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**THE BRAHIMI REPORT: AN INITIATIVE TEMPERED BY PROCESS & POLITICS**

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## ABSTRACT

In 2000, the former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, convened a high-level panel to conduct a review of United Nations peace and security activities and to make recommendations to improve the conduct of peace operations. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report, was submitted to the Secretary-General on August 17, 2000, and made public at the September 2000 Millennium Summit. The report contained 57 recommendations, the implementation of which were tracked by the United Nations in three reports in October 2000, June 2001 and December 2001.

The Brahimi Report was widely endorsed by the entire spectrum of peace operations stakeholders. Expectations were high for how the recommendations could significantly improve peace operations; however, difficulties in implementing some have tempered the results. While much has been achieved – especially in the areas where the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Secretary-General were empowered to make changes – further progress has been hampered and somewhat hidden by factors which were not foreseen during the Panel’s review. These include the world security environment post-9/11, the trend by developed nations to withdraw from United Nations peace operations, the emergence of regional organizations involved in peace operations and the significant surge in the demand for United Nations peacekeeping at the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

While the Brahimi report did “move the yardsticks” its full promise was tempered by a less than ideal process, and ongoing politics in the Secretariat, the General Assembly and the Security Council. Nonetheless, the Brahimi Report will forever be acknowledged for ushering in a remarkable culture of change and deserves high praise for setting the conditions for further review and follow-on reforms by a bureaucracy notorious for maintaining the *status quo*.

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The Brahimi Report and subsequent actions at the UN headquarters have done much in recent years to improve the quality of peacekeeping. The challenge is to harness this and develop the political support for more effective operations around the world.<sup>1</sup>

– Dipankar Banerjee, “Current Trends in UN Peacekeeping: A Perspective from Asia”



## INTRODUCTION

The great promise and most fervent hope for a peaceful world was stated simply on June 26, 1945, in the preamble to the United Nations Charter. “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war ...”<sup>2</sup> To great shame and greater tragedy, succeeding generations have borne the abomination of war, never glimpsing the gentle state and implied promise contained within that simple avowal though the United Nations did create the conditions for the prevention of a third world war. But while not able to guarantee a world free from conflict, the United Nations, through its peacekeeping mechanism, has often been able to mitigate the ravages of conflict whilst maintaining peace between belligerent forces. That honourable United Nations legacy which began in 1956 when the first United Nations peacekeeping force deployed to the Suez Canal to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, was severely challenged and unquestionably tarnished during the 1990s when United Nations peacekeeping forces suffered a number of high-profile failures. Despite early 1990s successes in Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador and Nicaragua, and the late 1990s

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<sup>1</sup> Dipankar Banerjee, “Current Trends in UN Peacekeeping: A Perspective from Asia,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.12, No.1, Spring 2005, available from <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=2&hid=12&sid=e3fcec29-ff0e-4b5b-87dd-25ed13a42f75%40sessionmgr8>; Internet; accessed January 30, 2007, 27.

<sup>2</sup> The United Nations Charter, available from <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>, Internet; accessed January 27, 2007.

successes in Guatemala, Macedonia, Kosovo, Eastern Slavonia and Bosnia, the failures of the 1990s, exposed by international media whose coverage greatly intensified the perception of failure, were represented as defining a decade which left carnage to the nations and people in crisis, and retreat to the nations whose uniformed men and women laboured in the name of UN peacekeeping. And the reputation of the United Nations was damaged; damaged by the declining confidence of member nations, and damaged in the eyes of the world's people. At the dawning of the new millennium the assurance of the Blue Beret to 'make things right' was shaken, and an entire new generation stood in speculation as to whether it could ever be made right again.

This is the backdrop against which United Nations Secretary General<sup>3</sup>, Kofi Annan, on March 7, 2000, convened a high-level panel to conduct a review of United Nations peace and security activities, and to make recommendations for the improved conduct of these activities going forward. The panel, chaired by the former foreign minister of Algeria, Lakhdar Brahimi from whom the final report derived its common name, The Brahimi Report, comprised 10 eminent personages. Each had great faith in United Nations peace and security activities, and all believed deeply that these activities could be improved to better serve the cause of peace.<sup>4</sup> On August 17, 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the Brahimi Report, was submitted to the Secretary General. It promulgated 57 recommendations under four broad categories – doctrine, strategy and decision-making for peace operations; United Nations

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<sup>3</sup> All references to the Secretary-General in this paper refers to former Secretary-General Kofi Annan unless the current Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, is specifically named.

<sup>4</sup> "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," August 17, 2000, available from [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/docs/summary.htm](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/summary.htm); Internet; accessed January 20, 2007, iii.

capacities to deploy operations rapidly and effectively; headquarters resources and structure for planning and supporting peacekeeping operations; and peace operations and the information age – and was acclaimed a landmark document providing a critical framework for improving peacekeeping operations and of consequence, recapturing the confidence of member states.

It is this document which frames the basis of this paper's discussion. The Brahimi Report, widely lauded as the most comprehensive evaluation and analysis of United Nations peace operations, proposed sweeping recommendations for change after a decade of United Nations Secretariat and Department of Peacekeeping Operations failures. Some of the recommendations have been implemented, others have not. This is an examination of the Brahimi Report's successes and failures, strengths and weaknesses, and of whether the implemented recommendations have actually had the desired effect – whether they successfully addressed the deficiencies noted in the report. This paper also examines those recommendations that were not acted upon and how their non-implementation affected the overall amelioration of peacekeeping operations. Despite good intentions, dedicated work, hopeful optimism, tremendous need and encouraging evidence of improvement in the short term, the Brahimi Report was not, nor was ever intended to be, a universal remedy for the future viability and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Some of the deficiencies can be attributed to aspects of the report itself, some to the United Nations organs and environment in which it was conceived, some to world events post-Brahimi which shaped perceptions of the international security environment, and a lot to the political will of member states to apprehend and appreciate the absolute criticality to the reality of world peace upon which their support to United Nations operations relies. But how much of the Brahimi Report was actually

implemented? And did the Brahimi Report help to address deficiencies and thereby restore confidence in the United Nations to conduct effective and successful peacekeeping operations?

This paper will first review the evolution of United Nations peacekeeping to form the basis of the requirement for the 2000 review. It will then examine the Brahimi Report process and discuss how it shaped the scope of the effort, discuss the major Brahimi Report recommendations and implementation, examine a couple of major issues the Report did not deal with, and address how the emergence of regional organizations and coalitions of the willing to manage conflict impact United Nations peacekeeping and by extension, the relative value of the Brahimi Report recommendations. Finally, this paper will examine briefly the current Department of Peacekeeping Operations strategy, Peace Operations 2010, which builds on both the Brahimi Report and the lessons learned from implementation of the Brahimi Report, to further advance and enhance the United Nations capacity to address the security and safety concerns which proliferate the modern world landscape.

This paper addresses a snapshot in time from 2000 when the Brahimi process began until 2003 after which there is no substantive discussion of the report. The Secretary-General's last implementation report was issued in December of 2001, a mere 17 months after the report was first submitted to him. Little academic literature exists on the Brahimi Report and there is little source documentation – particularly post-2003. There is therefore some reliance on the work of Dr. William Durch of The Henry L. Stimson Center who authored the Brahimi report on behalf of the Panel, and who has followed the Report through monitoring and evaluation of its implementation. Dr. Durch's last comprehensive evaluation, *The Brahimi Report and the Future*



of UN Peace Operations, was published in 2003. Though this paper's subject is not current, the Brahimi Report has significance as it set the United Nations on a new course and provided the framework for understanding the requirements of successful peace operations. The Brahimi Report remains important and worthy of review and reflection.

## **THE EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING**

United Nations peacekeeping operations have evolved over the decades – influenced by reaction to world events and therefore developed in a manner that can only be described as *ad hoc*. With no explicit provision for peacekeeping in the United Nations Charter and subsidiary bodies, and no prescriptive formula for planning, mounting or conducting operations, United Nations peacekeeping responded to crisis and conflicts heavily influenced by the instruments of the United Nations and the politics and personalities in place at the time. Nonetheless, the original concept involved observer missions and later, to inject impartial United Nations military forces between two belligerent forces to maintain peace and prevent further armed conflict. Since its inception as a tool for keeping the peace, United Nations peacekeeping has transitioned through four developmental stages.<sup>5</sup>

The first-ever United Nations peacekeeping force was proposed by Canadian foreign minister Lester B. Pearson in 1956 – an international peacekeeping force under the United Nations banner to manage the Suez Canal crisis by supervising the withdrawal of troops from the region and remaining in place as a buffer between Egypt and Israel. This force typified what is generally become acknowledged as ‘traditional peacekeeping’ – an international force occupying a buffer zone between two belligerent forces – which defined the first phase of United Nations

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<sup>5</sup> Banerjee, “Current Trends in UN Peacekeeping” ..., 18.

peacekeeping. Traditional peacekeeping was contingent on there being a peace to keep and the willingness of all parties to the conflict for deployment of an international force. While UNTSO has been in existence since 1948 and UNMOGIP since 1949, one of the longest-running traditional United Nations peacekeeping forces is the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which began in 1964 with United Nations forces interposed between the Turks and the Greeks. Since 1974 a buffer zone divides the island state roughly in half on an east-west axis with the Turks to the North and the Greeks to the south. UNFICYP is still in place today after 43 years.

United Nations peacekeeping entered a second developmental stage after the end of the Cold War. Expectations for success were based on the successes of traditional peacekeeping however, the conflicts to which peacekeeping forces were applied were far more complex and thus far more demanding than what was experienced in traditional peacekeeping. Civil war or intra-state conflict was more typically the scenario, often fuelled by centuries-old grievances stemming from ethnic, religious and political differences. A complicating factor was conflict engagement by non-state actors rather than formed national military forces making it difficult for United Nations military forces to differentiate belligerents from peaceful citizens, and for United Nations officials in the field to identify credible leaders with whom to engage in discussions aimed at finding peaceful solutions. Notably during this stage there most often was no peace to keep however that did not deter the United Nations from mounting forces to intercede with a concurrent universal expectation that they would succeed. Forces deploying with insufficient training in these environments, often with mandates which did not relate to the task, insufficient equipment and inappropriate rules of engagement were soon overwhelmed by the monumental

tasks given them in uncompromising environments. The United Nations missions in Rwanda and Bosnia well illustrate the challenges to achieving success under these conditions. As world attention focused on these struggling missions, with most of the culpability accruing to the United Nations, countries which traditionally supported United Nations missions through troop contributions began to display great reluctance to subject their soldiers and their reputations to what could be described as an international institution with faltering credibility. The failures of United Nations peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the early mission in Angola – particularly the criminal genocides and humanitarian disasters suffered by innocent civilians in Rwanda and Srebrenica – all reinforced the crisis of credibility for the United Nations and provided the impetus for further withdrawal by developed nations:

The peacekeeping system malfunctioned terribly in the 1990s for a host of reasons. In Bosnia, the United Nations was asked to do too much with too little; in Rwanda, world powers failed to act in time; in Somalia, the United Nations was blamed for the ill-planned operation ... A chronic condition underpinning all of these disasters was the failure of member states to back their rhetoric with resources ...<sup>6</sup>

With the declining participation of traditional peacekeeping nations – largely western, developed nations – the third stage of peacekeeping emerged with developing nations taking the lead in United Nations peace operations characterized by a regional approach to managing conflict.<sup>7</sup> Regional organizations were thought to have a better comprehension and appreciation for the nuances of the conflict and a vested interest in terminating the conflict or at least diminishing their negative regional effects. The dilemma posed by this approach however, was

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<sup>6</sup> Peter D. Bell and Guy Tousignant, "Getting Beyond New York: Reforming Peacekeeping in the Field," *World Political Journal*, Fall 2001, available from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/2002/reform.htm>; Internet; accessed January 20, 2007.

