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**INTEGRATING DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT:
A MILITARY ASSESSMENT**

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the integration of Canadian defence and development initiatives in Afghanistan with a view to proposing areas where they can improve their effect. The genesis of the study was the challenges observed in applying the integrated approach proposed in Canada's *International Policy Statement* to regaining stability and building lasting peace in Afghanistan. First, the analysis found the Government of Canada failed to define a coherent international policy because the policy is not focussed, and is interpreted differently and implemented with varying degrees of enthusiasm by each department. Second, the analysis of Canada's Strategic Advisory Team found that they have effectively integrated defence and development initiatives to assist the Afghan Government to build those human capabilities and capacities, and processes required to ensure results and strategic coherence in governance, peace and security. Similarly, Canada's Provincial Reconstruction Team effectively integrates Canadian defence and development initiatives to promote good governance and assist the Afghan Government to extend its authority to facilitate the development of a stable, secure and self-sustaining environment in Kandahar Province. However, both teams could improve their effects in many ways. The paper concludes that the Government must appoint a lead Minister who is competent, accountable and responsible to interpret the *International Policy Statement*, set priorities, assign resources and coordinate other federal contributions to integrating Canada's defence and development initiatives in failed and failing states.

INTRODUCTION

The preamble to the 1949 United Nations Charter describes goals for international peace, but the manner of achieving them must acknowledge the security environment's challenges.[1] Until the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping traditionally included four steps: establish a ceasefire through diplomacy, insert neutral military observers or forces to assist formerly warring armies to disengage and obey the ceasefire, resolve the conflict through additional diplomatic efforts, and provide development assistance. Since the state actors consented to the mission, peacekeepers were lightly armed and little additional security measures were needed before development assistance could be provided. The goal of peacekeeping has not changed with the end of the Cold War. It remained, ". . . to help countries torn by conflict, create conditions for sustainable peace.[2] Nonetheless, the traditional peacekeeping model failed in the new security environment because it did not evolve to meet the challenges of dealing with non-consenting leaders in intra-state conflicts. Belligerents seldom agreed to ceasefires and lightly armed peacekeepers facing humanitarian crisis could not provide sufficient security to encourage battling forces to disengage, enable diplomatic conflict resolution, or enable development assistance. Without security, diplomatic and development initiatives could not prevent disasters, such as the ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica, Krjina and Rwanda. Peacekeepers learned the hard way they could not build peace or assist development

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[1] United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations," http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/; Internet; accessed 28 March 2007. The preamble describes states' resolve to collectively work to save succeeding generations from war; enable the maintenance of justice, respect for treaty obligations and international law; promote social progress and better standards of life; practice tolerance and live together in peace; unite to maintain international peace and security; and to promote economic and social advancement.

[2] United Nations Peacekeeping, "Meeting New Challenges: Q&A," http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q1.htm; Internet; accessed 28 March 2007.

without security and supporting institutions such as, police, justice systems and viable governance. Insecurity in the growing number of failed and failing states further inhibits international peace by providing havens for terrorists and organized crime groups. By undermining the host nation's justice and governance systems to retain their own freedom to operate, terrorists and criminals debilitate the host-state's ability to serve the population. Hence, the defining characteristics of a failed or failing state are the, ". . . state's inability or unwillingness to provide physical security, legitimate political institutions, sound economic management and social services for the benefit of its population."[3] Consequently, weak states need assistance to rid themselves of security threats and rebuild their capacity to govern and serve their people. Countries wishing to assist must expect complex interventions that include peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, diplomatic, reconstruction and develop activities. This diplomacy, defence and development team must work together on new tasks, such as disarmament; cantonment and demobilisation of armed forces; training military and police forces; electoral support; human rights monitoring; humanitarian relief; resettling refugee and displaced persons; mine clearing; building governance institutions; and building social and economic capacity.[4] How should Canada prepare to face the challenges of complex interventions?

The Government of Canada urgently needs to face the challenges by developing strategies to assist failed and failing states. Doing so will both promote peace in the current global security environment and improve Canadian national security.

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[3] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "DAC Guidelines and Reference Series A DAC Reference Document: Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States," http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/24/37826256.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 April 2007, 17.

[4] Mats R. Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?: An Analysis of the Changing Military Requirements of UN Peacekeeping with Proposals for its Enhancement*, Adelphi Paper 281, (London: Brassey's (UK) Ltd. For the International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1993), 3, 12 - 25.

Afghanistan is an example of a failed state, and Canada's participation in the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan demonstrated
Canada's desire to halt conflict and improve human welfare. However, ISAF is not, nor
has it ever been, a traditional peacekeeping mission.[5, 6] There are no ceasefire
agreements to enforce nor negotiated peace settlements to respect. Hence, the Canadian
Government's goal, ". . . to protect Canadians by ensuring that Afghanistan never again
falls into the hands of the Taliban and that Afghanistan becomes a stable, free and
democratic society,"[7] will be prosecuted while Afghanistan is in a state of conflict.[8] The
Government stated its commitment to improving Canada's national security by
participating in ISAF, but now it faces the challenges inherent in intervening in a failed
and failing state. What policies should the Canadian Government adopt to assist the
Afghan Government to extend security through their country; establish conditions to
maintain justice and respect for the rule of law; promote social progress and better
standards of life; promote the economic and social advancement of all peoples; and
integrate Afghanistan back into the international community? Could Canada achieve a
greater effect by combining the defence and development components of national power?

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[5] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1286 authorized ISAF on 20 December 2001.

[6] Canada's participation in ISAF also strengthened relations with the U.S. by demonstrating
support for America's Operations Enduring Freedom global war on terrorism.

[7] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "NATO Operations and Missions:
Afghanistan," http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/nato/nato_operations-en.asp; Internet; accessed
2 April 2007.

[8] Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 *Canadian Forces Operations* (Ottawa:
DND Canada, 2005), 1-3. The CF spectrum of conflict describes that peace exists when there is an absence
of violence or the threat of violence, and conflict exists when violence is either manifested or threatened.
By this definition, conflict is present in Afghanistan. The CF continuum of operations defines non-combat
operations as military operations where weapons may be present but their use is primarily for self-defence
purposes, and combat operations as military operations where use or threatened use of force is essential to
accomplish a mission. Therefore, non-combat and combat operations occur in the Afghanistan conflict.

This paper seeks to evaluate the integration of Canadian defence and development initiatives in Afghanistan with a view to proposing areas where they can improve their effect. The Oxford Compact English Dictionary defines 'integrate' as combine to form a whole [or] bring into equal participation in an institution, and the purpose of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan is to build that country's capacity to govern. [9, 10] Therefore, by definition alone Canada's Government could improve Afghan governance by integrating the effects of Canadian departments and agencies that provide capabilities such as foreign affairs, defence, development aid, international trade, security, intelligence, police, justice, finance and immigration. It is beyond this paper's scope to evaluate the integration of all these components, but the paper will evaluate the integration of defence and development because the alleviation of poverty will be key to achieving security in Afghanistan.[11] The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's definition of official development aid will be liberally used to define it as grants or loans to needy countries that are undertaken by the official sector with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective.[12] Development

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[9] *The Compact Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, 3rd ed., s.v. "integrate."

[10] Gen R.J.Hillier, *Covering Letter: CF Campaign Plan - Afghanistan* (National Defence Headquarters: file 3350-165/A37 (OP ARCHER), 5 May 2006), Unclassified version released under Access to Information, 1. Afghanistan's capacity to govern includes, "providing the Afghan people a safe and just society in which every citizen - male and female - can speak freely, worship as they wish, pursue an education, enjoy the fruits of their labour and contribute to the growth and prosperity of their country through open and democratic elections."

[11] Gordon Smith, "Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working," Report Prepared for the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute available from http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Canada%20in%20Afghanistan%20Is%20it%20Working.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 April 2007, 5.

[12] Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, "Development Co-operation Directorate (DAC), DAC's Glossary," http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,2586,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#o; Internet; accessed 2 April 2007.

will also encompass initiatives, such as policing and justice, which are intended to improve governance because the rule of law enables economic and social development. Although the U.S. military sees reconstruction as a precursor to development because it deals primarily with rebuilding infrastructure, systems and governance, in this paper 'development' will include both reconstruction and development.

This paper will evaluate Canada's defence and development initiatives in Afghanistan by analyzing the policy framework in chapter 1 and identifying problems and potential solutions in chapter 2. Chapter 1 will analyze the Canadian *International Policy Statement's* (IPS) vision of an integrated approach to conflict prevention and post conflict development to determine how Canada has defined its integrated approach. It will explain the origins of the integrated approach, why the IPS was released in 2005, the logic behind its integrated approach, and the evolution of associated terminology. Since the focus will be on the integration of defence and development, chapter 1 will describe the mandates assigned to the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to integrate their initiatives. Chapter 2's evaluation will measure the effects Canada's Strategic Advisory Team and Provincial Reconstruction Team have achieved in consideration of those CF defence and development objectives assigned in the *CF Campaign Plan - Afghanistan* and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project's five pillars: security; governance and participation; justice and accountability; economic conditions; and social services and infrastructure.[13] The chapter will also propose

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[13] Seema Patel and Steven Ross, *Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan*, Report Prepared for The Centre for Strategic and International Studies' Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 1 March 2007) available from http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070329_breakingpoint.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 April 2007.

solutions to the problems, and discuss where, and at what level to better integrate

Canada's defence and development initiatives to improve Afghanistan's capacity to

govern. Finally, the paper's conclusion will summarize the overarching theme and

highlight issues for further critical study. Since the defence and development domains

are interdependent, successful development will likely be dependant on well-sequenced

and coherent progress across at least these two domains.[14]

The paper's scope will be limited to analyzing the integration of those specific

defence and development initiatives in Afghanistan that are within Canada's sphere of

influence because Canada does not have enough resources to solve all of Afghanistan's

challenges. Further, the paper's scope will be limited to dealing with the integration of

those defence and development capabilities necessary to stabilize Afghanistan.

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[14] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "DAC Guidelines . . ., 17.

CHAPTER 1 - INTEGRATING DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT

*It seems to me that we have such a burden of responsibility to make the
world a better place for those who were born into far worse
circumstances. It is more than donating money to charities, it is taking
action and trying to make things better.*
Captain Nichola Goddard[15]

This chapter will determine how the Government defined its integrated approach
to post-conflict development by analyzing the Canadian *International Policy Statement's*
(IPS) vision of an integrated approach. The analysis focuses on the integration of
defence and development initiatives while examining how Canada's integrated approach
to foreign affairs has evolved from Prime Minister Paul Martin's April 2004 National
Security Policy (NSP) to Prime Minister Stephen Harper's 2006 *Whole of Government*
approach. This chapter will first examine the NSP to consider where its integrated policy
came from, why it was issued in April 2004, and what it said about integrating defence
and development. Second, this chapter will examine the IPS to consider its origins, why
the Government released it in 2005, the logic behind integrating defence and
development in Afghanistan, and the mandates given to DND and CIDA to integrate their
defence and development initiatives. This chapter will also explain the evolution of the
associated terminology, such as *3DC* and *Whole of Government*, and determine if the
Government appointed a department or agency to oversee integration.[16]

CANADA'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

The NSP tabled by Prime Minister Paul Martin on 27 April 2004 under the title

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[15] Captain Nichola Goddard, (Letter home to parents, Kandahar, 2 May 2006), quoted in Levon
Sevunt, "Sisters in Arms," *Reader's Digest*, April 2007, 94.

[16] 3DC is an abbreviation of 'diplomacy, defence, development and commerce.'

Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy mandated an integrated

approach to national security. Although this was the first such official Canadian policy,

the concept of combining or focusing government departments on important outcomes

was not a novel idea.

The 2000 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, chaired by

Lakhdar Brahimi, whose experience in the aspects of conflict prevention, peacekeeping

and peace-building is vast, includes recommendations for an integrated approach to peace

operations that could apply to Canada's integrated approach to assisting failed and failing

states.[17] This report acknowledged the fundamental requirement to project credible force,

and the peacekeepers' challenge to create stable post-conflict environments while peace-

builders work to make this environment self-sustaining. He also emphasized the

importance of integrating development initiatives with the force since, ". . . force alone

cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace may be built."[18]

Brahimi's recommendation to bring together mission leadership, such as the Special

Representative of the Secretary General, force commander, civilian police commissioner,

and heads of other components of the mission, early to jointly develop the mission's

peacekeeping and peace-building objectives could also apply to integrating Canadian

operational planning. Similarly, Brahimi's recommendation to create Integrated Mission

Task Forces including those responsible for political analysis, military operations,

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[17] United Nations, "Biography of Lakhdar Brahimi: Special Adviser to the Secretary-General," http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/brahimi-bio-jan04.htm; Internet; accessed 5 April 2007. Lakhdar Brahimi's vast conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building experience includes being the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to missions in South Africa (1993-1994) and Haiti (1994-1996), the Secretary-General's Special Envoy on three missions including Afghanistan (1997 – 1999, and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (3 October 2001 to 31 December 2004).

[18] United Nations, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," available from http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/; Internet; accessed on 2 April 2007.

civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displace persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment to plan and support new missions could serve as a template to integrate Canadian operational planning and support. Due to its importance, this paper will revisit this recommendation elsewhere. The UN report also recommended improving preparedness for missions requiring both peacekeeping and development by including related forces, such as military planners, military forces, civilian police, international judicial experts, penal experts and human rights specialists in the United Nations standby arrangements. Again, adoption of a similar integrated readiness system could facilitate implementing Canada's integrated approach to assisting failed and failing states. His recommendation to maintain integrated databases of peace and security information to improve decision support and knowledge management within the United Nations could also be implemented by the Government of Canada to assist making decisions to contribute defence and development capabilities, and to assist managing the subsequent operations and projects. In summary, the 2000 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* included recommendations, which influenced the development of the NSP's integrated policy and could apply to Canada's integrated approach to assisting failed and failing states. The NSP's integrated approach also responded to calls from national security policy analysts.

Canadian policy analysts' calls for a national security strategy linked to defence policy motivated the completion of the NSP. They described the risks that Canadian Governments were taking by tabling White Papers on defence and foreign affairs at separate times without unifying them under a national security policy. The post

11 September 2001 security environment exposed the necessity of an integrated approach to national security. Analysts such as W.D. Macnamara and A. Fitz-Gerald in *A National Security Framework for Canada* observed the value of, ". . . a vision across the whole of government . . .,"[19] to link strategic vision, applicable policy, meaningful objectives, and applicable resources. They felt Canada would benefit from also adopting a systemic approach to national security policy planning so called for a coordinated inter-departmental approach to developing a national security strategy for Canada that linked foreign policy objectives and national interests.[20] Since it was another eighteen months before the Government announced its integrated approach, one must ask if they took any action during this time to integrate their initiatives.

In 2002, the Treasury Board began developing a framework to define high-level Government priorities (know as Government of Canada Outcomes) and focus appropriate resources to achieve them. This framework enabled departments to relate their contributions (known as Strategic Outcomes and their subordinate Program Activities) to the Government priorities and integrate their Strategic Outcomes with those of the other contributing departments. An organization's strategic outcome represents the difference a department or agency wants to make for Canadians. Government designed this *Whole of Government* framework to improve the reporting to Parliament of plans, results and performance towards achieving Government priorities within the key federal policy areas of Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, International Affairs and Government Affairs. One of this logic model's strengths is that it crosses structural boundaries to focus on

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[19] W.D. Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald, "A National Security Policy for Canada," *IRPP Policy Matters* 3, no. 10 (October 2002) [journal on-line] available from http://www.irpp.org/pm/archive/pmvol3no10.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 April 2007, 7.

[20] *Ibid.*, 3.

achieving the Government's priorities in an integrated manner that can increase the output or economize on the inputs.[21]   Since the Government was taking action in 2002 to integrate its effect, what influenced the issuing of the NSP in April 2004?

