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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
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EXERCISE/EXERCICE New Horizons

No More Leading From Behind:

**Implementing a JIMP Strategy
To Compliment The Canadian Whole of Government Initiative**

By /par

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Syndicate 11

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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the Government of Canada's (GoC) "whole of government" initiative provides a valuable opportunity to implement a Canadian Joint Interagency Multinational Public (JIMP) strategy. The origins and definition of JIMP are investigated to allow for an appreciation of the power of a JIMP approach in any intervention strategy. Using the mission in Afghanistan as a case study, the current GoC "integrated" approach to Afghanistan is explored with a view to the applicability of the JIMP framework in overcoming shortcomings in the mission and in Canadian counterinsurgency strategy.

The future security environment (FSE) is examined to support the necessity of the implementation of a JIMP framework for future Canadian Forces operations. A number of government initiatives are also investigated that demonstrate the success in interagency integration that has taken place to date. Finally, a strategy for the implementation of a JIMP framework is proposed exploiting the lessons learned by a number of Canada's allies. The paper identifies the issues of culture, ethos and training that can be overcome if the appropriate leadership from the centre of government is committed to the development of a JIMP framework. The tools required for the implementation of a JIMP strategy are identified, and in most cases already exist or are near the implementation phase in support of current whole of government initiatives.

No More Leading From Behind:

Implementing a JIMP Strategy To Compliment The Canadian Whole of Government Initiative

“Canada’s mission in Afghanistan is an integrated approach which includes security, development and governance.”

Rebuilding Afghanistan - Dept of Foreign Affairs Website updated 27 March 2007

INTRODUCTION

The new post September 11 2001 world order saw the new Liberal Government, under then Prime Minister Paul Martin, issue a new international policy statement entitled “A Role of Pride and Influence in the World”¹. Published in 2005, the policy of Development, Diplomacy, Defence and Commerce (3D + C) could be viewed as formal government recognition of Canadian responsibility as a middle power with commensurate responsibilities on the world stage. These events also coincided with the naming of General Hillier as the Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS), a new commitment to Afghanistan in the dangerous southern region of the country, and a substantial increase in the budget of the Canadian Forces (CF). Although the 3D+C foreign policy statement was subsequently moved to the back shelf in 2006 by the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, the more focused foreign policy efforts towards Canada-United States relations and the work of the UN and the G8 remained². It is clear that

¹ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Canada’s International Policy Statement – A Role of Pride and Influence – Overview*. Ottawa: Canada. Catalogue No. FR4-3/2005. 1-6.

² Dr John Kirkton. “Harper’s Foreign Policy Success?” *International Insights*, Vol 4 No 4, Published by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 2-3. Although no mention is made that the previous Liberal

both governments recognized that Canada does have a middle power role to play and is setting the conditions for that invigorated role on the world stage to be successful.

Revised Canadian foreign policy clearly recognizes that a credible military capability is a significant portion of an overall capability, but recent scrutiny of the Afghan campaign has caused the government to refocus on a more integrated solution for foreign interventions that include development and other long-term solutions³. These challenges frame the complexity and long-term commitments anticipated for operations in the future security environment (FSE). Military intervention alone will not provide a long-term solution for the development challenges in weak and failing states, nor will unilateral approaches ultimately succeed in this ever increasingly interconnected world. Any government intervention strategy must harness all aspects of national power in a multilateral context and be prepared to commit to long-term solutions to strategy challenges that have often seen their genesis many generations ago. To undertake such a transformation in Canada will be a considerable challenge as government departments and interagency cooperation have never been the hallmarks of the Canadian Bureaucracy.

This paper will argue that the success of future Government of Canada (GoC) intervention strategy will depend on its ability to leverage all aspects of the Joint Interagency Multinational Public (JIMP) framework. This position will be substantiated through an examination of the Canadian commitment to Afghanistan where interagency, multinational and non-governmental efforts fail to capitalize on the potential benefits of operating within a JIMP framework. JIMP will then be explored as a means to better integrate all lines of operation to best respond to the challenges of the FSE. Finally, the

foreign policy has been formally dropped, the Conservative agenda has changed the priorities of a number of initiatives undertaken under that previous agenda.

³ Paul Weinberg, "Canada's Involvement in Afghanistan," Global Research, March 13 2006, 1.

“whole of government” approach will be examined to substantiate the timeliness of the JIMP strategy and that an opportunity exists for the defense community to reinforce the whole of government strategy in Canada through the JIMP framework. Interagency and multinational aspects of the framework will form the focus of this study, as the Joint framework is the subject of much integration effort and the Public domain is too complex to include in the scope of this work.

