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**COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES –
LESSONS LEARNED FROM HISTORY, AFGHANISTAN AND THE IMPACT
OF EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS**

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ABSTRACT

The delivery of national power through the military has become more complicated by the contemporary operating environment. The Canadian Forces is now not the only element of national power that is required to rebuild failed and failing states. As Canada continues to express an interest in remaining involved in international conflicts it is necessary for Canadian expeditionary forces to pursue new concepts in order to achieve the required strategic endstates. This paper examines the history of Canadian expeditionary forces, the current situation in Afghanistan and the new concept of Effects-Based Operations. The intent of this paper is to show that historical lessons coupled with recent lessons from Afghanistan and the theories behind Effects-Based Operations can provide solutions for the future of Canadian expeditionary operations.

INTRODUCTION

As a wealthy and stable state, Canada has the capacity, in conjunction with other nations, to help ameliorate threats to global peace and security. Doing so is in Canada's best interest, as it increases its standing in the global community and, as a trading nation, continues to be wealthy as long as international trade is not affected by instability. To help improve a situation outside of Canadian territory, it is necessary to project the nation's will to help through national power. In the introduction to Clayton Newell's *The Framework of Operational Warfare*, he identifies the elements of national power as follows: "[t]hese elements of power include, but are not limited to, the diplomatic, economic, technological and military."¹ In today's complex world environment, the coordination of the different elements of national power is critical to successful involvement in failed or failing states. This has been one of most important lessons learned from recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United States (US), British and Canadian involvement in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan.²

The development of the 3D or 3D+C or the whole-of-government approach by the Government of Canada has reflected the adoption of a focus designed to harness as many elements of national power as possible to create a safe and secure environment in

¹Clayton R. Newell, *The Framework of Operational Warfare* (London: Routledge, 1991), 9.

²Howard G. Coombs and General Rick Hillier, "Command and Control during Peace Support Operations: Creating Common Intent in Afghanistan," in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives: Leadership and Command*, ed. Allan English, 173-191 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 176.

Afghanistan.³ However, as noted in Anne Holohan's *Networks of Democracy*, the adoption of an approach in a nation's capital city is only part of the solution. To truly harness all the elements of national power on the ground, it is necessary to use a network approach to the interaction between the many state and non-state actors in any given conflict area. This approach is based on breaking down the traditional hierarchical structures of the various organizations in the region and allowing them to interrelate as a network in order to pursue their common goals of peace and security.⁴

Traditionally, the military contribution to overseas missions has always been organized in a very hierarchical manner and focused on pursuing well defined and isolated goals. But Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that it is no longer possible to pursue military objectives in isolation. Therefore, there is a need for modification of military organizations deployed in the current conflict environments to assist failed and failing states. In particular, as the Government of Canada decides to use the military element of national power in any given conflict area, it is critical that there exists a national conduit from the government to the Canadian expeditionary force commander to communicate intent or national will.⁵ But more so, the deployed commander must be supported by the appropriate size and type of headquarters to ensure

³3D refers to Defence, Diplomacy and Development. 3D+C adds Commerce. Whole of government refers to all governmental departments that may have a stake in the mission. For a specific example of this approach see Government of Canada, "Protecting Canadians, Rebuilding Afghanistan," <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/menu-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2007.

⁴Anne Holohan, *Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq and Beyond* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 45.

⁵National will or intent will be used throughout the paper to indicate the "ways" which the Government of Canada wishes to have the elements of national power (the "means") act in order to achieve the "ends" intended by the government for that particular international issue. In this paper the specific element of national power or "means" will be military unless otherwise specified.

that this national will is able to be transmitted to the Canadian Forces (CF) on the ground. The Canadian control of deployed CF elements has not always been the case but it is assumed to be so by Parliament.⁶ For a military so comfortable with alliances and coalitions this provides a conflict when CF elements deploy overseas in a coalition, as national control can become difficult to achieve without the national commander being in the right place and connected to the right decision-makers.⁷ But the right place and the right connections vary from mission to mission, so it is difficult to find lessons from the past that can be leveraged in the future other than simply remembering to have the national commander in a critical place in the operational chain of command and to ensure that he is connected to the decision-makers.

There is a portion of the expeditionary command structure, however, that can benefit from more detailed study. By conducting a historical review of Canadian expeditionary deployments, an examination of emerging trends from Afghanistan, and analyzing the impact of concepts such as those identified by Anne Holohan, it will be possible to determine which key factors impact on the core utility of a Canadian expeditionary force headquarters. That utility is predicated on ensuring that the expeditionary force commander is supported by a headquarters capable of providing the support necessary to allow the commander mission success. Therefore, the focus of this paper will be to provide recommendations for the structure of future Canadian

⁶Douglas L. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), 175.

⁷The concept of national control is the retention of command and control of deployed military forces such that Government of Canada decisions can be communicated to those forces through a linear chain of command. This link must exist even in coalitions or alliances or there is no national control of those deployed forces.

expeditionary force headquarters that will allow the commander of those forces the ability to deliver Canada's national will and to leverage emerging changes in doctrine such as Effects Based Operations (EBO).⁸

Anne Holohan's recommendations for Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond call for a more permeable and transparent conduct of operations by the military in order to leverage all the state and non-state organizations that exist in failed and failing states.⁹ EBO is one of the concepts that, coupled with the whole of government approach, the CF hopes will achieve that change. The many non-military allies to armed forces that exist in areas such as Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan calls for a far more involved and networked approach to operations than has been the case during the Cold War. EBO is one of the methods that are expected to improve the transparency of military operations, as it requires the repackaging of military missions and objectives so that they are understandable by all organizations. It also calls for non-traditional approaches to achieving these effects and a departure from the more kinetic or blunt force methods that are intrinsic to the application of military force.

To explore the future structure of expeditionary force headquarters it will be necessary to examine the key elements of EBO. These elements then need to be combined with lessons that can be learned through a historical study of Canadian

⁸EBO will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. For a general overview see United States, Joint Warfighter Center, *Commander's Handbook for Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations* (Suffolk, VA: Joint Warfighter Center, 2006). Or see Lieutenant-Colonel Craig King, "Effects Based Operations: Buzzword or Blueprint," (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Advanced Military Studies Course Paper, 2004).

⁹Holohan, *Networks of Democracy*..., 178.

expeditionary operations starting with the South African War and ending with an examination of current deployed forces in Afghanistan. It will only be through the harnessing of historical lessons learned, current practices in Afghanistan, and the expected future doctrinal framework for the CF that will make it possible to discover the critical elements that will be required for future deployed headquarters. However, this examination will not delve into the very complicated relationships that exist in Ottawa between and within National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Parliament, Cabinet and the Prime Minister. These areas of study are beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the focus will be on how national will is enacted after it leaves Ottawa, not how it is formulated in the Canadian capital. Therefore, first it is necessary to become acquainted with the background and key elements of EBO.

EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS

Origins

Time and again senior military officers have been accused of planning to fight the last war. It is to counter this natural tendency that professional militaries around the world engage in force development, operational research and discourse about future war theories and concepts. As the nature and style of warfare changes this academic exploration becomes all the more important. In the current context, with the pressure to shrink military spending after the Cold War, this experimentation and discourse has resulted in many credible and plausible theories of how to wage war. From the Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA) to Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and from the Three-Block War to Fourth Generation Warfare the theories abound.

At the root of many of these concepts is the need to change the well-ingrained paradigm of senior commanders and planners. As their amount of experience builds, it is harder to fundamentally change their perspective of what will bring success in the next war. Potentially adding further resistance to change is the military and national culture of the senior personnel.¹⁰ But these changes are necessary, as demonstrated by the oft-quoted example of the senseless slaughter during the First World War. To change an existing paradigm within a military institution, it is necessary to propose new ideas with

¹⁰This is one of the key cautions of Canadian transformation that was identified by Drs. English, Gimblett and Mr Coombs in their review of the different agents of change currently being examined by western militaries. See Allan English, Richard Gimblett and Howard Coombs, *Beware of Putting the Cart before the Horse: Network Enabled Operations as a Canadian Approach to Transformation* (Contract Report Prepared for Defence Research and Development Canada. Toronto: Defence R&D Canada, 2005).

their associated lexicon, and then expose them to operational research and academic discussion. Only by adopting the lexicon and truly understanding the breadth and depth of a new idea will it be possible to actually begin to shift current methods of planning and waging war.

Into this cluttered conceptual examination of the future of warfare, the United States Air Force (USAF) has championed Effects-Based Operations (EBO). However, as with many of the theories connected with warfare, the idea is not new. Many examples dating back to the Second World War can be used as a demonstration of that fact.¹¹ Further, it has been suggested that the concept can be traced back to the teachings of Sun Tzu.¹² The current manifestation of EBO has its immediate origins during the first years of the 21st century in the USAF. In particular, Lieutenant General David A. Deptula has championed this method of examining the application of force.¹³ But it has only been in the past few years that it has gained any traction outside of the USAF. This was partially due to the lack of focused doctrine on the subject but also because of the observations by detractors that EBO was overly focused on the use of scientific solutions at the expense of the human aspects of war.¹⁴ Now there are indications that a larger audience is adopting this concept. The United States Joint Warfighting Center has just issued a pre-

¹¹Colonel (Ret'd) Phillip S. Meillinger, USAF, "The Origins of Effects-Based Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly* 35 (2004): 116.

¹²Edward A. Smith, "Effects Based Operations: The way ahead," *9th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium* (Copenhagen, Denmark, September 2004), 2.

¹³David A. Deptula, "Effects-Based Operations," *Air and Space Power Journal* 20, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 4.

¹⁴Milan N. Vego, "Effects-Based Operations: A Critique," *Joint Force Quarterly* 41 (2nd Quarter 2006): 51.

doctrine manual on EBO and the concept is also being employed across the CF.¹⁵ As this theory is becoming more prevalent, it is therefore necessary to examine exactly what it is and how it can help the CF's deployed commanders.

What is EBO?

The concept of EBO “is a methodology or way of thinking.”¹⁶ It was developed to counter the traditional focus on destroying an enemy's physical forces or the will of those forces to resist. This conquest based focus has since evolved into what Canadian Colonel Jim Cottingham has referred to as the second spiral of EBO, which is more success focused.¹⁷ This current mature application of the theory holds that if the senior commanders and planners enter a conflict being more aware of the entire operational environment and the possible first, second and even third-order effects of their actions on this environment then the options available to achieve the strategic or operational endstate will be far greater and more comprehensive than with traditional methods. Thus, in the ideal execution of EBO it may be possible to “impose our will on the enemy without his realizing we have done so.”¹⁸

¹⁵Department of National Defence, Director General Land Capability Development, *Capability Development Record – Command* (Kingston: DGLCD, 2006), 12.

¹⁶Deptula, “Effects-Based Operations,” 4.

¹⁷Colonel J.F. Cottingham, “Effects-Based Operations: An Evolving Revolution,” (unpublished paper written as part of the MA in War Studies program, Royal Military College of Canada, 2004), 28.

¹⁸Deptula, “Effects-Based Operations,” 5.

