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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
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Master of Defence Studies

**NATO in Afghanistan -
The End of the Alliance or Much Ado About Nothing?**

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23 April 2007

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Abstract

NATO's most recent mission in Afghanistan has caused military pundits to again predict its demise. The mission has been divisive at both the international and national levels. The debate within Canada, as an example, over the conduct of the mission has typified that seen in other countries. NATO has, however, overcome many challenges in its history and demonstrated the ability to adapt itself to changing situations. This paper will argue that the debate surrounding NATO's current mission in Afghanistan is no different than many of the debates seen throughout its history. Crises in NATO have ranged from the early challenges of German rearmament to recent concerns over equal burden sharing of combat roles in Afghanistan. NATO will face the challenge, find a way to either overcome it or adapt itself to a new reality and in that way continue to exist.

Introduction

Current Pressure over ISAF MISSION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has faced a number of challenges in its history. Yet, today, nearly sixty years later, it remains intact. Some of these challenges have been significant. They have ranged from those of the 1950's over the fears of Germany re-arming and its subsequent entry into the Alliance, to a clash of ideals over France's involvement in Indochina and its subsequent withdrawal from the military organization of the Alliance. There have been consistent sore points, such as concerns over what has constituted appropriate burden sharing levels within the Alliance, and more lately, a torrid discussion over what NATO's form and function should be in the post Cold War era. At the end of each of the previous debates, either a consensus has been reached and the Alliance has moved forward intact, or a member of the Alliance has acknowledged that there was disagreement and has worked toward narrowing the differences. Things might be different this time. A new debate within NATO rages today that seems to have a much more ominous undertone.

In the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall NATO was struggling to understand its place in the post Cold War world without the glue of a common and easily identifiable threat when a tragedy occurred. NATO was propelled down a path leading to either a secure future or to the dismantlement of the world's longest standing military and

political alliance. The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001
pushed NATO into launching its first anti-terror operation.[1]

The day immediately following the terrorist attacks in the U.S. marks a significant
one in NATO's history, for it was the first day any party to the Treaty had invoked
Article 5. This is significant because Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that:
"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all…."[2] By invoking this article, the
United States formally declared that it had been attacked and wanted NATO's assistance.
The NATO countries, by virtue of the Article 5 declaration, were obliged to help.
NATO members responded by offering assistance of all kinds and by sending seven
NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) airplanes to the United
States on 9 October 2001.[3] When Afghanistan was subsequently identified as home to
the headquarters of Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist group responsible for
the terrorist attacks, the governments of Britain, Germany, Canada and France
immediately pledged forces to support operations against Afghanistan.[4] Coalition
support from the more than ten NATO member-states conducting operations in

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[1] NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO Response to Terrorism* (Brussels Belgium: NATO), 3.

[2] NATO, NATO Information Service, *Basic Documents* 3rd ed. (Brussels: NATO, 1981), 10.

[3] NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO Response to Terrorism* (Brussels Belgium: NATO), 3.

[4] Barry R. Posen, "The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics," *International Security* 26, no. 3 (Winter, 2001), 41, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28200124%2F200224%2926%3A3%3C39%3ATSATGS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007

Afghanistan was so great that by May 2003 there were more European and Canadian troops in the country than those from the U.S.[5]

When the coalition forces came under NATO leadership in 2003 the Afghanistan mission represented NATO's first meaningful venture into out of area operations. While the long term effect the Afghanistan mission will have on the Alliance's unity is not clear, it is undoubtedly proving to be another challenge the Alliance must overcome. The mission not only represents the first venture out of area for NATO but also the first foray into combat operations (vice peacekeeping operations) for many of its members since the end of the Second World War. The geography and nature of the mission is causing internal strife between NATO partners. Not only does debate exist about whether or not NATO should be involved as an entity in a region so far from Europe, the combat emphasis in this mission is also causing considerable and heated internal debate. Not all members of NATO are approaching their commitment to the mission from the same perspective. Countries like Canada and the Netherlands understand that their troops will be involved in combat and have not placed restrictive national caveats on their employment. This is not the same for all NATO participants. Many countries have explicitly forbade their troops from participating in the more dangerous missions. Many cannot leave Kabul, fight at night or fight the Taliban at all. The internal NATO debates have increased as the danger experienced by all nations has not been equally shared.

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[5] Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 1.

Even though there are more than ten NATO countries in Afghanistan, the U.S., Canada and Britain have suffered more than 90 per cent of the casualties.[6]

While it is outside the scope of this paper to review the impact the current NATO debate is having on every national participant in the Afghanistan mission, Canadian examples will be used to illustrate some of its domestic effects. From a Canadian perspective, these types of casualties have essentially divided the country. The Canadian public had not dealt with this sort of casualty rate in recent memory and it has caused the country to remain divided in its support of the Afghanistan mission. An Ipsos-Reid Poll released 22 February 2007, identified public support for troops, but also a deep division over what the troops should be doing. Canadians identify with the sacrifices of their soldiers and supports them as a force, but question the reason their government has sent them to Afghanistan to make such a sacrifice. As a nation, the country was nearly evenly split with 51 percent supporting the mission, and the remainder ready to leave Afghanistan altogether.[7] The domestic debate in Canada has been made more acute as the perception that all NATO countries were not sharing the same risk burden on the mission. This type of domestic division has highlighted a long standing rift between NATO countries. While the question of burden sharing has been a consistent sore point since NATO's inception, it has historically centred on the position of the United States

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[6] "NATO Allies Deaf to Pleas from Canada," *Edmonton Journal*, Dec 2, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1173355911&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[7] Paul Koring, "U.S. Backs NATO Troop Plea," *The Globe and Mail*, Nov 22, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1166397521&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

encouraging other partners, like Canada, to increase defence spending. The debate now, however, revolves around the combat burden borne by a few countries. As the domestic pressure to reduce the Canadian presence in NATO grows, the demands for other countries to demonstrate their resolve and solidarity has increased. Pressure from some members on others to effectively share the combat burden, by reducing the types of caveats placed on their troops that prevent them from directly engaging in combat missions, has increased. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper spoke strongly at NATO's Riga Summit, in December 2006, about Canada's need for military back up in Afghanistan. Prime Minister Harper, U.S. President George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair all pleaded at the Summit for additional combat troop support in Afghanistan.[8] Their pleas were only partially heard and have resulted in a division that has the potential to fracture NATO. Just as this division has called into question the commitment of NATO's members, it has also questioned whether or not the type of mission NATO is involved itself in Afghanistan is indeed truly valid. Both the Canadian press and its political leaders have kept the Afghanistan mission topical and stimulated nation wide debate on not only what Canada's role should be, but also whether or not NATO should be there, period.

In light of the renewed debate over NATO's future after Afghanistan, this paper will demonstrate that given that NATO has survived a number of historical challenges and, regardless of the outcome of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO will survive.

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[8] "NATO's Wavering Gives Taliban Hope," *Toronto Star*, Dec 1, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1171992481&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

Chapter 1 - History of NATO Crises

Introduction

NATO's Beginning

Once the elation over the defeat of Nazi Germany was allowed to subside, a grim new reality cast a shadow over Europe in the mid 1940's. The immediate post war environment was characterized by a steadily deteriorating relationship between the Soviet Union and the western world. Tensions between former allies increased as the disparity of forces in Europe grew and the ambitions of the Soviet Union's leader, Josef Stalin, became clearer.

Allied forces in Europe dropped from five million in 1945 to only 880 000 in 1946 while, at the same time, the Soviet Union maintained a force of over six million with over one hundred seventy-five of those divisions placed in its western region.[9] Large Soviet troop levels, combined with the concurrent rise of internal communist movements that began to exert serious pressure in France and Italy, added to an atmosphere of international mistrust. While these movements were alarming in themselves, it was the Soviet Union's direct control over the governments of many of the Eastern European countries that added greatly to the West's concern. Direct Soviet

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[9] Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 41.

influence in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Czechoslovakia resulted in Moscow gaining significant control over these countries.[10]

Any hope that postwar Europe would be characterized by peaceful development faded as these events combined to foster an international sense of apprehension. The Soviet Union and the West could not agree on the fate of Germany, Stalin had a demonstrable territorial appetite, and the threat of massed Soviet forces on Western Europe's backdoor was too much to ignore.[11] The United Nations (UN) had been borne from the ashes of the Second World War where its central figures formed a core group of powerful nations that ruled international affairs through the Security Council. Each member had the right of veto and it was not long before the diverging interests of the Soviet Union and the West became apparent. Successive Soviet vetoes between 1945 and 1946 included one over an attempt to regulate atomic energy known as Baruch Plan, and the request to lift the Berlin Blockade in 1946.[12] These vetoes were only two in a series that typified the lack of progress that could be made on any international event that included any possibility of a split between western and Soviet interests. It is not surprising then that it was not long before the West began discussing the possibility of an alliance outside of the UN.

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[10] David Brown, "'The war on terrorism would not be possible without NATO': a critique," *Contemporary Security Policy* 25, no. 3: 414; http://www.web.ebscohost.com; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[11] David Brown, "'The war on terrorism would not be possible without NATO': a critique," *Contemporary Security Policy* 25, no. 3: 414; http://www.web.ebscohost.com; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[12] Alfred J. Hotz, "The United Nations since 1945: An Appraisal," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 336, no. Is International Communism Winning? (Jul., 1961), 131, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-7162%28196107%29336%3C127%3ATUNS1A%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

Negotiations for a Western European alliance first took form through the Treaty of Dunkirk in1947, then later, in March 1948, through the Brussels Treaty. While the short lived Dunkirk Treaty was designed to protect France and Britain from a resurgent Germany, the Brussels Treaty was squarely aimed at forestalling Soviet aims in Western Europe.[13] The Brussels Treaty, however, failed to include an important participant – the United States. Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, had earlier recognized that U.S. involvement in any meaningful European collective security arrangement was critical. By December 1947 he had already begun discussions with the U.S. Secretary of State, George Marshall, aimed at ensuring U.S. involvement in European security.[14] At the urging of British Prime Minister Clemont Atlee, discussions between Canada, Britain and the United States over the formation of a collective security block continued in earnest in March 1948. Soviet territorial ambition was again demonstrated after the coup in Prague, Czechoslovakia. Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, succinctly summarized the West's feelings over the Soviet Union's central role in the coup, when he stated that the events should come as a dire warning to all democratic governments.[15]

Ernest Bevin had begun the process, but it was certainly aided by Canadians Escott Reid and Louis St. Laurent. It is widely believed that it was the Canadian, Escott Reid, a senior official of the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa, who first

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[13] Charles G. Cogan, "The Security Crisis of the Late 1940's," in *A history of NATO: The First Fifty Years Volume II*, ed. Gustav Schmidt, 321-340 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 336.

[14] Charles G. Cogan, "The Security Crisis of the Late 1940's," in *A history of NATO: The First Fifty Years Volume II*, ed. Gustav Schmidt, 321-340 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 337.

[15] David G. Haglund, "Canada and the Atlantic Alliance: An Introduction and Overview," in *What NATO for Canada?*, ed. David Haglund, 1-14 (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 2000), 3.

forwarded the idea for a grouping of the nations of North Atlantic.[16] This early idea was publicly reinforced by the soon to be Prime Minister of Canada, Louis St Laurent. Between March and June of 1948, St Laurent made seven public speeches supporting the idea of a defensive alliance.[17]

He also successfully convinced George Keenan, the father of containment policy in the U.S., to support the North Atlantic pact.[18] This was a significant achievement, as it helped smooth the way for critical U.S. involvement in an international forum when the American Public was seeking a return to more isolationist policies. The Vandenberg resolution, which was passed in the U.S. Congress in June 1948, stressed the role of the US in managing global security and declared the Senate's intent to pursue "progressive development of regional and other collective defence."[19] The beginning of the Soviet Union's blockade of Berlin, later in 1948, further reinforced St. Laurent's earlier dire warnings and added to the growing international atmosphere supporting an Atlantic alliance of some sort. On 4 April 1949, the treaty of Washington was signed and NATO came into being. The Canadian historian, Jack Granatstein, summarized the birth of NATO such that: "NATO came into existence, in other words, because in 1949 the UN had already demonstrated that it was going to be completely unable to provide the

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[16] Jack L. Granatstein, "The United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty," in *A history of NATO: The First Fifty Years Volume I*, ed. Gustav Schmidt, 29-38 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 30.

