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Canadian Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations – A Better Way?

By / par LCol Robert Chaloux

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Abstract

The 2006 Lebanon evacuation raised many questions about the Government of Canada's capability to rescue its citizens from a foreign country during an emergency. This thesis will examine how Canada conducts Non-Combatant Evacuations (NEO) through a review of departmental doctrine and orders and an assessment of the Canadian Governmental actions in Lebanon. Sweden's Lebanon NEO will be examined as a case study as Sweden is a nation very similar to Canada which performed very well during the crisis. The whole will be analyzed through the criteria of speed, coordination and resource application, factors considered to be critical in an evacuation. Finally, a series of recommendations will be made in order to improve Canadian NEOs in the future, aimed at increasing the speed of the response, improving the level of training and preparation, and upgrading governmental doctrine.

Introduction

The need for cooperation between the Department of National Defence and other government departments is on the increase due to the plethora of national emergencies in Canada and international crises abroad. On the international scene, an area which has become important and highly visible is the Non Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). A NEO is defined as “A military operation conducted to assist the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in evacuating Canadians and selected non-Canadians from threatening circumstances in a foreign host nation (HN) and moving them to a safe haven.”¹ This thesis will examine NEOs.

This thesis will answer the question “Are Canadian NEOs effective or not”? This question will be examined by applying a series of criteria to NEO which are the main contributors to success. First, how was the promptness of the government in taking action to resolve the issue? Second, how was coordination conducted between the various elements involved in the NEO? Third, were sufficient government resources committed for a successful outcome?

These questions arose during the Lebanon crisis out of the perception that the Government of Canada was not as prepared as it should have been for this type of crisis and took too long to rescue its citizens. In the latest Non-Combatant Evacuation, thousands of Canadians were evacuated from Lebanon in July 2006. Although the mission was a success, there were errors committed. Other nations involved were seen as having reacted quicker and with better organization. The emergency began on 12 July and Canada starting evacuating its first citizens on 19

¹ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FP-050 *Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), 89.

July in a disorganized manner. Other nations had started their evacuation efforts days before and were better prepared. The criteria of promptness, coordination, and sufficiency of assets committed will be an accurate measure of governmental performance.

This thesis will demonstrate that the government performed satisfactorily during a period of extreme crisis in a part of the world very far from Canada where the government had few assets in place.

The answers will be reached by analyzing government doctrine, studying the Lebanon evacuation as a real life example, studying another nation's approach and finally, providing recommendations for improving future responses. The thesis will be sourced from various Canadian and international government publications, manuals, and reports. As the crisis was recent and very little was written about it in reference books, there will be many media sources utilized.

This thesis will be articulated in six chapters. It will begin with an explanation of what a NEO is, when it occurs and in what circumstances. The three analysis criteria of speed, coordination and resources will be outlined and contextualized. This will lay the groundwork for the understanding of the topic. The second chapter will be an analysis of current Canadian government doctrine based on the three criteria for success. This will demonstrate if the doctrine is sound and still relevant. The third chapter will concentrate on the Lebanon evacuation and how the Canadian government performed its tasks, based on the criteria. Response time, time of year, number of evacuees, speed of evacuation, government resources used, finances, public perceptions will all be covered. This will demonstrate how the government reacted in

a real-life emergency and if it followed its doctrine. The fourth chapter will be based on a case-study of the Swedish NEO in Lebanon which proved to be particularly successful. It will be seen if Canada can learn any lessons from the Scandinavian approach. Based on these studies, recommendations will be made on how to improve the effectiveness of Canadian NEOs.

Chapter 1 - Non Combatant Evacuation – Definitions and Analysis Criteria

1.1 Definitions and Background

What is a NEO? Who is responsible? When are they undertaken? These are important questions which must be understood before delving into the subject matter. This chapter will lay the groundwork using Canadian and other government doctrine as the source of materiel. The Canadian perspective and the role of the Canadian Forces in the NEO will be outlined. Finally, the analysis criteria which will form the basis of the thesis will be explained to demonstrate the methodology and why the criteria were chosen. Firstly, the NEO definition will be looked at.

A NEO is an operation conducted by the government to evacuate non-combatants, selected host-nation citizens and other third country nationals whose lives are in danger from locations in a host nation to an appropriate safe haven. It usually involves a swift insertion of a military force, temporary occupation of an objective, and a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission.² NEOs are fundamentally defensive in nature and are conducted to reduce to a minimum the number of citizens at risk and to protect them during the evacuation process. They are not an intervention in the issues in the host nation. The end-state for a NEO is when all citizens who wish to be evacuated arrive at the safe haven and the CF task force (TF) has withdrawn

² United States, Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07.5 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*. (Fort Monroe: DOD U.S.A., 1997), vii.

from the host nation. No evacuee is forced to accept an offer of evacuation.³ The Canadian perspective will be examined.

The Government of Canada has a primary obligation to ensure the safety and well being of Canadian citizens. For Canadians living outside of Canada, this responsibility is undertaken by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Dangerous and life threatening circumstances arise on a frequent basis from a variety of sources, such as natural disasters or man-made conflicts. In whatever instance, the Canadian Diplomatic Mission accredited to an area where risks are developing is responsible to monitor conditions, advise in-country Canadians and plan the safe evacuation of Canadian Entitled Personnel (CEP). Rapidly evolving threats may be too much for the Canadian Missions to handle, especially if they are violent in nature. DFAIT may request the assistance of the Canadian Forces (CF) to conduct the evacuation.⁴ The CF is mandated to perform this role.

The 1994 Defence White Paper states that "the Canadian Forces will maintain the capability to assist the Department of Foreign Affairs in the protection and evacuation of Canadians from areas threatened by imminent conflict".⁵ The CF has select assets and resources that can both assist in the overall evacuation and provide it appropriate security.⁶ No other governmental department has the personnel, equipment or training to conduct these operations. The CF role is further formalized under the Vice Chief of Defence Staff Defence Planning and Management Branch

³ Ibid., 1-1.

⁴ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FP-050 *Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), 1-1.

⁵ Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper*; available from http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/scen/scen-5_e.asp; Internet; accessed 18 April 2007.

⁶ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FP-050 *Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), 1-1.

contingency planning scenarios. While the scenario framework is still in development, eleven scenarios have been outlined which span the spectrum of conflict and operations envisioned for the CF. Scenario 5 is a full scale NEO combining the CF with the other government departments in the evacuation of Canadian citizens from a hazardous area.⁷ The CF is thus fully committed to NEOs and has a vital role to play in their execution. A NEO is a very complex operation with many players performing different roles, all in the aim of returning citizens home from a dangerous situation. These NEOs must be analyzed to determine which factors are important for their successful outcome. The following are the analysis criteria.

1.2 Analysis Criteria

This section will describe the chosen analysis criteria of speed, coordination and resources and why they are considered the foundations for a successful NEO.

1.3 Speed

In most operations, the speed of execution is a critical factor in the achievement of the mission. In the NEO context it is the most important ingredient. It will be a race against the clock to organize, deploy, conduct the extraction and return home before the situation in the affected nation deteriorates to the point of endangering the CEPs. The operation must be conducted in a rapid manner to stay ahead of events and to be proactive. This begins with the promptness of the political element to make the decision to become involved in an operation, thus enabling government departments. If the political leadership procrastinates in its task of decision making, the situation

⁷ Department of National Defence, "Scenario 5 - Evacuation of Canadians overseas." *DND VCDS Defence Planning and Management*; available from http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/scen/scen-5_e.asp; Internet; accessed 10 April 2007.

may become overcome by events and offer no solutions. The rapidity of the lead department to organize it and others and to make the initial decisions to enable the operation is vital. The swiftness of deploying assets to Theatre and reinforcing the headquarters at home is essential for the smooth functioning of the NEO. The Canadian speed of operation will be compared with that of Sweden, which successfully acted in Lebanon. Promptness is directly linked with the criteria of coordination.

1.4 Coordination

Coordination is defined as the combining of diverse parts or groups to make a unit, or the way these parts work together. In a NEO it can be surmised that first-rate coordination would be when different government departments and agencies would come together quickly and work as a unified team to resolve the situation. It would also be reflected in effective dealings with other nations, especially the host nation. The Canadian level of coordination will be viewed alongside the Swedish model to see how well this was achieved. The application of resources is the last criteria essential for a successful NEO.

1.5 Resources

The government has a tremendous amount of resources available to enable it to perform its tasks. How the government organizes itself and utilizes its resources is the fundamental building-block of a NEO. Doctrine indicates which resources should be available for a NEO and how they are to be employed. Did the real-life example of Lebanon bear this out? Success in asset employment can be defined as the careful allocation and speedy deployment of all necessary personnel and materiel to where

they are needed to effectuate the mission. These criteria will also be compared to the Swedish reaction in terms of assets employed and their effect on the situation.

The combination of a speedy reaction, proper coordination amongst the branches of government and the employment and deployment of the right amount of assets are the most important criteria in a NEO.

The aim of this chapter was to provide the groundwork for the thesis. The NEO was defined, placing emphasis on the Canadian context. The role of the CF in a NEO and the government mandates behind it were elucidated, establishing the vital nature of military participation. Finally, the method of analysis to determine NEO success was outlined and prioritized, using the criteria of speed, coordination and resource application as the gauges. These criteria will be applied in the analysis of the Canadian Government Doctrine.

Chapter 2 – Canadian Government Doctrine

This chapter will address the relevance of Canadian government doctrine as it pertains to NEO. Is the doctrine pertinent, timely and useful for the conduct of NEO? These questions arose following the Lebanon evacuation when public perception of the government performance was critical. Doctrine is defined as the “fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” In general, doctrine describes the factors involved and provides the broad “how” to plan and execute operations or military activities.

The quality and relevance of doctrine varies greatly between organizations, with the CF providing the most comprehensive and useable. The doctrine will be analyzed through the application of the criteria of speed, organization and resources to the different governmental policy manuals and Contingency Operations Plans (COPs). The chapter will begin with an analysis of CF doctrine and contingency orders for NEO. Secondly, the DFAIT Manual of Consular Instructions, which covers evacuations, will be examined for its significance. Lastly, the other more minor government players such as the RCMP and CSIS will be examined for their roles. The analysis will begin with DND doctrine.

2.1 DND Doctrine

This section will address the question of the relevance of DND doctrine as it pertains to modern NEO. The CF deployed assets to Lebanon to assist DFAIT in the evacuation of CEPs in 2006 in the last major government NEO effort. Was the

doctrine confirmed through the actual deployment? The CF performed well during the crisis, in large measure to its doctrine and contingency plans. The answers will be reached through the application of the analysis criteria to the relevant CF Doctrine and plans. The main publication which deals with NEOs is the “Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations” instruction manual which details CF procedures and processes to support the evacuation of Canadians abroad.⁸ From this manual, an Operational Level NEO Order (COP ANGLE) was prepared by the CF Command responsible for NEO, the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM). The first part will look at the NEO manual, the second will scrutinize COP Angle, and the chapter will finish with some recommendations for future improvement.

2.2 Non Combatant Evacuation Operations Manual

The principal Canadian manual incorporating doctrine on NEO is the CF Non-Combatant Evacuations Manual. It was prepared to detail CF procedures and processes to support DFAIT in the evacuation of Canadians abroad. It is written at the strategic and operational level and forms the basis for all tactical manuals, plans and orders dealing with NEO.⁹ This manual will be analyzed using the three criteria to confirm its relevance and usefulness. The first criteria analyzed will be the most important, rapidity of action. Does this manual allow and encourage swift action during a NEO?

2.3 Speed

⁸ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-307/FP-050 *Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), i.

⁹ *Ibid.*, i.

Does the NEO Manual allow for speed and agility of action in the conduct of NEO? The governments perceived slow reaction in Lebanon may be rooted in faulty doctrine which bureaucratizes action instead of encouraging it. It will be demonstrated that there are many inclusions in the manual at different levels of government which will encourage promptness during an emergency. The answers will be reached through the study of the manual.

The first and most important element in achieving quick reaction is to have contingency plans in place before a crisis erupts. This is well covered in the manual and is comprised of different elements, starting with DFAIT.

DFAIT, as the lead department for evacuation operations, will develop and maintain contingency plans for all nations. These plans are called Consular Emergency Contingency Plans (CECP) and provide all necessary information required in times of disaster. In cases of nations at risk, DFAIT will issue warnings and will recommend the preparation of Personal Emergency Plans. These plans counsel Canadians to keep all vital documents together in one accessible location, ensure passports and visas are valid, have sufficient money for emergencies, and register and maintain contact with the Canadian Mission.¹⁰ These plans will enable the government to act quickly at the collective level and Canadian civilians to be prepared individually. The CECP will now be examined in greater detail.

The CECP is aimed at assisting the Mission staff deal with emergency situations. It is not necessarily an evacuation plan but it may become so if the situation deteriorates to a certain point. The preferred solution will be to emphasize self-help measures for Canadians such as departing by commercial means before the

¹⁰ Ibid., 2-3.

situation deteriorates. The CECP is designed to provide guidance to missions during the lead up to and during a crisis. The CF can assist DFAIT with the preparation of more detailed CECPs at the onset of a crisis. The CECPs will provide information on the possible courses of action for different threats, the Mission's Standing Task Force (STF) and standing operating procedures (SOPs), the Mission's emergency action infrastructure, the notification system, the warden system, evacuee data, evacuation chain data, evacuation support data, and critical staff data. In the case of a possible NEO, the Canadian Defence Attaché (CDA) will review the CECP and synchronize it with CF NEO doctrine.¹¹ The CECP is the foundation document in the event of an emergency. If it is logical and kept up to date, it will provide most of the data required to carry out an evacuation in a rapid manner. As the CF is expertly trained in crisis planning, it should be an integral part of all CECP planning and review. The CECP is important but the elements which will action it, the Standing Task Force (STF), is essential.