EBO also advocates the widening of the tools available to affect the enemy to include diplomatic, developmental, economic and informational manifestations of national power. However, the identified difficulty with the concept is the ability to measure or observe these effects to the point where the understanding of the operating environment is sufficient to fully comprehend all impacts of friendly force actions. The key shift towards adopting an Effects-Based approach to operations is based on connecting all projections of national power to a desired effect, then observing the operating environment to determine if that desired effect has occurred. It is further postulated that this approach will allow for different techniques to be used to rebuild failed states while avoiding the lapse into a shooting war that is currently being observed in Iraq and Afghanistan. These are certainly lofty goals and expectations, but as new and different types of warfare are encountered around the globe it is crucial to adopt any new methodology that will allow success. Now that it has been shown what EBO is, it is necessary to demonstrate how Canadian expeditionary force commanders can utilize this approach.¹⁹

Applicable to Canadian Expeditionary Force Commanders

Post-Cold War deployments of Canada's military have become very complicated. This phenomenon, however, is not unique to Canada, as the US and the UK are also experiencing the same complexity. What has become evident is that solely military solutions to international problems have been mostly relegated to the history books. This

¹⁹Major David W. Pendall, US Army, "Effects-Based Operations and the Exercise of National Power," *Military Review* 84, no. 1 (January/February 2004): 26.

change can be attributed to three new factors that affect the involvement of western democracies in global issues. First, western nations are being drawn into more complicated conflicts than those that existed during the Cold War. Second, the increased informational access that 24-hour-a-day media sources and the internet have brought to every person on the planet allows every individual to more closely monitor global events. Third, without the overbearing pressure of two superpowers, more international issues are developing into armed conflicts.²⁰ These factors have resulted in it being far more difficult to “fix” international problems than it has been in the past. Add to these difficulties the risk of deploying soldiers into a hostile operating environment and the result is far more pressure on expeditionary force commanders to succeed. Canada’s decision to deploy into the more volatile southern portion of Afghanistan has brought this issue home for the CF and the nation as a whole. As a result, it behoves the Canadian military establishment to quickly identify any methods of achieving success and incorporate them swiftly into CF doctrine and culture. It can only be through this rapid adaptability that Canada and the CF will be able to avoid protracted involvement in complex situations around the world.

The adoption of EBO not only gives the expeditionary force commander a framework to leverage and understand just how his military force is impacting on the operating environment, but also *when* he needs to leverage non-military tools to achieve an effect. In the past, the military has been guilty of focusing on the destruction of the

²⁰Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1999), 271; Stephen N. MacFarlane, *Peacekeeping at a Crossroads* (Clementsport, N.S.: Lester B. Pearson Canadian Peacekeeping Training Centre, 1996), 1-2; Sean J. A. Edwards, “Cross-Case Analysis,” in *Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2000), 67.

enemy or, in recent decades, the removal of the enemy's will to fight. Both of these foci are on the enemy. However, in current conflicts, given the inability of any formed enemy to resist the destructive power of western armies, the "enemy" has become less identifiable. As a result, most of the potential military power that exists in any operating environment cannot be used against the enemy. It is therefore necessary to use the many other tools of national power in conjunction with military power in order to achieve the strategic national and international endstate.²¹ Knowing when to use them and what these non-military elements of national power are represents the problem that EBO can solve. By detailed analysis of the operational environment before, during, and after a conflict it is possible to observe effects being generated by specific actions. As the positive effects (those that contribute to the achievement of the national endstate) are observed, the action that precipitated them must be repeated or reinforced. This must happen regardless if the action was the building of water wells, paving of a road, empowering local leaders, movement of local or international forces, or a good harvest.²²

Canadian expeditionary force commanders are charged with deploying and delivering the national will to an operating environment; if they can orient their headquarters to think along the lines of EBO then all actions can be tied to positive effects and those that are effect neutral or those that produce negative effects can ideally be avoided. The theory postulates that this will then result in more success towards the

²¹Cottingham, "Effects-Based Operations...", 34-35.

²²Dennis J. Gleeson, *et al*, *New Perspectives on Effects-Based Operations: Annotated Briefing*, Report Prepared for the Institute for Defense Analyses Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2001), 6, available from <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA395129>, accessed 18 April 2007.

endstate than current methods. Now that it has been shown that EBO is useful for expeditionary force commanders, it is necessary to examine how Canadian expeditionary force headquarters can adopt this new theory without significant retraining or restructuring.²³

What is the impact on Expeditionary Force Headquarters?

A headquarters is simply a tool for the commander to achieve his mission. As such, it is necessary for the headquarters to gather the information that the commander requires while promulgating his direction across the area of his command. In the case of EBO, the headquarters needs to gather observations of effects across the operating environment, link those effects to actions, formulate plans to produce more of the positive effects, and coordinate the delivery of the actions that lead to positive effects.²⁴ At the very generic level this is no different from current headquarters planning procedures that involve intelligence gathering, plan development and delivery.²⁵ What must be done to have a headquarters adopt EBO is to reorient the intelligence gathering to monitoring effects and find the links to actions, reorient the planners to focus on actions that deliver positive effects while avoiding the negative ones, and use the

²³Cottingham, "Effects-Based Operations...", 37.

²⁴Ibid., 39.

²⁵Department of National Defence, B-GL-005-500/FP-000 *Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2002), 3-1.

operations staff to both direct actions to subordinate organizations and coordinate the actions of organizations that are not within the traditional chain of command.²⁶

However, one caution has come from a Canadian study of EBO and the closely related Network Enabled Operations (NEOps) by Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC). The study warns that the technology focus of both concepts do not work well with Canadian military culture. It then recommends that the human dimension of the networks both within and outside the headquarters have to be leveraged to ensure that these concepts work for the CF.²⁷ Therefore, the greatest structural change within the headquarters will be the increased requirement for liaison to those non-military organizations that can influence the operating environment. These liaison officers will allow more of a human contact with non-military organizations and thus give the expeditionary force a face. Without the personalization of the organization and the clear expression of expected effects made possible by EBO language, it will remain difficult to impossible to work in conjunction with the many non-military organizations involved in a modern theatre of conflict. With respect to the inner workings of the headquarters, the

²⁶Two recent studies concur with this assessment: Canadian Colonel Cottingham's July 2004 unpublished thesis for an MA in Defence Studies at RMC indicates that the major components of EBO are described as effects based planning, effects based execution and effects based assessment. Canadian Director General Land Capability Development's *Capability Development Record on Command* from June 2006 indicates that to harness concepts such as EBO in the current operating environments that future headquarters will have to include an effects synchronization section. See Cottingham, "Effects-Based Operations...", 39; DND, *Capability Development Record...*, 35.

²⁷English et al., *Beware of Putting the Cart before the Horse...*, iv.

changes are in attitude, or as USAF Lieutenant General David Deptula put it, “a way of thinking.”²⁸

This is a very cursory overview of the changes that will be necessary to adopt EBO. However, it does show that the order of magnitude of the change is not wholesale; it is manageable given current force structures and manning pressures. Future headquarters will need to change the method by which they plan to include the intended effects of their actions, change the method by which they execute operations to include a collaborative approach with the non-military organizations involved and change the method by which they collect intelligence to be able to monitor the immediate and higher-order effects. Some of the physical changes to the structure of a headquarters have been studied by the Canadian Director General Land Capability Development and captured in the June 2006 *Capability Development Record on Command*. This study noted that EBO fits well with the contemporary operating environment, as it allows for more openness from military headquarters towards non-military organizations.²⁹ The study also noted that well-informed and competent liaison officers and specialist advisors are critical in order to harness the effects that can be affected by Information Operations, Civil-Military Cooperation, Psychological Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Public Affairs.³⁰ Now that EBO and its impact are well understood, it will be necessary to keep these necessary changes in mind when examining the capabilities that will have to be included in future Canadian expeditionary force headquarters.

²⁸Deptula, “Effects-Based Operations,” 4.

²⁹DND, *Capability Development Record...*, 53.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 32.

Nonetheless, a wholesale adoption of this new concept would be dangerous without being grounded by the lessons that have been demonstrated by history. An examination of previous Canadian expeditionary operations is therefore warranted. Through this examination, the lessons learned will be compiled to allow for the coupling of them with the precepts involved with EBO to determine the factors that future expeditionary operations must consider to be successful.

HISTORICAL REVIEW

Introduction

Canada's military history is rich with expeditionary operations. From Confederation until the present, the predominant, observable, employment of the Canadian Forces (CF) has been away from North America. This is not to imply that Canada has not focused on protecting its sovereignty, but the direct immediate threats have not manifested themselves against the nation itself. Therefore, expeditionary operations have been a significant focus for Canada's military over the past century and are replete with interesting examples that can provide fodder for future similar undertakings. Nevertheless, this historical review must remain focused at the level that will produce the most lessons for future deployed expeditionary force headquarters. As such, regardless of the historical example being studied, it will be the senior deployed Canadian commander and his headquarters that will be the focus of this review. However, to put the evolution of Canadian expeditionary experience into context it will be necessary to occasionally examine the larger context of the conflict.

The historical study of Canadian expeditionary forces starts at that point in history when the British first started requesting military contributions from Canada as opposed to what had been the status quo for more than two centuries – Britain sending forces to assist in the defence of Canada. The first occasion of the converse occurred in 1884. It was at this time that Britain requested assistance from Canada in the form of voyagers who were thought ideal to help navigate a British force up the Nile River to rescue

Major-General Charles Gordon.³¹ The second, more famous occasion was to assist in the South African War in 1899, when Canadian units actually fought under Canadian officers. Both of these events were examples of Canadians answering the call to assist in Imperial British missions, a concept that did not sit well with some Canadians.³² However, the South African War provided lessons for future expeditionary missions, as historian Desmond Morton points out:

Service in South Africa was a precedent for Canada's role in two world wars and Korea....South African experience dictated that Canadians in future would serve together under their own officers. Canadian commanders would carry a dual responsibility: to the government in Ottawa as well as to British superiors in the field.³³

For the purposes of this paper, the dual responsibility will be the more important lesson to be preserved. Now it is necessary to examine the bloodiest of Canadian expeditionary operations.

The First World War

Despite Canada's automatic entry into the conflict with the British declaration of war in August 1914, it was not until 1915 that the Canadian Corps was established in

³¹Lieutenant-Colonel D. J. Goodspeed, *The Armed Forces of Canada 1867-1967: A Century of Achievement* (Ottawa: Directorate of History, 1967), 14.

³²Colonel Bernd Horn and Ronald G. Haycock, "Primacy of National Command: Boer War Lessons Learned," in *The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest*, ed. Colonel Bernd Horn, 137-168 (Toronto: Dundurn, 2006), 160.

³³Morton, *A Military History of Canada...*, 118.

keeping with the lessons learned in the South African War.³⁴ It also took some time for the connections to be established that allowed for the implementation of the dual responsibility identified by Morton. The responsibility to the British superiors in the field was automatic but the link to Ottawa took some time.

The early years of the First World War demonstrate a significant trend in Canadian expeditionary forces. Specifically, the tradition of the government was to focus on sending forces to be commanded and used by other nations. While this was somewhat understandable during the period before and immediately after Confederation, the trend did not stop with the First World War. Despite the formation of a Canadian Corps, the commander of that formation found it impossible to influence strategic decisions.³⁵ To address this issue, the Government of Canada decided to send a federal minister to London to ensure that Canada's will was being considered.³⁶ The Minister appointed, Sir George Perley, was provided with a military staff to assist in the coordination of all Canadian military forces. For the remainder of the war there was friction between Militia Headquarters in Ottawa, Corps Headquarters in France, and the Headquarters in London. Therefore, the First World War provides the initial example of a Canadian National Headquarters deploying forward to shape the delivery of national power. However, as

³⁴Goodspeed, *The Armed Forces of Canada...*, 35.

³⁵A. M. J. Hyatt, "The Military Leadership of Sir Arthur Currie," in *Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders*, ed. Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris, 43-56 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), 44.