<sup>7</sup> Banerjee, "Current Trends in UN Peacekeeping" ..., 21.

that other than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) comprised of western, developed nations, these regional organizations were largely ill-prepared to deal with complex conflict. Mainly from underdeveloped nations and often from Africa, the military forces comprising these peacekeeping missions were ill-trained, ill-equipped, unprofessional, not informed of international legal norms with regards to the law of armed conflict and perhaps even less inclined to follow these norms. Additionally the regional peacekeeping forces were often agents of their own governments' self-interest which were not necessarily the altruistic intentions encompassed in the notion of traditional United Nations peacekeeping. For this last reason these regional organizations sometimes "lacked the moral legitimacy"<sup>8</sup> of the United Nations which tempered their credibility, their authority, and consequently their ability to manage the conflict in the eyes of those party to the conflict as well as the international community.

The phase of international peacekeeping which endures today entails international forces responding to overwhelming humanitarian crises the genesis of which is often failed and failing or fragile states. Though 'responsibility to protect' is a compelling factor in the United Nations decision to respond to these crises, the intent in this paper is not to engage in a lengthy discussion about 'responsibility to protect'.

The evolving nature of peacekeeping, the reality of increasing need, the resurgent demand on the United Nations for address, and the occasion and optimism of the new millennium presented an opportune moment for the progressive Secretary General and once Under-Secretary General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Kofi Annan, to cause

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

the exploration and evaluation of United Nations peacekeeping operations with the explicit intent to detail deficiencies, devise solutions, and then aggressively pursue implementation. Annan's high-level panel tasked with conducting the review was established and tasked with presenting its findings in a report to be submitted in time for the United Nations Millennium Summit of September 2000.

## **THE BRAHIMI REPORT**

### **Process**

The Brahimi Report was submitted to the Secretary General on August 17, 2000, a mere five months after the overseeing panel was convened. Some of the deficiencies inherent in the report, and the failure of its recommendations to fully address the scope of amelioration required in the planning, mounting and conduct of peacekeeping operations, are directly attributable to the review timelines and process.

The forced pace of the panel, report writers and supporting team precluded an exhaustive review with full examination of the issues. The study was announced on March 7, 2000. One week later the writers were in place and one week after that the panel met for the first of only three meetings. The Millennium Summit was to be the high-profile international venue at which the Brahimi Report would be revealed for maximum public exposure of the issues it contained and for direct targeting of gathered world leaders. And it was to take place in New York in September only six months from its announcement. That the Secretary General risked announcing such a momentous project to be conducted within a notoriously closed environment

and with a notoriously plodding bureaucracy is testament to the conviction he had in the absolute necessity of the outcome to the continued viability of the United Nations as the international overseer of peacekeeping. The new millennium and its climate of renewed hope for the world provided a unique opportunity to exploit a narrow window where attentive listening and open minds might be susceptible to the Report's message.

Some 200 'not for attribution' interviews with United Nations staff were conducted; the knowledge gleaned informing the final report. Though the terms of reference called for the report to "cover the full spectrum of UN activities in the general area of peace and security, from prevention to post-conflict peace-building, including observation missions, peacekeeping and enforcement,"<sup>9</sup> time constraints pressured the panel to focus, in the words of the report writer Dr. William Durch, "... more closely on peacekeeping in complex settings of recent internal conflict than on conflict prevention, peacebuilding writ large, or enforcement."<sup>10</sup> This informs the basis of criticism of the Brahimi Report – its lack of relativity and applicability to the current international security environment where the nature of peace operations is primarily peace-building and very often enforcement. And it completely abandons discussion and recommendations of the area in most desperate need of international attention – prevention, the very area in which the United Nations needs to develop expertise and the area where success would do the most for the world and implicit in that, the reputation of the United Nations. Prevention was subsequently addressed in a later Secretary-General report dedicated to this

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<sup>9</sup> Terms of Reference, Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.

<sup>10</sup> William J. Durch, "Building a Better Peace Operation: Lessons from the Brahimi Report Process," August 15, 2005, available from [http://un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Durch\\_paper\\_UN\\_reform\\_lessons\\_Brahimi.pdf](http://un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Durch_paper_UN_reform_lessons_Brahimi.pdf); Internet; accessed January 27, 2007.

important function. However, as described by Dr. Durch, “In the interest of trying to fix what ailed UN peacekeeping operations, most issues related to prevention, peacebuilding, and enforcement understood as the imposition of peace were left to other teams and other venues.”<sup>11</sup> What the process did do, however was finally give definition to many terms commonly used in the peace operations lexicon.

A number of recommendations contained in the final report were not revolutionary at all. In fact “... many of the Brahimi Report’s recommendations were not new; the Panel followed earlier calls for change by the Lessons Learned Units, the Special Committee of Peacekeeping and the Secretary General’s own reports.”<sup>12</sup>

Though the team solicited input from field missions, the responses largely came from or were coordinated through each mission’s Special Representative to the Secretary-General and as such were likely tempered by the personalities and politics involved. While the input helped to define what worked well and what was problematic for each mission, more time would have allowed for input from the working level within each field mission, valuable input from a group who may have been more inclined to ‘speak truth to power’. Another time-related deficiency was the lack of consultation with outside experts, authorities, agencies and regional organizations. Not only would their insights have better informed the final report, the process of bi-lateral, symmetric communication would have done much to temper third-party criticism of

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> Christine Gray, “Peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report: Is there a crisis of credibility for the UN?” *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 2001 Vol 6, No 2; available from <http://jcs.l.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/6/2/267>; Internet; accessed January 20, 2007, 268.

the report after its release. Perhaps the most tangible result of the time compression was that the final report's delivery, just three weeks prior to the Millennium Summit, precluded the thorough review by member states to whom the report was sent directly. The 'direct-to-capitals' approach bypassed and thus alienated national diplomatic representatives in New York creating opposition in a group which would be pivotal to recommendation implementation at a later date.

Dr. Durch cites another deficiency in the Brahimi Report process relating to communications. Because the report's target audience included the heads of state that would be present at the September 2000 Millennium as well as the United Nations bureaucracy which had to be convinced and motivated to change, the report's findings and its language tended to send mixed messages. There were prescriptive recommendations for change as well as "suggestions and cautions to the UN member states, on both the level of "political will" and the level of operational capabilities."<sup>13</sup> The consequence of targeting two distinct audiences with differing messages in the same document possibly resulted in degrading the impact for both audiences.

Finally, Dr. Durch also acknowledges that critical issues were not dealt with by the report due to their politically sensitive nature. He describes these 'no-go' zones as being "... so politically charged as to risk diverting attention from everything else if addressed in any detail by the report."<sup>14</sup> While omitting discussion of issues likely to hijack the entire report undoubtedly may have been a reasonable, if not the only, manner in which to proceed, the legacy of this decision is that issues critical to addressing the future viability and integrity of United Nations

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<sup>13</sup> Durch, "Building a Better Peace Operation: Lessons from the Brahimi Report Process" . . . . .

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*



peace operations were excluded. Though many praised the Brahimi Report for concentrating on actionable proposal and avoiding unactionable rhetorical recommendations, the approach goes a long way to explaining what is missing from the report and what continues to be elusive target areas for real and enduring peace operations reform including Security Council reform, member state engagement, outstanding national dues, and the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’. Some of these will be elaborated upon later in this paper.

### **Recommendations and Status as of 2003**

The Brahimi Report recommendations fall into four broad categories – doctrine, strategy and decision-making for peace operations; United Nations capacities to deploy operations rapidly and effectively; headquarters resources and structure for planning and supporting peacekeeping operations; and peace operations and the information age. These categories are further subdivided with a corresponding set of recommendations articulated for each. Conceptually, the recommendations are distinguished by type – operational or strategic. Those recommendations within the operational category tend to be those within the purview of the Secretary-General to approve and the United Nations bureaucracy to implement. These found greater traction and resolution than the strategic recommendations which relied on Security Council and member state support to bring to resolution. This reality goes a long way to explain why the Brahimi Report, in many respects, is assessed as having met with a certain degree of success in ameliorating many aspects of United Nations peace operations requiring immediate address – those conspicuous issues whose tremendous visibility give profile to peace operations. But the success in the operational category has had the effect of masking the stalemate in the

strategic where real change must be executed for necessary and enduring reform. The Brahimi Report bluntly states this requirement up front in its discussion of the need for change stating "... the key conditions for the success ... are political support ... These changes ... will have no lasting impact unless Member States of the Organization take seriously their responsibilities ... if the Organization is to be credible as a force for peace."<sup>15</sup> Nonetheless, the Brahimi Report and subsequent implementation of many of its recommendations addressed many of the problems that made the planning, mounting and conduct of peace operations a messy, inefficient and often ineffective affair. It accomplished the very essence of what was expressed by H.E. Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations when he stated that "... the UN system should focus on fixing what it can fix, rather than despairing that it cannot fix everything (and thereby fix nothing)."<sup>16</sup> Each of the 57 recommendations, the issues leading to them, and their implementation status as of 2003 when the Secretary-General issued his last implementation report are described in this paper.

## Doctrine, strategy and decision-making for peace operations

### Preventive action

The Report only briefly addressed preventative action indicating that in the 1990s United Nations peace operations dealt with less than one-third of the existing world conflicts at that time and concluded that preventative action was the preferred method of dealing with emerging

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<sup>15</sup> "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" ..., 1.

<sup>16</sup> "Refashioning the Dialogue: Regional Perspectives on the Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations," International Peace Academy, Regional Meetings, Johannesburg, Buenos Aires, Singapore, London, February-March 2001, available from <http://pbpu.unlb.org/Pbpu/library/Refashion%20the%20Dialogue--Regional%20Persp.%20on%20the%20Brahimi%20Report.pdf>; Internet; accessed February 8, 2007, 1.

situations before they became full-blown conflicts. It reaffirmed the Secretary-General's statement in the Millennium Report that reducing poverty, achieving economic growth, and achieving equality amongst ethnic and religious groups – the basis for most conflicts – was the preventative action required in those parts of the world prone to intra-state conflict. Though the report applauded the fact-finding mission mechanism as an appropriate means to identify short-term prevention, it identified two significant impediments to these missions – the legitimate concerns of smaller and weaker nations for the preservation of their sovereignty, and the gap that exists between member state rhetoric on the issue of prevention and the resources those member states are willing to bring to bear on the issue. Brahimi articulated two recommendations on preventative action: for all parties involved in conflict prevention and development to proceed in a more integrated manner; and for the more frequent use of fact-finding missions with a concurrent call on member states to provide more assistance to these important missions.<sup>17</sup>

#### Status as of 2003

Address in this area was limited as a separate and distinct initiative, the “Prevention of Armed Conflict” report was concurrently underway by the Secretariat so was not dealt with in depth by the Brahimi Report or subsequent implementation reports. The Security Council and Secretary-General did acknowledge the value of increased use of fact-finding missions and since the Brahimi Report, have both increased their own use of this valuable mechanism. The implementation reports did note that funding for fact-finding missions continues to be voluntary

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<sup>17</sup> “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” ..., 6.

and *ad hoc* and could benefit from becoming institutionalized and funded through annual assessments.<sup>18</sup>

The June 1, 2001, Implementation Report did note that there was a separation of responsibilities with reference to fact-finding missions between the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations as follows:

### **Department of Political Affairs**

Plan and participate in fact-finding, peacemaking and other missions to areas of actual or potential conflict where the Secretary-General's preventive and peacemaking efforts may be needed or are already engaged

### **Department of Peacekeeping Operations**

Leads the planning process for a peacekeeping operation by providing the overall framework, developing options for courses of action, leading reconnaissance missions to the field and coordinating and integrating inputs from within the department and from other entities into a comprehensive plan for approval by the Security Council.

Division of fact-finding mission responsibilities<sup>19</sup>

### Peace-building strategy

The Panel acknowledged the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operation's 2000 report which stressed the requirement to put sufficient rigour into identifying peace-building elements before they form part of a mission's mandate to ensure General Assembly continued

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<sup>18</sup> "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping," Full report of the Stimson Center, 2003, available from <http://pbpu.unlb.org/Pbpu/library/Stimson%20Center%20study%20on%20Brahimi%20Report%202003.pdf>; Internet; accessed February 8, 2007, 15.

