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Size Matters – Employing Canadian Middle Power

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ABSTRACT

This paper will argue that middle powers of the world such as Canada can achieve foreign policy objectives that sometimes elude the great powers. Further, this paper will suggest that Canada might be able to achieve certain military goals more effectively than the US. Canada's ability to pursue a foreign policy independent of the US is dependent on the level of influence available. Given Canada's current economic stability and a recent rejuvenation of its military credibility, Canada's hard power resources furnish Canada with the option to exercise leadership in international forums. Canada's cultural makeup and reputation as a non-threatening nation provides Canada additional soft power that might also be harnessed in the pursuit of Canada's foreign policy. Areas that fall into Canada's national interest such as NATO's mission in Afghanistan is one area in which Canada can complement US efforts. NATO's mission in Afghanistan is under scrutiny due to uncertainty regarding the amount of progress being made. Given Canada's current status as a middle power, Canada might be able to improve the overall effectiveness of NATO's mission by providing leadership in the areas of diplomacy, security building and development assistance.

"The paradox of American power at the end of this millennium is that it is too great to be challenged by any other state, yet not great enough to solve problems such as global terrorism and nuclear proliferation. America needs the help and respect of other nations."

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the polarized opponents of Communism and Western liberalism have given way to a new international structure and a less well-defined distribution of power around the world. Global politics have evolved from a bipolar struggle between two superpowers to that of a uni-polar world dominated by the United States. Within this new world order, tension and conflict are still present but in a different framework. While interstate rivalry still exists, most of today's armed clashes occur within individual states as they struggle to maintain their sovereign entities. Conflict also arises due to non-state actors pursuing violence as an extreme means of achieving their political demands. While it is uncertain whether or not this global construct will continue indefinitely, based on the current power status of the US and assuming that there are no immediate challengers to US supremacy, it is reasonable to assert that for at least the foreseeable future that this international paradigm will hold true.

Despite the pre-eminence of the US, America frequently finds itself struggling to achieve the foreign policies that it pursues. While all foreign policy tests a country's

¹ Sebastian Mallaby, "A Mockery in the Eyes of the World," Washington Post, 31 January, 1999, B5. Joseph Nye subsequently used the phrase 'paradox of American power' in the title of his book.

diplomatic capability, great powers such as the US, have inherent characteristics that make it difficult to accomplish some of its objectives. A country's attributes and past patterns of behaviour tend to create certain preconceptions about that country's intentions. Since perceptions have such a critical bearing on the success of foreign policy, the understanding of how nations perceive each other is essential if policy implementation is to succeed. Due to the hegemonic tendencies of the US, diplomatic relations are often hindered by the perception of a rich, Western-Christian nation bent on removing all regimes opposing its supremacy.

If the strongest nations in the world are challenged by their intrinsic characteristics, then perhaps countries that are smaller can achieve greater success. If the great powers are the traditional economic and military giants in world affairs, then all others are by default non-great powers. Yet even within these non-great powers, all nations are not comparable. The spectrum of power is not a system of two classes great and non-great, but is rather a continuum of states with varying capacity to wield influence in international affairs. Within this non-great group, there is a similar group of highly developed nations, but due to their population size, economic base or military capability cannot challenge the great powers in traditional hard power terms. Neither is this group lacking resources or in danger of internal collapse due to economic instability or civil unrest. These countries that thrive as economically viable nations with high standards of living and almost unbounded civil liberties are closer to the powerful end of the spectrum than the weaker end. These are the *middle powers*.

The question that arises is: if large powers are not able to attain total success in achieving foreign policy, can middle powers achieve objectives that the great cannot?

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that middle power countries like Canada have the potential to wield their modest influence in order to achieve objectives that are more difficult for great powers to realize. Furthermore, in Canada's particular case, its modest military power might be more effective in unconventional operations than large powers.

The initial discussion will expand on the theory of why large powers are not always successful in achieving their foreign policy. In terms of relationships, there are some inherent characteristics of larger and smaller powers that result in latent biases between actors that influence relations. The way the larger nation is perceived and the way in which the smaller power reacts will shape the nature of the relation and will affect the outcomes. The way in which a nation understands its own reputation and how others perceive it will profoundly affect international relations and thus the ability for that state to succeed in achieving its foreign policy objectives. Understanding these relational phenomenon will help guide how nations conduct diplomacy.

When great powers bring their coercive power to bear, the results are not always successful. US operations over time have demonstrated that a large conventional, technologically superior military is not always victorious over a smaller, relatively crude force in an unconventional war. The nature of counterinsurgency and the relationships

between large and small powers usually combine to attenuate the overall effectiveness of the great power's military. Furthermore, when crafting solutions to these complex problems, great powers, specifically Western nations, frequently assume that solutions based on traditional Western logic will work in non-Western societies. The underlying, cultural, religious and societal frameworks are frequently misunderstood resulting in a mistaken application of 'logical' Western approaches. So why are lesser power countries able to perform more effectively in certain areas?

Canada's role in the world and its relative position of power and influence might enable Canada to perform better than large powers. Nevertheless, Canada's relationship with the US is a key feature in how Canada fulfills its role in world affairs. Canada's traditional sources of hard power, its economy and military, are significantly influenced by both geographic proximity to, and allied cooperative security arrangements with, the US. One area in which there might be more of a distinction between the two nations is that of soft power. It is suggested that Canada's reputation and attractive soft power has the potential to be leveraged as part of the whole of Canada's influence. Properly balanced, Canada can map out an appropriate foreign policy direction that will achieve certain objectives that are difficult for the US to realize. By carefully employing its limited hard power and unique soft power Canada can make a valuable contribution to the maintenance of international peace and stability.

CHAPTER 1 – WHY BIG POWERS FAIL

The ascendancy of the United States as the uncontested global military superpower has resulted in a 'unipolar' balance of power of unprecedented strength and proportion. Previous world ruling powers such as the Roman Empire and colonial powers such as the British, French and Japanese once possessed formidable and wideranging influence. While the former Soviet Union still possesses a significant nuclear arsenal, and China has a massive armed force, only the US has the capacity to successfully wage conventional war anywhere in the world.² While this is perhaps a dramatic statement, the implications of such a world power do not go unnoticed or unchallenged.

Despite the significant advantages that the world's leading countries possess, it is still possible that smaller countries with almost no world standing can foil the plans of the strong. For all of the capability the modern world has produced, the technology, the information networks, the economic regulatory systems and the strategic alliances, there are intangibles that money cannot buy. It is here where the poor and weak nations of the world can achieve effects that are disproportionate to the military means available to them.

The aim of this chapter is to explain the challenges a powerful nation faces when it interacts with a smaller power. In order to do this, it is first necessary to understand the

² Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Superpower can't go it Alone, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, 35.

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types of power nations have available for use. There will then be an explanation of the three principal reasons underlying the challenges of big powers in defeating smaller ones. The first reason concerns the relationships between nations and how a country's power affects that relationship. The second reason explains why, for one conflict, there two sets of rules: one set that constrains the strong, and a different set that favours the weak. The final challenge is one that stems from the tendency to base solutions on what we know as opposed to what our opponent understands.

In order to consider why 'big powers' fail we should first establish who 'big powers' are. For the purposes of this paper, 'big powers' will include the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council: the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, France, China and the United States.³ This will give focus for argument and limit the scope required for historical examples. For now, the classification of the stature of other nations' power is not required, as it will be interpreted as the discussion progresses.

POWER

What exactly is power? There are numerous definitions and interpretations, but an accepted definition will help establish the guidelines for discussion. Joseph Nye Jr. establishes the definition of power as "...the ability to influence others to get the

³ The United Nations. http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp; Internet; accessed 26 January 2007.

outcomes one wants."⁴ Bertrand Russell defines power as "...the production of intended effects."⁵ The difference is that Nye states power in terms of potential or 'ability', whereas Russell defines power in terms of an end state. Nevertheless, in either definition it is clear that there is a source of power needed in order to obtain results. In other words, a nation must have resources to influence others in order to achieve the intended effects.

There are several sources of a nation's power. Military and economic are the two most tangible and widely recognizable forms of power. These are forms of hard power. In political terms, hard power is the most prominent means used to achieve a desired outcome. These two areas of influence, military and economic, are concrete means by which governments can offer tangible threats or inducements in order to shape the outcome of negotiations. Therefore, nations are powerful if they possess substantial military and economic 'resources', or have the potential to influence others using hard power. If all nations possessed equal amounts of power resources, no matter how great a quantity a nation held, there would be parity between nations. Thus, the quantity of power held would be irrelevant. But this is obviously not the case. Countries possess different amounts of power. Therefore, power is a term of relativity and nations must be understood in comparative terms.

⁴ Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics ..., 2.

⁵ Bertrand Russell, "The Forms of Power," In *Power*, edited by Steven Lukes (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 19.

Nye offers a method of classifying and comparing nations' power. He states that there are in broad terms three types of nation states: poor, weak and post industrialized. While it is useful to categorize these theoretical, discrete groupings into which all countries fit, in reality a country's relative position of 'strength' regarding their national power is complex and cannot necessarily be based solely on one component of power. Thus, it is might be useful to place countries onto a continuum of relative national power along which the broad groupings help to identify countries with large degrees of commonality.

For example countries such as Somalia, Afghanistan and Bangladesh are likely categorized as being poor. Weak powers are countries such as Iraq, Cuba and North Korea. Post-industrialized countries might include India and China, Canada and the United States occupying the extreme end of the spectrum as the most powerful. Obviously there could be significant debate about the influence of nuclear weapons, population size, geographical location etc. on a country's relative position of power. However, it is enough for now to illustrate that each country holds a position along the spectrum.

Hard power is not the only element of power at work in the international system.

Nye disaggregates international relations into separate planes of what he describes as a three-tier chessboard. This enables a component analysis of the military plane on the top

⁶ Joseph S. Nye Jr., Limits of American Power, Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in *International Relations* 3rd edition Phil Williams, Donald Goldstein, Jay Shafritz Thompson Wadsworth: University of Pittsburgh, 2006.

board, interstate economic relations in the middle, and trans-national issues on the bottom. Nye posits that it is in the realm of the bottom board, where a nation must employ elements of its soft power.⁷

Soft power is the ability to attract, a way of co-opting others to want what you want. It is a result of a nation's intangible resources. Nye states that there are essentially three sources of soft power: culture, political values and foreign policies. Thus soft power may be within government control in regards to policies or political values, but the attractiveness of a nation's culture is beyond control per se. Nevertheless, this national attractiveness is a potential area of significant influence. This element of power can have profound effects on relations and perceptions as will be illustrated in the next section.

While we now understand what the sources of power are and where countries rank in relative terms regarding the quantity of each sources held, there is one more component required in order to appreciate why big powers do not necessarily triumph over small. This component is not purely about the sources of power themselves, but rather how they are used.

What a nation possesses in terms of sources of hard power is only one facet of the overall influence a nation can wield. The way in which a nation uses its hard power is

⁷ Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics..., 4-5.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

critical. That is to say, it is not sufficient to simply have military or economic leverage, the approach a state takes in employing their influence is equally important. Broken down into its two components, hard power is the combination of ability and intention. Therefore, a nation's power must be assessed in the context in which nations interact. As previously mentioned, while soft power is less tangible and difficult to wield in the same sense as hard power, its potential effects should not be ignored.