³⁶C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Government: The war policies of Canada 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1970), 206.

will be shown, the friction between this national headquarters and the field formations were also a reoccurring theme in the 20th century.

The Second World War

As the Second World War began, the Government of Canada began to contribute militarily in a deliberate manner to ensure domestic support and to avoid the potential of “any exceptional amount of blood [being] spilt by the incompetence of foreign generals.”³⁷ Although a deployed headquarters had been established in London, the sheer enormity of the task of training, equipping and transporting Canadian Forces to England resulted in this forward operational headquarters, the Government in Ottawa, and the High Commission in London all being focused on the task at hand instead of becoming involved in the planning of the war.³⁸ The Dieppe Raid changed the situation.³⁹

The Canadian losses at Dieppe brought the details of command and control of Canadian forces within the allied war effort to the attention of the Canadian Government. Future troop contributions were examined in more detail and the lines of communications

³⁷Adrian W. Preston, “Canada and the Higher Direction of the Second World War: 1939-1945,” in *Canada’s Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century*, ed. B. D. Hunt and R. G. Haycock, 98-118 (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993), 104.

³⁸Ibid., 102.

³⁹The significance of the Dieppe Raid was due to its being the first battle for the untested Canadian Army troops, the number of casualties involved, the persistent debate as to whether the raid was worth those casualties and the lack of involvement in the planning by Canadians. See Alain Buriot and Arnaud Coignet, “The Raid on Dieppe, 19th August 1942,” In *Dieppe 1942-1997: The Faces of Memory*, edited by Ville de Dieppe and l’Association Jubilee, 13-25. (N.p., 1997). See also Morton, *A Military History of Canada...* See also Paul D. Dickson, “Colonials and Coalitions: Canadian-British Command Relations between Normandy and the Scheldt, In *Leadership and Responsibility in the Second World War*, edited by Brian P. Farrell, 235-273. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004).

between Ottawa, London and the forces themselves became more important. At the beginning of the war, a Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) had been established in London. Its role was to act as liaison between the senior Canadian formation commanders in Europe/England and the Minister of National Defence in Ottawa. Similarly, the Canadian High Commissioner in London dealt with the British government and reported back to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Fortunately, these two organizations in London appear to have functioned well together and ensured that the link between Ottawa, the decision-makers in London, and the Commanders of forces worked reasonably well.⁴⁰ There are, of course, examples of when it did not work well.

The Canadian Government advised the Chief of the Imperial (i.e. British) General Staff directly that Canadian troops could be used for the invasion of Sicily in 1943. This was in contrast to the position of the Canadian military leadership in Britain that all Canadian troops needed to be saved for a united effort across the English Channel.⁴¹ Then, as the Normandy invasion was about to commence, the Government demanded a written feasibility study on the operation directly from General H.D.G. Crerar, the senior Canadian commander involved.⁴² These examples show that the concept of national control of expeditionary forces and the available apparatus to do so were not well understood by the ultimate Canadian authority, the Government of Canada. Specifically, when there was little risk to Canadian military personnel the Government was satisfied to

⁴⁰Stacey, *Arms, Men and Government...*, 206-207.

⁴¹Bill Rawling, "The Generalship of Andrew McNaughton: A Study in Failure," in *Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders*, ed. Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris, 73-90 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), 82.

⁴²Dickson, "Colonials and Coalitions...", 239.

allow commanders (at all levels of command) the leeway to execute their missions as they saw fit. As the risk was elevated so too was the involvement by Ottawa. The danger being that the Government would not exert its control through the established military chain of command that was set up for that purpose but through the political and diplomatic channels. Unfortunately, this was the beginning of a trend within the topic of national control of Canadian expeditionary forces.

There was another key difficulty that Canadian expeditionary forces had during the Second World War. Due to the lack of specific Canadian direction to operational commanders, but given the levels of responsibility that was expected of them, they were always walking a very fine line between their national responsibilities and the coalition or allied operational requirements. Without a clearly defined apparatus between the government and a commander in the field, that commander had to find his own path to meet the competing demands of protecting Canadian soldiers, sailors and airmen while still contributing effectively to the allied war effort. The first senior Canadian Army commander, General Andy McNaughton, lost his position when he failed to negotiate these competing demands.⁴³ A study of his successor, General Crerar, is full of similar difficulties, most notably his conflicts with his operational superior, British Field Marshall Sir Bernard Montgomery, over the progress of the Canadian Army in Holland.⁴⁴ Similarly, Rear-Admiral Leonard Murray found it difficult to maintain his Canadian

⁴³Rawling, "The Generalship of Andrew McNaughton...", 85.

⁴⁴Dickson, "Colonials and Coalitions...", 250.

command in the North-West Atlantic Ocean without support from Ottawa.⁴⁵ Also, there were the difficulties that the Royal Canadian Air Force had consolidating the Canadians within the squadrons.⁴⁶ These examples represent some of the difficulties identified in Desmond Morton's quote as "dual responsibility" which persisted into the future for deployed Canadian expeditionary forces.

The Korea War

The Korean Conflict marked the end of an imperialistic age for Canadian forces. The Cold War resulted in Canada choosing an independent course on many military issues and entering into coalitions as an equal, no longer a British vassal state. Although Canada has never been able to offer the quantity of military might such as the United Kingdom or the US, the goal of General Charles Foulkes to offer quality, relevant forces (known as functionalism) has been successfully demonstrated repeatedly.⁴⁷ With this

⁴⁵The RCN contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic was difficult in the early years of the war due to lack of equipment and trained sailors. This was further impacted by the decision by the Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa to strip trained sailors from RAdm Murray's command to feed RCN expansion elsewhere. Despite these challenges, the steadfast focus of Murray's leadership and persistence allowed his Newfoundland Escort Force to rise above adversity and for him to command the only Canadian operational theatre during the Second World War, the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command. See Wilfred G.D. Lund, "Rear-Admiral Leonard Warren Murray, CB, CBE, RCN: A Study of Command and Leadership in the Battle of the Atlantic," in *Canadian Military History Since the 17th Century: Proceedings of the Canadian Military History Conference, Ottawa, 5-9 May 2000*, ed. Yves Tremblay, 297-307 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2001), 302.

⁴⁶This process has been called "Canadianization" and was due to the initial deployment of Canadians directly and individually into the RAF. After the numbers of Canadians in the RAF became larger, there were pressures from Canada to consolidate these airmen into Canadian squadrons, wings and groups commanded by Canadian officers. This process was both passively and actively resisted by the British. See Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*....

⁴⁷General Charles Foulkes as the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Canada, championed the idea that one of the benefits of an alliance was the sharing of the requirement to provide large quantities of military forces. But he did recognize that without filling a specific niche in the alliance that a nation would not be a full partner. Thus, as Sean Maloney put it "Canada must bring something

capability comes the opportunity to have more of a voice in the decision making apparatus of the coalition in question. This factor, then, has allowed the chance for Canada's national will to be communicated using its military forces. However, this opportunity has not been capitalized upon very often in Canadian military history.

As the hostilities in Korea commenced and the United Nations (UN) appointed the US to carry its flag in opposition to the North Korean forces, Canada immediately offered three destroyers and then an air transport squadron. Throughout the conflict, the ships answered operationally to the UN Command structure but administratively back to the Canadian Flag Officer Pacific or Atlantic Coast (FOPC or FOAC) as appropriate, based on the origins of the RCN vessel.⁴⁸ The air transport squadron was assigned to the US Military Air Transport Service which was operating between North America and Japan. This vital air bridge was critical for the UN and Canadian forces in the Korean conflict but did not go forward into Korea itself. The final commitment that Canada made was the eventual deployment of an Infantry Brigade Group, which worked within the Commonwealth Infantry Division.⁴⁹ The Divisional commander was responsible to both his US operational commander within the UN chain of command but also to the contributing Commonwealth nation's Chief of General Staff. For the Canadians, this

unique to the table to make up for the lack of mass." See Sean M. Maloney, "General Charles Foulkes: A Primer on How to be CDS," in *Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders*, ed. Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris, 219-235 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), 223. As for functionalism see Howard Coombs with Richard Goette, "Supporting the *Pax Americana*: Canada's Military and the Cold War," in *The Canadian War of War: Serving the National Interest*, ed. Bernd Horn, 265-296 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006), 266

⁴⁸Thor Thorgrimsson, *Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters: 1950-1955* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1965), 135-136.

⁴⁹Goodspeed, *The Armed Forces of Canada...*, 212.

latter responsibility was exercised through the Canadian Military Mission Far East (CMMFE).⁵⁰ Therefore, the three parts of Canada's commitment to the Korean conflict operated in different areas and were linked back to Ottawa through different mechanisms.

The lack of a unifying deployed national headquarters for the Canadian military elements involved in the Korean War is a departure from both world wars.⁵¹ While this change is reflective of the lack of interest by the Government of Canada to use the deployed military forces to exercise specific national strategy, it makes it far more difficult for the government to become involved when there is a need to do so. One specific and pertinent example was the diplomatic fervour resulting from the assignment of a Canadian infantry company to the Koje-do prison in 1952.⁵² The Commander of CMMFE viewed this deployment as a normal military task so he did not raise it to the attention of the senior military staff in Ottawa. Once the details of the assignment were communicated by the Canadian Brigade Commander, Brigadier M. P. Bogert, to the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, the appropriateness of the task was brought into question. The Minister of National Defence and the rest of Cabinet

⁵⁰David Jay Bercuson, *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 200.

⁵¹Coombs, "Supporting the *Pax Americana*...", 275.

⁵²To display coalition unity, the Commanding General of the UN Forces in Korea deployed two companies of infantry from the British Commonwealth Division along with a Greek Company to augment the Dutch, South Korean and US forces already at the prison. The two companies from the Commonwealth Division were British and Canadian. The decision touched two sensitive areas in Ottawa – the separation of Canadian troops from their parent unit and the public connection of Canada with the prison. For more details see Canada, External Affairs and International Trade, "Assignment of Troops to Koje Island," in *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, Volume 18, 1952, ed. Donald Barry (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1990), 66-77.

had the Canadian Ambassador to Washington publicly raise the issue with the US Government, which resulted in a diplomatic rift for some weeks.

The provocative handling of the Koje-do incident by the Canadian Government was not based solely on this one event, but represented a growing dissatisfaction with decisions being taken unilaterally by the US.⁵³ When the potential use of atomic weapons in the Far East was announced by the US Government, the lack of consultation between the nations contributing the troops again became a significant diplomatic issue.⁵⁴ These examples show that CMMFE was not as involved as the Government of Canada would have liked to be able to influence coalition decisions. Nor was there a higher body that would allow key policy issues to be discussed among the nations. The US was proving to be no different as the lead nation in a coalition than the British were in the First World War. For the deployed commanders the lessons that were learned during the Korean War were threefold. First, the importance of having one joint deployed headquarters is critical to ensure that national intent or will is able to be effectively and clearly transmitted to all Canadian military forces in the conflict. Second, that headquarters must remain ready and able to respond to increased Government of Canada involvement if the actions of the expeditionary force become a matter of national interest. This will be the only organization that can keep the government in Ottawa satisfied while not encumbering tactical commanders. Third, the expeditionary force headquarters must

⁵³David Jay Bercuson, *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 201-202.

⁵⁴Morton, *A Military History of Canada...*, 236.

remain focused on accurately reporting those issues that could become of interest to the Canadian Government.