[17] David Brown, "'The war on terrorism would not be possible without NATO: a critique," *Contemporary Security Policy* 25, no. 3: 415; http://www.web.ebscohost.com; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[18] David Brown, "'The war on terrorism would not be possible without NATO': a critique," *Contemporary Security Policy* 25, no. 3: 415; http://www.web.ebscohost.com; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[19] Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 46.

collective security it was supposed to deliver and the collective security that the Western democracies so desperately wanted."[20]

Historical Crises

NATO was barely ten years old before one of its early supporters began to speak out against it. James Warburg, the former World War II Deputy Director of the U.S. Office of War Information Overseas Europe, argued in 1960 that: "As a military alliance, NATO is obsolete...."[21] These types of predictions have been consistent as NATO crises have varied from basic misunderstandings to threats of actual combat between members. The remainder of this chapter will review some of the challenges NATO has faced and overcome amidst recurring dire predictions of its demise to help set the context for the current debate.

Korea

Korea had historically been at a crossroad of national strategic interests. Competing interests between Japan and China over who would control Korea tilted to Japan after the disputed Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty of 1910. When Japan was defeated in World War II, Korea was essentially divided into two distinct spheres of administration. The Soviet administered North, above the 38th parallel, and the U.S. controlled South, below it. By June 1950 Kim Il-sung, the communist leader of North Korea, with ambitions to take over the entire country, had convinced both Joseph Stalin

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[20] Jack L. Granatstein, "The United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty," in *A history of NATO: The First Fifty Years Volume I*, ed. Gustav Schmidt, 29-38 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 32.

[21] James P. Warburg, "How Useful is NATO?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* no. 330, (Jul., 1960), 140, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-7162%28196007%29330%3C133%3AHUIN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

of the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong of China to support a conventional war against South Korea.[22]

The UN was only able to quickly respond because the Soviet Union was not present at the Security Council. The Soviets had boycotted the Security Council over the UN's refusal to accept the status of the People's Republic of China as the rightful successor to the Republic of China. With the Soviet Union not able to use its veto, the UN quickly passed a number of resolutions.[23] This quick show of resolve effectively forestalled what could have been an early out –of –area mission debate. As it was, the Korean conflict had two primary effects on NATO. It first helped to solidify the burgeoning Alliance by demonstrating that the Soviet Union would willingly use any of its satellites to use force to expand its sphere of influence and, second, it opened a line of logic that brought not only the prospect of German re-armament to the forefront, but also highlighted one of NATO's first internal challenges.

German Rearmament

While the Korean conflict of 1950 did not present an immediate challenge to NATO, it did bring to the forefront issues of German rearmament that did. The reminder that Communist aggression was in fact real caused many to fear that the Korean conflict was the beginning of a trend that might directly affect the future of Germany. The Soviets seemed eager to expand wherever they could and Germany was a logical future threat. To bolster the number of available troops in Western Europe, the U.S. pushed for

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[22] Allan R. Millett, "Introduction to the Korean War," *The Journal of Military History* 65, no. 4 (Oct., 2001), 952, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718%28200110%2965%3A4%3C921%3AITTKW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[23] Jack L. Granatstein, "The United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty," in *A history of NATO: The First Fifty Years Volume I*, ed. Gustav Schmidt, 29-38 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 33.

the rearmament of Germany as an important part of European defense.[24] This initiative was met with some resistance by members of the Alliance, who had only recently ended hostilities against Germany. France, in particular, had no desire to see Germans in uniform again so soon after the horrors of World War II and argued that the idea of German re-armament would be unacceptable no matter how vital the need to increase troop numbers in Western Europe were.[25] The question of German rearmament could only be offset, in France's eyes, if there was a mechanism to ensure that Germany would not evolve once again into a threat. France felt that this assurance would come from an increased U.S. role in Europe. During a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December 1950, NATO took steps to recognize one of its member's concerns and reorganized itself into a credible military entity. With France now assured that the U.S. would have a significant presence in Europe, the government in Paris agreed that German units defending Europe could be placed under the command of the well respected and newly appointed Supreme Commander of NATO, U.S. General Eisenhower.[26] A compromise was therefore reached in an early challenge and the Alliance moved ahead.

Germany's Entry into NATO

As Germany rearmed, the pressure to admit it to NATO as a full partner increased and France, once again, objected. NATO's ability to rise past this challenge was a significant milestone because it showed how members of the Alliance could reach a

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[24] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*.(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 16.

[25] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*.(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 16.

[26] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*.(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 17.

compromise outside of official NATO channels. Early efforts to admit Germany into

NATO were initially rejected by France. A meeting was subsequently held in 1950 with

the purpose of trying to find mechanisms through which France would be sufficiently

assured to allow Germany into NATO. Representatives from relevant Western European

states, the US, Canada, Germany and Italy met to discuss the admission of both Germany

and Italy into the European Defence Community. [27] The European Defense Community

was established under the Treaty of Brussels as part of an inter-governmental defence

treaty. By first bringing Germany and Italy into the European Defense Community

(EDC), France felt that it would have the assurance it needed.[28] The armed forces of the

Federal Republic of Germany would be an auxiliary of NATO with which came the

controls over German forces France had so desperately sought.[29] When the EDC

subsequently failed in 1955, West Germany officially entered NATO. The significance

of how Germany gained entry into NATO should not be minimized. Nations of the

Alliance had different goals and fears, yet they worked together to find common ground

outside the formal protocols of the Alliance. While members of the Alliance wanted the

additional ground troops Germany could offer in Western Europe, the sensitivities of one

of its members were recognized and efforts were made to achieve an end state agreeable

to all.

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[27] Frederick L. Schumann, "The Soviet Union and German Rearmament," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* no.312 (Jul., 1957), 80, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-7162%28195707%29312%3C77%3ATSUAGR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[28] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*.(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 18.

[29] Lawrence S. Kaplan, "NATO Retrospect," *The Review of Politics* 23, no. 4 (Oct., 1961), 449, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6705%28196110%2923%3A4%3C447%3ANR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

The Suez Crisis

The following year, on 26 July 1956, the President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized the Suez Canal and set off a series of events that would both test and help the Alliance to grow. The Prime Minister of Great Britain, Anthony Eden, had become increasingly concerned about Nasser's Arab nationalistic actions and labeled him a "second Mussolini."[30] When Nasser completed an arms deal with Czechoslovakia in September 1955, the West, in general, grew concerned about his growing relationship with the Soviet Union and subsequently repealed an earlier offer to help finance the Aswan dam project. Nasser responded by breaking a long-standing promise to Britain and France to keep the canal open and nationalized it. The French and the British, both of whom had significant economic interests in the region, were furious and determined to respond aggressively. The United States, by contrast, was in the midst of an election year and had no interest in seeing a conflict erupt in the Middle East. The Suez Crisis brought about a different kind of threat to NATO. It brought to the forefront how sovereign nations viewed their relationship within the alliance when they were acting outside its strict mandate. The crisis essentially evolved around Nasser, his nationalization of the Suez Canal and the effect that action had on the NATO members of Great Britain, France and the United States. Each state had a different appreciation of the situation directly affected by its national goals.

In October 1956, Britain and France moved troops to take control of the northern part of the Suez Canal under the pretext of imposing peace between battling Israeli and

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[30] Anthony Adamthwaite, "Suez Revisited," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 64, no. 3 (Summer, 1988), 450, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-5850%28198822%2964%3A3%3C449%3ASR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

Egyptian forces. These actions were conducted outside of NATO and the UN, and without consultation with other NATO Allies.[31] In addition to wanting to ensure free passage through the canal, Britain was looking to maintain its overall influence in the region. [32] A succession of events, including a separatist revolt in Cyprus, the removal of the pro-British Glubb Pasha as the Chief of Staff of Jordanian Forces and the Soviet Union's treaty of friendship with Yemen, all affected London's position. As if to highlight London's dwindling clout in the region, the Soviet Union's treaty with Yemen was accompanied by a warning to Britain not to interfere with oil prospecting in the region. London viewed Nasser's actions as further disintegration of British influence in the Middle East and felt some compulsion to act.

Paris had concerns, which, while different from Britain's, still lay outside the norms of the NATO alliance. Paris sought to check Nasser's actions, as it linked Nasser to France's ongoing conflict in Algeria. At the time of the crisis, France had over 180,000 troops in Algeria fighting the National Liberation Front (FLN) and was convinced that Nasser was cooperating with Yemen and Morocco to keep the FLN armed.[33] From the perspective of Britain and France, the Egyptian nationalization of the

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[31] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*.(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 13.

[32] J. -B Duroselle, "France and the United Nations," *International Organization* 19, no. 3, The United Nations: Accomplishments and Prospects (Summer, 1965), 708, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28196522%2919%3A3%3C695%3AFATUN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[33]Douglas T Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO out-of-area problems since 1949* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, c1990), 59.

canal was an outright act of aggression.[34] Both the British and the French had hoped that

their position in the Alliance would at least reduce the response from the U.S. to mere

tokenism. This was not to be.

The United States was forced to side with the Soviets and oppose the Suez

invasion. The U.S. felt compelled to support the Soviet Union in the UN because of the

U.S.'s historically strong position on the illegal use of force.[35]   The U.S. was also

concerned about how the potential crisis might undermine its position with influential

Third World countries, like India, or how it might also present a gateway through which

the Soviets could enter the Middle East.[36] In a desire to resolve the conflict with as little

turmoil as possible, the U.S. acted as a mediator to the conflict while simultaneously

exerting pressure on Britain and France to withdraw their forces from the region. The

U.S. did not support its NATO allies' position, but acted against them by refusing to

honour an earlier agreement with Britain to provide gasoline in case of such a crisis. This

type of pressure ultimately forced Great Britain to remove its forces from the Suez, with

France following shortly thereafter.[37]

This crisis highlighted the early growing pains of the Alliance and caused a re-

evaluation of the responsibilities of each nation within it when larger repercussions were

a possibility. In this case, the actions of both the French and British were predicated on

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[34] Douglas T Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO out-of-area problems since 1949* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, c1990), 60.

[35] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 13.

[36] Douglas T Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance : NATO out-of-area problems since 1949* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, c1990), 59.

[37] Anthony Adamthwaite, "Suez Revisited," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 64, no. 3 (Summer, 1988), 453, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-5850%28198822%2964%3A3%3C449%3ASR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

pure national goals that fell outside the purview of the Alliance but, had the Soviet Union

viewed their actions differently and acted aggressively, the situation could have escalated

and NATO would have had to have been involved. In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis,

an analysis was undertaken by the so called Committee of Three on Non-Military

Cooperation, more popularly known as the Three Wise Men. Lester Pearson of Canada,

Halvard Lang of Norway and Gaetano Martino of Italy studied the situation and

recommended that more consultations take place on items affecting NATO interests

beyond the North Atlantic.[38] A situation in which each nation of the Alliance understood

why another nation had taken action, but failed to understand the relative priority of that

action within a larger contextual framework provided an early lesson for the members of

the Alliance.[39] Even though there was tension between allies, a large difference in

opinion was overcome and the experience forged a better understanding of each

member's role in, and responsibilities to, the Alliance.

France's Withdrawal

By 1959, growing French dissatisfaction over its perceived inferior position in the

Alliance started to come to the forefront. Early in NATO's history France had been

dissatisfied over the allocation of NATO command appointments and had opposed plans

for an integrated force structure that would accentuate its concerns.[40] In 1959, France

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[38] Douglas T Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO out-of-area problems since 1949* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, c1990), 64.

[39] Douglas T Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO out-of-area problems since 1949* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, c1990), 58.

[40] Edgar S. Furniss Jr., "De Gaulle's France and NATO: An Interpretation," *International Organization* 15, no. 3 (Summer, 1961), 352-353, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%2819612%2915%3A3%3C349%3ADGFANA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W; Internet; accessed 22 April

removed the French fleet from the Mediterranean and thus began a seven year process

that eventually took it out of NATO's military organization altogether. The removal of

the French fleet was followed by announcements in 1963 that France would not

participate in NATO exercises scheduled for 1966. Finally, in March 1966, France

requested that all NATO commands be removed from French soil within the year.[41] This

final request came about through a series of events that culminated in a difference of

opinion over the perception of sovereignty in military affairs that eventually took the

form of a debate over nuclear weapons.