CANADA IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE JIMP FRAMEWORK

The Canadian response to the events of 9/11 was swift and in lock-step with much of the developed world – that the Taliban of Afghanistan had facilitated the terrorist strike against the United States. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1368 demanded the Taliban regime denounce terror and prosecute any perpetrators, resolutions 1373 and 1377 outlined measures for the prevention of terrorism and support to terrorism⁴. UNSCR 1378 ushered-in a new regime after the Taliban were removed from power by an international coalition supporting the Northern Alliance.⁵ Canada is now engaged in an international effort to rebuild Afghanistan based on The Afghanistan Compact and Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy (ANDS)⁶, both endorsed by the UN⁷.

Undertaking a review of the success of the Canadian in Afghanistan to date with a view to aligning it with a JIMP strategy will first require a definition of JIMP and the

⁴ United Nations Security Council. *UNSCR 1373 (2001) 28 September 2001*. and *UNSCR 1377 (2001) 12 November 2001*.

⁵ United Nations Security Council. *UNSCR 1378 (2001) 14 November 2001*.

⁶ Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. *Afghanistan National Development Strategy* and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. *The Afghanistan Compact*.

⁷ United Nations Security Council. *UNSCR 1659 (2006), 15 February 2006*.

JIMP framework. Canadian progress in supporting the ANDS and its security pillar through the potential employment of a JIMP approach will require a brief examination of counterinsurgency strategies. Appreciating the JIMP framework and its applicability to counterinsurgency operations, we can evaluate and discuss the potential applicability of the JIMP framework to Canadian operations on Afghanistan.

THE JIMP FRAMEWORK

JIMP is not a methodology or strategy; it is an integration framework for resolution of complex problems⁸. Part of its origins can be found in the post conflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq, and the US experiment in the Joint Interagency Coordination Group, indicating that a JIMP framework was essential if all aspects of national capability are to be brought to bear on resolving a situation either domestic or international.⁹ Understanding the breadth of the term requires it be broken into its individual components.

“Joint” warfare, is the integrated and synchronized application of all appropriate military capabilities¹⁰. Integrated joint forces are those forces where the total of the unique capabilities of individual services is greater than the sum of its parts.

“Interagency” operations involve more than one governmental department, and may also involve more than one level of government as well as non-governmental

⁸ The United States Army maintains a cadre of officers whose domain of excellence is battle command integration and simulation. The information from “Functional Area 57” remains the most current in the domain of JIMP study.

⁹ Travis E Rooms. “Beginning With the End in Mind: Post-Conflict Operations and Campaign Planning”, Ft Leavenworth KS: School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, 25 May 2005. US Central Command (US CENTCOM) experimented with this ad-hoc planning group at its headquarters to better coordinate reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The JIAG continues to operate in CENTCOM and will likely be incorporated in future US post-conflict reconstruction doctrine.

¹⁰ Department of Defense. Joint Publication (JP) 1. *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*. United States. 14 Nov 2000.

agencies. The integration of interagency operations is often more complex than the integration of joint operations as differences in the culture and capabilities of interagency components are significant, as are their means of communication, command and control. Like joint synchronization, interagency synchronization yields results greater than the sum of its parts.

“Multinational” refers to the involvement of more than one nation in the resolution of a situation and future international operations will likely be multilateral as very few nations possess all the capabilities necessary to successfully undertake missions unilaterally. Multilateralism tends to lend greater legitimacy to operations, a key component where protracted operations are anticipated. Organizations such as the UN and NATO are central in many multilateral operations and an ability to integrate the lexicon and command and control mechanisms ensures unified effort and the greatest efficiency in resource constrained environments.

“Public” refers to public opinion, specifically the influence of the media and its effect on decision making at all levels, principally in the governmental policy domain. Public opinion is a factor for the deployment of troop contributing nations as well as a factor in gaining popular support in the area in which operations will be undertaken.

The challenges of the JIMP framework are principally cultural and linked to interoperability across three broad domains: information interoperability or the way we share information including technological and procedural aspects; cognitive interoperability or the way we perceive and think reflected in doctrine and decision

processes; and behavioral interoperability or the way we carry out the selected course of action.¹¹ Implementation of a JIMP strategy is therefore complex and wide reaching.

Counterinsurgency Strategies and JIMP

Of the significant study of counterinsurgency operations, one of the most promising models for success is that proposed by Dr Max G. Manwaring of the US Army War College. His study of 43 post-Second World War insurgencies yielded seven dimensions that must be won for a given counterinsurgency effort to succeed: (1) the legitimacy war; (2) the shooting war; (3) the wars to isolate insurgents from internal support; (4) the war to isolate insurgents from external support; (5) the war to stay the course and maintain commitment; (6) the intelligence and information war; and (7) the war for unity of effort.¹² N.N. French in “Learning from the Seven Soviet Wars: Lessons for Canada in Afghanistan” further postulates that in Afghanistan now Canada is failing in isolating the insurgents from external support, the intelligence and information war and the war for unity of effort.¹³ Implementing a JIMP framework would support shortcomings in these three areas as they speak to the lack of horizontal integration across all domestic interagency players as well as the multinational dimension.

