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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
JCSP 33 / PCEMI N°33

MDS RESEARCH PROJECT/PROJET DE RECHERCHE DE LA MED

**THE EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM IN CANADA:  
INCREASED THREAT IN A CULTURE OF INDIFFERENCE**

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## ABSTRACT

This paper examines the evolution of terrorism in Canada by looking at some of the major terrorist episodes in recent Canadian history. It shows that terrorism, both domestic and international, has long been a part of the Canadian picture but, due to the indifference of Canadians and the government's failure to define it or pass laws against it prior to the *Anti-Terrorism Act*, terrorist groups have been able to operate in Canada with little trouble. It also discusses how the nature of the terrorist activity and terrorist groups in Canada have evolved in concert with international terrorism.

The paper draws several conclusions. First, the culture of indifference in Canada prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US was recognized by terrorist groups from around the world and exploited to set up extensive support networks for their activities. Second, the failure to define what is meant by terrorism and create laws to deal with it resulted in Canada's inadvertent contribution to the evolution of terrorism with a corresponding increase in the level of threat to Canada. Third, modern terrorist groups are sophisticated learning organizations that are rapidly improving their methods, doctrine and training and are continually evolving into a greater threat to Canada, And finally, when the terrorism that has long been present in Canada is added to the new networks of Islamic extremists inspired by the ideology of Al Qaeda, it raises the overall threat to Canada to a level much greater than it was prior to 9/11.

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## CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

With perhaps the singular exception of the United States, there are more international terrorist groups active here than any other country in the world... Terrorist groups are present here whose origins lie in virtually every significant regional, ethnic and nationalist conflict there is.

Ward Elcock  
Former Director CSIS  
24 June 1988<sup>1</sup>

We are not fighting so that the enemy recognizes us and offers us something. We are fighting to wipe out the enemy.”

Hussein Massawi  
Former Leader of Hezbollah<sup>2</sup>

On the morning of September 11, 2001, Canadians watched in disbelief as two hijacked commercial airliners slammed into the twin towers of New York’s World Trade Centre and a third into the Pentagon, just outside of Washington. A fourth airliner crashed in Pennsylvania after passengers wrested control from the hijackers to prevent it from reaching its target. Until that morning, most Canadians believed that terrorism was a phenomenon that was new to North America and relatively nonexistent in Canada. Canada has a rich and colourful history of terrorism dating back to the 1920s when the Sons Of Freedom, a Doukhobor nationalist group that saw themselves as a repressed minority, became Canada’s first terrorists when they initiated a wave of arson and bombings that lasted for the next four decades.<sup>3</sup> In the years following the Doukhobor

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<sup>1</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Submission To The Special Committee of The Senate on Security and Intelligence By Ward Elcock, Director of The Canadian Security Intelligence Service 24 June 1998,” <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/speeches/speech24061998.asp> ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

<sup>2</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press. 2006), 90.

<sup>3</sup> Stewart Bell, *Cold Terror* (Mississauga: John Wiley and Sons Canada Ltd, 2005), 21.

attacks, the number of terrorist incidents in Canada and their severity has steadily increased from both domestic and international terrorism until it peaked in the 1960s and began a slow decline in number of attacks (until 2000 at which point the number rapidly started to climb again), but not necessarily their severity.<sup>4</sup> In fact, on 23 June 1985 off the coast of Ireland, a bomb exploded on Air India flight 182, killing all 329 people on board. This made Canada home to the single most deadly terrorist incident in modern history, a dubious distinction we held for over 16 years until September 11, 2001.<sup>5</sup>

Not only did the frequency and severity of attacks in Canada increase, but international terrorist groups quickly recognized Canada for what it was, an exceptional state from which to support their efforts abroad. Canada has a diverse population that is proud of its multiculturalism and actively encourages immigration. It also has a refugee policy that provides a safe haven for people who cannot return to their state for fear of persecution. No system is perfect, however, and it is inevitable that some of the people coming to Canada are associated with international terrorism or will become so after arriving in Canada. Under the guise of numerous varied covers such as community support organizations, religious groups, legitimate businesses and organized crime, terrorists have been able to funnel millions of dollars out of Canada to support terrorist groups around the world. In some cases they have even been able to register these

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<sup>4</sup> N.A. Kellett, *The Terrorist Threat* (Ottawa: Department Of National Defence Directorate of Strategic Analysis, June 2001), 8.

<sup>5</sup> Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, *The Report of The Honourable Bob Rae, Independent Advisor to the Minister of Public Safety and Bombing of Air India Flight 182* (Ottawa: Air India review Secretariat, 2005),1.

fundraising efforts as charitable organizations in order to issue tax receipts.<sup>6</sup> Canada offers numerous other advantages for the terrorist in that it is right next door to the United States, the world's largest terror target.

Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, American security agencies began a thorough and exhaustive search for the origins of this heinous act. Initial indications led some to the mistaken, yet entirely plausible theory that the attacks had been planned and staged from Canada. Americans had long watched Canada turn a blind eye to the fact that terrorist groups were operating networks in Canada to raise funds, recruit and train for their operations elsewhere. This culture of denial that existed in Canada at the time made US politicians critical of Canada's handling of its terrorist problems. In response to the attacks, the Canadian government began to turn a critical eye towards the terrorist presence in Canada. In so doing, they discovered what the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) had known all along but the government was not willing to admit; that Canada was a country with a terrorist problem.

This paper will examine the evolution of terrorism in Canada by looking at some of the major terrorist episodes in recent Canadian history. It will be shown that terrorism, both domestic and international, has long been a part of Canadian history but, due to the indifference of Canadians and the government's failure to define it or pass laws against it prior to the *Anti-Terrorism Act*, terrorist groups have been able to operate in Canada with little trouble. It will also be shown that the nature of the terrorist activity in Canada has evolved in concert with international terrorism and, although many of the underlying

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<sup>6</sup> John C. Thompson, Joe Turlej, "Other People's Wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism In Canada," The Mackenzie Institute, [http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/other\\_peoples\\_wars.htm](http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/other_peoples_wars.htm) ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007, chap.3.

motivations have changed little, the threat to Canada now is much greater than it was prior to 9/11.

It will begin by looking at the problems associated with defining terrorism in Canada and how, without defining the concept, Canada was contributing to the culture of denial that exists here with respect to terrorism and was inadvertently contributing to the improvement and evolution of international terrorism which, in turn, increased the threat to Canada. Next, a brief look at the problem of categorizing terrorism will be undertaken with a view to narrowing the numerous categories down to four for the simplification of discussion in this paper. It will be shown that the most dangerous of the categories is religious extremism because, unlike nationalist terrorism, its adherents are not concerned about losing their support base due to normal human revulsion resulting from their heinous acts. Chapter four will then examine the long, never-ending evolution of terrorism into the more threatening and dangerous form we see today. The characteristics of twenty first century terrorism and how it has changed from the latter half of the twentieth century as terrorist groups have become smarter, more lethal, media-savvy, high-tech learning organizations will be examined. Then the most terrifying trend in modern terrorism, the fundamental shift in motivation away from nationalist terrorism to religious extremism, will be looked at. A final concern for Canada, as a microcosm of the world, is that the number of international terrorist incidents, which had been on the decline until 2000, has taken a dramatic upswing starting in the year 2000 and has remained high ever since.

Following the evolution of terrorism, the paper will then commence an examination of a cross-section of the most prominent terrorism episodes in Canadian

history starting with the eight years of FLQ activity which, prior to 9/11 was the most violent chapter of domestic terrorism in Canada's history.<sup>7</sup> Although this crisis appeared to be strictly Canadian in its makeup, it bore some of the hallmarks of international terrorism in the rhetoric and tactics of the FLQ which was Marxist in nature and reflected the prominence of left-wing revolutionary terrorist groups on the international scene at the time. During the limited eight years of FLQ activity, it can be seen that they rapidly evolved from a nuisance threat to a serious challenge to the government of Québec that necessitated the imposition of the *War Measures Act* and the deployment of the Army to quell the uprising. By failing to heed the wake-up call contained in the FLQ uprising, the Trudeau government missed the opportunity to create a new law to counter terrorism and in so doing, set the stage for the exploitation of Canada by future terrorist groups.

To study the aspect of international terrorism in Canada, it is necessary to look at the international makeup of Canada's population. Chapter 6 will show that, as a result of Canada's immigration and refugee policy, diaspora communities from most countries on earth have been formed in Canada's urban centres, many of them quite large. It is these communities that international terrorists often exploit to set up support networks.

Next the new and more dangerous form of terrorism represented by Sikh extremists in Canada will be studied to demonstrate how they took advantage of Canada's culture of denial with respect to terrorism and set up an intricate support network for its campaign against India. Their terrorist activities escalated to the point where they perpetrated the deadliest terrorist attack in history from Canada. The attack

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<sup>7</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Counter-Terrorism" *Backgrounder No.8* (August 2002). <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/backgrounders/backgrounder08.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

should have had a similar effect on Canada that 9/11 had 16 years later on the US, but the government missed the warning and failed to define terrorism or create new laws.

The Tamil Tigers will then be examined as yet another stage in the evolution of terrorism. Their highly organized command and control structure has enabled them to spread their network to Tamil diaspora communities around the world where they extort Tamil immigrants, set up businesses both legal and illegal, and spread their influence within the local, provincial and federal governments. They took advantage of Canada's indifference and the non-existent laws against supporting terrorism to raise funds to support their violent activities in Sri Lanka. The Tamil Tigers are a learning organization that, as long as they are allowed to exist and fight in Sri Lanka, will only get better at their trade, which in the long run represents an increased threat to Canadians.

The final stage in the evolution of international terrorism will be covered in chapter 9 with a look at Islamic extremism. The presence of Islamic extremist support networks have been in Canada for a long time but, because of a lack of legislation against the support of terrorism they were allowed to carry out their activities with little impediment. The attempt by Ahmed Ressam, in 1999, to drive a car bomb from Canada to blow up the Los Angeles International Airport marked the third clear message to the Canadian government that a definition and law in the form of the *Anti-Terrorism Act* was required but went, yet again, unheeded. It will then be shown that the transformation of Al Qaeda following 9/11 as a result of the US-led war on terror has changed the nature of the operations of adherents to Al Qaeda into a scattered network of small cells operating on their own. This final stage in the evolution of terrorism represents the greatest threat to Canada from terrorism.

And finally, we will look at the overall threat these terrorist groups represent to Canada. It will be shown that, in comparison to the period just prior to 9/11, the threat to Canada has increased despite the overall threat level still being assessed as low. In addition to the new threat posed by the loose networks of Islamic extremists inspired by the ideology of Al Qaeda, Canada still has present the vast majority of groups that were here prior to 9/11 and, as a result of the evolution seen in modern terrorism, they represent a significant threat.

For the purposes of this paper, the term evolution is meant as continual process of improvement in methods, doctrine, tactics, recruiting fundraising, command and control and all other elements that make-up a terrorist group. Every terrorist group evolves by learning from its own successes and mistakes and by learning from those of other groups.

Due to its sensitivity, much of the literature pertaining to terrorism in Canada is classified material and cannot be used in this unclassified report. As a result, the available sources for specific subject areas are often limited to a very narrow field of authors or to the publicly released CSIS reports. In the case of the CSIS reports it is very difficult or even impossible to verify the information in the report or check the sources. In the case of the limited cadre of authors available, many of whom also rely heavily upon CSIS information and each other, it is occasionally possible to make comparisons based upon works pertaining to international terrorism, but not always.

## CHAPTER 2 - DEFINING TERRORISM IN CANADA

The act of defining what is meant by the word terrorism is an important step in a state's ability to deal with it. In the case of Canada, it will be shown that, prior to the *Anti-Terrorism Act*, an adequate definition of the word did not exist, which contributed to the culture of denial in this country. It also allowed terrorist support activities to take place in Canada that were contributing to the efforts of international terrorism and, by doing so, we were inadvertently contributing to the improvement and evolution of terrorism which, in turn, increased the risk to Canadians.

By its very nature, terrorism is an extremely difficult concept to define in a neat, concise manner. Global terrorism is one of the most discussed topics in the world today and yet it tends to defy easy categorization. Everyone has a different paradigm about what it is based upon according to their perceptions, beliefs and cultures yet no one has been able to agree on its causes or cures.<sup>8</sup> The chosen definition of a particular author or organization may differ greatly, depending upon the institutional affiliation or ideology that he or she represents. For example, a government may label all violent acts committed by their opponents as terrorism while the opponents of that government will be quick to point out that they are acting as they do because they are victims of government terrorism.<sup>9</sup> Walter Laqueur, one of the most prolific writers on the subject,

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<sup>8</sup> See, Charles W. Kegley Jr, *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls* (Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 6-7.

<sup>9</sup> Brian M. Jenkins, "The Changing Characteristics of Twenty-First Century Terrorism," in *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, ed. Charles W. Kegley Jr, 15 – 26 (Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 16-17.

pointed out that there are over one hundred definitions of terrorism and stated that “Perhaps the only characteristic generally agreed upon is that terrorism always involves violence or the threat of violence.”<sup>10</sup> Even this may not be true now that the world relies on the Internet and the threat of cyber-terrorism has become a reality.

Internationally, states have been struggling with a definition for decades. An attempt to create a universally acceptable definition was made under the League of Nations but ultimately failed to reach consensus. The definition they is as follows:

All criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public.<sup>11</sup>

Following on from the League of Nations, the UN has been struggling to come up with one but, to this day, still has no agreed-upon definition and no convention on terrorism.<sup>12</sup> The best they have done is to use stern words in the form of “resolution language” as follows:

1. *Strongly condemns* all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed;<sup>13</sup>

2. *Reiterates* that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that

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<sup>10</sup> Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism* (New York: Oxford University Press. 1999), 5-6.