By the early 1960's it was becoming clear that nuclear weapons had replaced

ground troops as the prime component of deterrence. Debates within the Alliance

centered on how the weapons would be controlled, who would own them and where they

would be placed. The notion that Britain and France would acquire their own nuclear

weapons was met with stiff resistance from Robert McNamara, the U.S. Secretary of

Defense. He criticized both countries' pretensions of nuclear capability. He believed

that the American arsenal was sufficient and did not want proliferation. France did not

share this view and believed in a state-level approach through which national nuclear

arms would act as a deterrent by instilling a sense of insecurity in the aggressor.[42] While

giving a contemporary speech on the subject of the nuclear debate within NATO, General

Lauris Norstad, an American Air Force General and former Supreme Allied Commander

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[41] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 33.

[42] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*.(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 32.

of Europe,[43] succinctly summarized the issue between France and the U.S. when he described the central question of the debate as, "How, and by whom, shall political and military control be exercised over the means thus shared?"[44] France clearly interpreted the issue as a national one and opted to depart from NATO's military structure. This action, however, must again be viewed in the larger context. President de Gaulle's removal of France from NATO's planning and command function was not a direct indictment against NATO, but more an assertion of independence both within the Alliance and more globally as well. [45]

France's departure from the military structure could have spelled disaster for the Alliance, but it survived nonetheless. France did not dispute the value of collective defence, understood the inherent value of the Alliance, and therefore took steps to mitigate the consequences of its departure. For example, France remained a member of NATO and demonstrated its resolve by keeping troops in Germany, only under national provenance. [46]   A common understanding of the value of the Alliance, while allowing for different national means to manifest that desire, allowed NATO to emerge from the crisis relatively intact.

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[43] General Norstad was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe from 1956 until 1963.

[44] Lauris Norstad, "NATO, its Problems and its Continuing Promise," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 27, no. 3, Domestic and International Financial Policies of the United States (May, 1963), 109, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0065-0684%28196305%2927%3A3%3C102%3ANIPAIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[45] Douglas T Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO out-of-area problems since 1949* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, c1990), 224.

[46] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*.(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 33.

Burden sharing

Unlike previous examples in which NATO faced a specific challenge, it is not as easy to point to a single event where burden sharing became so critical as to make NATO's triumph over it noteworthy. That being said, controversies over burden sharing within the Alliance have existed since its earliest days, continue today, and may well be an enduring characteristic of the organization. While the recent controversies over the equitable division of combat roles in Afghanistan will be dealt with more fully in the following chapter, this section will present a brief historical review of the debate to help place the current one into context.

The debate over burden-sharing within NATO began in the early days of the Alliance and generally evolved around the idea that there were differences in defence burdens and a widening gap for some members between defence costs and benefits.[47] As each state will use whatever indicator serves its own purpose to justify or refute burden-sharing arguments,[48] the validity of each claim is not critical to this discussion. Nor is it important to detail or explain here the relevant metrics of burden-sharing, nor justify or extol burden-sharing claims by member-nations, but only to present historical examples of the debate to demonstrate that while it has been continuous, it has not been

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[47] Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, "NATO Burden-Sharing: Past and Future," *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 6 (Nov., 1999), 666, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3433%28199911%2936%3A6%3C665%3ANBPAF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[48] Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, "NATO Burden-Sharing: Past and Future," *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 6 (Nov., 1999), 676, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3433%28199911%2936%3A6%3C665%3ANBPAF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K.

substantively divisive.

1950's- 1960's

The burden-sharing debate began within NATO soon after the formation of the Alliance. From the U.S. perspective, the immediate post war era and the 1950's saw large troop commitments to Europe as "…a necessary accommodation to the fact that its principal NATO allies were still overcommitted abroad."[49] This was a direct indictment by the U.S. over the decision of some of its NATO allies to expend too many resources securing colonial possessions. By 1954 France had over 160 000 troops in Indochina as part of its French Expeditionary Corps.[50] European allies were urged to settle their problems in the Third World so they could "…take up their "fair share" of the NATO defense burden."[51] This demand for increased numbers of European troops on the ground in Europe played a significant role in opening the door to allow German troops to be incorporated into a European defence scheme.[52]

While the discussions over troop commitments never completely went away, as the 1950's moved into the 60's, a new form of the debate began to emerge and took a

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[49] Douglas T Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO out-of-area problems since 1949* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, c1990), 54.

[50] Pierre Millet, "Our Common Stake in Indochina," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 294, no. America and a New Asia (Jul., 1954), 102, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-7162%28195407%29294%3C99%3AOCSII%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[51] Douglas T Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO out-of-area problems since 1949* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, c1990), 54.

[52] Douglas T Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO out-of-area problems since 1949* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, c1990), 55.

more fiscal tone. By 1961, it was estimated that the U.S. was contributing over 400 million dollars annually to Germany's foreign reserves, at a time when the U.S. was running a trade deficit. Without its direct investment into Germany and subsequent imbalance, the U.S. would have been running a surplus in its commitments and balance of payments.[53] As the U.S. economy slowed, this disparity became noticeable and domestic pressure to eliminate it increased. To this end, Germany and other Allied nations purchased over 700 million dollars worth of equipment from the U.S. by 1962. While the overarching debate over the imbalance of payments did not completely fade away, there was an acknowledgement that there was a downward trend in the U.S. deficit and strides were being taken to maintain that trend.

Vietnam

The Vietnam War had two primary divisive elements that essentially revolved around some version of burden-sharing. The prevailing feeling in the U.S. continued to be that European countries were not contributing their fair share to the defence burden.[54] The Vietnam War, *per se,* was not a NATO issue but the debate it caused throughout the Alliance was significant. By 1965 the U.S. commitment in Vietnam had forced a temporary drawdown in overall U.S. land forces in Europe. This raised a concern in Europe that Washington's decision to devote so much of its national security resources to

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[53] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years.*(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 51.
[54] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years.*(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 52

Vietnam contributed to blurring NATO's own forward defence strategy.[55] When this perception was combined with a much different view over the relative priorities of troop placement held by many Americans, the potential for this situation to destabilize the Alliance was certainly present.

The debate in the U.S. over this issue evolved around three main issues: the large amount of money going from the U.S. to Europe, persistent complaints about unfair burdens, and the perceived lack of European understanding about the stakes in Vietnam.[56] Unlike earlier discussions with Europe over troop commitments outside of the continent, the U.S. was not concerned with securing colonial possessions, but with halting communism before it spread. The financial hardship the U.S. bore in maintaining 300 000 American troops in Europe was temporarily mitigated when a compromise was reached. Germany agreed to buy 500 million dollars in U.S. government bonds in 1968 while the U.S. agreed to scale down its redeployment plans and furthermore agreed that American force levels in Europe would be based on security rather than fiscal considerations.[57]

In 1968, Britain promoted the establishment of Eurogroup. Eurogroup was an informal multilateral initiative of European governments within the NATO framework. The goal of the group was: "…to help strengthen the whole Alliance by seeking to ensure that the European contribution to the common defence is as strong and cohesive as

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[55] Douglas T. Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO out-of-area problems since 1949* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, c1990), 77.

[56] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 53.

[57] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 53.

possible."[58] In an attempt to help address the imbalance of contributions within the

Alliance, Eurogroup launched the European Defence Improvement Programme in 1970.

The goal of the Programme was to directly support President Nixon in defeating the

Mansfield resolution,[59] an effort to reduce American troop levels in Europe in the face of

the mounting troop and fiscal pressure over the Vietnam War. The aim of the initiative

was to spend one billion dollars over the next five years to enhance NATO's

infrastructure and forces.[60] The establishment of Eurogroup, and its subsequent activities

to try to efficiently harmonize the European contribution to NATO, is another example of

how the Alliance has found innovative ways to ensure its survival in pursuit of common

goals. Despite debates and harsh criticisms across the Atlantic, the Alliance did not falter

and not a single nation chose to exercise its right under Article thirteen to leave the

Alliance in 1969.[61]

1970's-1980's

The debate over burden sharing continued as successive U.S Presidents worked to

ensure that all Alliance partners contributed what they perceived to be their fair share.

Many members of the U.S. Congress forwarded burden-sharing resolutions and

amendments and while few passed through Congress, the 1970's saw an exception. The

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[58] NATO. NATO Information Service. *NATO in the 21st century*, (Brussels: NATO, 2004), 20.

[59] Gustav Schmidt, "Getting the Balance Right: NATO and the Evolution of EC/EU Integration" in *A history of NATO: The First Fifty Years Volume II,* ed. Gustav Schmidt, 3-28 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 14.

[60] Gustav Schmidt, "Getting the Balance Right: NATO and the Evolution of EC/EU Integration" in *A history of NATO: The First Fifty Years Volume II,* ed. Gustav Schmidt, 3-28 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 14.

[61] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 54.

Jackson-Nunn amendment to the 1974 Department of Defense Appropriation

Authorization Act called for a proportional reduction in deployed U.S. forces in Europe

to the extent that the 1974 balance-of-payments deficit was partially offset.[62] This bill

would have required that NATO allies make contributions such that they offset that part

of the U.S. balance of payments which was considered to result from U.S. troop

commitments to NATO. This amendment could have resulted in a reduction in the

number of troops in Europe on a sliding scale if there was no increase in the allied

contribution. The NATO members worked together to ensure this situation did not arise.

In a speech to the U.S. Congress in May 1975, President Ford stated that he was pleased

to report that: "…our Allies have fully offset the U.S. fiscal year 1974 deficit and that the

troop reduction provision would not have to be implemented."[63]

This type of debate continued between the U.S. and other allied countries through

the late 1970's and into the 1980's. As the debate continued, so did predications of

NATO's demise.   In 1977 President Carter forwarded a "3 per cent proposal" in which it

was agreed among NATO allies that all of them would commit to increases in annual

defence spending in the period between 1979-1983 by three per cent. [64] The early part of

the 1980's saw increasing frustration over a variety of issues highlighted by nations

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[62] GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office, "ID-76-32 Additional Costs of Stationing U.S. Forces in Europe, April 28, 1976," http://www.gao.gov/docdblite/info.php?rptno=ID-76-32#content; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[63] The American Presidency Project. "Gerald Ford XXXVIII *President of the United States:1974 – 1977* – 281 – Message to the Congress Transmitting Final Report on the Balance of Payments Deficit . Incurred Under the North Atlantic Treaty." http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4940; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[64] Douglas T Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO out-of-area problems since 1949* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, c1990), 84.

failing to meet their three per cent increase. [65] An article written in *Foreign Affairs* in 1987, questioning the relevance of the Alliance, looked at many divisive issues but highlighted the historical impact of burden sharing problems within the Alliance and stated that NATO was at an impasse over burden sharing and could not be saved by reform.[66]

The pertinent point in the continuing dialogue between NATO allies is that despite the consistent presence of sometimes very aggressive talks over burden sharing that has been present in the Alliance since its inception, NATO is still here. The issue is not always resolved and burden sharing disagreements may be a fundamental trait of the Alliance yet they have not resulted in a major division or departure. The underlying understanding is that while disagreements have and will occur, the intrinsic value of the Alliance to each of its members will ensure unity in a larger context.

Cyprus

In an effort to bolster NATO's southern region and to fight the internal and external communist threat in the south, NATO was expanded in 1952 to include Turkey and Greece.[67] This expansion brought together unlikely allies. The historic enmity

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[65] Douglas T Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO out-of-area problems since 1949* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, c1990), 96.

[66] Christopher Layne, "Atlanticism without NATO," *Foreign Policy*, no. 67 (Summer, 1987), 29, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0015-7228%28198722%290%3A67%3C22%3AAWN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[67] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*.(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 72.

between Greece and Turkey dates back to the Ottoman Empire and manifested itself in the 1974 dispute over Cyprus.