The lessons learned by Canada in working with the US in Korea and during the last years of the Second World War were combined with the earlier lessons of working with the British to give rise to many of the practices embodied in the NATO Alliance and the UN. Canada pushed for NATO to be a group of equals with the intent that the rest of the nations would balance the natural heavily dominating US influence in the alliance. The window for such a move was opened by the end of the Korean conflict. As the US gave assurances to the United Kingdom about the use of atomic weapons, it did the same with Canada, on an equal footing.⁵⁵ NATO then developed into a very robust and inclusive decision making body for the employment of national power through the use of national militaries in a coalition. But this was dependent on a common enemy and a common intent among the nations. Within the UN context, however, there was never the common intent. Canada did, nevertheless, lobby to ensure that it was not just the great powers that were making all the decisions for that international body.⁵⁶ It is therefore now prudent to examine the period of the Cold War after the Korean Conflict to determine the impact that such international organizations and alliances as NATO, the UN and even North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) brought.

⁵⁵Stephen Price, "Life in the Empire Yet? Post-War Defence Cooperation within the British Commonwealth," in *Canadian Military History since the 17th Century: Proceedings of the Canadian Military History Conference, Ottawa, 5-9 May 2000*, ed. Yves Tremblay, 361-369 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2001), 366.

⁵⁶Coombs, "Supporting the *Pax Americana*...", 266.

The Cold War

The Cold War represents a very different strategic environment within which Canadian expeditionary forces operated. The Second World War had taught most nations the necessity of collective security, so there was an emerging primacy of alliances and international organizations. Canada was no longer the automatic subordinate to Britain, as a special relationship had begun during the Second World War with the US that would persist. Caught between these two powers, the attractions of NATO for Canada was that many other nations were involved in the decision making process, not just Britain and the US. Similarly, the UN became critical in keeping small conflicts from directly involving the superpowers. UN peacekeeping was a niche at which Canada could and did excel. Finally, there was the emerging threat to North America which brought military planning between the US and Canada closer together. Eventually, this resulted in joint defence plans including NORAD.⁵⁷

These realities resulted in the physical defence of Canada being subordinated to the defence of North America. Within that concept was the fact that the US would provide the majority of the forces to protect North America, so Canada did not need to maintain a military commensurate with its physical size. The impact of alliances, coupled with the small size of most peacekeeping missions, also afforded a nation like Canada savings in the size of its standing forces. These factors all colluded to result in a

⁵⁷Sean M. Maloney, "Canada and the Cold War," in *Forging a Nation: Perspectives on the Canadian Military Experience*, ed. Bernd Horn, 353-365 (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing, 2002), 356; Coombs, "Supporting the *Pax Americana*...", 272; David Last, "Almost a Legacy: Canada's Contribution to Peacekeeping," in *Forging a Nation: Perspectives on the Canadian Military Experience*, ed. Bernd Horn, 367-392 (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing, 2000), 371.

decline of interest from the Government of Canada in defence issues from the high point of the Second World War to the low point in the 1970s and 1980s.⁵⁸ The impact on Canadian expeditionary forces was a lack of interest in their employment, as the only focus at the governmental level was to remain a participating and relevant member of international organizations such as NATO, the UN and NORAD.⁵⁹ Despite this “fire and forget” mentality of deploying forces, the Cold War period does provide some interesting lessons that need to be absorbed in future Canadian expeditionary force deployments.

National involvement in all multinational command structures became a method through which specific Canadian military goals or strategic interests could be protected. This concept was shown in the formulation of NATO command structures to include a voice from the involved nations at the highest planning levels. At the operational level, every headquarters had embedded Canadian staff officers or commanders to ensure that Canadian interests were championed or monitored as the situation dictated. This was mirrored within the NORAD structure, as the deputy commander-in-chief position was dedicated to a Canadian air force officer. Further, within the UN context, deployed headquarters were made up of representatives of the troop contributing nations and usually the size of the contribution was reflective of the number and importance of the staff positions within the mission headquarters.⁶⁰ This lesson of ensuring that the

⁵⁸Sean M. Maloney, “The Canadian Tao of Conflict,” in *Forging a Nation: Perspectives on the Canadian Military Experience*, ed. Bernd Horn, 271-285 (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing, 2000), 282.

⁵⁹Coombs, “Supporting the *Pax Americana*...,” 270.

⁶⁰Sean M. Maloney, *Securing Command of the Sea: NATO Naval Planning 1948-1954* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 84; Maloney, “The Canadian Tao of Conflict,”..., 279; Coombs,

deployed multinational headquarters have national representation if Canadian forces are going to be involved in the mission is one that has persisted and will continue to persist into the future. Another rich source of lessons from the Cold War involves the more traditional expeditionary operations during the timeframe, peacekeeping.

The Canadian contributions to the UN and other peacekeeping missions during the Cold War were numerous and diverse. Other than the Korean Conflict, these deployments can be classified in one of three ways: surveillance missions, supervisory missions, or internal security missions.⁶¹ The observer and supervisory missions were typified by a small but important contribution by Canada, while the internal security missions usually involved greater numbers of personnel and some critical capability such as tactical airlift, signals support or logistics.⁶² As indicated above, the contribution of forces was the only decision made at the Canadian Government level. After that point the Secretary General of the UN commanded the deployed forces. The lack of a guaranteed voice to protect Canadian national interests or the lives of Canadian military personnel within the UN hierarchy was balanced by the normally low risk to deployed peacekeepers.⁶³ It is not until after the Cold War that more dangerous peacekeeping and peacemaking missions began to occur. This rise in risk levels brings more interest from

“Supporting the *Pax Americana*...” 282; Dan Loomis, *The Somalia Affair: Reflections on Peacekeeping and Peacemaking* (Ottawa: DGL Publications, 1996), viii.

⁶¹J. L. Granatstein, “Canada: Peacekeeper – A Survey of Canada’s Participation in Peacekeeping Operations,” in *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response*, 93-187 (Lindsay, Ontario: John Deyell, 1968), 186.

⁶²Last, “Almost a Legacy...,” 371.

⁶³The exception was the UN mission in the Congo. See Granatstein, “Canada: Peacekeeper...,” 160.

the Government of Canada. The tendency that was first shown during the Second World War was repeated as the government in Ottawa became more actively involved in the employment of Canadian expeditionary forces.

Another important development in Canadian expeditionary operations was demonstrated both during the UN Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949 and the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Southeast Asia from 1954 until 1974. These two missions showed involvement and interest from the Department of External Affairs (DEA). In the first case, as the request came to provide officers for UNMOGIP, DEA offered to pay for two of them. The Canadian contribution for ICSC included three military generals and three Ambassador level diplomats from External Affairs.⁶⁴ The results of these two early examples of cooperation between the two departments were mixed. For UNMOGIP, it is likely that Canada would not have participated in this important early test for the UN were it not for the support from DEA. As for ICSC, the mixed deployment was effective but the nature of the mission and the growing hostilities in Vietnam do not make it possible to declare ICSC a success.⁶⁵ Regardless, the example of close cooperation between defence and diplomacy represents the beginning of a current trend that involves more of the tools of national power being harnessed to aid in the resolution of international conflicts. The levels of involvement represented by these two examples

⁶⁴Letter from Secretary of State of External Affairs to the Minister of National Defence, January 18, 1949. Quoted in Lieutenant J. L. Granatstein, *Report No. 4 Directorate of History Canadian Forces Headquarters: Canada and Peace-keeping Operations* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, October 22, 1965), 9. Available from <http://www.forces.gc.ca/dhh/downloads/cfhq/cfhq004.PDF>; accessed 21 April 2007; Granatstein, "Canada: Peacekeeper...", 110.

⁶⁵Granatstein, "Canada: Peacekeeper...", 101, 102, 110-112.

may not be appropriate in the future, but the lesson of close cooperation between the two departments of the Government of Canada must be maintained.

Therefore, the lessons that can be learned from the Cold War as they apply to Canadian expeditionary force deployments is the importance of embedded Canadians in the command structure, the increased involvement of Ottawa as the risk to deployed forces increases, and the close cooperation of the Departments of National Defence and External Affairs in peace support operations. However, throughout the Cold War, there is evidence that participation in international organizations and alliances became the overriding concept for the deployment of expeditionary forces. There was also a noted trend involving the reduction of interest in the military by the Canadian Government. This was based on the relative low risk to deployed Canadian personnel, the small number of forces involved and the lack of domestic public interest in their employment. The result was many deployments during which the senior Canadian commander was faced with little direction or authority to make decisions but, depending on the threat scenario, a very high amount of responsibility to protect the lives of Canadian soldiers.⁶⁶ The lack of connectivity between the government and the military became an issue during the Cuban Missile Crisis, as the automatic provisions in the plans for the defence

⁶⁶G. E. Sharpe and Allan D. English, *Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces* (Winnipeg: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2002), xiv.

of North America resulted in elements of the Canadian Armed Forces being put on a high alert status without Canadian Government consultation.⁶⁷

As the historical study continues it will be shown that the increasing size of expeditionary deployments, the elevated risk to those forces and the heightened potential to impact on domestic issues drew strategic decision-makers from Ottawa further into the business of deployed expeditionary operations. To demonstrate this concept it will be necessary to examine the larger post-Cold War deployments of elements of the Canadian Forces.

The Gulf War

The first significant post-Cold War deployment of Canadian Forces was the Gulf War in 1990-91. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, US President George H. W. Bush began to gather a “coalition of the willing.” Concurrent to the US efforts, the UN had increased its sanctions on Iraq and needed additional naval assets to achieve this aim. Canada committed to both the US and UN initiatives and deployed a Naval Task Group from Halifax under the UN mandate. As the need for air cover for this Task Group became apparent, a squadron of CF-18s was deployed to the region. This squadron fulfilled more tasks than just air cover for the Canadian ships, however, as the aircraft were amalgamated into the entire coalition air force. As well as these two primary

⁶⁷Peter T. Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), 91.

combat elements, a field hospital, a company of infantry for protection, numerous logistics elements and finally military engineers were deployed to the region.⁶⁸

The initial mounting of this operation was handled piecemeal from NDHQ through Maritime Command for the ships and Canadian Forces Europe for the aircraft. As the number of elements in the theatre of operations increased and the difficulties in dealing with two separate commands were discovered, the need for a national deployed headquarters became apparent. On 27 September 1990, the CDS sent a message announcing the creation of the position of Commander, Canadian Forces – Middle East (CANFORCOMME) who, with the assistance of a joint headquarters, would command all Canadian assets in the special duty area.⁶⁹ The Parliament of Canada made this decision not because of any great desire to have a direct line to deployed forces but due to the difficulties that NDHQ was having controlling those forces through two or more different senior commands.⁷⁰ The headquarters created for the Gulf War was touted as the first one in Canadian military history to be truly joint.⁷¹ This was due to earlier conflicts occurring when there were still three service chiefs at the head of the CF and following the creation of the CDS position, the different missions that were mounted

⁶⁸Morton, *A Military History of Canada...*, 274.

⁶⁹Jean H. Morin and Richard H. Gimblett, *The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf: Operation Friction 1990-1991* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997), 114.

⁷⁰Bland, *Chiefs of Defence...*, 202.