The United States Army has recently revised its counterinsurgency doctrine and best practices of a successful counterinsurgency. Furthermore, the Senlis Council, in its study of Afghanistan, supports the new American doctrine and supports practices to “better integrate development and security concerns, incorporate mainstream social,

¹¹ Department of National Defence. Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre Glossary of Terms. Canada.

¹² N.N. French, “Learning from the Seven Soviet Wars: Lessons for Canada in Afghanistan”. Presented to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs Youth Symposium, 21 Mar 2007, Montreal. 2. Drawn from Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Toward a New Analytical Approach”. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, (Winter, 1992): 276-279.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 19.

political and economic concerns in the overall military strategy; “Learn and Adapt” [to match or better the insurgent’s adaptability in order] to be successful on the ground; and develop ... and implement strategies in coordination with local stakeholders.”¹⁴ Although these practices are heavily weighted with military effort, much of the strategy will be impossible without interagency and multinational coordination, again supporting the JIMP approach to operations.

There are those who would argue for alternate approaches (non-violent) to the challenge of counterinsurgency to support the pillars of governance, rule of law, human rights, economic and social development, these approaches too can be supported by the JIMP framework. The Atlantic Council’s position paper on international stabilization and reconstruction efforts supports the notion of the integration of all interagency and multinational assets in the development of: (1) Governance and participation, (2) Humanitarian Assistance, (3) Economic Stability and Reconstruction and Infrastructure and (4) Justice and Reconciliation.¹⁵ Again, none of these efforts will succeed without a JIMP approach as individual efforts in one area cross lines of operations in others, requiring a synergistic, coordinated approach.

Canadian Objectives and the Applicability of JIMP

Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan: Measuring Success is the February 2007 Report to Parliament on the progress of the Canadian effort in Afghanistan. The report is endorsed jointly by the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Defense and International Cooperation. The report states Canada’s objectives clearly:

¹⁴ Senlis Afghanistan, *Countering The Insurgency In Afghanistan: Losing Friends And Making Enemies* London – Kabul – Paris – Brussels- Kandahar – Lashkar Gah – Jalalabad, February 2007. 17.

¹⁵ The Atlantic Council of the United States. *How Should NATO Handle Stabilization Operations and Reconstruction Efforts?* C. Richard Nelson Principal Author and Project Director, Sep 2006.

“Canada’s objectives – like those of the Afghan government and our international partners – are focused firmly on the longer term and the future. We believe in the Afghan people and in their desire to have a country where security, development and good governance replace the chaos, violence and destruction of the past.”¹⁶

The report highlights the lines of operation under which the Canadian commitment to Afghanistan will operate – and they are in synch completely with that of the ANDS.¹⁷ The execution of the (1) security and stability, (2) governance and rule of law, and (3) development lines of operation is complex, with crossover, dependency and interconnection. For example, the rule of law is linked to the security line, but executed by another agency or multinational partner¹⁸. The same applies to human rights and other development efforts, some of which are sequential, some are concurrent. The JIMP construct would provide the means to better coordinate all lines of operation.

Canada has supported the multinational effort in Afghanistan from the earliest stages in 2001, in both the US led Operation Enduring Freedom, and the UN sanctioned NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)¹⁹. Both international commitments supported the Bonn Agreement of 6 Dec 2001 and the Afghanistan Compact which followed the formal end of the Bonn process in September 2005, and the ANDS.

¹⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan: Measuring Progress*. Report to Parliament February 2007. Canada. http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/docs/260207_Report_E.pdf; Internet; accessed 23 February 2007.

¹⁷ The ANDS outlines the broad pillars under which the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRA) will execute its development strategy - the three pillars of: (1) security, (2) governance, rule of law and human rights, and (3) economic and social development. The ANDS is essentially a contract between the GIRA and the international community to advance long term peace and stability for Afghanistan so it may never again be a terrorist sanctuary or training ground.

¹⁸ The training of the Afghan National Police is the purview of the German Government, where the training of the Judiciary is the purview of the Government of Italy for example.

¹⁹ Department of National Defence. *Backgrounder Canadian Forces Commitment in Afghanistan to Date*. Canada. BG-05.012 - May 16, 2005.