The island of Cyprus has a predominantly Greek population with a minority of Turkish decent, with a ratio of approximately seven to three.[68] In 1960, Cyprus gained its independence from Britain under the Zurich-London Agreement. This agreement recognized the independence of Cyprus and also its unique heritage. Under the agreement, the President would be a Greek Cypriot, while the Vice President would be a Turk-Cypriot with each having the right of veto over foreign policy, defence and security related matters. The agreement specified that Greece, Turkey and Britain would have special rights to oversee that the agreement was adhered to by all parties. It also permitted Britain, Turkey and Greece to maintain national forces on the island. Britain retained two sovereign strategic bases in the vicinity of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, while Greece and Turkey maintained troop levels of 950 and 650 soldiers respectively.[69] Increasing tension between Greek and Turkish Cypriots finally resulted in widespread violence in 1963 and the subsequent formation and deployment of the U.N. Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in March 1964.[70] Despite the presence of the UN peacekeepers,

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[68] T. W. Adams, "The American Concern in Cyprus," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 401, no. America and the Middle East (May, 1972), 97, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-7162%28197205%29401%3C95%3ATACIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[69] T. W. Adams, "The American Concern in Cyprus," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 401, no. America and the Middle East (May, 1972), 97, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-7162%28197205%29401%3C95%3ATACIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[70] Glen D. Camp, "Greek-Turkish Conflict Over Cyprus," *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no. 1 (Spring, 1980), 61, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-3195%28198021%2995%3A1%3C43%3AGCOC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

violence again erupted in July 1974 when, in an attempted coup, Greece tried to annex Cyprus for Greece.[71] Turkey responded by landing troops in Cyprus on 20 July 1974.

Naturally, NATO was concerned that the instability in Cyprus would affect the overall stability of its eastern flank. While the U.S. had tried to remain impartial over the Cyprus question between Greece and Turkey and had preferred that the three main players (Britain, Greece and Turkey) work out the problem on their own, in the events leading up to the crisis, the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. had become strained. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. had been forced to remove some of its medium range missiles from Turkey in a mediation effort with the Soviets. Under the back drop of increasing tension between Turkey and the US, and the impending government overthrow in Cyprus, Turkey had expressed concern over the fate of Turkish Cypriots. The U.S. had, however, already given Turkey stern warnings about invading Cyprus. The U.S. responded quickly to Turkey's military intervention by placing an embargo on U.S. military equipment to Turkey in 1975. Turkey responded in like fashion by suspending the U.S.'s use of Turkish military bases shortly thereafter.[72] Turkey did finally cease its military action after it had occupied the northern 38 per cent of the island.[73] The perception in Greece was that NATO and the U.S. had let Greece down by not forcing the Turks out of Cyprus and the subsequent outcry from Greece was

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[71] Glen D. Camp, "Greek-Turkish Conflict Over Cyprus," *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no. 1 (Spring, 1980), 48, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-3195%28198021%2995%3A1%3C43%3AGCOC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[72] Leigh H. Bruce, "Cyprus: A Last Chance," *Foreign Policy*, no. 58 (Spring, 1985), 118, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0015-7228%28198521%290%3A58%3C115%3ACALC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[73] Leigh H. Bruce, "Cyprus: A Last Chance," *Foreign Policy*, no. 58 (Spring, 1985), 118, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0015-7228%28198521%290%3A58%3C115%3ACALC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

so strong that Greece was forced to temporarily withdraw from NATO's military structure.[74]

The Cyprus question has not been resolved, yet both Greece and Turkey remain full members of NATO today. Despite a significant ongoing challenge, NATO unity has not seriously faltered. By allowing nations to have differences and still work together speaks volumes of the inherent value of the alliance and its longevity.

Falkland Islands

Another potentially divisive issue occurred in 1982 when the Argentinean dictator, General Leopoldo Galtieri, attempted to occupy the Falkland Islands. The islands had been under British control since 1832 and Britain's nearly immediate response was to dispatch warships to the South Atlantic. In spite of the abundance of issues that would have divided the Alliance, its members never faltered in their support of Great Britain. Aside from the obvious concern over the unavailability of British warships for NATO missions (because they were involved in the Falklands), a number of national issues were present as well. The U.S. feared a possible re-awakening of Latin American nationalism. Italy was concerned about the large Italian population in Argentina. The socialist governments of France and Germany wished to avoid being perceived as

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[74] CSIA European Security Working Group, "Instability and Change on NATO's Southern Flank," *International Security* 3, no. 3 (Winter, 1978), 156, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28197824%2F197924%293%3A3%3C150%3AIACONS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

supporting colonial powers. Nevertheless, no one complained, and there was "…an affirmation of transatlantic unity that was too frequently conspicuous by its absence."[75]

Post Cold War Actions

In a reaction to the rearmament of West Germany, and its imminent entry into NATO, the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, commonly known as the Warsaw Pact, had been formed in Warsaw, Poland on 1 May 1955.[76] The Warsaw Pact has historically been the opposition force to which NATO has compared itself. When the Berlin Wall fell on 9 November 1989, a series of events began that changed how the Warsaw Pact was viewed and profoundly affected both the construct and the rationale for NATO. By May 1990 NATO's Military Committee concluded that it no longer considered the Warsaw Pact a threat to the Alliance[77] and by June 1990, in the Declaration from Turnberry, NATO declared that the Cold War was over.[78] The reunification of Germany, the formal disbandment of the Warsaw Pact and, finally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 caused an identity crisis in NATO.

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[75] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*.(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 91.

[76] Richard Cavendish, "The Warsaw Pact is Signed: May 14th, 1955," *History Today* 55, no. 5 (May, 2005), 62, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=834011321&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[77] Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (Summer, 1996), 449, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199622%2950%3A3%3C445%3ANPATCW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[78] Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (Summer, 1996), 453, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199622%2950%3A3%3C445%3ANPATCW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

The organization had to contend with a fundamental shift in its view of collective security as in just two short years the core factors that had contributed to NATO's creation (a divided Germany and the Soviet threat) disappeared.[79] In June 1990 the Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Wörner, immediately requested that the member states begin a full review of the Alliance and took his first move to restructure NATO's military forces into true multi-national units, moving away from the traditional geographically fixed defences of the past.[80]

At the Rome Summit of 1991, the sixteen member states agreed on a new strategic concept that recommitted the Alliance to collective defense but also asserted that instabilities resulting from break up of the USSR would constitute a new threat.[81] For the first time in nearly twenty years a new military policy document was introduced. [82] The document laid out radical plans for rapid reaction forces, a new multi-national force structure and proposed to reach out to countries in Eastern Europe.[83] The change in focus for NATO was absolute. The Alliance had ceased planning for operations against the

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[79] Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (Summer, 1996), 448, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199622%2950%3A3%3C445%3ANPATCW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[80] Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (Summer, 1996), 454, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199622%2950%3A3%3C445%3ANPATCW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[81] Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 53.

[82] New document was called Military Committee (MC) 400.

[83] Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (Summer, 1996), 454, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199622%2950%3A3%3C445%3ANPATCW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

Soviet Union and refocused to make its primary purposes crisis management and promoting international stability.[84]

As a first step in the promotion of international stability, the Alliance created a number of institutional affiliations with the new governments of the former Soviet Union. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)[85] was founded in December 1991 and was the first post cold war mechanism to establish ties with non-NATO governments. The goal of the NACC was to provide formal links between the sixteen NATO members and the new eastern European states for consultation and cooperation on security related matters.[86] NATO developed closer ties with the UN and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and by June 1992, in light of the struggles in Yugoslavia, NATO had declared its willingness to support the CSCE and later the UN in their peacekeeping operations.[87]

The Brussels Summit of January 1994 saw a continuation of NATO's remodelling by setting the conditions for improved military responses to crises and by continuing to integrate, to the extent possible, former Eastern Bloc countries. Militarily, the summit set the conditions in which NATO assets could be used in missions that included a variety of NATO and non-NATO forces. The Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept was

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[84] Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (Summer, 1996), 449, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199622%2950%3A3%3C445%3ANPATCW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[85] Changed to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EACP) in 1997

[86] Richard E. Rupp, NATO *after 9/11: an alliance in continuing decline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 54.

[87] Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 55.

introduced to facilitate this vision. The creation of CJTFs would give NATO the flexibility to respond to Alliance approved military activities that did not necessarily feature all Alliance nations. The idea that NATO would respond militarily and allow that some member-states might not contribute showed a heretofore unseen level of flexibility and movement towards a "coalition of the willing" construct previously seen primarily in U.S. led operations.[88] While NATO could not agree in 1994 on whether the Alliance would admit new members, what the mechanisms for enlargement would be, or who would be involved in enlargement, the current members understood that a more formal relationship needed to be developed with the former Eastern Bloc countries.

The Brussels Summit announced the Partnership for Peace (PFP) initiative and was aimed directly at developing a closer relationship with former Soviet satellites. The PFP program differentiated itself from the NACC as it would focus on the needs of individual participating states and adopt a practical, cooperative approach.[89] There were six primary areas of interest that NATO wished to pursue with PFP countries. These included transparency in national defence planning, democratic control of armed forces, a desire to maintain forces at a sufficient level to work with NATO in UN mandated missions, the development of a cooperative military relationship with NATO, the establishment of an increased capability in PFP forces and the mechanism to be able to

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[88] Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 55.

[89] John Borawski, "Partnership for Peace and Beyond," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 71, no. 2 (Apr., 1995), 90, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-5850%28199504%2971%3A2%3C233%3APFPAB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

consult with NATO if PFP countries felt that their territorial integrity was threatened.[90]

This program was announced with the clear understanding that participation in it was a

necessary precursor to full entry into NATO later on.

NATO's initial response following the end of the Cold War indicated willingness

to progress and change itself into a relevant alliance. While NATO transformation is

ongoing, it must be stressed here that at the London, Rome and Brussels summits, NATO

demonstrated that even in the absence of a compelling threat, it would be innovative in its

strategic direction and could still provide value to its members.[91]

The Balkans

The Balkan region is an ethnically and religiously diverse region with multiple

Slavic, Romance and Turkic languages. It has been home to Celts, Illyrians, Romans,

Avaris, Vlachs and various Germanic tribes. The diverse history of the region lead to

innovative methods of government. In the 17th century the Ottoman Turks ruled much of

the region, now known as former Yugoslavia, and had understood the diverse religious

and cultural influences of the region and had thus instituted the millet system. The millet

system created regions that were divided either by religion or culture and each of these

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[90] John Borawski, "Partnership for Peace and Beyond," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 71, no. 2 (Apr., 1995), 90, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-5850%28199504%2971%3A2%3C233%3APFPAB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[91] Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (Summer, 1996), 449, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199622%2950%3A3%3C445%3ANPATCW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

regions ruled themselves semi-autonomously.[92] In the post World War II era, the region

was again divided, but this time into independent states that created boundaries which

artificially separated historically linked groups. When Yugoslavia was formed after

World War II the historic diversity of the region was encapsulated in that one country. It

was only through the powerful personal force of Marshall Tito that the country had

managed to stay together. In the 1970's Marshall Tito divided the country into a number

of republics, loosely based on historic and cultural factors, in a federal system. The

creation of these republics was problematic since enclaves of distinct ethnic groups had

grown in regions dominated by other cultures. It thus became nearly impossible to

ensure that any given cultural group was always placed within its larger republic. Once

the separate republics were created the sense of isolation for smaller groups was

problematic.

Tito's death in 1980 opened the way for intense ethnic rivalry. The Serbians

aspired to the place of predominance that they had enjoyed before 1941 but had lost

under Tito's regime.[93] Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian leader, worked to overthrow the

leadership of the republic of Montenegro and illegally brought the provinces of

Vojvodina and Kosovo, which had been guaranteed their immunity under the

constitution, under central rule.[94] Milosevic had additionally insisted that minority

Serbian groups in other republics also fall under his control. The republics of Slovenia

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[92] Michael Moodie, "The Balkan Tragedy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 541, no. Small Wars (Sep., 1995), 102, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-7162%28199509%29541%3C101%3ATBT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[93] Hall Gardner, *Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia, and the future of NATO* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), 157.