With the preceding as a framework against which power is understood, the challenges of large powers can now be put into context. First we shall look at relational phenomena in terms of power, both capability and intention, and perceptions. Next, we shall explore how a nation's power affects contemporary conflict resolution.

RELATIONSHIPS

America's rise to military supremacy might have actually created more enemies for the US than if it were less powerful. Many nations who might have otherwise remained uncommitted to a policy regarding the US have felt compelled to align themselves with clear positions either in favour of or in opposition to the US and its approach to the use of its power. It is in fact the way in which actors wield their influence that causes other actors to react in a contrary or unexpected manner.

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⁹ James N. Rosenau, "Capabilities and Control in an Interdependent World," in *International Conflict and Conflict Management: Readings in World Politics*, Second Edition ed. Robert Matthews, Arthur Rubinoff and Janice Stein, 143-154 (Prentice-Hall Canada Inc, Scarborough, Ontario, 1989), 144.

The relationship existing between two parties is influenced by many factors. How actors perceive, assess and react to one another is a complex relational phenomenon.¹⁰ In the case of relations between powerful states and weak parties, be they small states or non-state actors, there are two significant factors that shape the nature of the relationship.

The first issue is that of large power reputation. Each country carries a reputation or projects inherent perceptions based on that nation's performance history on the world stage. This national image will affect a country's ability to wield influence in the international arena. The second factor is related to how smaller powers react to stronger powers. Whether state or non-state actors, smaller powers by definition have less flexibility in determining the outcome of the relationship, and will thus be naturally threatened by the larger power.

Large Power Image

"Standing alone, proud and tall, is as much a part of the American political culture as it is of Hollywood." ¹²

The US is a powerful nation that will likely remain in the position of first among superpower equals for some time to come. It is therefore not surprising that the US invokes certain preconceptions that may or may not be true. Real or perceived, these latent biases prejudice the nature of a relationship before any formal dialogue takes place.

¹⁰ James N. Rosenau, "Capabilities and Control in an Interdependent World," ... 144.

¹¹ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Superpower...*, 12.

¹² D. Stairs, et al, *In The National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World*, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003, 18.

It is this national persona that will shape all interactions that a nation has with others.

This real though intangible notion can be summed up as 'image'.

By way of example, France occupied Vietnam for almost one hundred years.

During that time, generations of indigenous Vietnamese learned to speak French. Even the Commander of the People's Army of North Vietnam, Senior General Võ Nguyên Giáp, drew serious criticism for some of the luxuries he indulged in that were of a 'Western' nature. North Korean leader Kim Jong-II has a taste for cognac, American films and fine 'Western' food. Despite the serious food shortage facing North Korea, the leader is attracted to Western food and culture. In both of these examples, a nation's culture or associated trappings may be highly desirable. Both France and the US have desirable cultural elements that bear influence on others. Therefore, when countries like Vietnam deal with France or North Korea with the US, there will be assumptions on how French and Americans behave based on the perception of French and American values as perceived through their unintended cultural exports.

The combination of a nation's hard power assets with its soft power image will have a significant bearing on diplomatic relations. It is not difficult to see why smaller, poor and weaker nations could easily feel resentment, jealousy or even hatred for those nations that have wealth, the ability to defend that wealth and the spoils of modern culture.

¹³ Cecil, B. Currey, Victory at Any Cost (Washington: Brassey's Inc, 1997), 243-244.

¹⁴ BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1907197.stm; Internet; accessed 26 January 2007.

Take for example the US military action in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The sentiment of anti-Americanism is worse than it has ever been.¹⁵ In the current Islamic context, this exported culture appears to be deepening the divide rather than attracting potential opponents:

Whatever your view of the relative merits of the west and Islam, the most acute tension comes at the edges where they meet. It arises, in particular, from the direct, personal encounter of young, first- or second-generation Muslim immigrants with Western, and especially European, secular modernity. The most seductive system known to humankind, with its polychromatic consumer images of health, wealth, excitement, sex and power, is hugely attractive to young people from often poor, conservative, Muslim backgrounds. But, repelled by its hedonistic excesses or perhaps disappointed in their secret hopes, alienated by the reality of their marginalized lives in the west or feeling themselves rejected by it, a few - a tiny minority - embrace a fierce, extreme, warlike new version of the faith of their fathers. ¹⁶

Instances of religious intolerance are fanned into hatred as Western culture collides with other cultures around the world. An example of Samuel Huntington's thesis was manifest in February 2006 when rioting erupted in Pakistan and other predominantly Muslim countries over a cartoon satirizing Muhammad. This event in Pakistan illustrated the volatility of religious sensitivities and how a soft power export of several Western fast food restaurants became a focal point for anger and public outcry.¹⁷

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¹⁵ Jennifer Welsh, At Home in The World (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2004), 14.

¹⁶ The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1570236,00.html; Internet accessed 26 January 2007.

¹⁷ Declan Walsh, "Western businesses burn in Pakistan riots," *The Guardian*, 16 February 2006. http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/0,.1710740,00.html; Internet; accessed 11 March 2007. The violent response to these cartoons was particularly vehement in Lahore, Pakistan where McDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken and Pizza Hut franchises were severely vandalized.

Clearly soft power is not easily controlled. While there is a possibility to wield it to an advantage, it has the potential to exacerbate already deep-seated differences. It will affect international relations in subtle, indirect ways and could have a more profound impact on shaping a nation's image than hard power. Nevertheless, the big power must be mindful of its image and if the effects of soft power cannot be wielded, the negative impact must at least be mitigated.

As big powers strive to understand how others perceive them, it is appropriate to consider how the small power will react to provocation, regardless of whether that provocation is real or unintended.

Small Power Worries

Threat or the perception of threat begets a defensive reaction. When one actor perceives a threat, it will be motivated to act defensively. Whether the threat is real or perceived is less important. The point is that the actor feels threatened. How doe this reaction manifest itself in concrete terms? The current US position on the former Iraqi government offers an explanation.

Given President Bush's stated aim "... that regime change is in the interest of the world," 18 it is small wonder that nations that have dissimilar approaches to national leadership to that of the US would feel threatened. So-called 'rogue nations' or countries

¹⁸ CNN. <u>http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/09/30/sproject.irq.regime.change/</u>; Internet; accessed 27 January 2007.

with different values, ideals and approaches to life in general would be right to perceive a threat based on the President's comments. Regardless, it is clear that a nation such as the US with an openly stated goal of regime change will be perceived as a threat by those nations who are not 'friends' of the US.

For powers that feel threatened, the options available for negotiating will depend on the relative position of power that a state holds within the international forum. A weaker state possesses few power resources therefore it is has only limited influence. For those actors with little power at all, the methods of negotiation become very limited and so how the actor uses his power is critical.

One need look no further than North Korea's recent demonstration of its burgeoning nuclear capability. In a measure of defiance against US power and the implied threat of President Bush's world interest of regime change, Kim Jong II drew the proverbial line in the sand of the 38th parallel by testing a nuclear device. Similarly, although Iran claims to be interested only in the generation of nuclear power, the continued research and development of dual-use technology suggests that Iran too might be preparing to counter a potential threat from the US. But why would countries pursue such drastic security policies when they are not being directly threatened? The answer lies in the relation between source of power and the goal sought.

¹⁹ CBC. History: North Korea and its Military. Updated 9 October 2006. http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/northkorea/; Internet; accessed 18 January 2007.

²⁰ CBC. Iran's Nuclear Program, 13 March, 2006. http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iran/nuclearprogram.html; Internet; accessed 18 January 2007.

As previously established, power is a product of resources and intent. When the resources are few, the intent becomes evermore important. Even in the case of a nuclear-armed North Korea where one could argue that there is a considerable military power, there is more threat associated with Kim Jong II's intention regarding the use of military force than with the actual military force itself. Although nuclear weapons are a significant threat in and of themselves, since it is unclear what conditions will trigger their use, the threat is significantly higher. By leveraging a credible nuclear threat with a demonstrated resolve to use them, Kim Jong II has increased his overall influence. This is because the uncertainty surrounding when II might use the weapons magnifies the effect of just simply having them. The UK and France have nuclear weapons but compared to North Korea, they would likely require more provocation to employ them. Once again, power is a result of capability and intent.

The relationship between actors is a key component shaping the outcome of big and small power interaction. Perceptions and reactions are at play whether these result from latent characteristics of the actors or are due to a specific behaviour of a party. The dynamics of the relationship must be considered in order to conduct productive negotiations. If negotiations fail, a common eventuality will lead to the employment of hard power against one's opponent.

To apply Clausewitz in contemporary terms, one could argue that economics is today's extension of politics by another means. Be they economic sanctions or military intervention, direct application of hard power assets frequently results when dialogue

breaks down. But in today's world, these means of pursuing foreign policy might not yield the expected results. In fact the very nature of conflict in which there is substantial military disparity between actors is itself the second area in which big powers fail.

NATURE OF THE 'UNFAIR' FIGHT

A common military quip is that an army always prepares for the last war. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that armies prepare for the last conventional war. The conventional war holds clearly defined opponents, widely accepted operational practices and an international body of legal guidelines that govern armed conflict. In an asymmetric conflict the rules are different. To be more precise they are different for both sides. That is to say that the stronger nation, specifically in terms of Western militaries, is bound by the generally accepted 'normal' rules of war, whereas the rules for the 'weaker' side are altogether different.²¹

David Galula defines asymmetrical as a struggle between an insurgent, the weaker opponent, and the counterinsurgent. Galula describes an asymmetric conflict between three two groups as revolutionary warfare. These are revolutions or civil wars in which insurgents seek change through various means. So why then are the rules for each opponent different in the same conflict? There are four components to this answer.

21 David Calula Country

²¹ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group Inc., 1964), xii.

The insurgent cause is something with which the majority of the population, or at least a significant portion, can identify. The cause will appeal to the proletariat of an industrialized nation or the uneducated peasantry of the undeveloped country. ²² Causes can be social, political, economic, racial, religious, cultural, artificial or falsely exaggerated or a combination of several. The actual cause itself is less important than the degree to which it can be manipulated, controlled and 'weaponized' to the insurgent leaders' advantage. With the popular support of a state, or several states, an insurgency will take root and becomes difficult to counter since one cannot attack the population in pure military terms. In a counterinsurgency operation, conventional military strength will not lead to victory without the support of the population. ²³ If the population supports the insurgent the counterinsurgent cannot use his superior military force. This is the first advantage that the insurgent has over his opponent.

Popular support is a manifestation of the will of the people to resist existing conditions. It is the will of the people that is the central element around which the insurgency is fused. The will of the insurgent and his supporting people is a critical element to the continuance of the insurgency. The will of a nation to fight is directly linked to the purpose of the conflict. The skilful insurgent leadership links the purpose of the conflict to one of national survival. In so doing, the insurgent has, again modifying Clausewitz, concluded that insurgency is a continuation of national survival by other means.

²² *Ibid.*, 12-13.

²³ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (New York: Praeger, 1964), ix.

Since the insurgency is a struggle for national survival, the will of the people is far stronger than the will of the counterinsurgent. The smaller power is willing to absorb the costs and suffering associated with the conflict. The insurgent is generally willing to endure more human loss and destruction of their country than the larger power.²⁴ If the will of the people is sustained, "the guerrilla can win simply by not losing, whereas the counterinsurgent power can lose by not winning."²⁵ Here is the second advantage of the insurgent over his opponent. Again the conventional military advantage of the stronger counterinsurgent cannot be used to defeat the ethereal will of a people.