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Definitions of Terrorism.” [http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism\\_definitions.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html) ; Internet; posted 31 March 2007, accessed 31 March 2007.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* This phrase was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly by its resolution 60/1 at the 2005 World Summit.

may be invoked to justify them." (GA Res. 51/210 Measures to eliminate international terrorism)<sup>14</sup>

Canada is no exception when it comes to defining terrorism. Prior to passing of the *Anti-Terrorism Act* in 2001, there existed no clear official governmental definition for terrorism or terrorist support activities.<sup>15</sup> Neither the RCMP website nor the *Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act* specifically defines terrorism.<sup>16</sup> The *Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act* makes an attempt to define it as “activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state...” as a “threat to the security of Canada”.<sup>17</sup> It can be seen in this definition the authors of the act quickly recognized the need to define it and targeted, not only the violent acts of terrorism but the activity related to supporting those violent activities. The problem with their definition, however, is that it exists only as guidance and direction to CSIS for their activities and does not have the effect of making these activities illegal.

The overt, violent acts relating to terrorism such as murder, hijacking and kidnapping, were adequately covered under existing criminal law but activities

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid. This phrase is part of the *United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, Adopted by the General Assembly on 8 September 2006 in Resolution 60/288.

<sup>15</sup> Kent Roach, “Canada’s Response To Terrorism,” chap. 23 in *Global Anti-Terrorism Law And Policy*, ed. Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor and Kent Roach, 511-533 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 513.

<sup>16</sup> Department Of Justice. *The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act*. 1985. See also, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “Strategic Priorities,” [http://www.rcmp.ca/priorities/index\\_e.htm](http://www.rcmp.ca/priorities/index_e.htm) ; Internet; accessed 19 February 2007.

<sup>17</sup> Department Of Justice. *Bill C-23: The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act*. 1985. Section 2(c).

supporting the commission of these crimes was not.<sup>18</sup> Until 2001, participation in the activities of a terrorist group, instruction in terrorist methods, fundraising, financing and the provision of property to terrorist groups was completely legal in Canada. As will be discussed in later chapters of this paper, this culture of denial in Canada was recognized by terrorist organizations from around the world who, over the years, established extremely complex networks in this country to support their terrorist activities in other parts of the world. By allowing this to happen, Canada was not doing its part in the global fight against terrorism and was inadvertently allowing international terrorists to get better at what they do. Anything that enables international terrorists to get better at their trade will, as we will see in later chapters, increase the threat to Canada.

The events of 9/11 brought these deficiencies to light and the result was the creation of the *Anti-Terrorism Act*, passed in December 2001. Its definition is, of necessity, rather lengthy and complex but it defines terrorist activity as follows:

“an act or omission that is committed in or outside Canada and that, if committed within or outside of Canada that is committed:

1. in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause, and
2. in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act, whether the public or the person, government or organization is inside or outside Canada,

and that intentionally:

1. causes death or serious bodily harm to a person by the use of violence,
2. endangers a person's life,
3. causes a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any segment of the public,

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<sup>18</sup> See, Kent Roach, “Canada’s Response To Terrorism,” chap. 23 in *Global Anti-Terrorism Law And Policy*, 513. See also, Department of Justice Canada, “Backgrounder: Royal Assent of Bill C-36 – The Anti-Terrorism Act,” 18 December 2001. [http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc\\_28217.html](http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc_28217.html) ; Internet; accessed 20 April 2007.

4. causes substantial property damage, whether to public or private property, if causing such damage is likely to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of clauses 1-3,
5. causes serious interference with or serious disruption of an essential service, facility or system, whether public or private, other than as a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work that is not intended to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of clauses 1-3,

and includes a conspiracy, attempt or threat to commit any such act or omission, or being an accessory after the fact or counseling in relation to any such act or omission, but, for greater certainty, does not include an act or omission that is committed during an armed conflict and that, at the time and in the place of its commission, is in accordance with customary international law or conventional international law applicable to the conflict, or the activities undertaken by military forces of a state in the exercise of their official duties, to the extent that those activities are governed by other rules of international law.<sup>19</sup>

Moreover, the problem of definition gets harder rather than easier as new forms of terrorism emerge and the nature of the subject is constantly becoming more complex.

There are more types of terrorism today than at any time in history.<sup>20</sup>

For Canada it is important to have an official definition because the very act of defining it in legislation means that the problem of terrorist support activities is finally getting the attention it deserves at the very highest levels of government and represents a milestone in the battle against the culture of denial towards terrorism in our country. The *Anti-Terrorism Act* itself is a milestone because it finally gives CSIS and the RCMP the tools they need to submit a “. . . criminal and/or security intelligence reports [sic] on an entity disclosing the reasonable grounds to believe that the entity has knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist activity; or the entity is

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<sup>19</sup> House of Commons. *Bill C-36: Anti-Terrorism Act*. 18 December, 2001. Section 83.01. The definition is abbreviated to make it more readable.

<sup>20</sup> Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, 4-7.

knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of or in association with an entity involved in a terrorist activity.”<sup>21</sup> In other words, they finally have the power they need to make not only the violent acts of terrorism illegal but also the activities that support terrorism illegal in this country.

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<sup>21</sup> Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. “Keeping Canadians Safe: Currently Listed Entities.” <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/index-en.asp> ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

### CHAPTER 3 - CATEGORIES OF TERRORISM

When it comes to categorizing terrorism, many of the same obstacles are faced as when we try to define it. There are so many different types of terrorism that the subject defies neat and concise categorizations. Again, most Canadians might be surprised to learn that Canada has had virtually every category of terrorism represented in this country in one way or another. The most dangerous form of terrorism in the world today fits within one category, that of international religious extremism, which will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper.

Every terrorist group is unique in many ways. Some will only ever fit into their own unique category while at the same time, a large percentage of them straddle several of the categories.<sup>22</sup> There are five general methods of classifying them: by ideological type; by the nature of their goals; by the setting in which they carry out their activities; by the nature of their targets; and finally, by the terrain in which they operate. Broadly speaking the following categories can be used to cover the majority of terrorist groups in the world: nationalist, revolutionary, single-issue, far-right extremism, international versus domestic, religious extremism and state terrorism.<sup>23</sup> For simplicity, this paper will use four broad categories to cover the different types of terrorism: the first will be nationalist terrorism which will include all the categories listed above except religious

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<sup>22</sup> Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, 6.

<sup>23</sup> *Encyclopedia Of Terrorism: Vol 1*, 1997. "Categories of Terror" 188-190. For simplicity, revolutionary, single-issue, far-right extremism and state terrorism will not be used to categorize terrorist groups in this paper despite the fact that a particular group may fit nicely into one of these categories.

extremism; the second will be that of religious extremism. These two types of terrorism can be further sub-divided into the two categories of domestic or international terrorism.

### **NATIONALIST TERRORISM VERSUS RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM**

Nationalist terrorism, in the context of this discussion, arises from the desire of people who share the same culture to achieve self-determination through the control, removal, or coercion of their own government.<sup>24</sup> Most of the groups in this paper strongly exhibit characteristics of nationalist terrorism groups even though other categories have been and will continue to be used to describe them. Nationalist terrorists tend to focus their activities on the image of the authority that stands in their way but, unlike fighters in a guerilla war, they target the civilian population vice the military. Groups who embrace terrorism for the purposes of nationalism, “aim to overturn the ruling elite by intimidating, scaring or panicking the general public.”<sup>25</sup>

The other type of terrorism that will be examined here is religious extremism. Within this category there exists a spectrum that spans from groups who have goals and aims that are nationalist in character, to groups that believe in some form of divine inspiration, that their actions satisfy the will of their particular god and that they must seek to make conditions better for members of their faith alone. All of these groups get

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<sup>24</sup> Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, 80-81.

<sup>25</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Counter-Terrorism” *Backgrounder No.8* (August 2002). <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/backgrounders/backgrounder08.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007. See also, *Encyclopedia Of Terrorism: Vol 1*, 1997. “Nationalist Terrorism” 191-193. There are numerous examples of nationalist terror groups throughout the world and, since Canada has representatives from a great number of those groups, nationalist terrorism is well-represented in Canada. Some of the more noteworthy examples are the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who are fighting for a national homeland in Sri Lanka, Babbar Khalsa (BK) who are struggling for independence of the Sikh minority in India, and our very own Front de liberation du Québec (FLQ) who sought independence of the Québec francophones from the rest of Canada.

placed in the religious extremism category because they have cloaked themselves in religious rhetoric to gain legitimacy and support or, in many cases actually believe, they are carrying out the will of God. According to Walter Laqueur, “The real innovation in the late twentieth century is the appearance of radical religious (or quasireligious) nationalist groups adopting terrorism as their main form of struggle, sometimes within the framework of established religion (mainly Islam, but also Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism). . .”<sup>26</sup>

Nationalist terrorists generally believe that their actions are carried out as a means to an end and they are attempting to appeal to an audience of sympathizers and supporters. Because of this, they must limit the scope of their terror to avoid losing their support base out of shock and disgust. Religious extremists are able to claim that the only audience that matters is God himself which means there are fewer constraints of conscience, making them capable of almost limitless violence in the name of their cause.<sup>27</sup> The starkest and most dangerous example of this is, of course, Al Qaeda and the many adherents to the ideology of Al Qaeda which will be discussed in chapter 9.<sup>28</sup>

## **DOMESTIC VERSUS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM**

Terrorism can be further categorized into domestic or international terrorism. Domestic groups are focused on affecting politics within one state only and, in Canada, include such examples as the FLQ, the Sons of Freedom and the various animal rights, anti-abortion and environmentalist groups. International terrorism, on the other hand,

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<sup>26</sup> Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, 80.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 81-104, 127-155.

<sup>28</sup> See, Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 90.

involves two or more countries, whether it is the activities of the terrorists in more than one state or the activities in one state and the support of the citizens or government of another state.<sup>29</sup> The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Babbar Khalsa and Al Qaeda all fit within the category of international terrorism and an examination of the currently listed entities on the PSEPC website reveals that the overwhelming majority of currently list terrorist groups in Canada fit into the international terror category.<sup>30</sup>

The diverse nature of terrorism makes it very difficult to divide groups into neat, concise categories but, for the purpose of this paper the four categories of nationalist, religious extremism, international and domestic will be used. The most dangerous category of terrorism tends to be religious extremism because, unlike nationalist terrorism, its practitioners do not feel constrained by the limits of normal human revulsion that would drive away their support base. In order to more fully understand the picture of terrorism in Canada it is important to examine the evolution of international terrorism and, by extension, Canadian terrorism.

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<sup>29</sup> *Encyclopedia Of Terrorism: Vol 1*, 1997. "Domestic Versus International Terrorism" 202-205.

<sup>30</sup> Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, "Keeping Canadians Safe: Currently Listed Entities." <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/speeches/speech02042003.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

## **CHAPTER 4 - EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM**

Terrorism, which has been around in one form or another since the beginning of recorded history, has been undergoing a long, occasionally erratic, but never-ending evolution to become more threatening and dangerous today than it ever has been in the past. The characteristics of twenty first century terrorism have changed from the latter half of the twentieth century as terrorist groups have become smarter, more lethal, media-savvy learning organizations that take advantage of modern technology and have begun to cooperate with one another on a scale never seen before. The most terrifying trend in modern terrorism and the greatest terrorist threat to Canada has been the fundamental shift in motivation away from the mix of terrorist ideologies prevalent in the twentieth century to the ideology of religious extremism. Another concern for Canada as a microcosm of the world is that, globally, the number of international terrorist incidents had been on the decline until 2000 when they took a sharp upturn and have remained high ever since.

### **IMPROVED CAPABILITIES**

There is very little agreement amongst terrorism experts on the division of the subject into coherent time periods or eras because, as with the definition and categorization, neat parceling is very difficult. For the purposes of this paper worldwide terrorism and, as an extension, terrorism in Canada is an evolution from traditional terrorism, which began in the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century with the appearance of guerilla warfare associated with the Napoleonic Wars in Spain and Russia, to the more

modern form of religious extremism which has taken shape in the last several decades.<sup>31</sup> Canada truly joined the ranks of countries with serious terrorist problems in the early 1960s with the beginning of the FLQ bombing campaign in 1963. This date roughly corresponds with the beginning of a steady climb in terror activity internationally<sup>32</sup> and the appearance of an increase in the violence and ruthlessness of terrorist groups throughout the world.<sup>33</sup>

The characteristics of twenty first century terrorism have changed from those of the latter half of the twentieth century as its practitioners are taking advantage of new technologies and their methods are becoming increasingly more sophisticated and deadly. There are some general trends that add a terrifying new dimension to the terrorism of today<sup>34</sup> and because the groups represented in Canada tend to mirror the overall trend of terrorism worldwide, it is worth taking a look at them.

Terrorist networks have become more global than they were in the past. Innovations such as the Internet, the cell phone and satellite communications with cryptographic technologies have drastically improved security of communications and effectiveness of their command and control capabilities. Near-instantaneous coverage by the global media has enabled them to adapt their strategies to more effectively send their message to its intended audience, which is often the entire world. Because of these

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<sup>31</sup> Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, 12-43.

<sup>32</sup> Human Security Centre, "The Human Security Brief 2006," <http://www.humansecuritycentre.org/images/stories/HSBrief2006/figures/Figure2.6.pdf> ; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007.

<sup>33</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Counter-Terrorism" *Backgrounder No.8* (August 2002). <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/backgrounders/backgrounder08.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

<sup>34</sup> Kegley, *The New Global Terrorism...*, 3-5. Once again, this summation cannot possibly work for all of the terrorist groups in the world and there is no way that the direction of the general trends will be followed by all, or even most, of the terrorists in the world.

improved technologies and because the movement of people internationally has increased dramatically in the last few decades, borders matter very little to modern groups.<sup>35</sup>

Terrorist groups have become far more lethal than they were in the past. Global media coverage has numbed the average citizen to the effects of violence in the world so terrorists must keep notching up the sensationalism of their attacks to achieve the desired effect. The machine gun, the suicide bomber and the car bomb are still popular methods of achieving the desired effect, however, modern groups have shown that they have the wherewithal to carry out attacks using much more sophisticated and unexpected methods. Al Qaeda demonstrated the lethal effect of this by flying passenger jets full of fuel into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.<sup>36</sup>

Improved security, increased public awareness and better intergovernmental cooperation since 9/11 has caused terrorist groups to change their targeting and methods. Some of the disturbing trends include activities such as: random attacks and deliberate murder of foreign aid and non-governmental organization workers; kidnapping; attacks on infrastructure such as energy grids, transportation, banking and tourism; hoaxes intended to disrupt and frighten; and use of the Internet for the spread of propaganda, fundraising, and command and control.<sup>37</sup> They have become sophisticated learning organizations that are proving to be more imaginative in their methods of recruiting and

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<sup>35</sup> See, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Counter-Terrorism" *Backgrounder No.8* (August 2002). <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/backgrounders/backgrounder08.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

<sup>36</sup> See, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Report No. 2000/01: Trends In Terrorism" *Perspectives* (18 December 1999). <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/perspectives/200001.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

<sup>37</sup> See, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Remarks by Mr. Jim Judd, Director, CSIS to the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) (27 October 2006)." <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/speeches/speech27102006.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

training. Their attacks show a level of marketing skills and media awareness that has previously never been seen before. They are increasingly ignoring the differences in their ideologies and aims in order to collaborate with each other and they are sharing intelligence, training and methods amongst each other. Lessons learned from failed and successful attacks, techniques of counterterrorism and changes in security are shared between groups to improve their chances of future success.<sup>38</sup> All of these improvements in technology, method and doctrine have driven the evolution of terrorism into a far more formidable threat today than ever faced previously.

