks a tightrope between implementing unpopular reforms and maintaining satisfactory forward progress. Turkey's pace of reforms have slowed considerably and there remain significant areas for improvement. However, in areas such as the curtailment of the powers of the military, the government must tread softly. The military has significant popular support of their citizens and internal security issues with the Kurds necessitate a strong military force. While Europeans criticize Turkey for its slow progress, Turks reflect on all the upheaval in their lives brought on by the EU's policies and wonder whether it is all worthwhile. They risk running out of patience before they see positive results of their sacrifices. With such a long process, the government faces the difficult task of implementing change while riding through economic downturns, elections and other political crises.

While the current government deals in the present with the problems of accession compliance and state governance, it is the next generation of politicians in the distant future who will negotiate the final agreement. By that time, Turkey and the EU will be different than they are today. Turkey will be richer, more modern, and less agricultural. Europe will be older, more mature, and likely better able institutionally to deal with a larger population.

With all the potential obstacles and changes in foreign policy priorities, it is difficult to determine with accuracy how Turkey will eventually fare when its accession is brought to a vote. Turkey could maintain its status quo, become a privileged member or attain full membership status. With all of Turkey's challenges, its powerful potential vote, and its enormous drain on the EU budget, odds are that it will fall short of full membership. It is likely that with the EU's support, it will successfully implement a large number of reforms. Its government will continue to modernize and liberalize. Its economy will improve and raise the standard of living of its citizens. The increased prosperity should reduce instability among the vulnerable elements of its society. With the assistance of the EU, it will likely achieve a measure of success in improving its external relations with its neighbors. There is also a strong common interest in sealing Turkey's leaky borders and the EU should be able to help it to implement modern police procedures to increase its effectiveness.

However, there will likely continue to be a tension between government and the nationalistic and fundamentalist elements of Turkish society that will hinder its progress and ability to fully meet the EU standards for equality, freedom of expression and human rights. These value-based goals will take longer to reform. In Turkey's favor, its progress toward the EU standard is incremental and even if it is rejected when its accession finally comes to a vote, there is always a tomorrow and each small reform brings it closer to a united Europe.

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