Although broad in scope the focus of the GoC effort is clear – long term developmental goals for which a military only strategy is inappropriate²⁰. To address these requirements the CF have deployed a number of tailored elements to Afghanistan. The Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A) is an “Afghan-Canadian bi-lateral arrangement that does not come under the command of either *ISAF* or the US led coalition. Instead, the team leader takes his direction from the Senior Economic Advisor to the President²¹ in consultation with both the Canadian Ambassador and Head of Aid.”²² Its role is to provide “generalist military planning skills to the solution of civilian problems”²³. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) “...reinforces the authority of the Afghan government in and around Kandahar and helps local authorities stabilize and rebuild the region. Its tasks are to monitor security, to promote the policies and priorities of the national government with local authorities, and to facilitate reform in the security sector.”²⁴: the PRT thus represents a military-led JIMP strategy.

It can be postulated that this military strategy of “leading from the rear”²⁵ in terms of development has its shortfalls, as the influence on Afghan government policy is not being synchronized through all elements of national and international power with a clear focus. The PRT Post-Operation Report (POR) for the last rotation echoes this reality:

²⁰ Department of National Defence. Backgrounder Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan. Canada. BG-07.009 - January 5, 2007.

²¹ Dr. Ishaq Naderi, an internationally acclaimed economist currently on the faculty of New York University.

²² Col MD Capstick. “Strengthening the Weak: The Canadian Forces in Afghanistan ...” 5.

²³ *Ibid.*, 5.

²⁴ Department of National Defence. Backgrounder Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan ...

²⁵ Department of National Defence. *CF Strategic Advisory Team Personnel Requirements – General*. Ottawa: Canada. December 2006, 1.

“... [The] operational plan is based on specific AOs [areas of operation] and directed by National Command Elements with no overarching coord[ination] between AOs. RIP [relief in place] from another nation may mean that their concept of ops may not match yours. Gains in SSR [security, stabilization and reconstruction] will be diminished without a common plan or direction from the Afghan national level.”²⁶

Other common themes in the PRT POR are the lack of linkage of projects to a higher goal or plan as well as a lack of common reporting, assessment formats and information sharing.

Further issues identified by the PRT POR involve the coordination of Non-Governmental Agencies (NGOs) operating in theatre.²⁷ This component of long-term stability is confronted by “the militarization of aid” that accompanies operations in a military framework. The public’s perception of NGO’s must be one of impartiality - but operating with military protection leads to local perceptions of being party to the conflict. The apolitical nature of the NGO network is also placed at risk where forced to work within the security line of operations, curtailing much of the popular goodwill created by NGO’s.²⁸ The military oft overlooks the fact that networks of this type have been, are and will continue to work throughout the world in all natures of conflict and their positive influence should not be dismissed. A JIMP framework would optimize the effects of the NGO network and resolve many of the persistent complaints of the NGO community such as militarization of aid and apolitical assistance.

In recent testimony to the Standing Committee on National Defense, Dr. Doug Bland of Queen’s University commented:

²⁶ Department of National Defence. *Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Post-Operation Report (POR)*. Kingston:Canada. November 2005.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

²⁸ Mrinalini Menon, “Human Security and the Militarization of Aid Delivery”, *The Human Security Bulletin*, Vol 5, Issue 1, The Canadian Consortium on Human Security, Vancouver, BC Canada. 15-16.

“... we need to look at this as a war management problem of the whole of the Government of Canada. This is not a mission of the Canadian armed forces or the Department of National Defence, or even just CIDA and the foreign affairs department ... this is a whole of government operation, not a three-D operation.”²⁹

The evidence suggests that a cohesive program may yield more positive results and reinforces the fact that both military and civilian assets are part of the long-term solution for Afghanistan. This has been termed the war of unity of effort by Dr. Max G Manwaring of the US Army War College³⁰ a war that can be won by the employment of a JIMP strategy. However, any investigation of the applicability of a JIMP framework to potential intervention strategies will first require a brief examination of the FSE.

FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

A comprehensive national approach to JIMP must accommodate the challenges of the FSE. The elements of long term success in state development – security, governance, rule of law, human rights and social and economic development must all be exploited³¹. An examination of the FSE and the applicability of the employment of the elements of state development strategies in a JIMP framework will indicate not only that the JIMP framework is suitable, but that it is an essential approach if long-term success is to be achieved.

²⁹ House of Commons. *Evidence*. Dr. Doug Bland in testimony to the Standing Committee on National Defence, Canada. NNDN No. 12 1st Session 39th Parliament, Monday, 25 September 2006.

³⁰ N.N. French, “Learning from the Seven Soviet Wars: Lessons for Canada in Afghanistan”. Although the war of unity of effort referred to by Dr. Manwaring is taken in the context of a counterinsurgency, any large scale interagency and multinational operation will have challenges of unity of effort.