<sup>19</sup> "Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," A/55/977, June 1, 2001, available from [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/docs/55\\_977e.pdf](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/55_977e.pdf); Internet; accessed January 20, 2007, 88.

support and funding for these activities in the post-conflict timeframe. It then went on to articulate an additional five recommendations in the Brahimi Report for incorporation into the United Nations peace-building strategy. These include: the provision of mission funds for ‘quick impact projects’ to demonstrate tangible results and thereby establish mission credibility; free and fair elections must be considered part of the peace-building strategy for the future viability of a struggling nation; the scope of United Nations civilian police must be expanded beyond actual policing to encompass the reform and training of a fragile nation’s police force congruent with international standards, and the mission be augmented by judicial experts to strengthen the rule of law system within the nation; human rights activities must be administratively and politically supported; and the functions of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants all be assessed budgets rather than the demobilization and reintegration programs continuing to be funded voluntarily by a myriad of sponsors. Additionally, the Panel recommended that a focal point be named to coordinate all peace-building components of a mission, suggesting the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs would be best placed to fulfill this function.<sup>20</sup>

### Status as of 2003

Despite the Secretary-General instructing the Executive Committee on Peace and Security to develop a fully-integrated peace-building strategy, their document titled Plan of Action and submitted in November 2001 was disappointing presenting only general guidelines. Since then a Peace Building Commission was formed and a Peace Building Support Office established. Until a comprehensive strategy is articulated, the United Nations will likely

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<sup>20</sup> “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” ..., 6-8.

continue to struggle with the tremendous complexities inherent in peace-building, and just as likely suffer resulting public lack of confidence in the organization to handle these missions which so typify the current environment. The quick impact projects recommended by the Report have been instituted and are regularly used, particularly in the start-up phase of a mission. The funding of the reintegration piece of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration has met with only partial success due to funding issues – funding is not provided for reintegration therefore the requirement for individual nations volunteer to lead on this piece. This is deemed to be a critical requirement for the long-term success of stabilization in a nation emerging and rebuilding from a war-torn situation. Though the Secretary-General did not endorse the recommendation for a fundamental shift in civilian police doctrine, the Executive Committee on Peace and Security did establish a Rule of Law Task Force to explore the requirement and capabilities further. Additionally, two dedicated staff members were tasked with drafting a rule of law framework based on the work of the task force. Finally, the Panel’s recommendation to enhance the capacity of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to plan for this activity in field missions was not well supported by member states.<sup>21</sup>

### Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy

While the Panel reaffirmed the basic tenets of peacekeeping doctrine to include local party consent, impartiality of United Nations troops and civilians, and the use of force only for self defence, it also acknowledged that the conflicts in which the United Nations are involved increasingly are perpetrated by parties and factions rather than recognized governments. This

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<sup>21</sup> “The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping” ..., 16-17.

acknowledgement includes the recognition that factions may not have control of their fighters, and that faction leaders themselves may be disposed to reversing their position on agreed to terms for United Nations activities dependent on what they perceive is in their self-interest or best interest of their faction at the time. The reality that fractious local parties and factions are held to a far lower standard of conduct than recognized governments by the international community is at the very heart of this. The absolute necessity for United Nations bodies, organs and member states to apprehend this reality and accommodate it through developing peace operation doctrine and strategy is fundamental to enabling United Nations missions with the flexibility to carry out their mandates successfully. To this end the Panel commented that United Nations military forces must be able to defend themselves, mission components and mission mandates, and that the mission's rules of engagement must reflect this requirement. The Panel further stated that impartiality should be defined to mean actions in line with the principles of the United Nations Charter which distinguishes impartiality from neutrality or equal treatment. Overall, it urged the Secretariat to "... not apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behaviour."<sup>22</sup> The Panel made clear that the Secretary-General should be empowered to provide troop contributing nations with an accurate assessment of risk, and ensure them that a given mission, including its size, composition, resources, rules of engagement and mandate, reflect appropriate levels for United Nations forces to meet if not mitigate the assessed risk. It also described the inequality of various national militaries called on to act as United Nations forces in terms of training, equipment, professionalism, ethos and doctrine, and urged training, resources and support be provided these troops to enable effective participations in United Nations peace operations. The

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<sup>22</sup> "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" ..., 9.

overall recommendation made in the Brahimi Report is that deployed United Nations peacekeepers must have robust rules of engagement to defend themselves, mission components and the mission mandate against those who would undermine any of these.<sup>23</sup>

### Status as of 2003

While the member states' Special Committee of Peacekeeping Operations acknowledged that peacekeepers must be capable of defending themselves and in some cases the mission mandate as well as other mission components, it did not endorse the Panel's recommendation for robust forces and requisite rules of engagement to effect this defence.<sup>24</sup> Since, both Security Council mandates and United Nations forces have become more robust as demonstrated by missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo however there is some work to be done on further increasing the robustness with appropriate rules of engagement. Resolution of this requirement is necessary to encourage developed nations in particular which continue to exhibit reluctance to inject their military forces into United Nations missions where the mandate is not sufficiently robust in terms of military force to guard against another Srebrenica or Rwanda.

### Clear, credible and achievable mandates

Discussing this category the Panel categorically articulated the requirement for the Security Council to give priority to absolute clarity in enunciating mandates rather than letting

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>24</sup> "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping" ..., 21-23.



the predilection to build consensus impact mandate definition to the point of ambiguity. This may not be realistic in a divided Security Council motivated by diverse national interests however, the Panel recommended that the Secretariat ask for imposed minimum conditions on ceasefire and peace agreements prior to the Security Council committing United Nations forces to a mission; for the Secretariat to present to the Security Council mission force and resource levels commensurate with the mandate rather than levels it assumes will meet the threshold acceptance level of the Security Council; that Security Council resolutions on missions remain in draft until the Secretary-General can confirm troop contributing nations will commit the requisite level of troops; that member states committed to contributing troops be allowed to attend Secretariat and Security Council briefings affecting the safety and security of troops; and that should a mission be given a mandate to protect civilians, necessary resources be committed to meet that mandate.<sup>25</sup>

### Status as of 2003

While the Secretariat seems to be taking a closer look at the actual requirements of a mission and pronouncing realistic expectations for what the United Nations can and cannot take on, the Security Council did agree to significantly increase consultations with troop contributing nations when drafting mandates and assessing risk. The Security Council decided not to act on the Panel's recommendation to establish the standing committee for these consultations,<sup>26</sup> but the Secretary-General could, on his own initiative, form a committee for each operation. The implicit concern is that without a standing committee and a formalized process for troop

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<sup>25</sup> "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" ..., 10-12.

<sup>26</sup> "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping" ..., 17-19.

contributor consultation, the Security Council may or may not act on the consultation requirement for each mission mandate depending on a myriad of factors which could include political interests by any one of the five Permanent Members.

The Panel's recommendation that mission mandates be held in draft until sufficient troops required to carry out the mandate were identified met with partial acceptance. The Security Council decided to create planning mandates to allow time for troop contributing nations to be canvassed for commitments. Full implementation of mandates would be deferred until the required level of commitment was guaranteed.<sup>27</sup>

Though the Security Council resolved in Resolution 1327 (2000) to give clear, credible and achievable mandates, sufficient progress for some to acclaim that it was the basis of a new peacekeeping doctrine, initial assessments were not positive citing that "... experience in Sierra Leone and DRC leaves it open to doubt how far this new doctrine will have any significant practical impact."<sup>28</sup> Of note, the Security Council has moved on the resolution and is now assessed to be respecting both the Brahimi recommendation and the resolution the Security Council passed to operationalize the commitment.

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<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>28</sup> Gray, "Peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report: Is there a crisis of credibility for the UN?" ..., 274.

### Information-gathering, analysis and strategic planning capacities

The Panel was emphatic that the United Nations could not develop a truly strategic approach to peace operations without a system to gather, analyse and distribute information from internal and external sources so that all decision makers had the benefit of a common operating picture that would actually alert them to budding crises as well as keeping them well apprised of existing ones. In 1997 it was envisioned that the newly created Executive Committee on Peace and Security, comprised of a number of United Nations sections and committees, would perform this function. Though the Executive Committee on Peace and Security has facilitated a better exchange of information between departments, its membership tends to be engaged in daily issues therefore the requirement for real pro-activity is usurped by moment-to-moment crises, always in a reactionary mode. The Brahimi Report calls for the creation of what it termed the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS). The proposal called for participation by the Policy Analysis Unit, the Department of Peacekeeping Operation's Situation Centre, the Department of Political Affairs' Policy Planning Unit, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' Policy Development Unit, and the Department of Public Information's Media Monitoring and Analysis Section. The recommendation called for the inclusion in EISAS of subject matter experts including military personnel, police officers, and information systems analysts, with administration by and a reporting relationship to both the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" ..., 12-13.

## Status

The member states have resisted all recommendations to create an integrated information system such as the Brahimi-proposed EISAS to the detriment of the United Nations ability to anticipate and manage crises, and taking preventative measures to mitigate those crises. Canadian academic and specialist in United Nations-related studies, Dr. Walter Dorn, attributed this resistance even before Brahimi to "... concerns from states that the UN would be prying into their internal affairs."<sup>30</sup> This has left it to individual units to develop support networks inside and outside the United Nations. Both the Department of Peacekeeping Operation's Situation Center and Best Practices Unit are particularly aggressive in their pursuit of establishing these networks. One recommendation that has been acted upon is the development of a United Nations-wide Extranet to connect headquarters and field missions.<sup>31</sup> Since, Joint Mission Analysis Cells (JMAC) and Joint Operations Centres (JOC) have been established in all operations, and Intranet was established in 2006.

## The challenge of transitional civil administration

There is great ambivalence amongst member states for the United Nations to shoulder the responsibility of what is actually an interim state government in failed and failing states, and little experience or capacity on the part of the United Nations to actually do this. There were few incidents of the requirement for United Nations civil administration prior to 1999 but since, the Security Council committed the United Nations to exactly this in both Kosovo and East Timor

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<sup>30</sup> Walter A. Dorn, "Early and Late Warning by the UN Secretary-General of Threats to the Peace: Article 99 Revisited," available from [http://www.rmc.ca/academic/gradrech/dorn30\\_e.html](http://www.rmc.ca/academic/gradrech/dorn30_e.html); Internet; accessed January 30, 2007.

<sup>31</sup> "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping" ..., 38-40.

where they struggled to establish and manage the complete range of civil administration tasks including the law, education, customs, taxes, banking, public utilities, foreign investment and more. The larger question the Panel asks is whether in fact the United Nations should be in this business and if the answer is yes, should it be the responsibility of peace operations or come under another United Nations department. The Panel understands the dilemma facing the United Nations: not preparing for the eventuality of transitional administration would leave the United Nations struggling and likely unsuccessful should they be committed to this task again; but preparing for the eventuality given the prevalence of failed and failing states in the current international environment would cause the international community to turn to the United Nations with the expectation that the United Nations would take on the responsibility. The costs would be enormous considering local administration is not funded through United Nations peace operation assessments but rather are voluntarily funded by outside organizations – often individual member states. Another difficulty recognized by the Panel in the area of the rule of law is the disparate sets of laws unique to individual nations. This last reality caused the Panel to recommend that the United Nations form a panel of international legal experts to “evaluate the feasibility and utility of developing an interim criminal code”<sup>32</sup> which could be used by operations until the rule of law is re-established in an affected nation or region.

### Status

There was little movement inside the United Nations to put rigour and resources to formulating legal tools for use by field missions charged with transitional civil administration as was the case in Kosovo and East Timor. While acknowledging the value of this and other tools

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<sup>32</sup> “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” ..., 14.

to facilitate those activities inherent in running municipalities, the Secretariat charged responsibility for developing these to an office without sufficient resources to action the task and nothing was achieved. In 2003 the United States Institute of Peace Rule of Law program stepped up to the challenge of formulating a generic criminal code and procedures in line with international law to be used in transitional civil administrations.<sup>33</sup> With the establishment of the Peace Building Committee the United Nations has progressed this recommendation much further.