## **SHIFT IN MOTIVATIONS**

Among the most notable trends over the past two decades has been the fundamental shift in the motivations of international terrorist groups, most significantly in the area of religious terrorism. Revolutionary terrorism, while never a strong factor in North American terror groups but prevalent in European groups, has been on the decline worldwide. North American terrorism has tended more towards nationalist aims, like the FLQ in Canada, and terrorism that has arrived on the continent with immigrant communities. Among the deadliest attacks in the past 15 years, however, have been associated with religious terrorist groups. In June of 2001, Anthony Kellett of the Directorate of Strategic Analysis of the Department of National Defence wrote, “This fact, along with the multiplication of religious groups over the past quarter century, has led some terrorism analysts to conclude that religious and quasi-religious groups are the

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<sup>38</sup> See, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Remarks by Mr. Jim Judd, Director, CSIS to the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) (27 October 2006).” <http://www.csis-sers.gc.ca/en/newsroom/speeches/speech27102006.asp> ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

most likely to resort to mass-destruction terrorism, notably with CBRN means.”<sup>39</sup> A mere three months later Al Qaeda would demonstrate the uncanny prescience of his statement albeit without the use of CBRN weapons.

Terrorism in the name of religion is not a new phenomenon. It goes back thousands of years and constitutes some of the earliest examples of what we now know as terrorism. Throughout recorded history there have been religious terror groups such as the Assassins, the Sicari and the Thugs but, in the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the number declined significantly to be replaced by the traditional terrorist groups motivated by the mix of ethnic, nationalist and ideological purposes that we have become familiar with. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, however, the number of religious extremist groups has taken a dramatic upswing and continues to rise.<sup>40</sup> This new surge in religious extremism is largely a result of the increase in Muslims, initially mostly Sunni Arabs but increasingly Non-Arabs as well, who have adopted the “ideology of al Qaeda”<sup>41</sup> which will be discussed at greater length later in this paper.

## **UPWARD TREND IN INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS**

The National Security Coordination Centre published a listing of 366 domestic and 62 international terrorist incidents in Canada between 1960 and 1989 inclusive. 64% of these attacks occurred during the 1960s, 19% occurred during the 1970s and 17%

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<sup>39</sup> Kellett, *The Terrorist Threat*, xii-xiii.

<sup>40</sup> See, Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, 81-104, 127-155. See also, Canadian Security Intelligence Service. “Presentation By Jim Judd Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service to The Subcommittee on Public Safety and National Security 22 February 2005.” <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/speeches/speech22022005.asp> ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

occurred during the 1980s. A further 511 potential terrorist incidents were excluded from the list because they were inconsistent with the definition in the report, were considered terrorism support activities, or were excluded for other reasons.<sup>42</sup> It is quite likely that for the purposes of this analysis many of the incidents excluded from the study such as terrorist support activities would now be included. This comment is indicative of the Canadian mindset prior to 9/11 which tended not to see terrorist support activities as terrorism. There are no published data for the number of incidents in Canada in the 1990s but CSIS has stated that there was a “notable drop” in the number<sup>43</sup> and remarks by CSIS director Jim Judd indicate that the number and severity of terrorist incidents worldwide is once again on the increase as we move into the new millennium.<sup>44</sup> This statement is consistent with the international terrorism data from the Human Security Brief which shows a steady climb from 97 international terrorist incidents in 1968 to 420 in 1991 followed by a steep drop to 106 in 2000 and then a sharp climb to 395 by 2004.<sup>45</sup> The data for 2005 indicate that the trend is holding with 305 international terrorist incidents.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Kellett, *The Terrorist Threat*, 8. The responsibility for the NSCC database was given to CSIS in 1993 and as of 2001 there had been no annual or bi-annual reports produced for public use.

<sup>43</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Report No. 2000/01: Trends in Terrorism” *Perspectives* (18 December 1999). <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/perspectives/200001.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

<sup>44</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Speaking Notes For Canadian Bar Association Panel on National Security and Human Rights Mr. Jim Judd, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service 15 August 2006.” <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/speeches/speech15082006.asp> ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

<sup>45</sup> Human Security Centre, “The Human Security Brief 2006,” <http://www.humansecuritycentre.org/images/stories/HSBrief2006/figures/Figure2.6.xls> ; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

This trend is very troublesome for Canada because we already have a diverse cross-section of terrorist groups represented in this country and an increase in worldwide terrorist activity will almost certainly mean a corresponding increase in the terrorist activity here. Today's terrorist groups are reaping the benefits derived from the long history of terrorism and have become more threatening and dangerous today than ever before. Modern groups have significantly improved their operating procedures and knowledge in the first part of the twentieth century and the shift in motivation towards religious extremism raises the threat because many modern religious extremist groups do not feel constrained by moderation as do nationalist terrorists.

In order to look at the evolutionary trends in modern terrorism from a Canadian perspective it is necessary to explore some of the incidents of terrorism in Canada. The following is a brief look at some of Canada's most prominent terrorists, terrorist groups and episodes starting with the country's most serious episode of domestic terrorism, the FLQ.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Counter-Terrorism" *Backgrounder No.8* (August 2002). <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/backgrounders/backgrounder08.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

## CHAPTER 5 - THE FRONT DE LIBÉRATION DU QUÉBEC (FLQ)

Vive le Québec libre! Vive les camarades prisonniers politiques! Vive la révolution québécoise! Vive le Front de Libération du Québec!

Excerpt from the 1970  
FLQ Manifesto<sup>48</sup>

Prior to 9/11, the eight years spanning 1963 to 1971 involving the FLQ is the only episode of terrorism in this country that many Canadians can identify. This period marked the most violent chapter of domestic terrorism in our history and near its end, during the height of the October Crisis, marked the only time that our political system was ever at risk.<sup>49</sup> Although this crisis appeared to be strictly Canadian in its makeup, even it bore some of the hallmarks of international terrorism. The rhetoric of the FLQ at the time was Marxist in nature and reflected the prominence of left-wing revolutionary terrorist groups on the international scene at the time. Additionally, during the limited span of eight years it can be seen that the FLQ rapidly evolved from what was a nuisance threat to a serious challenge to the government of Québec that necessitated the imposition of the *War Measures Act* and the deployment of the Army to quell the uprising. By failing to heed the wake-up call contained in the FLQ uprising, the Trudeau government missed the opportunity to create a new law to counter terrorism and in so doing, set the stage for the exploitation of Canada by terrorist groups.

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<sup>48</sup> McGill Law: Tetley's Maritime and Admiralty Law, "October Crisis 1970 – Appendix H: The Manifesto of the FLQ (6 October 1970) – French Text and English Translation," <http://www.mcgill.ca/maritimelaw/crisis/>; Internet; accessed 19 April 2007.

<sup>49</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Counter-Terrorism" *Backgrounder No.8* (August 2002). <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/backgrounders/backgrounder08.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

## BACKGROUND

The FLQ formed in February of 1963 in the midst of an era of labour unrest in Québec coupled with a rising tide of separatist sentiment. Francophones in the province were becoming disenchanted with what they saw as the increasing control of Québec industry by English-speaking Canadian and American executives who discriminated against the local population along the lines of language. The first separatist political party, Le Parti républicain du Québec, had just been formed in December of 1962 and the climate was right to take advantage of this separatist energy. Recent remarks by Donald Gordon, the president of Canadian National Railways had fired the passions of francophones and triggered a series of events that were to have far-reaching consequences for the province and the country.<sup>50</sup>

The FLQ resembled many of the revolutionary terrorist groups present on the international scene at the time. They formed as a violent separatist movement whose early goals included the independence of the francophone majority in Québec from the rest of Canada. Later, their goals called for the formation of a workers' state in addition to separation.<sup>51</sup> The group was organized in a pyramidal, cell-like structure in which very few members knew the identities of more than two or three others and in this way they

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<sup>50</sup> See, Gustave Morf, *Terror in Québec: Case Studies of the FLQ* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1970), 1-4. Mr. Gordon was asked why the company only had one French-speaking director out of the company's 28 directors. Mr. Gordon replied that promotion depended on merit, not language and there were just not enough French Canadians qualified for such a position. Many French-Canadians took the remark, which was not stated in malice, as a slap in the face.

<sup>51</sup> See, William Tetley, *The October Crisis, 1970* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), 18-19.

were able to maintain very tight operational security.<sup>52</sup> Even to this day, despite the fact that Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon are often named as the ideological leaders of the FLQ and the high profile they played in the October Crisis, it is not known for certain who the real leader of the group was.<sup>53</sup>

## ACTIVITIES

The activities of the FLQ can be separated into in three distinct time periods.<sup>54</sup> Each one of these evolutionary phases evinced an increase in maturity, sophistication, violence, effectiveness and danger to the state. Phase 1 commenced in March of 1963 with the ignition of a gasoline bomb inside the wooden CNR building in Montreal. By the end of April they had dynamited nine different installations in the Montreal area including a military recruiting office, an RCMP building, the Canadian Legion offices and an oil refinery. In May of that year, they planted 11 bombs in mailboxes around the Westmount area of Montreal. Five of the bombs were defused before they went off but one bomb permanently disfigured a military engineer in the process of dismantling it.<sup>55</sup> In 1964 they broke into the Montreal militia armouries, stealing dozens of rifles, machine

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<sup>52</sup> See, Gerard Pelletier, *The October Crisis* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd, 1971), 212-217. See also, Dan G Loomis, *Not Much Glory: Quelling The FLQ* (Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1984), 29. There have been estimates, most notably that of Gerard Pelletier that put the FLQ membership as high as 3000 people during the peak of their activity. That figure has been challenged by many, including influential figures like Rene Levesque who point out that they would not have enjoyed their high level of operational security with that many members.

<sup>53</sup> Tetley, *The October Crisis, 1970*, 19-20.

<sup>54</sup> There are many different ways to break FLQ activity into different time periods but this approach clearly shows the advances in knowledge, technique and method from phase to phase.

<sup>55</sup> In June of 1963, seventeen FLQ members were arrested in connection with the bombings.

guns, ammunition, mortars and rocket launchers. Later that year they attempted to break into a firearms dealer in Montreal resulting in the deaths of two of its employees.<sup>56</sup>

After two years of relatively low activity, phase two began in a more audacious manner. Two hundred separatists were rallied to disrupt the annual St. Jean Baptiste day festivities on June 24, 1968. By the end of the day 135 people had been injured, 290 arrested and a firebomb had been thrown at Prime Minister Trudeau.<sup>57</sup> Over the course of 1969, the FLQ launched an offensive called Operation Liberation which began with a series of bombings and thefts of weapons, ammunition and dynamite. They bombed two Armed Forces Armouries, the Liberal Reform Club, the Queen's Printers bookshop and the home of Jean Drapeau, the mayor of Montreal. In October, an FLQ front organization called *Mouvement de libération du taxi* demolished the garages of the Murray Hill Limousine Service, killing a Québec Provincial Police Officer in the process. The violence continued to escalate through 1970 with a series of weapons thefts, bank robberies and dynamite bombings which included National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. By the summer of 1970 the dynamite bombs of the FLQ were becoming extremely large and sophisticated. In one instance, a 150 pound bomb with a high-tech fuse was found in a Volkswagen parked outside a Montreal office building and was successfully disarmed.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> See, Loomis, *Not Much Glory: Quelling The FLQ*, 24-25.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>58</sup> See, Loomis, *Not Much Glory: Quelling The FLQ*, 25-26. In March of 1969, the FLQ newspaper *Victoire* published a chilling article titled "The FLQ Would Kill". In the article, the following questions were asked?

Have you ever seen a bus full of the English blow up?  
 Have you ever seen an English library burning?  
 Have you ever seen the president of a Yankee corporation under fire?  
 Have you ever seen a pellet micro-bomb?

A distinct evolution of tactics marked the beginning of Phase three in August, 1970 when several FLQ members undergoing advanced tactical training with the commandos of the PLO held a press conference and announced that the FLQ would soon begin a campaign of selective assassination. On October 5, 1970 a unit of four FLQ members kidnapped the British trade commissioner, James Cross from his Montreal home. Five days later a different cell kidnapped Pierre Laporte, the Québec Labour Minister and acting Premier (in the absence of Robert Bourassa) from his home in St. Lambert. In exchange for his life, the kidnappers demanded \$500,000 in gold, the release of 23 terrorists from prison, transportation to either Cuba or Algeria, the broadcast and publication of the FLQ Manifesto, an end to the investigation of the FLQ, the disclosure of the name of an informant, and the rehiring of drivers who became unemployed as a result of the Post Office initiating a private contract.<sup>59</sup>

Shortly after the kidnapping of Pierre Laporte, Robert Bourassa asked Prime Minister Trudeau to put the army on standby and be ready to proclaim the *War Measures Act*, which he did on 15 October. The act allowed the police to arrest and detain suspects without a warrant or just cause and detain them for periods up to 90 days without formal charges being laid. The act remained in force for a period of six months during which

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Have you ever seen a miniature incendiary bomb?  
 Have you ever seen a can explode on the shelf of a supermarket in the British quarter?  
 Have you ever seen a Protestant church burning?  
 Have you ever seen Westmount without telephones or electricity and with its water supply  
 poisoned?  
 Have you ever seen sharpshooters ambushed on roofs, shooting down traitors?  
 Be sure you soon will!