³¹ Government of Canada “Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan ...” 4. These lines of operation are developed from the ANDS and GoC policy and may only be part of an overall strategy to be tailored to each situation. For examples, the eradication of narcotics has not been included in this list but is a line of operation in Afghanistan.

Globalization, rapid scientific and technological innovation, the rise of hegemons, demographic shifts, resource degradation and scarcity, disease, state weakness and the rise of non-state actors only begin to explore the challenges that lay ahead.³² Considering any of these threats in isolation is a challenge, but they will most likely come in combinations that contribute to their complexity and protracted nature. The international community will therefore accord closer attention to the emergence of combinations of factors that may indicate the risk that a given state could be a spawning ground for terrorism.³³ This is termed the “failed states”³⁴ focus by the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC). The CCIC postulates that potential western intervention strategies should not be measured simply against the hyper-political³⁵ notion of failed states. The CCIC’s description of the sophistication of future threats supports the JIMP approach to intervention strategy and broadens the response options available to planners.

Security

In *The Army of Tomorrow – Assessing Concepts and Capabilities for Land Operations Evolution* the Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts has recognized the challenges the FSE will present in terms potential military intervention and speaks to the JIMP environment. The document also highlights the importance of the public aspect of

³² Peter Gizewski. “The Future Security Environment: Threats, Risks and Responses”, *International Security Series*, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, March 2007. 1-7.

³³ Stewart Patrick. “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction”. Center for Strategic and International Studies and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 2006, 34-36. Also available in the *Washington Quarterly*, 29:2, 27-53. Evidence from a detailed analysis is used to support the finding that much deeper analysis is needed of the roots of terrorism and the link with “fragile states”, including clear distinctions between the factors or state capacity and will to develop useful response strategies.

³⁴ Canadian Council for International Cooperation. “Failures of the “Failed States” Framework”, Discussion papers. December 2006. Part 1 - 1.

³⁵ In this case read the policy of the world’s only hyper-power, the United States of America.

the JIMP equation – the media attention to operations and the public opinion it subsequently generates. The army proposes the implementation of a JIMP strategy but proposes no methodology by which to undertake the work necessary. The CF vision document 2020 published in June 1999 outlines in very broad terms the plan to “undertake joint planning with Other Government Departments, where appropriate, to achieve synergies and efficiency”³⁶ but elaborates no further. However, the CF strategy does appreciate the challenge, noting that “innovative institutions will outperform those unable to integrate new information technologies and management practices into their business processes. Leadership will be emphasized over administration and management.”³⁷ Those planning future capabilities that support the security line of operation recognize the importance of a flexible, integrated approach but offer little insight into how such a JIMP strategy would be implemented. Other lines of operation offer similar challenges.

Governance, Rule of Law, Human Rights and the JIMP Framework

The long-term viability of states where intervention is undertaken is heavily dependant on the issues of governance and the rule of law. Developing policies of globalization and free trade are by no means guarantors of long term success in state building.³⁸ Therefore an international, integrated approach - a JIMP strategy – is critical in satisfying this line of operation in the FSE.

³⁶ Department of National Defence. *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*. Ottawa: Canada. June 1999. 11.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

³⁸ Canadian Council for International Cooperation. “Failures of the “Failed States” Framework”, Discussion papers. December 2006. Part 1 of 3, 3. It will not be the conditions set by the World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF) that will lead to long-term change in nations at risk. Pursuing similar policies will be unsuccessful if basic civil structure is not in place.

“... central to building confidence in a new or restored government is the covenant or unwritten contract between the governed and the governing, which needs to be negotiated, formally or informally. It cannot be forced top-down from a national level and even less so by external interveners, which is the approach being used in many current state-building exercises. Failure to focus on the bottom-up, civil society aspects of building democracy results from a narrow pre-occupation with military stabilisation, without understanding that stability is a by-product of more essential factors in governance, such as a sense of fairness and trust.”³⁹

On the human rights line of operation the Canadian Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine is also gaining momentum,⁴⁰ as is the notion of international principles for engagement in fragile states.⁴¹ It can be argued that these initiatives have gained significance as a result of the challenges of international involvement in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the weight of study that these interventions are garnering in the international cooperation community support the notion that future interventions in weak states will be required, but with a better developed strategy for success prior to their execution. Such planning initiatives are supported by the JIMP construct as they accommodate and complement the effects achieved in all domains of power, by all national and international actors.

Economic and Social Development in a JIMP Framework

The building of economic capacity and long-term social support structures is essential for societal viability⁴². This is more than the imposition of strict rules by the IMF, it is the integration of a myriad of efforts by NGO's and other contributors to

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴⁰ Luiza Ch. Savage. “Canada's 'responsibility to protect' Doctrine Gaining Ground at the UN.” *Maclean's* July 18, 2005.

