CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
CSC 32 / CCEM 32

MDS RESEARCH PROJECT/PROJET DE RECERHCHE DE LA MED

DEFINING CANADA'S ROLE IN HAITI

By /par Maj J.M. Saint-Yves

ABSTRACT

Haiti is the poorest state in the western hemisphere. It has a history of failed or incomplete interventions, leaving the nation time and again in the precarious situation of state failure. The Haitian people have suffered through two colonial rulers, brutal dictatorship and repeated failed governments. They have never known economic or political stability. The current UN intervention while accepting many lessons is not applying them in a manner that will succeed. Haiti needs firmer direction and leadership if it is to emerge as a strong, prosperous nation state. This paper argues that the true solution to the Haitian situation will come from the acceptance of the role of lead nation by Canada to resolve the crisis. Solving the Haitian crisis is in Canada's national interest and Canada is uniquely position in the world to provide the kind of leadership needed in Haiti. Canada is already deeply involved in Haiti. An expanded role for Canada in resolving the crisis would ensure that Canada continues on the International Policy Statement's clearly articulated goal of re-engagement with the world and it would ensure that Canada is once again viewed as a significant regional power. Haiti is a Canadian problem whether we want to accept it as such or not. The collapse of the Haitian state has negative ramifications for Canada in terms of economics and security. Canada should consider accepting leadership of the MINUSTAH mission and should actively seek leadership roles in the development of Haiti as part of the Interim Cooperation Framework agreement. The solution to the Haitian problem lies in Haitian acceptance that they must cede some of their sovereignty if they are to impose the reforms necessary to root out corruption and establish a viable economy on which to build a democratic society.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEFINING CANADA'S ROLE IN HAITI

CHAPTER 1 -INTRODUCTION

Canada's International Policy Statement sets forth ambitious goals for Canada in

the world. It identifies a new approach to diplomacy abroad in which Canada will take a

leadership role through actively engaging in failed and failing states through an inter-

agency approach that combines Defense, Diplomacy, Development and Trade (the 3D&T

approach.) The essence of this policy and its rationale is summarized below:

> Canada can make a distinctive contribution through an integrated, three-
> part approach: stabilization through rapid deployment of our military and
> police; governance assistance through contributions such as the new
> Canada Corps; and economic and social revitalization through
> development assistance and innovative private sector development
> initiatives. This combined and targeted effort is a microcosm of our
> broader international strategy: Canada can matter to the world while
> pursuing its national interests.[1]

Canada published this policy under a Liberal government, since replaced. The policies

outlined in the Conservative election platform, however, indicate that the new

Conservative government will carry on with the policies outlined in the International

Policy Statement. In its election platform the Conservative Party of Canada promised to:

> Articulate Canada's core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of
> law, human rights, free markets, and free trade – and compassion for the
> less fortunate – on the international stage.
> Advance Canada's interests through foreign aid, while at the same
> time holding those agencies involved in this area accountable for its
> distribution and results.
> Increase spending on Overseas Development Assistance beyond
> the currently projected level and move towards the OECD average level.[2]

---

[1] The Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement*, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/IPS/IPS-Overview.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 April, 2006. p. 11.

[2] Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada*, *Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform 2006*, available from http://www.conservative.ca/media/20060113-Platform.pdf ; Internet; accessed 2 April 2006, p. 46.

These ideas are consistent with the message expressed in the International Policy Statement, as are the Conservative governments intentions since coming to power. Canada has committed itself to a stronger and more important role on the world stage, particularly in the area of addressing the dangers of failed and failing states. In recent years Canada has focused significant effort in Afghanistan, while avoiding large-scale commitments in other areas of the world. This paper will examine the problems in a failed state very close to home, Haiti, a state that has direct impact on trade and security within our own hemisphere.