<sup>59</sup> James Stewart, *The FLQ: Seven Years of Terrorism* (Richmond Hill: The Montreal Star, 1970),  
 6.

time 497 suspects were arrested and, of those, 435 were later released without charge.<sup>60</sup>

The use of the *War Measures Act* by the federal government essentially led to the destruction of the FLQ and their activity ceased from that point onwards.

## ANALYSIS

In the end, this was the only terrorist episode in Canada's history where the stability of our political system was ever at risk and it represents the first of a series of what should have been serious wake-up calls to the government with respect to terrorism. The public outcry, although it correctly targeted the actions of the government and the knowledge that the RCMP Security Service had been involved in illegal and improper activities, was also misplaced in that it did not recognize the serious nature of the evolving terrorist threat represented by the FLQ. The Trudeau government commissioned an inquiry in 1977 by the McDonald Commission who published their report in 1981. Among the findings of the commission was the recommendation for the creation of a separate agency to investigate terrorism and subversive activity in Canada. This led to the passing of the *Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act* and the formation of CSIS and the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) in 1984.<sup>61</sup> What they failed to recognize was that the *War Measures Act* was not a suitable method of dealing with the increasing levels of domestic and international terrorism in Canada and that a new law was required. This law would not appear in the form of the *Anti-terrorism Act* until 2001, following the attacks of 9/11.

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<sup>60</sup> Tetley, *The October Crisis, 1970*, 91.

<sup>61</sup> Security Intelligence Review Committee. "Origins of SIRC," [http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/origins\\_e.html](http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/origins_e.html) ; Internet; accessed 21 February 2007. See also, Department Of Justice, *Bill C-23: The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, 1985*, PartI and PartIII.

The study of the FLQ is informative in the rapidity in which they improved their knowledge, methods and effect. It served as an ominous foreshadowing of things to come and should have served as a warning to the government that new anti-terrorism laws were required. It also speaks to the evolutionary nature of terrorism because, if the FLQ could so markedly improve their abilities in the absence of the Internet while maintaining a strictly isolated cell-like structure, terrorist groups in the twenty first century should be able to improve their skills at a much higher rate. It is interesting to note that even the most vivid example of domestic terrorism in Canada has an international element in that the FLQ received advanced tactical training from the PLO and many of their procedures are reminiscent of those used by the PLO. In order To understand the international aspect of terrorism in Canada it is necessary to first take a look at the phenomenon of Canada as a country of immigrants and refugees and how Canada's population has a correspondingly high international nature.

## CHAPTER 6 - CANADA AS A COUNTRY OF IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES

A survey that we made based on media reports of 25 Islamic terrorists and suspects who entered Canada as adults indicated that 16 claimed refugee status, four were admitted as landed immigrants and the channel of entry for the remaining five was not identified. Making a refugee claim is used by both terrorists and criminals as a means of rendering their removal from the country more difficult.

Martin Collacott  
The Fraser Institute<sup>62</sup>

Canada has an immigration policy that encourages skilled workers from almost every country on earth and their families to immigrate here to help the nation grow and prosper. For many of these immigrants, Canada represents a chance for a new life, far away from the difficulties faced at home. People still regard Canada as a land of opportunity and it is viewed as a state that respects the rights and freedoms of individuals, promotes cultural diversity and allows immigrants to keep and practice their own religion and retain their cultural and social values as long as such activities do not negatively affect the rights and freedoms of other citizens.<sup>63</sup> Canada also has a refugee policy that provides a safe haven for people who cannot return to their country because of a “well-founded fear of persecution, as well as those at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.”<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Martin Collacott, “Canada’s Inadequate Response To Terrorism: The Need For Policy Reform,” *Fraser Institute Digital Publication* (February 2006); available from <http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/admin/books/files/Terrorism%20Response5.pdf> Internet; accessed 29 March 2007.

<sup>63</sup> Andrew P. Artus, “Bill C-36: Canada’s National Security Response To The Attacks of 11 September 2001” (master’s Thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 2002), 4-10.

<sup>64</sup> Citizenship and Immigration Canada, *The Canadian Refugee System*. <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/index.html> ; Internet; accessed 1 April 2007.

The *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* of June 2002 replaced the 1976 *Immigration Act* and “. . . makes a clear distinction between the basic social, cultural and economic goals of the immigration program and the humanitarian goals of the refugee protection program.”<sup>65</sup> There are three basic categories of people who can become permanent residents: the economic class which includes skilled workers; business immigrants; provincial nominees; live-in caregivers and members of their immediate family; the family class which includes spouses, partners, children, parents and grandparents of the sponsors; and the protected persons category which encompasses government assisted and privately sponsored refugees selected abroad as well as individuals who are recognized in Canada as Convention refugees or persons in need of protection. In addition to permanent residents, Canada’s immigration policy allows for the temporary entry and residence of foreign workers, business people, students and tourists.<sup>66</sup>

The Refugee Protection System consists of two main components. The first is the “Refugee Humanitarian Resettlement Program” which is designed to help people seeking protection from outside Canada. To be eligible, refugees must have no other resettlement option available to them within a reasonable time. Refugees are selected either by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) or by private sponsorships from within Canada. Before accepting a person as a refugee, CIC will ensure the person cannot return to their home state or stay in the state where they have been given asylum. CIC will also check to see if there is another state where the refugees can resettle. Refugee applicants

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<sup>65</sup> Citizenship and Immigration Canada, *Facts and Figures: Immigration Overview – Permanent and Temporary Residents* (Ottawa: Communications Branch Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2006), 1.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid*, 59.

will undergo medical, security and criminality screening before being accepted and must also show that they will eventually be able to re-establish themselves in Canada. The second part of the Refugee Protection System is the “Asylum in Canada” component that is designed for people making refugee claims from within Canada. The claim for protection can be made at a port of entry or at any CIC office in Canada. Once a CIC officer decides that a refugee protection claimant is eligible to be referred, the claim is sent to the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) for a decision on the risk on return.<sup>67</sup>

Moreover, Canada does not detain refugee seekers once they have entered the state nor does it require them to leave the country while they await their hearing. Should the refugee claimant actually be a terrorist, he could easily disappear into his or her specific diaspora community within the country and not show up for scheduled refugee hearings. An example is Ahmed Ressam, who arrived in Canada in 1994 with a fake passport and made a refugee claim once he had landed. By the time a warrant was issued for his arrest four years later for failing to show up for a hearing in his refugee case, he had been arrested four times for petty crime, been tracked by CSIS for activities relating to terrorism, attained a fake Canadian passport and had left the country to an Al Qaeda terrorist training camp in Afghanistan.<sup>68</sup>

In 2005, Canada accepted 262,236 permanent and 247,143 temporary residents. Of these 14,137 were adult refugee claimants. From 1990 to 2005 Canada admitted over 3.6 million permanent residents, over 3.4 million temporary residents and more than 360,000 refugee claimants. The vast majority of the permanent residents are 25-44 years

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<sup>67</sup> Citizenship and Immigration Canada, *The Canadian Refugee System*. <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/index.html> ; Internet; accessed 1 April 2007.

<sup>68</sup> See, Bell, *Cold Terror*, 147-157.

of age and come from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.<sup>69</sup> Many of these immigrants gravitate towards their specific diaspora communities which, in the larger urban areas of Canada can be quite large. With roughly half a million individuals being allowed into Canada every year it is very difficult to believe that every one of them is a law-abiding, upstanding citizen fitting the model outlined in our immigration policy. Because Canada represents a cross-section of the world at large, it should be expected that there are terrorist elements representing a significant portion of the world's terrorist organizations. It is these diaspora communities specifically that enable terrorists to blend in to Canadian society.

In order to analyze the increasing threat to Canada from international terrorism it is necessary to take an in-depth look at some of the more prominent episodes in Canadian history. The first is an examination of Sikh extremism and the worst terrorist incident in Canadian history, the bombing of Air India Flight 182.

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<sup>69</sup>Citizenship and Immigration Canada, *Facts and Figures: Immigration Overview – Permanent and Temporary Residents* (Ottawa: Communications Branch Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2006), 8-9,62-63.

## CHAPTER 7 - SIKH EXTREMISM

Let it be said clearly: the bombing of the Air India flight was the result of a conspiracy conceived, planned, and executed in Canada. Most of its victims were Canadians. This is a Canadian catastrophe, whose dimension and meaning must be understood by all Canadians.

Bob Rae  
Report to the Minister of PSEPC<sup>70</sup>

Sikh extremism marked a new and more dangerous form of terrorism for Canada than the FLQ. Emerging out of India's Punjab region and consisting of a multitude of international religious extremist terrorist groups, Sikh extremists took advantage of Canada's culture of denial with respect to terrorism and set up an intricate support network for its goals of establishing an independent state known as Khalistan. Their terrorist activities targeting India escalated to the point where, from Canada in 1985, they perpetrated the single most deadly terrorist attack in history. The attack should have had a similar effect on Canada that 9/11 had 16 years later on the US, but it did not. The intense attention focused on the Sikh extremists in Canada following the bombing reduced the subsequent level of terrorist activity in the country but did not eliminate it altogether because, as already discussed, the concept of terrorism had not been officially defined in Canada and anything short of criminal activity in support of terrorism was not illegal in Canada.

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<sup>70</sup> Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, *The Report of The Honourable Bob Rae, Independent Advisor to the Minister of Public Safety and -Bombing of Air India Flight 182* (Ottawa: Air India review Secretariat, 2005), 2.

## BACKGROUND

Sikhism was born in the 15<sup>th</sup> century in the region straddling the current India-Pakistan border. For a brief 50-year period in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, Sikhs were able to enjoy autonomous rule in their own homeland but, when the British moved in to stabilize the region, they brought the Sikh autonomy to an end. In 1964 the Indian government created the Punjab state as a concession to the Sikh leadership. The new state, however, was based on the Punjabi language, which was spoken by most Sikhs and not upon Sikhism, which left them as a minority in their new region. Resentment began to build and violence increased in their attempt to regain their autonomy until, in 1984, Indian security forces mounted Operation Blue Star in which they stormed the Golden Temple fearing that Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale would declare an independent Sikh state known as Khalistan. The raid killed several thousand people, including Bhindranwale and instantly provided Sikh radicals with the legitimacy they required among the Sikh populace for the escalation of violence. Four months later, ethnic tensions spiked when two of Indira Gandhi's Sikh bodyguards murdered her to avenge the massacre at the Golden Temple. Anti-Sikh rioting in India forced thousands of Sikhs to flee the Punjabi region and emigrate to other countries, such as Canada, in fear for their lives.<sup>71</sup>

Before the raid on the Golden Temple, Bhindranwale's group Dal Khalsa was the most visible and powerful separatist organization in the Punjab region. Following the raid, the atmosphere present in the region sprouted numerous new terrorist and separatist groups that were highly independent of one another, prone to counterproductive infighting and could not unite to make the separatist voice strong enough to accomplish

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<sup>71</sup> See, John C. Thompson, Joe Turlej, "Other People's Wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism In Canada," The Mackenzie Institute, [http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/other\\_peoples\\_wars.htm](http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/other_peoples_wars.htm) ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007, chap. 2.

its goals. This infighting spilled over to the international wings of these organizations and the violence against one another continued in other countries, Canada included.<sup>72</sup>

Numerous Sikh terrorist groups are represented in Canada but none is as prominent as the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI). The words “Babbar Khalsa” mean “Tigers of the True Faith,” the key elements of which are a “. . . strict Sikh religious practice and an unwavering commitment to an independent Khalistan, to which must be added a ruthlessness about how these goals would be achieved.”<sup>73</sup> The founder of BKI, Sukhdev Singh Dasuwal, was originally a follower of Bhindranwale but separated from him and later tried to kill him. Dasuwal founded BKI in 1978 and within a short period of time there were BKI branches in many Western countries. The BKI controlled the lifestyles of individual Sikhs and were not hesitant to enforce their strict fundamentalist code of discipline through the use of violence. Their practices are strict to the point of verging on religious cultism.

Among the terrorist groups that formed out of the ashes of the Golden Temple attack are several that are especially important to Canada. The Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) is the armed wing of a committee of mostly militant radical organizations whose objective was to launch an assault upon the state of India (as opposed to the religious goals of the BKI). After much internal infighting and numerous breakaway factions (most of whom now fall under the control of the BKI), the KCF is the main alternative to that BKI for radical Sikh militants in Canada. The International Sikh Youth

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<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. 2.

<sup>73</sup> Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, *The Report of The Honourable Bob Rae, Independent Advisor to the Minister of Public Safety and -Bombing of Air India Flight 182* (Ottawa: Air India review Secretariat, 2005), 6.

Federation (ISYF) is the international wing of the All-India Sikh Student's Federation which was created in Britain in the 1980's and migrated to Canada. There are two factions of the ISYF in Canada and competition between the two is intense as they fight over the Sikh community newspapers in the country and the hearts and minds of Sikh youth in Canada.<sup>74</sup>

## ACTIVITIES

By the early 1980's, the RCMP had increased its surveillance of the Sikh groups and began to issue warnings about the potential threat of violence from these groups. Numerous new Sikh extremist groups were forming and their rhetoric was reaching new highs. It was rumoured that one of these groups, The Dashmesh Regiment, had published a hit-list of moderate Sikhs. The Indian government repeatedly warned the foreign affairs department that violence was imminent and they were afraid that Babbar Khalsa members would return to India to attack targets there. In August of 1984 when CSIS was formed, its first large-scale counterterrorism investigation was targeting Sikh extremism.<sup>75</sup>

On June 22, 1985, two suitcases filled with bombs were loaded onto Canadian Pacific airplanes in the Vancouver airport. The owners of the suitcases failed to show up for their flights but their suitcases were loaded onto the planes nonetheless. The first suitcase made its way to Tokyo's Narita Airport where it exploded at 11:15 PM while it was being transferred from the Canadian Pacific flight it had arrived on to another Air

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<sup>74</sup> See, John C. Thompson, Joe Turlej, "Other People's Wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism In Canada," The Mackenzie Institute, [http://www.mackenzieinstitutue.com/2003/other\\_peoples\\_wars.htm](http://www.mackenzieinstitutue.com/2003/other_peoples_wars.htm) ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007, chap. 2.