The Head of Mission (HOM) is responsible for the CECP but the Mission's STF is the element that puts it together. The STF is made up of members of the mission who would be responsible for executing the plan and are under the command of either the HOM or the Head of Chancery. The STF has the authority to draw resources from the Mission and DFAIT during a crisis.¹² These personnel are pre-named and intimate with the workings of the plan, which will greatly facilitate any evacuation. Another component which is critical to the swiftness of a plan is knowing all the elements you will be dealing with, the most important being how many Canadians are actually

¹¹ Ibid., 2-5.

¹² Ibid., 2-4.

located in the country. This is done through the Registration of Canadians Abroad (ROCA).

DFAIT has a citizen inventory system in place where Canadians who are planning to spend three months or more in a country can register with the Mission. Canadians living in countries of high risk are also encouraged to register. This is the ROCA and is a vital planning document in the event of an evacuation. The ROCA will never be complete so intelligence staffs must consider alternate sources of information to bring a greater sense of fidelity to the number of Canadians in a given country.¹³ This document will provide a good baseline to start planning and will save a tremendous amount of time. It must, however be kept up to date and the data verified on a recurrent basis to be of any use. The last measure enabling rapid action and a good connection between the Mission and the Canadians is the Warden System.

Each mission will have a Warden System established in order to convey information quickly between the Embassy and the resident Canadians. Wardens will convey information on contingency measures and evacuation arrangements. During an evacuation, the wardens will control their groups and lead residents to the evacuation assembly areas.¹⁴ This system of having assigned citizens who know their group and where individual Canadians live will greatly simplify an evacuation, especially during times of stress and confusion.

The NEO Manual makes very good provisions for allowing the government to react quickly through a series of sound preparations. The background planning of the CECP, STF, ROCA and Warden System will enable the Mission to have the basic

¹³ Ibid., 2-5.

¹⁴ Ibid., 2-5.

information readily available in the case of an emergency. There will be a pre-designated plan with all of its sections outlining how to evacuate and where, a cadre of trained diplomats who will action the plan, a system of identifying most of the Canadians and where they are located, and finally, a system of communication and evacuation based on custodians who know their charges and their roles in the overall plan. The vital element in this is to ensure the plans are valid and the rest of the information is updated and kept relevant. The second criteria, coordination, will be examined.

2.4 Coordination

Does the NEO Manual provide guidance on coordination between various government departments, with other nations and organizations in the event of a crisis? The Lebanon evacuation provided a positive example of first-rate coordination but was this based on a doctrinal model? The NEO Manual will be scrutinized to verify if it is so.

The emphasis for coordination starts with the lead department, DFAIT. Within the Government of Canada DFAIT is the lead department in evacuation operations outside of Canada and the Minister of Foreign Affairs is the lead minister.¹⁵ This is emphasized early in the manual and establishes who is in charge.

Coordination and cooperation with friendly countries is vitally important as nations may assist each other in times of need. Some nations may be better situated and equipped to conduct an evacuation or have spare capacity, thus providing some much needed support to a nation in need. The Manual recognizes this and outlines the many memorandums of understanding between Canada and its primary allies.

¹⁵ Ibid., 2-7.

Missions will cooperate with other missions from friendly countries during the preparation of contingency plans. Canada has a series of Memorandums of Understanding with the UK, U.S.A. and Australia to cooperate in the planning process and assist each other during evacuations.¹⁶ This system has the potential to greatly assist in a crisis and was proven during Lebanon when Canada evacuated other nations' citizens and Canadians were evacuated under the same arrangements. This level of coordination leads to a similar form of cooperation with Canadian companies and International organizations.

There may be Canadian companies and International Organizations operating in the Affected Nation (AN). The manual encourages the cooperation with these organizations in the creation of the CECP. The organizations could appoint one or more wardens from amongst the employees to help maintain the ROCA and to provide liaison for the firm's Canadian employees. These companies may be able to provide additional facilities and resources in an emergency such as communications equipment, transport, supplies, and assembly areas. The companies may have their own contingency plans, which should be coordinated with the CECP.¹⁷ The manual encourages coordination and cooperation with these organizations which could be a great asset to a Canadian evacuation. Now, specific Canadian government interaction will be seen.

During a NEO, the main area of coordination is between the CF and DFAIT. The planned synchronization is extremely well detailed in the manual and lays out how the CF will assist the Mission staff. The CF and DFAIT remain two distinct yet

¹⁶ Ibid., 2-7.

¹⁷ Ibid., 2-7.

highly integrated team members. The CF may provide assistance to a Mission through the CF Defence Attaché (CDA) accredited to the HN. Additionally, other CF specialists may be attached to the Mission to provide support with communications, planning, protection and liaison. Other Canadian Government departments such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) may also assist the Mission with the evacuation.¹⁸ The manual mentions these OGDs but the focus is on the CF/DFAIT interface.

The JTF will carry out operations in support of the HOM's plan and both the military and the Mission must coordinate the work to be done. The CF assistance is usually in the form of the security element for the Mission Staff but can also involve evacuee processing and marshalling tasks. The fundamental asset committed to a NEO is a tactical self-sufficient unit (TSSU) which would be capable of performing a collection of tactical capabilities and have the ability to be supported by enabling capabilities. This begins with the Joint Task Force and its elements which will deploy to Theatre. The first part of the JTF is the Advance Party.

The first group to arrive in Theatre to be able to effectuate major tasks is the Advance Party. The main tasks are that of the Forward Command Element (FCE) and the Evacuation Point Party (EPP). The FCE will coordinate with the Mission Staff and the HN authorities and will establish the rear link with the TF HQ. The FCE will deploy as early as possible to theatre and establish contacts, determine support requirements and begin to coordinate with HN and Embassy personnel. It will acquire and review all plans associated with the evacuation, including developing an escape

¹⁸ Ibid., 4-10.

plan for the FCE. All materiel needs such as necessary communications equipment, weapons and ammunition, and medical requirements will be identified. Any over-flight and landing rights needed for appropriate countries will be identified through the CF chain for action.¹⁹

The second task element, the EEP, is designed to identify and assist in the establishment of the critical evacuation chain points of the Assembly Points (AP) and the Evacuation Centre (EC). It will assist in the operation of the EC during the evacuation and will plan and organize the EC before the arrival of the TF main body. It will coordinate with Mission officials and HN authorities to ensure a smooth operation. It will conduct all ground reconnaissance and confirm the suitability of all evacuation chain nodes. It will prepare the AP defensive plan and evacuation security requirements and will plan for any emergency medical evacuations. The EPP will also conduct the initial preparation of the evacuation nodes in advance of the main body. It will assist the Embassy personnel with media enquiries and will maintain communications with the TF HQ.²⁰

These tasks demonstrate the critical role of the Advance Party in setting the stage. The assigned tasks will enable communications and coordination with the Mission staff and HN, will reconfirm or adjust existing plans, will make final arrangements for the deployment of the main body and the extraction of the evacuees, and will confirm and initiate the evacuation chain nodes. This will set the stage for the Security Element (SE).

¹⁹ Ibid., 3-12.

²⁰ Ibid., 3-13.

The SE is part of the main body and will be responsible for the security of the evacuation. Specifically it will monitor threats to the evacuation, anticipate the response of the HN security forces in the evacuation area, will provide the necessary crowd confrontation at each site, provide security for marshalling and search teams, secure the perimeters of all evacuation points and will maintain a reserve. It will also provide security for the Ambassador and other key personnel.²¹

The last portion of the team is the Marshalling Element (ME). It is responsible to move to the pre-designated APs and establish perimeter security. It then brings evacuees to the APs and escorts them to the EC. It will identify primary and alternate routes, plan convoy control and identify safe houses along the routes. It will ensure there is sufficient transport to move the evacuees, search parties, security sections and will ensure adequate communications.²²

The manual outlines how each military element will coordinate with the DFAIT officials in the Mission to conduct a successful NEO. The CF will review the plans, finalize them if they are insufficient, bring in the necessary assets and finally conduct the evacuation in support of DFAIT. This is very well detailed and complete. Finally, coordination with the HN will be examined.

Coordination is critical with the HN and its various organizations as nothing will be achieved without it. The manual clearly outlines the need to conduct the evacuation with the agreement of the HN and to consider the long-term political impacts.²³ HN support services may still be functioning and could include security forces, transport services, air and seaport authorities, immigration and other forms of

²¹ Ibid., 3-13.

²² Ibid., 3-13.

²³ Ibid., 4-13.

logistics support. Anything which can be used through the HN can minimize the CF footprint and further reduce the possibility of inflaming the situation.²⁴ This level of coordination is encouraged and well explained.

The NEO Manual establishes very solid doctrine in the view of enabling coordination between the various elements involved in a NEO. Beginning with an unambiguous designation of DFAIT as the lead department, it outlines the need for coordination with other friendly nations, coordination with Canadian companies and International Organizations, coordination with OGDs, coordination with the HN and finally, intimate coordination between the CF and DFAIT. It may be prescriptive but it serves as a good check-list of what should be done by whom. This criterion is fully met. Now, the resource application during a NEO will be looked at.

2.5 Resources

Were Government of Canada resources allocated adequately for the successful prosecution of the Lebanon operation? Was the careful allocation and speedy deployment of all necessary personnel and materiel to where they were needed to effectuate the mission done? The public criticism of the handling of the crisis brings this into doubt. In fact, the Government spared no expense and did what it could at the time to repatriate its citizens. This sub-chapter will examine the NEO manual to see if resource application is adequately covered.

If a crisis is beyond the capacity of DFAIT to handle, it may request the assistance of the CF to assist in the conduct the evacuation. The CF has select assets and resources that can both assist in the overall evacuation and provide security.²⁵

²⁴ Ibid., 4- 6.

²⁵ Ibid., 1-1.

This is a profound implication as the entire available CF inventory is potentially on-call to assist in a crisis. As the CF has the highly trained personnel and specialized equipment to intervene and solve a crisis, it demonstrates the governments resolve to protect its citizens.

Once an evacuation is in progress, the needs of the evacuees will have to be met. These requirements will include basic accommodation, feeding, amenities and recreation to keep people safe and comfortable until they are withdrawn from the danger area.²⁶ The NEO manual clearly identifies the evacuation organization is responsible for meeting these needs. This should be planned and incorporated in the CECP and the CF has capacity to assist in a worse case scenario.

The greatest resource available will be the JTF provided by the CF to assist DFAIT. It may be broad-based and balanced, incorporating elements and capabilities from maritime, land, air and special operations forces (SOF) units, as well as joint and national level units.²⁷ The CF participation will be task-tailored for the job and may range from a single aircraft or a small team of SOF to a full blown JTF comprised of all Capability Components. The specific Task Force Structure and their roles have been previously mentioned. This is the most important tool the government has to quickly influence situations in a crisis overseas. The addition of CF assets will rapidly deliver guidance, control, capability and order to a chaotic scene. The NEO manual effectively details this role.

In addition to the JTF assets available, another key ingredient in the CF package is the service support which will be brought to bear. Service support incorporates

²⁶ Ibid., 2B-4.

²⁷ Ibid., 3-1.

movements, materiel support, medical and military police and is involved with the preparatory, entry/withdrawal, evacuation and supporting operations. The TF must plan for its own requirements along with the mission's and the evacuees needs.²⁸

TF service support in a NEO will conform to those arrangements and requirements for other international operations but will have some significant differences due to the nature of the mission. The Mission will normally have many HN-contracted administrative goods and services already arranged. This must be carefully reviewed by the TF during the reconnaissance as instability and the deteriorating circumstances may have affected the contracted arrangements. The TF should plan for a worst-case scenario and deploy with a self-contained force capable of moving and sustaining itself independently. The operation will be conducted swiftly and the logistics plan must reflect this. Most service support will occur at the unit echelon level, which will be most intimately involved in the evacuation. The size and complexity of supporting logistics elements must be assessed as the footprint in the Operational Area should be minimized. What goes in must come out, along with the evacuees. An area of vital importance will be supporting the evacuees. It is the responsibility of the Mission to look after the evacuees but in a worst-case scenario the TF will have to support the evacuees, the Mission Staff and the evacuation organization. The evacuees will be of all ages and health levels and will have varied support requirements which the TF will have to plan for.²⁹

The movements function of service support will be one of the most important in the conduct of a NEO. Military movements will be required to deploy, sustain and

²⁸ Ibid., 4-15.

²⁹ Ibid., 4-16.

redeploy the TF and may be required to evacuate the CEPs from the AO. Movement personnel will be imbedded into the TF from the outset and will play a crucial role in the selection of the movements nodes. From the capabilities of the various seaports and airports and the available movements assets, a plan and timeline can be established. The points of entry and departure should be chosen to be able to handle both the entry and withdrawal of the TF along with the CEPs. The payloads of aircraft and ships must be maximized and prioritized to make maximum use of available assets. The movements staff will liaise with the movement staff of other nations conducting NEO to de-conflict and prioritize the flow through the ports and look at the possibility of pooling resources.³⁰

Medical support to the NEO will be provided from both CF resources and HOM arranged medical support from the HN. The CF personnel will receive integral medical support from the TF and higher levels through arrangements made for by the Mission staff. It may be possible and advantageous to utilize coalition medical facilities but these must be verified during the reconnaissance. Evacuees will receive medical support from Mission-arranged sources. In emergency circumstances, the CF may provide medical support to the evacuees. The Operations Plan must take into consideration the varied medical issues surrounding the evacuees, who will range in age and medical condition. Mortuary matters must also be addressed.³¹

Military Police (MP) will be deployed to the FMB and may be sent to the AO as required. If no MOU/SOFA is in place, the ability of the MPs to intervene with the

³⁰ Ibid., 4-16.

³¹ Ibid., 4-16.