Haiti has collapsed in the past and in recent decades has been a country at risk of collapse again. Its history belies the difficult nature of its development. Haiti has suffered through colonialism, occupation by a foreign power and two international interventions. Haiti's history provides a wealth of lessons for modern actions to rejuvenate the state. As a country in the western hemisphere Haiti has significant impact on Canada through the transhipment of narcotics and the size of the Canadian resident Haitian diaspora. The suffering of the Haitian people is evident to many Canadians through our media and through the Haitian immigrants they know personally. As a wealthy nation Canada has a responsibility to assist other nations, particularly those in our own region. Canadian interests and responsibilities coincide in Haiti, a fellow member state of La Francophonie. We have been involved in Haiti both through direct intervention and through the provision of aid for many years, although never to a level that could be defined as decisive. Canada can no longer simply commit just enough resources to prevent the complete collapse of that state. Our place in the region and in

the world demands that we act to in a manner consistent with our published policy to ensure the recovery of Haiti through long-term commitment of significant resources and leadership. This paper will present the reasons why previous interventions in Haiti have failed, identify why solving the Haitian problem is in our national interests and discuss some solutions to the problems faced by that unfortunate country today.

While other nations must help if the international community is to avoid the total collapse of that state Canada is uniquely positioned to lead. We have a history of postive involvement in that country not matched by any other nation. Canada has not ignored the Haitian problem; we have however committed our resources to other regions as a matter of priority. It is important that we understand the risks of allowing a nation so close to our own to continue to exist as a failed state while we expend our resources elsewhere. The noble sentiments expressed in our current International Policy Statement must be tempered with reason in the commitment of resources. Those sentiments must also be examined in light of the importance of problems that directly impact Canada. This paper then is not an argument to abandon our course in Afghanistan, that nation's reconstruction and rehabilitation is critical from a global perspective. Instead, this paper is a call for Canada to commit leadership to resolve the Haitian problem. Canadians have recently accepted that we have a greater role to play in the world than the one we have occupied since the end of the Cold War. This role comes with some cost in resources, one that Canadians seem willing to accept. It follows then that we should look to those problems where we can have significant impact and those that most directly affect our nation. Haiti clearly meets these criteria and Canada should look to an increased role in the resolving many of the issues in that state.

CHAPTER 2 – WHY HAVE INTERVENTIONS FAILED IN HAITI?

Understanding why previous attempts at creating a stable state in Haiti have failed is critical if we are to formulate a plan that will succeed in the goal of creating a stable Haitian state. Canada has invested significant capital in Haiti for almost two decades with little to show in terms of concrete results and advancement. A study of previous interventions provides valuable lessons that have been ignored and may contribute to future failure if they are not heeded in the future.

Since gaining its independence Haiti has been a country at risk of collapse. It has rarely succeeded in creating political stability and those periods during which the country was stable were characterized by brutal dictatorships or outside intervention. To date no externally imposed solution has succeeded in ensuring a long-term stable democratic government nor has any Haitian regime succeeded in creating conditions of economic and democratic success. This part of the paper will provide the historical background that has led to foreign involvement in Haiti. It will also examine the principle interventions in Haitian history: the United States occupation from 1915 to 1934, and the United States-led United Nations mission in 1994, to determine why those interventions did not succeed in bringing long-term stability to Haiti. The paper will also provide an analysis of the current United Nations-led operation to ascertain if there are old lessons that should be applied today. Understanding the reasons for the failure of the interventions in the history of Haiti is essential if we are to propose a workable strategy for the future. This paper will show that the key failures to be avoided in the future are: intervention exclusively for national interest, the establishment of a weak or incapable

government without international support, intervention without a long-term plan to deal with the economic crisis that plagues the nation, and the pre-mature withdrawal of intervention forces. The means to ensure the future success of the Haitian nation will also be drawn out during this process and include: the establishment of a viable democratic government, the establishment of a secure and stable environment under international control, the creation and support of a genuine Haitian economy and acceptance but not control of the solution by the United States. These key elements will be reintroduced in a subsequent portion of the paper that will examine a variety of potential solutions to the conundrum of the Haitian problem.

The problems in Haiti are not recent and in fact, incorporate the long history of unrest and economic instability in the country. The history of Haiti plays a significant role in its current difficulties and any consideration of the current situation must take the origins of the country and its political establishment fully into account. For this reason this paper will discuss the history of Haiti. From its origins as an artificially created slave-based plantation economy, through the imposition of many brutal and bloody dictatorships Haiti has never known stable democracy in its entire 200-year history. History indicates that there is little hope for Haitian democracy and prosperity without massive assistance and the imposition of significant external control over some of the mechanisms of state.