⁷¹Joint is described by NATO as an “Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations in which elements of at least two services participate.” See NATO, NATO Standardization Agency, AAP – 6 *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions* (Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency, 2007). Available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap-6-2007.pdf>; accessed 21 April 2007. For the Canadian Forces, who are by definition one service, the term joint applies to activities, operations and organizations that involve more than one environment. See Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-000 *Canadian Forces Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000)

under NORAD, NATO, and UN auspices were fundamentally focused on force generation instead of force employment.⁷²

The magnitude and utility of a forward deployed joint Canadian headquarters was not overwhelmingly obvious to all elements of the Canadian Forces. Several other issues clouded the performance of this headquarters and resulted in the concept not being fully embraced. One issue was the location chosen. As the headquarters was led by a naval officer, the choice of Bahrain, close to the port and coalition naval operations naturally drew some scepticism. Those detractors stressed that the distance to the other coalition main headquarters and decision-makers in Riyadh restricted the usefulness of the deployed commander.⁷³ The second issue was the reduced control by elements of NDHQ of deployed forces. As the CANFORCOMME was established, the functional commands in NDHQ were ordered to become supporting commands, thus relinquishing some control to the new commander. This change was not fully embraced by some of those sections in NDHQ.⁷⁴ However, despite the problems, there were successes such as easier coordination of new tasks, better integrated force protection, savings in terms of sustaining the deployed force and closer monitoring of Canadian elements in a high threat environment.⁷⁵

⁷²Force generation includes the training, equipping and deploying of military forces while force employment includes the control of those forces while deployed. See Bland, *Chiefs of Defence...*, 179.

⁷³Canadian Forces College, "Strategic Operational Management in the Gulf War," (National Security Studies Course Case Study, 1999), 19/59.

⁷⁴CFC, "Strategic Operational Management in the Gulf War," ..., 24/59.

⁷⁵CFC, "Strategic Operational Management in the Gulf War," ..., 24/59, 26/59, 50/59.

The Canadian Forces structure in the Gulf War represented the first in a series of post-Cold War expeditionary force structures that will be studied later in this paper. The concept of the requirement for a single national headquarters was the start of an excellent trend that has allowed Canada to not only control the forces deployed but also allow for the integration of other elements of national power such as aid and diplomacy. Nevertheless, the advantages of having a single, joint, deployed national headquarters had to be relearned in Somalia and the Balkans. Therefore, it is now necessary to examine these two deployments to further develop the utility of a deployed national headquarters as well as other emerging trends that will be useful for the future of Canadian expeditionary force operations.

Somalia⁷⁶

The nature of the deployment to Somalia changed while the Canadian ground forces were actually in transit to the area. Initially, it was intended that the Canadian Forces would be part of the UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). As a result, and based on many years of operating in similar organizations, Canada ensured that there were embedded Canadian staff officers in the headquarters of UNOSOM. These personnel were both prepared to stay apprised of the details of Canadian employment within the mission and to help shape it to meet national requirements if necessary.⁷⁷

However, in December 1992, the nature of the situation in Somalia degraded to the point

⁷⁶This paper will not focus on the conduct of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia, but will instead examine how the deployment of Canadian Forces assets to Somalia in late 1992 and into 1993 was structured and controlled from a national perspective.

⁷⁷Loomis, *The Somalia Affair...*, xii.

that the UN asked the US to lead a mission under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter.⁷⁸ In response, US President Bill Clinton spoke with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to ask for a CF contribution to this new mission. Mulroney agreed, and the forces originally earmarked for UNOSOM were shifted to the US led Unified Task Force (UNITAF). Unfortunately, this meant that the pre-positioned staff officers in UNOSOM HQ were no longer in the correct HQ. Furthermore, there was no effort by the Canadians or offer from the Americans to embed Canadian staff officers in the US UNITAF HQ.⁷⁹

Within this framework it was fortunate that a national headquarters known as the Canadian Joint Force Somalia (CJFS) was included in the deployment. It was subordinate to UNITAF HQ and kept all the Canadian Forces elements subordinate for the entire mission.⁸⁰ These elements included the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, the Rotary Wing Aviation Flight, the Canadian Air Transport Detachment Somalia, HMCS *Preserver*, and for the later part of the mission a Field Squadron from 2 Combat Engineer Regiment.⁸¹ Although it was difficult for CJFS to influence the decisions being made in the US led UNITAF HQ, all orders to the Canadian elements in the theatre of operations had to pass through CJFS so that they could be modified if

⁷⁸Typical UN missions designed to keep an already established peace are considered to be under Chapter Six of the UN Charter. The Korean and Gulf Wars did not involve an established peace and therefore required the UN force to re-establish that peace and therefore are considered to be under Chapter Seven of the charter. Thus Chapter Six missions are commonly referred to as Peacekeeping and Chapter Seven as Peacemaking. See United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations," <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>; Internet; accessed 21 April 2007.

⁷⁹Loomis, *The Somalia Affair...*, vii.

⁸⁰Canada, *After Action Report – Op Deliverance* (Ottawa: unpublished, 1993), 1/7.

⁸¹Allen G. Sens, *Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping: The Implications for Canada* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), 105.

required to meet national objectives. It was also possible for this headquarters to be able to accurately report to NDHQ what was happening in Somalia given its position in the operational chain of command.⁸²

The extremely detailed examination of every aspect of this mission done by the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia has provided some important information for this study of the command and control of Canadian expeditionary forces. First, when new coalitions are formed that lack the overarching structure of the UN or NATO it is important to include a mechanism to ensure that Canadian interests are protected. That mechanism may be embedded staff officers in smaller missions but it should be a national headquarters such as CJFS in larger missions. This lesson was observed during the Gulf War but still not adopted by the Canadian Forces, as will be shown in the section on Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A second observation highlighted by the Somalia Inquiry and useful for Canadian expeditionary force operations is the lesson learned with respect to humanitarian support. UNITAF deployed with well integrated US State Department and US Aid teams as well as Civil-Military coordination (CIMIC) teams. CJFS, however, did not deploy with similar assets and it made the task of assisting with humanitarian aid and reconstruction that much more difficult.⁸³ Future missions are expected to require more than just military force to achieve the endstate and, therefore, it will be important to leverage as many civilian organizations as possible through deployed CIMIC teams.

⁸²Loomis, *The Somalia Affair...*, xii.

⁸³Ibid., xi.

The last point that is of note from the Somalia Inquiry for expeditionary deployments is contained in one of the report's recommendations. Specifically, that more vigilance is required from Parliament in the oversight of the Canadian Forces when it is being deployed onto complicated and high risk missions.⁸⁴ However, this will not be possible unless there is a functioning, efficient conduit for information between Parliament and the deployed forces. Thus, an expeditionary force commander with a competent staff placed in the correct location both physically and within the operational chain of command is critical to ensuring that Parliament can discharge the duty to provide more oversight for CF missions. Despite all of the negative lessons that have come from Somalia for the Canadian Forces, there are therefore three positive lessons that should be retained for future expeditionary deployments. These are: ensuring a mechanism exists to protect Canadian interests; increasing the number of CIMIC teams, and providing a communications conduit from the conflict area back to Ottawa. Now it is necessary to examine the longer term deployment of Canadian Forces in the former Yugoslavia.

Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

The disintegration of the Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 was one of the after effects of the Cold War. The migration of the different states, which had been held together under a communist regime, to independent nationhood interested in democratic government was viewed by the western world as a step in the right direction. Many nations immediately recognized the new states but as the tensions mounted between the

⁸⁴Canada, *Executive Summary: Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair* (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 1997), ES-46-ES-47.

old government in Belgrade and the new nations, it soon became apparent that an intervention would be required to stabilize the situation.⁸⁵

The initial UN mission in the former Yugoslavia was to protect the ethnic Serbs within Croatia and was called the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). This mission was intended to be headquartered in Sarajevo to remain outside of Croatia. However, the violence in the region quickly spread into Sarajevo and the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus making the selection of headquarters location impossible.⁸⁶ As a result, the UN mission had to expand to attempt to stabilize Bosnia as well. This rapid expansion coupled with the magnitude of the violence left the international forces unable to establish peace and therefore resulted in the erosion of the credibility of UNPROFOR. Furthermore, the original role for UNPROFOR disappeared, as the Croatians forcibly took back all their territory and ensured that the ethnic-Serbs moved elsewhere.

As the instability in Bosnia progressed and the UN continued to display a lack of capability to respond to the crisis, an agreement was brokered by the US that established a “roadmap” to peace but also allowed for the transition of the mission to a NATO led operation.⁸⁷ Initially this new force, called the Implementation Force (IFOR) and then the Stabilization Force (SFOR), arrived with more troops, enhanced capabilities and more

⁸⁵United Nations, “Resolution 713 (1991),” <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/49/IMG/NR059649.pdf?OpenElement>; Internet; accessed 21 April 2007; United Nations, “Former Yugoslavia: United Nations Protection Force,” http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprof_b.htm; Internet; accessed 21 April 2007.

⁸⁶Morton, *A Military History of Canada...*, 278.

⁸⁷Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “The Contact Group, NATO and Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia: European Security at the Crossroads,” in *Peacekeeping at a Crossroads*, ed. S. Neil MacFarlane and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, 45-62 (Clementsport, NS: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), 53.

robust rules of engagement. SFOR achieved its goals and transitioned to a European Union Force (EUFOR) to continue the development of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a country.

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Into this complicated situation, Canada deployed over 40,000 troops between the initial deployment of a Battalion in 1992 until the handover of the NATO mission to the EUFOR in 2004.⁸⁹ During these 12 years, the scope of the mission and Canada's involvement changed significantly. In 1992, the initial deployment of ground forces was from Canadian Forces Europe and was under a straightforward UN mandate. This deployment was larger than most previous UN missions but not significantly. Given the large number of troops available in Germany due to the expiration of Canada's commitment to forward defence in Europe, this mission did not initially pose any difficulties.⁹⁰

As the war spread into Bosnia, Canada answered the call for more forces by deploying a second Battle Group. This level of commitment was maintained, with one unit in Croatia and one in Bosnia, until the mission transitioned from the UN to NATO and focused in Bosnia. From that time until handover to the EUFOR in November 2004, Canada maintained a Battle Group with supporting elements in north-western Bosnia.

⁸⁸Canada, Department of National Defence, "Canadian Forces Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina," http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=992#EUFOR; Internet; accessed 4 March 2007.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Sean Maloney, "In the Service of Forward Security: Peacekeeping, Stabilization, and the Canadian Way of War," in *The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest*, ed. Colonel Bernd Horn, 297-323 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006), 313.

Canada also deployed ships to assist in the NATO sea embargo in the Adriatic Sea during this period. Based on the long period of time and the number of personnel from the CF that served in Croatia and Bosnia, this expeditionary deployment has had a lasting impact on the Canadian military. The ever-changing mandate, failure of the UN, success of NATO and higher threat levels than previous missions have provided a wealth of lessons to be learned with respect to the command and control of these expeditionary forces.⁹¹

As Canadian Forces deployed under the UN mandate the tried and true pattern of embedding senior Canadian officers in the mission hierarchy was repeated. It was the deployment of Brigadier-General Lewis MacKenzie as the UNPROFOR Chief of Staff that allowed for the Canadian battalion to be used to open the Sarajevo airport. Although this task was outside of the original intent for the battalion, it was a task that was desperately required.⁹² The existence of a senior Canadian in the headquarters, able to discuss the issues directly with the Canadian CDS, ensured that the necessary information required by Ottawa was passed directly and personally, and that the continued trust from Ottawa could be counted upon given the continued monitoring of the situation by General MacKenzie.⁹³

As the volatility and quickly changing nature of the mission in Croatia and Bosnia became apparent, Ottawa began appointing a Commander Canadian Contingent

⁹¹Canada, DND, "CF Ops in Bosnia-Herzegovina"...

⁹²Lewis MacKenzie, *Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo* (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 1993), 202-203.

⁹³Ibid.