The third advantage for the insurgent is also linked to popular support. This element of popular support stems not from wanting to resist against invaders, but is rather a function of individuals' survival within their society. Even if the nation's people do not support the insurgency, it is difficult for occupying forces to gain a host nation's complete support. This is because once the occupying "protecting" force leaves, those who cooperated with the occupying force will be left behind to suffer their fate with the inevitable remaining insurgents. Through coercion and terrorism populations are dissuaded from aiding outside forces purely out of self-preservation or preservation of their families. Once again, superior military power cannot triumph over the lack of cooperation from indigenous populations.

²⁴ Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony," *International Security* 28 no. 1 (2003): 23.

²⁵ Jeffrey Record, "Why The Strong Lose," *Parameters* 35 no. 4 (Winter 2005-05): 20.

²⁶ Martin Wolf, "The Limits of America's Military Power," *The Financial Times*, 8 July 2003, 1.

The fourth reason why the larger counterinsurgent force cannot use his military advantage to its fullest effect is due to the type of warfare. There is usually a significant technological military advantage of the large counterinsurgent over his opponent. Larger powers have standing conventional military forces, albeit with varying degrees of modern equipment, but still much larger in scale and much more technologically capable than any insurgent. The insurgent on the other hand may have no military force at all. This is because the insurgent is an organization that may or may not have an accompanying military arm. Since an insurgency is first and foremost a socio-political phenomenon, an insurgency will likely not have a military component in the early stages. Galula states that in the "cold revolutionary war" the insurgent's activity is mostly legal and non-violent and progresses to violence depending on when the insurgent determines the appropriate time is.²⁷

What is important here is that since the insurgent has either no or limited military capability, it is difficult to employ military force against him. Even in the case where the insurgency escalates into a larger armed conflict such as in the Second Indochina War, the nature of guerrilla warfare is such that conventional forces are challenged to effectively bring the full weight and advantage of their significantly more powerful military force to bear on the smaller, weaker force.

The nature of asymmetric warfare itself means that the stronger power cannot use its conventional military advantage to full capacity. Therefore, while there is still

²⁷ David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice ..., 43.

remains an absolute requirement to employ military force, the counterinsurgent's military superiority does not necessarily offer an immediate advantage over the military capability of the insurgent. The interplay between insurgent forces and the population makes the wielding of military power a complex venture.

The complexity of the nature of warfare does not stop on the battlefield. As the US pursues its foreign policy objectives, one wonders what assumptions guided a country's strategy. In the next section we shall see that large powers sometimes fail because of the assumptions on which they base their policy. In non-Western theatres such as Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, logic that would normally be appropriate in a Western policy simply does not work.

FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS

Four years after the start of America's invasion of Iraq, there appears to be no compelling proof that the US strategy is yet effective. While there have been changes in these countries, the current frailty of the struggling indigenous national government and the seemingly irreconcilable divides between local religious and cultural factions, portend a prolonged and gruelling journey to the point where the US can declare mission success and withdraw from theatre. But why is it that the only country in the world with access to all the resources it needs is not able to succeed? This question is by no means intended to denigrate the efforts of the US or its allies in their efforts to grapple with the complex task of shoring up and rebuilding a failed nation. The recent release of FM 3-24, the US

Army's new Counterinsurgency Manual, is proof positive that the US understands the subtleties of fighting insurgency. Nevertheless the point remains, why has the US not yet succeeded?

Large powers, particularly the US, do not always succeed in advancing foreign policy due not only to limitations associated with their power image but also from the foreign policy approach taken. The US history of isolating a country through the application of diplomatic and economic sanctions has met with mixed results. While punitive 'sticks' are a legitimate means to implementing foreign policy, there is a compelling argument that contends applying sanctions actually reinforces the resolve of a diplomatic adversary to resist outside interference.²⁸ In fact history indicates that that when a weaker unconventional opponent is attacked with conventional military force, the result will most likely be an increase in the resolve of the weaker actor.²⁹

If coercive measures are one method of effecting regime cooperation, then the inducement of change using the rewards of 'carrots' are another. Instead of threatening a regime to change or modify its behaviour, induce change by offering dispensation. If a target government concedes to a change or modification in policy by acceptance of a diplomatic or economic benefit, then the long-term conditions for continued success are more likely to be framed in a cooperative rather than adversarial context. That is to say,

²⁸ Miroslav Nincic, "The Logic of Positive Engagement: Dealing with Renegade Regimes," *International Studies Perspectives* 7 no 4 (November 2006), 325.

²⁹ Jeffrey Record, "The Limits and Temptations of America's Conventional Military Primacy," *Survival* 47 no. 1 (Spring 2005): 36.

that if international diplomacy is to have any chance at bearing long-term results, positive engagement must be part of the solution set. There is, however, the underlying assumption that the recipient country wants help, especially Western liberal democratic help.

Engagement is an acceptable policy option from a Western, liberal, democratic perspective. It seems perfectly suitable and logical, except for one thing: countries like Iraq are not Western, liberal democracies. As Diana West observes, why is it that Western countries such as the US insist, "...such logic works the same way everywhere." Perhaps the secret to success in lies not in pursuing a plan based on what would normally be accepted as logical according to Western solutions, but rather on a plan based on that country's accepted problem solving approach. As always, history holds a poignant lesson.

In Vietnam, American leadership drastically underestimated the PLAF resolve and determination. The US underestimated the importance of Confucianism as a fundamental culturally defining element of Vietnamese society. Confucianism places the desires of the individual subordinate to the needs of the family or group. As such, there is a societal obligation to supporting each other that is fundamentally different from a US culture that promotes life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that is to say that these are individual pursuits. In other words, by applying Western logic, it is mistakenly assumed that non-Western peoples embrace similar values and have similar cultural expectations.

³⁰ Diana West, "A Flawed Strategy in Iraq," *The Washington Times*, 23 March 2007.

Clearly, this is not so. Cultural and religious practices of Muslims serve to underscore this point.

Islamic law or *Shari'a* is based largely on teachings of the *Qu'ran*. While the *Qu'ran* is common throughout Islam, practices of jurisprudence differ significantly between regions based on Islamic sect, Shia or Sunni, degree of adherence to religious practice, and even local custom and precedence. Even at a very basic level, it would be a significant challenge to create a body of law or rules of governance for a country with such a diverse cultural make up. Furthermore, many Islamic cultural practices especially regarding women are fundamentally different from Western Christian customs. Similar schisms in cultural understanding are currently at play in Afghanistan.

It could be said that Afghanistan is not a failed state because it was never really a state to start with. This is because Afghanistan is a tribal territory. In Afghanistan, tribal code calls for revenge if someone is slighted. Further, bearing arms is a part of accepted Afghan culture; it is unthinkable to be without a firearm even in peacetime. Together, these two elements of accepted cultural behaviour combine to make a potentially volatile society with serious consequences.³¹ It therefore seems clear that if the essential societal framework is not properly understood by an outside agency, then solutions to the problems cannot be developed in the correct context.

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³¹ Louis A. Delvoie, "Afghanistan: Realistic Expectations," *Canadian Military Journal* 7 no. 3 (Autumn 2006): 88.

In all problem-solving processes it is necessary to make assumptions. Applying 'normal' Western thinking to non-Western cultures clearly misses the mark in producing a completely satisfactory result. The question that remains to be answered in this paper is: Can anyone else do a better job?

SUMMARY

In this chapter we have explored what challenges the great powers and specifically the US face in trying to successfully interact with smaller powers. We have examined three sources of contemporary power: hard power, which includes economic and military and soft power, which is derived from the ability for one party to attract the other party to his point of view. Big powers fail to succeed based on their resources alone due to a lack of understanding of the implications inherent in big power–small power relations. The nature of asymmetric conflict largely neutralizes the material hard power advantages that big powers normally possess. The differences in both how and why nations fight give the weaker power a significant advantage over the strong. Finally, the application of Western logic does not always account for cultural, religious and tribal factors that are at play in non-Western countries.

In this first chapter it is clear what resources nations possess that enable them to act on the international political stage. It is also clear that there are limits to a nation's power. Given these limitations, it is unlikely for one nation, even the world's only superpower, to achieve success all the time for all international interactions. In the next

chapter, we shall explore Canada's past successes, what Canada's relative power status was during those successes and how this enabled Canada to succeed.

<u>CHAPTER 2 – THE CANADIAN MIDDLE POWER ADVANTAGE</u>

"The world needs a middle power like Canada that brings a point of view to the world that is rooted in North America, but which is independent from the United States," 32

Deputy Prime Minister John Manley

So far we have established the difficulties facing big powers in international politics. Due to the complex nature of international relations, there are elements at work that diminish the hard power advantages generally held by big powers. So why would other countries dare presume that they are able to achieve goals that elude the great powers? To be clear there is no guarantee that smaller powers can necessarily be more successful at international relations than great powers. Nevertheless, it is worth investigating how middle powers interact in the world arena and how their track record compares to that of the big powers.

The aim of this chapter is to determine whether the nature of a middle power's character enables it to wield influence in the global political arena. Specifically, does Canada's relative position of power in the world permit Canada to achieve its goals in a diplomatically less threatening manner than major powers? In this chapter, we will explore how other middle power countries perform on the world stage and explore their overall effectiveness. Using Nye's definition of soft power, a pattern will emerge regarding a nation's culture, its political values and its approach to foreign policy.³³

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³² Steven Edwards, "US View not only one, Manley tells Americans," *National Post*, 14 June 2003, A4.

MIDDLE POWER

Before exploring middlepowership a definition of middle power is in order.

There are several ways middle power is interpreted. The term itself has been the subject of much academic debate, and there are those who suggest that the concept of middle power has been intentionally perpetuated as a means of inflating the sense of importance of those states that do not have the traditional prerequisites to wield significant influence in the realm of international relations.³⁴

Adam Chapnick asserts that the principle behind non-great powers wielding influence should be based on the 'functional principle.' This means that states can be involved in international affairs to the extent that their national interests and capacity allow at a given point in time. While the concept of 'functionalism' is a perhaps a more accurate way of describing the actions of those states that are neither great nor small, the fact remains, these countries are by default 'in the middle' and will always have a greater or lesser degree of capacity to engage in world affairs. Chapnick does acknowledge that his point could be considered academic hair splitting since different labelling does not necessarily change the substantive understanding of the term. Notwithstanding Chapnick's assertion, for the purposes of this paper the term *middle power* will be used in reference to those non-large powers who merit separate consideration from small or weak

³³ Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics..., 11.

³⁴ Adam Chapnick, "The Middle Power Myth," International Journal 55 no 2 (Spring 2000): 189.

states by the way in which they implement foreign policy and their ability to influence global decision making.

The first concept of a middle power traces back as far as 1589 where Italian political writer Botero used the term in *Ragion di Stato*. The concept has evolved over time taking on several meanings, and is frequently applied in overlapping contexts. The characteristics of each middle power nation are unique, and so it is important to understand the nuances of each definition so as to appreciate the full complexity of the term when applied to specific countries.