Two issues influenced the April 2004 release of the NPS: first, paralysis within the political executive element of Canada's Government caused by international affairs and leadership changes; and second, realizing the significance of Canada's diplomatic, defence and development commitments to Afghanistan. Although the post 11 September 2001 security environment highlighted the necessity of a more integrated approach to security, Prime Minister Chrétien's Government continued to manage international affairs, such as the American invasion of Iraq and Canadian contributions to ISAF, in a reactive manner instead of a systemic manner that linked foreign policy objectives and national interests under a unifying policy. The paralysis continued throughout the fall of 2003 because the governing Liberal Party was preoccupied with selecting a new leader. Although Prime Minister Martin became the Leader of the Liberal Party on 14 November 2003, he did not immediately release appropriate policy because the Governor General did not swear him in as Prime Minister until 12 December 2003 and parliament did not sit until 2 February 2004. Of course, the new Prime Minster also chose to postpone releasing policy until he approved it. Regardless, Canada's establishment of diplomatic

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[21] Treasury Board of Canada, "Whole of Government Framework," http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/dcgpubs/mrrsp-psgrr/wgf-cp_e.asp; Internet; accessed 22 March 2007. DND activities in Afghanistan are reported under the 'Conduct Operations' Program Activity which is mapped to the 'Success in assigned missions in contributing to domestic and international peace, security and stability' Strategic Outcome, then to the 'A safe and secure world through contributing to international cooperation' Government of Canada Outcome, which joins development initiatives mapped to the 'International Affairs' policy area. CIDA activities in Afghanistan are similarly captured under the 'Sustainable development to reduce poverty in the poorest countries, measured through making progress on the development goals of economic well-being, social development, environmental sustainability, and governance' Strategic Outcome then mapped to the 'Global Poverty Reduction through sustainable development' Government of Canada Outcome, which maps to the 'International Affairs' policy area.

relations with Afghanistan, commitment of, ". . . the largest contingent in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force . . .,"[22] in 2003 and contribution of humanitarian and development assistance totalling over $616 million since September 11, 2001 demonstrated the need for an overarching national security policy.[23]

Much of the principles behind the NSP's and International Policy Review's integrated approach can be extracted from Prime Minster Martin's 12 December 2003 release, *Canada's Place in the World*, which announced nine focal areas for the updating of Canada's defence, development, and trade and investment strategies:

- . . . targeting and enhancing the impact of international development assistance, consistent with Canadian values;
- identifying Canada's defence priorities, and fundamentally reviewing the future capability of the Canadian Forces;
- a more integrated approach to managing the Canada-US relationship;
- developing a strategy for renewing the multilateral system to enhance its effectiveness in promoting global governance;
- helping define a new National Security Policy that outlines the government's approach to enhancing security in Canada and internationally;
- leveraging Canada's representation abroad to promote Canada's objectives in key areas;
- leveraging Canadian expertise to promote improved domestic governance in developing countries;
- expanding markets and opportunities for trade and investment; and
- showcasing Canadian creativity and know-how abroad.[24]

Prime Minster Martin released this announcement immediately after his swearing in to

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[22] Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004), 49.

[23] Canadian International Development Agency, "Canada Reaffirms Commitment to Afghanistan," (31 March 2004) [news release on-line]; available from http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JER-328145554-RDK; Internet; accessed 3 April 2007.

[24] Canadian Coalition to end Global Poverty, "Planning for an International Policy Review: A CCIC Policy Briefing Note," (February 2004) available from http://ccic.ca/e/docs/002_policy_2004-02_ccic_ipr_briefing_note.pdf; Internet; accessed 6 April 2007. Note the primary source document, "Canada's Place in the World," is no longer available on the Prime Minister's website at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/chgs_to_gov_4.asp.

promise a review of Canada's place in the world, including development assistance and defence priorities, which would acknowledge the current security environment's challenges. Having reviewed the origins of the NSP to consider where its integrated policy came from and why Government issued it in April 2004, this paper will analyse the NSP's direction to integrate defence and development initiatives.

Prime Minister Martin declared the need for a statement of national security policy that integrates strategy for addressing current and future threats because he understood that globalization has increased the complexity of international affairs to the extent that events originating elsewhere can have a major impact on the well-being of Canadians.[25] Hence, the NSP provided a strategic framework and action plan to ensure Canada prepares for and can respond to such threats. Further, the NSP described that the integrated approach would frame the combining of Government capabilities and coordination with key partners in the provinces, territories, communities, private sector and allied organizations to achieve Government of Canada Outcomes because, ". . . there can be no greater role, no more important obligation for a government, than the protection and safety of its citizens."[26]

The NSP's focus:

> . . . in addressing three core national security interests:
> 1.   protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad;
> 2.   ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and
> 3.   contributing to international security.[27]

is relevant to integrating defence and development assistance to failed and failing states.

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[25] Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security . . .*, cover letter.

[26] *Ibid.*, vii.

[27] *Ibid.*, vii.

The policy acknowledged that Canada's contribution to international security could require the deployment of CF capabilities to protect against threats and Canada could provide development assistance to improve governance and strengthen public institutions in failed or failing states.[28] In addition, it recognized the national security benefit of contributing to international security by indicating that post-conflict development can stabilize failed and failing states that would otherwise provide havens for terrorists who may threaten Canadian national security. By also stating, ". . . it is imperative that we take appropriate security measures to protect our diplomats, aid workers and other personnel representing Canada abroad,"[29] the NSP acknowledged that diplomatic, defence and development capabilities should work together to provide security.

In addition to relating national security interests to the integration of defence and development, the NSP's explanation of the guiding principles for the International Policy Review described the reason, the key capability, and the manner Canada would integrate its capabilities. The first principle - "The Canadian Government will make Canada's national security one of the top priorities in its International Policy Review" [30] communicates that Canada conducts international relations to benefit herself. By further directing the international policy to reflect an, ". . . integrated approach to defence, diplomacy and development (the "3Ds"),"[31] the Government acknowledged that these three elements must be engaged to countering international terrorism, which it felt threaten Canada's national security from failed and failing states. The International

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[28] *Ibid.*, 6.

[29] *Ibid.*, 5.

[30] *Ibid.*, x-xi.

[31] *Ibid.*, 47. This was the first mention of the 3D concept in a Canadian strategic policy document.

Policy review's second principle, "The Government is committed to ensuring that the Canadian Forces are flexible, responsive and combat-capable for a wide range of operations, and are able to work with our allies,"[32] illustrated the realization that relevant military capabilities are necessary to re-establishing security and rebuild institutions in the current complex security environment.[33] Government intended to integrate its rejuvenated defence and development capabilities to contribute to the third principle, i.e. leveraging Canada's experience in building peace, order and good government to help developing failed and failing states, as security is re-established.

In summary, the NSP tabled by Prime Minister Paul Martin under the title *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* articulated Canada's core national security interests and mandated an integrated approach to national security. Canada's development of an integrated approach was influenced by the United Nations recommendations for an integrated approach to peace operations, Canadian policy analysts' calls for a national security policy that linked defence and foreign policy, and the Treasury Board framework that defined Government of Canada Outcomes and associated resource to these outcomes. The Government did not release the NSP before 27 April 2004 because of political paralysis within its executive branch. However, it released the policy to provide a unifying framework for Canada's diplomatic, defence and development commitments to Afghanistan. The NSP signalled the Government's intent to integrate strategy for stabilizing failed and failing states so that threats originating from them cannot negatively affect the well-being of Canadians. Canada would mitigate such threats and improve the effect of assistance to failed and failing

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[32] Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security . . .,* x-xi.

[33] *Ibid.*, 50.

states by combining defence and development departmental policy development;

operational planning and support; preparations for operations; contributions to post-

conflict development; decision support; and reporting of their contributions to

Government of Canada Outcomes. The International Policy Review's output - i.e. the

IPS - must be analysed to determine how Canada has further defined its integrated

approach.

CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL POLICY STATEMENT

The IPS tabled by Prime Minister Paul Martin on 19 April 2005 under the title

Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World

mandated that departments implement international policy in an integrated manner,

including integrating defence and development initiatives in Afghanistan. First, this

section will describe the IPS's origins. Second, it will describe why the Government

released the IPS in April 2005. Third, this section will describe the logic behind

integrating defence and development initiatives in Afghanistan while explaining the *3DC*

concept and its defence and development pillars. Fourth, this section will analyse the

mandates the IPS gave DND and CIDA to integrate their defence and development

initiatives. In addition, the analysis will determine if the Government mandated a

department or agency to oversee the integration of defence and development initiatives.

If the policy does not identify a leader, Chapter 3 will address a potential solution.

The IPS originated from the International Policy Review, NSP, *Canada's Place in*

the World announcement and *Whole of Government* approaches developed in other

countries. Since this chapter already explained the NSP and *Canada's Place in the World*

announcement, this section will only explain the International Policy Review and allied *Whole of Government* approaches. The review assessed how Canada could best combine the effect of its work in diplomacy, defence, development and international trade, ". . . all of which have [had] become profoundly interdependent,"[34] to assume a more influential role for Canada in international affairs. Ministers and associated deputies with experience in diplomacy, defence, development and trade policy developed the review's initial options and proposals in order to write an integrated policy. An Integrated Parliamentary Committee, composed of representatives of the various associated Standing Committees, reviewed the initial options and proposals to refine the IPS's integrated approach.

The Government of Canada was not the only body to seek an integrated or *Whole of Government* approach. The United Kingdom, Australian and New Zealand governments were also developing approaches to support integrating and cutting across government. Similar to Canada, their initiatives focused on outcomes in all areas, not just international affairs policy. Regardless, the *Whole of Government* approaches aim to connect government departments and agencies, (and ideally levels of government, and non-governmental organizations) bringing their individual expertise to bear across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated response to a wicked problem such as security.[35] Although *Whole of Government* approaches challenge the bureaucratic silos resulting from devolution in the 1990s, successful implementation will improve effectiveness, efficiency or both. The interested nations studied the concepts

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[34] Canadian Coalition to end Global Poverty, "Planning for an International Policy Review . . . .

[35] Australian Government, "Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges," http://www.apsc.gov.au/mac/connectinggovernment.htm; Internet; accessed 10 April 2007.

since the late 1990s.[36]

Although the sequencing of policy announcements and the statement's development influenced the IPS, Government released it in April 2005 to provide a unified policy framework for Canada's commitments to Afghanistan. The IPS's release was the culmination of milestones such as Prime Minister Martin's 12 December 2003 announcement of *Canada's Place in the World*, the 2 February 2004 direction to conduct the International Policy Review, the 2004 federal budget, the 27 April 2004 release of the NSP, consultative development of the IPS, and the 23 February 2005 federal budget. Although the process was logical, the IPS was needed to provide an integrated framework for the increase in Canada's commitments to Afghanistan. Canada's commitment to work in close cooperation with the senior ministerial leadership of the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, deploy a battle group under Operation Enduring Freedom and lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the insecure province of Kandahar were examples of the diplomatic, defence and development assistance Canada could provide to a weak state.[37] These initiatives had a higher probability of success if combined by appropriate strategic policy, and their success could validate the IPS's integrated approach to international affairs. The contributing departments and agencies could not succeed unless they understood how they should proceed.

The logic behind integrating defence and development initiatives in Afghanistan came to the fore during the International Policy Review and the IPS described it. The review's analysis of the contributions the Government departments and agencies, such as

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[36] Peter Wilkins, "Accountability and Joined-up Government," *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 61, no. 1 (March 2002): 114.

[37] For the sake of simplicity, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will be referred to as the Afghan Government for the remainder of this paper.

DFAIT, DND, CIDA, Public Safety, Health Canada, Treasury Board, and others, could

make to conflict prevention and post-conflict development in failed and failing states

found many interdependent relationships, so it proposed the integration of the

complementary contributions. For example, reconstruction projects such as a school can

grow into a developed education system if DND, Public Security and Emergency

Preparedness Canada and Justice Canada work to build sustainable security capacity.

Hence, the IPS directed the integration of those Canadian diplomatic, defence and

development contributions that could assist failed and failing states, such as Afghanistan,

and strengthen Canada's international role in contributing to its own security. Prime

Minister Martin reinforced this theme within the IPS's foreword by stating:

> . . . It [the IPS] also declares that the best way for Canada to make a
> difference in post-conflict situations is to pursue a "3D" approach,
> undertaking Defence efforts to strengthen security and stability, pursuing
> Diplomacy to enhance prospects for nation-building and reconstruction,
> and making certain that Development contributions are brought to bear in
> a coordinated and effective way.[38]

Canada can assist the weak states found in the current complex security environment by

deploying military and police forces to improve security; deploying the new Canada

Corps to improve governance; and providing development assistance to revitalize weak

countries' governance, economic and social capacities. Their integration must also

enable concurrent defence and development because transitions between combat,

stabilization, and humanitarian and development activities in the, "three-block-war," [39]

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[38] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's . . . Overview . . .,* fourth page of foreword.

[39] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's . . . Overview . . .,* 11. "Our military will be engaged in combat against well-armed militia in one city block, stabilization operations in the next block, and humanitarian relief and reconstruction two blocks over." For further explanation, see Gen Charles C. Krulak, USMC. "The Three Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas." *Vital Speeches of the Day* 64, no. 5 (15 December 1997): 139-142.

can be so rapid that the defence and development initiatives must be coordinated, relevant, and responsive. Although the IPS provided the mandate to integrate defence and development, it did not provide sufficient detail about the desired level of integration. In the current security environment, Government must integrate defence and development initiatives on the ground, not just in generalist strategic policy. The CF does not have a mandate nor expertise to conduct sustainable humanitarian or development activities. Most importantly, belligerents will not wait for CIDA's projects to enable long-term stability.

Another logical argument in favour of integrating defence and development is that such an approach synergistically focuses Government resources to maximize their effect. The Government's resources are too limited to implement an integrated approach while also continuing to spread its resources across multiple activities and regions. Therefore, in the IPS the Government set priorities that focused the elements of Canada's national power on particular threats, partners, institutions and markets that affect Canada's national interests. For example, Prime Minister Martin declared Canada would play a leading and lasting role in peace support operations, and contribute to securing and rebuilding Afghanistan by leading the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar. In addition, the IPS improved the effectiveness of development assistance by directing CIDA to refocus Canadian development assistance to target states with the greatest potential for successful intervention, and narrow the focus to sectors, such as governance, that hasten development and maximize their contribution to Canadian security. [40] Analysts also believe that Government should focus their development resources to maximize their effect.

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[40] *Ibid.*, 21.

In *Canadian Official Develop Assistance Policy: Juggling the National Interest and Humanitarian Impulses*, Dr. Jean-Sébastien Rioux argues that the integrated approach will improve the effectiveness of Canada's development contributions. His acknowledgment that:

> . . . ODA [Official Development Assistance] has always been one of the key elements of Canadian foreign policy, along with diplomatic efforts at promoting multilateralism and conflict resolution, as well as its military commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and participation in international peacekeeping,"[41]

illustrates the historic importance of considering the contributions diplomacy, defence and development can make to foreign policy. Unfortunately, there are few Canadian examples of the synergistic integration of defence and development, let alone focussed development assistance. Rioux believes Canada's development assistance has been scattered due to overly broad priorities and policy, CIDA's past tendency to take cues from international and non-governmental organizations instead of foreign policy, and impulses to contribute to multilateral initiatives. Likewise he believes CIDA had, ". . . a tendency to look for a seat at every table and to work with all NGOs, regardless of the actual size of its ODA budget. [42] The resulting waste was a disservice to Canadian taxpayers and those in need. The challenges of stabilizing failed and failing states in the current security environment calls for close integration of defence and development capabilities and initiatives in time, space, and therefore, in policy and implementation. The IPS does not describe the procedures to implement an integrated approach well enough for defence and development personnel to see how to work together.

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[41] Jean-Sebastien Rioux, "Canadian Official Development Assistance Policy: Juggling the National Interest and Humanitarian Impulses," in *The Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 210.

[42] *Ibid.*, 219.