### United Nations capacities to deploy operations rapidly and effectively

#### Defining what “rapid and effective deployment” entails

There is no disagreement within the United Nations that the capacity to deploy operations rapidly and effectively needs to be strengthened however the Panel did identify that what does need to be agreed is the specificity of just what rapidity and effectiveness entails. Agreeing that the critical period for establishing a stable and credible presence after a ceasefire or peace agreement is six to 12 weeks, the Panel recommended that deployments should be tailored to meet this timeframe. The specific Panel recommendations on rapidity were that the United Nations needed to develop the capability to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping missions within 30 days of Security Council resolution adoption, and fully deploy complex peacekeeping operations within 90 with the caveat that a functioning mission headquarters would be in place within 15 days. The specific Panel recommendations on effectiveness were the provision of

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<sup>33</sup> “The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping” ..., 33-35.

equipment, funding, information assets, operational strategy and a military and political centre of gravity for missions established in uncertain circumstances. To maintain a standard level of readiness the Panel recommended standing military, police, civilian, material and financial reserves, standby capacities for short notice calls, and sufficient visibility on emerging situations to allow the lead time necessary to acquire the requisite resources. This last recommendation relates directly back to the EISAS recommendation. Aware that many member states have resisted the establishment of a standing United Nations force, standby arrangements, and even pre-planning for potential operations, the Panel emphatically stated that without implementation of these recommendations the United Nations would not have the capacity for rapid and effective deployment.<sup>34</sup>

### Status as of 2003

Member states and the Secretary General endorsed the recommendation to define rapid and effective deployment capabilities to mean the deployment of a traditional peacekeeping force within 30 days of resolution adoption and 90 days for complex peace operations. This was further defined to include troops levels – 5,000 for traditional and 10,000 for complex operations.<sup>35</sup> The situation has progressed much further since 2003 with a Strategic Reserve Deployment Capability, Standing Police Units and civilians on permanent employment.

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<sup>34</sup> “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” ..., 15-16.

<sup>35</sup> “The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping” ..., 64.

### Effective mission leadership

The Panel was very critical of the manner in which mission leaders including Special Representatives to the Secretary-General, Force Commanders, Police Commissioners, and heads of administrative components of missions are selected. The Report cited a litany of deficiencies in this regard calling the process one which "... leaves major room for improvement."<sup>36</sup> Reference was made to mission leaders not being selected until after adoption of a Security Council resolution; not meeting until actually deployed in-theatre; and not given terms of reference or given terms so general as to cause them to formulate their own mission policies and implementation strategies. The politics of selection is also problematic with the views of the Security Council and member states within the region of conflict to consider as well as the requirement for the nationalities of the Force Commander and Police Commissioner to reflect force composition, irregardless of relevant United Nations peace operations experience. It was the Panel's considered view that "... managerial talent and experience must be accorded at least equal priority in choosing membership leadership."<sup>37</sup> The Panel recommended that the Secretary-General compile and maintain a comprehensive list of potential Special Representatives to the Secretary-General as well as other mission leaders to enable timely selection in the event of an immediate requirement, and for the entire leadership group to be gathered in New York for briefings, orientation and consultation. In line with this the Panel recommended that strategic guidance be developed, optimally in consultation with the mission leadership prior to deployment.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" ..., 16.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*



## Status

A Senior Appointments Group was created by the Secretary-General to define minimum leadership qualifications and establish a roster of potential leadership candidates and identify which were available and willing to deploy to the field. This progressive step was somewhat tempered by the Special Committee's insistence that political candidates continue to be considered and placed on the roster. Worse, the Special Committee refused to endorse managerial skill and experience as prerequisites for leadership positions.<sup>39</sup> The Secretary-General (Annan) agreed to assemble leadership teams at headquarters prior to deploying, and formalized a regular training programme. The recommendation for the provision of strategic guidance to them had not been effectively implemented.<sup>40</sup>

## Military personnel

Despite the United Nations Standby Arrangements System wherein member states identified at the time of the Brahimi Report some 143,300 military, 2,150 civilian police and 2,450 civilian specialists to be available for deployment at various readiness levels, a mere 31 of 87 participating member states had actually formalized the availability through a memorandum of understanding which articulated a requisite level of preparedness. This memorandum of understanding however, is conditional. In the plain-speak which characterizes the language of the Brahimi Report, regardless of the memorandum of understanding, the codified conditionality

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<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>39</sup> "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping" ..., 68.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 67-70.

allows states to “just say no”<sup>41</sup> when called upon to contribute personnel to a mission. The Panel also noted a trend which demonstrated a rise in undeveloped nation participation and a concurrent decline in developed nation participation. At the time of the Brahimi Report, 77 percent of deployed United Nations troops came from developing countries, and far fewer troops from the five Permanent Members of the Security Council. Further, the Panel cited examples of troops which deployed without personal weapons or personal protective equipment, no means of ground transportation in-theatre and often inexperienced and untrained for mission responsibilities. Again the Panel chose to speak plainly when pronouncing on this situation by simply stating “This must stop.”<sup>42</sup> The Brahimi Report recommended member states be encouraged to form partnerships to deploy brigade-size forces rather than single battalions for deployment within the timeframes recommended for rapid deployment. It also recommended that the Secretary-General be given the authority to query member states as to their willingness to contribute troops in the event a particular mission is created; that the United Nations form specialized teams to assess whether troop contributors meet the minimum training and equipment requirements for a mission; and that an on-call list of 100 military officers on seven-days notice be created to augment United Nations peace operation planners.<sup>43</sup>

### Status

The United Nations Standby System was reorganized as a result of the Brahimi Report to allow four levels of commitment including a new category, the Rapid Deployment Level, which

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<sup>41</sup> “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” ..., 17.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

lists troops available for deployment within the 30- and 90-day standards adopted by the United Nations for rapid deployment. The reorganized list is updated quarterly to ensure currency. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations also implemented a Military On-Call List which would see nine key military officers designated to assist mission planning arrive at United Nations headquarters within a week of being called. While the intent was for individuals to actually be named on this list, countries have only agreed to pledge a person with the required skills. In terms of assuring common peace operations training for military troops from all contributors, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations developed Standard Generic Training Modules in consultation with troop contributing nations and regional organizations.

There has been limited success in encouraging troop contributing nations to form partnerships to provide brigade-size forces for rapid deployment rather than individual national battalions though there are several regional organizations including the European Union and the African Union which are moving in that direction. Several South Asian states did partner after deployment to contribute the Ituri Brigade to the Congo mission.

Finally, the United Nations has instituted pre-deployment inspections as well as in-theatre inspections to ensure troops meet the requirements for peace operations. In instances where troops fall short of the requirements in terms of equipment quality or shortfalls, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations now attempts to secure third-party country providers. Clearly, the Brahimi recommendations aimed at deploying capable military forces to meet the standards of

rapid and effective have found great traction within the United Nations and the member state community.<sup>44</sup>

### Civilian police

At a time when the demand for United Nations civilian police is escalating, 25 percent of authorized United Nations civilian police positions were vacant, largely due to national police forces being of a size and type required to meet a particular nation's internal policing requirements. The Panel's recommendation for a doctrinal shift in the role of United Nations civilian police to include reforming and restructuring of local police forces in a mission area adds to the number and level of experience required. Further, the Panel's recommendations are largely urging in nature – encouraging member states to establish pools of police officers ready for deployment; encouraging member states to form regional training partnerships to foster a common level of preparedness for deployment; and encouraging member states to identify a national focal point to manage a nation's civilian police contributions. In addition to member state encouragement, the Panel did recommend that, similar to military officers, an on-call list of 100 police officers on seven-days notice be created to form the police component of a new mission and to train incoming civilian police; and that parallel arrangements to all previous recommendations for civilian police be created for all other relevant specialists required to establish and enforce the rule of law.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> “The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping” ..., 70-79.

<sup>45</sup> “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” ..., 21.

### Status as of 2003

Despite encouragement by the Panel, member states have resisted, if not outright rejected, the recommendation for them to create national pools of civilian police for rapid deployment. Nor have they developed common regional training of civilian police for peace operations. It is still common for nations to offer inadequately trained civilian police for deployments, and more common still for no offers to fill the civilian police on-call list. This resistance is understandable given that national and municipal police force size levels are determined and funded by the nations and municipalities they serve. Even in the most developed rule of law countries, police forces are often already stretched to meet their own requirements. Nonetheless, the United Nations need for large numbers of capable, professional civilian police and associated legal specialists has passed the point of criticality in today's environment of "failed, failing, and fragile states" characterized by a complete absence of the rule of law.<sup>46</sup> Unless this fundamental requirement is met, fragile and developing states will be severely hampered and resulting humanitarian crises will continue to plague innocent people and destabilize regions.

### Civilian specialists

At the time of the Brahimi Report, some 50 percent of civilian field positions remained vacant, severely impacting missions, and those that were staffed often were filled by personnel without the requisite qualifications for the positions. The United Nations did not have a standby system for the deployment of civilian specialists, especially with qualifications and experience in

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<sup>46</sup> "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping" ..., 79-83.

emerging areas requiring address such as electoral assistance, economic reconstruction, human rights monitoring, media production and most recently civil administration encompassing all aspects of running municipalities. Not only did a roster of available candidates not exist, the practice of making urgent phone calls to possible candidates giving them very short notice to deploy was impractical given the tremendous need. No contractual system existed to offer personnel deploying to missions on field assignments any potential for career prospects outside the specific mission contract, and many of the positions required experience within the United Nations system that was not resident with new recruits. The potential to fill field positions with headquarters personnel was diminished by the volunteer nature of field positions along with reluctance by headquarters department heads to authorize the deployment. This deteriorating situation was addressed by the Panel with the following recommendations: the establishment of an Inter- and Intra-net based roster of pre-selected candidates; the reform of the Field Service employment category; the establishment of revised conditions of service to attract qualified external candidates and retain them with the prospect of a career; and the formulation by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operation missions.<sup>47</sup>

### Status as of 2003

There has been significant movement on the Panel's recommendations for recruiting and deploying appropriate civilian staff for field operations. Delegation of hiring authority to the field, and an on-line 'positions available' system called the Galaxy Project, has greatly increased the number of applications attracting some 20,000 applications per month, and a revamped

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<sup>47</sup> "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" ..., 25.

system allows easier management of a 10,000-person on-call list. Nonetheless, processing of this huge number of applicants continues to present challenges and less than half of applications received are actually vetted. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations also created three civilian rapid deployment teams comprising some 120 pre-vetted United Nations personnel to deploy with prior approval of their supervisors. Mission training funds have increased three-fold by 2003, and training within the Department has been institutionalized.<sup>48</sup>

### Public information capacity

The Panel recognized the need for an effective, robust public information capability in the field with specialists who are well acquainted with the United Nations system and are integrated into the mission leadership team. The Panel identified this requirement for both external and internal communications functions. The Panel also noted that less than one percent of mission budgets are allocated to public information which is completely contrary to the stated importance of the function to foster understanding and garner support for the mission by external audiences including international and host nation publics alike. The Brahimi Report recommended that public information be allocated additional and dedicated resources from mission budgets to conduct effective communications programs in support of the mission.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> “The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping” ..., 83-90.

<sup>49</sup> “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” ..., 25-26.

### Status as of 2003

There has been virtually no movement on the Panel's recommendations to establish the public information capability within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or to enhance and assure dedication of the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information to peace operations. Until 2002 there was only one person in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to handle public information and though this position was designated "political officer" the position was filled by the spokesperson to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. Since, two positions have been added to the Department of Public Information – so small an increment as to not garner tangible results.<sup>50</sup> According to a Department-sponsored, 2003 comprehensive analysis of the United Nations public information function in support of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations reliance on a "... centralized Department of Public Information to manage communications for the entire Secretariat represents a 1960s model that largely has been discarded by private industry and public organizations as unwieldy and inflexible."<sup>51</sup>

### Logistics support, the procurement process and expenditure management

The Panel discovered that nearly all aspects of the logistics support and procurement process hamper rapid and effective deployment at the start-up and throughout a mission. Long procurement lead times and spending limits in need of upwards revision continue to diminish the ability of a mission to function as intended. While the United Nations start-up kits launched

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<sup>50</sup> "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping" ..., 97-99.