The first definition of middle power to be discussed is traced to the German origins of the concept where a country is literally a *Mittelmacht*, a geographic middle-power, when it is associated by proximity next to or in between great powers. The geostrategic location of these countries empowers them to maintain the balance of power between two stronger states.³⁶ Luxembourg offers an example of a state that has such a geographic challenge of maintaining a balance between two large powers. As part of its official foreign policy, Luxembourg has traditionally worked towards maintaining harmony between France and Germany.³⁷

³⁵ Carsten Holbraad, *The Role of Middle Powers* Occasional Papers 18 (Ottawa: School of International Affairs, Carleton University,1972), 5. Botero's usage discusses relative survivability of middle-sized states compared to larger and ones.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

³⁷ Jeanne A.K. Hey, "Luxembourg: Where Small Works (and Wealthy Doesn't Hurt)," in *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*, ed Jeanne A.K. Hey, 75-94 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 84.

Perhaps a more intuitive hard power definition, a middle power can be identified by its relative position in the international hierarchy. This definition links back to Botero's concept of the relative position a nation occupies with respect to the others. If a nation has moderate military and economic strength, then it will be strong enough to prevent aggression, but it is less likely to be perceived as a threat than a great nation. This definition relates how economic and military influence defines where a middle power 'fits' into the world scale. Ironically, Italy is a good example of a middle power.³⁸ Holding a credible military and sound economy, Italy neither poses a threat to others nor is threatened by others.

The third definition of middle power is one that depicts certain countries as possessing a more virtuous character than other states.³⁹ This definition relates back to Nye's attractiveness of soft power. There is a sense that a state has a degree of moral character and as such exerts diplomatic influence based on a certain recognized trust. Sweden is well established as a middle power. Based on a historical pattern of neutrality, charity and a liberal immigration policy, Sweden is a prominent member of the moral

³⁸ Middle Power Initiative, http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/archives/000175.shtml; Internet; accessed 18 February 2007. Italy is included in the MPI list of middle power countries.

³⁹ Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993), 17-18.

power club. ⁴⁰ Norway has also made a name for itself for contributing to a better world, both in conducting peacekeeping and delivering aid. ⁴¹

A fourth way of understanding middle powers is via the idea of a nation's behaviour. A country is a middle power because it is a leader in multilateral decision-making and demonstrating willingness to compromise.⁴² Australia is one such nation that is well known the effects it has tried to achieve in world politics. A significant south pacific regional power, Australia has been a key member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), building trade success within Asia and Pacific Rim.⁴³

In addition to these four well established definitions, there are also some emerging variations of middlepowership. Given its population size, economic and military role and proximity to Russia, Ukraine holds a middle power at least in an Eastern-block form. There is also the notion that two regional, like-minded nations with complimentary resources and the ability to work collaboratively could be considered a middle power. Monica Hirst argues that the due to pressure exerted by the US, Brazil and Argentina have been forced to work cooperatively on economic and defence issues,

⁴⁰ Christopher Caldwell, "A Swedish Dilemma," *Weekly Standard*, Vol 10 Issue 22, 28 February 2005. http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer preview .asp?idArticle=5271&R=ED33710; Internet; accessed 27 January 2007.

⁴¹ Jonas Gahr Støre, "Norway – a peace nation Myth or fact?" A speech delivered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs at The Nobel Peace Center, Rådhusplassen, Oslo, 24 April 2006; http://odin.dep.no/ud/english/news/speeches/minister_a/032171-090628/dok-bn.html; Internet accessed 27 January 2007.

⁴² Bernard Wood, *The Middle Powers and the General Interest*, Middle Powers in the International System (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1998), 20.

⁴³ Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993), 98-105.

and that these countries together can be thought of as a middle power. Independently two countries may not have the sufficient resources or ability to achieve a diplomatic solution, but the combined capacity of two countries (there is an assumption that these are regional countries) can be wielded effectively as a single entity.⁴⁴

While there are several ways of thinking about a middle power and from where it draws it source of influence, it is not necessary to settle on one particular definition. It is more important to understand the implications of the term 'middle power' within the context that it is applied. Each of these definitions helps to explain the subtleties of what a middle power is and how their individual characteristics impact on their middle power status.

With these interpretations of the term 'middle power' and an understanding of who these middle powers could be, let us explore in detail why Canada is a middle power, and how middle powers can bring their influence to bear in the world political arena.

CANADA'S SPECIAL PLACE IN THE WORLD

Canada's unique attributes are such that all four of the above definitions of middle power are meaningful with respect to Canada. Within each of these realms of middle power, Canada has an ability to wield influence. By exploring these middle power roles,

 $^{^{44}}$ Geoffrey Hayes, "Middle Powers in the New World Order," *Behind the Headlines* 51 no.2 (Winter 1993-94): 9.

it will become evident that Canada has certain advantages over large powers that enable it to act more effectively in certain corners of the world arena than big powers. The ability to accomplish goals that others may not is due to Canada's 'special place' in the world.

Canada's relative position within the global hierarchy stems from several roots.

Located adjacent to the world's superpower, Canada has an undeniable geographic claim to being a middle power. While Canada might not appear to have the traditional sources of hard power, examination reveals that Canada has a certain economic clout and a current military credibility that lends credence to Canada's claim as a middle power.

Canada's soft power attractiveness is a key component of Canadian middle power.

Finally, Canada's history of working through multilateral institutions is directly attributable to Canada's status as a middle power. Throughout this next section, it will be shown that Canada's unique situation is grounded in a pattern of credible international diplomacy consistent with its middle power status.

Proximity to the US

If the US is the world's superpower, then Canada could be considered the world's ultimate *Mittelmacht*. Sharing the world's longest undefended border, Canada's geographic proximity to the US has a profound influence on almost every aspect of foreign and even domestic policy. But being a member of this exclusive neighbourhood has both privileges and responsibilities. The complexities of Canada-US relations will not be fully explored here. Nevertheless, Canada's interaction with the US during key

periods in history concerning specific issues reveals that Canada can both enhance US policy and also act as an irritant.

During the Cold War, Canada occupied a key position between the United States and the Soviet Union, possessing "the most vital airspace in the world." Established in 1958, NORAD's core mission is still to "Deter, detect, and defeat aerospace threats to North America." While it could be argued that Canada's geographic importance may have declined since the end of the Cold War, the fact that the defence of continental North America depends on the cooperation of both Canada and the US is still extant. In fact the role of Canada might be more important now than during the Cold War.

First, there is the issue of Ballistic Missile Defence and the ongoing requirement for cooperation due to the continued air space protection concerns. These concerns are no longer attributable to another great power such as the Soviet Union, but rather potential rogue nations such as North Korea. Further, due to the bi-national security implications of a post 9/11 threat environment, Canada's function as a middle power fighting terrorism is still germane. A brief comparison between Europe and North America is instructive.

Within Europe borders between countries are virtually invisible. A common currency signals a willingness for fiscal cooperation and trade equity. Physical borders

⁴⁵ Kim R. Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc, 1985), 25.

⁴⁶ NORAD; http://www.norad.mil/about_us.htm; Internet; accessed 28 February 2007.

are now seamless with no guarded border crossings and no requirement to present passports in order to move between nations. In contrast, Canadian and American dollars are still separate currencies, the American dollar naturally being the more dominant. For the first time ever, Canadian border guards will be armed as of summer 2007. Canadians can no longer fly to the US without a passport and will soon not be admitted to the US at all without one.⁴⁷ This is part of the price to be paid as a middle power member of the North American neighbourhood. Thus, Canada's location is still an important component of its role as a middle power.

Canada's geostrategic position enables Canadian leaders to foster unique relationships with leaders of the world's superpower. Canada's 'special relationship' with the US enables Canada to do things other states cannot. This relationship is sometimes one that is stretched to the fullest extent of diplomatic relations as witnessed between Prime Minister Diefenbaker and President Kennedy during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and shortly thereafter with the Pearson-Johnson tension over Vietnam. The seemingly ongoing cycle of agreement and disagreement over continental ballistic missile defence is likely to be a point of permanent divergence in policy. In all these cases, Canada's difference of opinion on security issues, rightly or wrongly, demonstrates an independent, Canadian approach to foreign policy. Despite the exclusive link between the US and Canada, there is an established pattern that suggests that Canada can maintain an independent diplomatic position from the US. This freedom of diplomatic action affords Canada the means of conducting international negotiations from a unique

⁴⁷ CBSA; http://www.cbsa.gc.ca/agency/whti-ivho/how-comment-e.html; Internet; accessed 28 February 2007.

position, one that can be independent from the world's superpowers, but can equally permit Canada to use this diplomatic relationship if required.

Nevertheless, independent action sometimes comes at a cost. Jack Granatstein maintains that the US is of 'overwhelming importance' to Canada and cautions that anti-Americanism does not equate to independence. Canadian leaders should appreciate that they can exercise autonomy from US policy, but there is a potential cost to be borne in the strength of the relationship with its closest ally. The ability for Canada to have its own opinion when tackling international issues is a key part of successful negotiations. That said, even Granatstein admits that there are instances where acting to constrain unilateral American action is in Canada's national interest.

Hard Canada – Economic Stability and Canada's Military

As discussed, the two principal components of a nation's hard power are based on economic and military strength. While the following analysis is not definitive, here is an assessment of Canada's current relative hard power.

Economic. As a trading nation, Canada's economy is tied to that of the US, giving Canada both economic stability and dependency. Canada is America's largest trading partner importing roughly eighty five percent of all Canadian exports. This

⁴⁸ J.L. Granatstein, "The Importance of Being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada's National Interests through Tighter Ties with the U.S," C.D. Howe Institute Benefactors Lecture, Toronto, October 2003, 25.

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means that success a successful US economy will result in a flourishing Canadian economy. Similarly, an economic downturn in the US will tug at Canadian prosperity. However, presuming that the US continues to prosper, Canada's future is also promising. Further, given that Canada possesses the world's second largest reserve of oil, its economic future should continue to be bright. Canada's oil reserves will be a key factor in maintaining a close and cooperative relationship with the US. This will enable Canada to continue to hold significant sway with US policy makers, one that could be leveraged during international negotiations.

However, with the war in Iraq entering its fourth year, and based on the adverse economic conditions in the US following their last major conflict in Vietnam, Canada's future economic stability and hence its credibility as a middle power could equally be endangered by such a close economic linkage. If the US economy falters in a post-war US, Canada's economy will be drawn in the same direction. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to surmise that Canada's unique economic connection with the US does afford Canada some negotiating leverage that could be used advantageously during international diplomacy.

Military. During the 1990's, Canada's military became a victim of other government spending imperatives. Despite participation in numerous United Nations missions, by the mid nineties, Canada's military power had receded to levels comparable

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⁴⁹ Energy Information Administration; http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Canada/Oil.html; Internet; accessed 19 February 2007.

with lows of 1939 and 1950.⁵⁰ Even as recently as 2003, poor equipment, negative publicity and a general government and public apathy continued to plague the Canadian Forces (CF). But that was before Afghanistan.

Transforming from a philanthropic 'peacekeeping' military, in 2003 the CF struck out in a bold new role. When Defence Minister McCallum announced Canada's participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under NATO, the credibility of the CF was reborn. During the past three years Canada's military successes have re-equipped Canada with voice and influence within NATO. Current efforts in Afghanistan offer evidence that Canadian credibility is sound and perhaps stronger than ever. ⁵¹ Other notable indicators point to the same conclusion.