Rioux's argument of shows that if the Canadian Government better communicates how they expect defence and development to integrate than there would be more popular support for the Afghanistan mission because the electorate would understand both the realist and pluralist reasons to provide development assistance. From a realist perspective, development assistance to Afghanistan can serve Canada's core national security interests of protecting Canada and the safety of Canadians at home and abroad, and contribute to international security because the aid could increase Afghan prosperity, freedom and security so that terrorist power brokers are eliminated.[43] One element of the pluralist perspective is the humanist perspective that aid is, ". . . motivated by a humanitarian concern for the population in the recipient state,"[44] and pluralists can argue that Afghans are amongst the world's neediest people.[45] Although, this approach could gain the support of Canadians from both the realist and pluralist camps, the IPS fails to make the benefits of integrating defence and development in Afghanistan easy for the electorate to understand. Instead of contributing to a unified policy, the IPS's Development volume refers to long-term develop projects in other regions of the word, contributions to the Millennium Development Goals, the New Partnership for Africa's Development and other initiatives that did not apply to Afghanistan.[46] The integration of defence and development initiatives can be achieved if official development assistance is

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[43] It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse each international relations paradigm. For a brilliant analysis of realism, read Arnold Wolfers, ""National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly* 68, no. 4 (December 1952): 481-502.

[44] Jean-Sebastien Rioux, "Canadian Official Development Assistance Policy . . ., 215.

[45] *Ibid.*, 215. Rioux believes that in the pluralist paradigm decision-makers and other actors contribute for a variety of positive motivations although they are mostly guided by translational humanitarian concerns. Pluralists assess the level of need by considering a variety of metrics including per capita GDP and GNP.

[46] Since the release of the IPS, Afghanistan has developed a plan to progress towards the Millennium Development Goals.

focussed, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and CIDA

reduce their friction, and official development assistance is dispersed in the appropriate

manner, be that multinational or bilateral via the partner approach.[47] Most importantly,

government policy must provide sufficient direction to reduce conflicting agendas and

the policy must effectively communicate the vision to Canadians. The IPS fails on both

accounts. Rioux believes that the three pillars of Canadian foreign policy - i.e.

diplomacy, defence and development - can institute better methods for working together

through an integrated approach. Although the IPS includes vague ideas, it fails to tell the

bureaucrats who must implement it and what the better methods are. Does the

Government want CIDA to implement immediate post-conflict reconstruction projects

instead of focussing on development? Should CIDA develop more bilateral

arrangements to lead aid projects directly? The IPS describes the Canada Corps' work to

provide electoral support to fledgling democracies, but fails to describe how the Canada

Corps will help weak states embrace a democratic process that can work within their

culture. The theme that, "Canada can matter to the world while pursuing its national

interests,"[48] is prevalent in the IPS, but its five volumes lack detail and unity. Regardless,

practitioners agree with proposals to integrate defence and development initiatives.

In a February 2007 interview with DFAIT officials after his term as the

international community's and European Union's High Representative for Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Lord Paddy Ashdown proposed that timely integration of defence and

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[47] *Ibid.*, 219-220. Foreign aid can take several forms. Bilateral programs direct grants and loans to foreign governments or forgive debt by a poor country to one's own country. Participation in multilateral programs involves direct cash transfers to the World Bank, humanitarian assistance to refuges in war zones, hunger prevention programs, and international action against land mines. The third form is grants to third parties such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to spend on specific community development for a specific project such as building a school or digging a well.

[48] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's . . . Overview . . .*, 11.

development initiatives would enable governance and stability.[49] He believes the

intervening states must provide security and meet the public's needs to sustain

development. If the intervening states cannot provide fundamental security needs, the

population:

> . . . will go away and find somebody else who can - the local militia, the insurgencies. This was the classic mistake. We made it in Bosnia, but we got away with it."[50]

Sufficient defence capabilities and capacities are essential to provide security to people,

and intervening states should immediately integrate defence capabilities with appropriate

development capabilities once a secure environment is established. Otherwise, soldiers

will be misemployed as police officers, prison guards, judges, aid workers and developers

until official development assistance arrives to bring the rule of law. This timely

integration can be achieved, but Canada's federal departments must focus on the

Government's priorities, not their own. The IPS defined its integrated approach to post-

conflict development, and the Government explained the priorities and subordinate key

initiatives to follow to achieve its goal of stabilizing failed and fragile states, so it seems

logical for Canada to integrate its defence and development in Afghanistan. This chapter

will analyse the mandates given to DFAIT, DND and CIDA to integrate their initiatives,

and their departmental direction to determine if the IPS's direction was clear to them.

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[49] Lord Paddy Ashdown has a variety of defence, political and diplomatic experience, the most significant of which was his appointment as the international community's High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina from May 2002 to 2006. This position and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina were created in 1995 after the Dayton Peace Accord to oversee the civilian implementation of this agreement. The High Representative and the OHR represent the international community through the United Nations. The High Representative is now also the European Union's Special Representative. Lord Ashdown preceding experience includes 18 years as a British Member of Parliament, several years in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and 13 years as a Royal Marine officer.

[50] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Video Interview: Lord Paddy Ashdown," http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/lord__paddy_ashdown-en.asp; Internet, accessed, 24 March 2007.

DFAIT acknowledged their mandate to, "Establish a Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) to plan and coordinate rapid and integrated civilian responses to international crises,"[51] and issued appropriate departmental direction to exercise it. In addition to creating the START in September 2005 to ensure, ". . . timely, coordinated and effective responses to international crisis - whether natural or caused by humans,"[52] DFAIT became accountable for the funds (C\$142 million in fiscal year 2006-2007) allocated to the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF). Since the IPS advised DFAIT to, "Establish links between START and crucial partner departments, especially National Defence and CIDA,"[53] the department formed an Interdepartmental START Advisory Board to ensure the coherent development of Government policies related to conflict prevention, crisis response and stabilization initiatives by integrating concerns from DFAIT, DND, CIDA, and several other departments.[54] The Government demonstrated its will to respond to crisis in failed and failing states via the START by mandating and funding DFAIT to coordinate the capabilities inherent amongst several Government departments to more quickly plan for and respond to crisis in failed and failing states. Therefore, DFAIT led the integration and funded the deployment to Kandahar of Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Correctional Services Canada (CSC) and DFAIT staff so they could support the PRT by providing policing assistance,

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[51] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's . . . Overview . . .,* 13.

[52] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Year in Review: Mobilizing Canada's Capacity for International Crisis Response September 2005 to September 2006* (Ottawa: Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) Communications Unit, 2006), 3.

[53] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's . . . Overview . . .,* 13

[54] Public Security and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Privy Council, and Justice Canada, are also members of the Interdepartmental START Advisory Board.

an initial assessment of correctional needs and political advisory support.[55] Regardless of

this good example of integration, the START is involved in such a plethora of other

regions, such as the Sudan, Haiti, the Horn of Africa and the Balkans, that it is not

focussed on responding to the crisis in Afghanistan. In addition, many of the activities

credited to the START are not new. For example, it was credited with contributing to the

adoption of Red Crystal symbol for use by the International Red Cross, although DFAIT

had represented Canada at such international negotiations long before the START was

formed.[56] Analyst should investigate the START further to see if the reorganisation of

DND, CIDA and other Government departments' activities under START has improved

effectiveness or efficiency. As explained, DFAIT took leadership of the START as

directed in the IPS and coordinated pan-departmental direction.

DND acknowledged their mandate to, "Maintain combat-capable Canadian

Forces, focussed on the challenge of restoring peace and stability to failed and fragile

states,"[57] and issued departmental direction to exercise it. The IPS provided additional

direction on the implementation of this priority by describing the associated key initiative

to, "Focus in integrated operations to get the best mix of forces to the right place, at the

right time, and to the right effect."[58] However motivating ill-defined phrases such as

'combat-capable,' 'best mix,' 'right place,' 'right time' and 'right effect' may be to those

who wish to enhance military capabilities may be, too much room has been left for liberal

interpretations. Given the Chief of Defence Staff's (CDS) contribution to the IPS's

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[55] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Year in Review: Mobilizing . . .*, 6.

[56] *Ibid*., 8-9.

[57] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's . . . Overview . . .,* 14.

[58] *Ibid*., 14.

Defence volume, it is not surprising that he believes, "The SIOC [*Canadian Forces Strategic Integrated Operating Concept*] was written with a clear understanding of the strategic context provided by the government's recent policy statement's and new CF vision."[59] In contrast, the politicians facing the cost of getting the best mix of combat-capable forces to the right place at the right time to achieve the right effect do not share the understanding.[60] Instead, they question the cost of and need for casualties, C-17s, medium lift helicopters and main battle tanks. Further, by stating, "The CF will optimize its ability to analyse, plan, and conduct operations with interagency and multinational partners,"[61] the CDS showed that the CF would integrate with others. Although, the SIOC illustrated the CF's desire to reach out to other Government departments and agencies to enhance chances for success in failed and failing states such as Afghanistan, the other government departments may not share the enthusiasm. For example, the Interdepartmental PRT Working Group records of discussion show an average representation per meeting of eleven DND members and ten members form all other government departments combined.[62] Does this high proportion of representation

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[59] Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Strategic Integrated Operating Concept* (Draft Version 04 01 July 2005 for CDS Review) (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2005), 2.

[60] The author has used so many 'jingoistic' adjectives in this sentence to make a point, not to demonstrate poor literary skills!

[61] *Ibid.*, 16.

[62] This data was compiled form the records of discussion listed below. Maj I.P. Rutherford, *Interdepartmental PRT Working Group 29 June 2006 Record of Discussions* (Nation Defence Headquarters: no file number), not dated. Available through Maj Ian Rutherford, DND CEFCOM J5; LCdr M.J. McKay, *Interdepartmental PRT Working Group 03 August 2006 Record of Discussions* (Nation Defence Headquarters: no file number), not dated. Available through Maj Ian Rutherford, DND CEFCOM J5; Maj I.P. Rutherford, *Interdepartmental PRT Working Group 30 August 2006 Record of Discussions* (Nation Defence Headquarters: no file number), not dated. Available through Maj Ian Rutherford, DND CEFCOM J5; Maj R.W. Van Der Pryt, *Interdepartmental PRT Working Group 2` September 2006 Record of Discussions* (Nation Defence Headquarters: no file number), not dated. Available through Maj Ian Rutherford, DND CEFCOM J5; and Lukas Gudinskas, *Interdepartmental PRT Working Group 11 October*

demonstrate strong leadership, focus and enthusiasm from DND, or do the other

government departments lack confidence in strategic policy? If the latter is true, then the

IPS has failed to articulate a convincing approach to foreign policy. Hence, it will not be

implemented. Chapter 2 will evaluate how DND and CIDA integrate their defence and

development initiative in the PRT. In summary, the CF demonstrated its understanding

of the IPS's direction to adopt an integrated approach to defence and development

initiatives in failed and failing states, but others may not share DND's interpretation.

The IPS gave CIDA a mandate to focus Canada's development assistance and

CIDA's articulation of new agency-level polices illustrated their understanding of this

mandate, but their program is still too widely spread.

Through the IPS, the Government explained their vision of CIDA's role in

ensuring continued prosperity and security for Canadians when it reasoned that CIDA

will have an important role in defending against terrorist recruitment through promoting,

". . . accountable, democratic governments that respect human rights, allow for peaceful

dissent and fulfill the aspirations of their people."[63] Hence, the IPS directed CIDA to,

"Refocus Canadian development assistance to target states with the greatest need and

greatest potential for successful intervention."[64] In addition, the IPS put this mandate

into context by stating:

> . . . Canada's strategy to address the multiple challenges posed by failed
> and failing states must be focussed, first and foremost , on preventing state
> breakdown.[65]

2006 Record of Discussions (Nation Defence Headquarters: no file number), not dated. Available through Maj Ian Rutherford, DND CEFCOM J5.

[63] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's . . . Overview . . .,* 12.

[64] *Ibid.,* 21.

[65] *Ibid.,* 13.

In order to prevent state breakdown, the IPS's Development volume directed that by 2010, two thirds of bilateral assistance resources be allocated to the 25 Development Partner countries, and the remaining one third of bilateral assistance resources be combined with multilateral assistance resources to help failed and failing states.[66] Although the Government directed changes, they were not immediately implemented due to ongoing commitments.

Although CIDA's freedom of action was initially limited, their adoption of a four-part agency-level policy, known as *Canada's Aid Effectiveness Agenda*, proved they understood their mandate to improve the effectiveness of Canadian aid.[67] CIDA plans to become more effective by strategically focussing on countries and sectors where Canada can make a difference; strengthening program delivery; gaining more effective use of resources; and strengthening accountability for results.[68] In agreement with Government policy, CIDA believes that the integration of defence and development into Canada's response to global challenges will strengthen program delivery by ensuring that Canadian policies and programs are coherent, complementary and effective. CIDA's 2007 *Report on Plans and Priorities* uses the integration of civilians from CIDA, DFAIT and the RCMP with CF members in the Kandahar-based PRT as an example of a venue that can strengthen program delivery and enhance coherence.[69] CIDA has committed to focus

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[66] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A role of Pride and Influence in the World – Development*, (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2005), 25.

[67] Canadian International Development Agency, "RPP 2007-2008," http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/0708/cida-acdi/cida-acdi01_e.asp#s1.4.1 Internet; accessed 9 April 2007.

[68] *Ibid*.

[69] *Ibid*.

bilateral programming in fewer countries, focus greater support on those multilateral

institutions that are most effective, and fully integrate development cooperation into

Canada's international policy framework. However, CIDA's programmes are still too

widely spread and, contrary to the IPS's theme, their framework does not include a

strategic focus on stabilizing countries or sectors that threaten Canadian national security.

      The ISP also mandated CIDA to continue to engage Canadians and civil society

as partners in development via Canada Corps, which was to primarily:

> . . . assist countries to build the conditions for secure, equitable
> developments by promoting good governance, focusing Canadian efforts
> on democratization, human rights, the rule of law, public-sector capacity
> building, and conflict prevention.[70]

Although CIDA established Canada Corps in 2004, the Office for Democratic

Governance absorbed Canada Corps' responsibilities in October 2006 in addition to a

mandate to promote freedom and democracy, human rights, the rule of law and open and

accountable public institutions in developing countries.[71] Although Canada Corps had

coordinated their activities with others via the START, The Office for Democratic

Governance does not refer to integrating with others.[72] Before deciding if this change

represents a change in CIDA's approach to integration, other trends will be analysed.

      This paragraph will analyse CIDA's announcements and policy documents in

order to decide if CIDA understands the Government's direction received in the IPS. The

current security environment and mandate to focus development assistance challenges

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[70] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's . . . Development . . .*, 12.

[71] The IPS directed Canada Corps to continue to work at state and local levels to assist weak states to develop governments, courts, electoral bodies, health systems, education systems, judicial systems, legal and regulatory frameworks, and encourage environmental sustainability

[72] Canadian International Development Agency, "The Office for Democratic Governance," http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/NIC-54102116-JUN; Internet; accessed 10 April 2007.

CIDA to assist in preventing state breakdown or assist in peace building in unstable countries. It is honourable to focus on prevention, but CIDA must retain sufficient capacity to integrate with defence capabilities to re-stabilize failed states such as Afghanistan. The IPS's Development volume and CIDA's 2007 *Report on Plans and Priorities* are in conflict. Specifically, the Minister of International Cooperation's opening message in the IPS's Development volume refers to the links between acute poverty and state failure. However, her 19 April 2005 announcement that CIDA would concentrate the bulk of its bilateral assistance in twenty five of the worlds' poorest developing countries did not include a significant failed state, i.e. Afghanistan.[73, 74] The Minister's omission of one of the poorest states in the world that had already threatened Canadian security demonstrates poor understanding of the focus directed by her Government.[75] The statement, ". . . Afghanistan is currently the largest CIDA aid program,"[76] from their 2007 *Report on Plans and Priorities* may illustrate an improved level of development assistance to defend against terrorist recruitment in Afghanistan, but

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[73] Canadian International Development Agency, "CIDA Announces New Development Partners: Developing Countries Where Canada Can Make a Difference," [news release on line] available at http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JER-324115437-MU7; Internet; accessed 10 April 2007.

[74] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's . . . Development . . .,* Minister's message n.p.

[75] United Nations Development Program, "Human Development Report 2005," http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/HDR05_HDI.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 April 2007, and Bruce Ross-Larson, Meta de Coquereaumont and Christopher Trott, *Human Development Report 2006*, Report prepared for the United Nations Development Program (New York: Hoechstetter Printing Co., 2006) [report on-line]; available at http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR06-complete.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 April 2007 . The Human Development Index (HDI) is a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education, gross enrolment ration and gross domestic product to rank the world's countries. The UN's 2005 and 2006 Human Development Reports did not rank Afghanistan because it was unable to provide all the necessary data, but the data it could provide indicated it was, and remains, one of the world's poorest countries. CIA, "World Fact Book," https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html; Internet; accessed 10 April 2007. The CIA World Fact Book ranks Afghanistan with the 9th lowest GDP per capita in the world.