St Domingue: The French Colony and Independence

When Christopher Columbus landed on the island of Hispanola in 1492 he found

a small native population and, most importantly, gold. The Spanish stayed for the gold

and within 30 years they also determined that the island could be used for the cultivation

of sugarcane. Colonization of Hispanola started under Spanish rule, although the

occupation of the island was shared with the French. After Spain found that easier profits

could be had elsewhere, it gradually withdrew from the island, ceding it to the French

completely in 1795. The French followed the Spanish lead and developed a plantation-

based economy. The French however did so on a far grander scale, importing vast

numbers of slaves from Africa to the island. The establishment of a slave based

plantation system as the primary industry was different from the Spanish use of the

eastern side of the island, where commercial agriculture was far less important. Jared

Diamond explains the difference between the two colonies and the relative importance of

French Saint-Domingue:

> During the 1700s the Spanish colony had a low population, few slaves,
> and a small economy based on raising cattle and selling their hides, while
> the French colony had a much larger population, more slaves (700,000 in
> 1785, compared to only 30,000 in the Spanish part), a proportionately
> much lower non-slave population (only 10% compared to 85%), and an
> economy based on sugar plantations. French St Domingue, as it was
> called, became the richest European colony in the New World and
> contributed one-quarter of France's wealth.[3]

In 1791 and 1801 the slave population in St Domingue revolted against the harsh

conditions forced upon them and the rule of the white colonial masters. France,

---

[3] Jared Diamond, *Collapse, How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*. (New York: Viking) 2005. p. 334.

threatened with serious conflicts in Europe, needed to consolidate her military power against the many and varied threats arrayed against the infant republic and could not afford to commit large forces to subdue the revolt. A small French force was dispatched to the island but could not be supported once French interests in the Caribbean began to wane, nor could it afford the significant casualties it suffered through both combat and disease. By 1803 the French army had withdrawn from Haiti, leaving the island independent and under the control of former slaves who simply filled in the vacuum left behind as the colonial power retreated. The French had been defeated in their effort to retain their colony by a combination of attacks by the locals, the impact of disease and the inability of France to reinforce her colony during a period of significant European conflict. With no occupying force left on the island, Haiti declared its independence in 1804. The declaration was accompanied by the killing of most of the remaining white population on the island. The Haitian commander of the revolution Jean-Jacques Dessalines, created the Haitian flag by ripping the white out the French tricolour.[4] The brutal actions of the new Haitian government ensured it was not endeared to its former colonial masters, and the nations origins in revolution resonate today with Haitian distrust in the motivations of those white nations who offer assistance. [5]

It was during the period between the slave revolt and 1820 that fateful decisions were made for the Haitian economy. The early rulers of Haiti continued the plantation system, but now they used forced labour vice slave labour. When the nation split into two, due to internal conflict, the ruler of the Southern republic, Pétion, permitted

---

[4] Fleurimond W. Kerns translated by Greg Dunkel, "The Haitian Flag – Birth of a Symbol" May 18, 2003, available from http://www.iacenter.org/haiti/flag.htm; Internet, accessed 19 March 2006.
[5] This account of the early history of Hispanola is taken from Jared Diamond, *Collapse, How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*. (New York: Viking) 2005. Chapter 11, Pp. 329-357.

individual land ownership, beginning the demise of the plantation system. In addition,

Pétion also permitted the rise of the Mulatto elite with the Southern republic. These

crucial elements of his rule continue to impact Haiti today. When the southern republic

was able to take over the north in 1820 the same system of land management was

imposed throughout the nation.[6] The tradition of independent and small land ownership

established during this time continues in modern day Haiti. In addition, the clear

separation in wealth between average Haitians and the elite, which now includes not only

mulatto business people but also governmental officials, has become entrenched as a part

of everyday life.[7] The distinct separation between rich and poor in Haiti was the

continuation of a class system established by the French that would be used by the next

colonial masters of Haiti, the United States.