In 1997, Louise Fréchette was selected as the Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations. In summer 2005, Canada's former Chief of Defence Staff, Gen Henault was selected as NATO's chief military advisor. In 2006, Canadian Major General Petras will become the chair of NATO's influential National Reserve Forces Committee, while yet another senior Canadian officer, Captain (Navy) Carman McNary, will assume the presidency of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers. Captain McNary states that these appointments indicate "...a formidable leadership presence on the international military stage, [and] a clear demonstration of Canada's influence within NATO..."

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⁵⁰ Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in The World* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2003), 46.

⁵¹ CBC. News. NATO chief rejects claim Canada bears Afghan burden. 23 February 2007. http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2007/02/23/nato-canada-070223.html. Internet: accessed 24 February 2007.

While it is true that Canada's defence budget suffered a decline in the 1990's, the current trend is more hopeful. With Defence Minister O'Conner's recent announcements regarding the acquisition of several key pieces of new equipment and a commitment to growing the regular force component of the CF by 15,000 members, approximately twenty five percent, indications are that Canada's military is once again a robust, credible fighting force. With this renewed military component of hard power, Canada's middle power status is further reinforced. Canada for the first time in almost twenty years is equipped with a credible military with recent operational experience that enables Canada to have a voice in international security discussions.

Soft Canada – Attractive Canada

There is a commonly held myth regarding Canada. It is a myth that evokes views of great tolerance and moral superiority. It is a myth because this view is a perception of Canada by Canadians.⁵⁴ Canadians see themselves as altruistic members of the world community. These global do-gooders hand out foodstuffs and carry out noble peacekeeping in the name of world order and humanity. Despite this predilection for self-congratulatory diplomacy, is there any substance to what Canadians claim? While

⁵² Department of National Defence, Canadians Take Lead Roles with NATO Reserves, 7 July 2006; http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view news e.asp?id=197; Internet; accessed 3 March 2007.

⁵³ Department of National Defence, Speaking Notes for the Honourable Gordon J. O'Connor, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute Annual General Meeting, 23 February 2006; http://www.dnd.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1860; Internet; accessed 3 March 2007.

⁵⁴ J.L. Granatstein, "The Importance of Being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada's National Interests through Tighter Ties with the U.S." C.D. Howe Institute Benefactors Lecture, Toronto, October 2003.

how Canada sees itself on the world stage is important for internal consumption in terms of reassuring governments of public support, what is more important is how others see Canada. Since soft power is a function of national credibility, ⁵⁵ it is necessary to establish Canadian credibility on the world stage so as to demonstrate that Canada does indeed have soft power to wield.

From a cultural perspective Canada and the US are very similar, but are equally different. While the US is the great melting pot where peoples from all nations are assimilated into 'Americans', Canada is more of a chunky stew where individual religious, ethnic, racial and linguistic groups are encouraged to retain their defining identities within a loosely viscous, colloidal society. Both countries welcome new members to their country; however, there are quite different expectations for US immigrants than Canadian. The resulting freedom of cultural expression that is fostered in Canada might provide Canada with a soft power edge.

If Nye's argument is valid that soft power is a viable means of influence, then Canada can exploit this aspect. Canada's diversity has the potential to enable Canada to connect with peoples of other nations. Canada's immigrant community and aboriginal peoples might be able to form the bridge required between Western nations and countries in which the international community is acting. To illustrate this concept, let us look briefly at Indonesia.

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⁵⁵ Joseph S. Jr Nye. *The Paradox of American Power...*, 69.

Indonesia is the largest liberal democracy in Southeast Asia and the nation with the largest Muslim population in the world. It is believed that Indonesia might possess the requisite criteria needed to enable it to act as the mediating middle power in today's struggle with radical Muslim terrorist groups. ⁵⁶ If Indonesia can leverage Islam against contemporary Muslim threats, then Canada too has the potential to tap into its Muslim-Canadians. Canada has employed this concept in Peru.

Canadian aboriginals have been successful in establishing a tribal parliament and on creating a new Canadian aboriginal territory. Building on this success, Canadian aboriginals are assisting Peruvian natives in establishing their own government. Until 2001, Peru had no indigenous national assembly. Canada has been instrumental in helping Peru advance human rights, health, education and aboriginal governance agendas.⁵⁷ While this is not necessarily a definitive model of Canadian soft power foreign policy, it is a proof of concept that has achieved success.

This ethnic-religious example is only one area in which Canada can potentially leverage its soft power. Nevertheless, the argument holds that Canada has the ability to employ its soft power in an international setting. Canada's approach to multi-culturalism could arm Canada with an attractiveness with which other countries can identify. While even Nye acknowledges that soft power is difficult to exert in the same way as

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⁵⁶ Greg Sheridan, A powerful voice of moderation, *The Australian*, 03 February 03, 2007.

⁵⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/aboriginalplanet/around/latin/arperu-en.asp; Internet; accessed 19 February 2007.

conventional hard power resources, it remains that there is the possibility that Canadian soft power based on values can be harnessed.

The Good International Citizen

"Diplomacy is more likely to succeed when the people involved respect each other, when their supporting resources are readily available, when the attendant circumstances are not all adverse." 58

Canada's physical location, relative position of power and soft power influence all contribute to Canada's credibility as middle power. But perhaps one of the more important features of Canada's middlepowerhood is based on Canada's pattern of international leadership. Canada has long been a supporter of acting through multilateral institutions. Be it the UN, NATO or G8, Canada is comfortable effecting change from within a consensus-based organization. While Canada's prominence in world affairs has not been consistent, when Canada has played a part, its contributions have been valuable and relatively predictable.

During the 1950 Korean conflict, Canada deployed military forces as part of a UN mission. This was significant since it marked the first instance where Canada had deployed armed forces under a UN mandate. This event marked Canada's official entry into the middle power neighbourhood.

⁵⁸ Geoffrey Murray, "Glimpses of Suez 1956," *International Journal* 29, 1 (Winter 1973-74): 61.

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Pearson's pivotal role during the 1956 Suez crisis will stand in Canadian political history as a defining moment for Canadian diplomacy. Due in large measure to Pearson's personal credibility and pragmatic diplomatic skills, his ability to negotiate a settlement between four powers, propelled Canada to the fore of international middlepowerhood. It has in fact been argued that the US understood the complexity of the diplomatic situation and realized that Canada could solve a diplomatic incident that none of the major powers could. Because Canada was 'non-aligned' US leaders believed "...that Canadian leadership would be more likely to attract wide support." 59

As further proof of Canada's legitimacy as a middle power, in 1976 President Ford secured an invitation for Canada to join the then G6 organization. There are several 'offshoots' of the G8 group. The so-called 'G8+5' includes that vary in middle power status. However, it is interesting that as a select group of industrialized democracies, Canada remains firmly ensconced as one of the eight principal members, testament to its standing as a middle power.

The eighties and nineties were not memorable years for Canadian international achievement. Due in part to domestic uncertainties, government shifts and changes in priorities, for Canadian diplomats the nineties was "a calamitous decade." Nevertheless, there were notable instances where Canadian diplomats resurrected the

⁵⁹ John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order*, vol. 2, *1943-1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 361 and 367.

⁶⁰ Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept..., 137.

'Pearsonian' tradition of diplomacy that had brought Canada so much credibility in the fifties.

In 1987, despite Britain's objections, Prime Minister Mulroney worked through the then G7 and Commonwealth venues imposing sanctions, albeit relatively minor ones, against South Africa to raise awareness of apartheid. This continued for several years and in 1989 Canada used its influence as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council to help further this cause. Former Canadian Ambassador to the UN Stephen Lewis called Canada "...a major international power..." in the effort to lead the international community to force an end to apartheid.⁶¹

In the nineties, Canada was a key leader in two particular international endeavours: the Ottawa Treaty calling for a ban on anti-personnel mines and the establishment of the International Criminal Court.⁶² While neither of these initiatives was ratified by the US, both initiatives received widespread international support and demonstrated that Canada still has a serious ability to wield middle power influence.

This brief evaluation Canada's middle power status offers considerable evidence that Canada's position in the world arena is prominent. Before the country was even one hundred years old, Canada emerged as a powerful mediator, capable of reaching

⁶¹ CBC. Despite sanctions, Canada's trade with South Africa is up; http://archives.cbc.ca/IDCC-1-71-703-4144/conflict_war/apartheid/; Internet; accessed 25 February 2007.

⁶² Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept..., 154.

settlements and leading change where others could not. Devoid of economic and political agendas of the major powers, yet equipped with diplomatic robustness unavailable to smaller powers, Canada has been a middle power leader in the world for almost sixty years.

A WORD OF CAUTION

Up to this point, it is clear that the middle powers have a role to play in world affairs and can achieve things due to their middle power attributes, sometimes where large powers cannot. But establishing the righteousness of the middle power is not the intent. The point here is that middle powers must work in concert with others, and that is where the middle power draws its strength. There will always be a requirement for nations to work collaboratively in order to maximize their overall effectiveness. This is where middle-powers and regional powers can bring their advantages to bear in the international arena. But that is not all. There are two key observations.

First, it is not useful for countries to assume a position of moral superiority. This can delude as to why a country has diplomatic influence and will quickly diminish the influence of any country. In the past, this has been a pit into which Canada has fallen.

Second, it is less important to classify a nation within a bracket of power than it is to view a nation by what it has done with its power, and for what purposes.⁶³ While it is

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⁶³ Jennifer Welsh, At Home in The World (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2004), 135.

necessary to understand a nation's power sources and a nation's will to employ these resources, it should be remembered that why a country does something is sometimes more important than the actual act itself. Even Chapnick concedes, "Canada has used the concept of middle power to further its foreign policy aims...." If this is indeed the case, Canada does have unique policy options available that could enable Canada to succeed on the international stage where others may not.

It is in this vein that we move to the next part of the paper. If middle powers have unique policy options available to them, then what are they and how are they to be achieved? How can a country such as Canada exercise its independence without jeopardizing its relationships with key partners without disenfranchising them? Furthermore, are there distinctive advantages that Canada has over the US that will enable Canada to be an international leader? If the US cannot accomplish some of its foreign policy objectives, perhaps Canada truly does have a unique role to play.

SUMMARY

In this chapter the definition of middle power has been divided into four component parts. A nation can be a middle power due to its physical location in relation to a larger power. A middle power can be so defined due to its relative ranking of hard power assets when compared to other nations. A country's attractiveness can create a soft middle power. Finally, the way in which a nation chooses to conduct itself on the

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⁶⁴ Adam Chapnick, "The Middle Power Myth,"..., 188.

international stage will create a behavioural pattern that can be associated with a county of middle power status.

As a middle power by all four definitions, Canada's distinctive geo-strategic situation means that Canada has linkages with other nations both great and small that will permit Canadian diplomats to conduct negotiations from a unique perspective. Canada's current hard power resources reflect Canada's current sound reputation as a credible middle power. Canadian soft power has the ability to play a key role in Canadian diplomacy. Lastly, Canada's historical pattern of international political behaviour has established Canada as a well-respected international mediator, able to successfully negotiate through complex multi-lateral institutions.

Now that it has been established that Canada is a legitimate middle power and that Canada presently has a position of prominence as a middle power, the next chapter will explore how Canada can use its influence in order to advance the international agenda of peace and security.