UNPROFOR (Commander CCUNPROFOR) from among the senior officers deployed within the mission hierarchy. Concurrently, it was recognized that Commander CCUNPROFOR needed a Canadian staff dedicated to allowing him to fulfil his duties both to the deployed forces in the area and to the requirements of NDHQ in Ottawa. This CCUNPROFOR headquarters staff grew slowly from rotation to rotation until it became the National Command Element.⁹⁴ Another evolutionary change was the removal of Commander CCUNPROFOR and his staff from the multinational hierarchy to focus solely on Canadian issues as well as the interface between NDHQ and the mission chain of command. This evolution demonstrated the predictable national response, as the mission changed from a simple peacekeeping deployment into the complex, NATO led stabilization force. As the danger and complexity of the mission increased the need for more national oversight did as well.⁹⁵

Another significant lesson that was learned from the Bosnia experience was the increasing interconnectivity of the military and civilian efforts to stabilize this failed state. The General Framework Agreement, which was the result of the Dayton meetings and which was the “roadmap” for the stabilization of Bosnia, separated the military plan from the civil tasks of creating a Bosnia government and also from the reconstruction tasks.⁹⁶ This separation was noticed on the ground by military commanders as they tried to link the delivery of three separate effects (security, good governance and aid) without

⁹⁴Operation Harmony and Palladium Post Operational Reports, reproduced in the *Lessons Learned Information Warehouse Version 10.0* [CD-ROM] (Kingston: The Army Lessons Learned Centre, 1999).

⁹⁵Larry Wentz, *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington: CCRP, 1997), Chapter 3 page 2/8.

⁹⁶Ibid.

the authority to control two of them. Although the long term goals of all three effects were the same, the short term delivery was not synchronized and, as a result, was at times incoherent and not efficient.⁹⁷ It is certainly debatable that the control of these three effects should be in the hands of individual battalion commanders, but this observation speaks to the need for these effects to be synchronized across all levels of command and all agencies involved such that the overarching mission is achieved as efficiently as possible.

Overall, the long, protracted, and complicated mission that faced the Canadian Forces in Croatia and Bosnia has impacted on a generation of senior leaders. Although there were a myriad of important lessons learned in those 12 years, the two that are critical for this paper are: 1) that the requirement for national command increases with risk and complexity of the mission; and 2) that it is becoming increasingly important when dealing with failed and failing states to integrate all elements of national and international power to effectively rebuild them into healthy nations. As will be shown in the next section, these lessons that began in the northern Balkans were confirmed and added to during the very complicated international involvement in the southern Balkans.

⁹⁷These observations are based on the author's experience in the Balkans which included a deployment as the UNPROFOR Force Engineer Battalion Liaison Officer from November 1992 until April 1993, as the Canadian Infantry Battalion Engineer in UNPROFOR from April until October 1994, and as the Canadian Infantry Battle Group Engineer in SFOR from April until October 2001. See also Operation Harmony and Palladium Post Operational Reports.

Kosovo

The tensions between the Serb government in Belgrade and the predominately Muslim population in Kosovo did not erupt during the early 1990s when the rest of the former Republic of Yugoslavia was in turmoil. Instead, it was after the situation in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had become relatively stable that the ethnic friction in Kosovo began to follow a far too familiar pattern for the region. Initially, a negotiated truce was monitored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).⁹⁸ However, as the situation deteriorated further in 1998 and 1999, NATO commenced a strategic bombing campaign to bring the government in Belgrade back to the negotiating table. This was effective and was followed by the deployment of army and tactical aviation elements known as Kosovo Force (KFOR) in June 1999. This organization was under a UN mandate but was led by NATO.⁹⁹

Canadian involvement in Kosovo was multifaceted but not long lasting. It began with the Air Force CF-18s that had been involved in the region for some time with NATO to monitor exclusion zones in Bosnia and to maintain a no-fly zone on behalf of the UN. When the requirement to conduct the air campaign in Kosovo and Serbia was identified by NATO, Canadian CF-18s were therefore already pre-positioned in Italy. This allowed the Canadian Air Force to contribute significantly to the entire air

⁹⁸J.H.P.M. Caron, "Kosovo, The Military-Civilian Challenge and the General's Role," in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, ed. Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, 291-300 (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing, 2001), 292-293.

⁹⁹Lieutenant-Colonel David Bashow, *et al*, "Mission Ready: Canada's Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign," *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 56; NATO is still leading KFOR today. See NATO, "KFOR," <http://www.nato.int/kfor/>; Internet; accessed 4 March 2007.

campaign.¹⁰⁰ Also, when the OSCE deployed observers into Kosovo before the air campaign, individual Canadian Forces officers accompanied this group. Finally, included in the multinational KFOR ground forces deployed into Kosovo were an infantry battle group and a squadron each of engineers, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and helicopters from Canada. This contribution ended in June 2000.¹⁰¹

The diversity of these deployments and their recent timeframe allow for some significant lessons to be learned from observation of this mission. Both the air and the ground forces deployed with a Canadian commander supported by a National Command Element separate from the mission's operational chain of command. In both cases, as similar to some previous missions, this allowed for clear information to be passed back to Ottawa and the requisite oversight on the employment of Canadian Forces in the mission area. As a result, the normally difficult challenge of target approval for bombing was effective and the ground forces in Kosovo were able to be used as the situation dictated, not as prior national direction dictated.¹⁰² This was not the case for all nations contributing forces in either the air or the ground campaigns in Kosovo.¹⁰³

Continued difficulties harnessing all the elements of nation building were shown again in Kosovo. Both during the OSCE mission and during the KFOR mission the

¹⁰⁰Bashow, "Mission Ready...", 56.

¹⁰¹Canada, Department of National Defence, "Operation Kinetic," http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Operations/kinetic_e.asp; Internet; accessed 4 March 2007.

¹⁰²Bashow, "Mission Ready...", 57.

¹⁰³Ivan Fenton, "The Peacekeeping Team at the Millennium," in *Future Peacekeeping: A Canadian Perspective*, ed. David Rudd, Jim Hanson and Adam Stinson, 15-22 (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2001), 17.

difficulties in harnessing military security, civilian administrative support, civilian policing, non-governmental and governmental reconstruction aid and humanitarian efforts were evident. During the OSCE mission, which was civilian led and composed of personnel with many diverse backgrounds, it was found that the advantageous skills of the military officers were not leveraged due to a lack of common understanding between the military and civilian mission members.¹⁰⁴ Similarly, the importance of the Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Teams in KFOR was stressed as a lesson that must be learned for future missions. These teams can be instrumental in providing the interface between the military organizations and the myriad of other contributors in any post-conflict area.¹⁰⁵

From the strategic perspective, the interface between the deployed operational commander and Ottawa has become more complex due to technology and media interest.¹⁰⁶ But there is also a developing trend within NDHQ to acknowledge that operational commanders must be given the tools and authority commensurate with their responsibilities.¹⁰⁷ This maturing approach is difficult to maintain as media and political scrutiny increases. As discussed previously, with respect to the requirement of national commanders to transmit information to Ottawa, technology is beginning to facilitate this

¹⁰⁴Caron, "Kosovo...", 296.

¹⁰⁵Fenton, "The Peacekeeping Team...", 20.

¹⁰⁶Richard Goette, "Command and Control Implications for Canadian Forces Air Expeditionary Operations," in *Canadian Expeditionary Air Forces*, ed. Allan D. English, 67-82 (Winnipeg: Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, 2004), 72.

¹⁰⁷R.R. Henault, "Modern Canadian Generalship in Conflict Resolution: Kosovo as a Case Study," in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, ed. Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, 275-290 (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing, 2001), 287.

information flow but as the capacity to increase the flow is augmented so too is the appetite for it in Ottawa. However, this common operating picture between Ottawa and the deployed commander serves both participants, as it allows NDHQ to deal more effectively with the media and political masters in Ottawa while the deployed commander is better supported and allowed to make more effective decisions to achieve the mission.¹⁰⁸

Finally, in the context of multinational missions a point should be observed about the sharing of intelligence. As missions become more dangerous and unpredictable the need for reliable intelligence is critical to the deployed commander. If there are barriers between nations with respect to intelligence sharing, then the commander could be at a disadvantage and so too will his subordinates. Therefore, as future missions are being considered, it will be important to ensure that the intelligence available to Canadian expeditionary force commanders is as robust as possible.¹⁰⁹

As the deployment to Kosovo involved a civilian led mission with OSCE, an Air Force centric mission to support the bombing campaign, and ground forces, it has yielded many important lessons for future deployments. Also, given the short amount of time that has passed since this mission, many of the lessons are still appropriate. Therefore, it

¹⁰⁸This will only be true if mutual trust exists between the headquarters in Ottawa and the deployed commander. As identified by several papers, the converse is more dangerous. See Goette, "Command and Control Implications...", 79 and Major-General D.P. Gosselin, "The Loss of Mission Command for Canadian Expeditionary Operations: A Casualty of Modern Conflict?," in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives – Leadership and Command*, ed. Allan D. English, 193-228 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 196.

¹⁰⁹Fenton, "The Peacekeeping Team...", 17.

will be important to leverage the lessons of increasing CIMIC involvement, strong lines of communication between the deployed commander and Ottawa, the provision of a robust intelligence capability commensurate with the risk to deployed troops and the requirement for a dedicated national staff to assist the commander. Now it is necessary to examine the last portion of the study of Canadian expeditionary deployments and that is the mission that is still underway in Afghanistan.

AFGHANISTAN

Background

Shortly after the World Trade Center was attacked on 11 September 2001, Canada deployed elements of its navy to the Persian Gulf to assist in the War on Terrorism. This was followed by the establishment of a support base known as Camp Mirage in one of the Gulf States and then ground forces, for a six-month timeframe, into southern Afghanistan. These elements were all in support of the US-led Operation “Enduring Freedom,” which had as its endstate a free and democratic Afghanistan. As the Taliban was forced out of power and the situation transitioned from a war to counter-insurgency operations, other nations formed the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) and began to relieve US forces, starting with those in the capital of Kabul. Once NATO assumed command of ISAF in 2003 it began to plan further US to ISAF handovers. The plan involved a counter-clockwise transition of the four regional commands from US to NATO, starting with the north, then west, south and east. The pre-conditions of the transfer were mainly based on NATO being able to deploy the correct size of force with all the critical enablers in order to continue supporting the democratically elected Afghan Government on the road to peace and security.¹¹⁰

The Canadian involvement in ISAF was initially focused in the Kabul area and included a Canadian general commanding the Kabul Multinational Brigade on a

¹¹⁰Sean Maloney, “From Kabul to Konduz: Lessons for Canadian Reconstruction of Afghanistan,” *Policy Options* 26, no. 4 (May 2005): 61-62.

rotational basis. In 2005, as the need for NATO to replace US forces in Regional Command South was being planned, three NATO countries agreed to contribute to a multinational brigade, Canada, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The transition plan involved a replacement of the US Brigade Headquarters and some US troops in advance of the handover of Regional Command South from Operation “Enduring Freedom” to ISAF by August 2006. The remaining NATO forces deployed to the region shortly after the transition date.¹¹¹

Canada agreed to both lead the new multinational headquarters and send the initial troops to the region. To accomplish this deployment, the Canadian forces in Kabul moved personnel and materiel down to the southern Afghanistan province of Kandahar and began setting up part of the Kandahar Airfield to accommodate the arrival of many more Canadian troops. The soldiers and headquarters staffs started arriving in February 2006 from Canada, and they assumed command from their US counterparts by the end of the month.¹¹²

During the period following the initial naval deployment under Operation Apollo from October 2001 until October 2003, the Canadian Navy deployments have been kept separate from the land force involvement in Afghanistan. Despite the challenges and danger faced by the Canadian naval vessels involved in the region, their command and

¹¹¹Department of National Defence, “News Release: Canadian Officer responsible for Regional Command South in Kandahar,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1863; Internet; accessed 9 April 2007.