The United States Occupation 1915-1934

Haitian independence led to the creation of the first nation in the region run by

former slaves, a reality that did not endear Haiti to the United States, at least not until

after the American Civil War.   As Kim Iskyan explains:

> Why has Haiti been so troubled for so long? For one thing, the country
> started off in a tricky position, as its mere existence—as a former slave
> plantation state that defeated Napoleon's France to win independence—
> terrified most of the rest of the Western Hemisphere, for which slavery
> was an economic foundation. As a result, Haiti was an international
> pariah, which hurt post-independence trade and development. The United

---

[6] Library of Congress "Haiti – A Country Study - Christophe's Kingdom and Pétion's Republic"
available from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/httoc.html; Internet, accessed March 19, 2006.
        [7] Chetan Kumar, "Peacebuilding in Haiti"21-52, *Peacebuilding as Politics, Cultivating Peace in
Fragile Societies* ed. Elizbeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado: 2001)
26.

States didn't allow trade with Haiti and diplomatically recognized the country only six decades later in 1868. [8]

In fact, the United States largely ignored Haiti until the advance of German interests and the reality of Haitian instability leading up to the First World War led to concerns about the establishment of a potential German outpost and genuine threats to United States commercial interests on the island. [9] Once the danger was realized the United States was quick to intervene to control the island and ensure the security of what the Monroe Doctrine defined as an area of exclusive United States interest. The Hon. Robert Lansing, former Secretary of State expressed the rationale for the American intervention into Haiti in 1915, in a letter to the Chairman of the Select Committee on Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1922:

> The murders and atrocities perpetrated marked the complete breakdown of Haitian institutions, the culmination of a process of disintegration which had been in progress for a generation or more. It was evident from the state of affairs that there remained no possibility of a civilized government functioning without external assistance. The limit of tolerance for such conditions, which menaced the lives and property of Americans and other foreigners, was finally reached when the French Legation was violated. The restoration of order and government in Haiti was as clearly the duty of the Government of the United States as was the landing of the marines. If the United States had not assumed the responsibility, some other power would. To permit such action by a European power would have been to abandon the principles of the Monroe doctrine. The United States had no alternative but to act, and to act with vigor. [10]

---

[8] Kim Isykan, "Why Is Haiti Such a Mess? It takes a rebellion to get America's attention." *Slate*, available from http://www.slate.com/id/2097722/; Internet; accessed March 24, 2004.

[9] John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti 1994-1997* (Praeger Publishers: Westport CT, 1998), 17.

[10] United States Government, *Inquiry Into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and The Dominican Republic, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Report No. 794, April 20, 1922, Appendix B*, available from http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/haiti_inquiry.htm ;Internet, accessed 17 March, 2006.

From 1915 to 1934, Haiti was occupied and run by the United States Marine Corps. Domestic security issues were resolved and stability returned to the island, although economic prosperity continued to elude Haitians.

The United States occupation of Haiti was conducted not just for humanitarian reasons but primarily for those of national interest. The intent was to avoid a threat to a regional hegemonic power. The United States worked hard at nation building during its occupation of the island as the Congressional Investigation of 1922 clearly pointed out [11], however it left the Haitians without an effective government and with no clear plan to ensure the continued economic development of the island.[12] The United States occupation had achieved its clearly set aims, to reduce the threat to United States national security and to prevent the destruction of United States business interests in the Republic. The United States occupation, however, was not conducted to ensure the success of the nation. When the United States departed in 1934 the only viable governmental institution left was the Garde, the Haitian army that had been created by the Marine Corps during

---

[11] "It may be set down to the credit of the American occupation and the treaty officials that the Haitian cities, once foul and unsanitary, are now clean, with well-kept and well-lighted streets. The greater part of an arterial highway system opening up the heart of the country has been built. The currency, which once violently fluctuated under the manipulations of European merchants, has been stabilized, to the great advantage of the Haitian peasant. Arrears of amortization as well as of interest on the public debt have been paid, as also are regularly paid the salaries of the smallest officials. The steamship communications between Haiti and the United States are greatly improved. Trade and revenues are increasing. The revision of the customs and internal taxes, so important to the prosperity of Haiti and especially of its poorest classes, awaits the funding of the debt by a new loan. There is peace and security of property and person throughout the Republic. The peasant in his hovel or on the road to market is safe from molestation by brigand or official authority. A force of 2,500 gendarmes, insufficiently trained to cope with the caco outbreak in 1918, is now admirably disciplined. As its morale has improved, the force has become at once more considerate and more efficient in the discharge of its duties. It is noteworthy that an increasing proportion of the commissioned officers are native Haitians, those promoted from the ranks to be supplemented by others, graduates of the newly established cadet school. In brief, under the treaty, the peace of the Republic, the solvency of its Government, and the security of its people have been established for the first time in many years." United States Government, *Inquiry Into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and The Dominican Republic, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Report No. 794, April 20, 1922, Appendix B*, available from http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/haiti_inquiry.htm ;Internet, accessed 17 March, 2006.