CHAPTER 3 – APPLYING CANADIAN MIDDLE POWER

"It is really vital that we develop a 'grand strategy for a small country' that integrates military, diplomatic, and foreign aid instruments in a thrust that preserves security and opportunity at home, advances leverage with our allies, and responds in an integrated way to the threats that are real from abroad." 65

Although large powers have the resources and tools required to act unilaterally, "the US lacks both the international and domestic prerequisites to resolve conflicts that are internal to other societies...." Nye goes on to say that even the US needs the cooperation of middle powers to achieve its objectives. Middle power countries such as Canada possess attributes that enable them to act in certain internationally settings more effectively than large powers. Physical location, smaller hard power assets, soft power attractiveness and a tendency towards cooperative multilateralism can all contribute to a middle power's less threatening perception.

In a recent survey, Canada and Japan tied for first place as the countries that people identified as 'the most positively viewed state.' While the description is somewhat ambiguous, clearly Canada has an attractiveness that people appreciate. One of the key explanations given was due to the way that many of the unattractive countries, which included Israel, Iran and the US, used military power to pursue their foreign

 65 Hugh Segal, "A Grand Strategy for a Small Country," *Canadian Military Journal*, 4 no. 3 (Autumn 2003), 5.

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⁶⁶ Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power ..., 40.

policies.⁶⁷ It would appear that the perception of Canada is decidedly positive and unthreatening. Given certain challenges that great powers have, it is worthwhile considering whether or not Canada can employ its tools of middle power tools of statecraft more effectively to achieve positive effects in a troubled place such as Afghanistan.

In this chapter we will look at foreign policy effects of middle powers as they interact with large powers. Specifically, based on Canada's current relative position of power within the international arena, the aim of this chapter is to explore how Canada can employ its middle power in order to be more effective in Afghanistan.

But why is it important for Canada to act in the international arena at all? Canada is a neutral country that is happy to trade with others to its economic advantage.

Canadians are happy to live a peaceful co-existence in North America with the US, while the US carries out its daily business of global superpowership. But that is not so. Canada is not a neutral country; it is a fully-fledged member of several military and economic alliances. As Canada develops and implements foreign policy it is essential that this fact be considered in every decision.

If middle powers behave as great powers they run the risk of creating for themselves a similar reputation as the great powers. This is not necessarily helpful in

⁶⁷ Olivia Ward, "Israel, Iran world's most disliked countries, poll finds," *Toronto Star*, 6 March 2007, A10. The BBC World Service survey on the influence of 12 of the world's major countries included the opinions of 28,000 people from 27 countries.

building a reputation as a country aiming to maintain a certain diplomatic independence from the great powers. For example, the US did not ratify the Hague Convention, either of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention, the Ottawa Treaty or the statute recognizing the authority of the International Criminal Court. Most nations have accepted these treaties, laws and international judicial bodies that are all aimed at making conflict unnecessarily barbaric. While the US and others have their own reasons for not following policies adopted by the majority of Western nations, as a whole, the impression is that the US is willing to conduct armed operations on their own terms and answerable to only their nation's laws and no others. If middle powers are to work towards improving global peace and security, they need to follow policies that will not colour them with these aggressive, unilateral impressions.

While numerous examples throughout the first two chapters have illustrated how middle and great powers interact, the following section serves to bring some structure to these relations. If there is a reasonably consistency to these relations, then it will be possible to craft a deliberate, more predictable approach to policy.

⁶⁸ International Committee of the Red Cross. State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 29-Mar-2007, http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party_main_treaties/\$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf; Internet accessed 1 April 2007.

FOREIGN POLICY - A MIDDLE POWER APPROACH

In order to develop an effective foreign policy commensurate with a middle power's relative position with the world order, it is necessary to understand how middle power behaviour affects the large power. Denis Stairs perhaps overstates the case when he says, "...the only real imperative in Canadian foreign policy is Canada's relationship with the US." Nevertheless, his point is valid that Canadian foreign policy must take into account the impact of Canadian policy on the US before Canadian action is taken. As Pearson, Diefenbaker, Trudeau and Chrétien can all attest, unilateral action taken without having informed the US is likely to result in both diplomatic and economic tension. Let us then examine how middle power foreign policy affects that of the great power.

Chong Ja Ian describes a series of different effects that non-great states attempt to achieve through interaction with great powers. He describes these reactions in terms of countries' response to the preponderance of American power. In other words, in response to great power action, middle power nations will respond in two principle ways. His initial discussion posits that nations will attempt to balance a powerful nation by attempting to shift the distribution of power through alliances and domestic policy. If a state is unable to affect a degree of balancing, it will 'bandwagon' with the powerful, essentially going along with the great power in order to achieve its own policy objectives.

⁶⁹ D. Stairs et al, *In The National Interest...*, viii.

He goes on further to bring greater definition to these actions. Buffering, binding, bonding and beleaguering all are used to describe how states attempt to either balance or align with the great powers.⁷⁰ These definitions provide a useful framework in which to consider a states reaction to great power actions in a unipolar world. Without going too far into each of these definitions, suffice it to say that middle power states have the potential to perform one or more of these functions depending on their relative level of power and on their level of integration into the world system.⁷¹

Relative Power Under Unipolarity

		Lesser	Greater
Lev ntegr: the V	Lesser	Bonding	Beleaguering
el of ation in Vorld stem	Greater	Binding	Buffering

Fig 1. State responses to preponderant power where differences in power between the leading and other states are moderately large.⁷²

How a middle power interacts with a great power will influence how the rest of the world's nations perceive it. So how does a middle power find the right approach to

⁷⁰Chong Ja Ian, "Revisiting Responses to Power Preponderance: Going Beyond the Balancing-Bandwagoning Dichotomy," Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. November 2003.

Technological University, Singapore, January 2004, 1. Binding is the entering of institutional arrangements with a stronger state by a weaker state to secure a mechanism for restraining the stronger state in exchange for recognizing leadership. Bonding is the creation of functional value by a weaker state to give others a stake in its interests. Buffering is the establishment of a set of institutional and other arrangements weaker states undertake with each other to reduce the influence and impact of the stronger state. Beleaguering is the disruptive action taken by a weaker state in order to receive payoff from stronger states to desist or not repeat such behaviour.

⁷² Chong Ja Ian, "Revisiting Responses to Power Preponderance: Going Beyond ..., 10.

conducting international, relations within a US dominated world? As Ian's model illustrates, the answer depends on the level of integration within the world and, similar to Chapnick's assertion, the relative degree of power available to that nation. That said, there are still limits to how middle powers are likely to behave and thus ultimately on the successes they can achieve.

Bernard Wood provides a good summary of the traditional roles that middle powers.⁷³ He suggests that if a middle power is to perform more effectively in international relations than the great powers, then they must focus in the appropriate areas. If these middle power roles are coupled with the effects that they are likely to have on the great powers, we can start to form the basis of policy options for middle powers. The following table indicates what effects each traditional role has on the great power along with some historical examples.

Traditional Role	Policy Option	Historical Examples
Leader, Regional or sub-regional	Buffering	Ottawa Treaty
Functional Leader	Binding	ICC
Economic management		G8
In the international commons		APEC
In international law and justice		NORAD
Stabilizing Roles	Bonding	Korea
Separating other powers		Suez
Counter-balancing or neutralizing		
Mediating		
Negative Roles	Beleaguering	NORAD – BMD
Free-riding		NAFTA
Status seeking		

⁷³ Bernard Wood, *The Middle Powers and the General Interest...*, 21.

'Good multilateral citizenship':	Buffering	NATO – Afghanistan
General commitment and Leadership		UN in general

Fig 2. Foreign policy objectives and middle power roles.

While Ian's model encompasses all non-great states, let us consider only the middle powers. If it is accepted that middle powers have by definition a high level of integration within the world, then the degree to which a country elects to bind or buffer depends on the level of relative power that nation holds in the global scale. According to the model, in so doing, middle powers will take on roles of regional leaders and will work through multilateral organizations. There are two caveats.

First, as Stairs cautions, Canada must not pursue 'dishonest multilateralism.' In order to maintain international credibility as a middle power, a country must be prepared to contribute a suitable level of resources that accompany the rhetoric. Second, pursuit of a middles power's foreign policy objectives must be in that country's national interest. If a middle power is going to pursue the buffering and binding strategy, this might mean pursuing objectives that are not necessarily in line with those of the great powers. In other words, when a middle power pursues an independent policy, the potential risks must be worth challenging the great powers. NATO is one area in which Canada can pursue middle power leadership.

The current mission in Afghanistan is NATO's first attempt at operating outside the NATO area, and many believe that the success or failure of this mission will in fact signal the future for NATO. Cohesion within NATO is essential if the alliance is to have

a viable future. Further, it is in Canada's interest to be a member of NATO and to have NATO succeed.

Many non-Western nations, middle powers or otherwise, already make little or no distinction between Americans and non-Americans from the West. It has been said that from an Afghan point of view, Canadians are just part of the big NATO war machine that continues to destroy villages in their quest to eradicate Taliban insurgents. So how then does Canada somehow define a difference in its overall approach that is different from that of the US, while still working towards maintaining the cohesion within NATO but potentially fundamentally improving the alliance's approach towards Afghanistan? One issue on which Canada could demonstrate leadership would be regarding the handling of detainees.

Canada could advocate for the elimination of the US run prisons in Guantanamo Bay and Bagram Air Base. These facilities perpetuate the American threat perception from both a hard and soft power perspective. An international detention facility run by the Afghan government with international assistance might be a better solution. Subject to the laws of the ICC, this facility would perform a similar detention role as the American prisons but would reduce the criticism levelled against the US for their current practices; thus it is in fact also in America's interest. Middle power countries with a 'global peace and security' agenda could be instrumental in this regard.

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⁷⁴ Jeffrey Simpson, "We're ignoring the Counterinsurgency Rules at Our Peril," *The Globe and Mail*, 27 September 2006, A17.

Canada currently has voice and influence in NATO that is arguably at its highest level ever. If Canada has the ability to be a legitimate middle power leader, divergence from US policy will be a true test of Canada's middlepowership. As Denis Stairs counsels, "When Canada and the US disagree on global issues...the general principles of 'quiet diplomacy' are as relevant today as they were during the cold war.'

FOREIGN POLICY - A CANADIAN APPROACH

If a middle power can succeed in exercising foreign policy in the buffering and binding quadrants of Ian's model, then it will in effect exhibit a degree of autonomy from the great powers. In Canada's case, independent action from the US will demonstrate a specific Canadian approach. If Canada can take these delicate diplomatic steps properly, then there is potential for Canada to successfully exercise its independence, when it is in Canada's interest. Foreign policies can be either interest or values based or a mix of both. Prime Minister Blair recently expressed that there is no longer difference "...between a foreign policy driven by values and one driven by interests." However, Canada needs to be clear on how values and interests should be used in the formulation of its policy.

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⁷⁵ D. Stairs, et al, *In The National Interest...*, 18. Recommendation 7 stemming from this study.

⁷⁶ Tony Blair, "A Battle for Global Values," *Foreign Affairs* 86 no.1 (January/February 2007): 90.