⁴¹ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. *Principles For Good International Engagement In Fragile States*. DCD(2005)8/REV2 07-Apr-2005.

⁴² Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Canada's Mission in Afghanistan: Measuring Progress*. 6.

address health and other social development issues. The multinational and multi-faceted nature of this work will be well-served within a JIMP framework, as it will allow for the long-term planning and integration of complimentary initiatives. A JIMP framework would allow for the sharing of planning information multinationally and between NGO partners to optimize effect and coordinate the effort being taken on all lines of operation.

It is clear that the FSE will offer significant challenges to all planners. Many destabilizing forces will be at work in the future –disease, resource scarcity or the threat of non-state actors operating in weak or dysfunctional nations. Each may require a multinational response that may not necessarily have a military component. The lessons of Afghanistan – the interrelation of lines of operation, lack of interagency and international coordination - have shown that future interventions must include a more deliberate and longer-term strategy that will incorporate all aspects of national power. But what indications exist that the interagency integration necessary for future success is underway or even contemplated?

IMPLIMENTING A JIMP STRATEGY

The examination of the Canadian involvement in Afghanistan has shown that any effort towards the implementation of a JIMP strategy will be beneficial to long term operational success. From the benefits of fighting a counterinsurgency to the challenges of the FSE, an integrated approach is key. The challenge is the complexity of each of the four JIMP domains. The military, however, is not the only organization to recognize the benefits of integration and many government efforts are underway to optimize service delivery through a whole of government approach. Domestic intelligence sharing initiatives and successful allied integration efforts support the migration to a JIMP

construct. But challenges in this new domain include training, adoption of a shared ethos and “common intent” which are a challenge to overcome. Finally, what should a JIMP framework look like and what are reasonable goals for integration?

Government Integration Initiatives

Canada is a well established liberal democracy with the operations of government led by a well trained, professional public service. The notion of the integration of government and the efficiency that accompanies it should be well established – but it is not necessarily true^{43 44}. It has been only recently due to government downsizing that streamlining and integration have been given weight. This integration is termed the “whole of government approach” in Canada and does not refer to external affairs,⁴⁵ although it does provide an opportunity to extend it into that domain.

An opportunity that can be exploited from whole of government initiative which supports the JIMP framework is the adoption of a common, secure communications backbone and lexicon, key aspects of any integrated planning activity. Furthermore, the distribution of plans and knowledge across the whole of government will leverage the skills and capabilities that already exist in many government departments.⁴⁶ Although

⁴³ Department of Human Resources and Social Development. *Horizontal Tools and Relationships: An International Survey of Government Practices Related to Communities*. Prepared by The Task Force on Community Investments - Peter Elson, Marilyn Struthers and Joel Carlson. Ottawa: Canada. January, 2007.

⁴⁴ Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. *Management in the Government of Canada: A Commitment to Continuous Improvement*, (2005). Ottawa: Canada.

⁴⁵ Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. *Canada's Country Report 2005*. Submitted to the International Council for Information Technology in Government Administration, RDIMS#367004 2005-10-25. Ottawa: Canada. 6.

⁴⁶ Departments with well-developed international interaction and staffs include: Heritage, Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Elections, Environment, Finance, Health, Human Resources and Social Development, Justice, National Research Council, Natural Resources, Natural Sciences and Engineering

many are non-traditional contributors to military operations, bringing these departments together under one planning tool could only serve to improve that chances of international success based on the years of accumulated experience they contain. Formal coursing and JIMP exercises could overcome many of these hurdles and the Canadian Forces College could provide the venue to initiate such opportunities.

Intelligence Sharing

A more challenging aspect of the whole of government approach is intelligence sharing. The leverage of all aspects of intelligence will be a significant contributor to the success of operations in the FSE. Several initiatives are encouraging and are indicative of the whole of government approach. The first and most significant is The Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) housed within Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) facilitates. ITAC provides increased information-sharing and integrated intelligence analysis and threat assessments for the Government of Canada, which are distributed within the intelligence community and to relevant first responders. ITAC also promotes a more integrated international intelligence community by developing liaison arrangements with foreign intelligence organizations.⁴⁷ Another intelligence sharing project builds on the experience developed through the ITAC, and transitions into the operational domain. The Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOC) exist on the east

Research Council, Parliament of Canada and Public Works and Government Services. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *International Policy*. Ottawa: Canada.