[94] Hall Gardner, *Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia, and the future of NATO* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), 157.

and Croatia saw this declaration as a potential threat and believed Milosevic's declarations to be a precursor to the creation of a greater Serbia.[95] Slovenia declared its independence from Yugoslavia in June 1991 with Croatia following shortly thereafter. Full scale civil war broke out between the Serbs and Croats in 1991 with many Bosnian Muslims caught in the middle. By September 1991 the UN had declared an arms embargo on Yugoslavia while the European Union (EU) tried to negotiate a ceasefire. Germany recognized Croatia's independence in December 1991 and a ceasefire was signed between Serbia and Croatia in January 1992. At the time, Serbian forces occupied nearly one third of Croatia. In March 1992 the United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) attempted to stabilize the region while casualties and ethnic cleansing atrocities mounted during the Balkan civil war.[96]

NATO was faced with a number of competing national agendas during the early stages of the civil war in the Former Yugoslavia that made it difficult to come to any consensus. Greece had historically supported Serbia, Turkey had interests in Bosnia, and Germany had a historical bias in favour of Croatia and sought a quick recognition of the secessionist movements. The U.S. had initially thought of it as a civil war, and essentially a European problem, but was sensitive to Turkey's concern over the

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[95] Michael Moodie, "The Balkan Tragedy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 541, no. Small Wars (Sep., 1995), 103, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-7162%28199509%29541%3C101%3ATBT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[96] Norman Hillmer and Dean Oliver, "The NATO-United Nations Link: Canada and the Balkans, 1991-95," in *A history of NATO: The First Fifty Years Volume 1*, ed. Gustav Schmidt, 71-84 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 72.

possibility of the conflict spreading to Kosovo and thus tended to back the Bosnian Moslems and the Croats against the Bosnian Serbs.[97]

With so many competing national agendas and interests, NATO's early role in the Balkans conflict was to support UNPROFOR. NATO ships were tasked with monitoring an embargo operation in the Adriatic while NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft patrolled the UN mandated no fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Out of concern for the safety of each country's UN peacekeepers, NATO's offer of air strikes was initially restricted to those targets conducting a direct attack on UNPROFOR personnel.[98] NATO's role shifted significantly on 30 August 1995, when a Serb mortar attack killed thirty eight people in a Sarajevo marketplace.[99] What swiftly followed were 3, 400 NATO air sorties, over a two week period, that targeted Bosnian Serb Forces. These air missions ultimately forced a negotiated peace in Dayton, Ohio and effectively ended the fighting in Bosnia.[100]

After the Dayton Agreement was signed, NATO was given its first peacekeeping operation. Under United Nations Security Resolution (UNSCR) 1031, NATO was charged with implementing the military aspects of the peace accord.[101] NATO

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[97] Hall Gardner, *Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia, and the future of NATO* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), 155.

[98] Norman Hillmer and Dean Oliver, "The NATO-United Nations Link: Canada and the Balkans, 1991-95," in *A history of NATO: The First Fifty Years Volume 1*, ed. Gustav Schmidt, 71-84 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 76-77.

[99] Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years*.(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 120.

[100] Norman Hillmer and Dean Oliver, "The NATO-United Nations Link: Canada and the Balkans, 1991-95," in *A history of NATO: The First Fifty Years Volume 1*, ed. Gustav Schmidt, 71-84 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 82.

[101] NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels, Belgium: NATO 2006), 257.

subsequently led the Implementation Force (IFOR) around Bosnia on 16 December 1995

and followed up with another NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) a year later.[102]

According to Colonel Glenn Brown, a former member of the international staff at NATO

Headquarters, the "…organizational brilliance of the Alliance for establishing IFOR, the

largest most complex military operation since the end of the Second World War and the

first action by NATO outside of area, was simply outstanding."[103] Even allowing for

pride of authorship, it must be acknowledged that while NATO's early actions in the

Balkans crisis were characterized by varying degrees of in-fighting, its ability to

organize, coordinate and execute the IFOR and SFOR missions is a testament to how the

organization met a new challenge and succeeded.

Russia and Enlargement

When the Cold War ended it quickly became apparent that NATO could be

strengthened if it pushed its boundaries further east by allowing former Warsaw Pact

countries to join. There was, however, debate within NATO on how and if this

expansion should occur. The debate essentially revolved around two competing themes.

One side argued that admitting new members would export stability and therefore keep

political and economic instability away from NATO's eastern borders, while the opposite

view was concerned over the costs of increased commitments and, perhaps more

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[102] NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO Handbook,*. (Brussels, Belgium: NATO 2006), 257.

[103] Glenn Brown, "NATO Successes 1949-1999: A Historical Overview," in *The Canadian Strategic Forecast: NATO at 50: Successes, Challenges & Prospects*, ed. David Rudd and Jim Hanson, 4-13, (Toronto: Canadian Institute For Strategic Studies, 1999), 11.

importantly, how Russia would react.[104] This section will not debate whether or not

NATO should have enlarged but will restrict its focus to how NATO met the challenge of

managing Russia's concerns.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were formally offered NATO

membership at the Madrid Summit of 1997 and formally joined a year and a half later in

Washington, in March 1999.[105] In the years immediately following the break up of the

Soviet Union, leading to the terrorist attacks in New York City, the opposition to NATO

enlargement became the most important item of the Russian foreign policy agenda.[106]

When Vladimir Putin was asked to comment in June 2000 on the hopes of Baltic

countries to join the alliance, he emphatically stated that it was natural for Russia to

regard the plans to further NATO enlargement as hostile and as being opposed to its

security.[107] Russia's historic geopolitical concerns over eastern expansion presented

NATO with a thorny problem.

NATO recognized this concern and took measures to mitigate them. On 27 May

1997, in Paris, NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations,

Cooperation and Security. The Founding Act established the Permanent Joint Council

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[104] Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Germany, the United States and the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance," in *A history of NATO: The First Fifty Years Volume I,* ed. Gustav Schmidt, 207-220. (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 208.

[105] Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 60.

[106] Lasha Tchantouridze, "Russia and NATO: A New Play in the Old Theatre," in *New NATO, New Century: Canada, the United States, and the future of the Atlantic alliance*, ed. David Haglund, 137-154, (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Queen's University Centre For International Relations, 2000), 138.

[107] Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 58.

(PJC) which was established as a forum for "…consultation and cooperation."[108] The

council ensured that NATO and Russia had a regular dialogue and helped smooth the

way for NATO expansion. While the differences over NATO's Kosovo campaign

caused Russia to withdraw from the council in early 1999, Lord Robertson, the NATO

Secretary General, and Russian President, Vladimir Putin, worked to rebuild the

relationship. The sinking of the *Kursk*[109] and the terrorist attacks in New York

effectively reinforced the need for mutual cooperation on a wide variety of issues. The

PJC was replaced by the NATO-Russia council in May 2002, where all twenty six NATO

countries and Russia meet on equal terms to pursue "…opportunities for joint decision

and joint action across a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro Atlantic area."[110]

Since the terrorist attacks in New York and the subsequent Russia-NATO cooperation,

the relationship between Russia and NATO has steadily improved as Russia has realized

that NATO is not the Cold War military alliance Moscow once confronted.[111]

Conclusion

Since its inception, NATO has been dealing with various forms of challenges and

crises. Challenges have ranged from disagreements over proportional burden sharing to

armed conflict between members. Not every issue has been resolved – but none have

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[108]NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO Handbook,* (Brussels Belgium: NATO 2006), 209.

[109]The *Kursk* was an Oscar type Russian nuclear cruise missile submarine which sank in the Barents Sea on 12 August 2000.   A multi-national effort tried and unfortunately failed in their attempts to save the crew.

[110] NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO Handbook,* (Brussels, Belgium: NATO 2006), 211.

[111] Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 59.

remained significantly divisive. History clearly indicates that the Alliance has withstood these many challenges. The issue that remains to be considered is how NATO reacts to similar challenges without the benefit of a unifying threat. Early challenges to NATO unity in the post cold war era were principally concerned with finding the way ahead and expanding its mandate. The Balkans crisis provided some indication that NATO was adapting to the new reality by looking at crises that did not fall within the boundaries of its member states, but the link to security in the Balkans and European security for NATO in Europe was not difficult to see. The same link is more difficult to see in NATO's current mission in Afghanistan. NATO now finds itself facing a strong challenge with a tenuous link to European security and without the benefit of the Soviet Union's unifying presence of the past.

Chapter 2 –NATO's Mission in Afghanistan

Introduction

In the years between the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, NATO was preoccupied with the immediate task of managing the fall out of the break up of the Soviet Union. The NATO members had to ensure the stability of their own borders while essentially winding down the Cold War peacefully.[112] While a debate over how NATO would evolve certainly occurred, it was not on centre stage until 11 September 2001. The terrorist attacks pushed the debate about the nature of NATO to the forefront and ultimately led NATO to Afghanistan. Barnett Rubin's article in the Jan/Feb 2007 issue of *Foreign Affairs* is indicative of the current pervasive sentiment that NATO will live or die in Afghanistan. Rubin wrote bluntly, "The future of NATO depends on its success in this first deployment outside of Europe."[113]

The first chapter of this paper briefly described some of the many challenges that NATO has faced and overcome in its nearly sixty year history. This chapter will describe in greater detail NATO's current challenge - the mission in Afghanistan. It will discuss the history of the conflict, the impact the mission will have on NATO's relevance and how NATO will continue to evolve as it brings back to Europe the lessons it has learned in its first ever out of Europe mission. In short, this chapter will describe NATO's latest

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[112] George Robertson, "Transforming NATO to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century," in *Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO For The 21st Century*, ed. Daniel S. Hamilton, 25-36, (Washington D.C.: Center For Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2004), 30.

[113] Barnett R. Rubin, "Saving Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 1; 1 (01//Jan/Feb2007, 2007), 58.

challenge and assert that it is only the most recent in a series of challenges which it will also overcome.

Prague Summit

The NATO Prague Summit of November 2002 was originally billed as an enlargement summit and, indeed, seven new nations were invited to join, but the events of 11 September 2001 gave the summit a much different focus. If the days following the terrorist's attacks of 11 September were the catalyst that propelled NATO into Afghanistan then it was the NATO Prague Summit of 2002 that provided the vehicle. As a general philosophy the outcome of the Prague Summit was succinctly summarized by Daniel Hamilton, the Director of the Center of Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University: "Allies agreed that NATO forces must be able to deter, disrupt and defend against terrorists, and that they should do so wherever the interests of NATO nations demand it."[114] Lord Robertson, a former Secretary General of NATO, said that the Prague Summit became the milestone in NATO's transformation into a true 21st century alliance and identified three significant outcomes related to the aforementioned agreement.[115] These outcomes represent a fundamental shift in how NATO operates and include new roles, new relationships and new capabilities.[116] The new role for NATO, as explained by Lord Robertson, was that "…NATO at Prague became the focal point for

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[114] Daniel S. Hamilton, "What is Transformation and What Does it Mean for NATO," in *Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO For The 21st Century*, ed. Daniel S. Hamilton, 8-23, (Washington D.C.: Center For Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2004), 8.

[115] George Robertson, "Transforming NATO to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century," in *Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO For The 21st Century*, ed. Daniel S. Hamilton, 25-36, (Washington D.C.: Center For Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2004), 30.

[116] Lord Robertson, "Our Grandchildren's NATO," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 8 (12, 2003), 510.

planning military contributions against terrorism, a major new role and one which no other organization in the world could play."[117] The announcement of the NATO Reaction Force (NRF) and the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) were designed to help NATO with its new roles. The NRF, a 21 000 person multi-national quick reaction force equipped with leading technology, has recently become operational.[118] In order to help the force modernize to be able to fight these new threats it was agreed through the PCC that all NATO partners would make major military improvements in key areas such as military lift and precision guided munitions. It was further recognized that the old command structure was not meant to cope with the new tasks and thus a more streamlined command structure was adopted which included a new Allied Command for Transformation. The members of NATO understood that to work effectively in an environment which was not necessarily their own backyard, and often in times of humanitarian crisis, relationships with other entities needed to be forged. As a first step NATO instituted permanent military linkages with the European Union (EU) such that "No longer are NATO and the EU living in the same city but on different planets."[119] Each of these actions helped pave NATO's road to Afghanistan.

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[117] Lord Robertson, "Our Grandchildren's NATO," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 8 (12, 2003), 510.

[118] NRF declared operational in October 2006.

[119] Lord Robertson, "Our Grandchildren's NATO," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 8 (12, 2003), 512.