In the 1995 DFAIT Foreign Policy Review, projecting Canadian values and culture was one of three key objectives.⁷⁷ This went beyond being a good international citizen, and presumed that Canadian values and culture are both good, or perhaps better than others', and that Canadian values and culture should be something that all peoples are interested in and worse, willing to follow. As Nossal remarks, this type of policy causes Canadian values to be used not for determining Canada's foreign policy objectives, but for actually becoming Canadian foreign policy objectives.⁷⁸ Why should Canada want to assimilate other peoples' values and cultures into the Canadian perspective? Nossal goes on to observe that this values-projection policy is in fact hypocritically quite un-Canadian in its approach. Ultimately, projecting Canadian values abroad is no different than the US exportation of democracy.

However, both Nossal and Granatstein point out that Canadian national interests based on Canadian values are absolutely acceptable and must in fact be the foundation upon which foreign policy is based. This is a good place to start as it ensures that Canadian international relations are guided by realistic expectations tempered by what Canadians generally believe. Furthermore, it avoids the perception of Canadian self-righteousness, which can only harm Canada's middle power reputation in the long-term.

⁷⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada in the World Canadian Foreign Policy Review 1995*, http://www.international.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menuen.asp; Internet; accessed 13 March 2007.

⁷⁸ Kim R. Nossal, "'The World We Want'? The Purposeful Confusion of Values, Goals and Interests in Canadian Foreign Policy," http://cdfai.org/PDF/The%20World% 20We% 20Want.pdf; Internet; accessed 13 March 2007.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

The 2004 National Security Policy lays out Canada's three core national security interests and is actually a good articulation of Canadian interests based on Canadian values. Canada clearly committed to "contributing to international security," specifically with regard to the prevention of intrastate conflict in failed and failing states. ⁸⁰ This was reiterated a year later in the 2005 IPS as the Government of Canada sought to stabilize failed and fragile states. ⁸¹ This goal was specific enough to be understood, yet general enough to leave room for governmental commitment. But in trying to design an improved approach to Canada's role in Afghanistan, it is the 'how' part of the implementation of government policy that needs addressing. From a defence perspective, the current CDS has already started the CF down the right path.

The CF has never been used for the purpose for which it was designed. It has always been a tool of foreign policy instead of for defending Canada. Et would seem obvious then that the CF needs to be revamped to be a more effective tool of foreign policy. As stated, Canada's current CDS has already taken some significant steps towards that end. The CF will soon have a vastly improved expeditionary capability due to the infusion of the C-17 strategic lift aircraft. The concern of more troops has also been addressed as part of General Hillier's transformation initiatives. Force projection and expansion have not been a traditional part of CF policy (at least since the end of

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⁸⁰ Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy, (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 2004), 49.

⁸¹ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World - Overview*, (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 2005), 13-14.

⁸² Kim R. Nossal, "The Army as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy: Implications for the 'Army of Tomorrow'," *Towards the Brave New World: Canada's Army in the 21st Century*, ed. Bernd Horn and Peter Gizewski, 23-32 (Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, Kingston, 2003), 25.

World War II). Given that there is no direct threat to Canadian sovereignty, this is a considerable shift in Canadian defence policy. From a defence perspective these are logical measures that position Canada be a genuine asset to NATO as well to better implement Canadian foreign policy. The proviso is that Canada does not forgo its soft power for hard.

Canada's place in the world yields a perception of a moderate Western nation. It is a nation that is highly integrated into the international system, has the ear of the Americans, but is still able to pursue foreign policy independent of the US. It has a progressive, pluralistic society, a highly developed economy and a small but credible military. In combination, Canada's reputation should enable Canada to conduct diplomacy without the threatening preconceptions that so often accompany US delegations. If Canada is to have a whole of government approach that is consistent with its position of relevance in the world, then the first place Canada should start to employ its middle power capability is at the negotiating table.

Diplomacy – Talking to Terrorists

"For the sake of the future – one, two or three decades from now – the only way to help everybody, everywhere is to co-operate with the Islamic movements and Arabic countries because they are not your enemy." 83

Mahmoud Zahar, Palestinian Foreign Minister

83 Mark MacKinnon, "Canada making enemies, Hamas warns," *Globe and Mail*, 22 January 2007,

A1. Comments made during Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay's visit to Israel, when MacKay opted not to meet with Zahar.

During a visit to Israel earlier this year, Palestinian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Zahar criticized Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay for refusing to meet together. Zahar offered that Canada could "...be a leading country, a linkage..." in discussing issues between Israel and Palestine. The extent to which a Canadian diplomat could be effective in this type of negotiation is uncertain. However, this is evidence that leaders of state and non-state actors seek to use Canada as a medium through which to conduct dialogue.

Current US policies regarding military intervention are typical approaches for large Western powers. As we now know, these methods are not always successful. After pursuing al-Qaeda into Afghanistan and then turning on the Taliban, Al-Qaeda terrorists and members of Afghanistan's former ruling Taliban are now linked to form an insurgency with the potential to use terrorism as a global method of securing negotiation. The current US diplomatic situation with Pakistan is tenuous and has not been helped by the heated diplomatic language used by US officials.

Following a recent visit by US Vice President Cheney to Pakistan's President Musharraf, Pakistan's spokesperson Maj Gen Shaukut Sultan remarked that Canada has a history 'independent thinking' (presumably from the US). He urged Canadian diplomats to "Initiate backdoor political and diplomatic moves with resistance groups who are not hardcore Taliban. Develop a level of accommodation." If Pakistan is publicly

⁸⁴ Haroon Siddiqui, "Memo to Canada: Might Won't Win in Afghanistan," *Toronto Star*, 4 March 2007, A15.

suggesting that negotiations might be possible with moderate factions of the Taliban surely this option should be explored.

As introduced in the first chapter, positive engagement must play a part in ameliorating the current overall effort. As Major General Shaukut has indicated, there must be a way to induce moderate Taliban away from the hard liners. If Afghans can work with the international community to offer amnesty to those Taliban willing to lay down their arms, this will at least reduce the Taliban fighting force. More importantly, the US and the international community must fundamentally rethink their approach with Pakistan. If the effect that Pakistan is having on Afghanistan is not changed, Afghanistan will not break the cycle of poverty and instability.⁸⁵

This is not to say that negotiating with terrorists is definitely a viable approach. Every terrorist group or insurgent organization has different and complex circumstances. However, British success with the IRA has proven that talking with terrorists must occur in order to resolve issues. Without dialogue, communication cannot occur and thus problems go unresolved.⁸⁶

While this approach may not sit well with American diplomats perhaps middle power countries like Canada can work these issues. Providing Canada coordinates

85 Barnett R. Rubin, "Saving Afghanistan," Foreign Affairs 86 no. 1 (January/February 2007): 72-73.

⁸⁶ Peter R. Neumann, "Negotiating With Terrorists," *Foreign Affairs* 86 no. 1 (January/February 2007): 138.

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closely with the US beforehand, pursuing this type of option is an appropriate role in which a middle power such as Canada could make a difference.

Military Strategy - Spending Canada's Currency in COIN

"On the arc of the spectrum of how irregular warfare is dealt with there are thirty or so modern armies on this spectrum - at one extreme you have the Canadian method, and, at the other extreme you have the American method....The Canadian method is one which involves our military getting out of their vehicles, talking to people...building relationships."

John Ralston Saul

In early March 2007, US soldiers who were ambushed in a convoy "...shot indiscriminately at cars and civilians..." killing ten and injuring thirty-five Afghans. 88

While Saul's view of Canadian counterinsurgency methods might be somewhat utopian, never mind the piety from the safety of an armchair, US military forces seem to have a reputation for heavy-handed reactions. With the arrival of Leopard tanks in Kandahar, Canadians have also been accused of using too much force. The fact is that in most stability and support operations, including counterinsurgency, the prosecution of conventional warfare is less important than some of the less conventional specialized skills such as human intelligence, civil affairs, police, public health, foreign language and foreign force training. 89 Irregular warfare demands an irregular response, and perhaps Canada should focus less on the conventional and more on the unconventional.

⁸⁷ John Ralston Saul, "A New Era of Irregular Warfare?" Lecture delivered to faculty and cadets Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario, *Canadian Military Journal* 5 no.4 (Winter 2004-2005): 16-17.

⁸⁸ Rahim Faiez, "They Were Firing Everywhere," *Toronto Star*, 5 March 2007, A10.

⁸⁹ Jeffrey Record, "Why The Strong Lose," *Parameters* 35 no. 4 (Winter 2005-05): 26.

To combat unconventional warfare, it is proposed that a new kind of holistic approach is required. The concept of 'full spectrum dominance' combines all forms of national power including military, economic, political, psychological and ideological. However, this is not a new concept at all. Forty years previous, Trinquier drew the same conclusions saying, "Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions – political, economic, psychological, military." Thus is the enduring nature of conflict; that is to say human nature.

In all military operations, the human nature of the soldier-public interface can ultimately create success or failure. The literal 'strategic-corporal' is especially true when an army is deployed into a theatre where an important, if not decisive, element in deciding success is based on the support of the local population. Such is the case in counterinsurgency.

A critical step in fighting insurgency is to counter the insurgent's organizational advantages. Working closely with pro-indigenous government community leaders to monitor activities of guerrilla sympathizers, the counterinsurgents must attempt to separate the insurgents from the population. ⁹² Canada's military is currently employing this theory in three ways in Afghanistan.

⁹⁰ Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 53.

⁹¹ Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View..., 6.

⁹² Robert T. Tomes, "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare," *Parameters* 34 no. 1 (Spring 2004): 16-28.

Training the Afghan National Army has been a successful endeavour. By enabling the Afghan government to field a cohesive military as one of its tools of government reduces the long-term need for foreign assistance and thus the Western influence in Afghanistan's affairs. While there is no indication that any particular country is better suited to this type of military activity than another, simply helping Afghanistan to build a professional army will go a long way to diffusing insurgency and disabling the warlords.

Second, Canada's Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) is currently having a significant effect in Afghanistan. The SAT came into being as a result of a personal relationship that developed between President Karzai and then LGen Hillier. Working with host nations to build government capacity is not a new concept. However, the current SAT mission in Afghanistan has gained the trust and respect of the Afghan ministers. The Canadian soldiers dress in native Afghan clothing and make every effort to blend into the Afghan scenery. They keep a low profile and because of their success at relationship building have complete access to key Afghan government officials including President Karzai. 93

While much of the credit for the success of the SAT must be attributed to cooperation between two key leaders, the fact remains that the SAT mission as a whole has continued to build on the Hillier-Karzai relationship. Afghan ministers and senior Canadian officers continue to build effective relationships based on individual bonds of

⁹³ LCol Fred Aubin, "Canadian Strategic Advisory Team," (lecture, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, ON, 4 April 2007) with permission.

trust and mutual respect. This is precisely the type of interpersonal acuity that soldiers need to apply in this 'complex human environment.'

The third endeavour experiencing noticeable success is that of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Working at a more tactical level than the SAT, lower level military leaders work with local leaders throughout Afghanistan trying to foster the support of the population by conducting nation building, security force training and making infrastructure improvements to the local areas. It would appear that soldiers from the middle power nations appear to be having some of the greatest success. It is estimated that the New Zealand and Australian PRT are the most effective at fulfilling their mandate, while Canada places within the top five. ⁹⁴ This anecdotal evidence indicates that non-great powers can make a significant contribution. But does it mean that these operations are due to soldiers' inherent abilities?