[12] Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1914-1934* (Rutgers University Press, New Jersey: 1971) p.232-233

their tenure on the island.[13] It was inevitable that the country, so long under the direct

control of a colonial power, would regress into anarchy or despotism without direct

international assistance and a phased transfer of power and it was also inevitable that

those who could retain power would use the Garde to ensure their status as ruler. As

Hans Schmidt explained in his book, The United States Occupation of Haiti 1915-1934:

> "Politically the development of the Garde d'Haiti as an efficient military
> organization plus the building of functioning communications networks
> resulted in a decisive centralization of Haitian political authority in the
> aftermath of the occupation. The Garde, conceived of as a non-partisan
> peacekeeping force that would dominate politics and ensure orderly
> constitutional processes, became an instrument of political domination." [14]

The United States occupation failed to establish a strong viable government upon

departure and it failed to ensure a long-term plan for economic development, but it did

leave the tool needed by future despots to retain power. The occupation also clearly

established that Haiti is within the United States sphere of influence, and that any action

taken on the island must either be led by the United States or meet with its approval.

This fundamental reality continues to this day.

The United States intervention set the stage for the brutal and repressive

dictatorships of the Duvaliers, which endured for 30 years. The period between the

withdrawal of the United States and the election of François Duvalier in 1957 was

marked by political instability and the background power of the Haitian Garde. When

Duvalier became the Garde's preferred candidate for the 1957 election it was believed

that he could be controlled by the military. Duvalier was able to secure his own power

through domination of the military apparatus, creation of an unofficial security apparatus,

---

[13] Library of Congress document, *Haiti – The United States Occupation 1915-1934*, available from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/httoc.html; Internet, accessed March 19, 2006.
[14] Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1914-1934 (Rutgers University Press, New Jersey: 1971) p.235.

the *tonton makouts*, which ensured his power in the rural areas, and terror. As he was not

a communist and therefore not a threat to United States interests during the Cold War[15],

Duvalier was able to survive as leader until his death in 1971 when rule of Haiti passed to

his son Jean-Claude.[16] Jean Claude was able to maintain his power in Haiti until 1986

when his extravagant lifestyle and poor leadership ensured he lost United States support

for his regime and drove the Haitian military to take action and compel his departure

from the island.[17]

The United States Invasion and the United Nations Intervention - 1994

The period between the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier and the election of

Jean-Bertrand Aristide was marked by instability and the installation of five different

regimes. By 1990 however, under pressure from the United States, Haiti managed to

hold what most observers have accepted as genuine democratic elections and Aristide

was voted into power.[18] His initial time as President was cut short by a military coup in

September 1991 in which Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras ceased power. By 1993 the

United Nations had imposed sanctions on Haiti in an attempt to compel the return of

Aristide.[19] The 1993 dialogue between the military rulers in Haiti and Aristide resulted

in the signing of the Governors Island Agreement that set out the specific date for

---

[15] John R. Ballard, "Upholding Democracy, The United States Military Campaign in Haiti 1994-1997" (Praeger: Wesport CT, 1998) p. 35.

[16] Library of Congress, *Country Stud y- Haiti - François Duvalier*, *1957-71*, available from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/httoc.html; Internet, accessed March 19, 2006.

[17] Library of Congress, *Country Stud y- Haiti - François Duvalier*, *1957-71*, available from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/httoc.html; Internet, accessed March 19, 2006.

[18] John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy, The United States Military Campaign in Haiti 1994-1997* (Praeger: Wesport CT, 1998) p 41-45.

[19] United Nations, *The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, 3rd Ed (United Nations: New York, 1996) p. 616-617.