Historical Background

A basic understanding of Afghanistan's history and diverse cultural dynamic is critical to understanding some of the challenges faced by NATO and other allied forces in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has seven major ethnic groups vying for power and influence. The largest two groups, comprising about seventy percent of the country, are Pashtuns and Tajiks. Pashtuns live predominantly in the east and north while the Tajiks live in the northern and central parts of the country.[120] Some sub groups, such as the Pashtun Kuchis, are nomadic and have little concept of national borders. Conflict in Afghanistan and its surrounding regions is not new and a brief examination of the historical context of the conflict will help explain the nature of the challenges the Allies face in this, the latest conflict in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan lies either at the crossroads or along the path of many historic empires. Soldiers of Persia, Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan and the Indian Mogul Empire have all fought battles in, or marched through Afghanistan.[121] After Britain conquered India, Afghanistan became a strategic buffer between Britain and Russia.[122] Britain's attempt to solidify this resulted in three Anglo-Afghan wars. In the first (1839-1842), the British were soundly beaten by the Afghans while the second forced the ruler of Afghanistan, Amir Abd-ur-Rahman to cede control of foreign policy to Britain and

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[120] Anthony H. Cordesman, Chair and CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, "The Situation in Afghanistan," *FDCH Congressional Testimony*, 12.

[121] Ben Smith, Afghanistan*: where are we?* (Camberley, England: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2005), 11.

[122] Robert Strausz-Hupe, "The Anglo-Afghan War of 1919," *Military Affairs* 7, no. 2 (Summer, 1943), 91, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3931%28194322%297%3A2%3C89%3ATAWO1%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

agree not to cross the frontier to British India in 1879.[123] The boundary became known

later as the Durand Line, named after Sir Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of the

British Indian government. The line drove right through the traditional tribal areas of the

Pashtun. This is now the much contested modern border between Pakistan and

Afghanistan that has separated one-third of Pashtuns in Afghanistan from the remainder

in Pakistan. The third Anglo-Afghan war, of 1919, resulted in Britain's recognition of

Afghanistan's full sovereignty, but the tension over the border dispute between

Afghanistan and Pakistan has never dissipated.

When the British divided their Indian empire into India and Pakistan in August

1947, Afghanistan argued that the semi-autonomous Pashtun regions should have had the

option of forming a nation of Pashtunistan that could have been integrated with the

Pashtun region of Afghanistan.[124] Pakistan was opposed to the loss of any territory and,

in the end, the British did not allow it. Although the Pashtun question and its effect on

Pakistani foreign policy will be dealt with later as it relates to the formation of the

Taliban, it is worth highlighting here that it has been a divisive point between

Afghanistan and Pakistan for many years. Pakistan has two driving concerns which

dictate a continuing interest in Afghanistan. Pakistan will always seek to ensure that its

western border is secure and that the ruling regime did not push an agenda for

Pashtunistan. The mountainous region between Pakistan and Afghanistan is populated by

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[123] Barnett R. Rubin, "Lineages of the State in Afghanistan," *Asian Survey* 28, no. 11 (Nov., 1988), 1188, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0004-4687%28198811%2928%3A11%3C1188%3ALOTSIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[124] Patricia Gossman, "Afghanistan in the Balance," *Middle East Report*, no. 221 (Winter, 2001), 13, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-2851%28200124%290%3A221%3C8%3AAITB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

the Pashtuns who think little of national boundaries and look more closely at tribal

affiliations. Pakistan wants to ensure that its western territorial integrity is not questioned

by a national Pashtun movement. This is relevant to the current issue only because when

the British finally left the region in the late 1940's Pakistan aligned itself with the U.S.

Pakistan was concerned with protecting itself from the much larger and stronger India

and sought a strong ally. In an attempt to counter Pakistan's relationship with the U.S.

Afghanistan moved closer to the Soviet Union to protect itself from Pakistan and its

historic desire to maintain influence in Afghanistan.

In November 1933, Muhammad Zahir Shah, a Pashtun, took over the monarchy

of Afghanistan after his father, Mohammad Nadir Shah, was assassinated. In 1973 he

was ousted in a coup by his cousin, Dauod Khan. To gain power, Khan had allied

himself with the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a Marxist Leninist

Party. He later tried to distance himself from the USSR but was killed in a coup by a

coalition of Parcham and Khalq ethnic groups.[125] Widespread ethnic violence and civil

war followed and the USSR moved into Afghanistan in 1979 to begin ten years of

occupation. The Soviet choice for the presidency of Afghanistan was Mohammad

Najibullah, the former head of the Afghanistan secret police.

As the Cold War was ending the Soviet Union left Afghanistan, taking with it the

financial support and military muscle that had kept Najibullah in power. The various

Muslim groups that fought the communist, known as Mujahideen, formed an Islamic

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[125] Patricia Gossman, "Afghanistan in the Balance," *Middle East Report*, no. 221 (Winter, 2001), 13, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-2851%28200124%290%3A221%3C8%3AAITB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

state that came under attack in turn from a devout Islamic Pashtun movement known as the Taliban. The United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan faction, known as the Northern Alliance, came together to rule Afghanistan in the face of growing opposition from the Taliban. The Alliance was unable to maintain control in face of Taliban opposition and again civil war and ethnic violence erupted. Years of internal fighting left Afghanistan devoid of any meaningful government infrastructure, one third of Kabul were destroyed, over 50, 000 died and hundreds of thousands were driven from their homes to become new refugees in Pakistan.[126]

The Taliban movement, led by former Mujahideen Mullah Mohammed Omar, soon began to take control of the country. The Taliban are made up from a core Pashtun group but do not proclaim a desire to form a distinct Pashtun country which makes them compatible with Islamabad's strategic interests. By supporting the Taliban, the Pakistani government ensured a friendly and stable regime to the west and did not have to worry about the nagging Pashtunistan question. By 1998 the Northern Alliance of feuding Mujahideen had been pushed to a few pockets in the northeast while the Pakistani supported Taliban had established control over much of Afghanistan.[127] The Taliban immediately instituted a mix of harsh Islamic and traditional tribal law.

Saudi Arabian oil magnate, Osama bin Laden, was a well known supporter of Muslim fighters from around the world and had been involved in Afghanistan as a freedom fighter during the years of Soviet occupation. He had been working to train and

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[126] Patricia Gossman, "Afghanistan in the Balance," *Middle East Report*, no. 221 (Winter, 2001), 14, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-2851%28200124%290%3A221%3C8%3AAITB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[127] Barnett R. Rubin, "Saving Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 1; 1 (01//Jan/Feb2007, 2007), 60.

organize Muslim freedom fighters in Sudan until international pressure forced Sudan to expel him. Bin Laden found refuge as a trusted advisor of Mullah Omar in Afghanistan. As bin Laden's influence grew in Afghanistan so did that of Arab freedom fighters.[128] It was the Taliban's provision of refuge for bin Laden and his followers that ultimately led to the current chapter in Afghanistan's violent history.

How did NATO get there?

Shortly after the attacks of 11 September the U.S. was convinced that the Taliban in Afghanistan were providing refuge to those who had planned the attacks. The international community was also convinced as Britain, Canada, Germany and France immediately supported the call from the U.S. for a full-scale war in Afghanistan.[129] On 12 September the North Atlantic Council demonstrated support by the invoking NATO's collective defence mechanism, Article 5, for the first time in its history. Many allies, both from within and from outside of NATO pledged varying levels of assistance.

On 20 September 2001, President Bush gave a public speech which allowed the Taliban an opportunity to hand over the terrorists or essentially suffer the consequences.[130] On 7 October, when Bush did not receive a response, the U.S. and coalition forces began Operation Enduring Freedom with a series of air strikes on al

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[128] G Patricia Gossman, "Afghanistan in the Balance," *Middle East Report*, no. 221 (Winter, 2001), 13, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-2851%28200124%290%3A221%3C8%3AAITB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[129] Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 135.

[130] Barry R. Posen, "The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics," *International Security* 26, no. 3 (Winter, 2001), 45, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28200124%2F200224%2926%3A3%3C39%3ATSATGS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

Qaeda training camps and what little Taliban infrastructure existed.[131] Over the next two months special forces, precision air strikes and forces from the Northern Alliance worked together to finally drive the Taliban into hiding.[132]

In November 2001, as the Taliban were being driven from power, a conference in Bonn, Germany was held to discuss Afghanistan's political future.   The conference was attended by representatives from the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban forces of Afghanistan. The "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions," (the Bonn Agreement), was reached on 5 December 2001.[133] The Bonn agreement devised a strategy for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and set the guidelines for writing the constitution, organizing elections and setting the format of future Afghan governments.[134] The agreement additionally called for assistance from the United Nations and thus set the conditions for the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF).[135] The ISAF mission was formally authorized by the United Nations under Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 and specifically authorized the:

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[131] Patricia Gossman, "Afghanistan in the Balance," *Middle East Report*, no. 221 (Winter, 2001), 13, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-2851%28200124%290%3A221%3C8%3AAITB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[132] Patricia Gossman, "Afghanistan in the Balance," *Middle East Report*, no. 221 (Winter, 2001), 13, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-2851%28200124%290%3A221%3C8%3AAITB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[133] NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels, Belgium: NATO 2006), 211.

[134] Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 155.

[135]Security Council Resolutions 2001, "United Nations S/Res/1383 (6 December 2001)," http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

…establishment for 6 months of an International Security Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.[136]

The ISAF is not a UN force, like the force in the mission to Rwanda, but is made up of a coalition of NATO forces and other contributing nations who participate at their own expense. Between 2002 and 2003 over 90 per cent of ISAF personnel came from NATO governments and the mission itself was led by alternating governments from NATO countries. While NATO had been involved in Operation Active Endeavour since 26 October 2001, NATO's formal contribution to ISAF did not extend much beyond the support many of its members contributed. [137] This changed in August 2003 when NATO formally took responsibility for leading the mission.[138]

NATO in Afghanistan

A criticism of NATO's preliminary involvement in Afghanistan was that its formal arrival occurred only after the early offensive stages of the operation had ended. This criticism should be taken in context as up until then the U.S. had preferred to deal with ad hoc assemblies of coalition forces[139] and failed to see the need for a large scale

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[136] Security Council Resolutions 2001, "United Nations S/Res/1386 (20 December 2001)," http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm; Internet; accessed 6 January 2007.

[137] NATO had deployed ships as early as 6 October 2001 to the Eastern Mediterranean as a demonstration of Alliance solidarity and began Operation Active Endeavour on 26 October 2001 but formal NATO contribution to the Operation Active Endeavour is concerned with keeping the trade routes through the Mediterranean open and was ultimately expanded to provide escorts through the Straits of Gibraltar and the boarding of suspect vessels.
NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, *Combating Terrorism at Sea* (Brussels Belgium: NATO), 2-3.

[138] NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels, Belgium: NATO 2006), 155.

[139] David Brown, "'the War on Terrorism would Not be Possible without NATO': A Critique," *Contemporary Security Policy* 25 (12, 2004), 414.

international peacekeeping effort.[140] The U.S. experience in Kosovo had, additionally, made it wary of the command and control problems that might have arisen and potentially hindered its operation in Afghanistan had NATO become involved earlier.[141]

Part of the goal of the Prague Summit had been to address some of the command and control problems experienced in Kosovo. When NATO took responsibility for the ISAF mission it brought with it a ready made Command and Control infrastructure that has allowed for a level of stability between participating countries. The ISAF headquarters (HQ) in Kabul itself was first manned under NATO's mandate by the Joint Command Centre in Heidelberg and subsequently passed command to Canada, Eurocorps, Turkey and Italy. While individual countries may have commanded the HQ in Kabul itself, it fell under a larger overarching command structure. The Supreme HQ Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) has responsibility for the overall command of the mission while the Joint Force Command in Brunssum (Netherlands) acts as the operational level HQ.[142] NATO has placed itself in a position to test its improved organization while executing the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

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[140] James Dobbins, "New Directions for Transatlantic Security Cooperation," *Survival (00396338)* 47 (2005///Winter), 46.

[141] Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 136.

[142] NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels, Belgium: NATO 2006), 155.

NATO's Mission

While UNSCR 1386 authorized the ISAF to maintain the security in Kabul and its surrounding areas[143] it had become clear to the coalition forces and the UN that a lack of security outside Kabul was inhibiting any nation-building efforts. Progress to the desired end state of a stable government outlined in the Bonn Agreement had been stymied. The UN responded by expanding ISAF's mandate through UNSCR 1510. UNSCR 1510 specifically authorized the expansion of the ISAF mission to allow it to "…support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs…."[144] The primary mechanism through which ISAF has attempted to achieve this mission is through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

The Provincial Reconstruction Team construct is one which ISAF has inherited from earlier coalition forces. PRTs are structured as civil-military partnerships that work closely together to build strong relationships with local authorities. The goal is for each PRT to support all local sectors of security reform to provide an environment in which reconstruction and development are possible.[145] The establishment of a secure

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[143] Security Council Resolutions 2001, "United Nations S/Res/1386 (20 December 2001)," http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm; Internet; accessed 6 January 2007.