<sup>75</sup> Bell, *Cold Terror*, 26-28.

India flight bound for Bangkok. The explosion killed two Japanese baggage handlers and injured four others. The second suitcase was flown to Toronto where it was loaded onto Air India Flight 181 which was to then become Flight 182 after a brief stopover in Montreal. Early in the morning of 23 June, the bomb detonated in the luggage compartment of the aircraft. The airplane, flying at a cruising altitude of 31,000 feet, had a large hole blown in the fuselage which caused it to crash into the ocean southwest of Ireland. The crash killed all 329 people on board and, at the time, was the single most deadly terrorist attack in modern history and the “. . . worst encounter with terrorism Canada has experienced.”<sup>76</sup>

## **ANALYSIS**

The ensuing investigation and trial were the most lengthy and costly in Canadian history. Justice Josephson, of the British Columbia Supreme Court, determined in his “Reasons For Judgment” that “the conspiracy to bomb the two Air India flights involved individuals belonging to what became known as the Babbar Khalsa movement, a group of Sikh radicals determined to “purify” the Sikh religion and establish an independent homeland for Sikhs in Punjab, India.”<sup>77</sup> In the course of his investigation, Bob Rae was made aware of a culture of fear within the Sikh communities that has been undertaken to prevent people from coming forward to tell the truth about what happened. Two people who were potential witnesses in two of the trials for the conspiracy to bomb the Air India

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<sup>76</sup> Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, *The Report of The Honourable Bob Rae, Independent Advisor to the Minister of Public Safety and -Bombing of Air India Flight 182* (Ottawa: Air India review Secretariat, 2005), 1.

<sup>77</sup>*Ibid.*, 3.

flight were killed before they could take the witness stand. Many people in the Sikh community are upset by the “. . . threats of violence, the past misuse of Gurdawaras (temples) for political purposes and the abuse of charitable fundraising for extremist causes.”<sup>78</sup>

In his report on the Air India bombing, Bob Rae poses the question of “. . . why it took 9/11 to galvanize opinion, to introduce the *Anti-Terrorism Act*, to list certain terrorist groups. Quite naturally, they (the families of the Air India victims) ask why the bombing of Air India Flight 182 did not move the Canadian government to act more decisively against the threat of terrorism.”<sup>79</sup> The families of the victims have expressed the sentiment that Canadians do not feel as if this is their own tragedy and that “. . . if their skins were white the post-bombing experience of the country might have been different.”<sup>80</sup>

In his book *Cold Terror*, Stewart Bell writes “The failure to bring to justice the terrorists behind such a high profile attack within a reasonable time frame cemented Canada’s international reputation as a safe haven.”<sup>81</sup> The subsequent governments since that time have failed to realize that “. . . Air India and the Armenian attacks beforehand were not isolated incidents, but rather the opening shots in a new era that would see the world’s major ethnic, religious and political conflicts spill across Canada’s borders.”<sup>82</sup> Air India should have had the same impact on Canada that 9/11 had on the US. Instead,

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<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>81</sup> Bell, *Cold Terror*, 36.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

Canadian politicians resisted all efforts to improve anti-terror laws in this country and, to make matters worse, did not even revoke Babbar Khalsa's charitable status until 1996. It took until 2003 for the government to finally add Babbar Khalsa, the BKI and the International Sikh Youth Federation to the list of outlawed terrorist organizations.<sup>83</sup> This was seen by other terror groups around the world as an invitation to come to Canada and set up a support infrastructure for fundraising, operations and recruiting.<sup>84</sup>

Sikh extremists are still active in Canada and are also quite active when it comes to trying to influence Canadian politicians. In 2003 Herb Dhaliwal and David Kilgour, both Liberal cabinet ministers at the time, “. . . joined the lobby that is attempting to keep a Khalistan Commando Force member in Surrey BC from being repatriated to India to face capital charges for a 1993 terror bombing.”<sup>85</sup> Additionally, as part of the campaign, “. . . a delegation - which included two members of the ISYF (now a banned terrorist organization) – traveled to Ottawa and met with the Prime Minister and three other cabinet ministers. The terrorist delegation also met with NDP MP Svend Robinson and Alliance MP Gurmant Grewal.”<sup>86</sup>

Sikh extremists represented a terrorist threat to Canada which was more dangerous than the FLQ and was the next step in the evolution of terrorism in Canada.

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<sup>83</sup> Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. “Keeping Canadians Safe: Currently Listed Entities.” <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/index-en.asp> ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

<sup>84</sup> Bell, *Cold Terror*, 36.

<sup>85</sup> John C. Thompson, Joe Turlej, “Other People’s Wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism In Canada,” The Mackenzie Institute, [http://www.mackenzieinstitutue.com/2003/other\\_peoples\\_wars.htm](http://www.mackenzieinstitutue.com/2003/other_peoples_wars.htm) ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007, chap. 4.

<sup>86</sup> John C. Thompson, Joe Turlej, “Other People’s Wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism In Canada,” The Mackenzie Institute, [http://www.mackenzieinstitutue.com/2003/other\\_peoples\\_wars.htm](http://www.mackenzieinstitutue.com/2003/other_peoples_wars.htm) ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007, chap. 4.

Their international character has brought a struggle for self-determination in India to the shores of Canada. Their violence and coercion has led to the suffering of Sikhs in their diaspora communities in Canada and the death of Sikh immigrants who were Canadian citizens. By claiming the moral high ground of religious extremism, they do not feel constrained in the ruthlessness of their methods, as amply demonstrated in the Air India bombing. The Air India bombing provided the second unheeded wake up call for the government to create a new law aimed at combating the culture of denial in Canada and, by ignoring that call they set the conditions for yet another dangerous terrorist organization, the Tamil Tigers.

## CHAPTER 8 - TAMIL TIGERS

Ninety percent of people, even if they don't support the LTTE, they are scared. The killing doesn't just happen back home in Sri Lanka. It happens in Paris, In Canada. They burned the library, they broke the legs of DBS Jeyaraj. They tried to stop the CTBC radio from organizing. A journalist was killed in Paris. The threat is not only in Sri Lanka. It's everywhere, all over the world.

Tamil Community Activist  
Toronto, January 2006<sup>87</sup>

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or Tamil Tigers as they are more commonly known, represent another type of threat to Canada that is different from both the FLQ and Sikh extremism. The Tigers are a nationalist terrorist group fighting for an autonomous homeland in Sri Lanka and they have set new standards in terrorism for their ruthlessness, audacity and sophistication. Their highly organized command and control structure has enabled them to spread their network to Tamil diaspora communities in countries around the world where they extort Tamil immigrants, set up businesses both legal and illegal, and spread their influence within the local, provincial and federal governments. The Tamil Tigers quickly realized that, by keeping a low profile in Canada by not attacking or staging attacks from Canada, they could take advantage of the non-existent laws against supporting terrorism and Canadian indifference to raise funds here as well as use Canada as a safe haven for its guerilla fighters needing a place to lay low. The Tamil Tigers are a learning organization that, as long as they are allowed to exist and fight in Sri Lanka, will only get better at their trade, which in the long run represents an increased threat to Canadians.

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<sup>87</sup> Human Rights Watch, "Funding the "Final War" - LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora," <http://hrw.org/reports/2006/lte0306/>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2007, chap. I.

## BACKGROUND

Sri Lanka is home to one of the bloodiest civil wars of modern times. Since 1983 the Buddhist Sinhalese, comprising roughly 74% of the population of 20 million people and the Hindu Tamils, comprising 18% of the population<sup>88</sup>, have been fighting an ethnic battle that has killed nearly 68,000 people.<sup>89</sup> The troubles began in 1948 when Great Britain granted the island its independence. The Tamils were worried that they would suffer under the Sinhalese, who formed the large majority of the population, and the Sinhalese wanted to even the score for what they felt was 150 years of British rule that had favoured the Tamils. In 1956, a government dominated by the Sinhalese came to power and began to systematically discriminate against the Tamils. Both ethnic groups feel that they have a legitimate claim on the region. Each group speaks a different language, they both have a different version of the history of the region through claims that their ancestors inhabited the island before the others and both sides believe they alone can claim moral superiority in the struggle. The new government prompted the beginning of an insurgency campaign by the Tamils which slowly began to escalate in violence.<sup>90</sup>

In 1983, the Tamils murdered eighteen Sinhalese soldiers sparking violent retaliatory riots in the capital of Colombo the were aimed at the Tamil community.

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<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. II.

<sup>89</sup> Reuters, "Sri Lanka's Tigers Bomb Base in First Air Raid." <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSCOL9265820070326?pageNumber=2> ; Internet; posted 26 March 2006, accessed 26 March 2006.

<sup>90</sup> See, Human Rights Watch, "Funding the "Final War" - LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora," <http://hrw.org/reports/2006/lte0306/>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2007. Chap. II. See also John C. Thompson, Joe Turlej, "Other People's Wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism In Canada," The Mackenzie Institute, [http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/other\\_peoples\\_wars.htm](http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/other_peoples_wars.htm) ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007, chap. 2.

Thousands of Tamils were killed in the riots, an estimated 90% of Tamil businesses were destroyed and almost 100,000 people were displaced.<sup>91</sup> Out of this conflict was born the terrorist group known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or, as they are more commonly known, the Tamil Tigers.

## ACTIVITIES

The Tamil Tigers are among deadliest terrorist groups in the world and can claim to be the only one to have assassinated two world leaders; Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa and President Rajiv Gandhi of India. They have adopted the suicide bombing tactics of the Palestinians, improved upon them to deadly effect, and have carried out more suicide bombings than any other terrorist group in the world.<sup>92</sup> Recently they demonstrated they have an Air Force capable of offensive operations when they bombed a Sri Lankan airbase, killing three and wounding 16 others.<sup>93</sup> They have taken advantage of the fact that their struggle in Sri Lanka is not of sufficient strategic importance to the rest of the world in order to set up a complex worldwide support network that “. . . uses crime, front organizations and front companies to keep the fighting units supplied, and the most important of these offshore bases is Canada.”<sup>94</sup> Despite having been outlawed in the United Kingdom, described by the US as a terrorist

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<sup>91</sup> See also, Human Rights Watch, “Funding the “Final War” - LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora,” <http://hrw.org/reports/2006/lte0306/>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2007, chap. II.

<sup>92</sup> See also, Bell, *Cold Terror*, 40-42.

<sup>93</sup> ABC News International, “Rebels Launch Airstrike in Sri Lanka.” <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=2980644>; Internet; posted 26 March 2006, accessed 26 March 2006.

<sup>94</sup> Bell, *Cold Terror*, 40-42.

organization, and been added to the United Nations' list of terrorist individuals and entities, it took the government of Canada until April 2006 to add them to Canada's listing of banned terrorist groups.<sup>95</sup>

The organization of the Tamil Tigers is split into two tiers. The first tier is a military wing that patterns itself on the basis of a professional army and the second tier is a political wing which is subordinate to the military. These two branches are overseen by a central governing committee headed by the supreme leader of the LTTE. The central governing committee is responsible for overseeing numerous subdivisions such as the amphibious group (Sea Tigers), an airborne group (Air Tigers), an elite fighting wing (the Charles Anthony Regiment), a suicide commando unit (Black Tigers) and an intelligence group.<sup>96</sup> This last group, the intelligence unit has even targeted the RCMP. After hiring a Tamil translator, a police informant enlightened the RCMP to the fact that their new translator was an LTTE intelligence officer. In fact, upon further investigation, they discovered that this agent had already written the RCMP entrance exam in an attempt to become an RCMP officer and infiltrate the force.<sup>97</sup>

When it comes to fundraising on behalf of a terrorist organization, the LTTE or, as the Canadian wing is known, the Snow Tigers, are without equal. They have a wide range of methods both legal and illegal including: applying for and receiving government

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<sup>95</sup>Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. "Keeping Canadians Safe: Currently Listed Entities." <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/index-en.asp> ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007. See also, John C. Thompson, Joe Turlej, "Other People's Wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism In Canada," The Mackenzie Institute, [http://www.mackenzieinstitutue.com/2003/other\\_peoples\\_wars.htm](http://www.mackenzieinstitutue.com/2003/other_peoples_wars.htm) ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007, chap. 3.

<sup>96</sup> Peter Chalk, "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) International Organization and Operations – A Preliminary Analysis," *Commentary No.77*(Winter 1999). Available from Canadian Security Intelligence Service. <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/commentary/com77.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

<sup>97</sup> Bell, *Cold Terror*, 47.

grants; human trafficking; smuggling of migrants; running drugs; organized crime; siphoning funds off of legitimate businesses and organizations and outright extortion of Canadian citizens of Tamil origin.<sup>98</sup> At one point in time Toronto police and Sri Lankan officials believed that over one million dollars a month was being raised in Toronto and funneled to the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.<sup>99</sup> The Sri Lankan government estimated that, at one point, the LTTE were raising on the order of \$120 million per year and roughly one quarter of that money was coming from Canada.<sup>100</sup> In addition to their legal and illegal business activities the Snow Tigers have perfected the technique of eliciting regular donations from Tamil immigrants to Canada, both voluntary and involuntary. If Tamil immigrants stopped paying their monthly donations or moved away so they could not be found, their relatives back in Sri Lanka were harassed or monitored by the Tigers until they revealed the whereabouts of their Canadian relative who was then tracked down and made to resume the regular payments.<sup>101</sup>

By 1986, the escalating fighting in Sri Lanka sparked off a wave of Tamil immigration to countries in Europe, Asia, Australia and North America, especially Canada. In that year, 1,800 Tamils became permanent Canadian residents followed by

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<sup>98</sup> Human Rights Watch, "Funding the "Final War" - LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora," <http://hrw.org/reports/2006/lte0306/>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2007, chap. VI.

<sup>99</sup> John C. Thompson, Joe Turlej, "Other People's Wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism In Canada," The Mackenzie Institute, [http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/other\\_peoples\\_wars.htm](http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/other_peoples_wars.htm); Internet; accessed 20 January 2007, chap. 4.