¹¹²Department of National Defence, “Backgrounder: Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1703; Internet; accessed 10 April 2007.

control is not currently joint and is part of a well established pattern of working with the US Navy.¹¹³ As such, it does not offer many useful lessons for this paper. Therefore, the Canadian expeditionary force to be considered in the following paragraphs only includes the contingent in Afghanistan itself.

Canadian Command and Control

It is arguable whether or not a Canadian general commanding the multinational brigade added to or detracted from the effectiveness of the transmission of Canada's national will into the region. Regardless, it certainly added to the complexity of command and control structures. Canadian Brigadier-General David Fraser was charged with both commanding the multinational brigade in Regional Command South as well as being the commander of all Canadian elements in the area. This required that he both respond to direction from the US-led Operation "Enduring Freedom" chain of command and national direction from the newly-created Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) in Ottawa.¹¹⁴

¹¹³Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder: HMCS *Ottawa* Deploys for Operation ALTAIR," http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=2108; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007; Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder: The Canadian Forces Contribution to the International Campaign against Terrorism," http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=490; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

¹¹⁴The implementation of CF Transformation occurred at approximately the same time as the deployment of the Brigade Headquarters to Kandahar. The pertinent part of transformation for this paper was the change of control of overseas operations. Until 2006, these deployed operations had been controlled by the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff or the Joint Staff (J Staff), as they were commonly known. In 2006, CEFCOM was established by moving several personnel from the J Staff and others from the Joint Headquarters in Kingston. This new headquarters was charged with commanding and controlling all overseas operations. Therefore, as BGen Fraser deployed to Afghanistan he was one of the first deployed commanders to report to a new organization in Ottawa – CEFCOM. See Department of National Defence,

For subordinate forces, there was a similar mix of multinational and Canadian-only forces at General Fraser's disposal. The Canadian Infantry Battle Group, Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, and the Canadian elements of the multinational brigade staff were within Fraser's multinational command, but there were also several supporting and enabling elements that were Canadian-only. Conversely, there were US forces in Regional Command South that were responsive to the multinational headquarters and there were some that were still only responsive to US command. As the British forces started to deploy to Regional Command South they interposed their national headquarters between the multinational brigade headquarters and all UK assets in Afghanistan. The Dutch forces were not due to be in theatre prior to the transition to ISAF, but they were also intending to interpose a national command element between the multinational brigade headquarters and their assets in Afghanistan. As the Canadian-led multinational brigade in Regional Command South transitioned from Operation "Enduring Freedom" to ISAF, the US expressed a desire to place a national command element between the multinational brigade headquarters and those forces that they had committed to the brigade. Finally, as the command of the multinational brigade transitioned from Canada to the Netherlands, Canada deployed a far more robust national command element and interposed it between the Dutch-led multinational brigade headquarters and the Canadian assets in Afghanistan.¹¹⁵

"Backgrounder: Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM)," http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/cft-tfc/00native/FINALBackgrounderCEFCOM_13%20Sep_e.doc; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007. See Colonel F. A. Lewis, "The Ability to do Old Things in New Ways – Counter-Insurgency and Operational Art," in *Canadian Army Journal* 9, no. 3 (Winter 2006): 17.

¹¹⁵These facts are based on the author's experience as the Chief of Staff for the Canadian NCE from February to July 2006. It was part of the author's duties to draft the proposal to insert the Canadian

In each case the motivation was the same: to ensure that national command of expeditionary forces remained under national control through a deployed commander that is responsive to national direction. As long as a Canadian national headquarters is positioned between a multinational headquarters and the deployed Canadian Forces elements in a theatre of conflict it will be quite simple for the Government of Canada to monitor Canadian interest. The challenge has evolved from the one seen in the Cold War and early days in the Balkans which featured little to no strategic/national direction to the challenges currently facing deployed commanders due to clear strategic/national direction. This new difficulty is now within the coherent command and control of the multinational organizations, as each of them must balance potentially competing national issues. This new problem is, arguably, workable if the nations have committed to the same operational endstate in any given theatre of conflict.

Compounding the difficulties for deployed commanders is the increased number and diversity of assets now available to help achieve their mission. As the western militaries and nations assimilate the lessons learned from Iraq, each nation is bringing more diverse enablers into southern Afghanistan.¹¹⁶ These include radio stations, Foreign Affairs personnel, development personnel, cultural and religious advisors, police experts, and public affairs personnel, among others. All of these represent a departure from traditional, purely kinetic, military operations and present challenges to integrating the expertise of these enablers with the direction of the commander. Further adding to the

NCE into the operational chain of command following the departure of BGen Fraser. To complete the proposal it was necessary to liaise with the US, British and Dutch NCEs to confirm their command structure and intents for the near future.

¹¹⁶Colonel Bernd Horn, "Outside the Wire: Some Leadership Challenges in Afghanistan," *Canadian Military Journal* 7, no. 3 (Autumn 2006): 11.

confusion is the presence of representatives from other Canadian governmental departments and the need to unite the efforts of diverse elements such as the battle group in Kandahar and the Embassy in Kabul. With the realization that it is impossible to rebuild nations without a coherent connection between all the manifestations of national power, it is even more important for these diverse enablers to be coordinated with what has traditionally been the purview of the military commander. The question that must therefore be asked is how can the structure of the commander's headquarters assist in this endeavour?¹¹⁷

Canadian Headquarters Structure

During the work-up training for the Canadian deployment to southern Afghanistan two parallel headquarters were created to assist Brigadier-General Fraser. One was multinational and focused on the command and control of Regional Command South, while the other was Canadian and focused on the command and control of those non-multinational Canadian assets within the theatre of operations. This second headquarters was largely responsible upwards to the Canadian higher headquarters, CEFCOM, while the multinational brigade headquarters was responsible upwards along the Operation "Enduring Freedom" chain of command.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷Lieutenant-Colonel Tim Bishop, "Regional Command South Operations Brief" (lecture, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, ON, 17 April 2007), with permission.

¹¹⁸This changed to ISAF on 31 July 2006. See Bishop, "Regional Command South....".

With both headquarters being responsive to General Fraser, this system was possible. Many of the new enablers could be coordinated by either headquarters depending on operational requirement. This was evident with intelligence, development aid, Foreign Affairs advice, civil-military cooperation, air support, general support engineering, information operations, public affairs, service support, legal advice, pastoral support and reach-back to other national capabilities. However, there was sensitivity to many of the national assets (Canadian and otherwise) being used without caveat in the multinational environment. To deal with this sensitivity, all of the nations involved decided to maintain some vestige of national control of their assets by ensuring that a national command element existed between the multinational headquarters and the national assets. The Canadians in theatre and in CEFCOM adopted this approach and as a result there was an augmentation of the Canadian national command element in Kandahar Airfield to coincide with the departure of General Fraser and the loss of Canadian command of the multinational brigade. Some of the other lessons learned or confirmed by both headquarters had to do with both structuring to conduct Effects-Based Operations and to enable an all-of-government approach to the challenge at hand: making Afghanistan stable and secure.¹¹⁹

These lessons included the refocus of what has been traditionally known as the “fires cell” in the multinational headquarters into an “effects cell”.¹²⁰ In the past this organization was responsible for coordinating all artillery, attack aviation and close air

¹¹⁹These facts are based on the author’s experience as the Chief of Staff for the Canadian NCE from February to July 2006. Ensuring that Canadian-only assets were controlled yet available when required by Canadian assets in the multinational Brigade was a key task for the NCE.

¹²⁰Bishop, “Regional Command South...”.

support in the brigade area. To better focus on effects they were charged with connecting all kinetic and non-kinetic actions by the brigade towards achieving specific effects that contributed towards the endstate in Afghanistan.¹²¹ To make this “effects cell” work it was necessary to involve many members of the headquarters that are not normally involved in kinetic targeting. This included involving the Civil-Military Cooperation officers who have connections to all non-military actors in the region. Their involvement allowed for these non-military actors to be integrated, where possible, into the overall intended effect by the commander. Information Operations officers were included to ensure that all psychological and other information operations were in line with the overall effect trying to be achieved. This additional effort would have been for naught if the collection of intelligence and information was not focused from all possible sources to monitor the effects of the actions by Regional Command South on the area of operations.

The Multinational headquarters in Regional Command South, within its establishment and capabilities, was therefore employing EBO to assist the commander to reach the declared endstate in this difficult operating environment. Afghanistan is the most complex operating environment that has yet faced the Canadian Forces. As demonstrated above, several of the lessons identified during the history of Canadian expeditionary warfare are being harnessed to great effect in this difficult region. It will be necessary to continue to monitor these attempts to further refine them and better

¹²¹Kinetic effects are traditional military effects caused by the impact of bullets, artillery, armour or infantry. Non-kinetic is the term being used for tools now available to the military to alter the mindset of the enemy. This may include psychological operations, media broadcasts, active participation in reconstruction projects, human interaction during patrols, etc.

enable Canadian expeditionary force commanders to be successful in the future. To that end, the next section will examine what elements will be required in future Canadian expeditionary force headquarters to ensure that commanders are best served by emerging doctrine such as EBO and historical lessons learned.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXPEDITIONARY FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Future expressions of Canada's national will through the medium of Canadian expeditionary military forces need to build upon the rich history that Canada has with expeditionary operations as well as emerging concepts such as EBO. The lessons identified in this paper during the examination of the history of Canadian expeditionary force deployments coupled with emerging EBO concepts and the lessons currently being learned in Afghanistan can all be synthesized into two important factors that must be considered for future operations. The first is the expectation that the Government of Canada's interest in any given military deployment will ebb and flow based on domestic pressures and the risk to Canadian personnel. The national deployed headquarters must be prepared for these changes from Ottawa. To do so, it must therefore be robust enough with respect to staff and means of communications to remain current as to the operations being conducted by Canadian Forces in the operations area and be able to transmit a clear, concise operational picture back to Ottawa. The second requirement is that the headquarters become more transparent and interoperable with non-military organizations. This need can be satisfied by empowering the existing Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) section, by having enough liaison officers to remain in close contact with all the other organizations, Canadian or otherwise, that are operating in the area in question, and by changing some of the methods of communications to allow non-military interaction with the headquarters.

These two requirements will be enabled by the underpinnings of EBO. By adopting an Effects Based Approach within the headquarters and by crafting the military

and national objectives for the mission in Effects Based terms, it will facilitate the interaction with other organizations in the area as well as higher headquarters in Ottawa.