⁴⁷ This all-source intelligence centre links Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), CSIS, Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Correctional Service of Canada, DND, Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Ontario Provincial Police, Privy Council Office (PCO), Public Safety (PSEPC), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Transport Canada. Canadian Security Intelligence Service. *The Integrated Threat Assessment Centre*. Ottawa: Canada.

and west coasts of Canada and serve to bring to bear all civilian and military resources necessary to respond to any marine security threat.⁴⁸

These projects operate within the domestic and international realms and reinforce horizontal integration, which is a key aspect of the JIMP strategy. ITAC and MSOC also provide for the integration of communications and coordination technology, another key component of a JIMP approach. But other hurdles to successful integration are created by the very nature of the organizations themselves.

Training, Ethos and Common Intent and JIMP

An important aspect of the whole of government approach that must be explored is the requirement for formal coursing, shared professional conferences and journals, as very few in the public service have more than a superficial understanding of the military and *vice versa*. “Professional snobbery” also exists and can only be overcome by the interaction of all actors in the resolution of common challenges. Public service values are also different and involve fiscal providence, probity and an avoidance of risk, whereas the “warrior spirit” is drawn to risk. Finally, each of the communities apply different ethical and legal reference points in determining what is appropriate when working in morally and socially ambiguous circumstances.⁴⁹ A JIMP strategy will clearly require a champion who can build relationships, identify future departmental leaders and support common training initiatives.

⁴⁸ Department of National Defence. *Marine Security Operations Centres Scope Statement*. Project no. 00000806, File no. 30000806-326 Amdt 1. Ottawa: Canada. 22 June 2005. The centre brings together assets from the Canadian Border Security Agency (CBSA), Coast Guard, DND, PSEPC, RCMP and Transport Canada and provides a crucial link to authorities in the United States also responsible for maritime security matters.

⁴⁹ Alan Okros. *3D Security: The Implications of Integrating Defence, Diplomacy and Development in Multi-National Missions*. Paper presented at the Swedish National Defence College Forum for Security Studies Conference “Civil-Military Cooperation in Multinational Missions”, Stockholm, January 18-19 2007, 4-5.

Another aspect of the whole of government approach that warrants consideration is the notion of common intent, or commanders intent or, in Canadian Army doctrine, “mission command”. Research has indicated that effects-based planning requires all staff to internalize common intent⁵⁰. A 2005 Multi-National Experiment in a JIMP environment noted considerable challenges in achieving the level of internalization of common intent necessary where participants were unaware of the planning processes in use. This finding underscores the requirement for common training and an appreciation of the capabilities of all players on the whole of government stage if operations are to be successful.

Development of a JIMP Framework

The development of a JIMP framework in Canada is essential to the long-term success of any of the increasingly interrelated missions that the FSE would present. The Canadian mission in Afghanistan also requires a better JIMP framework if it is to be successful in the long term. That the bureaucracy is now pursuing the whole of government approach is encouraging and an opportunity to be exploited as it will yield the necessary linkages. The whole of government initiatives will serve the JIMP framework and include multinational or inter-governmental as well as inter-sectoral initiatives, all aimed at arriving at a common operating language and system. But two fundamental challenges exist to this effort as described by the Treasury Board “1) the vertical nature of government accountability tools and 2) the lack of a governance structure or “jurisdictional home” to provide leadership on horizontal [whole of

⁵⁰ Philip SE Farrell. *Measuring Common Intent During Effects Based Planning*, DRDC Toronto, TM 2005-150, 9 November 2005. 3-5.

government] issues (e.g. lead department/central agency).”⁵¹ A study of the United Kingdom’s (UK) approach may shed light on overcoming these issues.

Of all governments that have embarked on the whole of government approach, the UK with the “Joined-Up Government” is the most advanced, with a clear recognition of the benefits and risks. The UK’s approach provides the best approach to a JIMP framework and appreciates that “horizontal demands real cooperation and this cannot be imposed from above. It requires genuine collaboration across departments, governments and organizations, all of which is supported by politicians and senior managers, and conducive policies and incentives.”⁵² The UK Ministry of Defense (MOD) has capitalized on the joined-up government concept and, in Joint Discussion Note 4/05 proposed the Comprehensive Approach (CA) or a UK MOD approach to JIMP.⁵³

In the UK, the CA will be “used to reinvigorate the existing, Cabinet Office-led, approach to coordinating the objectives and activities of Government Departments in identifying, analyzing, planning and executing national responses to complex situations.”⁵⁴ The UK proposal is made with an appreciation of the FSE and the doctrine of R2P.⁵⁵ This international effort supports the development of a Canadian JIMP

⁵¹ Auditor General of Canada. *2005 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada*. Ottawa: Canada.

⁵² C. Pollitt, “Joined-Up Government: a Survey.” *Political Studies Review*, Vol. 1, 34-49.