<sup>51</sup> Rita LePage, "Communications Analysis, Strategy and Policy for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations" (Master's project, Royal Roads University, 2003), 1.



mid-1990s, pre-positioned in Brindisi, Italy, and capable of sustaining a 100-person mission headquarters for 100 days helped to facilitate rapid deployment of smaller missions, the equipment was soon degraded. It was less expensive to sell used equipment in-theatre and purchase new than it was to ship and refurbish old equipment however, the Secretariat was required to return funds from the sale of equipment to member states rather than use it to purchase new. Further, the pace of new missions was outpacing the closure of old putting a severe strain on logistics and procurement. The General Assembly had established a Peacekeeping Reserve Fund from which the Secretary-General, with approval, was able to request \$50 million to finance the start-up of a new mission but only after the adoption of a Security Council resolution to establish the mission, negatively impacting the Secretary-General's ability to meet timelines required for rapid deployment. The Brahimi Reports makes some very specific recommendations in the area of logistics, procurement and financing as follows: the Secretariat needs to develop a global logistics support strategy; the General Assembly should authorize a one-time expenditure to maintain a minimum of five start-up kits at the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy; the Secretary-General should be given the authority to draw \$50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve fund when it is clear a mission is likely to be stood up even if that is prior to the actual adoption of a Security Council resolution; the Secretariat should conduct a review of procurement policies and procedures to ensure they facilitate rapid deployment; the Secretariat should conduct a review of the management of financial resources with a view to giving greater flexibility for field missions to manage their budgets; and the Secretariat should increase the procurement authority of field missions from \$200,000 to as much as \$1 million for all goods and service available in the mission area.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" ..., 26-29.

### Status as of 2003

It was discovered that authority already existed for the Secretary-General to draw \$50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve prior to the adoption of a resolution to mandate a new mission, but this mechanism had not been exercised because of ambiguous implementation requirements. Clarity was brought to this issue in 2003 and it is now accepted practice to exercise the mechanism in the stand-up of new missions.

There has been tremendous success in implementing the Panel's recommendations with reference to enhanced equipment stocks and the delegation of procurement authority to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and deployed operations. Strategic Deployment Stocks worth some \$142 million are pre-positioned at the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, and are replenished from mission budgets. Significant procurement authority was delegated to the field which now accounts for more than one-half of all procurement though the Department of Management retains overall responsibility for procurement.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping" ..., 65-66, 90-93.

## Headquarters resources and structure for planning and supporting peacekeeping operations

### Staffing-levels and funding for Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations

The Panel determined that funding for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations staff positions has never represented more than 6 percent of the total cost of peace operations and currently was at about 2 percent. The insufficient level of staffing to plan, coordinate, manage and backstop field missions has severely compromised the level of support provided from United Nations headquarters to deployed missions. To illustrate the lack of capacity within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Panel spoke of the nine civilian police officer posts at headquarters to support all civilian police activities including doctrine development, selection and deployment; and only 11 military officers to identify and manage troop rotations for all military operations. On the civilian side, the Office of Operations had 15 professionals to cover 14 missions. The shortage means that staffs have no back-up for crisis situations, sick leave or holiday time. Worse, desk officer efforts are routinely in support of reporting to United Nations legislative bodies, committees and member state requests – all of which receive greater support than do field missions. The situation is compounded by the treatment of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations as a “temporary creation and peacekeeping a temporary responsibility of the Organization”<sup>54</sup> within the United Nations rather than a core activity which is envisioned to be sustained well into the future. This latter situation burdens the Department with the further requirement to justify seven out of every eight of its post annually. Though member states and

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<sup>54</sup> “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” ..., 30.

the Secretariat support baseline funding for Department positions, the Panel recommends that a third-party review be conducted by professionals well-acquainted with the personnel level requirements of large governments and corporations which support activities around the world on a 24/7 basis. Specific Brahimi Report recommendations to ameliorate the inappropriate and untenable staffing levels include a substantial increase in personnel resources at headquarters to directly support field operations; that supporting peace operations be treated as a core United Nations function funded through a regular program budget; and that the Secretary-General approach the General Assembly for an emergency increase to the support account for immediate recruitment of support personnel.<sup>55</sup>

### Status as of 2003

The Brahimi Report recommendations met with much success in terms of enhancing the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and rebuilding the Secretariat. Some 200 additional posts had been created by late 2001 giving the Department an enhanced ability to support field operations immediately after implementation. This staff increase and the Department's capacity to support the field has been hugely impacted and degraded by a surge in peace operation missions. In July 2006 there were 65,572 military and 7,250 civilian police deployed on missions. When three new missions were approved in August 2006 – United Nations Security Resolutions 1701 on Lebanon, 1704 on Timor-Leste and 1706 on Darfur – those deployed numbers rose 43 percent for military personnel and 80 percent for civilian police.<sup>56</sup> The growth in peace missions has outpaced the growth in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to

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<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 29-34.

support them. There is also more two-way symmetrical communications between field missions and headquarters, and by 2003 the Department of Political Affairs transferred responsibility for complex peace operations including those without military troops or civilian police to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The Department of Political Affairs handles the politics, and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations handles the mission which is appropriate given their specialized areas of expertise. Two notable recommendations which were not implemented are the creation of a Peace-building Unit and increased funding for the Electoral Affairs Division within the Department of Political Affairs. Given the increased requirement and requests for the international community, and therefore the United Nations, to address peace-building and elections assistance, the non-implementation of these recommendations continued to have grave consequences for the United Nations ability to respond.<sup>57</sup> A Peace Building Committee and Peace Building Support Office were eventually created in 2005-2006.

#### Need and proposal for the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces

The Panel cited the requirement for what they termed Integrated Mission Task Forces to integrate all United Nations planning for field operations. Nothing of this sort existed resulting in various components of missions being planned in isolation of the other components as well as other United Nations agencies involved in the mission area including for example the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Though collaboration between components and agencies were carried out in an

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<sup>56</sup> “Twenty Days in August: The Security Council Sets Massive New Challenges for UN Peacekeeping,” Security Council Report No. 5, September 8, 2006, available from [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.2056585/k.A1E/Special\\_Research\\_Report\\_No\\_5\\_8\\_September\\_2006.htm](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.2056585/k.A1E/Special_Research_Report_No_5_8_September_2006.htm); Internet; accessed January 20, 2007.

<sup>57</sup> “The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping” ..., 52-56.

informal, *ad hoc* manner relying heavily on personal relationships, the Panel clearly articulated the need for this to be formalized. This would offer more efficient and effective planning while importantly giving field operations one point of contact at headquarters to address all concerns and particularly urgent situations immediately. Integrated Mission Task Forces would enable the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to truly become the office of primary interest for all aspects of a peace operations mission.<sup>58</sup>

### Status as of 2003

Integrated Mission Task Forces for missions have been created as a result of the Brahimi Report and the benefits accruing to the decision-making process for missions have been valuable. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations commented positively on the development in a 2002 Journal of International Affairs interview:

I think we've made serious progress. For Afghanistan, we have put in place one of the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel report: an integrated mission task force. We had one for Congo and one for East Timor. What is new with Afghanistan is that we have seconded, on a full-time basis, people to the task force. And when I say "we" it's the various components of the UN system: DPKO, WFP and UNHCR. A number of key players have a full-time member in the task force so that the planning of the mission, the thinking on what needs to be done in Afghanistan, is really shared very early on in the process with various players in the system.<sup>59</sup>

Still, there remain difficulties as the Integrated Mission Task Forces lack the authority for decision-making and therefore often are relegated to drafting documentation formulated by

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<sup>58</sup> "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" ..., 34-37.

<sup>59</sup> Shireen Khan, "The United Nations post-Brahimi: An interview with the UN under secretary-general for peace operations – Jean-Marie Guéhenno," Journal of International Affairs, New York: Spring 2002. Vol. 55, Iss. 2, available from <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=12&did=166956161&SrchMode=1&sid=8&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQ T=309&VName=PQD&TS=1170203283&clientId=1711>; Internet; accessed January 30, 2007.

others. Despite the progress, much more needs to be done to ensure task forces continue to add value to the mission planning process.<sup>60</sup>

#### Other structural adjustments required in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

The Panel handled several issues in this broad category of the Brahimi Report including changes to the Military and Civilian Police Division, Lessons Learned Unit, and senior management. The Panel supported the notion that the military and civilian police division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should be two separate and distinct sections as they are essentially supporting but unrelated disciplines within peace operations. Civilian police should not be reporting through the military chain of command within the headquarters or the mission area. It further recommended that the Military Division be restructured in line with how a military headquarters is structured in the field – what is known as the ‘continental’ system with ‘J’ staffs from 1-9 which is followed by most militaries of developed nations. The Panel further recommended the creation of a separate unit staffed with experts in criminal law to act in direct support of the civilian police section. Noting the tremendous value of lessons learned the Panel called for urgent enhancements to this function and the repositioning of the unit within the Office of Operations. Two other issues upon which recommendations were made in this broad category

were the requirement to increase the number of Assistant-Secretaries-General within the

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<sup>60</sup> “The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping” ..., 47-50.

department from two to three with one designated the Principal and deputy to the Under-Secretary-General; and authority for peacekeeping budgets and procurement functions be transferred from the Under-Secretary-General for Management to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations for a trial period of not less than two years.<sup>61</sup>

### Status as of 2003

In line with the Brahimi Report recommendation, the military and civilian police functions have been separated into two distinct and equal divisions.<sup>62</sup> In addition, the organization structure recommended in the most comprehensive implementation report of June 1, 2001, “Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” was largely implemented as detailed in the recommended (Figure 1) and current (Figure 2) DPKO organizations charts:

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<sup>61</sup> “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” ..., 37-40.

<sup>62</sup> “The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping” ..., 55.






Figure 1: DPKO organization structure recommended in the June 1, 2001 Implementation Report.<sup>63</sup>




Figure 2: Current DPKO organization structure.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>63</sup> "Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," A/55/977, June 1, 2001 ..., 67.

<sup>64</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Organizational Chart, available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/info/page2.htm>; Internet; accessed April 18, 2007.

### Structural adjustments needed outside the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Again, the Panel examined a number of issues within this one broad category including operational support for public information, peace-building support in the Department of Political Affairs, and peace operations support in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Panel noted that there is no unit with line responsibility for public information within peace operations. A four-person Peace and Security cell within the Department of Public Information is supposed to have responsibility for peace operation public information including products and web-site postings however the efforts of that cell are regularly redirected to other Department of Public Information priorities. The Panel recommended that a public information unit be established ideally within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations but acceptably an enhanced and dedicated public information Peace and Security section within the Department of Public Information.

The Panel noted that funding for peace-building within the Department of Political Affairs is voluntary, and that it is simply not oriented, resourced or equipped to support peace-building in field operations. The Panel supported the Secretariat's creation of a Peace-building Unit within the Department of Political Affairs, recommended that the budget for the Electoral Assistance Division be substantially increased, and procurement, logistics and other related administrative support to peace-building be provided by the United Nations Office for Project Services. Finally, because the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights was assessed by the Panel to not be sufficiently resourced and without the staffing

capacity to deploy field personnel, it was recommended that its planning capacity be substantially enhanced and funded from the regular budget as well as mission budgets.<sup>65</sup>

### Status as of 2003

The Brahimi Report did not conduct a thorough assessment of the Department of Political Affairs with corresponding recommendations because of the constrained timelines for the Report; this despite its symbiotic relationship with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Since the Brahimi Report, the Department of Political Affairs increased in size by only two posts even though its workload increased tremendously prompting many to call for a similar review of that department in line with what the Brahimi Report did for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

The proposed Peace Building Unit within the Department of Political Affairs was not implemented until 2005 when the Peace Building Support Office was approved in the 2005 Summit Document, even though this initiative was called for prior to Brahimi and endorsed fully by the Brahimi Report. The deal-breaker was the proposal to nest this unit within the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, a Brahimi recommendation which was not implemented. Subsequent attempts by the Department of Political Affairs to establish the unit within its department did not receive budgetary approval.<sup>66</sup> Despite the Brahimi recommendations, the Electoral Affairs Division received neither secure funding nor additional posts.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” ..., 40-42.