In a recent article on the loss of mission command, Canadian Major-General Daniel P. Gosselin, contends that expeditionary force commanders have been reduced to the senior administrators in any theatre of operations, not actual operational commanders.¹²² One of the main reasons for this postulate was the lack of trust between the Government of Canada, NDHQ, and the deployed commander. To enable a deployed commander to remain in the operational chain of command between Ottawa and the forces in a theatre of operations it will be necessary to rebuild this trust and ensure that it is maintained. This task has been attempted in the past and always proves difficult given the ever changing interest in deployed operations by the Government. As has been demonstrated in the historical portion of this paper, as the risk to deployed Canadian troops or the interest in them from the media or the Canadian people increases, the Government of Canada becomes more involved in the day-to-day tracking of the mission as well as wishing to become more involved in the decision making process. This fluctuating level of interest and involvement has been shown to be a constant; therefore, it must be presumed that it will continue into the future. In fact, the example of the

¹²²Gosselin, "The Loss of Mission Command..." 194.

current raised interest in Canada to the treatment of detainees in Afghanistan shows that this trend is still in effect.¹²³

Therefore, future deployed Canadian expeditionary force headquarters must be prepared to deal with increased interest from Ottawa in all actions being undertaken by the Canadian Forces as well as the potential for some decision-making to be removed from the deployed headquarters during times of increased interest. In practical terms, this will mean a more robust operations section that is capable of increasing the passage of information back to Ottawa during heightened periods of interest. As well, as the best indication of domestic interest is through the Canadian media, it will be necessary for the deployed headquarters to have a robust enough public affairs staff to track and monitor trends in the domestic Canadian media.¹²⁴ This will provide the advanced warning of the issues that the Government of Canada will need to know and thus ensure that the deployed headquarters is focusing on the right information to pass back to Ottawa. An EBO focused headquarters will always have as one of their effects the continued support of the Canadian people; therefore, it will be one of the effects that will be tracked and monitored. Any actions that may be detrimental to this effect will be minimized and all actions that are supporting this effect will be reinforced. By keeping this effect as a focus for the deployed forces, the continued trust of the Canadian people and therefore the Government of Canada will be ideally maintained. The danger of a loss of trust, as

¹²³Paul Koring, "Canada Loses Track of Afghan Detainees," *Globe and Mail online*, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070302.wdetainee02/BNStory/Afghanistan/home;Internet>; accessed 10 April 2007.

¹²⁴In a recent article by the Deputy Commander of Task Force Afghanistan this domestic interest and the domestic support for the mission was determined to be the centre of gravity for Canadian involvement in Afghanistan. See Lewis, "The Ability to do Old Things...", 19.

demonstrated during the Korean War after the deployment of the Canadian infantry company to the Kojedo prison and during Somalia after the torturing incident, can therefore ideally be avoided.

A critical part of maintaining trust across long distances and different levels of command is the transmission of a clear, concise common operating picture. There have been many technological advances in the ability to transmit information from deployed commands back to Ottawa but the appetite in Ottawa for information has always been larger than the capacity of the means of communications or the deployed headquarters output.¹²⁵ In the First World War, the passage of secure information by ship between London and Ottawa was the expectation of the Prime Minister; by the Second World War the encryption of telegraph communications allowed for the increased demand for timely information by Prime Minister Mackenzie King.¹²⁶ Currently, in Afghanistan, secure satellite communications is being used to transmit graphics based information and enable secure internet like communications among allies and back to Ottawa. This enhanced technology, if properly harnessed and manned at either end of the communications conduit, can be a great facilitator of keeping Ottawa fully apprised of the situation on a deployed operation. Some refinement will always be required to ensure that information overload is not occurring and to ensure that the critical information is being transmitted back to Ottawa.

¹²⁵See Goette, "Command and Control Implications...", 79 and Gosselin, "The Loss of Mission Command...", 196.

¹²⁶Preston, "Canada and the Higher Direction...", 103-104.

As the historical examples have shown, the danger is for the expeditionary headquarters to become bypassed by Ottawa. Whether it was the passage of national direction through the High Commission in London instead of the Canadian Military Headquarters for troop contribution for the invasion of Sicily in the Second World War or the resolution of the deployment of Canadian soldiers to the Koje-do prison in Korea through the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, history has shown that the Government of Canada will work through whatever apparatus is more useful to achieve its aim.

The Canadian deployed expeditionary headquarters has to be that useful conduit for national interests or it will become redundant. If the headquarters is redundant then the commander is similarly not useful. To ensure that this does not occur, as history has shown, the expeditionary force commander and his headquarters need to remain involved with the decision-makers in the theatre of operations and connected to all Canadian Forces elements (regardless of environment) that are serving in the area. As has been shown during Somalia and the Gulf War, this requires a truly joint headquarters with experts that reflect the capabilities of the deployed Canadian Force elements. To achieve the goal of being integrated into the multinational decision making in the theatre of operations, the historic lessons of embedding key staff in coalition headquarters, as demonstrated in the Gulf War and in the Balkans, or by ensuring that the national commander is in the chain of command, as occurred in Somalia or is now occurring in Afghanistan, must be accepted. It is only by ensuring that the deployed commander is relevant and useful to Ottawa that he and his headquarters will remain vital to the transmission of national will from Ottawa to the deployed Canadian expeditionary force.

The other requirement for future Canadian expeditionary force headquarters will be increasing the amount of transparency and connectivity to the non-military organizations that are so critical in the current operating environments.¹²⁷ This need is based on the lessons first noted in Somalia with the enhanced reliance on CIMIC staff and then confirmed in the Balkans, specifically Kosovo. To achieve this goal it will be necessary to ensure the following: that there are enough CIMIC staff and liaison officers to establish a personal connection with all the non-military organizations in the area; and that it is possible to communicate with these organizations in some common manner and that the goals and plans of the military headquarters are stated in unclassified documents with simple language so that all interested parties can understand. This is made so much more difficult given the diversity of non-military organizations. They include other Canadian Government departments, other allied countries' governmental departments, humanitarian organizations, non-governmental international organizations, and host nation governmental departments. Each organization needs to have one or two contacts within the headquarters that they know, trust and can reach easily by telephone or the internet. These last two points are contrary to the traditional organization of deployed headquarters. With the concern for physical force protection, the classification of most information and the constant rotation of personnel within a team environment, it has normally been very difficult to build connections outside of military channels.¹²⁸

¹²⁷Horn, "Outside the Wire...", 9.

¹²⁸Caron, "Kosovo...", 298.

But even with open communications, the concepts behind EBO will facilitate actual connections with non-military organizations through the statement of military goals as plainly worded effects. These statements of intent for the military organization will be more easily understood by non-military personnel and therefore it will become easier to join forces when necessary or when the goals are the same. It is not expected that non-military organizations will ever respond to the directives or orders of military commanders, but by communicating intent in a clear fashion, collaborative efforts become easier. Traditional military operation orders or campaign plans are much more difficult to explain to non-military audiences and therefore do little to harness the two organizations together to achieve common goals.¹²⁹

It is proving increasingly difficult in the post-Cold War world to separate military action from the other tools of national power. When a nation commits to helping a failed or failing state it is necessary to use all the tools available to achieve the mission in the most efficient method possible. Uncoordinated attempts by any one element of national power have proven to be ineffective in the long run and must be avoided. Therefore, as future missions will include not only many Government of Canada departments but also non-governmental organizations from across the globe, it will be necessary to integrate the military actions with these other organizations. One of the key enablers to achieve this intent is the use of EBO to facilitate understanding across the military-civilian divide. Further, future Canadian expeditionary force headquarters must be well integrated with all organizations in a theatre of operations as well as able to communicate effectively and

¹²⁹Cottingham, "Effects-Based Operations..." 37.

efficiently back to Ottawa. The quality of information from military sources must be as timely and as accurate as other Government of Canada departments or the trust between a deployed headquarters and Ottawa will be eroded. Without that trust, the deployed headquarters will find itself being marginalized as more and more decisions are repatriated to Canada. As the decision making authority leaves a deployed theatre of operations, the Canadian Forces in that theatre will become less able to complete their missions as their freedom to make local decisions is critical to responding to ever changing situations in the face of an enemy.

CONCLUSION

If the conflicts in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan are typical of the future wars that will require involvement from the Western world, then different approaches are required to meet these different challenges. These new conflicts involve the rebuilding of entire states and they need the help of many nations as well as many non-state organizations. More importantly, the rebuilding effort requires almost all elements of a nation's power working in close cooperation with other nations and the non-state organizations.

For the military portion of national power to be effective in this contemporary operating environment every expeditionary force needs to be well connected to its government and able to operate effectively with non-military organizations. This paper had as its aim the provisioning of recommendations for Canadian expeditionary force commanders and their headquarters to be able to work in this new environment by harnessing lessons from history and Effects-Based Operations (EBO).

During the examination of this new concept it was shown that EBO provides military planners a more transparent method of enunciating military objectives such that closer cooperation with non-military and non-Canadian organizations is enhanced. Further, the theory behind EBO dictates that there is a need to focus the entire deployed headquarters towards achieving effects and measuring them. The Canadian-led multinational brigade headquarters in Afghanistan in 2006 adopted this concept by creating an effects coordination section. Another lesson that must be applied to the structure and focus of future deployed headquarters is the reorientation of the intelligence

section to gather more than just data about the enemy. The collection of far more diverse information about the entire operating environment is required.

The exploration of the history of Canadian expeditionary forces explained many of the factors that have led to current practices but also many lessons that can be harnessed for the future. These include lessons from before the Cold War that show that there is always a natural friction between a deployed headquarters, Ottawa, and the field headquarters. Another lesson was that the higher the risk to Canadian Forces the more involvement that can be expected from the Government of Canada, through whatever mechanism is relevant to the government at the time. Also, it was found that deployed commanders are often left without significant direction from Canada, but there is always an expectation that they will be responsible for whatever occurs during the deployment. Finally, the two world wars and Korea showed that the Canadian Forces were more comfortable deploying under the direct control of the three environmental services instead of as a joint force.

The Cold War brought about trusted institutions such as NATO and the UN. They had sufficient integral checks and balances that allowed Canada to offer forces without being too concerned with specific national oversight during the mission itself. However, the practice of embedding Canadian staff officers and commanders in the deployed mission chains of command to ensure that Canadian interests were being protected began at the same time. The post-Cold War environment resulted in many new challenges to both the Canadian Forces and the Government of Canada. Among them was the smaller size of the environmental contributions to different missions, resulting in

the need for the national deployed headquarters to be joint in composition. Also, the emerging need to better coordinate military and non-military organizations in a theatre of operations was an important trend identified during the deployments to Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Finally, the initial post-Cold War deployments have shown a growing reliance on larger CIMIC sections, more developed intelligence sections and more capable communications links both back to Ottawa and within the mission area.

Currently in Afghanistan, many of these trends are being confirmed. These include the practicality of EBO as the headquarters focuses on the effects that are being delivered. However, the larger lesson learned was the importance of national command. It must be able to harness all the military elements of Canadian expeditionary force within the theatre of operations to achieve the mission. It also must remain closely connected and integrated in the coalition or multinational chain of command to maintain relevancy and control over the many diverse enablers that are now available to the expeditionary force commander.

Future deployments of the Canadian Forces will not necessarily be to theatres of operations that are similar to Afghanistan or Kosovo, but the evolutionary nature of armed conflict indicates that it will share some similar factors. As a result, it is necessary to learn from Canadian expeditionary force deployments that are currently ongoing and from those that span the history of Canada as a nation. The first of two main recommendations are that the deployed commander and his headquarters must remain engaged and relevant for both Ottawa and the deployed elements of the Canadian Forces. The second is that expeditionary forces must become more transparent through the use of

EBO, liaison, and communication networks with non-military organizations also working towards a common goal.

New concepts such as EBO can significantly enhance the effectiveness of a military organization if they are applied appropriately. History teaches lessons to the military professional as to the nature of pre-existing paradigms within the military culture. Only by tempering new concepts with lessons from history will the results be evolutionary and practicable. But these changes need to be proposed, studied and debated by academics and the practitioners of war or they will be dangerous. At their core, all new ideas in warfare are potentially lethal to the military forces that attempt to employ them. Therefore, the concepts and lessons outlined in this paper should be examined, considered, and if they pass the scrutiny, adopted to assist in the goal of not fighting the last war as we face future conflicts.

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