[144] Security Council Resolutions 2003, "United Nations S/Res/1510 (13 October 2003)," http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2003/sc2003.htm; Internet; accessed 6 January 2007.

[145] NATO International Security Assistance Force, "UNAMA/ISAF PRT Conference, ISAF Press Release #2006-031 (April 28, 2006)," http://www.jfcbs.nato.int/ISAF/Update/Press_Releases/newsrelease/2006/Release_28Apr06_031.htm?tsfsg=ea0a792ce7ada29750fbd36b5ca2602c; ; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

environment is strongly predicated upon a strong military presence. Through the maintenance of this military presence, terrorism and criminal activity are dissuaded and it is expected that stability will be improved in Afghanistan.[146]

ISAF began to take over existing PRTs in December 2003 when it took command of the formerly German led PRT in Kunduz. NATO has since taken command of the military component of five additional PRTs in the north in 2004 and four more in the west.[147] NATO has thus concentrated its efforts in the north and northwest portions of the country. The southern region was where coalition forces were primarily engaged in a heated counterterrorism campaign and maintained control over the regional PRT's.

NATO's Challenges in Afghanistan

Burden Sharing

Indications of the types of historical problems seen in NATO during the Cold War once again raised their heads over Afghanistan. The question of burden sharing within the Alliance was raised as early as October 2003 when General James Jones told a U.S Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that "…the political will expressed in Brussels was not matched by the capabilities on the ground…."[148] In 2004 there were 6 500

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[146] NATO International Security Assistance Force, "UNAMA/ISAF PRT Conference, ISAF Press Release #2006-031 (April 28, 2006)," http://www.jfcbs.nato.int/ISAF/Update/Press_Releases/newsrelease/2006/Release_28Apr06_031.htm?tsfsg=ea0a792ce7ada29750fbd36b5ca2602c; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[147] NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels Belgium: NATO 2006), 156-157.

[148] Richard E. Rupp, *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 160.

designated NATO troops for ISAF of which four thousand were Canadian or German.[149]

The mission was showing early signs that the political commitment by some of the Allies

was lacking. NATO's Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, diligently worked to

get nations to commit to the mission.[150] His theme for the Istanbul Summit of 2004 was

"Project Stability," and through it he hoped to overcome the disconnect between political

commitments and military implementation of the mission as noted by General Jones

earlier.[151] The summit produced what had been seen so many times in the past – a

compromise. The secretary general might not have gotten everything he wanted for the

Afghanistan mission but he did get two critical items. First he received a troop

commitment to help provide security for the upcoming elections and, secondly, a

commitment to take over existing PRTs in the south currently led by OEF coalition

forces.[152] By August 2006 NATO had taken command of the international forces in

southern Afghanistan and later, in September, it took command over twelve thousand

American combat troops in eastern Afghanistan. This transfer of command came as a

show of unity and it was hoped by Lt. General Richards of Britain that "…the huge

significance of this renewal of international commitment will not be lost on the majority

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[149] Richard E. Rupp *NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 160.

[150] Michael Rühle, "Quo Vadis, Nato? Analysing Nato's Istanbul Summit," *NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace* 49, no. 5 (2004), 15, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=793047701&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[151] Michael Rühle, "Quo Vadis, Nato? Analysing Nato's Istanbul Summit," *NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace* 49, no. 5 (2004), 15, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=793047701&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[152] Michael Rühle, "Quo Vadis, Nato? Analysing Nato's Istanbul Summit," *NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace* 49, no. 5 (2004), 15, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=793047701&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

who yearn for peace, stability and increased prosperity we [NATO] came here to

deliver."[153]   NATO's expanding role, in particular its push to the south, has proven to be

the catalyst for a very public intra-alliance controversy.

The problem of burden sharing within NATO now revealed itself in another way

– the application of national caveats to a country's fighting force and the dissatisfaction it

caused both within the Alliance and domestically in countries like Canada. The

imposition of national caveats on NATO troops is not unheard of in NATO's history but

in the Afghanistan mission it is more contentious as some nations are losing troops in

combat while some are not. By December 2006 Canada, the U.S. and Britain had

suffered more than 90 per cent of the casualties in Afghanistan while many NATO troops

were not able to leave Kabul, fight at night, fight in the winter or fight against the

Taliban.[154]   The Riga Summit was held in November 2006 with hopes to once again

increase the number of troops for the mission and come to some kind of an agreement on

the reduction of national caveats that would allow all NATO nations to share in the

combat missions in the south. The U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Nicholas

Burns, highlighted this concern when stated in front of the U.S. Congress that forces from

countries like France, Germany, Spain, Turkey and Italy were not in the fight and that

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[153] Carlotta Gall, "U.S. Hands Over Southern Afghanistan Command to NATO," *New York Times*Aug 1, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1086624871&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD ; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[154] "NATO Allies Deaf to Pleas from Canada," *Edmonton Journal*, Dec 2, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1173355911&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

"There should be no caveats, no restrictions whatsoever on the use, tactical use, of NATO forces inside of Afghanistan."[155]

Riga Summit

Related to the concerns expressed by Nicholas Burns the Canadians also had high hopes that some of the national caveats would be removed after the Riga Summit. According to Jean-Pierre Juneau, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, "The Riga Summit was an important opportunity to reaffirm the strength and unity of the Alliance while also allowing for a reinforcement of the transatlantic partnership."[156] The importance of the Summit was not lost on the President of Latvia, the meeting's host. At the opening of the Riga Summit Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberg set the stage for the Summit by appealing for NATO unity. In an attempt to inspire the other statesman to act collectively she recalled the sentiments of the Canadian, Lester B. Pearson when she said: "From the earliest days of NATO, Lester Pearson was an example of a statesman looking beyond borders to a broader future and a broader partnership. Let us do everything we can to protect the alliance so as to not have to fight wars that cause such grief."[157] She went on to state that NATO armies should not be there [Afghanistan] as tourists but to achieve aims.[158] Directly following

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[155] Anthony H. Cordesman, Chair and CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, "The Situation in Afghanistan," *FDCH Congressional Testimony*, 13.

[156] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Foreign policy – What's New," http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/nato/canada_nato-en.asp; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[157] Matthew Fisher, "Latvia Appeals for NATO Unity," *Star – Phoenix* Nov 28, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1170485251&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD ; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[158] Matthew Fisher, "Latvia Appeals for NATO Unity," *Star – Phoenix* Nov 28, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1170485251&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD ; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

the Summit Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper spoke positively about the outcome

saying that the Allies had made progress and that some of the caveats had been

softened[159] but his thoughts were not echoed by Canadian military pundits nor by popular

journalists. Directly following the summit the Canadian popular press was critical of its

outcome and concluded that the results of Riga were a disappointing partial

compromise.[160]

The Riga Summit failed to deliver on the two most important issues facing NATO

in Afghanistan: increasing the number of troops and reducing the national caveats.

Britain, the U.S., and Canada had all requested additional troop support and a measure of

relief in the south but NATO countries only agreed to reinforcement in the south in an

emergency and to deploy as few as five hundred combat troops.[161] Popular Canadian

military pundit, retired Canadian Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, stated that there was

no clear gain in Riga and that "NATO is in very very serious trouble…."[162] The lack of

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[159] Office of the Prime Minister Canada's New Government – GETTING THINGS DONE FOR ALL OF US, "Prime Minister applauds NATO allies for boosting commitments in Afghanistan," http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1434; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[160] Matthew Fisher, "NATO at Odds Over Fighting: Some Countries Favour Rebuilding to Battlefield Duty," *The Windsor Star* Nov 27, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1169781621&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD ; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[161] "NATO's Wavering Gives Taliban Hope," *Toronto Star*, Dec 1, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1171992481&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[162] Bill Schiller, "NATO 'in Serious Trouble'; Analysis Riga Summit Exposes Weaknesses of an Alliance that is Losing Credibility, Experts Say," *Toronto Star*, Nov 30, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1170707601&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD. ; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

concrete progress at Riga has made the Afghanistan mission a divisive issue in countries like Canada. In the weeks following the Riga Summit the popular press was rife with dire exclamations of dissatisfaction with the results. A headline in one of Canada's national papers, the *National Post*, predicted that NATO's future was now in doubt.[163] A headline in the *Edmonton Journal* on 2 December 2006 read that: "NATO Allies Deaf to Pleas from Canada."[164] The Riga Summit results added fuel to an already fiery internal debate in Canada.

Canadian Public Support

While Canadian support for their troops has not wavered, the country is essentially split over whether or not Canada should stay in Afghanistan.[165] The division within Canada seems to fall within one of two lanes. One group believes that the best way to achieve national security is to send forces to the hot spot to ensure they do not reach Canadian shores while the other believes that the mission in Afghanistan cannot be won and Canada should leave. During a press conference in November 2006 Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper lent his clear support to the first sentiment. He stated that: "We [NATO] decided unanimously to send forces to Afghanistan to confront the

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[163] "NATO's Future is Now in Doubt," *National Post* Dec 2, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1173352331&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD ; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[164] "NATO Allies Deaf to Pleas from Canada," *Edmonton Journal*, Dec 2, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1173355911&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[165] Paul Koring, "U.S. Backs NATO Troop Plea," *The Globe and Mail*, Nov 22, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1166397521&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

challenge to our security that exists in that country."[166] Senator Romeo Dallaire, a retired Canadian Lieutenant-General who had seen the horrific results in Rwanda of what can happen when there is inadequate international support, has stated similar supporting views in public. In one instance Senator Dallaire pointed out that there had been an international peace keeping force in Cyprus for over forty years, questioned why there would not be a similar commitment in Afghanistan, and concluded that Canada and NATO should stay as long as it takes.[167]

Before Stéphane Dion became the leader of the Liberal Party in Canada and thus the Leader of the Official Opposition he differentiated himself from other party hopefuls by strongly recommending the pursuit of a Canadian exit strategy for Afghanistan. During the leadership race he stated that Canada should withdraw its troops "with honour" before the end of the current mandate in 2009.[168] Even though Mr Dion has since stated that Canada should be true to its commitment in Afghanistan the fact that he felt it an issue important enough to try to differentiate himself from other leadership hopeful speaks to the divisive nature of the issue across the country. At a speech held at the Université de Montreal, in March 2007, the leader of Canada's New Democratic

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[166] Stephen Harper and Jan Peter Balkenende, "NATO's Steps to an Afghan Win: Defence, Development, Diplomacy," *The Globe and Mail* Nov 28, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1169265891&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD ; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[167] Chris Lambie, "Stay in Afghanistan as Long as it Takes, Dallaire Urges," *Edmonton Journal*, Dec 5, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1175167371&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD ; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[168] Jack Aubry, "Canada should Pull Troops Out of Afghanistan, Dion Says:" *Edmonton Journal*, Nov 22, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1167382411&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD ; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

Party, Jack Layton, reiterated his party's position that Canada should pull its troops from Afghanistan entirely and worried that Canada was merely a pond in a U.S. mission.[169] Gilles Duceppe, leader of the Bloc Quebecois, is also on record opposing the current conduct of the mission in Afghanistan and would oppose any extension of the mission unless its focus is changed.[170] Lest one think that this type of rhetoric is restricted to political campaigning it should be pointed out that it has also seen a great deal of play in the Canadian press. James Laxer, a political science professor at York University, has written extensively on why Canada should pull out of Afghanistan. In an article written in *The Globe and Mail* in March 2006 he stated that: "…Canada should pull its troops out of Afghanistan for an old fashioned, even politically incorrect reason. It is not in our interest to put young men and women in harm's way in a struggle that cannot be won."[171]

Can the Mission be Won?