[76] Canadian International Development Agency, "RPP 2007-2008," . . . .

is it factual? How can the statement be true if CIDA's *Report on Plans and Priorities* only identifies $175 million of their $4.2 billion fiscal year 2007/2008 budget as allocated to development assistance to Afghanistan?[77] Although CIDA could also be considering Canadian funds directed to Afghanistan from other allocations, such nebulous reporting does not demonstrate appropriate focus and inhibits other Government departments from understanding CIDA's plans. Ultimately, such reporting can suppress integration. CIDA has not focussed their program on Afghanistan. The program is still too widely spread. Therefore, it would be idealistic to determine that CIDA understood the direction they received in the IPS.

Governance

The IPS does not assign a lead agency to oversee implementation of the integrated approach, so departmental interpretations and agendas will lack unity. The IPS directs DFAIT to lead the START and allocates it the GPSF for release, ". . . in a whole-of-Government manner involving Foreign Affairs Canada, the Department of National Defence, CIDA, and other relevant agencies,"[78] but this is the closest the IPS gets to appointing a lead agency. CIDA and the three principle departments with mandates to implement Canada's IPS received general direction in their respective volumes of the IPS, but the IPS did not assign the responsibility to oversee the integration of defence and development initiatives to any specific Government department or agency. Who then will provide unity?

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[77] *Ibid* The RPP also reports $618M allocated to fragile states and countries in crisis, and $919M allocated to multinational and Canadian institutions.

[78] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's . . . Development . . .*, 24.

Whole of Government vs. 3DC

This analysis of the policy direction to integrate Canada's defence and

development initiatives would not be complete without determining the meaning of the

terms *3DC* and *Whole of Government*. As described earlier, the NSP and IPS used the

term *3DC* to refer to the contributions diplomacy, defence, development and commerce

make to implementing Canada's international policy. Government coined the term to

illustrate the link between these four elements, but it is not internationally recognized and

academics did not critically review it before use. The term *3DC* is limiting because it

only considers four capabilities. Hence, this buzzword only represents a sub-set of the

Whole of Government approach. As described earlier, several governments have adopted

the *Whole of Government* approach to deal with bridging successfully the demarcations

of bureaucracy that can undermine successful policy development and implementation.[79]

This holistic approach is necessary to deal with the plethora of challenges that do not

align with bureaucratic structures. Hence, the term does not just refer to the *Whole of*

Government approach to international policy, but can refer to the holistic approaches

required to deal with other challenges. The term *Whole of Government* is more inclusive

than the term *3DC* but less inclusive than the term integrate because integration can also

include the action of combining with other states, international agencies, non-

governmental organizations, and others. Hence, the *3DC* approach to international policy

became more inclusive when it grew into the *Whole of Government* approach. The

expectation grew to acknowledge that DND, DFAIT, CIDA, other government

departments and, ". . . agencies are expected to collaborate rather than continue to work

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[79] Australian Government, "Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges," http://www.apsc.gov.au/mac/connectinggovernment.htm; Internet; accessed 10 April 2007.

in the rather separate silos they had occupied for decades."[80] This paper will use the term integrated, instead of *3DC*, as it is a more inclusive term. This paper will define the term *3DC* to be that subset of the *Whole of Government* approach that only involves cooperation between the Canadian Government's diplomacy, defence, development and commerce capabilities to deal with a complex or wicked problem.

SUMMARY

In summary, the IPS mandated an integrated approach to Canada's foreign policy because the Government felt this offered the best way to project Canadian values and interests into the world to stabilize failed and failing states so that threats originating from them cannot negatively affect Canadians. The concept of integrating and cutting across bureaucracies to focus on and deal with wicked problems, such as security, had been studied and adopted by other state governments and Treasury Board, and recommended by *2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. Logically, the International Policy Review found that Canada can make a difference in weak states if it pursues an integrated approach that contributes defence efforts to strengthen security and stability, diplomatic efforts to enhance prospects for nation building and development efforts to development of governance means, institutions and infrastructure. Hence, the Government declared their vision of integration by releasing the IPS in April 2005, just in time to provide a unifying policy framework for Canada's increasing diplomatic, defence and development commitments to address Afghanistan's complex security challenges.

DFAIT, DND and CIDA's different interpretations of the integrated approach

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[80] Andy Tamas, "Development and the Military in Afghanistan: Working with Communities" (unpublished report prepared for the Canadian International Development Agency, 7 September 2006), 1.

highlight the IPS's failures and the work Government must do to implement their vision. The START has integrated various governmental capabilities, but its scope of activities is too wide. Does the Government want the START to focus on the current threat - most notably instability in Afghanistan - or mitigate the risks from other threats such as Sudan? Is the difference in initial departmental enthusiasm to integrate an indicator of friction or incoherent policy? Does CIDA have a focus? Should CIDA develop more bilateral arrangements to lead aid projects directly or should it continue to act through bilateral and multilateral arrangements? Instead of contributing to a unified policy, the IPS's Development volume refers to long-term develop projects in other regions of the word, contributions to the Millennium Development Goals, the New Partnership for Africa's Development and other initiatives that did not apply to Afghanistan. The IPS terminology, specifically integrate, *3DC*, reconstruction and development, should be refined. The policy gives a vision of integration but does not describe where, when or how departments and agencies should integrate. The term *3DC* is not defined and focuses on four elements of power that only represent a sub-set of the *Whole of Government Approach*. The policy should better define the intent of post-conflict reconstruction and development, and define the lead department agency for each. Should the Government assign a senior minister responsibility to lead the integration somewhat like a chief of staff? The IPS was the Canadian Government's first attempt at unifying diplomatic, defence, development and commerce within a single vision of Canada's international strategy. Future iterations should be better refined to ensure common interpretation.

Regardless of the IPS's weaknesses, Canadians are implementing it to provide

Afghans with a safe and just society, and meet national security policy goals of protecting

Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad, and contributing to

international security. Chapter 2 will propose areas where defence and development can

improve their effect by better integrating their initiatives.

CHAPTER 2 – THE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH IN ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN

Military forces are inarticulate without diplomacy. Diplomacy is not very effective without military capabilities behind it in a place like Afghanistan. Development . . . is unsustainable unless both diplomacy and defence resources are on the ground.[81]
Christopher Alexander, Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan from
August 2003 to October 2005

This chapter will evaluate the integration of Canadian defence and development initiatives in Afghanistan with a view to proposing areas where they can improve their effects. The evaluation will measure the effects Canada's Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) and Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) have achieved in consideration of those CF defence and development objectives assigned in the *CF Campaign Plan - Afghanistan*, and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project's five pillars: security; governance and participation; justice and accountability; economic conditions; and social services and infrastructure.[82] This chapter will first define the term 'effect', analyse the CF campaign plan to determine why and how they intended to integrate their defence initiatives with development, and analyse the CF's objectives and CSIS's five pillars. Second, this chapter will evaluate the SAT's effectiveness in integrating Canada's official defence and development initiatives in Afghanistan to identify the problems and their potential solutions. The evaluation of the SAT will not go below the operational, or pan-Afghanistan, level. This paper cannot compare the SAT's effects to those of similar state-sponsored organizations because the

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[81] Ambassador Christopher Alexander, quoted in Colonel Richard Gaguère, "Les relations opérationnelles et stratégiques entre les organisations internationales, les forces armées et les ONG," (presentation to IRPP Conference on Weak States and Sudden Disasters and Conflict: The Challenge for Military/NGO Relations, Ottawa, ON, 7 June 2005).

[82] Seema Patel and Steven Ross, *Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan . . .*, v.

SAT is unique. The third section will evaluate the PRT's effectiveness at the tactical, or provincial, level and identify problems and their potential solutions. This section will include case studies of the September 2006 Operation Medusa and the December 2006 Operation Baaz Tsuka in the Panjawi District to evaluate changes to the integration of defence and development initiatives.

MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS

Practitioners must understand the definition of 'effect' to integrate their initiatives and measure the consequences of their actions. The United States *Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations* defines an effect as, ". . . the physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect; or a change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom." [83] Similarly, the *Compact Oxford English Dictionary of Current English* defines an effect as, "a change which is a result or consequence of an action or other cause." [84] Both of these definitions reasonably align. However, to facilitate understanding amongst practitioners from both defence and development backgrounds, this paper will use *Oxford's* definition. A desired effect can create a condition that enables, whereas an undesired effect can inhibit achieving objectives. Hence, this paper will evaluate the combination of Canadian defence and development initiatives in Afghanistan with a view to proposing areas where they can improve conditions that enable achieving the Government of Canada's overarching intent of preventing, ". . . Afghanistan from relapsing into a failed state in which terrorists and

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[83] United States, Department of Defense, *Commander's Handbook for an Effect-Based Approach to Joint Operations* (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Force Command, 24 February 2006), 1-3.

[84] *The Compact Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, 3rd ed., s.v. "effect."

terrorist organizations would be provided safe haven."[85] Having defined 'effect' and the

Canadian Government's intent in Afghanistan, the next section will analyse the CF's

campaign plan to determine why they intend to integrate defence and development.

The CF intends to integrate its defence activities in Afghanistan with development

initiatives because doing so complies with the Government of Canada's strategy and

meets the Afghan Government's need to build governance capacity while projecting

security and services through their country. The CF derived its campaign plan from the

Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the *Afghanistan Compact* and the

Government of Canada Afghanistan Strategy 2005. The ANDS is the Afghan

Government's overarching strategy for promoting growth, generating wealth and

reducing poverty and vulnerability.[86] The *Afghanistan Compact* is the 2006 agreement

wherein the international community committed resources and support to the Afghan

Government's five-year plan to achieve the ANDS' high-level goals.[87] The Canadian

Government acknowledged that even after the election of a democratic government,

Afghanistan remains one of the poorest states in the world and is in a fragile position to

deal with the mutually reinforcing threats posed by terrorists, illegitimate regional

authorities and an established and growing narcotics industry. Understanding this

situation and the interdependencies between security and development, in 2005 the

Government of Canada set the following five strategic objectives for its operations in

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[85] Gen R.J.Hillier, *CF Campaign Plan - Afghanistan* (National Defence Headquarters: file 3350-165/A37 (OP ARCHER), 5 May 2006), Unclassified version released under Access to Information, 3.

[86] Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, "Afghanistan National Development Strategy," http://www.ands.gov.af/; Internet; accessed 14 April 2007.

[87] United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "The Afghanistan Compact: Building on Success: The London Conference on Afghanistan," (1 February 2006) [report on-line]; available from http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/20060130%20Afghanistan%20Compact%20Final%20Final,0.doc; Internet; accessed 18 April 2007, 2.

Afghanistan that show the need to integrate defence and development:

> . . . (1) Contribute to international security;
> (2) Provide political, economic, and military support as laid out in the Bonn Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions;
> (3) Assist the Afghan Transitional Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Transitional Authority, as well as UN personnel, can operate in a secure environment;
> (4) Assist the people of Afghanistan in the preliminary process of establishing a democratically elected and responsible government; and
> (5) Assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.[88]

This approach to post-conflict reconstruction intends to improve Afghan security, development and governance to prevent Afghanistan-based terrorists from threatening Canada. Since this approach is consistent with the Canadian views on national security, international security and human rights described in the IPS, all relevant Canadian departments should be participate in an integrated manner. However, how does the CF intend to integrate their defence initiatives with development?

The CF intends to integrate its initiatives with other government departments during planning, implementation and reporting at the local, district, provincial and national levels through liaison and organisations such as the PRT and SAT. The *CF Campaign Plan- Afghanistan* describes the CF's integrated approach by providing, ". . . guidance for Strategic alignment of operations in Afghanistan with the plans and actions of other government departments . . . in accordance with a long-term, coherent, and multi-agency strategy."[89] Hence, CF members endeavour to integrate strategic planning, GPSF allocations and reporting with DFAIT and CIDA via the Interdepartmental PRT Working Group, the Interdepartmental START Advisory Board and the DFAIT Project

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[88] Gen R.J. Hillier, *CF Campaign Plan - Afghanistan . . .*, 4.

[89] *Ibid.*, 2.

Development Management Working Group.[90] DND, DFAIT and CIDA also integrate

planning in the national-level SAT and provincial-level PRT. Local and district level

development projects are planned by the Afghan District Development Assemblies and

the Community Development Councils for approval by the PRT's Board of Directors.[91]

The level of integration during implementation varies with the nature of the project, the

control retained by Canada and the desired effect. Regardless, DND, DFAIT and CIDA

have integrated project reporting at the interdepartmental, Afghan provincial levels and

below via their shared databases.[92] Military operations are also coordinated with

development agencies to mitigate the affect on non-combatants and Afghan

infrastructure. This chapter's SAT and PRT sections will evaluate these methods,

identify problems and propose solutions. DFAIT, DND and CIDA think they can

integrate defence and development in Afghanistan, but the results must be evaluated

against the desired outcome - be they the CF Campaign Plan's objectives and criteria for

success, or the CSIS pillars of post-conflict reconstruction.

The CF evaluates its Afghan operations against the measures of effectiveness

listed in its campaign plan, but Access to Information regulations restrict release of the

actual measures being tracked and the progress measured to date.[93] Therefore, this paper

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[90] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's . . . Overview . . .*, 13., Maj I.P. Rutherford, *Interdepartmental PRT Working Group 29 June 2006 Record of Discussions* (Nation Defence Headquarters: no file number), not dated. Available through Maj Ian Rutherford, DND CEFCOM J5, and Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Year in Review: Mobilizing . . .*, 3.

[91] LCol Simon Hetherington, "Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team" (lecture, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, ON, 17 April 2007), with permission.

[92] Maj I.P. Rutherford, (CEFCOM J5 Plans 3-5), Interview with author, 14 March 2007. Maj Rutherford provided the 24 January 2007 copy of the Kandahar Project Implementation Timeline - Key Milestones that tracks all DND, DFAIT and CIDA projects at the provincial level and below. DFAIT, DND and CIDA are also developing a CIDA application to track Canadian projects in Afghanistan.

[93] Gen R.J. Hillier, *CF Campaign Plan - Afghanistan . . .*, C6.

will use the objectives and criteria for success assigned to the CF in the Afghanistan

campaign plan to evaluate the integration of their operations with development initiatives.

The CF strategic objectives that relate to contributing to development are to:

> . . . (1) Help maintain a secure environment in the ISAF Area of
> Operations; and
> (2) Support the establishment of efficient and durable Afghan security
> structures.[94]

The Government assigned the CF additional development-related operational objectives:

> . . . (1) Assist the GOA [Government of Afghanistan] in providing
> security and stability in the country, and in supporting reconstruction
> activities; [and]
> (2) Support efforts to address the humanitarian needs of Afghans
> consistent with international guidelines regarding the use of military assets
> in support of humanitarian activities. Such efforts should be
> complementary to and consistent with existing humanitarian operations,
> and are likely to be exceptional in nature.[95]

In practice, the CF will not only carry out military operations but will also support the

establishment of an efficient and durable Afghan National Army (ANA) element of the

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) through the CF's Operational Military Liaison

Team (OMLT). In addition to developing Afghan security capacity, the CF established

the Kandahar PRT to support reconstruction activities and efforts to address the Afghan's

humanitarian needs. The CF will know it has achieved the assigned objectives when:

> . . . (1) ANSF structures are established, sustained and fully controlled by
> the GOA;
> (2) ANSF can conduct effective independent counter-insurgency
> operations against OAG [other armed groups];
> (3) Afghanistan can mitigate foreign covert intervention in internal affairs
> and effectively control borders; and
> (4) Terrorist groups are denied sanctuary within Afghanistan.[96]

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[94] *Ibid.*, 4.

[95] *Ibid.*, 4-5.

[96] *Ibid.*, 15.

Some critics may fear that the Government's assignment of security related criteria for CF success ignores the importance of reconstruction and development initiatives. In contrast, many CF security tasks are actually security development tasks or directly support development initiatives. The *Whole of Government's* theme of integration must focus on achieving effects, regardless of the government organisations that contribute to achieving them. The CF derived its objectives and criteria for success after considering the ANDS, the *Afghanistan Compact*, Afghanistan's *National Solidarity Programme*, and other development-related frameworks.