<sup>100</sup> Anti-Defamation League, "Terrorism Update: Canada and Terrorism". [http://www.adl.org/terror/tu/tu\\_0401\\_canada.asp](http://www.adl.org/terror/tu/tu_0401_canada.asp); Internet, posted January 2004; accessed 20 January 2007.

<sup>101</sup> John C. Thompson, Joe Turlej, "Other People's Wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism In Canada," The Mackenzie Institute, [http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/other\\_peoples\\_wars.htm](http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/other_peoples_wars.htm); Internet; accessed 20 January 2007, chap. 4. See also, Human Rights Watch, "Funding the "Final War" - LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora," <http://hrw.org/reports/2006/lte0306/>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2007, chap. VI.

4,300 in 1987 and reaching 13,000 per year by 1992, setting up a large diaspora community the Tigers could exploit.<sup>102</sup> In choosing a state in which to set up a support and fundraising operation The LTTE looked for two factors: a generous and lenient refugee policy and a welfare policy that can be used to their advantage. For this reason, the LTTE have robust fundraising structures in place in countries such as: Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Australia, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.<sup>103</sup>

By the early 1990s the government was faced with a large backlog of refugee claimants so they decided to expedite the process by speeding up certain refugee claims. Ironically, the guidelines used to decide which claims to fast-track included young Tamil males between 10 and 40 and young Tamil females between 13 and 30 from the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka. This was a perfect window of opportunity for former LTTE guerillas who, with a bit of coaching and appropriate fake documents, could easily slip into the country. The immigration of Tamils into the country has been aided as well by a sophisticated human smuggling industry, the profits of which are returned to the Tigers for their war effort. Canada has the largest Tamil community outside Sri Lanka with an estimated 200,000 to 250,000 people,<sup>104</sup> mostly in the Toronto area, including up to 8,000 Tamil guerillas.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Bell, *Cold Terror*, 46.

<sup>103</sup> John C. Thompson, Joe Turlej, "Other People's Wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism In Canada," The Mackenzie Institute, [http://www.mackenzieinstitutue.com/2003/other\\_peoples\\_wars.htm](http://www.mackenzieinstitutue.com/2003/other_peoples_wars.htm) ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007, chap. 4.

<sup>104</sup> Human Rights Watch, "Funding the "Final War" - LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora," <http://hrw.org/reports/2006/ltte0306/>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2007, chap. II.

<sup>105</sup> Bell, *Cold Terror*, 46-48.

The primary organization for the Tigers in Canada, but certainly not the only one, is the World Tamil Movement (WTM). There are numerous others located in Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal and Vancouver, most notably: The Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT); Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO); Tamil Coordinating Committee; Eelam Tamil Association of British Columbia; World Tamil Movement (Montreal); and Eelam Tamil Association of Québec. Another organization, the Tamil Eelam Association of Canada has been receiving roughly two million dollars per year in funding from the federal government.<sup>106</sup>

In addition to legitimate community work and support of the Tamil expatriate community, these groups perform a variety of tasks on behalf of the LTTE. They lobby politicians, organize protests which appear to be on behalf of the Tamils but are really in support of the LTTE, lobby peace and human rights groups to bring them to the side of the Tamils and, of course, supervise the “donations” of the Tamil immigrants. They are very effective when it comes to lobbying politicians who are always searching for ways to secure the votes of a large block of voters such as the Tamil community. There have been several instances of politicians attending rallies and fundraising events given by the these LTTE front groups but none was so blatant as the New Years party thrown by FACT in which many municipal, provincial and federal politicians were in attendance including the finance minister at the time, Paul Martin and Maria Minna, a Liberal cabinet minister. When the two ministers were informed that they had attended a party given by terrorists they called their critics “un-Canadian”.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>107</sup> John C. Thompson, Joe Turlej, “Other People’s Wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism In Canada,” The Mackenzie Institute, [http://www.mackenzieinstitutue.com/2003/other\\_peoples\\_wars.htm](http://www.mackenzieinstitutue.com/2003/other_peoples_wars.htm) ;

This speaks to the culture of denial that existed in Canada prior to 9/11. At the time, the activities of extortion and harassment were illegal but the activities related to funding a terrorist organization were not. The Tamil community in the country was well aware of the activities but most of them were too scared to seek the help of the police. The police were aware of these activities but, because the majority of the victims were too scared to come forward, were not aware of its scale nor could they do much without a legal reason to target the groups that were supporting terrorism. It is difficult to convince Canadians that they have a terrorist problem when high level government officials will not admit there is a problem and worse, support the terrorists.

## ANALYSIS

The LTTE are a striking example of the evolutionary trends in modern terrorism. Until the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda, many terrorism experts believed the Tamil Tigers to be the most dangerous terrorist group in the world, not because of their ability to cause harm and disruption, “. . .but because the LTTE was setting new standards for sophistication and audacity in terms of its political and propaganda activities.”<sup>108</sup> They are more global in that they are represented in at least 54 countries,<sup>109</sup> they are becoming extremely sophisticated in their methods, their lethality is cutting-edge, they are

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Internet; accessed 20 January 2007, chap. 3. At the time of this party the federal government had already spent 5 years trying to deport Manickavasagam Suresh, a FACT leader, for reasons of national security.

<sup>108</sup> John C. Thompson, Joe Turlej, “Other People’s Wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism In Canada,” The Mackenzie Institute, [http://www.mackenzieinstitutue.com/2003/other\\_peoples\\_wars.htm](http://www.mackenzieinstitutue.com/2003/other_peoples_wars.htm) ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007, chap. 4.

<sup>109</sup> Peter Chalk, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization and Operations – A Preliminary Analysis,” *Commentary No.77*(Winter 1999). Available from Canadian Security Intelligence Service. <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/commentary/com77.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

incredibly media savvy, their use of high technology is impressive, and they have become highly knowledgeable in the area of operational security. By allowing the Snow Tigers to carry on with their fundraising activities in Canada, we have contributed to the improvement of everything they do which leads to the improvement of terrorism worldwide.

The only positive thing that can be said for the Tamil Tigers from a Canadian perspective, however, is that they realize they have a good thing in Canada and do not want to destroy it by starting to carry out terrorist attacks in Canada which is probably little comfort to the quarter million Canadian citizens being robbed and harassed by them on a regular basis. Their widespread coercion and extortion of Tamil immigrants, their willingness to lobby Canadian politicians and their funneling of millions of Canadian dollars into the financing of terrorism in Sri Lanka should be a cause of great concern to Canadians.<sup>110</sup> Moreover, their widespread human rights abuses around the world, not the least of which is a policy of using children soldiers, should have been unacceptable to Canadians. The fact that it took so long to outlaw them in a state that touts its respect for human rights is shameful.

The Tamil Tigers, still very active terrorists, represent a very advanced stage in the evolution of terrorism in the world. They cause untold suffering in the world, including the daily misery of a quarter million Canadians. However there is still one more stage in this evolution and we will now take a look at Islamic extremism.

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<sup>110</sup> See, Human Rights Watch, "Funding the "Final War" - LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora," <http://hrw.org/reports/2006/lte0306/>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2007.

## CHAPTER 9 - ISLAMIC EXTREMISM

“The world as it is today is how others shaped it. We have two choices: either to accept it with submission, which means letting Islam die, or to destroy it, so that we can construct the world as Islam requires.”

Ayatollah Baqer al-Sadr  
Shi'a theologian <sup>111</sup>

### BACKGROUND

Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world today with a current estimate of between 1.2 and 2 billion followers. It is growing at a rate faster than the world's population and if this trend continues, it will surpass Christianity as the world's largest religion by 2025.<sup>112</sup> The religion was born in Arabia in the 7<sup>th</sup> century AD and is a monotheistic religion based on the belief that the Prophet Mohammed received a series of revelations from God which have been recorded in the Koran. The Koran, together with the Hadith, which contains the recorded sayings of Mohammed, and the Sharia, which is a code of law derived from these two books, forms the basis on which Islam is founded. Shortly after the prophet's death, his followers became divided over how to choose a new caliph, or leader, for the Muslim community. Eventually they ended up splitting into two sects that would become known as Sunni and Shia. The Shia believed that any future caliph needed to be a person who bore a blood relationship with the prophet Mohammed and the Sunni believed that this was not required if the caliph met certain high standards of faith and knowledge. Over the years the Sunni became the majority sect and remain so

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<sup>111</sup> Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 90.

<sup>112</sup> Osama Bin Laden, *Osama Bin Laden: America's Enemy In His Own Words*, ed. Randall B Hamud, J.D. (San Diego: Nadeem Publishing, 2005) lx.

today. The Caliphate, a Sunni institution, was the central leadership authority of the Ummah (followers) and was dissolved in 1924 by the secular ruler of the Ottoman Turk empire. Since that time, Muslims have been without the institutionalized central leadership of a Caliphate.<sup>113</sup>

At its core, Islam is a peaceful religion that provides a code of conduct for its followers to guide their moral principles and help them be good citizens. Over the years, however, terrorist groups have invoked the name of Islam to add a measure of legitimacy to what are essentially nationalist goals. Islam itself does not call upon its followers to carry out terrorism and in fact, the vast majority of Muslims in the world are good, peace-loving citizens who want no part of the violence.

## **AL QAEDA**

Groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) exist to focus their energies on political goals such as the destruction of Israel and the creation of an Islamic state in its place. These types of groups are present in Canada and they represent a similar problem to the Sikh extremists and to the Tamil terrorists. They are using Canada as a support base to raise money in order to carry out their operations elsewhere. Hezbollah's Canadian base is an important source of fundraising, recruiting and an important component of the group's international network while the Hamas-backed Holy Land Foundation has raised hundreds of thousands of dollars in

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<sup>113</sup> For a more complete discussion of Islam see, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report (Authorized Edition)* (New York, NY: W.W.Norton & Company, Inc. August 2004), 47-59. This is, of necessity, a very broad generalization of an extremely complex religion and its followers.

Canada for the support Hamas and Islamic Jihad.<sup>114</sup> The form of Islamic extremism that presents the greatest threat to Canada however, is that associated with the “ideology of Al Qaeda”.<sup>115</sup>

The current incarnation of this phenomenon can be said to have its beginnings near the end of the 1970’s. Two things happened in close proximity that had a distinct effect on Islamic extremism. The first was the Iranian Revolution of 1979 in which the Shiite cleric, the Ayatollah Khomeini, seized power from the autocratic Shah. The second event, which occurred at roughly the same time, was the Soviet invasion of Iran’s neighbour Afghanistan.

In the years leading up to these events, Islamic extremists had been attempting to stir up anger and resentment amongst Muslims over what they perceived as increasing levels of corruption in their government officials and the growing influence of western governments in the region as a result of their dependence on oil. The extremists generally felt that Muslim states needed to return to non-secular Islamic governments who believed that the state and religion were inseparable and who would apply Sharia in ruling the state. They pointed to the Iranian Revolution as evidence that a pure, Islamic-led state could be established despite corrupt governments and western support.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> See, Anti-Defamation League, “Terrorism Update: Canada and Terrorism”. [http://www.adl.org/terror/tu/tu\\_0401\\_canada.asp](http://www.adl.org/terror/tu/tu_0401_canada.asp) ; Internet, posted January 2004; accessed 20 January 2007. See also, Stewart Bell, *Cold Terror* (Mississauga: John Wiley and Sons Canada Ltd, 2005), 108-109, 116-118.

<sup>115</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Remarks by Mr. Jim Judd, Director, CSIS to the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) 27 October 2006,” <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/speeches/speech27102006.asp> ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007. Mr. Judd has chosen the term “ideology of Al Qaeda” to refer to the ideology espoused by the original Al Qaeda organization, its organizational affiliates and the growing number of individuals and groups around the world that are inspired by it.

<sup>116</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment” *ITAC Presents: Trends in Terrorism Series* (Volume 2006-4). <http://www.csis->

Thousands of Muslims from around the world came to Afghanistan to join the jihad and expel the communists from the country in what was touted by extremists as a struggle of good (Islam) against evil (the godless communists). Over the next decade the battlefields of Afghanistan would provide an exceptional training ground for young Muslim men to learn the skills and attitudes necessary for terrorism whether they intended to use those skills following the war or not. It also provided a very good recruiting opportunity for current and future leaders of Islamic extremism because they had the opportunity to see potential recruits in action and handpick them for their organizations. Osama bin Laden and the men who would make up the future leadership cadre of al Qaeda, are examples of these recruiters. The victory over the Soviets in Afghanistan galvanized Islamic extremists around the world and changed the focus of the Jihad from petty, local concerns to a worldwide struggle in the name of Islam.<sup>117</sup>

Following the end of the war in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden created Al Qaeda and over the course of the next decade began to increase his influence and power amongst Islamic extremists. Bin Laden espouses a selective version of Islamic history designed mainly to appeal to Arabs and Sunnis but, following 9/11 has found increasing popularity among discontented non-Arab Muslims as well. He blames the destruction of the Caliphate on leaders who abandoned the ideals of Islam and calls for a new Caliphate

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[scrs.gc.ca/en/itac/itacdocs/2006-4.asp](http://www.scrs.gc.ca/en/itac/itacdocs/2006-4.asp) Internet; accessed 22 March 2007. Islamic extremists do not recognize a separation between religion and politics. The author of this report postulates that Muslims, especially Arab Muslims, had for decades been experiencing feelings of humiliation as a result of the failure of Muslims to keep pace with the advancements of the west. Again, a very broad generalization that cannot possibly cover all Muslims.