HN authorities will be very limited. The MPs will provide policing to the TF and will assist in the evacuation.³²

The conduct and provision of service support is a key resource available to the Mission. It will allow for a back-up if the situation deteriorates and the HN promised support does not materialize. This is very well explained in the NEO manual. The JTF must bring sufficient supplies to be self-contained and be ready to assist the evacuees but must not bring too much to become inflexible and bogged down. The supplies require lift and time, something in short supply during an evacuation. The positioning of the logistics base must be carefully examined in order to achieve the best compromise of availability and security. The movements planning must occur early in the process to make the best use of the ports and the movements assets to conduct the most effective evacuation as possible. The medical support must be robust and flexible to provide adequate assistance to both the CF members and the Mission staff and evacuees in an emergency. The use of mission-contracted medical support must be verified and confirmed prior to the NEO, and adjusted if found wanting.

The NEO Manual fully addresses the criteria of speed, coordination and resources in the planning and conduct of an evacuation. If the manual is followed as a checklist it will ensure that planners remember all the aspects of an evacuation. As this is a DND document, it remains to be seen if DFAIT and the OGDs also have this level of detail in their respective doctrine. The doctrine is turned into reality by a plan. The NEO Operational Level plan is CONPLAN Angle.

2.6 Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command Contingency Plan Angle

³² Ibid., 4-17.

The Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM), the Command responsible for NEOs, has drafted a contingency plan (CONPLAN) ANGLE in 2006 to serve as the operational level plan for future NEOs. This plan was developed to assist crisis response planning to address a short or no-notice NEO as a result of a sudden rapidly deteriorating situation in an Affected Nation (AN) that is threatening the safety of CEPs.³³ The plan uses the NEO manual as a basis and expands to form a bridge between the strategic level and the tactical level which will carry out the mission. This CONPLAN focuses on command and control and force generation, and serves as an overarching document for planning at the tactical level. This CONPLAN will be analyzed using the three criteria to confirm its relevance and usefulness.

2.7 Speed

Does the CONPLAN address the need to rapidly deploy forces overseas to assist DFAIT during a crisis? Are there specific timelines attached to JTF elements? These questions arose during the Lebanon crisis when the CF was perceived to have deployed not quickly enough to Theatre. A review of the CONPLAN will reveal that there are strict timings to be met in the deployment of forces to Theatre which are very rapid. This will be demonstrated through the milestones attached to the various CF elements involved in a NEO.

The key to success is to have CF assets deployed as quickly as possible to assist the DFAIT Mission overseas. The CEFCOM Commander's Intent is to support DFAIT and coalition partners with a rapid NEO comprised of flexible and scalable forces. The first priority is to have the reconnaissance party deploy as soon as

³³ Department of National Defence, *CEFCOM CONPLAN 0851/06 ANGLE* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2006), 1.

possible and to have the advance party in the AN within 48 hours to assist the HOM with planning and to provide limited protection to the mission. The next priority is to dispatch a rapid reaction force based on a Company Group (with the remainder of the battalion held in reserve), to the AO. The Company Group would implement the evacuation if conditions permit or act as an advance guard for a more robust task tailored or coalition force to follow.³⁴ This will be achieved through a phased process.

The CONPLAN is phased to allow for a division between the main events. This section will examine the timelines and tasks involved in the NEO. The conduct of a NEO will be initiated with a DFAIT request for CF assistance for a NEO. This is Phase 1 – Warning, of the operation. Any on-hand CF elements available in-Theatre will be placed on stand-by or sent to the AO. If there is sufficient time available, the Canadian Special Operation Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) will dispatch a Security Assessment Team (SAT) to the Mission to assist the HOM. The Canadian Forces Joint Headquarters (JTFHQ) will deploy a reconnaissance party within 12 hours to initiate preparations to establish a Forward Operating Base (FOB) in the AN for the Forward Command Element (FCE) as well as a Forward Mounting Base (FMB) for the Rear HQ in the Safe Haven. These teams will fly by the quickest means, which will most likely be CF airlift.³⁵ The reconnaissance party will also assist the HOM in planning a NEO for CEPs and to make preparations for follow on CF elements if required. Phase 2 – Preparation, If the situation in the AN worsens and a NEO is required, the FCE will deploy from the JTFHQ to the AN with the

³⁴ Ibid., 6/21.

³⁵ Ibid., 18/21.

supporting elements deploying to the Safe Haven to serve as the advance party. Phase 3 – Deployment, begins with the first elements of the NEO main body deploying within 72 hours to either the AN or the Safe Haven FMB. There will be a logistics build-up to enable force self-containment at the FMB. Final preparations of the JTF to conduct operations will be completed. A strategic reserve based on a battalion (minus) may be placed on three days notice to move to provide additional resources as required. Phase 4 – Employment commences with the establishment and securing of the evacuation chain in conjunction with the Mission staff. The phase will be complete once all CEPs requesting evacuation are removed and the HOM no longer requires CF assistance. Phase 5 – Redeployment and Reconstitution will be complete once all forces are back in their parent locations and mission essential equipment is complete.³⁶

This phased response and rapid timelines are highly satisfactory in achieving the goal. The timings are tight enough to allow for proper battle procedure at the JTF while meeting the need to quickly deploy assets to Theatre. It would not be reasonable or prudent to expect forces to move any quicker. The on-call high readiness assets such as the SOF and the JTFHQ will deploy almost immediately and provide the much needed early military experience, planning and advice to the Mission. If required, the other assets can be deployed swiftly. The phased system also allows for a scaled response, if matters improve, all you may need are the Advance elements. If things deteriorate to a certain point, you will have more assets available.

2.8 Coordination

³⁶ Ibid., 8/21.

Does the CONPLAN make arrangements for the coordination with OGDs and other elements? How will this occur? This analysis will show that the CONPLAN has definite coordination tasks allocated throughout. This will be demonstrated with a review of the sections where coordination between elements will occur.

Coordination between the CF and DFAIT is outlined right from the beginning, in the conduct of operations where the role of the reconnaissance party will be to assist the HOM and his staff in the planning of a potential NEO for CEPs from the AN to a safe haven.³⁷ The role of the Joint Task Force Commander is to coordinate CF activities in support of the Canadian HOM and his staff.³⁸ The JTF will assist the Mission with the conduct of the evacuation throughout the process as has been previously described. This level of coordination and cooperation is vital and is well written in the CONPLAN.

The CONPLAN outlines the coordination needs with other Coalition Forces, the AN, NGOs and International Organizations. The CONPLAN states if the evacuation is large scale and involving other nations, coalition forces will most likely be involved. The coalition forces will coordinate their military efforts in the AN to de-conflict national plans. This level of coordination will be achieved by providing liaison with other nations' planning teams and a Liaison Officer to the CDA responsible for the AN if not co-located with the HOM.³⁹ The Affected Nation Government is normally supportive of an evacuation but may be limited in its ability to provide support. This level may be determined by the Canadian Mission. Non-Governmental Organizations and International Organizations may be active in the HN with relief activities. These

³⁷ Ibid., 2.

³⁸ Ibid., 2/21.

³⁹ Ibid., 9/21.

organizations will normally have their own evacuation plans in place which must be coordinated with Canada's and the coalition. The NGOs may have up to date information on CEPs residing in the AN.⁴⁰ The level of coordination between the Canadian Government elements and the others as identified in the CONPLAN is sufficient and covers the bases.

The CONPLAN clearly identifies and mandates the need to coordinate all aspects of the mission with DFAIT, OGDs, the AN, Canadian companies, International Organizations, NGOs and Coalition Forces. As evacuations will be complex affairs with many overlapping activities, the coordination of almost every aspect across all the various elements is vital for a successful outcome. The CONPLAN fully addresses this fact. The final part of the CONPLAN review will look at resources allocated.

2.9 Resources

Does the CONPLAN allow for sufficient resources to be deployed to successfully accomplish a NEO? The Lebanon evacuation raised doubts that the government had sent enough assets to conduct the evacuation. It will be shown that the CONPLAN has dedicated the right amount of resources to evacuate CEPs during a crisis. This will be seen through an examination of the CONPLAN.

The military response to a DFAIT request will be tailor made and aimed at the right level to successfully carry out the mission. The JTF can be as small or as large as required to perform its task. The JTF will include its reconnaissance element, an advance Party, an Airlift Control Element, a main body made up of Land, Air, Maritime and a support component, and finally a strategic reserve. The robust reserve

⁴⁰ Ibid., 3/21.

capacity can be activated and ready to deploy hastily if it is required. Additional specialized assets will be incorporated into the JTF such as military engineering, public affairs, Military Police, Health Support Services and Logistics which will perform their specific roles in Theatre. The Logistics element will establish the needed amount of supplies at the Forward Mounting Base (FMB) and support the JTF accordingly. The FMB will be supported by the strategic level 3rd Canadian Support Group based in Montreal. This array of forces will enable the Canadian Mission to perform its tasks in almost any circumstances. Overall, the CF effort is planned to be very robust.

The CONPLAN is a first-rate document which bridges the gap between the strategic direction and the tactical plan while remaining faithful to Canadian doctrine. It fully addresses the three analysis criteria in a vigorous manner. The intended speed of action for the CF elements is as humanly fast as it can be while still performing their preparatory tasks. Having the reconnaissance party deploy immediately, and the advance party and ALCE deploy within 48 hours will provide the HOM with a tremendous resource to assist in finalizing plans and set up the evacuation. The main body will be deployed at the 72 hour mark, providing the force with all its pieces. The CONPLAN directs a high level of coordination with DFAIT, OGDs, Canadian Companies, NGOs, International Organizations, Coalition Allies and the AN, ensuring cooperation at all levels. The CONPLAN dedicates as many resources in a scalable manner as are required to complete the task. Overall, this is an excellent document. The second major government department, DFAIT, will be examined.

2.10 DFAIT Doctrine

This section will address the question of the relevance of DFAIT doctrine as it pertains to modern NEO. DFAIT led the Canadian Government effort and deployed assets to Lebanon to evacuate CEPs in 2007. Was the doctrine confirmed through the actual evacuation? DFAIT performed satisfactorily during the crisis, partly due to its institutional professionalism, doctrine and contingency plans. The answers will be reached through the application of the analysis criteria to the relevant DFAIT Doctrine. The main publication which deals with evacuations is NEOs is the “Manual of Consular Instructions” which details DFAIT procedures and processes to evacuate Canadians abroad. The second source is the DFAIT prepared post-Lebanon NEO presentation for CEFCOM which outlines how they conduct evacuations. These two documents will be analyzed through the three analysis criteria to determine if the doctrine is still relevant. The analysis will begin with the review for promptness.

2.11 Speed

Does the Manual of Consular Instructions allow for speed and agility of action in the conduct of NEO? The government’s perceived slow reaction in Lebanon may be rooted in incomplete and flawed doctrine which slows down reaction time. This review will show that there are many planned actions in the manual which will encourage speed during a crisis. The answers will be reached through an examination of the manual and the NEO Presentation.

The main tools to ensure a quick reaction are the CECF and the ROCA, which were previously covered in this essay. The intent of the CECF is to emphasize “self-help” measures which Canadians can implement before an evacuation becomes necessary. This includes encouraging people to depart the area at risk by commercial

means while they still can. The CECP is designed to provide information and guidance to Missions to aid them in their response regarding the safety of Canadians prior to and during the crisis.⁴¹ The key to the CECP is for the Missions to be proactive. The new Government of Canada approach is that all missions are required to maintain a register of visiting and resident Canadians, the ROCA and to file a CECP. The HOM is to be aware of existing host country emergency measures to provide quick information relevant to the management of crisis situations. This plan will greatly establish the groundwork for any evacuations but must be kept current and accurate. The ROCA and CECPs are good tools but are only as good as the quality of their information. Are personnel properly trained to prepare them? The personnel who will prepare and implement the CECP will be examined.

Each Mission is required to identify the members of a Standing Task Force (STF), the organization responsible for the execution of the CECP during a crisis. The STF could be headed by the HOM and has full authority to draw resources from the Mission once a crisis erupts.⁴² This is a vital element in crisis management as the STF members are supposed to be current with the CECP and are in a position to quickly action its elements. Having the HOM as the lead will enable it to have the necessary powers to achieve results. Another tool to assist in fast planning is the consular checklists.

The manual has detailed checklists of which actions are to be taken at the various phases of a crisis and by whom in the Mission. These lists are a good reminder of what needs to be done quickly. Variances between the different nations

⁴¹ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Manual on Consular Instructions*. (Ottawa: DFAIT Canada, 2003), 8.1.2.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 8.1.3.

will influence which steps have to be performed and are to be adjusted accordingly. These checklists will definitely expedite the Missions actions in a crisis. Another important means of achieving rapid action is through communication.

Accurate communications during a crisis is the difference between life and death and will be a basis for prompt action. The Mission will communicate the latest information and other evacuation-related information through various means. The basic way will be through oral advice provided by Mission staff members who will have the latest up-to-date information. E-mail is also an effective tool to quickly distribute information to a wide base. The Warden system will also be utilized to disseminate and collect information. There are Consular Information Letters and Warning Letters which are adapted to the particular requirement of the Mission and transmitted to all registered Canadians by the most rapid, reliable means. The last means of communication is through Radio Broadcasts. The Consular Emergency Services Division can arrange for warnings to Canadians to be broadcast on Radio Canada International, British Broadcasting Corporation and Voice of America during scheduled programs.⁴³ Some of these systems are old fashioned and can be improved upon. New technologies should be examined to verify if there are more quick, efficient and sure ways to communicate with Canadians. The Swedes made widespread use of SMS messaging on cell phones during the 2006 Lebanon evacuation with very satisfactory results. Cell phones are now in wide-spread use world-wide and should be considered during the next NEO.⁴⁴ This would allow rapid

⁴³ Ibid., 8.6.