The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project's *Breaking Point* report on the Afghanistan government and society's progress describes some effects of Canada's defence and development initiatives. The study is not partial to the CF's measures of effectiveness because it was prepared outside of Canada and a development agency funded it.[97] Similar to the Government of Canada's strategy, CSIS determined that, "Efforts should aim at helping Afghans reach the point where they manage their own affairs with minimum external involvement."[98] Therefore, the CSIS study measured progress in five pillars, i.e. security; governance and participation; justice and accountability; economic conditions; and social services and infrastructure by comparing Afghan perceptions from autumn 2006 to perceptions from similar surveys conducted in April 2005.[99] CSIS divided the pillars into sub-pillars, which compare favourably with the decisive points listed in the

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[97] Seema Patel and Steven Ross, *Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan . . .*, ii. and iv. CSIS is a U.S. based non-partisan organisation. USAID supported the *Breaking Point* study.

[98] *Ibid.*, 1.

[99] *Ibid.*, v.

CF Campaign Plan - Afghanistan. In addition, the study evaluated each pillar in terms of whether Afghan's short-term needs and interests are being met; and whether the Afghan state and society's long-term capacities are developing. CSIS deemed progress is viable if short-term needs are met while the government builds long-term capacity. Sustainable progress is at risk if either short-term needs are satisfied without long-term planning; or long-term capacity improves without satisfying immediate needs. Of course, the country's future is in danger if the government fails to meet people's short-term needs and build long-term capacity. Since CSIS interviewed people, it measured effects better than processes that focus on measuring performance, such as funds allocated, funds dispersed or deadlines met. For example, CSIS's methodology will indicate if Afghans feel their short-term civil safety and law and order needs are being met while also finding if they feel the ANP capacity is improving. In contrast, measurements of the number of ANP officers trained does not indicate if Afghans respect their police. However, one must be cautious of observing trends over such a short development period, comparing to an initial baseline that could have been influenced by high initial expectations, and comparing the situation during the military campaign season with the baseline study conducted in the spring. Regardless, the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project's report on the Afghanistan government's and society's progress will be used to evaluate the integration of Canadian defence and development initiatives in Afghanistan at the strategic and provincial levels. Canada must also combine their effects with the Government of Afghanistan's attempts to extend Afghan capacity to provide stability, security and services because the, ". . . key to ensuring long-term security and stability is the development of Afghan capacity across all aspects of society."[100]

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[100] Gen R.J. Hillier, *CF Campaign Plan - Afghanistan . . .*, 7.

STRATEGIC ADVISORY TEAM – AFGHANISTAN

This section will evaluate the SAT's effectiveness at integrating Canadian defence

and development initiatives at Afghanistan's national level with a view to identifying the

problems and their potential solutions. The evaluation will consider the SAT's role,

organisation, command, control, training, contribution to Afghanistan's relations with the

international community, and the SAT's contribution to the Afghan Government's

attempts to extend their governance throughout their country.

The SAT's Role

The SAT's role is to assist the Afghan Government to build those human

capabilities and capacities, and processes required to ensure results and strategic

coherence in governance, peace and security.[101] This directly relates to the Canadian

Government's objective to assist the people of Afghanistan in the process of establishing

a responsible government. As described in the *Afghanistan National Development*

Strategy, the country had a great need to rebuild its federal government because,

"Persecutions, killings, arrests and exodus had lowered the already small number of

skilled administrators and technocrats, and undermined the state's capacity.[102] Without

trained people, the Afghan Government could not extend their reach and credibility into

the provinces. Canada is the only state that has contributed an advisory team to assist the

people of Afghanistan to establish a stable, democratically elected and responsible

government. The SAT originated from a team of military planners assigned in 2004 to

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[101] LCol Fred Aubin, "Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan" (lecture, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, ON, 4 April 2007), with permission, slide 18.

[102] Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, "Afghanistan National Development . . ., 3.

the Afghan Transitional Authority's, ". . . Minister of Finance to assist in the

development of a both long-term framework for development and the first post-Taliban

national budget."[103] President Karzai was appreciative, so in 2005 asked General Hillier

to assist the Afghan Government to prepare for the January 2006 London Conference.

Hence, the SAT was formed in summer 2005 to contribute to achieving Canada's

objectives to support the establishment of Afghan security structures; assist the Afghan

Government in providing security and stability, and in supporting reconstruction

activities; and support efforts to address Afghan's humanitarian needs.[104] It also attempts

to bring coherence to the objectives of the Canadian Government, the CF, the

international community, and the Afghan Government. Hence, by participating in the

Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board and other interdepartmental boards, the SAT

endeavours to assist senior Afghan Government officials to implement the *Afghanistan*

Compact, the *Afghanistan National Development Strategy*, roll out national programs and

monitor success.[105, 106] One indicator of the SAT's success and influence is that, ". . . the

British plan to create a team based on the Canadian model."[107] It is encouraging to see

the SAT's work has impressed the British, but does the role of this small multi-

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[103] Col M. Capstick, "A Year in Kabul: Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan*," On Tr*ack 11, no. 3 (autumn 2006), 14.

[104] Gen R.J. Hillier, *CF Campaign Plan - Afghanistan . . .*, 4-5.

[105] LCol Fred Aubin, "Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan," . . ., slide 8, and LCol Fred Aubin, interview with author, 4 April 2007. The SAT works with the Chief of Staff of the Office of the President, the Senior Economic Advisor to the President, the Executive Director of the Afghan national Development Strategy, the Chairmen of Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission, and approximately eight Afghan ministries.

[106] United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "The Afghanistan Compact . . .,5. The Afghan Government and the international community established the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board for the implementation of the political commitments that comprise the compact.

[107] Rosie DiManno, "No-name Canadian Team Builds Afghan Civil Service*," Toronto Star*, 6 April 2007, A1 and A14.

disciplinary team of military and civilian strategic planners facilitate integrating Canada's defence and development initiatives?

The SAT's role facilitates combining the defence and development aspects of Canada's *Whole of Government* approach in three ways. First, the SAT's work should enable Canada to integrate its defence and development initiatives under a coherent Afghan strategy. Since the SAT's role includes building governance processes to ensure strategic coherence, it must by design assist the Afghan Government to coordinate its program across the Afghan strategy's three pillars of security; governance, rule of law and human rights; and economic and social development. Second, being as Canada provided the SAT under a bilateral agreement, it reports directly to Canadian decision makers without going through multilateral organisations such as ISAF, Operation Enduring Freedom or the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA). Further, Canada is purview to sufficient information to facilitate rebalancing its defence and development initiatives in accordance with changes in the environment because the SAT has incorporated members into Afghan ministries.[108] Third, the SAT facilitates feedback from the Afghan Government to the Canadian population, which can educate Canadians on the positive effects of integrating their defence and development initiatives. For example, the Afghan Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development's recent statement thanking Canadians and describing the positive effect of their defence and development initiatives informed them that Canada's investments are making a difference to Afghans. He stated:

. . . The Afghan people and government are grateful that Canadians have

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[108] LCol Fred Aubin, "Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan," . . ., slide 8. The SAT works with essentially the Chief of Staff of the Office of the President and all ministries except those within the security pillar. Canada is linked into the later ministries through ISAF and other organizations.

stepped forward to become leading partners in helping rebuild our
shattered nation, particularly Kandahar province. Afghans have learned
from bitter experience that development cannot take place without security
and security cannot take root without development. By helping provide
both, Canada is making a major difference in the lives of hundreds of
thousands of impoverished Afghans, and setting the conditions for a
lasting peace.[109]

The SAT likely told Minister Zia that Canadians should be informed of the value of

integrating their contributions, especially after the death of eight Canadian soldiers a

week before.[110] Minister Zia's comments reminded Canadians that their sacrifices are

making a difference and bringing peace to Afghanistan.

Regardless, of the logic of directly advising the Afghan Government, one should

question how the CF's leadership of this development-focussed organisation affects the

SAT's current organisation.

The SAT's Organisation.

The SAT would be more effective in integrating Canada's official defence and

development initiatives, let alone assisting the Afghan Government, if its organisation

included expertise from Canadian Government economic and social policy departments.

DND, DFAIT and CIDA are not the only Government departments or agencies with

expertise relevant to the SAT's role, but the team has not included bureaucrats from

relevant departments, such as Public Safety, Health, Finance, and Agriculture and

Agrifood. The SAT normally includes approximately sixteen CF members, a senior

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[109] Mohammed Ehsan Zia, "More Reconstruction," *The Ottawa Citizen* (19 April 2007) [newspaper on-line]; available from http://www.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=017605a3-7be3-4f21-b359-3ec009ff7d1e; Internet; accessed 19 April 2007.

[110] LCol Fred Aubin, interview with author, 4 April 2007. LCol Aubin noted that Minister Zia is most gracious for Canada's contributions, but the author is responsible for the cited assumption.

defence scientist as an analyst, a capacity development expert from CIDA, and a DFAIT representative.[111] Although the CF selected people with strategic planning and project management experience, they do not have experience in economic and social policy. As proposed by the first SAT commander, the SAT's recruiting challenges were based on lack of capacity and will in the Canadian public service:

> . . . the CF is really the only arm of the Canadian government that can quickly and continually generate the requisite numbers of people with the training and will to work in an austere and, at times, unstable environment.[112]

In 2006, CIDA could not find an employee to join the SAT, so they contracted Dr Andy Tamas to represent them. Based on his first-hand experience in the SAT, Tamas agreed that Canada should better integrate defence and development staff, ". . . to increase Canada's effectiveness in the kind of war we are fighting in places like Afghanistan."[113] The Chief of Defence Staff also agreed that it should be the responsibility of other government departments to, ". . . provide the bulk of reconstruction advice and assist efforts to increase GOA [Government of Afghanistan] capabilities."[114] The SAT could improve their effect if more departments contributed applicable expertise. As Tamas describes, the military lacks development expertise and development needs security:

> . . . If the military becomes more of a development agency it will expose itself to the risks of mission creep as it ventures further into a complex area for which it might not be well equipped. If development agencies place their personnel in high-risk environments they must be prepared to deal with casualties.[115]

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[111] In addition, the SAT receives political advice from the Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan.

[112] Col M. Capstick, "A Year in Kabul: Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan*," On* . . ., 14.

[113] Andy Tamas, "Development and the Military in Afghanistan: Working with . . . , 1.

[114] Gen R.J. Hillier, *CF Campaign Plan - Afghanistan* . . ., 8.

[115] Andy Tamas, "Development and the Military in Afghanistan: Working with . . . , 2.

The Government deployed the CF to deal with instability. If it wishes to implement at least the defence and development portions of its *Whole of Government* approach to improve effectiveness in Afghanistan, Canadian Government must add expertise from economic and social development departments to the SAT.

Command of the SAT

The SAT's members report to their respective departments, not one unified chain of command. For example, the military commander of the SAT is subordinate to the Canadian commander of Task Force Afghanistan who reports to the Commander Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command in Ottawa. The CF's campaign plan also puts the SAT, ". . . under guidance of the Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan."[116] The SAT's non-DND members also report to their own respective superiors beyond Kabul. Although the members cooperate to ensure that lack of unity of external reporting does not interfere with assisting the Afghan Government to build capacity, this problem should be solved. If SAT's members become unclear about how to accomplish their goals because they are receiving conflicting direction from their departments, then their advice to the Afghan Government will lack clarity and put the SAT's credibility at risk.

The Government should unify the chain of command and formalize the support responsibilities to facilitate the integration of additional non-DND expert staff into the SAT, and improve the integration of defence and development initiatives. The CF is really the only arm of the Canadian government that can sustain and support the SAT in Afghanistan's harsh environment, but further study of its chain of command will prove if

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[116] Gen R.J. Hillier, *CF Campaign Plan - Afghanistan . . .*, 13.

DFAIT or DND should lead the SAT. As Dr. David Carment found in his analysis of *Effective Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing States*, "The CF should be a key component, but not the sole element in Canada response to both failed and failing states."[117]

Control of the SAT

Although the SAT represents an attempt to bring the capabilities resident in Canada's instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, economic and others) to bear to assist Afghanistan, the lack of *Whole of Government* operational-level direction and assistance from Canada inhibits integrating defence and development in the field. Since the deployed field officers report to Canada via their departmental chains of command, the resulting direction is not unified with that emanating from other government departments. Departmental agendas and federal resources are not currently aligned and harmonized with Government objectives so field officers deployed to Afghanistan find it difficult to determine which actions are necessary to achieve the strategic aim. In addition, the SAT's cohesion is challenged by each department deploying its field officers on different schedules. Until there is unity at the strategic level and Canada adopts a *Whole of Government* approach at the operational level:

> . . . there is no mechanism for top-decisions to be translated into action.
> Thus, there is a gap between strategic intent and tactical execution.
> There's no one checking anyone's work. There is no mechanism to ensure
> top-level decisions are followed through by staff echelons. Thus, there is
> a lack of internal unity of action. Resources, particularly personnel, are

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[117] David Carment, "Effective Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing States," Prepared for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute's "Research Paper Series." http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Effective%20Defence%20Policy%20for%20Responding%20to%20Failed%20and%20Failing%20States.pdf; Internet; accessed 24 March 2007, 8.

unavailable or poorly matched to needs.[118]

The SAT could improve the integration of Canadian defence and development initiatives in Afghanistan if its deployed field officers were controlled by a single operational-level *Whole of Government* headquarters that could respond to challenges by prescribing the actions necessary to contribute to achieving the strategic aim. The operational leader would articulate the responsible minister's intent for the Afghanistan mission, approve the actions to achieve this intent and allocate resources to sustain the actions. Operational-level staff representing the contributing departments would design, prepare, set measures of effectiveness and oversee major contributions to building Afghan capacity. This operational level will be the vital link to strategy and tactics, and provide continuity between SAT staff rotations. While waiting for Ottawa to adopt a unified approach, the contributing departments should each adopt operational-level organisations to direct and support their deployed field officers. Each department's direction can be coordinated during interdepartmental meetings. Tamas agrees that integrated policy, command and control could improve the SAT's effects:

> . . . Ideally the concept of Integration should be applied at all levels of an intervention, from the policy formulation and conceptual phase through all steps to the application of Canadian resources and expertise in the field. The concept applies to CIDA's development workers, DND personnel and Foreign Affairs staff and possibly members of other agencies should form collaborative units that enable their diverse contributions to merge in a single integrated output.[119]

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[118]Roman Scarborough, "Group in Charge of Iraq Blamed for Woes," *The Washington Times*, 22 December 2003 [journal on-line]; available from http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives?p_product=WT&p_theme=wt&p_action=search&p_maxdocs=200&p_text_search-0=group%20AND%20in%20AND%20charge%20AND%20of%20AND%20iraq&s_dispstring=group%20in%20charge%20of%20iraq%20AND%20date(12/22/2003%20to%2012/23/2003)&p_field_date-0=YMD_date&p_params_date-0=date:B,E&p_text_date-0=12/22/2003%20to%2012/23/2003)&p_perpage=10&p_sort=YMD_date:D&xcal_useweights=no; Internet; accessed 20 November 2006.

[119] Andy Tamas, "Development and the Military in Afghanistan: Working with . . . , 7.

SAT Training

DFAIT, DND and CIDA do not develop their people in manners that foster an integrated approach. The military has well organized training and professional development programmes that teach foreign policy, but, ". . . there is no equivalent in the development community."[120] CIDA does not train development workers nor plan succession to ensure increase expertise in the field.[121] DFAIT inhibits collective understanding of the security issues facing Canada and the world by not joining CF officers on the Canadian Forces College's Canadian Security Studies Programme. The SAT's collective training if just as disjointed as its individuals' training.

The SAT could improve its effect by integrating its staff and building their cohesion before leaving Canada. The benefits are obvious and experts, such as Brahimi, have made similar recommendations. The trainees should include those people about to deploy and the trainers could include personnel from recent deployments and from the *Whole of Canada* headquarters described above. The staff training could be take advantage of the policy expertise inherent in the Canadian Forces College or the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, while the CF's Peace Support Training Centre could provide the training required to survive in Afghanistan's unstable security environment. In addition, the SAT could build strong relations with the PRT and Task Force by participating in portions of CF training at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre. Although the CF could contribute training venues, DFAIT's START should lead the training under their mandate, ". . . to plan and coordinate rapid integrated civilian responses to international

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[120] *Ibid.*, 7.