<sup>117</sup> See, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment." *ITAC Presents: Trends in Terrorism Series* (Volume 2006-4). <http://www.scrs.gc.ca/en/itac/itacdocs/2006-4.asp> Internet; accessed 22 March 2007. See also, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report (Authorized Edition)* (New York, NY: W.W.Norton & Company, Inc. August 2004), 47-63.

as an answer to the problems that are plaguing the world today. His belief that the United States is responsible for the vast majority of evil in the world has caught on with his followers. The goals of Al Qaeda can be summed up in the following broad, generalized themes: the removal of Western influence from Islamic states, the return to religious rule in these states in accordance with Sharia law, creation of a new Caliphate and the destruction of the United States and their Allies. Once again, of necessity, this is a broad generalization of a complex set of goals and aims but, in summarizing them, it can be seen that bin Laden and Al Qaeda are operating towards a distinct set of targets which makes them like every other terrorist group in the world, albeit with transnational goals that have greater reach and impact.<sup>118</sup>

Throughout the 1990s Al Qaeda began a campaign of terror attacks on the West, specifically singling out the United States for the brunt of the onslaught. Events such as the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York, the attacks on the US embassies in Africa in 1998 and the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen all demonstrated their intent to carry out attacks on a large scale. Establishment of Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan to train thousands of people in the skills of terrorism indicated that they were very serious about their intent.

By the end of the century Al Qaeda had demonstrated through these attacks that they were a deadly threat to the US but had not yet shown a desire to attack Canada. They had, however, set up a network of support in countries around the world to carry out fundraising, recruiting and training. At the time, as already discussed, Canada did not

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<sup>118</sup> See, Bruce Hoffman, "From The War On Terror To Global Counterinsurgency," *Current History* vol. 105, no. 695 (December 2006): 423-429.

have an official definition of what constituted terrorism nor was there an official stance on activities to support terrorism. Thus, the government was quite happy to turn a blind eye to Al Qaeda's activity in Canada and, once again, allowed a terrorist group to operate here. One vivid example of this is the case of Ahmed Khadr and his family.

### **THE KHADR FAMILY**

The case of the Khadr family is yet another example of the culture of denial towards terrorism that existed in Canada before 9/11. CSIS was aware of what Khadr was doing yet, because of our absence of a definition and law against terrorist support activities, he was allowed to continue and to use the largesse of Canadian society to his benefit. Once again, by allowing Khadr and his family to conduct their activities with impunity, we were inadvertently contributing to the improvement of a terrorist group that would turn around and present a threat to us.

Ahmed Khadr was a Canadian citizen who had moved to Canada from Egypt in 1975, went to university in Ottawa, had a steady job with Bell Northern Research, and had established himself as a regular Canadian citizen. When the war in Afghanistan started in 1979 Khadr moved to Peshawar Pakistan and ran a series of refugee camps. While there, he met and became friends with Osama bin Laden and became one of the chief fundraisers for Al Qaeda.

In 1992 Khadr was seriously injured. He was treated in the Peshawar hospital until he had stabilized, then moved back to Toronto with his family for extensive hospitalization and rehabilitation at the expense of Canadian taxpayers. Following his recovery he returned again to Peshawar to resume his duties as a fundraiser for Al Qaeda.

During this second stay in Peshawar he was accused of financing and being heavily involved in the planning of the bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad in 1995. He was arrested and jailed in Pakistan. In January 1996, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, while on a visit to Pakistan, lobbied Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto for Khadr's release. Three months later Khadr was released from jail without charges and returned once again to Toronto with his family.<sup>119</sup> The message this must have sent to terrorist groups around the world was that Canada was, not only tolerant of terrorists but, actively supportive of them as long as the violence did not happen in Canada. This incident went well beyond a mere culture of denial.

Later in 1996, Khadr packed up his family and once again moved to the region but, this time, it was to an Al Qaeda compound north of Jalalabad where Osama bin Laden and his senior leadership lived. The friendship between bin Laden and Khadr grew and the two families became close. While there the Khadr sons attended various Al Qaeda training camps to learn the skills of terrorism.<sup>120</sup> Khadr continued his fundraising work for Al Qaeda with much of it coming from Canada and every year he would return to Canada to go on a speaking tour of mosques across the country drumming up support for Al Qaeda's efforts. The fact that Khadr was raising funds for an organization whose primary target was Canada's closest ally, the US, did not prompt the government to make an attempt at creating a law against this type of activity.

In October of 2003, Khadr was tracked to an Al Qaeda compound in Baghar Pakistan along with a number of other Al Qaeda members. Pakistani army units moved

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<sup>119</sup> Bell, *Cold Terror*, 173-205.

<sup>120</sup> Khadr's second son, Abdurahman, became the youngest trainee at the camps when he began weapons training at the age of 11.

in on the camp to arrest the fugitives and, in the battle that ensued, Ahmed Khadr was killed and his son Abdul Karim was left a paraplegic. Khadr's wife was allowed to return to Canada in 2004 with Abdul Karim who received his medical care at Canadian taxpayer expense.

The oldest of Khadr's sons, Abdullah, was arrested and held in custody in Pakistan for a year. In December 2005, following his release from custody he returned to Toronto where he was arrested at the request of US authorities and held without bail. He was indicted in Massachusetts in February 2006 on four charges which included conspiracy to kill American soldiers in Afghanistan, conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, and conspiracy to possess a destructive device to commit violent crimes.<sup>121</sup> The second son, Abdurahman, was arrested in November 2001 as a suspected member of Al Qaeda. He was taken to the American prison in Guantanamo Bay in early 2003 and was released and sent back to Afghanistan in July 2003. He returned to Canada in October 2003. Omar, the third son, was arrested in Afghanistan in July 2002 at the age of fifteen and was accused of killing an American Army medic. He is currently the only Canadian being held in Guantanamo Bay prison. Khadr's daughter, Zaynab, is suspected of being involved with her brother Abdullah in running an Al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan in the 1990s and is currently living in Pakistan.<sup>122</sup>

Ahmed Khadr and his family are yet another example of terrorists who were allowed to freely use Canada as a support base when CSIS knew that they were members

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<sup>121</sup> If convicted, he could be facing a sentence of life in prison and a one million dollar fine.

<sup>122</sup> CBC News Indepth, "The Khadr Family." <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/khadr/>; Internet; posted 30 October 2006, accessed 30 March 2007.

of Al Qaeda. They raised funds here, took advantage of medical care at taxpayer expense and were allowed to return to the country whenever their terrorist activity necessitated a safe haven. By turning a blind eye to their activities the government was demonstrating another example of not admitting to themselves that there was a terrorism problem in Canada and they were sending a signal that it was okay to carry out activities to support a terrorist group. Former Prime Minister Mulroney derided the

. . . limp and pathetic manner the Liberal government handled the case of the Khadr family, intimates of Osama bin Laden. . . some of whose members have taken up arms in support of terrorism, and yet are welcomed back with open arms. Imagine the signal that these images send to the White House and the civilized world.<sup>123</sup>

Thankfully, in November of 2002 Al Qaeda was added to the list of outlawed terrorist entities in Canada and the activities of this family finally became illegal.<sup>124</sup>

So far, two episodes of terrorism in Canada have been discussed that should have served as a distinct wake-up call to the government. The first was the span of terror perpetrated by the FLQ, culminating in the October crisis, and the second was the Air India bombing.<sup>125</sup> The third incident that sent a clear, unambiguous message was that of Ahmed Ressam.

## **AHMED RESSAM**

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<sup>123</sup> Bell, *Cold Terror*, 205.

<sup>124</sup> Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, "Keeping Canadians Safe: Currently Listed Entities." <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/index-en.asp> ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

<sup>125</sup> In fact all of the incidents discussed thus far should have prompted the government with respect to the fact that there was a terrorism problem in Canada and that they did not have the proper tools to deal with it, but these two incidents, in concert with that of Ahmed Ressam serve as the ones where the message should not have been missed.

Another example of Al Qaeda terrorists using Canada as a support base is that of Ahmed Ressam. The Ressam case, however, marked a turning point for Canada in which it went from becoming a support base serving as a fundraising, recruiting and training hub to a place from which Al Qaeda conducted active operations against its enemies and our Allies. The case showed that Al Qaeda had taken another subtle step in its evolution towards becoming our greatest terrorist threat and they were changing and improving their methods. In this case the government again showed a clear unwillingness to admit that terrorism was alive and well in Canada and they missed another opportunity to properly define terrorism and create new laws against it.

Ahmed Ressam arrived in Canada in February of 1994 using a fake French passport. When he was questioned about it, he admitted his correct name and made a refugee claim, saying that he had spent time in an Algerian prison for being an arms dealer and associating with terrorists.<sup>126</sup> Ressam was allowed into the country and moved to Montreal.

In March 1998, Ressam flew to Karachi Pakistan on a Canadian passport under an assumed name, made his way to Peshawar and joined one of Osama bin Laden's terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Upon graduation from the camps, he received instructions to return to North America to carry out a terrorist attack on the United States. He returned to Canada and, in August 1999, Ressam teamed up with Abdelmajid Dahoumane to plan an attack on a target in North America. They chose Los Angeles

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<sup>126</sup> See, See, International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, "Ahmed Ressam," *Background Information Summaries*. 2006. 22. Ressam did indeed have ties to the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria but migrated towards Al Qaeda when the GIA became so extreme that even Osama bin Laden distanced himself from them. Ressam was used as an example of terrorists using Canada's refugee procedures to their advantage. His refugee claim should have prevented him from being allowed into the country but, for some reason he was allowed to stay.

International Airport as their target<sup>127</sup> and, in November, they flew to Vancouver, checked into a hotel room and rented a car. The hotel room served as their makeshift lab as they began to mix a large quantity of chemicals into a large bomb. Once the chemicals were mixed, they placed the bomb in the spare wheel well of the rental car and attached a homemade detonator to it.<sup>128</sup>

On 14 December they boarded the ferry to Vancouver Island at which point Ressaym continued alone to Port Angeles Washington onboard another ferry. As he was entering the US, a customs agent became suspicious and demanded to see identification. He panicked, ran from the customs agent and was quickly apprehended and arrested. The bomb was found in the trunk of his car and dismantled. Inside the car they also found a handwritten phone number of one of Osama bin Laden's important assistants.<sup>129</sup>

CSIS agents had been monitoring Ressaym and a number of other Algerians because of their suspected ties to terrorism but it was not until Ressaym's arrest that they realized Al Qaeda was using Canada to attack the United States. This incident served as a wake-up call for CSIS and the RCMP because, although Ressaym was very similar to other international terrorists present in Canada, the incident differed greatly in that Canada had now become a staging base for launching terrorist attacks on another state, in this case the US. It should also have been a wake-up call to the government pointing to

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<sup>127</sup> Among the targets they seriously considered were several Canadian ones including the Jewish neighbourhood of Outremont in Montreal.

<sup>128</sup> See, International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, "Ahmed Ressaym," *Background Information Summaries*. 2006. 22.

<sup>129</sup> See, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report (Authorized Edition)* (New York, NY: W.W.Norton & Company, Inc. August 2004), 176-179. See also, International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, "Ahmed Ressaym," *Background Information Summaries*. 2006. 22.

the changing nature of terrorism in Canada, specifically the evolving nature of Al Qaeda into a more dangerous threat to the country, but it was not. The Chrétien government should have taken action to prevent terrorism in Canada from evolving into a direct threat to our closest allies but by not admitting the problem, they missed another good opportunity to take action. This would not happen until 9/11.

### **THE IDEOLOGY OF AL QAEDA**

The events of 9/11 would bring the unwillingness of Canadians to see the terrorism problem in their country to an abrupt end. The global “war on terror” led by the US would focus worldwide attention on terrorism and finally give the Canadian government the push it needed to define exactly what the terrorism problem was and what it was going to do about it. The problem with the war on terror though, was that it would change the nature of Islamic extremism in the world, causing it to evolve into its present form as an even greater threat to Canada than ever before.

By the turn of the century, Al Qaeda was looking to achieve a spectacular goal on a scale never seen before. They finally achieved the effect they were looking for on September 11, 2001 when the horrific images of the two airliners hitting the World Trade Centre in New York were instantly broadcast around the world, serving to galvanize the global Jihad. The American response to the attacks with their invasion of Afghanistan and then later Iraq was “. . . a gift to Al Qaeda: mujahideen [sic] and religious nationalists could come together to strike at the global enemy and in defence of Muslim lands.

Insurgents in Iraq now comprise not only Arabs and Muslims from the Middle East but jihadis from Muslim diaspora communities around the world.”<sup>130</sup>

It is unlikely, however, that Al Qaeda was prepared for the ferocity of the American-led war on terror which marked the beginning of a campaign by countries around the world against terrorism and placed enormous strain on the Al Qaeda Jihadist networks worldwide.<sup>131</sup> The strain has forced a metamorphosis in the Islamic extremist networks because they were no longer able to rely on authoritative guidance from the leaders of Al Qaeda who were now permanent fugitives and rarely made contact with people outside their immediate circle of trust. This has caused large-scale disintegration and fragmentation of the networks and has left individual Islamic extremists and their small cells scattered all over the world to their own direction.<sup>132</sup> In other words, intentional or not, Osama bin Laden had successfully created the condition whereby thousands of small, self-sustaining, self-guiding jihadist cells suddenly formed and were able to easily recruit from the millions of disenchanting, angry Muslim youth in the worldwide diaspora communities who had just been given a direction in which to focus

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<sup>130</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment.” *ITAC Presents: Trends in Terrorism Series* (Volume 2006-4). <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/itac/itacdocs/2006-4.asp> Internet; accessed 22 March 2007. See also, Bruce Hoffman, “The Leadership Secrets of Osama bin Laden, *The Atlantic Monthly* (April 2003). [Journal on-line]; available from <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200304/hoffman> ; Internet; accessed 20 April 2007.

<sup>131</sup> The Netherlands, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. *Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current trends in the Islamist Terrorist Threat*. The Hague: General Intelligence and Security Service Communications Department, March, 2006. 15-18. “A jihadist network is a fluid, dynamic, vaguely delineated structure comprising a number of interrelated persons (radical Muslims) who are linked both individually and on an aggregate level (cells/groups). They have at least a temporary common interest, i.e. the pursuit of a jihadism-related goal (including terrorism). Persons within such a network are referred to as members. A member is a person who contributes actively and consciously to the realisation of the aforementioned goal within the bounds of the network.”