⁴⁴ Ben Charny, "Mobile phone usage in Africa – an opportunity for all parties?" *Silicon.com*. 3 April 2003; available from <http://www.silicon.com/networks/mobile/0,39024665,10003590,00.htm>; Internet; accessed 19 March 2007.

traffic to many recipients simultaneously, making communications much faster. The elements previously covered were all Mission based actions for hastening the evacuation. The following portion will examine national level elements.

DFAIT is responsible for coordinating the Canadian Government's response to any crisis abroad. The Consular Emergency Services Division (CESD) is DFAIT's arm for this activity. As part of the preventative nature of the new approach, the CESD will review each Mission's CECP on an annual basis to ensure it is properly developed and up to date. In the event of a crisis situation developing in a country, an Interdepartmental Task Force (ITF) will be convened. It is headed by the responsible geographic branch's Director General (DG) or Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) who is responsible for managing the crisis situation. The ITF will draw any required assistance from other governmental departments and other DFAIT division as required.⁴⁵

DFAIT has a register with the names of DFAIT personnel who are willing and able to quickly deploy in an emergency to strengthen a Mission. The Rapid Deployment Team (RDT) is an organization made up of pre-identified and pre-trained multidisciplinary teams located at DFAIT HQ and Missions throughout the world. Their role is to be ready and available to deploy on short notice to assist a Mission facing an emergency. They have special RDT kits to assist them in their mission. The RDT has a Crisis Action Plan prepared to facilitate any future deployments.⁴⁶ In reality the level of training is difficult to achieve and maintain, and the team

⁴⁵ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Manual on Consular Instructions*. (Ottawa: DFAIT Canada, 2003), 8.1.4.

⁴⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations Presentation for Exercise Joint Rescue 2006*. (Ottawa: DFAIT Canada, 2006), 6.

equipment is not well planned or sufficient. This deployable team is an excellent resource to quickly reinforce missions in a crisis with trained personnel. It must be properly trained on an on-going basis and their equipment must be rationalized and sourced. The register must be kept up to date and accurate to be of any use. During a crisis, the pressure on DFAIT HQ from persons requesting information will be immense. To help handle this, a Crisis Call Centre will be established early on.

The Crisis Call Centre Team is made up of pre-identified and trained volunteers at DFAIT HQ who would man a Crisis Call Centre during an emergency. The personnel are trained in handling calls from distressed clients and maintain their proficiency through on-going refresher training and on-going exercises. A large meeting room equipped for expansion is designated as the CCC and can be activated when required.⁴⁷ The capability of DFAIT to rapidly establish this centre at the onset of an emergency will help provide information and direction to Canadians involved in the crisis and their relatives. This will help with the promptness of the evacuation as information will be passed quickly and accurately from the start.

The DFAIT doctrine adequately covers the main aspects needed to act quickly in a crisis. Starting with Mission related elements, the CECP and the ROCA are vital documents which will greatly facilitate in the conduct of an evacuation as most basic planning and administrative arrangements will already be in place. It is important to have trained personnel prepare the CECPs and both the CECP and the ROCA must continuously be kept up to date. The Mission's STF is a very good organization with the needed power to put the plan into action. This team must nonetheless keep current with the plans and maintain a currency in training. The Mission checklists are a very

⁴⁷ Ibid., 7.

good tool to remind the Mission staff on the required actions in a crisis. There may be new personnel in the Mission who are not fully conversant with the plans so checklists are needed to ensure that all bases are covered. The communications down to citizens and up to Headquarters is a critical component to an evacuation. Reliance on letters and phone calls may be passé and new forms of communications such as SMS messaging should be looked at. At the DFAIT HQ level, the creation of the ITF will greatly speed government action as a central decision making coordinating all branches will be quickly stood up. The RDTs are another excellent resource which will allow DFAIT to quickly deploy reinforcements to beleaguered missions in a crisis. These personnel do need to maintain training currency and require comprehensive deployable equipment to fulfill their roles. Finally, the CCCT is another excellent tool which will allow DFAIT to rapidly stand up a full call centre to handle the influx of questions. These personnel will need to maintain training currency to be as useful as they can be. Overall, the DFAIT doctrine adequately meets the need for rapid action. The coordination aspect will now be examined.

2.12 Coordination

Does the DFAIT doctrine provide guidance on coordination between various government departments and other with other nations in the event of a crisis? The Lebanon evacuation provided a positive example of good coordination and cooperation but was this based on a doctrinal model? The DFAIT doctrine will be scrutinized to verify if it is so.

The DFAIT HQ is responsible for coordinating the Canadian Government's response to any crisis abroad. In a grave situation, the Interdepartmental Task Force

will be convened and will be directed by the geographic branch's Director General (DG) or Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM). They will manage the crisis and draw on other divisions and departments as necessary.⁴⁸ This is an excellent top-down method of organizing the various government departments in a crisis.

DFAIT doctrine encourages Canadian Missions to consult with missions of other friendly countries, especially those of large missions which have well-established working relations in the country, and may be in the best situation to provide necessary assistance.⁴⁹ Specific arrangements with foreign missions are to be reviewed and formalized on a yearly basis to maintain currency. The doctrine mentions MOUs with the U.S., U.K., Australia and other nations where Canada would cooperate with them in planning and would assist each other during evacuations.⁵⁰ This mandated level of cooperation with other like-minded nations is extremely important in a crisis when some nations will be in a better position to assist others. As resources will be scarce, coordination of all aspects of the evacuation will be critical. The next portion will look at the coordination with companies.

The doctrine indicates that cooperation with Canadian Companies and International Organizations should be sought during the drawing up of the CECP. These organizations would be able to provide wardens from amongst employees to help maintain the ROCA and to provide a liaison for the firm's employees. The companies may also provide additional facilities and resources to assist in an evacuation. The doctrine provides adequate guidance on cooperation with companies

⁴⁸ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Manual on Consular Instructions*. (Ottawa: DFAIT Canada, 2003), 8.1.4.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.2.5.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.2.5.

and organizations. The next portion will look at how DFAIT doctrine outlines coordination with DND and OGDs.

The area which is the most lacking in terms of coordination is how DFAIT and OGDs will actually work together in a crisis. Apart from the ITF, there is nothing else indicated. The greatest concern is the DND/DFAIT link which is very complex and must be understood by all participants before a crisis. It is not the time to be debating which department is responsible for what task during the middle of an evacuation. The only mention of DND is a brief section mentioning CF aircraft and ships may be available for evacuation duties.⁵¹ There is no mention of any of the CF capabilities or plans. Command and control of a NEO is never mentioned. This is the same for the OGDs who will all play important roles in a NEO. The DND doctrine is excellent in this regard; DFAIT should review and incorporate the necessary passages which outline the coordination between DFAIT and the OGDs.

Overall the DFAIT doctrine adequately covers the coordination requirements with other nations, Canadian Companies and International Organizations. It totally lacks sufficient detail in the coordination requirements with OGDs. DFAIT must re-look this gap and incorporate procedures on how the different Canadian Government departments will work together during a crisis. The last portion will examine the DFAIT doctrinal use of resources.

2.13 Resources

Does the DFAIT doctrine allow for sufficient resources to be deployed to successfully accomplish a NEO? The Lebanon evacuation raised doubts that the government had sent enough assets to conduct the evacuation. It will be shown that

⁵¹ Ibid., 8.8.5.

the DFAIT doctrine does not adequately address the issue of resources. This will be seen through an examination of the doctrine.

The RDT is a significant resource available for the reinforcement of a Mission in crisis. It will allow for the rapid deployment of trained personnel to assist in a time of crisis. This must be further developed with annual training and better deployable equipment.

The Missions are authorized to purchase locally basic items needed to supplement the provisions of evacuees such as food, water, gasoline, mattresses, etc... If unavailable locally the items can be obtained from neighboring missions.⁵² This capability is very important and will alleviate much unnecessary suffering by evacuees.

DFAIT is authorized to charter aircraft and ships to evacuate CEPs from a crisis. It may obtain CF assets if available or organize charters from Canadian or foreign carriers who operate in the area.⁵³ This is a critical capability to evacuate personnel but DFAIT is not the subject matter expert department in this. DND has expertise and large standing contracts world-wide in transportation matters and should be looked at as the primary chartering department.

There is no mention of the resources DND and the OGDs would bring to a crisis. This must be incorporated in the DFAIT doctrine to allow DFAIT personnel to understand what DND can bring and how the military will operate.

⁵² Ibid., 8.8.3.

⁵³ Ibid., 8.8.5.

Overall there is very scant information in DFAIT doctrine on the additional resources available to deploy to a crisis. This should be upgraded to identify what the OGDs will bring to the table during an evacuation.

The DFAIT doctrine on emergency evacuations is inconsistent. It adequately covers the need for rapid action by outlining key preparations such as the requirement for a CECP and the ROCA. It mandates the creation of a ITF to coordinate the government efforts and the set up of the Crisis call centre to handle the inflow of queries. The Missions will have STFs ready to conduct the evacuation when required. On the coordination aspect, the doctrine is adequate for explaining coordination with other nations, Canadian Companies and International Organizations. The important coordination required with DND and OGDs is virtually ignored. In terms of applying resources, it mentions the RDTs and their capability to reinforce missions but ignore the all-important DND and OGD inputs. This document should be upgraded with the assistance of the OGDs to present a comprehensive outlook of government action in a crisis. The final portion will examine the doctrine of the OGDs.

2.14 Other Government Department Doctrine

This section will address the question of the relevance of OGD doctrine as it pertains to NEO. DFAIT led the Canadian Government effort but many other governmental departments participated and deployed assets to Lebanon to evacuate CEPs in 2007. Was the doctrine confirmed through the actual evacuation? The Canadian Government performed adequately during the crisis, partly due to the drive and professionalism of its members, and its doctrine and contingency plans. The answers will be reached through the application of the analysis criteria to the relevant

OGD Doctrine. General research has shown that they do not have much materiel on NEO. That will be combined with personal research conducted in the form of personal interviews with departmental officials. The analysis will begin with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

2.15 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Doctrine

CSIS is at the forefront of Canada's national security establishment and as such, its programs are proactive and pre-emptive. The Service's role is to investigate threats, analyze information and produce intelligence; it then reports to, and advises, the Government of Canada, so as to protect the country and its citizens. Key threats include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, espionage, foreign interference and cyber-tampering affecting critical infrastructure. Through its Security Screening Program, CSIS prevents non-Canadians who pose security concerns from entering Canada or receiving permanent resident status or citizenship; the Service also safeguards the confidential information of the Government of Canada from foreign governments and other entities that may present a risk.⁵⁴

Due to the secretive nature of CSIS, it was impossible to obtain source documentation on the nature of CSIS assistance to NEO. Open sources confirm that CSIS does assist DFAIT in NEO but the specifics are not disclosed.⁵⁵ The CSIS Public Liaison Officer confirmed that CSIS did assist with the screening of the CEPs

⁵⁴ Canadian Security Intelligence Service Official Website, <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca.asp>; Internet; accessed 21 March 2007.

⁵⁵ Jim Judd. "Remarks by Mr Jim Judd, Director of CSIS, to the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS). 27 October 2006". Canadian Security Intelligence Service Official Website: available from <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/speeches/speech27102006.asp>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

prior to their evacuation to Canada to identify any potential threats.⁵⁶ This role was crucial in the maintenance of Canadian public security during a period of upheaval when certain elements could take advantage of the situation and enter Canada illegally. A total of eight CSIS officers participated in the emergency.⁵⁷ This demonstrated good cooperation and coordination with DFAIT but it is impossible to determine anything about rapidity or resources allocated. The other government agency primarily responsible for security, the RCMP, will be examined.

2.16 Royal Canadian Mounted Police Doctrine

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is the Canadian national police service and an agency of the Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. The RCMP is unique in the world since it is a national, federal, provincial and municipal policing body. It provides a total federal policing service to all Canadians and policing services under contract to the three territories, eight provinces (except Ontario and Quebec), more than 200 municipalities, 165 Aboriginal communities, three international airports and numerous smaller airports.⁵⁸

The RCMP would be the police force implicated in an NEO operation. The RCMP does not have any plans, doctrine or SOPs concerning NEO and would simply step in and perform any assigned role as required by the Canadian Government. The main roles the RCMP view as fulfilling are providing various policing and security

⁵⁶ Giovanni Cotroneo, Telephone interview with LCol Chaloux. Canadian Security and Intelligence Service Public Liaison Officer. 15 March 2007.

⁵⁷ The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon: Issue 6- Evidence- 1 November 2006*. (Ottawa: The Senate, 2006), 1.

⁵⁸ Royal Canadian Mounted Police. "About the RCMP," http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about/index_e.htm ; Internet; accessed 19 March 2007.

services on site in Canada and in the AN, along with security screening of the evacuees.⁵⁹

The RCMP is primarily a nationally based police force that does not have substantial expeditionary capabilities. Security and policing in the AN will be primarily conducted by the Military Police, who have the expeditionary experience and skills to operate in a foreign country. There is nothing to indicate how the RCMP would react in terms of the analysis criteria of promptness, coordination or resource application.

2.17 Doctrine Summary

The nature and completeness of Canadian Governmental doctrine regarding NEOs varies greatly between the different governmental departments involved. DND has a series of very thorough manuals which outline all aspects of a NEO, including the command and control relationships between departments. These manuals provide sufficient strategic and operational direction for the successful completion of an operation. DND also has a strong operational level Operations Plan aimed at bridging the gap between strategic direction and the tactical level Operations Plan to execute the mission. The three analysis criteria of speed, coordination and resource application are thoroughly covered. The DND doctrine can be used as a baseline for the OGD doctrine.

DFAIT, as the lead in any evacuation, has a surprisingly thin list of documents which detail their responsibilities and actions. The aspect of rapid action is well covered but the lack of information in the way they would operate with DND and

⁵⁹ B.V. Porrior, E-Mail to LCol Chaloux. Director, Emergency Management, Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 19 March 2007.