[121] *Ibid.*, 7-8.

crisis."[122] This holistic training would enable institutional learning and facilitate

implementing Canada's integrated approach to assisting failed and failing states by

planning, ". . . well in advance the expected outcomes and anticipated effect, both

positive and negative, of specific military, diplomatic and development objectives."[123]

The SAT's role is sound, but its organisational, command, control and training

problems restrict integration of its initiatives at a time when Canadians are involved in

complex operations. After assessing Canada's 3D approach to Afghanistan, the Institute

for Research on Public Policy agreed that these problems must be fixed:

> . . . Getting Afghanistan right is crucial, yet 3D has not developed into a
> truly integrated and results-driven approach. It is plagued by
> miscommunications, stereotypes and the rotation of staff. The approach is
> nevertheless essential, but there is reason for FAC [Foreign Affairs
> Canada] to be reluctant. While Foreign Affairs has the broadest interest in
> the country, it has the fewest resources. There is only one political officer
> in Kabul, a symptom of a wider lack of resources. For 3D to be more than
> tactical, Canada must create integrated units with real decision-making
> power."[124]

Even though it is idealistic to assume all government departments share similar values,

they are responsible to implement federal policy. The Government must appoint a leader

if they wish to solve the SAT's problems integrating defence and development, and

improve their effect in Afghanistan.

The SAT's Contribution to Afghan International Relations.

The SAT's effectiveness can be measured against the Chief of Defence Staff's

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[122] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's . . . Overview . . .*, 13.

[123] David Carment, "Effective Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing . . ., 9.

[124] Julia Wright, "Canada in Afghanistan: Assessing the 3-D Approach - Conference Report," Institute for Research on Public Policy, 6. [Conference Report on-line]; available from http://www.irpp.org/indexe.htm; Internet; accessed 21 March 2007.

intent that, "The SAT will assist the GOA in the identification of the enabling

capabilities, resources requirements, critical activities/milestones and a performance

measurement framework,"[125] and the CSIS pillars. The SAT joined the Afghan

Government in September 2005 as the *Bonn Agreement for Afghanistan* was ending and

the Afghans needed help to prepare the ANDS for the basis for the *Afghan Compact* by

January 2006. The Senior Economic Advisor to the President of Afghanistan was

responsible for both the ANDS and the *Compact* so stood up an ANDS Working Group

under the Senior Process Manager for the ANDS, Wahid Waissi. Faced with these

enormous tasks and limited staff experienced in producing keystone plans for

international approval, Waissi greatly appreciated the SAT's assistance. The SAT

contributed four staff officers to the ANDS Working Group, developed the Afghan

Government's work plan and provided structured advice that aligned plans with

objectives. Although it is fair to say that the Afghan Government needed outside help to

prepare for the London conference, they should be applauded for turning their back on

thirty years of war.[126] Never having suffered such waste, Canada was fortunate to be in a

position to assist the Afghans. The ANDS was derived from the new Afghan constitution

and their Government's vision:

> . . . to consolidate peace and stability through just, democratic processes
> and institutions, and to reduce poverty and achieve prosperity through
> broad based and equitable economic growth.[127]

The ANDS describes the Afghan strategies and investment priorities to progress security;

governance, rule of law and human rights; and economic and social development from

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[125] LCol Fred Aubin, "Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan," . . ., slide 17.

[126] Maj M.H. St-Louis, SAT Member, interview with author, 24 April 2007.

[127] Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, "Afghanistan National Development Strategy," . . ., 2.

2006 to 2011. The *Afghanistan Compact*, approved during a conference held in London from January 31 to 1 February 2006, sets out detailed outcomes, benchmarks, timelines for delivery and mutual obligations that aim to ensure greater coherence of efforts between the Afghan Government and the international community. The SAT had a great effect on the integration of the defence and development initiatives enabled by the international community approving and funding the ANDS and *Afghanistan Compact*. Professor Ishaq Naderi, the Senior Economic Advisor to the President best described the SAT's effect. "The Team has done invaluable work, particularly in organizing the country's economic development plan, which was recently approved at the London Conference on Afghanistan's' future."[128] The ANDS' pillars and sub-pillars include the same themes as the CSIS pillars of security; governance and participation; justice and accountability; economic conditions; and social services and infrastructure. Hence, when evaluated against the Chief of Defence Staff's intent and the CSIS pillars, the SAT was effective in integrating the defence and development plans so that Afghanistan could receive international support.

The SAT's Contribution to Afghan Internal Relations

Within Afghanistan, the SAT focuses on assisting deputy ministers to build capabilities, capacities and bureaucratic processes to implement national policy and manage national resources. They must effectively make the Afghan Government strong enough to extend their reach and credibility throughout the country to dislocate regional

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[128] Ishaq Naderi quoted in "Canada Helps to Shape Afghan," Canadian Forums International and War, [Canadian Press news report on-line]; available from http://www.canadaka.net/modules.php?name=Forums&file=viewtopic&t=13191; Internet; accessed 24 April 2007.

power brokers.[129] However, without an adequate level of security, not only will the

Government fail to remove illegal opponents, it will also fail to achieve the Millennium

Development Goals and the progress achieved during the last four years will be reversed,

increasing the likelihood of resumption of large-scale conflict.[130] The SAT must

integrate defence and development initiatives in Afghanistan to counter instability, and

honour Canada's commitments as a signatory of the *Compact*, supporter of the ANDS

and major donor to the *National Solidarity Program*. The SAT can take credit for

assisting the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and the ANDS Working

Group to assess, ". . . nation-wide progress made by different ministries, towards

achieving the goals set out in the Afghan Compact,"[131] but international think tanks are

also assessing progress.

     The CSIS' Post Conflict Reconstruction Report used 1,000 structured interviews

with Afghans in half of their provinces, surveys, focus groups and media monitoring to

assess changes to the Afghanistan environment from 2005 to 2006. They found:

> . . . (1) Afghans are losing trust in their government because of an
> escalation in violence;
> (2) Public expectations are neither being met nor managed; [and]
> (3) Conditions in Afghanistan have deteriorated in all key areas targeted
>   for development, except for the economy and women's rights.[132]

CSIS found that Afghans were less secure in 2006 than 2005 due, ". . . to the violence

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[129] Gen R.J. Hillier, *CF Campaign Plan - Afghanistan . . .*, 5 and 8.

[130] United Nations Development Programme and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Country Report*, (2005) [report on-line]; available from http://www.ands.gov.af/; Internet; accessed 14 April 2007, 21.

[131] Maj M. Diamond , SAT Member, quoted in MGen Ton van Loon, "Nation Building - CF Within the Afghan Government," *The Maple Leaf* 19, no. 40 (22 November 2006), 8.

[132] Seema Patel and Steven Ross, *Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan . . .*, v.

surrounding the insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns."[133] This observations

points to the fundamental challenge of removing armed groups without reducing public

security. In addition, the CSIS report notes that state security institutions increased their

capacity by training more personnel, but they have, ". . . problems with retention, staff

effectiveness, corruption, and general oversight."[134] The current Chief of Staff of the

SAT has recounted similar concerns, and Canada intends to develop a police liaison and

training team in Kandahar to assist in building ANP capacity in that province.[135]

Nonetheless, the SAT could recommend that retention be enhanced by increasing police

pay and equipment, and seek international funding. Concerning the governance and

participation pillar, the CSIS report found the, ". . . central government's institutional and

human capacity has improved, but its legitimacy has deteriorated,"[136] because the central

government is challenged to extend its reach throughout the country. The SAT can take

some credit for the increase in national capacity, but work must be done to build capacity

so that lower government levels can provide democratic rights, services and challenge

opposing commanders. The SAT and PRT must cooperate with their Afghan

counterparts to solve this problem. On a positive note, the general health of the Afghan

economy has improved because there is, ". . . a more open business environment."[137]

CIDA's micro-loan program contributes to this success by improving legitimate income

generating activities for the ordinary citizen. In the last pillar, Social Services and

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[133] *Ibid., v*.

[134] *Ibid.*.

[135] LCol Fred Aubin, "Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan" (lecture, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, ON, 4 April 2007), with permission.

[136] Seema Patel and Steven Ross, *Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan . . .*, v.

[137] *Ibid.*

Infrastructure, the CSIS study found a slight increase in the short-term needs being met, but long-term capacity was in danger because, ". . . deteriorating security conditions, a scarcity of competent personnel, and low quality have limited access and its benefits for many Afghans."[138] This observation clearly illustrates that unless defence initiatives improve Afghan security the international communities reconstruction investments will be wasted.

In addition to the issues identified by the CSIS report, the SAT could improve the integration of defence and development by advancing national coordination of the PRTs via the Provincial Governors. The SAT does not command the PRTs. Although, they are to assist the Afghan national and provincial bureaucracies, the PRTs follow their national mandates without ISAF coordination.[139] However, Afghanistan would be better served if the SAT and PRTs worked with their Afghan national and provincial counter parts under frameworks for federal-provincial relations. The *National Solidarity Programme* exemplifies a framework that lays, ". . . the foundation for a sustainable form of inclusive local governance, rural reconstitution, and poverty alleviation."[140] SAT members sit on the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development's National Solidarity Steering Committee that provides advice on programme direction and policies, and an inter-ministerial committee for economic and social development.[141] These committees support extending government services to districts and villages whose provinces are

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[138] *Ibid*.

[139] LCol F. Aubin, SAT Chief of Staff interview with author, 4 April 007.

[140] Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). "National Solidarity Programme (NSP): Operational Manual." (15 January 2006). Manual on-line; available from http://www.nspafghanistan.org/content/e79/e256/box_file257/NSPOperationalManualVersion3-15Jan2006_eng.pdf; Internet; accessed 21 April 2007, 1.

[141] *Ibid*., 9.

poorly governed. Regardless, of the provinces' challenges, the projects are not pushed on the villages. Instead, the committees support the village initiatives because, "Projects owned by the village were not attacked by the Taliban, unlike those by outside agencies."[142] This SAT assistance will enhance long-term governance capacity if coordinated with the PRTs' assistance to the Provincial Governors. Similar frameworks are also required for the ANDS' other pillars.

The SAT's assistance is preparing the Afghan Government to take ownership of all aspects of their security, stability, social and economic development. Although most CF initiatives in Afghanistan focus on directly enhancing security and stability, the SAT demonstrates that defence initiatives can support nation building, which will in turn can, ". . . provide security, support the implementation of the rule of law, improve governance, reform the economy and make progress towards human social goals."[143] Having considered the SAT's effect, this paper will next consider Canada's effect at the provincial level.

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM – KANDAHAR

This section will evaluate the PRT's effectiveness at integrating Canadian defence and development initiatives at Afghanistan's provincial level with a view to identifying the problems and their potential solutions. The evaluation will consider the PRT's background, role, organisation, command, reporting system, information sharing, and synchronization with military operations. The analysis of synchronization with military

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[142] Maj H.DeChamplain, SAT Member, quoted in Kristina Davis, "SAT-A Helps Afghanistan in a "Different Way"," *The Maple Leaf* 19, no. 43 (13 December 2006), 7.

[143] Gen R.J. Hillier, *CF Campaign Plan - Afghanistan . . .*, 7.

operations will include case studies of Operation Medusa in September 2006 and

Operation Baaz Tsuka in December 2006 in the Panjawi District to evaluate changes to

the integrate of defence and development initiatives.

Background

The PRT concept evolved from the American Joint Regional Teams that intended

to facilitate reconstruction efforts. PRTs expanded, ". . . the ISAF effect without,

expanding ISAF itself,"[144] because true growth would require 500,000 troops and cause,

". . . a coalescing of the country's factitious tribes against a common enemy."[145]

Although each country structures their PRTs differently, Save the Children sees them as:

> . . . joint teams of international civilian and military personnel, operating
> at the provincial level throughout Afghanistan, that undertake activities in
> the areas of security, reconstruction, support to central governance and
> limited relief operations."[146]

This assessment aligns with the PRTs' objectives to enhance security, strengthen the

reach of the Afghan Government, and facilitate reconstruction.[147] By October 2005,

twenty-two PRTs were trying to extend the Afghan government's reach into the

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[144] Michael J. McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?" *Parameters* 35, no. 4 (Winter 2005-06): 32.

[145] Craig T. Cobane, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Security Assistance: Comments on an Evolving Concept," *The DISAM Journal of International Security and Assistance Management* 27, no. 4(Summer 2005) [journal on-line]; available from http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/Archives/Web%20Journal%2027-4.pdf; Internet; accessed 19 April 2007, 92. The 500,000 number was based on the same force ratio of one peacekeeper per fifty people used in Kosovo.

[146] Gerard McHugh and Lola Gostelow, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan*, Report prepared for Save the Children (London: Save the Children, 2004), 1.

[147] The same basic objectives or areas of operations are cited in both Michael J. McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs . . ., 37, and Gerard McHugh and Lola Gostelow, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and . . .*, 2.

provinces. NATO realised the expansion of defence initiatives had to be integrated with development initiatives, so at the 2006 London Conference sought the appointment of a UN official to coordinate overall civilian reconstruction. American forces established the first PRT in Kandahar in January 2004 under Operation Enduring Freedom. Although this PRT was requested by the Afghan Government, it fell outside of the UN mandate and the Americans' methods were criticised for conducting military operations, including intelligence gathering, under the veil of humanitarian assistance.[148] In addition, Save the Children faulted them for concentrating activities in relatively safe areas where non-governmental humanitarian agencies were operating instead of leveraging their military capabilities to move out to implement high priority projects in less secure areas.[149] Under an ISAF mandate, Canada took command of the Kandahar PRT in August 2005 to build Afghan capacity in Kandahar Province in coordination with the SAT, the Provincial Governor of Kandahar and others.

The PRT's Role

The Canadian PRT's role is to conduct coordinated interdepartmental operations to promote good governance and assist the Afghan Government in extending its authority to facilitate the development of a stable, secure and self-sustaining environment in Kandahar Province.[150] This directly relates to the Canadian Government's objective to assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, which the CF's objectives to support the establishment of efficient and durable Afghan security structures; and to assist the

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[148] Gerard McHugh and Lola Gostelow, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and . . .*, 24.

[149] *Ibid.*, 24.

[150] LCol S Hetherington, "Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team" (lecture, . . ., slide 22.

Afghan Government in providing security, stability and support reconstitution enable. The PRT intends to effect all five of the CSIS post-conflict reconstruction pillars positively. Its intends to effect the security pillar by reducing popular support for armed opposition groups through information operations and providing tangible improvements to Afghan's lives.[151] The PRT intends to significantly effect the governance and participation pillar by encouraging Afghan Government provincial, district and community councils to implement the ANDS and other federal policies; assisting the provincial governor; developing governance capacity through CIDA's *Support to Confidence in Governance Programme*; and reintroducing protected Afghan Government presence throughout the province.[152] Further, the PRT intends to effect the CSIS justice and accountability pillar by facilitating growth of the ANP; providing force protection, infrastructure and military police assistance to the RCMP team leading the training; assessing the ANP's needs for infrastructure; improving information sharing on all aspects of Afghan National Police operations; and inform the Afghan Government via its Ministry of the Interior, of their police force's development, effectiveness and training. The PRT intends to effect CSIS' economic conditions pillar through CIDA's *Integrated Alternative Livelihoods Program* and the spin offs from the improvements to social services and infrastructure.[153] The PRT intends to effect CSIS' last pillar by assessing reconstruction and development requirements; prioritizing and funding programs to address the requirements; implementing projects that demonstrate tangible Afghan Government progress; developing human capital in the areas of health care and education

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[151] *Ibid*., slide 12.

[152] *Ibid*., slide 15.