<sup>66</sup> “The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping” ..., 57-58.

## Peace operations and the information age

### Information technology in peace operations: strategy and policy issues

The Panel concluded that the challenges to a United Nations system-wide information technology strategy and policy were more difficult than the challenges facing peace operations. Citing the criticality of access to information by all departments, agencies, employees field operations and non-governmental organizations, and noting the lack of a robust responsibility centre within the headquarters, the Panel recommended a responsibility centre be created to oversee common information technology strategy and training for peace operations, further recommending that this capability reside within the Brahimi Report proposed Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS).<sup>68</sup>

### Status as of 2003

The Panel contended that improving information technology in all areas was urgently required, and that many of their other recommendations were reliant on new technologies being adopted. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has established a headquarters responsibility centre for information technology, with a chief information officer doubling as the director for change management.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 58.

<sup>68</sup> “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” ..., 42.

<sup>69</sup> “The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping” ..., 42.

The Integrated Management and Information System has been improved and connectivity with field missions largely established. While this provides a critical capability to missions, overall Internet/Intranet/Extranet initiatives are challenged as they compete with other initiatives for funding. The proposed use of Geographic Information Systems received endorsement and has since progressed to the creation of a staff in excess of 10 professionals with systems resident in a dozen missions providing excellent mapping capabilities. Increased funding has been made available but with the demise of the Report's recommendation to move the system out of the Department of Public Information to the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has taken on the additional responsibility for the service.<sup>70</sup>

#### Tools for knowledge management

The Panel noted that an electronic clearing house needed to be created to acquire, share and retain data of assistance to all elements of peace operations at headquarters and in the field. Specific mention was made of geographic information systems and a Peace Operations Extranet to link headquarters databases with the field. The Panel further recommended that this knowledge management tool be incorporated into the responsibilities of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat. The Panel commented that information technology needs for this function to serve all components of peace operations should be anticipated and implemented during mission planning.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 43-45.

<sup>71</sup> "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" ..., 43-44.

### Status as of 2003

The tremendous worth of the emerging knowledge management field within large organizations had not been appreciated by the greater United Nations. This recommendation by the Brahimi Report was not the first time the deficiency was noted within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Secretariat yet their remains resistance to adopting the technology and a framework wherein information is captured, analysed and shared. The lack of endorsement and implementation for this Brahimi recommendation is tied to the suspicions member states have for the greater information system proposed – that of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat which itself was not implemented. It should be noted that in 2006, an extensive Intranet site was launched providing an excellent tool for headquarters and field missions alike.

### Improving the timeliness of Internet-based public information

The Panel made previous recommendations with reference to the staffing and positioning of the public information function in support of peace operations. In examining this aspect of public information, the Panel noted there was significant time delays attributed to the requirement for information only to be posted to the web by the Department of Public Information in order to guarantee the integrity of information and to ensure it met headquarters web standards. To alleviate the burden on the Department of Public Information and to expedite the posting of information for public consumption, especially important in a developing or crisis

situation, the Panel recommended co-management of the web function with headquarters oversight but field capability to post web content.<sup>72</sup>

### Status as of 2003

There has been great reluctance to enhance field missions and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations with additional resources, posts and authorities to conduct pro-active public information campaigns.<sup>73</sup> Over a number of years various recommendations have been made in this regard – Brahimi is simply one more report in which the public information recommendations found limited traction. The Department of Public Information is a large and powerful part of the Secretariat and has consistently demonstrated reluctance in handing any authorities to other Secretariat departments for the conduct of public information.<sup>74</sup> Though the Department of Public Information's Peace and Security section grew by two, as did the public information staff within the Department of Peacekeeping Information, the function is challenged by restrictions placed on functions such as updating the web to only those within the Department of Public Information. Clear evidence of this is revealed when surfing through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations website where some of the information is current but much is not.

### Implementation Reports

In the second and most comprehensive review of Brahimi Report recommendations implementation on June 1, 2001, the Secretary-General wrote that the findings:

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<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>73</sup> "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peacekeeping" ..., 97-99.

<sup>74</sup> LePage, "Communications Analysis, Strategy and Policy for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations" ..., 11-12.

“...confirm that what many of us have feared would be the consequences of trying to make do with too little for too long. The overall peacekeeping capacities of the Secretariat have not developed at the pace they should have because sufficient time, energy and resources have not been dedicated to planning for the future.”<sup>75</sup>

He went on to say that the reforms were not all that were required to increase success in operations, but that “The decisions made by the Security Council and its willingness to do all that is required to make sure that operations do not fail are determining factors.”<sup>76</sup>

In the final implementation report on December 21, 2001, the Secretary General concluded that “Regardless of the excellence of any system or machinery, a peacekeeping operation cannot succeed if there is no peace to keep, if it lacks an appropriate mandate, or if it is not given the necessary material and political support in a timely fashion.”<sup>77</sup>

A review of all 57 Brahimi Report recommendations, the three implementation reports of October 20 , 2000, June 1, 2001, and December 21, 2001, and subsequent reform progress enable mapping of the implementation status of the original 57 recommendations (Figure 3) where green represents largely implemented, yellow represents some progress, and red represents little implementation progress.

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<sup>75</sup> “Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” A/55/977, June 1, 2001 ..., 53.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.

<sup>77</sup> “Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” A/56/732, December 21, 2001, available from [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/docs/a56732e.pdf](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/a56732e.pdf); Internet; accessed January 20, 2007, 15.



<b>Brahimi Report Recommendations</b>	<b>Technical</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Strategic</b>	<b>Status</b>
	<b>Qty</b>		<b>Qty</b>	
<b>Doctrine, strategy and decision-making for peace operations</b>				
Preventive action	1	Green	1	Red
Peace-building strategy	1	Green	3	Yellow
Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy	0		1	Yellow
Clear, credible and achievable mandates	1	Yellow	3	Yellow
Information-gathering, analysis and strategic planning capacities	1	Yellow	0	
The challenge of transitional civil administration	0		1	Yellow
Total	<b>4</b>	Green	<b>9</b>	Yellow
<b>UN capacities to deploy operations rapidly and effectively</b>				
Defining what “rapid and effective deployment” entails	1	Green	0	
Effective mission leadership	3	Yellow	0	
Military personnel	3	Green	1	Yellow
Civilian police	2	Yellow	3	Red
Civilian specialists	4	Green	0	
Public information capacity	1	Yellow	0	
Logistics support, the procurement process and expenditure management	2	Green	4	Green
Total	<b>16</b>	Green	<b>8</b>	Yellow
<b>Headquarters resources &amp; structure for planning &amp; supporting pk operations</b>				
Staffing-levels and funding for Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations	2	Green	1	Yellow
Need and proposal for the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces	1	Green	0	
Other structural adjustments required in the Dept of Peacekeeping Operations	6	Green	0	
Structural adjustments needed outside the Department of Peacekeeping Operations	1	Red	4	Yellow
Total	<b>10</b>	Green	<b>5</b>	Yellow
<b>Peace operations and the information age</b>				
Information technology in peace operations: strategy and policy issues	0		1	Yellow
Tools for knowledge management	2	Green	1	Yellow
Improving the timeliness of Internet-based public information	1	Red	0	
Total	<b>3</b>	Green	<b>2</b>	Yellow

**Total Technical and Strategic Recommendations and Status by Category**

<b>33</b>	<b>24</b>
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Figure 3: Recommendation Status Table

## ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED

There are many issues not addressed or not fully addressed by the Brahimi Report. Some were not within the Panel's mandate and terms of reference, and some were set aside given the need to provide focus in the severely time-constrained timeframe in which the Report was researched, analysed, drafted, reviewed and finalized. Still others were not approached due to the significant political sensitivities associated with them and the very likely reality that their inclusion would hijack the overall purpose of the Report. Two of these are briefly discussed here – Security Council reform which falls squarely into the category of too politically sensitive to address, and the North-South divide which is implicitly addressed in the discussion of troop contributions.

### Security Council Reform

“Some states claim that reform of the Security Council is a precondition of the implementation of the Brahimi Report; others argue against delay. ... This systemic problem, which was at the heart of the crisis in peacekeeping, could only be resolved when the Council itself has been reformed. Although the third world dominated the Security Council's agenda, developing countries had little to say in its decisions.”<sup>78</sup>

This position goes to the very heart of the politically sensitive issue of Security Council reform. The Permanent Member formula is an anachronistic legacy of the international environment at the end of the Second World War and has reduced relevance to the current international security environment. Membership of the five Permanent Members is only one

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<sup>78</sup> Gray, “Peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report: Is there a crisis of credibility for the UN?” ..., 271.

issue. The other is the veto mechanism whereby any resolution under consideration may be struck down with only one dissenting voice from a Permanent Member. The veto mechanism and the willingness of the Permanent Members to use it are often grounds for accusations that the veto serves only to allow any of the five nations to act in their own, or their region's interests rather than the interests of the greater international community. This is cause for immense frustration for member states, especially those which have emerged as leaders on the world's landscape and those which by region such as Africa, are in direst need of the international community's attention and assistance.

Walter Dorn, in a paper exploring the future of the United Nations, called the Security Council a law unto itself, freely interpreting the United Nations Charter without censure. He endorses a judicial review of Security Council decisions suggesting that "If the Council acts in a clearly unconstitutional manner, one or more nations should be able to bring the issue before the International Court of Justice."<sup>79</sup>

Douglas Bland, chairman of the Defence Management Studies Program at the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, commented on the Brahimi Report in a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation interview. The substance of that November 2000 interview, available online, summarizes Bland's position that despite "... its impressive recommendations, the report fails to address the fact that the main problem with UN

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<sup>79</sup> Walter A. Dorn, "The United Nations in the Twenty-first Century: A Vision for an Evolving World Order," Originally published in: Dorn, A. Walter, ed., *World Order for a New Millennium*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), available from [http://www.rmc.ca/academic/gradrech/dorn11\\_e.html](http://www.rmc.ca/academic/gradrech/dorn11_e.html); Internet; accessed January 20, 2007.

peacekeeping operations is not in their procedures, but in the UN Charter itself.”<sup>80</sup> Bland relates this directly to the Security Council’s Permanent Five and their veto powers:

The Brahimi Report suggested that the UN Charter could be changed to force the members of the Security Council to regard international conflicts as global, not national interests, so that the UN could really become the main agent for peacekeeping in the world ... this is highly unlikely because the major powers would never agree to such a change in the UN Charter since it would restrict their ability to act globally in defence of their national security interests. In his [Bland’s] view, the problem the authors of the Brahimi Report faced can be compared to the old saying that ‘If pigs had wings, then they could fly.’ ... the report’s recommendations amount to a worthy but ultimately futile attempt to sew wings on the body of the UN pig. It is an example of what he refers to as the ‘administrator’s delusion,’ the idea that any major organizational problem can be fixed by changing its rules and/or procedures, not by altering the fundamental structures of the organization itself.<sup>81</sup>

As regards the Brahimi Report, many worthwhile and truly progressive recommendations were never implemented – most of those falling into the strategic category requiring Security Council endorsement. This reality further supports the widely-held view that there cannot be meaningful peace operations reform without Security Council reform. Furthermore, the Security Council may be judged morally if not criminally culpable in its abrogation of responsibilities to peacekeeping and peace-building where its decisions have not supported peace operations or worse, when it has decide not to be seized of an emerging humanitarian crisis. This at a time when 90 percent of Security Council issues pertain to developing countries which make up the majority of member states, most of which did not even exist as nations when the United Nations was formed with its Permanent Five. If we were to envision a Security Council with equal regional representation, we could also envision that abominations such as happened in Rwanda

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<sup>80</sup> Three Canadian Views, available from <http://www.cbc.ca/newsinreview/nov2000/un/3views.htm>; Internet; accessed January 27, 2007.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*

might never have occurred. We could envision a Security Council likely more seized of the matter of genocide in Africa or the complete absence of the rule of law in many African nations. A 2006 United States Congressional Service report by the Brookings Institution implied a direct relation of the shortcomings of the Brahimi Report to the Security Council stating:

By 2006, it had become clear that, despite the Brahimi reforms and DPKO's reform programmes, peacekeeping and other operational capacity is still being handicapped not only by sector specific problems, but perhaps more importantly by systemic problems in the governance and management culture of the organization.<sup>82</sup>

### **North-South divide**

The Brahimi Report discusses what is essentially a commitment gap between the resources required – professional, experienced, well-trained, and well-equipped troop and civilian police contributions – and the resources actually made available to United Nations peace operations by those countries which historically contributed the bulk of forces, the developed nations. The Report's language in this area is, for the most part, diplomatic. The reality is that there clearly exists a near abandonment of United Nations peace operations by developed nations. This trend began after the decade of United Nations disasters in the 1990s. Those disasters played out against the backdrop of the highly-successful Operations Desert Shield and Storm when in 1991, a U.S.-led coalition routed Iraqi forces from Kuwait and engaged the Iraqi army in a ground campaign lasting only 100 hours. Shield and Storm were not encumbered by the plodding, bureaucratic, political machinations of the United Nations. Instead they were military operations with military leadership and were painstakingly planned and conducted as such with political support but without political interference. The comparison between the two –

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<sup>82</sup> “Twenty Days in August: The Security Council Sets Massive New Challenges for UN Peacekeeping” . . . .