OGDs is especially troubling as DFAIT is the lead department. It also does not adequately address the application of government resources to the crisis. The Manual of Consular Instructions, which covers emergencies, should be revised and revised and updated, possibly using DND doctrine as an example.

The RCMP and CSIS do not have any formal doctrine concerning NEOs but do agree they have important roles concerning the screening and protection of CEPs. It was not possible to apply the analysis criteria to them. To better understand how the government performed during a NEO, the 2006 Lebanon evacuation will be examined.

Chapter 3 - The 2006 Lebanon Evacuation

How did the Government of Canada react during a real crisis involving its citizens stranded in a foreign country? This chapter will examine the Canadian Government performance during the 2006 Lebanon crisis, which was the best example of a recent large scale NEO where Canadian Government agencies fully participated. The following chapter will examine the Swedish Government response in the same circumstance to offer a fair comparison with a similar nation. Canada performed reasonably well in very trying circumstances where it had many citizens trapped in a location very far away from Canada. The main sources used are official Canadian Government documents along with open source media reports. The chapter will begin with a review of historical events behind the crisis to identify the circumstances of the evacuation. The strong links between Canada and Lebanon will be examined to make clear the political urgency and scale of the operation. A roundup of key facts and figures will be presented to demonstrate overall government effectiveness. Various factors such as the number of evacuees, speed of evacuation, CF resources used, financial burden, public perception, cooperation with OGDs, and the split of responsibilities will be identified. The Canadian Governmental actions during the crisis will briefly be examined and analyzed against the three criteria to measure effectiveness. Finally the different Lessons Learned generated by different organizations will be examined to see how the government performed its tasks and which lessons were learned to improve future operations. The chapter will begin with the historical events which led to the evacuation.

3.1 The Political and Military Course of Events

The 2006 Lebanon crisis began unexpectedly and very rapidly spiraled out of control, engulfing both Israel and Lebanon. On 12 July 2006, two Israeli soldiers were captured by Hezbollah in connection with an attack across the Israeli-Lebanese border. A further eight Israeli soldiers died during the incident. The event provoked large-scale counter-measures by Israel and led to battles between Hezbollah and Israel that lasted for 34 days. Lebanese infrastructure such as airports, bridges and roads were destroyed by Israeli bombs, making transportation and evacuation very difficult or impossible. Southern Lebanon and parts of Beirut were hit particularly badly. The runways at Beirut's airport were already bombed on 13 July. According to information from the Israeli army (IDF) approximately 7000 air strikes were carried out against Lebanese targets, while 3700 missiles from Hezbollah landed in Israel during the conflict.⁶⁰

On 15 July, Israel extended its air strikes to northern Lebanon, and two days later 15 people were killed when Tripoli, Lebanon's second largest city, was bombed. As from that date and up to the cease-fire the whole of Lebanon was exposed to Israeli attacks. On 20 July, ground warfare broke out between Israeli soldiers and Hezbollah on Lebanese territory. The scale of the evacuation of foreign citizens from Lebanon increased daily. However, this was complicated by the destruction of the infrastructure and the scale of Israeli bombing.

⁶⁰ Israel Defence Forces. "7000 targets in Lebanon," <http://www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?sl=EN&id=7&docid=56765.EN> ; Internet; accessed 21 March 2007.

From having initially carried out operations across the border into Lebanon only to a limited extent, Israel changed its tactics a few weeks into the conflict and, on 25 July, announced its intention to seize and maintain control of southern Lebanon until an international force was in place. A few days earlier, a large number of Israeli soldiers and tanks had penetrated into the area south of the Litani River. This intrusion further increased the streams of refugees and exacerbated the humanitarian situation in southern Lebanon. In connection with an Israeli air strike against the village Qana on 30 July, a large number of civilians were killed, more than half of whom were children. The event meant that several countries joined in demands for a cease-fire and that criticism of Israel for disproportionate and indiscriminate measures increased. Differences of opinion in the UN Security Council delayed discussions on a resolution for a number of days. Not until 11 August was the Council able to unanimously adopt Resolution 1701. Fighting ended at 8.00 a.m. on Monday 14 August, though some skirmishes occurred subsequently. Even though the crisis occurred in a far away land, its repercussions were felt world-wide, and especially in Canada.

3.2 Canada and Lebanon

Why was the Lebanon crisis felt so acutely in Canada? This paragraph will explain the rationale behind the strong political drive for the Government of Canada to be seen as doing everything it could for its citizens stranded in Lebanon. There are a great number of Canadians of Lebanese descent and Lebanese immigrants living in Canada. The 1991 census identifies 54,605 people born in Lebanon and living in

Canada, representing 1% of all immigrants.⁶¹ This group combined with the immigrants that arrived after 1991 and their descendants form a substantial number of people interested in the Lebanese situation. The majority are clustered in Quebec and Ontario where they have substantial political pull.⁶² Many of these immigrants maintain dual nationality and scores of them live permanently in Lebanon. At the time of the evacuation in July 2006 there was an estimated 50,000 Canadians living in or visiting Lebanon.⁶³ Of these, 30,000 were registered with the Canadian Embassy in Beirut.⁶⁴ The sheer numbers of Canadians involved in the crisis guaranteed political involvement at the Federal level, which would soon join the fray as the deterioration continued. The following section will examine the facts behind the evacuation.

3.3 Facts and Figures

What were the true facts behind the evacuation? How many people were repatriated, how long did it take and what did it cost the government? These questions repeatedly arose in the media where there was much criticism of the government handling of the situation. This review will reveal that the government reacted in an adequate manner during the crisis. This section will examine the various benchmark facts and figures surrounding the NEO to determine if it was conducted as effectively

⁶¹ Raymond Maurice K.H. Dib, "A profile of immigrants from Lebanon to Canada." *Citizenship and Immigration Canada*, 30 March 2002; available from <http://www.rootsweb.com/~lbnwgv/whoiswho/references/canadaimmigration.htm> ; Internet; accessed 21 March 2007.

⁶² Simon Doyle, "PM Harper's pro-Israel stance risks winning Quebec." *The Hill Times*, 31 July 2006; available from http://www.thehilltimes.ca/members/login.php?fail=2&destination=/html/index.php?display=story&full_path=/2006/july/31/quebec/ ; Internet accessed 4 April 2007.

⁶³ CTV News, "Canadian evacuation from Lebanon cost \$85 million." *CTV.ca News Staff*, 20 September 2006; available from http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060919/evacuation_tab_060919?s_name=&no_ads=; Internet; accessed 21 March 2007.

⁶⁴ CBC News, "Evacuation timeline: the biggest rescue in Canadian History." 31 July 2006; available from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/middleeast-crisis/evac_timeline.html ; Internet; accessed 21 March 2007.

as it could have. The facts were obtained from official government reports and reputable media sources.

The crisis began on 12 July 06 with the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers but spilled into Lebanon on 13 July with the bombing of the Beirut International Airport. This action negated air evacuation from Lebanon; any evacuation would have to be conducted by sea. DFAIT began making arrangements for ships to conduct a seaborne evacuation on 14 July, securing six ships by 17 July. Governmental agencies dispatched personnel to Theatre to set up the evacuation chain and assist DFAIT in the evacuation of CEPs. The evacuation was declared by the Minister on 16 July. The first outbound ship of evacuees sailed from Lebanon on 19 July. Other nations such as Sweden, Greece, U.K., Italy and France began evacuating their citizens on 17 July.⁶⁵ The Canadian portion of the evacuation was completed by mid-August, when the evacuation chain was shut down. During the evacuation period, 584 Canadian Government members from five agencies and departments deployed to Theatre and an additional 215 DFAIT members were attached to the Crisis Action Centre in Ottawa. A total of 14,039 CEPs were evacuated by sea, including 11,463 Canadian passport holders and 2,575 persons of other nationalities. Ten ships were contracted at a cost of \$24.7 million to sail CEPs from Lebanon to Cyprus and Turkey. The ships' capacities were for 20,071 people, providing an occupancy rate of 69.95 %. A total of 943 other Canadians were evacuated on ships arranged by other nationalities. DFAIT contracted 13 aircraft at a cost of \$34,8 Million for the onward portion from the safe havens of Cyprus and Turkey to Canada. A total of 14,338 CEPs flew to Montreal and Toronto

⁶⁵ CBC News, "Evacuation timeline: the biggest rescue in Canadian History." 31 July 2006; available from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/middleeast-crisis/evac_timeline.html ; Internet; accessed 26 March 2007.

on 65 flights with an overall occupancy rate of 78.25 %.⁶⁶ The overall costs are estimated at \$85 Million⁶⁷ including \$60 million for transportation expenses.⁶⁸ The Mission staff was very busy with passports, issuing 1,827 Emergency Passports and 35 Regular Passports between 12 July and 15 August. The registering of Canadians was a major effort, where there were 11,000 Canadians registered at the onset of the crisis to 39,028 at the peak. There are 12,500 people registered as of December 2006. The Crisis Call Centre was extremely busy throughout receiving calls and making contact with Canadians to pass on critical information. The Centre received 45,323 calls, made 30,000 calls and sent 12,933 Emails.⁶⁹ Overall the government performed well organizing the safe movement of a large number of CEPs from a war-torn area to the safety of Canada during a very stressful and dangerous time. Was this the image portrayed in the media in Canada and what was the public perception?

Public perception was mixed throughout the evacuation. Early impressions were negative⁷⁰ but eventually improved as more Canadians were evacuated. A study conducted by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute after the evacuation pegged public approval at the 30% mark, with 36% thinking the Government did a poor job.⁷¹ Overall the public did not believe the Canadian Government performed at its best.

⁶⁶ The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon*. (Ottawa: The Senate, 2006), 1.

⁶⁷ CTV News, "Canadian evacuation from Lebanon cost \$85 million." 20 September 2006; available from http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060919/evacuation_tab_060919?s_name=&no_ads=; Internet; accessed 26 March 2007.

⁶⁸ The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon: 6 December 2006*. (Ottawa: The Senate, 2006), 2.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁷⁰ CBC News, "Harper arrives in Cyprus to help with evacuation." 19 July 2006; available from <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/07/19/harper-evacuation.html> ; Internet; accessed 26 March 2007.

⁷¹ Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. "Foreign Policy Under A Conservative Government:

After reviewing the facts, it can be surmised that the government agencies and departments performed as well as could be expected in such a rapidly deteriorating situation. As the crisis occurred on the other side of the world where there were few Canadian assets readily available and a very large Canadian population to assist, what was accomplished was impressive. Specific government action will now be examined.

3.4 Canadian Government Action

This portion of the chapter will outline the Canadian Government actions during the crisis. These actions will afterwards be analyzed against the three criteria, verifying if the elements of speed, coordination and resource application were used.

As the situation worsened and began to spin out of control on 13 July, when the Beirut International Airport was bombed, Canadians trapped in Lebanon began requesting to be evacuated back to Canada. The Federal Government began organizing and putting plans into action. The Canadian Mission in Beirut activated its emergency plans and the Canadian Government, through Foreign Affairs Minister Mackay, officially declared that it was evacuating its citizens from Lebanon on 16 July 2006.⁷² The Government of Canada was now fully committed.

The government departments sprung into action with DFAIT fully engaged from the start. The department established an Interdepartmental Task Force (ITF) made up of the OGDs and the Provincial Governments, for the domestic impact. DFAIT held a joint DFAIT/GOC/Provincial conference call early in the process to clarify the Federal Government's position with respect to numerous issues concerning the evacuees and

An Interim Report Card.”; available from <http://cdfai.org/PDF/CDF.03CDFAIRportsenttoCitizen.pdf> ; Internet; accessed 26 march 2007. 13.

⁷² CBC News, “Evacuation timeline: the biggest rescue in Canadian History.” 31 July 2006; available from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/middleeast-crisis/evac_timeline.html ; Internet; accessed 26 March 2007.

help the provinces with their own preparations.⁷³ This proactive coordination was critical for the enablement of all affected agencies. The ITF became the primary organization responsible for managing the crisis. The ITF held twice-daily meetings which included the participation of Beirut, Cyprus and Turkey satellite operations. These meetings provided critical and timely information from all participants and allowed departments to quickly react to evolving situations.⁷⁴ It soon became clear the Missions in Theatre and DFAIT HQ would require reinforcement to effectively carry out a NEO.

DFAIT augmented the Mission through the rapid deployment of critical Government of Canada human resources and secure technical and communications assets to enable a successful operation.⁷⁵ DFAIT was quickly joined by DND, Transport Canada, Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), and CSIS. DFAIT deployed 200 staff from DFAIT HQ and other missions to the region. Another 215 employees in HQ accepted temporary assignment to the DFAIT Crisis Operation Centre. In addition, 151 DND, 2 TC, 34 CBSA and 8 CSIS officials deployed to Theatre to assist in the evacuation.⁷⁶ This rapid input of qualified personnel was a welcome addition to the overworked Mission staff which was toiling under tremendous pressure. Specifically, the CF Reconnaissance element greatly assisted the HOM and his staff in conducting operations in Lebanon. The Canadian Government officials, representing the various departments, worked in a coordinated fashion, balancing urgency and compassion with due diligence for the safety and

⁷³ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Israeli-Lebanese Crisis 2006 - Lessons Identified*. (Ottawa: DFAIT Canada, 2006), 9.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

security of Canada and the government's fiduciary responsibilities.⁷⁷ Next, DFAIT began warning citizens of upcoming actions.

Communications and information are vital during a crisis where confusion and frustration quickly rise to the surface when people are kept uninformed. DFAIT issued a travel warning for Lebanon on 13 July. On 15 July, three messages were sent to all registered Canadians, as well as being posted on the Internet, to apprise Canadians of the evolving situation and to advise them that the Canadian Government was looking into an evacuation.⁷⁸ The first Interdepartmental Task Force involving all relevant agencies and departments was convened on 14 July and the DFAIT emergency operations centre expanded to create a crisis call centre on 15 July.⁷⁹ These measures went a long way in informing Canadians in Lebanon of the dangers they were facing and what the Federal Government was going to do to assist them. Next the evacuation plan had to be executed.