[153] Maj Ian Rutherford, CEFCOM J5 staff, interview with author, 14 March.

in conjunction with partners; and facilitating the work of international organisations, non-governmental organisations and other government departments.[154] Again, these intents are noble, but the Canadians must be cautious not to repeat the Americans' errors. The Canadians have to assist the spread of government services to the one million Afghans living in Kandahar Province's seventeen districts, and bring unity of effort to the UNAMA, nongovernmental organisations, Afghan and Canadian defence and development activities. Unity of military effort should be achieved through the ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom chains of command so will not be discussed here. As opposed to the SAT's strategic work, the PRT's role involves social and physical reconstruction, daily contact with international aid organisations and Afghans of all walks, all in a violent environment. With so many influences, the PRT's members must receive clear direction, organise their people well, and encourage others to synchronize their actives to assist the province.

Organisation and Command of the PRT

This section will analyse the PRT's organization, including identifying the government departments and agencies represented and the command and control relationship between the representatives and their departments.

The Kandahar PRT includes 310 people, of which 180 can deploy off the camp.[155] The PRT would have less administrative overhead if it were based on the Kandahar Airfield, but doing so could diminish perception of the unit's role. The deployable

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[154] LCol S Hetherington, "Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team" (lecture, . . ., slide 18.

[155] *Ibid*., slide 30. The 130 remaining on the camp are responsible for the PRT's main headquarters, supporting the camp's and PRT's operations, and guarding the facility.

portion of the team includes representatives from DFAIT, DND, CIDA, Correctional

Service Canada, Canadian civilian police, the US Department of State, USAID and the

Afghan Ministry of the Interior. The deployable people are organized into an infantry

company equipped with light armoured vehicles for protection, a command and

operations element, a civil-military affairs element, a project management office, a

military police platoon, and the camp support element. Although DND appoints a PRT

commander, he exercises control through a board of directors that includes himself, the

political advisor from DFAIT, the development director from CIDA and the Civilian

Police Director from the RCMP.[156] Again, the CF contributes the majority of the PRT's

personnel but this is essential because of the security risks of operating within the

province.

The Canadian Government must enable its departments to sustain operations in

threatening environments because failure to do so risks development progress and the

defence mission, resulting in an increased insurgency in Kandahar province. The murder

of the PRT's DFAIT representative, Mr. Glynn Berry, on 15 January 2006 illustrated the

risks, reduced the PRT's activity significantly and highlighted weaknesses in the

integration of defence and development. Berry was killed and three soldiers were

critically injured after a suicide car bomber struck their vehicle in Kandahar city.[157] The

human loses and resulting development stagnation were tragic because defence and

development were not integrated while DFAIT took months to assign a new

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[156] *Ibid*., slide 32, and Maj Ian Rutherford, CEFCOM J5 staff, interview with author, 14 March 2007.

[157] CTV.ca News Staff, "Foreign Affairs Diplomat Killed in Afghanistan," *CTV.ca*, (15 January 2006) [news on-line]; available from http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060115/kandahar_convoy_canada_060115/20060115/; Internet; accessed 20 April 2007.

representative and CIDA pulled out their representative. Since the remaining elements of the PRT were predominately military, the Commander of Task Force Afghanistan reassigned the PRT under command of the Canadian battle group.[158] Humanitarian agencies were reluctant to deal with the military-dominated PRT because they believe military-dominated PRTs conduct relief operations to enhance the military's peace support operations, contribute to force protection and stabilisation; whereas humanitarian activities are impartial, independent and based on need. Hence, development work slowed during this period. Canada's PRT moved out from under command of the battle group in July 2006 to assist the Afghans and non-governmental organisations to distinguish between the fighting forces and the PRT. Even after the DFAIT and CIDA representatives rejoined the PRT, the Government did not authorized them to leave the camp for several months. The Government failed this test of its *Whole of Government* approach because its departments retreated when faced with danger. They had not prepared procedures or staff to respond to tragedy. The Government cannot implement its *Whole of Government* approach to failed and failing states unless the contributing departments have sufficient staff and will to sustain operations in threatening environments. Further, personnel need more than physical security. They need the job, medical, income and pension security that comes from robust support programs. Such programs, when combined with thorough training, will give public servants the will and confidence to work in threatening environments. It took the PRT ten months to reintegrate defence and development staff appropriately. Not only were time and resources lost in the interim but the failure to spend CIDA funds to implement ANDS

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[158] LCol Simon Heatherington, interview with author, 17 April 2007. By July 2006, the Canadian PRT was the only one in Afghanistan to be part of a battle group.

projects may have prevented Afghans from seeing the benefits for supporting the central

government and rule of law, and renouncing support for the Taliban. For example, the

CSIS report on progress in Afghanistan from April 2005 to September 2006 made the

following statements about security in Kandahar:

> . . . Afghans and international working for the government or NGOs have
> become targets of the insurgency. Several aid workers were killed this
> year [2006], and several high-level officials, . . ., were assassinated. The
> security threat has limited the movement of officials and aid workers to
> the provincial capital, rendering the unable to deliver services into the
> rural and insecure areas.[159]

The Canadian Government must sustain not only its defence but also its diplomatic and

development initiatives if it wishes to succeed in Afghanistan. The military cannot defeat

an insurgency on its own. The CSIS report shows that the insurgency gained support in

Kandahar province during the months of decreased PRT activity:

> . . . The insurgency has gained momentum in the south and east, regaining
> and holding control in many districts in the southern provinces of
> Helmand, Kandahar, ... Insurgents have managed to occupy critical
> roads and conduct ambushes from these strategic points. The insurgency
> is now able to recruit in large numbers, wage battles with battalion-sized
> forces, and employ new tactics.[160]

Had the PRT sustained effective DFAIT and CIDA staff after the tragedy, their

development progress could have inhibited the insurgencies growth. For example, a

September 2006 report to the UN Security Council found insurgents recruit foot soldiers

who are primarily driven are by poverty and poor education. Many insurgents, ". . . are

thought to be ready to disengage from the insurgency if the appropriate incentives,

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[159] Seema Patel and Steven Ross, *Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan . . .*, 44.

[160] *Ibid.*, 32.

particularly economic, are provided."[161] By September 2006, the Canadian battle group was decisively engaged in combat with strong insurgency forces. The PRT gained momentum by November 2006 when it was no longer associated with the battle group, had DFAIT and CIDA representatives, had its own camp, was augmented by specialist engineer teams to accelerate projects and had its own infantry company with light armoured vehicles to protect the development experts. Finally, the Development and Project Officers had sufficient protection and freedom of movement to get off camp to liaise with the Afghans officials. Hence, development restarted with representatives from DND, DFAIT, CIDA and RCMP.

The contributing departments must deploy development representatives who are experienced enough to coordinate development initiatives with senior military officers. For example, the diplomats and development officials in the PRT must be able to coordinate with the lieutenant colonel commanding the PRT. On the occasions that a Canadian commands ISAF's Regional Command (South), the senior diplomats and development officials should be proficient at advising this major general and coordinating with the ISAF Headquarters Development Officer, who is also equivalent to a major general. Hence, the civilians require a combination of communication, organisational, technical and project planning skills. They can also enhance their credibility by participating in pre-deployment training and for remaining with the mission for its duration, be that six months in the case of the PRT or nine months for the Regional Command (South) Headquarters. The senior diplomats and development officials should

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[161] United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for Peace and Security," (11 September 2006) [report on-line]; available from http://dacessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOCC/GEN/N06/492/46/PDF/N0649246.pdf?OpenElement.; Internet; quoted in Seema Patel and Steven Ross, *Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan . . .*, 32.

act, in priority, as advisors to the Canadian commander, senior planners in the PRT or

Regional Command (South), and, lastly, as project officers. Not only DFAIT and CIDA

have development expertise to contribute.

The PRT's Correctional Service Canada (CSC) representatives must have more

effect on reforming the penal system because failure to do so could risk the defence

mission and security in the province. Canadians value human rights, peace, order and

good government so will not support CF soldiers who cannot guarantee the care of

detainees. Hence, along with sixty-five other countries and fifteen international

organisations, Canada signed the *Afghanistan Compact* to reform the justice system:

> . . . to ensure equal, fair and transparent access to justice for all based upon
> written codes with fair trials and enforceable verdicts. Measures will
> include: completing legislative reforms for the public as well as the private
> sector; building the capacity of judicial institutions and personnel;
> promoting human rights and legal awareness; and rehabilitating judicial
> reform.[162]

CSC's slow response in joining the PRT highlighted the limitations of thinking only the

3DC departments needed to help stabilize failed and failing states. In December 2005,

Canada signed an agreement with Afghanistan with regards processing detainees through

their judicial and, if necessary, penal systems, but CSC did not send a representative to

Afghanistan to inspect the penal system until the summer of 2006.[163] The correctional

assessment that CSC tabled in October 2006 identified the need to refurbish the physical

infrastructure of the Sarpoza jail in Kandahar and train and mentor Afghan corrections

officers, but CSC did not deploy officers until February 2007.[164] The fifteen-month delay

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[162] United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "The Afghanistan Compact . . ., 3.

[163] LCdr M.J. McKay, *Interdepartmental PRT Working Group 03 August 2006* . . ., 2.

[164] Lukas Gudinskas, *Interdepartmental PRT Working Group 11 October 2006 Record* . . ., 4.

caused by CSC's problem recruiting officers to deploy is not acceptable because poor treatment of detainees is contrary to Canadian values. The two CSC officers deployed with the PRT now, ". . . provide training and mentoring to staff and prison administrators at Sarpoza Provincial Prison in Kandahar.[165] Although CSC has deployed officers, the PRT must still accelerate the refurbishment of the prison and rehabilitate the judicial and penal systems.

The PRT has failed to include a UNAMA representative to coordinate UN development initiatives with Canadian and ISAF development and defence initiatives in the province. There is no conflict in the three organisations working so closely together as the UN, Canada and NATO agreed to provide resources and support to realising the shared vision of Afghanistan's future articulated in *The Afghanistan Compact* and the ANDS. Not only did the United Nations agree in the *Compact* to take on, ". . . a central and impartial coordinating role. . .,"[166] but the ISAF PRTs and UNAMA both operate under a UN mandate. This provincial-level coordination should facilitate progress in the *Compact's* governance, rule of law, and human rights; and economic and social development pillars. Similarly, integrating the PRT and UNAMA's initiatives could improve progress under CSIS's governance and participation; justice and accountability; economic conditions; and social services and infrastructure pillars. Further, the integration of national and international agendas will assist the PRT to break away from the American PRT's poor relationship with humanitarian organisations.

One can see that the international community has plenty of defence and

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[165] Public Safety Canada, "Minister Day Announces the Deployment of Correctional Experts to Afghanistan," http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/media/hr/2007/hr20070209-en.asp; accessed 20 April 2007.

[166] United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "The Afghanistan Compact . . ., 2.

development work to do and many Canadian Government departments have expertise to contribute to Afghanistan. Regardless, decision makers must know if their initiatives are helping Afghans. They cannot tell by measuring the funds expended or allocated.

Improve the PRT's Reporting System

Government cannot see the effects of integrating their defence and development initiatives, and does not coordinate these efforts because their departments and agencies report activities in different manners. The *CF Campaign Plan- Afghanistan* includes measures of effectiveness to assess quantitative and qualitative changes in Afghan and threat attitudes, behaviours and capabilities to facilitate direction for future activities. However, development agencies are inhibited from accessing DND's data because the measures are classified as secret.[167] CIDA also inhibits measuring progress because they often report spending plans and funds dispensed instead of reporting the resulting effects. While the direct, immediate physical outcomes from specific initiatives or projects implemented by individual departments or agencies are relatively easy to observe, ". . . they rarely - by themselves - produce the conditions or operational effects needed to achieve theatre or national objectives."[168] CIDA also fails to report the long-term effects of their activities because the changes are so slow.[169] The Records of Discussion from the Interdepartmental PRT Working Group chronicle DND, DFAIT, CIDA, RCMP and Correction Services Canada's attempts to integrate their reporting, but the departments

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[167] Gen R.J. Hillier, *CF Campaign Plan - Afghanistan . . .*, Annex A.

[168] United States, Department of Defense, *Commander's Handbook for an Effect-Based . . .*, viii.

[169] CIDA, "Canada's New Government Substantially Boosts Support to Development Efforts in Afghanistan," (26 February 2007) [news release on-line]; available from http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=1&id=1552; Internet; accessed 14 April 2007.

have not yet agreed on the measures of effects.[170]

The Government must adopt standard measures of effects to determine the effect of the PRT's defence and development initiates. Further, it must measure the effects over long timelines to observe trends and trigger decisions, such as changing the weight of effort on defence and development initiatives, to maintain progress. CSIS's pillars could form the basis for developing appropriate measures of effects because they align closely to Task Force Afghanistan's lines of operations. For example, the PRT could track the degree to which non-governmental and international organisations work with the Governor of Kandahar Province to determine the level of confidence the international community have with his governance. The PRT must also sustain reporting systems that capture the progress of all development projects across the province, be they initiated by the Afghan Government, DFAIT, DND, CIDA, UNAMA, non-governmental organisations, or others, to determine which actions have a positive effect on the security environment.[171] Again, these problems result from poor leadership.

A true *Whole of Government* approach to international missions must start with national policy and strategy to unify the Cabinet and the government bureaucracy so they may rigorously formulate and coordinate action before, during, and after the mission.[172] The Canadian Government's departments and agencies involved in Afghanistan did not share a common understanding of the Government's vision before starting their tasks because they were committed before the IPS and a unified Government of Canada

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[170] Maj Ian Rutherford, CEFCOM J5 staff, interview with author, 14 March 2007.

[171] LCol Simon Heatherington, interview with author, 17 April 2007, and Maj Ian Rutherford, CEFCOM J5 staff, interview with author, 14 March 2007 spoke of the importance of common reporting.

[172] United States, Department of Defense, *Commander's Handbook for an Effect-Based . . .*, viii.

strategy for Afghanistan were issued. During planning, the bureaucrats could not analyse

the strategic direction to determine the enabling effects, when (i.e. immediate, short-term

or long-term) and where (i.e. local, district, provincial, national or international) each

enabling effect was to be achieved. Under a central leader, the executive branch's

bureaucracy could have also determined how, when and where to achieve each effect.

However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the IPS failed to designate a central leader. Since

the implementation of a *Whole of Government* response to Afghanistan's challenges

crosses departmental and agency structures, the practitioners must collectively select and

monitor those measures of effectiveness that enable understanding the changes to the

environment that result are a consequence of their actions or another cause. It is essential

for the senior Canadian official responsible for implementing the *Whole of Government*

plan for Afghanistan to integrate effects measurement so that she can assess ongoing

changes to Afghanistan and make appropriate decisions that weigh immediate needs

against longer-term requirements to achieve the Government of Canada strategic

objectives. Hence, the Interdepartmental PRT Working Group should reinvigorate their

efforts to implement an integrate method of measuring effects. Canada's probability of

success will increase if it integrates its defence and development initiatives during

planning and integrates their measures of effects with greater precision and rigor during

implementation.

Improve the PRT's Information Sharing

The PRT would be more effective at integrating Canadian defence and

development initiatives at Afghanistan's provincial level if it shared some information

systems amongst its Canadian government representatives, such as DFAIT, DND, CIDA, RCMP and CSC. Organisations usually face structural, cultural, environmental and technical challenges to sharing information and accessing expertise.[173] Hence, the PRT must understand and address these challenges to improve their effect. All practitioners interviewed described the positive will of the members to work together, so one can deduce that the PRT members have overcome the departmental structural and cultural barriers between them. Its members share a common operating environment so their information sharing is now only limited by technical challenges. Although the separation between secure and insecure information systems must remain, CIDA is preparing an integrated list of DFAIT, DND and CIDA projects and relating them to the capacities they contribute to in order to further integrate reporting progress in a *Whole of Government* manner. The intranet-based system names and describes each project, gives its timeline, links the project to the information campaign by noting if it has been announced, notes the project's expected outcome, the actual results to date, the expected results in the next reporting period and the expected final result. The database also notes each project's cash flow.[174] Although this system seems rudimentary, it has significantly increased understanding across the PRT's Canadian Government contributors and improved the integration of defence and development initiatives. Regardless of the internal information sharing, the PRT must still synchronize its activities with military operations to reconstruct the province while operations are ongoing.

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[173] Rebecca Linder, *Wikis, Webs and Networks: Creating Connections for Conflict-Prone Settings*. Report Prepared for The Centre for Strategic and International Studies' Post Conflict Reconstruction Project. Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, October 2006, available from http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061018_pcr_creatingconnections.pdf; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007.