1990 United Nations peacekeeping missions which perhaps would have benefited from more robust military forces, and Operations Desert Shield and Storm – was stark and was not lost on those developed nations which took part in both.

The criticisms of those 1990s United Nations peace operations are many, as are the lessons learned. For developed states the lesson learned was to not place faith in the United Nations to conduct effective operations where a robust military presence is a more effective tool to bring about stability and security to a war-torn region. And this is exactly one of the lessons the Brahimi Report sought to address with many recommendations directly targeting this area of concern in an effort to restore faith in the United Nations as the international organization of choice for peace operations including prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building and when required, peace-making. This commitment gap is known as the North-South Divide.

Anthony Craig from the Office of the Military Advisor in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations gave a presentation during a 2003 experts' discussion to contribute to the dialogue on foreign policy in Canada called, *The Future of Peacekeeping*. In his presentation Craig was emphatic indicating "... that a key priority of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is to restore the support and participation of Northern member states."<sup>83</sup> That same year the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, admitted in a press release that:

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<sup>83</sup> Dr. H. Peter Langille and Tania Keefe, "The Future of Peacekeeping," An Experts' Discussion to Contribute to the Dialogue on Foreign Policy, workshop co-hosted by the Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Centre for Global Studies, University of Victoria, The Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development and The Canadian Consortium on Human Security, March 21, 2003, available from <http://action.web.ca/home/cpcc/attach/The%20Future%20of%20Peacekeeping.doc>; Internet; accessed January 20, 2007.

... fundamental questions about peacekeeping remained unanswered, including where troops were coming from; whether Member States were comfortable with the fact that the developing world continued to provide the bulk of Blue Helmets in Africa, whereas the industrialized countries prioritized the deployment of their military personnel on operations led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union or ad hoc coalitions authorized by the Security Council ...<sup>84</sup>

In March 2007, none of the Brahimi Report recommendations or continuing reforms within the United Nations or the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has changed this situation – the North-South Divide. United Nations statistics from its last monthly report on February 28, 2007, shows that of 82,751 military and civilian police deployed on 18 current missions from 114 contributing nations, 66,530<sup>85</sup> came from developing nations. And though in 2006 France and Italy deployed significant forces to Lebanon, it is not clear that this establishes a trend but rather, may be an anomaly due to national interests in the region. As of December 31, 2006, only 4,630 of 82,113 deployed peacekeeping personnel came from Permanent Members of the Security Council as demonstrated at Figure 4.

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<sup>84</sup> “Reform of UN Peacekeeping Operations: A Real Process with Real Benefits,” United Nations Press Release GA/SPD/265, Fifty-eighth General Assembly, Fourth Committee, 8<sup>th</sup> Meeting (AM), October 15, 2003, available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/gaspd265.doc.htm>; Internet: accessed January 20, 2007.

<sup>85</sup> Peacekeeping Statistics, DPKO website, available from [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2007/feb07\\_2.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2007/feb07_2.pdf); Internet; accessed March 17, 2007.

U.N. Peacekeeping Personnel as of December 31, 2006, by Mission, Category, and Source												
Mission	Total U.N. Peacekeeping Personnel				U.S. Participation				Participation by Permanent U.N. Security Council Members			
	Troops	Civilian Police	Military Observers	Total	Troops	Civilian Police	Military Observers	Total	Troops	Civilian Police	Military Observers	Total
UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	-	-	150	150	-	-	3	3	-	-	15	15
UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	-	-	41	41	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	853	64	-	917	-	-	-	-	269	-	-	269
UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF)	1,048	-	-	1,048	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	11,563	-	-	11,563	-	-	-	-	1,807	-	-	1,807
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	31	4	183	218	-	-	-	-	-	-	53	53
UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)	-	12	127	139	-	-	-	-	-	2	13	15
UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	-	1,960	37	1,997	-	223	-	223	-	400	3	403
UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)	16,487	1,075	734	18,296	-	-	-	-	218	13	47	278
UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	2,063	-	222	2,285	-	-	7	7	-	-	20	20
UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	13,613	1,097	188	14,898	6	10	5	21	575	44	16	635
UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	7,847	992	190	9,029	-	-	-	-	185	10	21	216
UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	6,684	1,692	-	8,376	3	50	-	53	5	266	-	271
UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB)	1,656	14	75	1,745	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3
UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)	8,734	680	592	10,006	-	-	11	11	572	32	29	633
UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)	-	1,099	32	1,131	-	4	-	4	-	5	2	7
UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)	223	-	11	234	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
<b>Political or Peacebuilding Missions</b>												
UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSL)	-	17	9	26	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	4
UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)	-	3	11	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>70,802</b>	<b>8,709</b>	<b>2,602</b>	<b>82,113</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>298</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>322</b>	<b>3,631</b>	<b>774</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>4,630</b>

Note: Numbers for ONUB are from November 30, 2006. The ONUB mission completed its mandate on December 31, 2006, and was succeeded by the UN Integrated Office in Burundi. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations estimates that the total number of peacekeeping personnel could surge to about 140,000 when peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Lebanon, and Darfur become fully manned. See: U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "UN Peacekeeping Operations: Surge 2006," November 1, 2006, at [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/surge2006.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/surge2006.pdf) (January 31, 2007).

Sources: U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "UN Missions Summary of Military and Police," November 30 and December 31, 2006, at [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/mis06\\_4.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/mis06_4.pdf) (January 31, 2007), and U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "UN Mission's Contributions by Country," November 30 and December 31, 2006, at [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/mis06\\_5.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/mis06_5.pdf) and [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/mis06\\_5.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/mis06_5.pdf) (January 31, 2007).

Figure 4: U.N. Peacekeeping Personnel as of December 31, 2006, by Mission, Category, and Source<sup>86</sup>

Canada, a country which once was able to boast it had been a part of every United Nations mission, and whose national identity continues to embody peacekeeping as a major characteristic, contributed only 141 and of these, only 55 were military.<sup>87</sup> It has been well-demonstrated that "... the support of developed states has not been modified since the release of the Brahimi Report."<sup>88</sup> Instead, Northern nations have demonstrated a clear and continuing trend of redirecting their military force to coalitions of the willing as in NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan – a United Nations-mandated operation conducted under

<sup>86</sup> Brett D. Schaeffer, *Time for a New United Nations Peacekeeping Organization*, February 13, 2007, available from [http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/upload/bg\\_2006.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/upload/bg_2006.pdf); Internet; accessed April 18, 2007, 20.

<sup>87</sup> *Peacekeeping Statistics* ..., .

<sup>88</sup> Thierry Tardy, "The Brahimi Report: Four years on," *Proceedings of a Workshop held at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy*, June 20-21, 2004, available from [http://www.gcsp.ch/E/publications/CM\\_Peacebuilding/Peace\\_Operations/Conf\\_Proceedings/Brahimi-Report.pdf](http://www.gcsp.ch/E/publications/CM_Peacebuilding/Peace_Operations/Conf_Proceedings/Brahimi-Report.pdf); Internet; accessed January 20, 2007, 7.



Security Council Resolutions 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1659 and 1707 – with 32,000 mostly military personnel from 37 nations. And developed nations are contributing most of the troops illustrated by Canada’s contribution to the mission, 2,500 soldiers. This is understandable in the context of the post-9/11 security environment where developed nations believe their own safety and security is threatened. Their actions simply reflect what Northern and Western governments have assessed to be in their best national interests.

Not only are developed nations choosing to deploy to missions other than those conducted by the United Nations, the collective and combined military training conducted by these nations is nearly exclusively preparatory for operations outside of the United Nations. The NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, as well as all Allied military command and staff colleges, train future military leaders and commanders using scenarios depicting coalition task forces deploying under United Nations Security Council resolutions, but not under United Nations Department of Peacekeeping direction or authority. This further reinforces an assessment made in 2004 by a Brahimi Report workshop held at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy which concluded that “...the link between the reform of the United Nations and the propensity of developed states to go through the United Nations in order to conduct peacekeeping is weak.”<sup>89</sup> Further, the increasing propensity for coalition and regional organizations to conduct operations under Security Council mandated resolutions has invoked criticism of the United Nations for abandoning difficult and complex peace operations. A Global Policy Reform article illustrates this stating, “Some say the UN has subcontracted force out to

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<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

entities like NATO (Kosovo, Bosnia), ECOWAS (Sierra Leone) and Coalitions of the Willing (Iraq) and has thus undermined its own ability and credibility.”<sup>90</sup>

In 2001, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) conducted a conference called The Brahimi Report: Overcoming the North-South Divide, to which high-level diplomats, military and civilian police leaders experienced in peace operations, parliamentarians and politicians from North and South countries, and Permanent Representatives at the United Nations were invited. In general, the conference assessed the Brahimi Report to be a “Western-driven undertaking rather than an effort supported by all UN Member States.”<sup>91</sup> Further those portions of the Brahimi Report that dealt with democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and good governance were perceived by nations from the South to have the potential to threaten the sovereignty of southern nations. There was near unanimous agreement among participants that if the United Nations reform continued to move forward in a North-South framework, “... the outcome will remain largely meaningless or even counterproductive.”<sup>92</sup> And of the continuing commitment gap between the North and South to which writer Susan Rice of Global Securities pronounced the United Nations Secretary General should address head-on by using “... the bully pulpit to press reluctant member states to action, including by chronicling their failures and ‘naming and shaming’ them,

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<sup>90</sup> Felicity Hill, “The Military Staff Committee: A Possible Future Role in UN Peace Operations?” Global Policy Reform, [Women's International League for Peace and Freedom](http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/2001/msc.htm), available from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/2001/msc.htm>; Internet; accessed January 20, 2007.

<sup>91</sup> “The Brahimi Report, Overcoming the North-South Divide,” 6th International Workshop, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, June 29 to 30, 2001, available from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/2001/brahimireport.pdf>; Internet; accessed January 20, 2007, 11.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

as necessary,”<sup>93</sup> neither pundits nor the United Nations are ‘getting it’. Despite the 2006 deployment of European troops to Lebanon, it may still be a very long time before the United Nations woos developed nations back to United Nations peace operations as a steady-state. A European military leader attending the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik conference got it right when he stated, “I do not think that this point is sufficiently understood in New York that DPKO’s credibility is virtually zero in many Western capitals. There is not going to be Western participation in many of these operations until that is changed.”<sup>94</sup> This theme is a common one made by observers, politicians, analysts and writers who have examined the Brahimi Report and attended international conferences aimed at assessing it. Highlighting the divisive power of the existing North-South divide, a United States Institute of Peace-sponsored conference report acknowledged the Brahimi Report for its technical merit but pointed out that it failed to “... address the central problem of all peacekeeping missions, that is, the lack of political will by key Western governments to support UN peacekeeping operations.”<sup>95</sup>

## PEACE OPERATIONS 2010

The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno said, “The Brahimi Process was not the end of that effort, but rather a starting point.”<sup>96</sup> The Brahimi Report, while no longer driving the process of reform, was the catalyst for more reform

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<sup>93</sup> Susan Rice, *Collective Response to Crisis: Strengthening UN Peace Operations Capacity*, available from [http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Rice\\_paper\\_collective\\_response.pdf](http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Rice_paper_collective_response.pdf); Internet; accessed January 20, 2007.