To conduct the evacuation, the CECP must be implemented and the evacuation chain activated. The Mission established the evacuation chain, including an evacuation centre at the port, embarkation and debarkation sites and safe havens in Larnaca, Cyprus and Adana, Turkey. The plan was to have CEPs transit from home locations to the evacuation centre. From the evacuation centre they would embark on ships which would sail to the two safe havens. Government officials would then organize the CEPs and have them flown home to Canada, where the Federal and Provincial Governments would receive and administer them. The first boatload of 261

⁷⁷ Ibid., 2.

⁷⁸ The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon: Issue 6- Evidence- 1 November 2006*. (Ottawa: The Senate, 2006), 4.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 4.

CEPs departed Beirut on 19 July, leaving 1800 people who were scheduled to leave behind. There were many problems with Lebanese Customs and Immigration Officials and the scene at the port was chaotic.⁸⁰ There were few Canadian Officials at the evacuation centre and basic screening was conducted by hired security guards. People were haphazardly loaded on available ships, without prioritization. There were very few life support essentials at the centre to alleviate suffering.⁸¹ Matters improved on 20 July when four ships arrived in Beirut and transported 1375 Canadians to Turkey. CF personnel traveled to South Lebanon where they assisted in the evacuation of 15 Canadians through the port of Tyre, in Hezbollah-controlled territory. Additional CF personnel set up the FMB in Cyprus and assisted DFAIT in processing CEPs. The evacuation continued with the ships sailing back and forth to Lebanon until mid-August when the operation was halted.⁸² Overall the physical evacuation was well conducted considering the extreme circumstances. This was in large part due to the excellent cooperation between government departments. The control and organization at the evacuation centre would have been much better if the CF would have been there and put in charge of it. The government performance will be analyzed against the three criteria.

3.4 Analysis

⁸⁰ CBC News, "Evacuation timeline: the biggest rescue in Canadian History." 31 July 2006; available from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/middleeast-crisis/evac_timeline.html ; Internet; accessed 22 March 2007.

⁸¹ Mr Habib, Telephone interview with LCol Chaloux. Lebanon Evacuation Participant. 5 April 2007.

⁸² CTV News, "Canadian evacuation from Lebanon cost \$85 million." *CTV.ca News Staff*, 20 September 2006; available from http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060919/evacuation_tab_060919?s_name=&no_ads= ; Internet; accessed 22 March 2007.

This paragraph will examine the government actions to confirm if there was a sense of urgency in the procedures and if the departments responded rapidly. The government acted with all due haste, even without the benefit of a political decision until 16 July, four days after the start of the crisis. DFAIT recognized the problem immediately and convened its ITF for crisis management on 14 July. Direction was provided to the OGDs and the Provincial Governments allowing them to prepare themselves for the upcoming operation. The Crisis Call Centre and the Crisis Operations Centre were both established and manned very early on. Teams of officials from OGDs were then swiftly deployed to Theatre to assist DFAIT in setting up and conducting the evacuation. The CF had the Reconnaissance Party in Beirut as fast as humanly possible, providing much needed advice and support to the Mission. Ships and aircraft required for the evacuation were first sought after on 14 July, very early in the process. Critical information was also transmitted early to Canadians at home and in Lebanon. The CECF was quickly put into effect and the evacuation was started on 19 July. Overall, this was actioned as rapidly as it could have been. The coordination aspect will be examined.

This portion will examine if the Government of Canada elements coordinated adequately during the crisis. Under DFAIT's lead, the Canadian elements coordinated and cooperated with each other and with other nations magnificently. Beginning with the first ITF, the departments came together and immediately began coordinating the operation. The twice daily meetings ensured excellent situational awareness for all and provided the necessary direction for the government departments to perform their tasks. DFAIT and the OGDs were able to have their deployable personnel ready

quickly and dispatched them to Theatre where they were able to assist the Mission staff with the evacuation. Each Department concentrated on its affairs and completed its tasks in a professional manner, coordinating with the others throughout. DND had the Reconnaissance Team rapidly in Beirut to assist the HOM and staff coordinate evacuation matters with the Israelis and Lebanese. CF personnel also deployed to Cyprus and coordinated the set up of the FMB and assisted DFAIT in processing the evacuees. CSIS had their officers conducting security screenings; Transport Canada's personnel verified the airworthiness of foreign aircraft and ensured proper security screenings were taking place. Immigration Canada's (CIC) established a capacity to screen and document non-Canadian family members accompanying Canadian citizens being evacuated to Canada. The Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) developed and distributed analyses, screening guides, and classified intelligence in support of CBSA and CIC's efforts. It screened all ship and flight manifests through the available databases to identify passengers that posed a potential risk. Migration Integrity Officers were deployed to Theatre to assist with the screening of evacuees. Other CBSA officers assisted DFAIT and CIC with document verification and screening of individuals Border Services conducted screenings and prepared the way to receive the evacuees in Canada. Overall this level of coordination was a major factor in the success of the operation. Finally, the resource application will be examined.

This paragraph will verify if the government applied sufficient resources to the Lebanon crisis to successfully complete the evacuation. The government did allocate sufficient resources, barely. DFAIT reinforced its headquarters to activate the Call Centre and Crisis Action Centre to adequately deal with matters around the clock. It deployed personnel from the RDT to Theatre to strengthen the Missions and help carry

out the evacuation. The OGDs also quickly deployed the necessary assets to conduct their specific departmental roles in Theatre. DND deployed the reconnaissance party to Beirut to assist the HOM and to provide the basis for any augmentation. It did not; however deploy the main body of the JTF to Beirut to provide the security and marshalling roles. This may have become a security issue if the situation had deteriorated and the CEPs would have been at risk with no military personnel to protect them. Additional military personnel would have greatly improved the evacuation process in Beirut with some order and discipline, as they did in Cyprus. The military personnel deployed to Cyprus performed admirably, establishing a processing system and running it with DFAIT. For transportation assets, the government spared no expense to obtain the required air and sea lift resources to evacuate its citizens. Overall, the government did a proper job of providing the necessary resources to carry out the mission. Additional military personnel in Beirut would have greatly facilitated that portion of the evacuation and provided first rate security for the CEPs.

All in all, the Canadian Government reacted with satisfactory speed; its elements coordinated amongst themselves and with other elements properly, and deployed sufficient resources to conduct a successful evacuation. The Canadian Government lessons learned will be examined.

3.5 Lessons Learned

After most operations, Departments collate a series of lessons learned and proposed recommendations to improve matters in the future. This paragraph will examine the primary DFAIT lessons learned from the Lebanon scenario, which were

assembled from all federal agencies. Many of the lessons are not related to the analysis criteria but have been included as they are pertinent. Only the matters which require improvement will be touched on, positive points will not be mentioned.

The first lesson identified was the need for better communications abilities while deployed in Theatre. Both voice and data links were woefully inadequate and did not measure up to the task. It is recommended that secure data-links and systems be established to provide critical classified and personal information on the evacuees which could be shared amongst various departments and agencies in a timely manner. This would be achieved with the purchase of technology and development of common use software programs to allow for usage in Theatre.⁸³ This recommendation will enhance coordination between departments and speed up the communications.

The second lesson was for the need to create and maintain a roster of DFAIT crisis response expertise which is willing to deploy on short-notice to Theatre or to DFAIT HQ. This would be a “first response” list of personnel qualified to make up a core crisis response management team.⁸⁴ In missions, especially the smaller ones, the primary staff will be fully engaged with the primary crisis response. The deployment of additional staff must be immediate and should cover all functionality aspects of a mission.⁸⁵ There is no time to comb through endless lists during a crisis trying to locate qualified personnel who are available to deploy. This recommendation will improve the speed of response by having a deeper pool of talent available for a crisis.

⁸³ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Lessons Learned – Evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon*. (Ottawa: DFAIT Canada, 2006), 1.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁸⁵ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Israeli-Lebanese Crisis 2006 - Lessons Identified*. (Ottawa: DFAIT Canada, 2006), 3.

The third lesson was for the need to examine Government of Canada military and commercial assets which could be used transport Canadian Government resources to Theatre, evacuate CEPs to a safe haven, and for the final evacuation to Canada. The feasibility of implementing a set of standing offers, pre-formatted contracts and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the provision of services related to the crisis needs to be studied.⁸⁶ It would be preferable, and probably more cost effective, to rely on Federal assets and standing contracts to perform the transportation tasks. The last-minute hiring of foreign commercial resources proved to be exceedingly expensive. This will improve coordination between DND and DFAIT and will lead to a quicker way to obtain transportation resources.

The fourth lesson was the need to educate Canadians, especially those abroad, on the level of support they can expect from the Federal Government during emergencies. The parameters of the assistance which Canadian Mission staff can be expected to provide to Canadians in distress has to be clarified.⁸⁷ The precedent of the Federal Government evacuating all CEPs back to Canada at public expense has set a very high bar of public expectation. A baseline of what the government will do for its citizens during a crisis should be established.

The fifth lesson is related to the DFAIT contracting authorities in a crisis situation. The appropriate financial and contracting authorities should be in place to enable and support rapid decision making during a crisis. It is recommended to examine the Ministerial “approval” levels, sole-source emergency contracting and standing-offers to ensure compliance with the governmental fiduciary

⁸⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Lessons Learned – Evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon*. (Ottawa: DFAIT Canada, 2006), 2.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

responsibilities.⁸⁸ Civil servants, while performing their tasks of aiding Canadians in a crisis situation, should have the flexibility to respond in unconventional ways. The normal, long drawn-out process of obtaining goods and services may have to be abridged to save lives, without penalizing the civil servant. This recommendation will dramatically improve the swiftness of response in obtaining supplies and services and will provide for better resource management.

The sixth lesson is about establishing protocols and delegated authorities for the rapid pre-positioning of Government assets in areas adjoining a potential area of operations. This includes all materiel support required to operate evacuation and reception centres such as generators, tables, chairs and other office equipment.⁸⁹ This type of mundane equipment is essential when establishing facilities on the fly to administer CEPs. Having the ability to order and pre-position the stock before the crisis erupts will facilitate the eventual processing of Canadians. This recommendation will hasten the establishment of the centres through the smarter usage and purchase of resources.

The seventh lesson concerns the need to involve DFAIT HQ and DND in the preparation, development and exercise of contingency plans. It is recommended that a DND/DFAIT Contingency Planning Assistance Team be integrated and formalized to better support contingency planning and crisis management exercises. This would guarantee DND involvement in consular crisis training modules. It is recommended to hold joint DFAIT / DND reviews of NEO contingency plans of potential problem

⁸⁸ Ibid., 3.

⁸⁹ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Israeli-Lebanese Crisis 2006 - Lessons Identified*. (Ottawa: DFAIT Canada, 2006), 4.

countries on a regular basis.⁹⁰ This recommendation is elemental in the conduct of proper planning for future crises. DND personnel are highly trained in crisis management and know what must be done in an evacuation. The joint DND/DFAIT team can only improve the existing plans. This recommendation will improve coordination between the departments and will hasten future actions as the CECPs will be of a higher caliber.

The eight lesson is about the cooperation with the OGDs. It recommends key OGD partners be invited to participate at regularly scheduled Consular Conferences and Warden Conferences which incorporate a crisis response scenario exercise.⁹¹ The OGDs should be invited to all NEO exercises to be part of the Governmental team.⁹² As was previously mentioned, the OGDs have very important roles to play during a NEO. The more situational awareness they have, the better it is. They must fully understand the plans and what their roles will be during a crisis. The inter-departmental contacts can be made and strengthened during the conferences and exercises. This recommendation will greatly improve coordination between the departments.

The ninth lesson concerns mandatory crisis management training for key mission staff before they are posted overseas. It is recommended to incorporate such training through “crisis management modules” for DFAIT and OGD officials posted to missions.⁹³ As most civilians are not trained in crisis management, it would be extremely beneficial to impart the knowledge to key mission staff, such as the HOM,

⁹⁰ Ibid., 5.

⁹¹ Ibid., 5.

⁹² Ibid., 12.

⁹³ Ibid., 14.

on how to react in a crisis. The roles of OGDs and what can be expected from DND would be basic information for the HOM. The command and control arrangements could be clarified and explained so there would be no doubt on responsibilities.

The tenth lesson is about the need for CF personnel to be deployed as soon as possible during a crisis.⁹⁴ As military personnel are trained and equipped to operate in a crisis, they are the ideal partners for DFAIT, able to provide guidance, stability, security and assistance. The FCE provides the HOM and his staff with military advice and planning, along with laying the groundwork for the Main Body. The Main Body will execute the security tasks and help evacuate the CEPs. Logistics and administration are areas the military excel at and can be quickly provided to assist DFAIT in establishing and supporting the centres. This recommendation will improve both coordination and speed.

The Lebanon evacuation is the most noteworthy evacuation of Canadian non-combatants in history. It began with an incident between Israel and Hezbollah and quickly spiraled out of control into Lebanon, where the major infrastructure was destroyed and Canadian citizens put at risk. Canada and Lebanon have very strong links due to the high number of Lebanese who have immigrated to Canada and hold dual citizenship. Many of these dual citizens reside in Lebanon and wanted to be evacuated when the situation deteriorated, as was their right. The number of potential evacuees was approximately 40,000 people, including persons with Canadian Entitlement status. The Government of Canada, through DFAIT, hastily organized a multi-departmental team and began making preparations for the evacuation of CEPs.

⁹⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations Presentation for Exercise Joint Rescue 2006*. (Ottawa: DFAIT Canada, 2006), 16.