[174] Maj Ian Rutherford, CEFCOM J5 staff, interview with author, 14 March 2007.

Synchronizing PRT and Military Operations

The PRT's effectiveness at integrating defence and development initiatives in Kandahar Province cannot be analysed without considering its support to tactical operations. To this end, the analysis of synchronization with military operations will include case studies of September 2006's Operation Medusa and December 2006's Operation Baaz Tsuka in the Panjawi District to evaluate changes to the integration of defence and development initiatives.

In September 2006 the Canadian battle group began Operation Medusa to reduce insurgent forces in Kandahar's Panjawi District and expand Kandahar City's Afghanistan Development Zone (ADZ). The success of the military operation and the stability of the enlarged ADZ were limited by faulty humanitarian assistance. First, the PRT failed to inform humanitarian assistance organisations, such as UNHCR and the World Food Program, of the battle plans early enough for them to prepare to assist displaced and needy people. Second, the PRT was unprepared to plan reconstruction and assistance, and remediate damage because the Civil-Military Coordination Cell assigned from the PRT to the battle group did not have sufficient protection and mobility to deploy its PRT Detachments and Project Officers. Due to losses, the battle group commander reassigned the PRT's infantry force protection company and their light armoured vehicles to join the fight. Because of these two factors, humanitarian assistance did not begin to arrive in the district until weeks after the operation.[175] Although the displaced Afghans' basic needs for food and shelter were met after several weeks, many were not resettled until February 2007. The tactical military successes disrupted the Taliban but Afghan confidence in their central and provincial government suffered. The battle group and PRT failed to

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[175] Maj Rich VanDer Pryt, CEFCOM J5 Plans 3-4, interview with author, 15 March 2007.

integrate their defence and development initiatives to bring stability to the district and extend Afghan governance over the ADZ. CSIS found that Afghans felt less secure in September 2006 than in 2005, ". . . due largely to the violence surrounding the insurgency and counter insurgency campaigns."[176] In the following months the Kandahar provincial governor, Asadullah Khalid, and the PRT developed a plan to facilitate the Panjawi population to return home, but the district needed to be re-stabilized first.

The PRT was more effective at integrating defence and development initiatives during the following operation, Baaz Tsuka. Canadian forces launched Operation Baaz Tsuka on 15 December 2006 to reduce Taliban influence in Kandahar's Panjawi and Zhari districts, thereby facilitating securing and expanding the ADZ to the west of Kandahar City. Having learned from Operation Medusa, development issues were better integrated with the operation this time. Before the operation, the PRT established a permanent Joint Provincial Coordination Centre with the provincial government in Kandahar City to improve the province's ability to mange crisis. The first phase of the operation included shaping the battlefield by engaging in a series of actions designated to improve security in the district, especially, though not exclusively, focussing on the population centres. The military operations were prepared with the intention of facilitating the development of local security by reducing Taliban influence in the area.[177] The PRT informed humanitarian assistance organisations, such as UNHCR and the World Food Program, of the operation before it started in order to prevent another human crisis like that seen during Operation Medusa Operation. In return, these development experts provided sound advice that the civilian population be warned of the

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[176] Seema Patel and Steven Ross, *Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan . . .*, v.

[177] Maj Rich VanDer Pryt, CEFCOM J5 Plans 3-4, interview with author, 15 March 2007.

impending attacks. Hence, leaflets were dropped to warn the civilian population of the

impending battles, to encourage local people to support NATO instead of the Taliban,

and to warn Taliban fighters that they would soon face NATO forces. Since the PRT had

regained the protection of their infantry force protection company, they and humanitarian

organisations could follow up on the leaflets by meeting with community leaders to plan

reconstruction initiatives for after the Taliban's departure. The defence and development

team also ensured that displaced persons were registered, fed and provided with interim

shelter within hours of the end of hostilities.

PRT Detachments responded to immediate needs at the village level by

facilitating project identification, approval, management and implementation by

Afghans.[178] With the assistance of the deployed PRT Detachments, the Community

Development Committees were responsible to identify the need, location and scope of

projects and submit their proposals to the province's Disaster Management Committee.

This Afghan committee, collated with the Joint Provincial Coordination Centre,

interfaced with all development actors, including a Technical Advisory Group, to vet the

communities' requests before submitting them to the Provincial Development

Committee. This senior Afghan committee, chaired by the provincial governor,

prioritized and approved the reconstruction efforts in consideration of the short-term

need, long-term value and impact on other development initiatives. Once the projects

were approved, UNAMA and the PRT provided funding and project management

assistance. Although this approach may seem bureaucratic, it has improved Afghan

governance of development, and provincial accountability to the community leaders.

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[178] LCol S Hetherington, "Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team" (lecture, . . ., slide 51. Up to $5,000 was available for each immediate reconstruction project and the District Development Assemblies had the authority to approve larger more inclusive projects.

This process's positive effect is evident as less than one percent of the community-based projects have been attacked by the Taliban.[179]

The PRT also enabled better integration of defence and development initiates during the repopulation of villages after battle. The first step of repopulation was the establishment of security, which included the ANAand ISAF forcing Taliban forces out of the village, ANP committing to sustain security, engaging a community leader who is willing to support the Afghan Government, and employing ISAF teams to clear any ordinance. The second step is the initial return of the population, which involves ISAF's fighting soldiers departing less those who deliver immediate humanitarian material assistance, construction of temporary infrastructure for the ANP, and cooperation between the returning people and their leaders. During the consolidation step, ISAF soldiers only visit periodically, the village re-establishes consultative leadership through its *Shura*, the ANP prepares to counter any Taliban attempts to return, and non-governmental organisations arrive to facilitate cash for work programmes to stimulate reconstruction and the local economy. Theoretically, during the steady-state reconstruction step the ANA and ANP guarantee the village's security while the functioning *Shura* coordinates large-scale project and sustainable economic growth.[180] The long-term effects of this approach may be measured in CSIS' next annual report, but the Canadians and Afghans successfully implemented the first steps as part of Operation Bazz Tsuka. They learned from Operation Medusa's mistakes, reduced Taliban influence in Kandahar's Panjawi and Zhari districts, facilitated security and expanded the ADZ to

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[179] LCol Simon Heatherington, interview with author, 17 April 2007.

[180] Ibid., and LCol S Hetherington, "Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team" (lecture, . . ., slides 53 to 57.

the west of Kandahar City. Canada's Task Force Afghanistan improved their effects by better synchronizing their defence and development initiatives. Hence, Regional Command (South) has adopted similar processes as they attempt to expand the Panjawi District's security into Helmand Province during the current Operation Achilles.

SUMMARY

The SAT and PRT's integration of Canadian defence and development initiatives in Afghanistan have improved their effect. However, the Government of Canada should make further improvements to achieve the CF Campaign Plan's development objectives and prevent Afghanistan from relapsing into a failed state which provides safe haven for terrorist organisations. If Canada adopts the recommended improvements, the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project's future reports should measure positive changes to Afghanistan's security; governance and participation; justices and accountability; economic conditions; and social services and infrastructure.

The SAT effectively assisted Afghanistan to develop and implement strategic plans such as the *Afghanistan Compact*, the *Afghanistan National Development Strategy*, and prepare for the London Conference. Nevertheless, it could further improve the integration of Canadian initiatives while it helps the Afghan Government to build human capabilities and capacities, and strategically coherent processes. First, the SAT could improve their effect by including more expertise from Canadian Government economic and social policy departments such as Public Safety, Health, Finance, and Agriculture and Agrifood. Second, the Government should unify the SAT's chain of command and formalize the support responsibilities to facilitate the integration of additional non-DND

expert staff into the SAT, and improve the integration of defence and development initiatives. Third, a single operational-level *Whole of Government* headquarters that could respond to challenges by prescribing the actions necessary to contribute to achieving the strategic aim should control the SAT's deployed field officers. Fourth, the SAT should integrate its staff and build their cohesion through thorough collective training before leaving Canada. Fifth, the SAT should advance national coordination of the PRTs via the Provincial Governors and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development under the *National Solidarity Programme* framework. If Canada implements these recommendations, it will enhance the Afghan Government's capacity to govern.

Similarly, the PRT has begun to coordinate interdepartmental operations to promote good governance and assist the Afghan Government to extend its authority throughout Kandahar Province. Nevertheless, it could further improve the integration of Canadian initiatives at Afghanistan's provincial level while it facilitates the development of a stable, secure and self-sustaining environment in the province. First, the Canadian Government must enable its departments to sustain operations in threatening environments because failure to do so risks development progress and the defence mission, resulting in an increased insurgency in Kandahar province. The contributing departments need sufficient staff and will to sustain operations. Further, personnel need the job, medical, income and pension security that comes from robust support programs. Second, the PRT's development representatives must be experienced enough to coordinate their initiatives with senior military officers such as the lieutenant colonel commanding the PRT, the major general commanding Regional Command (South), and

the ISAF Headquarters Development Officer. Third, the PRT's Correctional Service Canada representatives must have more effect on reforming the penal system because failure to do so could risk the defence mission and security in the province. Fourth, the PRT should include a UNAMA representative to coordinate UN development initiatives with Canadian and NATO development and defence initiatives in the province. Fifth, the Government must adopt standard measures of effects to determine the effect of the PRT's defence and development initiates, and measure the effects over long timelines to observe trends and trigger decisions to maintain progress. Hence, the Interdepartmental PRT Working Group should reinvigorate their efforts to implement an integrate method of measuring effects. Sixth, the PRT should share some information systems amongst its Canadian government representatives, such as DFAIT, DND, CIDA, RCMP and CSC. Lastly, and most importantly, the PRT should continue the integrated approach adopted when planning, conducting and consolidating the results of Operation Bazz Tsuka. Long-term measurement of the effects may show that the operation's procedures disrupted Taliban leadership, separated Taliban cohesion and local population support, and built trust in ISAF and the Afghan Government. If Canada implements these additional recommendations, it will not only deliver vital services and opportunities to the people of Afghanistan, but it will also build capacity in government institutions and civil society organizations that will last for decades to come.[181]

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[181] Canadian International Development Agency RPP 2007-2008 . . . .

CONCLUSION

This paper evaluated the integration of Canadian defence and development initiatives in Afghanistan with a view to proposing areas where they can improve their effect.

The evaluation began with a critical analysis of the *National Security Policy*'s and *International Policy Statement*'s vision of an integrated approach to national security and post-conflict development. The analysis examined the policies' origins, factors influencing their release, the logic behind integrating defence and development in Afghanistan, and the mandates given to DND and CIDA to integrate their initiatives. The analysis also explained the evolution of the associated terminology and governance. Chapter 1's extensive summary described specific weaknesses in the *National Security Policy*'s and *International Policy Statement*'s concepts for integrating defence and development. Frankly, the Government of Canada failed to define a coherent international policy. Its *International Policy Statement* is not focussed, and is therefore, interpreted differently and implemented with varying degrees of enthusiasm by each department. The Government must appoint a lead Minister who is competent, accountable and responsible to interpret Government direction, set priorities, assign resources and coordinate other federal contributions to integrating Canada's defence and development initiatives in failed and failing states.

The evaluation continued by measuring the effects Canada's Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) and Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) have made in Afghanistan, and proposed areas where they can improve their effects. The second chapter also described

the relationships between the *CF Campaign Plan - Afghanistan*, *Afghan National Development Strategy*, *Afghanistan Compact* and Afghanistan's *National Solidarity Programme*, and the effects measured in the Centre for Strategic and International Studies Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project's *Breaking Point* report. The SAT's role is to assist the Afghan Government to build those human capabilities and capacities, and processes required to ensure results and strategic coherence in governance, peace and security.[182] The role is sound, directly relates to the Canadian Government's objective to assist the people of Afghanistan in the process of establishing a responsible government, and the organisation has effectively assisted Afghanistan to complete plans, such as the *Afghan National Development Strategy* and *Afghanistan Compact* to integrate defence and development needs, and receive international support. However, the SAT's organisational, command, control and training problems restrict improving the effects of further integrating its initiatives. Similarly, the evaluation found that the PRT's integration of Canadian defence and development initiatives has improved their effects but further improvements must be made. As shown by the progress from Operation Medusa to Operation Baaz Tsuka, Canadian military and civilian leaders in Afghanistan are significantly improving the coordination of interdepartmental operations to promote good governance and assist the Afghan Government in extending its authority to facilitate the development of a stable, secure and self-sustaining environment in Kandahar Province. However, as described in Chapter 2's detailed summary, the PRT's organisational, command, reporting and information sharing problems also restrict further improving the effect of its integrated initiatives.

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[182] LCol Fred Aubin, "Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan" (lecture, Canadian . . . slide 18.

Both the SAT's and PRT's limitations are caused by the Government of Canada's failure to unify the implementation of its *Whole of Government* approach to Afghanistan. No competent, accountable and responsible Minister is leading the interpretation of Government direction, setting of priorities or assignment of resources to ensure the Government objectives are achieved.

These conclusions and recommendations are not just proof that Canada can improve the effects of its defence and development initiatives in Afghanistan by integrating them. The conclusions and recommendations should be heeded for several reasons, some of which will save lives and enhance security, both in Canada and Afghanistan. First, the Canadian Government has committed its people and resources to preventing, ". . . Afghanistan from relapsing into a failed state in which terrorists and terrorist organizations would be provided safe haven,"[183] so has a moral obligation to maximize their effectiveness. Second, if Canada wishes to regains its place on the international stage the Canadian Government should honour its commitments to Afghanistan, NATO, the United Nations and multilateral humanitarian assistances organisations. Third, Afghanistan will not be the last weak state that needs international assistance to be stabilized before becoming a ungoverned exporter of human suffering and terrorism, so the Canadian Government must prepare for upcoming missions by correcting the faults in its foreign policy.

Although this paper is detailed, researchers should expand on this body of knowledge to answer remaining strategic and tactical questions. For example, how should solutions to integrating defence and development be extrapolated to engage the

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[183] Gen R.J.Hillier, *CF Campaign Plan - Afghanistan* (National Defence Headquarters: file 3350-165/A37 (OP ARCHER), 5 May 2006), Unclassified version released under Access to Information, 3.

entire federal government in assisting Afghanistan? How could Canadian defence and

development initiatives improve their effect by being coordinated with those of other

allied governments and international agencies? Operational analysts should evaluate the

planning, conduct and effect of the current Operation Achilles in Helmand Province to

expand upon the security and development lessons learned from Operations Medusa and

Baaz Tsuka. Namely, will ISAF be able to improve security in Helmand Province

enough to undermine the narcotics industry and refurbish the Kajaki dam to bring more

electricity and water to the parched region? Tactical level research is also need to find

additional ways for the SAT and PRT to integrate their initiatives with those of the

appropriate Afghan Government ministries. Specifically, although beyond the scope of

this paper, immediate research is needed into ways to work with the Afghan Ministry of

the Interior to improve the Afghan National Security Forces' capabilities. The CSIS

report found that Afghans believe justice and accountability are deteriorating because, ". .

. the formal justice sector remains inaccessible and corrupt and is unable to confront

impunity, adjudicate land disputes, unravel criminal networks, or protect the rights of

citizens."[184] Canada had little involvement in improving justice and accountability, but

the addition of Corrections Services Canada staff to the PRT and the recent concerns

about Afghan treatment of detainees illustrates that there is an immediate need to assist

with justice and accountability. The future of the unfinished mission could be a stake.

This leads to the most important avenue for future research - determining the structures

and policies the Canadian Government should adopt to deal with complex problems

while maintaining accountability and responsibility for their actions, and the expertise

resident in the contributing departments. Once these problems are solved, *Whole of*

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[184] Seema Patel and Steven Ross, *Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan . . .*, v.

Government approaches will succeed.

The challenge may seem great but human rights, tolerance, and human security all served as guiding values for the *International Policy Statement*, and Canadians value Peace Order and Good Government.[185] Our foreign policy should deliver on our values.

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[185] Michael Ignatieff, "Peace, Order and Good Government: A Foreign Policy Agenda for Canada," OD Skelton Lecture to Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa (12 March 2004) available from http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/pdf/Skelton.pdf; Internet; accessed 23 April 2007.

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