Based on historical examples, LtCol Cernicky concludes, "Preparing soldiers with knowledge includes giving them training grounded in moral values. Soldiers must have the conviction to act with equity and humanity." Von Clausewitz observes that moral factors are critical especially where troops are largely autonomous in their operations. In these 'human operations,' if soldiers' conduct has such a profound impact on operations, then the values and morals of Canadian soldiers must be carefully cultivated.

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⁹⁴ *Ibid*.

⁹⁵ Andrew J. Cernicky, "Moral Power and a Hearts-and-Minds Strategy in Post-conflict Operations," (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategy Research Project, 2005), 14.

⁹⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) 184-186. While Clausewitz describes these attributes to operations in mountainous regions, his description really is about decentralized command and control that is equally applicable in COIN.

"-an army needs its soldiers to have a perception of themselves as something other than warriors. Without such a perception, they are liable to apply a warrior approach, for example exercising hard power when they should be exercising soft power...it is thus remarkably difficult for an army to be really good at both warfighting and counterinsurgency."

LGen Sir John Kiszley, British Army

Recalling that Nye describes the influence of attractive soft power, these military successes might well be an example of Canadian soft power at play. If Canadians are ethnically aware and culturally sensitized, the task of preparing Canadian soldiers for intervention in other cultures might be easier than training soldiers from other countries.

While it is too much of a leap to conclude that the success of Canadian military operations such as the SAT and the PRT is due exclusively to the export of Canadian soft power, as von Clausewitz and Cernicky suggest, in the SAT and in the PRT, Canadian soldiers acting with a high degree of autonomy are building relationships based on equity and mutual respect. Further, although this might not be definitive proof that middle power countries can perform better than the great powers at nation-building, it does serve to emphasize that middle powers like Canada can have an influence in security and stabilization operations that is disproportionate to their relative size within the international hierarchy. And size might well play to Canadians' advantage.

⁹⁷ Sir John Kiszely, "Learning about Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* (March-April 2007): 11.

Due in part to its small size, Canada's armed forces could not pose any real conventional threat to other modern Western militaries. However, Canada's recent experiences in Afghanistan have proven that Canadian soldiers are competent and professional and are capable of conducting COIN. This combination of a small but respected military force is key to a middle power's success in the contemporary operating environment.

It could be said that this is why Canadian soldiers were so effective, up to the mid-nineties, at peacekeeping. The Canadians' friendly but firm approach worked well in the Balkans. This is not a call for a return to peacekeeping à la Cannadien, but there is an implication that Canada's traditional peacekeeping reputation has been re-established with a renewed combat credibility. In fact Canada's recent combat experience has reconfirmed Canada's standing as a trustworthy military ally. It is this credibility that enables Canada to lead within NATO.

If Canada can take a diplomatic lead and pursue independent military strategies, what of Canada's development assistance. Once again, Canada's soft power offers a potential advantage.

Development – The Afghan First Nation

As stated earlier, one should not presume that Canadian or Western politics and approaches are good for all countries. Some discussions stemming from US intervention

in Iraq suggest that counterinsurgency is a misguided endeavour that makes one key assumption: providing better government will beget greater public support which will in turn lead to an increased state stability. Once again, this assumption is simply not universally applicable.

In Western democratic liberal countries, this line of thinking is entirely supportable, but contemporary security problems emerge from non-Western, non-democratic, non-liberal states in which tribal, cultural, religious, economic, and government practices are vastly different from those of Western nations and indeed different from each other. Therefore, a Canadian foreign policy should adopt a fundamentally open minded approach that respects difference and is committed to peace, order and good governance, whatever form good governance might take. This is not necessarily a comfortable line of thinking for US political leaders, because American foreign policy is about spreading democracy. As previously suggested, democracy might not be viable in Afghanistan.

Former diplomat Louis Delvoie suggests that with Afghanistan's tribal history and decades of abuse by outside powers, rebuilding Afghanistan, even to the point of development it had prior to the 1979 Soviet invasion, will take generations. The introduction of Western styles of administration and justice will probably not replace traditional tribal systems, at least for the foreseeable future. It will also take the realization that Afghanistan's tribal culture will not want to take on the form of

⁹⁸ Edward N. Luttwak, "Dead End," *Harper's Magazine* 314 no. 1881 (February 2007), 34.

centralized government sought by the West, and will more likely want to pursue a power-sharing system of governance similar in kind to the Canadian provincial-federal arrangement.⁹⁹

Although not unique to Canada, Canada has a long history of sharing power between different levels of government dispersed throughout a lightly populated, mostly rural country. Furthermore, Canada has achieved recent successes in establishing a tribal government for a diverse group of Inuvialuit. The establishment of Nunavut was a significant, but modest, accomplishment. Nevertheless, Canadians, albeit only a few, understand the cultural nuances of creating a harmonious tribal government. As Canadians demonstrated in Peru, aboriginal solutions to tribal government might be useful in helping establish a national system of governance suitable for a country like Afghanistan. This is not an idealistic view proposing that Canada has all the answers in tribal and cultural governance, but if a country can be founded and maintained on French, English and native peoples, Canada surely has a unique perspective on peace, order and good government.

While Canada does have certain attributes that enable it to be an effective international player, there are limitations. When Canada cannot provide a solution, it must look to work multilaterally. Over the past five years 200,000 Afghans have received micro-financing loans from Canada to help generate local small business. ¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Louis A. Delvoie, "Afghanistan: Realistic Expectations," ..., 89-90.

While this is an impressive statistic, it is paltry contribution when compared to the potential economic assistance available from countries such as China.

Commerce – The Attractiveness of the Renminbi

Throughout this paper the thread of soft power has been weaved into numerous arguments. There has been much criticism about the assumption of how Western democratic solutions are not necessarily useful to non-Western cultures. It would thus be equally false to assume that the West has a monopoly on exporting soft power.

China has many developmental difficulties of its own. Since the collapse of its dynasty system in the early 1900s, China has struggled to find a suitable method of governance. Throughout the last century and even today, China is highly criticized, by the West, for its human rights record. Nevertheless, as an authoritarian, communist state, China has been hugely successful in fostering an industrial based economy that is one of the strongest in the world. In fact, there are those that suggest that China's economic model may have applicability in other countries.

Joshua Kurlantzick suggests that since China is a developing county itself, it offers natural appeal and inspiration to other developing nations. At the very least, to certain countries China is likely more appealing than the US. China's appeal to countries such as the Phillipines has enabled China to fill a void in providing aid and economic

¹⁰⁰ Department of National Defence, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/kprt-eprk/progress_e.asp; Internet; accessed 9 April 2007.

assistance. The recent meeting between Iranian President Ahmadinejad and China's President Jintao suggests that China can attract certain countries that the West cannot. 101

Kurlantzick states that China offers an alternative approach to Western foreign policy. China promotes, not surprisingly, a 'top-down' approach to development that is aimed more at economic reform than political reform. As stated in the beginning of the paper, China is considered a great power not a middle power. Nevertheless, if a country such as China offers a workable alternative to floundering current policies, using other forms of soft power should be considered. As a pragmatic solution, this might be far more attractive to people who are struggling for their survival, than pursuing the ideal of democracy, especially when much of what developing countries see of democracy is the violence caused as the US tries to spread its political ideals.

SUMMARY

In the final chapter of this paper, we examined how middle powers interact with great powers and the effect that their actions have. It was suggested that middle powers could take independent action from the great power. Independent action is most appropriate when the potential risks incurred from executing policy differently from that of the great power, are in the middle power's interest. Values are important in policy, but foreign policies should be based on values rather than exporting the values as part of policy itself.

¹⁰¹ Joshua Kurlantzick, "Soft Power made in China," *National Post* 7 March 2007, A19.

Given Canada's present international standing, Canada has the capacity to demonstrate initiative in certain diplomatic, security and development areas. As a middle power, Canada has significant diplomatic potential. There is evidence that suggests that Canada's reputation can enable Canadian diplomats to negotiate where American negotiators are less welcome. Canada's current defence policy appears to be appropriate given Canada's relative position as a middle power. Having earned a renewed credibility within NATO, Canada's military voice has the potential to influence policy and achieve change. An armed forces employing socially astute soldiers will enhance Canada's ability to succeed. Notwithstanding Canada's proven ability, caution should be exercised in the application of Canada's coercive power, lest it further decrease its non-great power distinction from the US and other great powers. In terms of international assistance, as a young country that has grown out of several cultures and languages, there might be ways of capitalizing on this knowledge and awareness in order to assist developing countries with similar tribal and cultural problems. While Canada's soft power should not be overblown, the fact remains that Canada's unique cultural diversity can be leveraged to help others. Finally, working multilaterally is still a valid policy option for middle powers and any country that can offer a bridge to success should be encouraged to help contribute to stabilization efforts. If non-Western nations can produce effects that are beyond the capability of Western middle powers, then the West should pursue other approaches.

CONCLUSION

In Chapter 1 it was demonstrated why big powers sometimes fail to achieve their foreign policy goals and ultimately their military objectives. Over time, a great power's aggressive policies create a threatening image. In addition, soft power due the luxuries of the wealthy sometimes generates a dichotomous effect of desire and resentment of the great powers. This resentment can exacerbate already tenuous relations. The contemporary nature of intrastate conflict and unconventional warfare frequently makes it problematic for large powers to effectively bring their full hard power to bear against the irregular warrior. Military solutions to conflict and nation building are complex and it is easy to assume that Western solutions will solve non-Western problems.

Despite the multiple shadings of the term middle power, it is a useful way to describe and analyze those countries that might not be great, but who still have a significant capacity to influence international affairs. Canada's position along the spectrum was described in terms of its relation with its most significant foreign partner the US. Canada's economic and military aspects of power are closely linked to the US, however, given the strength of both of these elements of hard power Canada is currently well positioned to exercise political independence. Canadian soft power is quite different from that of the US and might, therefore, enable Canada to achieve certain policy objectives that escape the US. While the capacity for Canada to actively pursue foreign policy goals has not always been possible, Canada has consistently been a multilateral

worker in the international arena and still has the potential to use this reputation to its advantage.

In the last chapter, the importance of foreign policy was linked to military strategy. How middle powers behave regarding the great powers must be understood before selecting a policy option, especially when the most important great power in a country's foreign policy is the US. Canada's current international standing makes it possible for Canada to strike an independent political course if necessary. In so doing, Canada must ensure that the instruments of government are synchronized and work towards reasonable, achievable goals that are in Canada's national interest. This might mean pursuing diplomatic goals or conducting military operations in a Canadian manner that might not always be endorsed by the US. Whether undertaking COIN or nation building, the Canadian soft power, Canadians' cultural acuity, and Canada's reputation as a middle power will assist Canada in possibly achieving success where the US cannot.

A recent article in TIME magazine suggests, that America's war weariness may not leave the US with any other choice but to 'outsource' its foreign policy. ¹⁰² In a strategy that President Nixon pursued towards the end of Vietnam, the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq might have the US so stretched that they must involve other countries in order to achieve their objectives. If this is true, it is in both Canada's interest and its ability to fill the potential leadership void in order to help improve international peace and stability. Thus it

¹⁰² Peter Beinart, "Return of the Nixon Doctrine," *Time* 15 January 2007, 10.

would seem that despite the vast resources of the US, America still needs the middle powers of the world in order to achieve certain foreign policy objectives.

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