DFAIT quickly stood up an Intergovernmental Task Force (ITF) and a Crisis Operation Centre early on and coordinated the efforts of the different branches of government to enable the NEO to be a success. Each agency that had a part deployed personnel to Theatre to assist in every step of the evacuation. Coordination was made with the provincial governments to make arrangements for the CEPs as they returned to Canada. Canadians started being evacuated on 19 July, just two days after much closer European nations with assets close-by began their programs. Key government departments went to work together and safely evacuated 15 thousand CEPs from a war-ravaged nation on the other side of the world, back to Canada. The general doctrine was followed and mistakes were made, but overall the operation was a success. Key lessons were learned and identified to improve similar operations in the future. Other nations also participated in the evacuation which may provide us with some lessons on how to improve. One nation which was successful and is similar to Canada in many ways is Sweden. The Swedish model will now be examined.

Chapter 4 – The Swedish Case Study

To understand how to improve Canadian NEO performance, it is worthwhile to study the successful actions of a similar country in identical circumstances as a case study. Sweden was generally recognized with having conducted a skilled and successful evacuation of its citizens while Canada was criticized for its performance. The Swedish government performed poorly during the 2004 Tsunami evacuation and received much public criticism. It had learned its lessons and revised procedures, applying them to great effect in Lebanon.⁹⁵ The resulting Swedish evacuation in Lebanon was highly regarded as being one of the best organized and executed.⁹⁶ Other countries such as the U.S., U.K., Italy and France would not offer a fair comparison as they are much larger, have greater defence forces and are physically closer to Lebanon.

This chapter will examine how Sweden successfully conducted the evacuation of its citizens from Lebanon in 2006. The chapter will begin with a brief comparison between Canada and Sweden to demonstrate the similarities of the two nations. Then a synopsis of the evacuation will be conducted examining the principal governmental actions. The analysis criteria of speed, coordination and resources will be applied to the evacuation. The Swedish lessons learned, which regarded various factors such as the management of the crisis, communications, equipment, and others which were important will be examined to see if any lessons can be used by Canada. The sources

⁹⁵ Sweden. Department of Foreign Affairs, *The Foreign Service's handling of the Lebanon crisis – report, views, measures and proposals*. (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2006), 1.

⁹⁶ CBC News, "Mackay defends Mideast Rescue operation." 21 July 2006; available from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2006/07/21/evacuees-home.html> ; Internet; accessed 30 March 2007.

used were original documents obtained from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish Ministry of Defence, and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency along with current media sources.

4.1 Swedish and Canadian Similarities

Sweden was chosen as the case study because it is comparable to Canada in so many levels. Canada and Sweden share a great many similarities with each other and are an ideal case comparison. Both are democratic constitutional monarchies with well established, solid political systems. They are wealthy (Swedish GDP per person: \$31,600 US, Canada: \$35,200 US)⁹⁷ nations with robust economies and low unemployment (Sweden: 5.6%, Canada: 6.4%).⁹⁸ Both have well-developed social systems providing essentials such as health care by the public sector. The climate and landscapes are also very similar – northern nations with an abundance of nature, natural resources and extreme climate. A key comparison are the high levels of immigration (Sweden: 1.6 migrants per 100,000; which is high for Europe, Canada: 5.85),⁹⁹ with both nations having large immigrant populations from Lebanon. At the time of the crisis, Sweden had approximately 9000 citizens in Lebanon¹⁰⁰ while Canada had 50,000, which potentially required evacuation. Both Canada and Sweden did not have many governmental resources in the region and both are located a great distance away. The evacuation will be viewed in greater detail.

4.2 Swedish Government Actions during the Evacuation

⁹⁷ Central Intelligence Agency. “World Fact book.” <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ca.html> ; Internet; accessed 30 March 2007.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Sweden, Department of Foreign Affairs, *The Foreign Service’s handling of the Lebanon crisis – report, views, measures and proposals*. (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2006), 6.

This section is a synopsis outlining the Swedish actions during the evacuation. This is imperative for the understanding of the complete picture, even though it will cover more factors than the three analysis criteria. The factors discussed in this section will afterwards be examined through the criteria analysis.

The Swedish government acted quickly and competently from the very beginning of the crisis, seizing and maintaining the initiative. The Swedes evacuated over 8400 citizens and other nationalities from Lebanon and Syria between 16 July and 16 August 2006, thus being the largest Swedish evacuation in modern times.¹⁰¹ The process began with the development of the crisis on 13 July when an increasing amount of telephone calls were arriving to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) concerning the safety of Swedish citizens in Lebanon. As in the Canadian model, the MFA is the lead department during a NEO and is supported by the OGDs. The MFA conducted its first crisis meeting at the sub-minister level and determined that there were many Swedish citizens affected in Lebanon. It was immediately decided to reinforce the Ministry Call Centre to handle the flow of calls, reinforce the Beirut Consulate for a possible evacuation of Swedish citizens, organize the Emergency Management Group (same concept as the Canadian ITF) and hold a meeting on July 14, and seek assurances from Israel for the possible safe conduct of Swedes out of Lebanon.¹⁰² The Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) were informed of the developments and continued to be kept up to date throughout. A clear mandate was given to the Swedish Government by the political leadership that everything that could be done to bring home Swedes from the war zone without delay

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 4.

¹⁰² Ibid., 6.

should be done, and the necessary means were quickly made available.¹⁰³ The Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) was warned of a possible deployment to Theatre.¹⁰⁴ The SRSA maintains a state of emergency preparedness to assist other countries with rescue and humanitarian aid operations. The majority of personnel employed on such assignments is recruited from the municipal fire & rescue services, thus are fully capable of operating in stressful environments.¹⁰⁵ The early actions of the Swedish government demonstrated a very high level of pro-activity and initiative. Early political support enabled the government departments to begin preparations in earnest. The second day loomed ahead.

The second day of the crisis saw a very high level of activity across the government departments in anticipation of a full blown evacuation. The Emergency Management Group (EMG), under the leadership of the Director-General for Consular Affairs, held its first meeting on 14 July with key representation from all Government departments. These meetings occurred twice daily until the crisis subsided, ensuring situational awareness and rapid decision making. It was decided to reinforce all foreign missions in the Theatre (The Beirut Consul was given the authority to recruit locally in Lebanon as a stopgap until Foreign Affairs personnel could arrive) and to provide the staff with wide powers to make assessments and take decisions on the spot¹⁰⁶, to look into chartering evacuation ships with the assistance of travel agencies, map out evacuation plans with other EU nations, and look into the possibility of

¹⁰³ Ibid., 4.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 7.

¹⁰⁵ Swedish Rescue Services, "About the SRSA." http://www.srv.se/templates/SRV_AreaPage_350.aspx ; Internet; accessed 2 April 2007.

¹⁰⁶ Sweden, Department of Foreign Affairs, *The Foreign Service's handling of the Lebanon crisis – report, views, measures and proposals*. (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2006), 4.

arranging SMS communications with cell phone subscribers in Lebanon.¹⁰⁷ The Government decided to increase appropriations to fund any potential evacuation.¹⁰⁸ The first SMS message informing Swedes in Lebanon of the plan to evacuate them was sent out.¹⁰⁹ This early level of initiative enabled the increased staffing of the Missions, funding of the operation, booking of transport and communication with its citizens. This was faster than other governments, which led Sweden to secure very scarce resources needed for the evacuation. The citizens knew early on that the government was there and would look after them. The evacuation process was being established and was almost ready.

Swedish reinforcements soon began arriving in Theatre and transportation assets were being booked. By 15 July, two ships had been secured and the possibility to hire more was examined. Fifteen busses were hired for a land evacuation through Syria. Staff reinforcements began arriving in Damascus, Larnaca, and Beirut to assist the hard-pressed Missions. The Larnaca group, which included members of the SRSA, would receive evacuees from Lebanon and make arrangements for their passage to Sweden.¹¹⁰ The first 750 evacuees traveled by bus to Aleppo, Syria, on 16 July where the MFA and SRSA had established a transit camp to receive the Swedes. Those people then flew to Sweden on 17 July where they were greeted by government officials from key departments such as Health and Welfare. The sea evacuation began

¹⁰⁷ James Joyner, "Sweden uses text messaging to speed Lebanon evacuation." 22 July 2006; available from http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/2006/07/sweden_uses_text_messaging_to_speed_lebanon_evacuation/; Internet; accessed 17 April 2007.

¹⁰⁸ Sweden, Department of Foreign Affairs, *The Foreign Service's handling of the Lebanon crisis – report, views, measures and proposals*. (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden), 2006. 7.

¹⁰⁹ Louis Roper, "Mobile technology aids Swedish evacuation." 20 July 2006; available from <http://www.thelocal.se/article.php?ID=4384>; Internet; accessed 17 April 2007.

¹¹⁰ Sweden, Department of Foreign Affairs, *The Foreign Service's handling of the Lebanon crisis – report, views, measures and proposals*. (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden), 2006. 8.

on 18 July, using the hired busses for the inland transportation within Lebanon. The situation became more manageable as of 19 July as many citizens had been evacuated. The government had established its evacuation chain and began repatriating the evacuees through using both sea and land. The early action to secure transportation assets had provided Sweden with more resources than the other EU nations.

Excess capacity was offered to other EU nations and Sweden was asked by the EU to coordinate the reception of other EU nations in Cyprus. Sweden was the first of the EU countries with suitable staff and a well-functioning organization capable of performing this task. The reception on arrival in Sweden was functioning very smoothly by this stage.¹¹¹ The last Swedish chartered ship departed Lebanon on 20 July, by which time 5000 Swedes had been evacuated home. By 23 July there was no longer any need for bus convoys so the Aleppo Transit Camp was closed. With so few evacuees remaining and the situation well in hand, the decision was made to close the MFA Call Centre at midnight. By 26 July it was decided to start reducing the staffing at the Missions in Theatre, and the last meeting of the EMG occurred on 31 July. The crisis would be then managed within the framework of the MFA.¹¹² The cease-fire was declared on 14 August and the Swedish evacuation efforts were officially closed on 16 August, by which time 8400 people had been evacuated to safety.¹¹³ Sweden's competence resulted in its sharing of its transportation assets to assist other nations and running the EU transit camp in Cyprus. The sea and land evacuations were well orchestrated and executed resulting in the rapid evacuation of Swedes out of Theatre.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 9.

¹¹² Ibid., 10.

¹¹³ Ibid., 10.

This enabled the government to scale back operations and revert to business as normal. The reasons for this achievement will be analyzed using the analysis criteria.

4.3 Analysis

This section will examine the factors which enabled Swedish success through the analysis of their evacuation effort. It can be seen that most of the Swedish actions mirrored the Canadian ones except for one; rapid political decision and clear direction to government.

4.4 Speed

Sweden performed poorly during the evacuation of its citizens after the 2004 Tsunami. It decided to correct its deficiencies by reviewing its procedures and training for government personnel. With the start of the Lebanon crisis, the new post-Tsunami procedures were in place and the MFA staff understood the need for rapid action. The political leadership was well attuned for the need for timely decisions and clear guidance to their government departments. Once the scale of the crisis became apparent, the political leadership swiftly decided to take action, thus empowering its departments. The MFA immediately set up its crisis response organization, the EMG, and began a coordinated government approach. The government was pro-active and decided to reinforce the Missions, activate the SRSA, secure transportation assets, establish the crisis call centre and inform Swedish citizens that they would be evacuated on day two of the crisis. This level of speed and initiative is remarkable in a governmental organization. Most actions were similar to Canada's, but occurred earlier in the process in large part due to the unequivocal political direction. As

Canada had a minority government at the time, it may have been more cautious to take such bold action early on in the crisis. Coordination will be the next criteria analyzed.

4.5 Coordination

The Swedish Government's efforts at coordination were excellent. The MFA took the lead and rapidly established the EMG to manage the government's overall efforts. The OGDs such as National Defence and the Health Department were rapidly brought into the picture and quickly performed their roles. The Swedish Government coordinated the evacuation with the EU and became responsible for the EU transit center in Cyprus. The MFA coordinated with other agencies such as the SRSA and had them quickly deploy their forces to Theatre to assist in the evacuation. At the Mission level, matters were coordinated with the Israeli and Lebanese authorities to ensure the safe passage of Swedish citizens. This high level of coordination and cooperation was very similar to Canada's efforts. The resources factor will be examined.

4.6 Resources

The application of additional resources to resolve the crisis was very well done. From the earliest moment, the MFA decided to reinforce key elements to better respond. The headquarters was beefed up with additional personnel to work in crisis management and the crisis call centre. Reinforcements were organized and deployed very hastily to assist the Missions in the crisis area. The missions were even authorized to hire locally to handle the initial crush. The SRSA was activated and dispatched to Theatre, ensuring a high level of organization and structure throughout the evacuation chain. OGDs also mobilized the necessary elements to handle the

crisis at headquarters and in the Missions. Extra funding was secured from the start and all the necessary transportation assets were secured before any other nation took any action. This level of support was directionally proportional to the level of political support provided to the government. Again, this was similar to Canada's reaction, just sooner. The following section will examine the Swedish Government Lessons Learned from the crisis.

4.7 Lessons Learned

As in all operations, there are some successes and some failures. The Swedes reviewed their actions post-Lebanon to examine lessons learned to be able to improve in future operations. This section will look at the main areas where things went well and not so well, beginning with the conduct of the crisis.

The management of the crisis proved to be very successful. The political leadership gave proper direction early in the crisis. The MFA, as the lead department, exercised its responsibilities through the EMG. The EMG represented all ministries and agencies involved in the evacuation, allowing for excellent situational awareness and inter-departmental coordination. The PMO was represented, providing political direction where needed. Decisions were not taken in the EMG but all actions were closely coordinated and the decisions were taken in the responsible ministries.¹¹⁴ It was deduced that the EMG was organized appropriately and worked well for the most part.¹¹⁵ One part of the crisis management organization which can be improved upon is the lack of a formal Operations Centre established to manage day to day operations. This caused confusion and frustration as there was no single point of entry for

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 11.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 13.

information. It is recommended to have such a Centre for future operations.¹¹⁶ The next section will look at communications.