<sup>132</sup> Bruce Hoffman, “The Changing Face of Al Qaeda And The Global War on Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, (Washington: The Rand Corporation, 2004), 549-559.

their anger.<sup>133</sup> The result of Al Qaeda's legacy is the appearance of a worldwide Islamic extremist surge in activity stretching across the globe seeking to bring Islam to its previous glory. Al Qaeda has legitimized the phenomenon and has given impetus to, not only the new jihadist cells, but to more traditional, nationalist Islamic extremist terrorist groups that have been in existence for some time.<sup>134</sup>

This presents a problem for Canada because of our large Islamic community, many of whom are concentrated in the larger urban areas of Vancouver, Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal. We have already seen evidence of this type of activity in Canada. The most stark example occurred in the summer of 2006 when more than 400 police officers took part in a series of raids in southern Ontario and arrested 17 suspects (followed by an 18<sup>th</sup> suspect two months later) in what was the largest operation ever carried out under Canada's Anti-terrorism Act. The group of men, 5 of whom were youths, were accused of “. . . knowingly participating in a terrorist group and either receiving or providing terrorist training.”<sup>135</sup> Police said the suspects were inspired by Al Qaeda and planned to make bombs to attack targets in Ontario. Some of the suspects had allegedly ordered and received three tonnes of ammonium nitrate which is three times the amount used by Timothy McVeigh in his bombing of an Oklahoma federal building.<sup>136</sup> The bombing targets included the Toronto Stock Exchange and the Parliament buildings. In addition to

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<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, 15-18.

<sup>134</sup> See, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment” *ITAC Presents: Trends in Terrorism Series* (Volume 2006-4). <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/itac/itacdocs/2006-4.asp> Internet; accessed 22 March 2007. See also, Hoffman, “From The War On Terror To Global Counterinsurgency,” *Current History*, 423-429.

<sup>135</sup> CBC News Indepth, “Toronto Bomb Plot.” <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/toronto-bomb-plot/>; Internet; posted 4 August 2006, accessed 1 April 2007. These charges have not yet been proven in a trial.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*

the bombing campaign they were intending to behead Prime Minister Stephen Harper. All of the suspects were either Canadian-born or were long-time Canadian residents, most of whom were of South Asian origin with two of them of Somali origin.<sup>137</sup> The fact that they were not of Arab origin and were not previously known to be affiliated with Al Qaeda gives credence to the evolving worldwide nature of Islamic extremism.

What this means for Canada is that Islamic extremism in its latest incarnation represents a different threat to Canada than what we have faced in the past. We still have many groups present in Canada such as Hezbollah and Hamas who, because of years of being allowed to operate in Canada with impunity, have established the country as a support base for their nationalist struggles elsewhere in the world. We also still have many people and groups who represent Al Qaeda and the more global set of grievances offered by that group. But the new breed of home-grown, self-radicalizing Islamic extremism is a lot more dangerous. They are more fluid and spontaneous than a traditional terrorist organization, many of them have links to other groups and quite often belong to more than one group, they use the technology of the Internet and cell-phones to operate with little chance of detection and they can spring up seemingly out of nowhere.<sup>138</sup> Their increasing presence in Canada is something that the government needs to monitor closely and take positive action to avoid, to the maximum extent possible, the damage that these groups are capable of doing.

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<sup>137</sup> The Economist, "The Americas: The Plan to Behead the Prime Minister; The Toronto Terror Plot," *The Economist*, June 10 2006, Volume 379, Issue 841, 56.

<sup>138</sup> See, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment" *ITAC Presents: Trends in Terrorism Series* (Volume 2006-4). <http://www.csis-sers.gc.ca/en/itac/itacdocs/2006-4.asp> Internet; accessed 22 March 2007.

The worldwide focus on terrorism and the scrutiny on the US would shake Canada, for the first time ever, out of the culture of denial that had existed for so long. The country could no longer deny the fact that a terrorism problem existed and finally created the *Anti-Terrorism Law* which had been needed for so long. The war on terror, however, changed the nature of the threat to Canada as a result of Islamic extremism from being Al Qaeda driven to a scattered group of small cells operating on their own under the ideology espoused by Al Qaeda. The new Islamic extremist terrorists are not concerned with staying in the good graces of Canada to maintain their support network. Canada, to them, is a viable target, thus making them a much higher threat to Canadians than ever before. In addition to this new threat, Canada also has all of the other terrorist threats still here, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER 10 - CURRENT THREAT

We have a bifurcated threat at this point – the threat that comes to Canada from the outside as well as a homegrown threat, and the homegrown variants look to Canada to execute their targeting

Jack Hooper  
Deputy Director CSIS  
3 June 2006<sup>139</sup>

To this point in the paper it has been shown that terrorism has evolved over the years into a more formidable threat internationally and, by extension, to Canada. Terrorist groups are better at what they do, they are more sophisticated, media-savvy, cooperative with other terrorist groups and have become much better at creating worldwide funding and support networks. We will now look at how that has translated into an overall threat for Canada. It will be shown that, in comparison to the period just prior to 9/11, the threat to Canada has increased despite the overall threat level still being assessed as low. In addition to the new threat posed by the loose networks of Islamic extremists inspired by the ideology of Al Qaeda, Canada still has present the vast majority of groups that were here prior to 9/11.

In 1999 the Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence said that “Overall, Canada and Canadians are not a major target for terrorist attacks. Canada remains, however, a "venue of opportunity" for terrorist groups: a place where they may raise funds, purchase arms and conduct other activities to support their organizations and

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<sup>139</sup> Stewart Bell, “Nevermind Foreign Terrorists, Why is Canada Growing Its Own Extremists?” *Canada.com*, 3 June 2006.

their terrorist activities elsewhere.”<sup>140</sup> In the course of the 1999 hearings, the committee learned that the number of terrorist incidents in Canada had declined. They also learned that, at the time, this was consistent with the international trends in terrorism. There was cautious optimism about the future but stern warnings were issued lest we let our guard down to the growing threat of religious terrorism which had focused its hatred mainly on the West.<sup>141</sup>

In 2006 the Solicitor-General again assessed the threat of a terrorist attack in Canada as low but warned that this is no reason for optimism.<sup>142</sup> It used to be that Canada was merely a support base for the most dangerous terrorist elements in the world and that the serious terrorism threat was a function of international dynamics. This aspect has not gone away but, in addition, Canada is now a staging ground for the planning of terrorist attacks and a population base from which practitioners are recruited, trained and indoctrinated.<sup>143</sup> In other words, the threat has increased despite the fact that the overall threat still remains low.

Canada is also more of a target than it was in 1999. Prior to 9/11 terrorists realized that the best way to ensure fundraising operations continued with little impediment was to avoid attacks on Canadian soil. Al Qaeda has changed this and Canada is now a viable target. On 13 November 2002, in an audiotape by Osama bin

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<sup>140</sup> Canada, “The Report of The Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence January 1999,” <http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/secu-e/rep-e/repsecintjan99-e.htm> ; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007 Chap. 1.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, chap.1.

<sup>142</sup> Janes Sentinel Security Assessment – North America, “Executive Summary, Canada,” <http://www8.janes.com/Search> ; Internet; posted 15 September 2006, accessed 21 January 2007.

<sup>143</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “How Should a Democracy Respond To Domestic Terrorist Threats,” *Talking Points for 2007 Raoul Wallenberg International Human Rights Symposium - Jim Judd, Director CSIS*, <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/speeches/speech19012007.asp> ; Internet; accessed 31 March 2007.

Laden, Canada was named as a target for Islamic extremist attacks along with 5 other western states. Since that time, all of the other targets listed in the tape have been attacked except Canada.<sup>144</sup> Al Qaeda has shown that they do not feel pressure to rush into an attack and are capable of waiting until the time is right to inflict the maximum damage possible.

When discussing the subject of the current threat from terrorism in Canada, however, one must not overlook the fact that Al Qaeda-inspired terrorists are not the only threat present here. Of the 40 terrorism entities currently listed by PSEPC, 16 of the entities are not directly associated with Islamic extremism. There are organizations as diverse as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), a Marxist insurgency group that aims to overthrow the government of Colombia, and Kahane Chai (KACH), a group of “right-wing, politico-religious, anti-Arab, Jewish terrorists whose overall aim is to restore the biblical state of Israel.”<sup>145</sup> The LTTE, for example, is alive and well in Canada and their recent bombing of a Sri Lankan airbase would indicate that they have not reduced their efforts any.<sup>146</sup> Jim Judd, the Director of CSIS stated that, “. . . while this [Al Qaeda] represents the most serious threat from terrorism we face today, it is by no means the only one.”<sup>147</sup> On the subject of other organizations he stated “At any given

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<sup>144</sup> CBC News Indepth, “Toronto Bomb Plot.” <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/toronto-bomb-plot/>; Internet; posted 4 August 2006, accessed 1 April 2007.

<sup>145</sup> Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. “Keeping Canadians Safe: Currently Listed Entities.” <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/index-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

<sup>146</sup> ABC News International, “Rebels Launch Airstrike in Sri Lanka.” <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=2980644>; Internet; posted 26 March 2006, accessed 26 March 2006.

<sup>147</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “How Should a Democracy Respond To Domestic Terrorist Threats,” *Talking Points for 2007 Raoul Wallenberg International Human Rights Symposium* - Jim Judd, Director CSIS, <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/speeches/speech19012007.asp>; Internet; accessed 31 March 2007

point in time we have court warranted investigations underway on individuals and groups here in Canada with affiliations to an array of other terrorist organizations.”<sup>148</sup>

Just recently, for example, on 15 January 2007, a new group calling itself the Camille Laurin cell of the FLQ wrote a letter threatening to attack “strategic targets of importance” in the mostly-English speaking part of West Montreal. The letter was the second one of its kind received in a two-month period. The letter mentioned “. . . crowded shopping malls, bridges, rail lines, airport facilities, water supplies, municipal buildings and service stations.”<sup>149</sup> It also mentioned businesses that do not conform to Québec’s French-language signage law. The target date for the attacks was between 15 February and 15 March 2007 which, thankfully has come and gone with no attack.<sup>150</sup>

Our ability to fight terrorism has increased but so too has the sophistication of the terrorists and the level of their activity internationally. From 1999 to 2005 the worldwide incidence of terrorism has increased threefold and the trend appears to be continuing upwards.<sup>151</sup> The terrorists of today are incredibly intelligent, adaptive and knowledgeable. They exhibit the traits of modern-day learning organizations which ensure that in the future they will be an even more formidable adversary that “. . . is not

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<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>149</sup> Peter Rakobowchuk, “CSIS Investigating Letter Threatening FLQ Attacks on Part Of Montreal,” *Canadian Press Newswire*, 18 January 2007.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>151</sup> Human Security Centre, “The Human Security Brief 2006,” <http://www.humansecuritycentre.org/images/stories/HSBrief2006/figures/Figure2.6.pdf> ; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007.

going to favour us with mindless repetitiveness in its actions.”<sup>152</sup> It is too early to tell if Canada’s new counterterrorism measures have tipped the balance in our favour or not, only time will tell

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<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*

## CHAPTER 11 - CONCLUSIONS

Terrorism will not go away. In fact all indicators point to it becoming much worse before it gets better. As Jim Judd points out, “There is no fixed end-point on either side of the equation. The threat is likely to change with time and the response will have to adapt accordingly. I regret to say that, at this juncture, there appears to be little prospect in the near term for the threat to dissipate.”<sup>153</sup> The threat is going to require long-term, improved cooperation between security agencies within Canada and with the international community.

Canadians have been very reluctant to admit that terrorism was and still is a problem in our country. The culture of indifference was quickly recognized by terrorist groups around the world and, as a result we have an extremely high number of terrorist support networks here. One of the lessons learned by terrorists in Canada following the Air India bombing was that, if you wanted to work and operate from inside of Canada, then you had better not kill Canadians. The Sikh terror groups involved in the attack were not put out of business but the bombing focused attention on them and gave the moderate, law abiding Sikh immigrants in Canada a plausible reason to withdraw their support and resist their coercion and threats. By keeping a low profile, the Tamil Tigers were able to extort, threaten and coerce Canadian citizens out of millions of dollars a year. They are but one example of the exploitation of Canada’s many, varied diaspora communities.

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<sup>153</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “How Should a Democracy Respond To Domestic Terrorist Threats,” *Talking Points for 2007 Raoul Wallenberg International Human Rights Symposium* - Jim Judd, Director CSIS, <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/speeches/speech19012007.asp> ; Internet; accessed 31 March 2007.

Not defining the meaning of terrorism contributed to the indifference of Canadians for years. Failure to heed the wake-up calls of the FLQ crisis, the Air India bombing and the Ahmed Ressam incident meant that, until shortly after 9/11, the RCMP and CSIS did not have the tools they need to stop terrorist support activities in Canada. It was not until the *Anti-Terrorism Act* was passed that terrorist groups could be outlawed in this country and activities to support terrorism became illegal. Further, by not defining terrorism or passing laws against it, we were inadvertently contributing to the evolution of terrorist groups into more sophisticated practitioners by allowing their support networks to raise money for their operations. In so doing we ended up contributing to what was to become a greater threat to Canada.

The nature of terrorism is also changing. Today's terrorist groups are deriving benefits from the long evolution of terrorism and have become more threatening and dangerous today than ever before. Modern groups have significantly improved their operating procedures and knowledge in the first part of the twentieth century and the shift in motivation towards religious extremism raises the threat level because, unlike nationalist terrorism, its practitioners do not feel constrained by the limits of normal human revulsion that would drive away their support base. The FLQ, Sikh extremists, the Tamil Tigers and adherents to the ideology of Al Qaeda all represent more advanced stages along the evolution of terrorism. Modern terrorist groups are sophisticated learning organizations that are rapidly improving their methods doctrine and training and are continually evolving into a greater threat for Canada.

And finally, the overall threat these terrorist groups represent to Canada has increased in comparison to the period just prior to 9/11 despite the overall threat level

still being assessed as low. In addition to the new threat posed by the loose networks of Islamic extremists inspired by the ideology of Al Qaeda, Canada still has present the vast majority of groups that were here prior to 9/11 and, as a result of the evolution seen in modern terrorism, they represent a significant threat.

The terrorists of today are incredibly intelligent, adaptive and knowledgeable. They exhibit the traits of modern-day learning organizations which ensure that in the future they will be an even more formidable adversary. The threat is going to require long-term, improved cooperation between security agencies within Canada and with the international community. As the 2010 Olympic Summer Games in Vancouver approach, Canadians are hoping they get it right.

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