<sup>94</sup> “The Brahimi Report, Overcoming the North-South Divide” ..., 13.

<sup>95</sup> Tim Docking, “Peacekeeping in Africa,” Special Report, No. 66, Part 2, February 13, 2001, from USIP Press, The United States Institute of Peace, available from <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr66.html#brahimi>; Internet; accessed January 20, 2007.

<sup>96</sup> “Reform of UN Peacekeeping Operations: A Real Process with Real Benefits” ..., .

initiatives which the Secretary-General and Guéhenno both pursued vigorously. Peace Operations 2010 is the most recent of these.

Peace Operations 2010 – note the absence of the term ‘peacekeeping’ – is a set of broad guidelines designed to give direction to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations as it takes on current and future challenges. Jean-Marie Guéhenno laid out these five guidelines in a November 30, 2005, memorandum to all Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ headquarters and mission staff, prefacing the new series of reforms with a frank estimation of the status of peace operations post-Brahimi. Saying the recommendations of the Brahimi Report were aimed at giving the United Nations the capacity to launch one major mission a year, the requirements had far surpassed the intended capacity with the United Nations launching four major missions in 2004 which representing a five-fold increase in deployed personnel since the Brahimi Report was submitted in 2000. Peace Operations 2010 reforms are an extension of Brahimi recommendations and are based on what is assessed to be the five components of successful peace operations under the banners of people; doctrine; partnerships; resources; and organization – all items commented on in the Brahimi Report – with concrete steps for implementation articulated for each.

### **People**

This stems from Brahimi’s recommendations in the areas of Civilian Specialists, Staffing Levels, Effective Mission Leadership, and Senior Management. The goal is to recruit and retain capable staff working under the direction of competent mission leaders by updating all personnel policies. Concrete steps include creating integrated training services to bring all military, civilian police and civilian staff training capacities together in headquarters and in the field; in

liaison with member states, developing a new training curricula for general orientation of staff especially those deploying to missions; developing a department policy for identifying and selecting senior mission leadership; and reviewing the conditions of service of the Field Service category.<sup>97</sup>

### **Doctrine**

This stems from Brahimi's recommendations in the areas of Peace-Building Strategy and Peacekeeping Doctrine and Strategy. The goal is to put together a comprehensive system of guidance on United Nations peacekeeping that establishes standard operating procedures, policy and best practices. Concrete steps include developing and promulgating the Department of Peacekeeping Operations guidance project framework and products including policy directives, standard operating procedures, manuals and guidelines; inventory all existing practice documents in the areas of peacekeeping tasks, mission management and mission support; prioritize areas requiring policy development and draft priority guidance materials; and create a system for reviewing and disseminating guidance to field missions.<sup>98</sup>

### **Partnerships**

This stems from Brahimi's recommendations in the areas of Headquarters Resources and Structure for Planning and Supporting Peacekeeping Operations including Structural Adjustments Needed outside the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The goal is to establish effective and predictable partnerships within the United Nations, regional organizations and other interested parties to gain the maximum benefits for collective efforts. Concrete steps

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<sup>97</sup> Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Peacekeeping 2010, November 30, 2005, available from <http://www.ukun.org/Document.pdf>; Internet; accessed February 8, 2007, 6.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*

include revising the integrated mission planning process; revise the guidance on integrated missions; develop a Departmental strategy to support United Nations Summit commitments to enhance African Union peacekeeping capacities; develop the technical specifications required to engage European Union battle groups in support of peace operations; develop an action plan to further United Nations-NATO cooperation in support of peacekeeping; and developing a framework for cooperation with the World Bank in post-conflict situations and ideally engage in one major joint undertaking with the World Bank to demonstrate benefit.<sup>99</sup>

### **Resources**

This stems from Brahimi's recommendations in the category of United Nations Capacities to Deploy Operations Rapidly and Effectively, and Peace Operations and the Information Age. The goal is to secure the necessary resources – personnel and financial – to improve peace operations. Concrete steps include putting in place an effective standing police capacity with an initial capacity of 25 civilian police; complete a comprehensive review of United Nations stand-by arrangements; develop a United Nations reserve capacity characterized by troop contributing nation commitment, military support from regional organizations, and inter-mission cooperation; improve information technology use and coordination; develop a public information capacity within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; and support the reform of finance and procurement policies put forward by the Secretary-General in support of operational needs.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 6-7.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

## Organization

This spans all Brahimi's recommendation categories. The goal is to provide clear direction and effective support to all aspects of integrated peace operations to field missions. Concrete steps include creating a flexible mission template for generic peace operations organizations structures; establishing joint operational centres or mission analysis centres, and implementing the United Nations Security Management Systems at duty centres throughout the world; creating a benchmarking system to track mission progress; and reviewing the organizational structure of headquarters to establish integrated units and at least one integrated operations team.<sup>101</sup>

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations, particularly the hard-charging and highly competent Under-Secretary-General, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, finally seem to be 'getting it'. Where the Brahimi Report aimed at coaxing back developed nations to peacekeeping operations by recommendations which addressed some of the issues believed to have repelled Western and Northern nations from the outset, Peace Operations 2010 has built on those Brahimi recommendations – those implemented and those not implemented – and learned some valuable lessons, many which can be apprehended by reviewing the Peace Operations 2010 strategy.

There is still a lot of peacekeeping reform ongoing, much of it within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations itself, but there are concrete steps that implicitly reveal an innate understanding that it is through cooperation, partnerships, and integrated operations that progress will be made. With this initiative, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations acknowledges

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<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

that the international community, particularly the North and West, has progressed beyond any idealistic yearning the United Nations may have to be the ‘organization of choice’ for peacekeeping instead committing their resources instead to organizations such as NATO and the European Union. The initiatives to strengthen peacekeeping competency and capacity within the African Union provides further evidence that the United Nations is taking a more realistic approach to peacekeeping in the future. And now they are carving out a niche for continued engagement in world peace operations as *a* player rather than *the* player. And this is important as the United Nations has and can continue to make a valuable contribution to world peace.

## **CONCLUSION**

Saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war is still the ideal to which all nations aspire, and there is a strong case to be made that for the greater international public the United Nations is the organization that most would identify as the keeper of that aspiration on behalf of the world. The image of the Blue Beret is compelling and enduring despite the challenges of the 1990s. And there is growing evidence that the robust military efforts of organizations such as NATO in Afghanistan and the U.S-led coalition of the willing in Iraq does not sit easily on the minds and in the consciences of knowing men.

The Brahimi Report came at a critical time in the evolution of United Nations peacekeeping when its credibility was very much at or past the tipping point characterized by member states whose confidence in the organization to address the complex peace challenges was greatly diminished. But as this paper demonstrated, the very process leading up to the Report – largely influenced by extremely tight timelines and terms of reference which excluded



examination of several major factors impacting the approval, planning, mounting and conduct of peacekeeping missions – limited the potential impact of the Report to prompt the culture of change required to implement its recommendations and accrue long-term benefit to the future of peace operations.

To its great credit the Brahimi Report was a frank document which did not refrain from blunt language when appropriate. Its practical recommendations defined a common-sense approach to implementing change and those recommendations that were operational in nature and within the purview of the Secretary-General and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations were widely endorsed and acted upon. Peace operations today benefit from those technical improvements. However, the slower movement of the Report's strategic recommendations demonstrates a United Nations governance framework more interested in preserving structures and privileges than advancing the capacity of peacekeeping:

By 2006, it had become clear that despite the Brahimi reforms, and DPKO's reform programmes, peacekeeping and other operational capacity was still being handicapped not only by sector specific problems, but perhaps more importantly by systemic problems in the governance and management culture of the organisation. The Secretary-General pointed out that management reforms involving flexible, modern best-practice human resource procedures were essential if the UN was to be able to appropriately deploy resources to the field. ... The Secretary-General's management reform proposals were debated in the General Assembly's Fifth Committee in 2006. Member states, however, decided to postpone consideration of that.<sup>102</sup>

This is nearly counter-intuitive given that United Nations peacekeeping is the public face of the United Nations throughout the world. Yet a United Nations culture which does not identify

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<sup>102</sup> "Twenty Days in August: The Security Council Sets Massive New Challenges for UN Peacekeeping" .... ,

peace operations as a core activity persists, and therefore enhancements lag behind the requirement for amelioration.

To a large extent, the Brahimi Report has been overtaken by events, time and emerging strategies to deal with peace operations in the current world security environment. There has been such an increase in peacekeeping so as to cause Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno to warn that despite Brahimi Report-generated progress, "... there remained very real risks about the capacity of the UN to cope with a major surge in peacekeeping operations."<sup>103</sup> And the Henry L. Stimson Center, which provided the Panel with the Report's author, reviewed the Brahimi Report and its implementation and concluded that "... while the reforms instituted in 2001 and 2002 had improved the UN capacity to deploy and manage routine peacekeeping, when it came to complex multidimensional operations "(...) the UN may now be only marginally more capable than it was in 1999."<sup>104</sup>

While the initial promise of the Brahimi Report to cause corrective measures to be taken for much of what ailed United Nations peacekeeping was only partially kept, the Report did usher in an era of change which itself is gaining momentum in New York. The Secretary-General, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and other Secretariat departments and United Nations agencies built on the culture of change invoked by the Brahimi Report and have prompted a number of additional initiatives<sup>105</sup> with actionable recommendations to continue to

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<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

pursue a better way of doing business. In a February 27, 2007 meeting, delegates of the Special Peacekeeping Committee supported the Peace Operations 2010 reform agenda and agreed on the importance of systematic, structural responses to new challenges confronting peace operations.<sup>106</sup> This movement after Guéhenno commented in May 2006 that, “I feel that the rules and regulations of the United Nations were designed for a headquarters organization that would run conferences but that would not run field operations.”<sup>107</sup> The Peace Operations 2010 initiative holds great promise for the realistic approach it takes to improving the capacity and competency of troops being offered for field missions, and by proposing workable partnerships with those nations currently investing in other organizations such as NATO and the European Union. And it would likely not be the credible strategy it is if the Brahimi Report had never been written. In his 2006 statement to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Guéhenno cited three interrelated processes as contributing to the Secretary-General’s reform agenda – the first of these was the Brahimi Report.<sup>108</sup> This is Brahimi’s greatest legacy – not that it did not deliver on all aspects requiring address, but that it spoke truth to power and in so doing, prepared the future for continuous reflection and action in helping to make the world a more peaceful place.



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<sup>105</sup> These include the Standing Police Capacity; enhancing the military reserve capacities; the establishment and enforcement of uniform standards for peacekeepers; and the creation of multidisciplinary conduct and discipline teams in headquarters and in eight peacekeeping missions.

<sup>106</sup> United Nations Press Release, February 27, 2007, available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/gapk193.doc.htm>; Internet: accessed April 6, 2007.

<sup>107</sup> Jean-Marie Guéhenno, U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, “Key Challenges in Today’s UN Peacekeeping Operations,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 18, 2006, available from [www.cfr.org/publication/10766/key\\_challenges\\_in\\_todays\\_un\\_peacekeeping\\_operations](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10766/key_challenges_in_todays_un_peacekeeping_operations); Internet: accessed April 18, 2007.

<sup>108</sup> Remarks of Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, February 27, 2006, available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/articles/article270206.htm>; Internet: accessed April 6, 2007.

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