There can be little doubt that ISAF and NATO have made a difference in Afghanistan. Free elections have been held, community councils set up, wells, roads and bridges have been built, and work is underway to train the army and police forces, but a

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[169] Jeff Heinrich., "We should Send Observers, Layton Says," *The Gazette* Mar 13, 2007, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1233010751&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD ; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[170] Hubert Bach, "Duceppe Pushes Reconstruction Focus: Allow Ex-Taliban into Government: Bloc," *The Gazette* Jan 26, 2007, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1204045741&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD ; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[171] James Laxer, "Why Canada should get out of Afghanistan," *The Globe and Mail Online* available from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/RTGAM.20060303.wcoment30303/BNStory; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

great deal of work is left to be done.[172] The question is whether or not a stable and self-reliant Afghanistan can emerge from the Taliban's shadow within the context of the current level of international commitment. A brief review of the difficulties faced will help convey why it is a real possibility that NATO's mission may fail in Afghanistan and set the stage for what happens to NATO next.

There are considerable impediments to NATO succeeding in Afghanistan. If the population of Afghanistan had a history of good government and an expectation thereof it might be able to withstand the Taliban insurgency but that is not the case. The region is ethnically diverse, competitive, and essentially a medieval society. It will not be easy for any force to make substantive changes in the short term. In February 2007 the Canadian Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence released an interim report on Canada's Afghanistan mission. The report detailed thirteen challenges to a successful outcome ranging from the inherent difficulty in conducting this type of high tempo operation so far from home to a belief that it will take far too long to help transform an essentially medieval society into a recognizable democracy. As it relates directly to NATO, the report stated that NATO was not passing this, its first real test of out of area operations.[173] The report concluded that it was "…doubtful that this mission can be

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[172] Stephen Harper and Jan Peter Balkenende, "NATO's Steps to an Afghan Win: Defence, Development, Diplomacy," *The Globe and Mail* Nov 28, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1169265891&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD ; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[173] Standing Committee on National Security and Defense, "Canadian Troops in Afghanistan: Taking a Hard Look at a Hard Mission," Interim report on-line available from http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/repFeb07-e.pdf; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007, 10.

accomplished given the limited resources that NATO is currently investing in Afghanistan."[174]

Gordon Smith from the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute wrote in March 2007 that NATO was not on course to achieve its stated objective which was "…to help establish the conditions in which Afghanistan can enjoy – after decades of conflict, destruction, and poverty – a representative government and self-sustaining peace and security…."[175] Smith concluded: "The success of NATO in Afghanistan is vital. But given the course of events and current circumstances, there is a quite reasonable possibility that NATO may not succeed."[176]

Even if NATO manages to increase its level of support for the mission it still may fail. In addition to the challenges in bringing together an ethnically diverse state with a long history of inter fighting, there also exists equally difficult external challenges to overcome. Patricia Gossman, an independent consultant on human rights in South Asia and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, forwards a theory that the sheer length and long history of civil war in Afghanistan points to influences originating from outside the country – a transnational war model vice only a civil war.[177] The principal

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[174] Standing Committee on National Security and Defense, "Canadian Troops in Afghanistan: Taking a Hard Look at a Hard Mission," Interim report on-line available from http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/repFeb07-e.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 March 2007, 13.

[175] Gordon Smith, "Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working?" Report Prepared for Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute March 2007. Available online at http///www.cdfai.org; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007, 14.

[176] Gordon Smith, "Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working?" Report Prepared for Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute March 2007. Available online at http///www.cdfai.org; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007, 14.

[177] Patricia Gossman, "Afghanistan in the Balance," *Middle East Report*, no. 221 (Winter, 2001), 14, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-2851%28200124%290%3A221%3C8%3AAITB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-

external influence on Afghanistan remains its eastern neighbour, Pakistan. Pakistan has

historically been concerned with security on its western border and in maintaining

influence in Afghanistan. The predominant view in Pakistan is that it is crucial for

Pakistan to have some influence over events in Afghanistan and to establish "strategic

depth" to its west.[178] It is particularly interested in ensuring that the cross border

nationalist Pashtun movement does not gain any momentum and that an unfriendly

foreign state not does not have undue influence over Afghanistan's affairs as occurred

during the time of Soviet occupation.[179] Pakistan has achieved this in the past by

supporting the Taliban. The Taliban are a predominantly Pashtun dominated group who

do not favour the formation of a separate state for themselves. Pakistan's ability to

maintain close ties with this group helps to ensure that it will have some level of

influence in Afghanistan. Even if Pakistan were to outwardly work against the Taliban it

would be a daunting task. The Taliban have traditionally found refuge in the Pashtun

tribal lands located in the mountainous region on the contested border between Pakistan

and Afghanistan. Pakistan has little control over its mountainous western border and any

attempt made by Pakistan to exert its influence in that region has been disastrous.[180]

Pakistan's western border represents the heartland of Islamist sentiments and it is thought

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F; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[178] "A Troubled 'Afghan Model'," *Newsweek* 148, no. 24; 24 (12/11/, 2006), 42.

[179] "A Troubled 'Afghan Model'," *Newsweek* 148, no. 24; 24 (12/11/, 2006), 42.

[180] Gordon Smith, "Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working?" Report Prepared for Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute March 2007. Available online at http///www.cdfai.org; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007, 14.

that the Al Qaeda is there and remobilizing.[181] The President of Afghanistan, Hamid

Karzai, has argued that Pakistan has tacitly and actively supported the Taliban along the

Afghanistan-Pakistan border and within Pakistan itself.[182] As long as Pakistan continues

to provide refuge for Taliban fighters, the U.S. counter insurgency efforts and the ISAF

efforts for meaningful stability will remain difficult to achieve.

What if NATO Fails in Afghanistan?

Since the possibility of failure is widely acknowledged, does the challenge faced

by NATO in Afghanistan figure more prominently than the previous challenges it has

overcome? Whether or not one believes that NATO will be brought down by failure in

Afghanistan will ultimately reflect why one feels alliances are formed and stay together.

While there are variations within the schools of thought, academic opinions have

generally been divided between what are called the neo-realist and the neo-liberal camps.

Subscribers to the neo- realist theory of alliances believe that alliances are based on

common threats and common interests. When these threats or interests are no longer

present the alliance should break up. Kenneth Waltz, a leading neo-realist predicted that

after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the removal of the Soviet threat, "…while NATO's

days may not have been numbered its years were."[183] Clearly, time has shown this not to

be true, so there must be another explanation as to why NATO continues to stay together.

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[181] Gordon Smith, "Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working?" Report Prepared for Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute March 2007. Available online at http///www.cdfai.org; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007, 4.

[182] "A Troubled 'Afghan Model'," *Newsweek* 148, no. 24; 24 (12/11/, 2006), 42.

[183] Andrew Cottey, "Nato: Globalization Or Redundancy?" *Contemporary Security Policy* 25 (12, 2004), 395.

The neo-liberal view, on the other hand, focuses on political values and institutions as key shapers of a state's behaviour and purports that the highly institutionalized nature of NATO plays a key role in maintaining unity.[184] In other words, the driving force that kept NATO together was more than the Soviet threat. This seems to be a better theoretical explanation on why the Alliance has continued to survive and evolve. The neo-realists will argue that NATO survived all the challenges it faced during the Cold War because individual states felt that the Soviet threat kept them together. The neo-liberals will argue that the Alliance may have formed in response to a common threat but stayed together because like minded nations generally work together to preserve what each feels important in an ever-changing global landscape. The new landscape has recently changed to include a new threat – terrorism. NATO is a community of states sharing common values as well as shared interests – it is more than just an alliance. NATO is working to understand how it will fit into the new reality in the absence of a Soviet threat.

NATO survived the dissolution of its solidifying common threat and has now chosen to take its organization out of Europe to Afghanistan to face the new threat. It continues to work through problems as it has for sixty years to find a common way to move ahead. One of NATO's consistent strengths has been its ability to adapt and compromise internally and externally to find common ground. What this means is that NATO's next out of Europe mission will not resemble exactly its uneven experience in Afghanistan. It is always learning. NATO does not have all the answers on how to operate in the new environment and has much to learn about nation building. NATO is receiving criticism from external agencies aid agencies that have not been completely

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[184] Andrew Cottey, "Nato: Globalization Or Redundancy?" *Contemporary Security Policy* 25 (12, 2004), 397.

happy with ISAF's approach in Afghanistan. John Watson, president of CARE Canada,

criticized the ISAF PRT on the basis that humanitarian aid should not be linked with a

military camp.[185] Anja de Beer, the executive director of the Afghanistan Umbrella

organization that represents ninety seven NGO members (ACBAR), has stated that: "We

[ACBAR] maintain always that for development activities, it might be better left to

organization that have long-standing experience like the UN and NGO's."[186] NATO will

continue to foster better relationships with both international aid organizations and other

partners like the EU because that is the type of role NATO is moving toward. It does not

matter what the exact role NATO will evolve into nor, in the long run, if ISAF succeeds

in Afghanistan, because it is more important to understand that it will continue to evolve

into something. The body of like-minded states will stay together because they all feel it

is in their interest to do so.

Conclusion

The war in Afghanistan will never be easy. Internally the Afghan people are not

homogeneous and there is no single solution that will immediately satisfy everyone.

Externally, Pakistan's historical strategic interests, its historical aid to the Taliban and its

strategic desire to maintain influence in the region will continue to hamper security

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[185] Bill Graveland, "Canada has Lost its Way with Foreign Policy: CARE," *Telegram*, Nov 18, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1165068381&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD ; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

[186] Bill Graveland, "Canada has Lost its Way with Foreign Policy: CARE," *Telegram*, Nov 18, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1165068381&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD ; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

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efforts. NATO may very well fail in Afghanistan. The mission is extreme and the measures of success will be difficult to quantify in the long term. When, for example, will the world say that the mission has been a success? Is it accepted, as Senator Dallaire has put forward, that NATO should and will be in Afghanistan for forty or more years? If the Alliance continues to face problems exemplified by the lack of progress seen at the Riga Summit then NATO's mission will surely fail and NATO will again re-evaluate its world wide role. It is difficult to say how that role will evolve and if, indeed, all the members will stay, but evolve it will because that is what NATO has done.

Conclusion

Like minded nations formed NATO as a response to the perceived threat caused by Soviet aggression in the post World War II era. That unifying threat ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Many neo-realist theorists, like Kenneth Waltz, had predicted the quick demise of NATO as a consequence. NATO did not immediately follow the example of the Berlin Wall and crumble and now a new scenario has again caused pundits to predict its end. That new challenge is the current mission in Afghanistan. There have been both internal domestic debates and external debates between members of the Alliance.   Canada has experienced elements of both. Domestically, Canada's participation in the Afghanistan mission has been a consistent topic in the news, effectively dividing the country over whether or not Canada should stay. Externally, Canada has been a vocal critic over the limitations that some nations have placed on the employability of their troops. The mission has divided Canada and caused increased speculation that NATO may not survive it. Even though NATO has survived up until now, the success of its first out of Europe mission is deemed essential to its continued survival - almost as if NATO has been living on borrowed time and that the Afghanistan mission is the real test.

There must be no doubt that NATO's mission in Afghanistan is a serious challenge that NATO may not meet completely. The challenges to military success are formidable and the mission has highlighted some of the historically divisive issues in the alliance like burden sharing. Additional problems inherent to any state level alliance that have emerged include placing national priorities within an alliance construct and

generating consensus on what the common objectives of the Alliance's mission are. It is contended here that this is not new. This paper has demonstrated that NATO has faced many serious challenges to its unity that have ranged from emotional disagreements involving conciliation with former foes, as in the rearmament of Germany, to practical alliance considerations when national interest diverge from those of the Alliance, as was seen in the Suez Crisis.

In the post Cold War era NATO has determinedly examined itself to ensure that it will evolve and remain a valued instrument of its members. NATO has refocused its structure, re-defined its mandate, and taken on new roles. It has looked to operate more effectively with other international organizations, like the UN, involved in world conflicts. It has demonstrated flexibility in Afghanistan by concurrently engaging in both combat and peace building operations under the completely new PRT construct. While this paper does not purport that the current NATO structure will be its last nor that it will ever embark again on another mission like Afghanistan, it does demonstrate that NATO continues to evolve as it suits its members.

Unless one were to believe that NATO is pouring good money after bad, one must view its expansion as an affirmation that it remains a viable entity that will survive Afghanistan as it has every other challenge it has faced. It is not really important to understand what form NATO will take, whether it will be an international police force for the UN, or a world partner in stability operations, or even the world's lead agency for anti-terrorism. The point really is that NATO will continue to evolve and will survive this challenge as it has so many in the past.

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