Information and its dissemination are essential for efficient crisis management. If people are not informed of what is going on they will be fearful and frustrated. To pass information to Swedes in bulk, the MFA primarily used the MFA external website and broadcasts through Radio Sweden. These were very efficient tools for spreading information about the crisis and the evacuation operation.¹¹⁷ The secondary method of communicating with its citizens was via e-mail and SMS messaging.¹¹⁸ These were very successful in passing a large amount of information to many people simultaneously. Telephones and faxes were also used as required. In Stockholm, the primary means of answering questions was through the MFA Call Centre established from the Crisis Support Team of thirty members drawn from the MFA staff. This centre was also used to register all Swedes who were not registered at that point. The Call Centre and the Registration Group were part of the crisis organization's section for contacts with the general public. This also included the e-mail group, the group for processing individual cases, the group for analysis and transmission of the list of registered persons, the group for analysis of the evacuation from Southern Lebanon and finally, the group for reception in Sweden. A total of 350 people were engaged in 700 shifts. This was well done but the task of mass registering Swedish citizens in the future will be turned over to the police.¹¹⁹ Communications was one factor in the

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 11.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 13.

¹¹⁸ Louis Roper, "Mobile technology aids Swedish evacuation." 20 July 2006; available from <http://www.thelocal.se/article.php?ID=4384>; Internet; accessed 17 April 2007.

¹¹⁹ Sweden, Department of Foreign Affairs, *The Foreign Service's handling of the Lebanon crisis – report, views, measures and proposals*. (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2006), 14.

successful evacuation; another was the speedy augmentation of staff at the Missions located in Theatre.

The strengthening of Missions in the crisis area and the staff at MFA HQ was vital for the planning and conduct of an evacuation. The speedy reinforcement of the Missions abroad was a success due to the MFA's Rapid Consular Response Team (RCRT). Forty members of the MFA are always on stand-by, ready to deploy to reinforce a foreign mission in an emergency.¹²⁰ The team has pre-packaged equipment always available to go. This gear includes all necessary items to function in an emergency such as satellite phones, cell phones, lap-tops and printers, battery chargers, digital cameras, scanners, laminating machines, forms for provisional passports and writing paper with the MFA logo.¹²¹ The main limitation with the RCRT was the insufficient number of personnel in the team and the skill levels. The MFA eventually deployed 60 members to Theatre, relying on volunteers for the additional 20 personnel who were not as trained as the RCRT members. To address this, the MFA has increased the size of the RCRT to 150 officers. Lebanon demonstrated the importance of the composition of the team. Emphasis will be placed on rounding out future teams ensuring key members have the leadership skills, communications skills, and group dynamics.¹²² Having a properly equipped and qualified RCRT was a defining factor in the rapid augmentation of the Missions, enabling a smooth operation. Another important factor is the level of training of MFA officials in Sweden and abroad.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 17.

¹²¹ Ibid., 20.

¹²² Ibid., 19.

Improved training at missions and at the MFA HQ was identified as a thing to improve. The SRSA has been mandated to train the RCRT in order to be capable of effectively supporting Swedish missions and consulates abroad.¹²³ At the Mission level, the skill level issue will be addressed through special training in crisis and emergency management for consular staff stationed in missions in volatile areas. The SRSA and Emergency Management Agency will visit the missions to give further support for emergency management issues. Eventually the MFA wants to operate with a system of “regional consular support offices” where foreign missions would be able to assist one another in a crisis, as had happened in Lebanon where the Syrian and Cyprus Missions assisted.¹²⁴ This increased level of training at Mission level and at the RCRT combined with the new regional consular support offices will ensure there will be sufficiently trained staff located in and around the crisis area ready to respond. This trained manpower is important but it must be coordinated in its efforts.

One area of contention was over the command and control of government assets in Theatre. The MFA is the lead department but its role is the coordinating of the overall government effort and concentrating on purely MFA matters such as maintaining contact with the host nation’s authorities.¹²⁵ Other governmental departments and the SRSA focused on their roles which often overlapped with other organizations and caused confusion. There was also no overall control of allocating tasks and areas of responsibility as each organization did its own thing. This led to unnecessary wasted effort and frustration. The recommended solution is to have the MFA tasked the overall command on a Mission enabling it to exercise control over the

¹²³ Ibid., 21.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 18.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 21.

various Swedish elements.¹²⁶ It is always important to have one organization which is in charge and can lead the overall government effort. No overall leadership will result in a rudderless ship. An important part of control is the application of logistics in an evacuation.

Cooperation between departments is vital for the synergy of the government. The MFA's consular crisis organization is based on two principles: the nation must act quickly through its agencies, and the rescuing of Swedish citizens is a multi-departmental and agency effort.¹²⁷ This was in evidence with the cooperation with the Swedish Military in terms of logistics support. Military personnel quickly went to serve at the MFA and provided expert logistics and communications assistance.¹²⁸ The military was instrumental in securing transportation assets to enable the evacuation. This success will be built upon with the formalization of an agreement between MFA and the military for future assistance from the Armed Forces Procurement Division. This will result with the MFA being able to join the armed forces capacity procurement with regard to air transport, providing a guarantee for hiring certain types of transport capacity for evacuation purposes in accordance with fixed preconditions.¹²⁹ This formal level of cooperation between the two departments will greatly enhance future operations as a level of guaranteed support will be established. The military staff with their special skills was very useful, but there were other issues with the general staffing of the crisis.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 21.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 24.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 24.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 25.

The crisis put very heavy demands on the government to furnish the adequate number of trained personnel at the Missions and at the MFA headquarters. Uncoordinated requests for additional staff were sent to the responsible department, the Human Resources Department. Augmentees were then sent in an un-prioritized manner to various workplaces. It was soon apparent that there was a shortage of workers and it was very difficult locating additional personnel with the required skill sets to function in the crisis organizations. To remedy this, a new system of prioritization and personnel allocation will be developed, allowing the department leadership to have the decision on where the personnel will be allocated. Also, a new competence database will be created to facilitate the search for qualified people in future crises.¹³⁰ All MFA members will fill out a questionnaire identifying their skill sets, levels of experience and their willingness to serve abroad. This will greatly facilitate and quicken future searches. The final portion of the chapter will look at how this case study can apply to the Canadian model.

The factors which affected the Swedes were very similar to those the Canadians faced and the lessons learned are also comparable. Both nations quickly established the fact that the situation was critical and their citizens would most probably require evacuation. Interdepartmental crisis management organizations were established early on but with different powers, the Canadian model had more authority over other departments while the Swedish model was primarily for coordinating the government efforts. Decisions were made to establish call centres in both nations and to augment the Missions in Theatre. The Swedes obtained political approval early and had the funding authority to act immediately, thus contracting transportation assets right from

¹³⁰ Ibid., 28.

the start. Sweden obtained the necessary assets to begin evacuating its citizens very early on, days before Canada which was more hesitant. The Swedish RCRTs deployed quickly with their augmentation equipment and were able to function smoothly from the start, in large measure to the communications suites in the deployment kit. Canada took longer to deploy its augmentation force and had more difficulty with communications, as there was a lack of equipment. Both countries augmented their national headquarters and had difficulty in finding the right amount of qualified personnel. Coordination at the evacuation points were better handled by the Swedes with their SRSC personnel deployed throughout providing the hands on control work with the evacuees. The DFAIT officials had difficulty with this and were greatly assisted by the CF once they arrived. Communications with citizens were better coordinated by the Swedes who had a political decision early about the intent of the government to evacuate its citizens. The method of communication was also slightly better with the Swedes, who were proactive and used more modern technology (SMS) to inform the evacuees of developments and had better forms of communications tools in Theatre. The other government departments worked well together in both cases, but the command and control of the elements was better handled by Canada. In the Canadian model, DFAIT has the lead and can task the OGDs accordingly. Overall both evacuations were well done but the main difference is in the speed of the Swedish reaction. Once the crisis became apparent, all departments and the political leadership worked together and made far reaching decisions, enabling the important groundwork to be initiated.

Chapter 5 - The Way Ahead – Recommendations for Improving NEOs

The following recommendations are designed to enhance the Government of Canada's capability to react to a future NEO. It is aimed at government as a whole, not just at a specific department:

- The Canadian Forces doctrine and Contingency Plan ANGLE must be upgraded and modernized to reflect the current transformational changes to the Canadian Forces.
- The DFAIT doctrine concerning NEO and emergencies must be rewritten and upgraded. The role of OGDs, and specifically DND, must be clearly identified. The command and control portion of an evacuation must be greatly detailed to avoid any confusion. The DFAIT role must be better detailed to enable any staff member to read it and know what actions must be taken in a crisis.
- The RCMP, CBSA, CIC, and CSIS should prepare doctrine addressing NEO to enable their members to know and understand their roles and responsibilities. They could be assisted by DND and DFAIT who have the expertise and original doctrine.
- Government departments should have the leeway to make preparations at the early stages of a crisis in anticipation of a political decision. These preparations could result in monies expended and personnel deployed but they will assure a swift response once the political decision is made.

- One individual chain of command is established in Theatre during a crisis. The HOM should be in command with the TFC and other governmental players in support. The concept of elevating interpersonal conflicts up separate governmental department chains of command to Ottawa for resolution is not wise.
- PSEPC and DFAIT must draft plans and SOPs on how to work together in the event of a crisis involving both an international and domestic component.
- Integrate the various governmental Health Partners early on into the crisis management network and identify a lead agency. The best suited would be PSEPC through the GOC.
- Purchase a secure communications system which would enable voice and data transmission anywhere in the world. This system should be owned by DFAIT and would have sufficient sets for all the augmentation by the OGDs. To enable familiarity with the equipment, training could be conducted during the annual exercises with all OGDs participating.
- Create and maintain a register of qualified personnel who will be immediately available to deploy to a crisis area to augment the Mission staff. The register will also address the need for HQ augmentation in Ottawa.
- Create and maintain a register of Government of Canada assets which could be used in a crisis. The feasibility of implementing a set of standing offers, pre-formatted contracts and Memorandum of

Understanding (MOU) for the provision of services related to the crisis must be studied.

- The level of support overseas Canadians will receive from the Government must be decided upon politically and that information must be made aware to citizens. The parameters of the assistance which Canadian Mission staff can be expected to provide to Canadians in distress has to be clarified.
- The appropriate financial and contracting authorities should be in place to enable and support rapid decision making during a crisis. It is recommended to examine the Ministerial “approval” levels, sole-source emergency contracting and standing offers to ensure compliance with the governmental fiduciary responsibilities.
- Establish protocols and delegated authorities for the rapid pre-positioning of Government assets in areas adjoining a potential area of operations. This includes all materiel support required to operate evacuation and reception centres such as generators, tables, chairs and other office equipment.
- Involve DFAIT HQ and DND in the preparation, development and exercise of contingency plans. It is recommended that a DND/DFAIT Contingency Planning Assistance Team be integrated and formalized to better support contingency planning and crisis management exercises. The team should visit all missions worldwide and assist in the finalization of the CECPs.

- Key OGD partners are to be invited to participate at regularly scheduled Consular Conferences and Warden Conferences which incorporate a crisis response scenario exercise. The OGDs should be invited to all NEO exercises as part of the Government team.
- Key Mission staff must undergo mandatory crisis management training prior to overseas postings. Such training should be incorporated through “crisis management modules.”
- CF personnel should be deployed as soon as possible to Theatre during the escalation of a crisis. These service persons will offer invaluable advice and capabilities to the Mission staff.
- Political decision making must be hastened and clear direction provided to the government departments.

Conclusion

This thesis addressed the question of the perceived efficiency of Canadian Non Combatant Evacuations. Beginning with the definition of NEO, it then outlined the analysis criteria of speed, coordination and resources as the basis for investigation of the question throughout the thesis. The second chapter looked at Canadian Governmental doctrine from DND, DFAIT, the RCMP, and CSIS. This doctrine was analyzed against the three criteria to verify if it stood up to modern challenges. The DND doctrine and plans are very comprehensive and are especially useable as guidelines during an emergency. The OGDs, and especially DFAIT, have incomplete doctrine which does not adequately cover the complexities of an evacuation. This is especially true of coordination between DND and DFAIT which is remains virtually ignored. To view how doctrine stood up to a real life event, the Canadian Government performance during the 2006 Lebanon evacuation was analyzed in Chapter 3. Overall, the government performed satisfactorily in extremely unusual and difficult circumstances, but some errors were committed. To compare the Canadian response with another similar nation, Chapter 3 was a case study of the Swedish operation in the same crisis. The analysis established that the two nations had very similar actions and reactions in the emergency. The main difference was with the initial speed and initiative of the Swedes, providing them with the advantage. Valuable lessons learned and recommendations emerged from the study of the crisis and these were summarized in the following chapter. The aim of this essay is to provide recommendations to the

Canadian Government to better prepare for future NEO operations at the government-wide level, not just for a specific department.

As Canada is a nation of immigrants, there will always be situations where it will have its citizens either living in or visiting a foreign nation which will be experiencing a crisis. The immigrants of the affected nation residing in Canada are mostly Canadian citizens with the power of the vote and the associated political clout. This will result in a great deal of political pressure being applied to elected officials to take appropriate action, as was well demonstrated in the summer of 2006. If the government is not ready and prepared to act with great haste, it will be perceived as being incompetent and uncaring for its citizens. It is therefore imperative for the government and its departments to enhance its preparations in anticipation of future crises, achievable through development of functional doctrine within and between the concerned departments. The designated governmental personnel in positions related to NEO should be trained accordingly, with the members of the other departments. The appropriate equipment should be researched and purchased, allowing for greater flexibility and speed. Finally, the government must be fully involved from the beginning of a crisis and must provide the appropriate timely political decisions, thus enabling its departments to achieve speed and initiative.

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