⁵³ Ministry of Defence. *The Comprehensive Approach*. Joint Discussion Note 4/05, London: United Kingdom. January 2006.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 1-1, 1-2.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 1-4. The R2P agenda is gaining acceptance in the international community. At the 2005 UN World Summit, (14-16 September 2005), there was a clear and unambiguous acceptance by all governments, of the collective responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and a willingness to take timely and decisive collective action for this purpose, through the Security Council, when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities are failing to do it.

framework, and Canada could exploit the headway made by the UK MOD and UK Cabinet office.

Based on the Canadian approach to whole of government and the more mature UK joined-up government initiatives, any successful JIMP implementation strategy will require the following tools:⁵⁶

- 1) Information management (IM) tools. These assets are essential for access to a common operating picture (COP) as well as collaborative, secure planning capabilities.
- 2) Sector to government relational agreement tools. Where NGO's or organizations outside the government environment are going to be required to support JIMP activities, relational agreements will be required.
- 3) Funding tools. Activities must be properly funded in an agreed funding framework that allows for responsiveness and fairness across agencies and multinationally where a relationship has been established. Reciprocal agreements may suffice in lieu of payments as an option.
- 4) Leadership tools. Horizontal initiatives require champions, and strong, sustained leadership, at the ministerial and senior cabinet level if there is to be lasting effect on bureaucratic behavior.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Department of Human Resources and Social Development. *Horizontal Tools and Relationships: An International Survey of Government Practices Related to Communities*. 25-32.

⁵⁷ Canadian Centre for Management Development. *Using Horizontal Tools to Work across Boundaries: Lessons Learned and Signposts for Success*. CCMD Roundtable on Horizontal Mechanisms, Ottawa.

- 5) Structural tools. This is essentially a lead ministry approach or a public sector reform goal. The lead ministry approach is better suited to the initial stages of JIMP.⁵⁸

Once the tools have been adopted and a strategy implemented, it will be crucial to undertake monitoring to determine if headway is being made. The international survey of Elson, Struthers and Carlson note a number of key issues to watch to determine if the approach is taking hold:

- 1) Cross-departmental objectives and budgets are established and funding practices are reviewed to become more results oriented.
- 2) Interdepartmental systems are implemented and structures begin to branch horizontally.
- 3) Leaders in the new domain begin to emerge and clear, attainable objectives are distributed.
- 4) Relationships begin to develop between otherwise unconnected JIMP partners.

None of these strategies will take hold and show results unless a champion (lead agency) has been empowered to bring down barriers and cross the stovepipes noted by both the Canadian Treasury Board and the UK Cabinet Office. What is clear is that DND cannot lead this effort, and it cannot be lead from the rear.

⁵⁸ Ministry for the Environment. *New Zealand Climate Change*. Auckland: New Zealand. For example New Zealand has taken a designated lead ministry approach. The Ministry for the Environment is responsible for leading the development, coordination and implementation of whole-of-government climate change policy with reports to the Minister Responsible for Climate Change Issues. Members of the Ministerial Group (for climate change issues) include the Deputy Prime Minister, and Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Environment, Energy, Research, Science and Technology, Agriculture and Forestry, Transport and Local Government.

CONCLUSION

The utility and practicality of the implementation of a JIMP strategy is undeniable for intervention in failed and failing states, and the effectiveness of GoC policy initiatives will significantly improve in a JIMP framework. Operations in Afghanistan will continue to benefit from the current integrated approach of the PRT, but the integration of CIDA, DND and DFAIT above and beyond this GoC initiative should be grown in the fertile whole of government atmosphere and the efforts underway leveraged to begin the transition now to a JIMP strategy. Furthermore, the challenges of the FSE will become more complex and require greater levels of interagency and intergovernmental coordination in an increasingly public world – a JIMP strategy will ensure any GoC effort is undertaken with optimal chances for success. Multinationally we are not alone in our efforts to develop a JIMP strategy and we should leverage the experience of the UK, US, Australia and New Zealand in finding a Canadian JIMP solution.

What is also clear is there must be a champion appointed to undertake this effort – a government department that is both empowered and capable of initiating the deliberate and long term training and coordination structures – and that department should not necessarily be DND. The axiom of “leading from the rear” will not serve the implementation of a true JIMP strategy and our country will be challenged in maintaining its middle power status if it does not embrace this evolving requirement. This effort will not be undertaken overnight as matters of training, ethos and common intent will require newer generations of military, non-government and civil servants to work together operationally to come to a common understanding of each others role in modern intervention strategy. The opportunity to embrace a JIMP strategy is upon us now.

Canadian success in the future may ultimately depend on its ability to successfully implement such a strategy.

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