Aristide's return to Haiti as President.[20] When this date passed and it became apparent

that Cédras was not prepared to allow the return of President Aristide, the United States,

in accordance with United Nations resolutions[21] prepared to invade the island to reinstall

Aristide. Last minute negotiations with Cédras allowed the United States force to deploy

into Haiti as a peacekeeping force rather than an invasion force with just hours to spare,

the planned airborne assault actually being turned around in mid-air after the order to

execute the invasion had already been issued.[22] The stage was set for the first

international community intervention in Haiti, albeit one largely driven by the interests

and military muscle of the United States.

The 1994 intervention in Haiti ended when the United Nations withdrew its

military forces in 1997. The intervention had transitioned from a United States-led

Multi-National Force through a United Nations Peacekeeping force, the United Nations

Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to a force designed to assist the Haitian National Police

transition to full operational capability, the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti

(UNSMIH). The mission failed to ensure the long-term success of Haiti as evidenced by

the return of international forces in 2004. As the US Ambassador to Haiti described the

effort by the international community:

> "At a news conference here Saturday, the United States ambassador, Mr.
> Foley, said the United States had learned from its experience in 1994,
> when it left after just two years.

---

[20] Dante Caputo, "Governor's Island Accord" July 3, 1993, available from http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/kretchik/appendixd.asp; Internet, accessed 20 March 2006.

[21] UNSCR 940 authorized the use of force by a Multi-National Force and the creation of a UN force in Haiti. United Nations, *United Nations Security Council Resolution 940*, 31 July 1994, available from http://www.thewednesdayreport.com/twr/Haiti/pdf/N9431222.pdf; Internet, accessed March 12 2006.

[22] John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy, The United States Military Campaign in Haiti 1994-1997*, p. 98.

   "I think it is very clear that the effort made 10 years ago did not yield
   results," Mr. Foley said. "It was not successful and the international
   community needs to apply those lessons and do better."[23]

It is unfair to characterize the efforts of the international community during the 1994-

1997 period as a complete failure, the withdrawal of United Nations forces was orderly

and a democratically elected government remained in power with an established if

fledgling police force. The United Nations Development Program had an ambitious

development program in writing. It appeared as if the international community had

genuinely set the conditions for Haitians to succeed. The Prime Minister at the time, Mr

René Préval, wrote with hope tempered with some trepidation of the outlook for the

future of Haiti as the United Nations forces prepared to withdraw:

> Today we can calmly contemplate the departure of all the United Nations
> military forces. However, it is important to continue working to strengthen
> our police force which has been in action for only two years, especially in
> the matter of personnel management and material, and the training of
> specialized corps to combat the growing insecurity, banditry and drug
> trafficking.[24]

The author, William Shawcross, reported on the situation in 1999, just two years after the

departure of most United Nations troops from Haiti:

> In Haiti, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, the 1994 UN
> intervention to restore democracy, backed if not controlled by the United
> States, had at first been thought of as a success. But when I went there in
> January 1999, there seemed to be almost no government at all; the country
> was spiraling down into greater impoverishment and anarchy and the
> outside world – especially the United States – had no policy whatsoever
> beyond somehow preventing Haitians from fleeing in boats to Florida.[25]

---

[23] Tim Weiner and Lydia Polgreen, "Rebels Threatened to Attack Capital
Unless Leader Resigned", *The New York Times*, Sunday 29 February 2004, available from
http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/6/3731; Internet, accessed 15 March, 2006.

[24] René Préval, *Letter dated 29 October 1997 from President René Préval to the Secretary-General* in *Report of the Secretary-general on the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti*, available from, http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1997/documentation/security/s-1997-832.htm; Internet, accessed 3 March 2006.

[25] William Shawcross, *Deliver Us From Evil*. (Toronto: Simon & Schuster, 2000) p. 37

It is important that we examine what went wrong after 1997 if we are to understand how to avoid a repetition of the situation in the near future. It is from the original agreement between the leader of the coup, Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras and Aristide, the Governors Island Agreement, that we see the documented origins of the idea that the recovery of Haiti requires the establishment of a secure and stable environment, with the assistance of the international community through the re-establishment of the national army and police force:

> 5.　　Implementation, following the agreements with the constitutional government, of international cooperation:
>
> > a.　　Technical and financial assistance for development;
> > b.　　Assistance for the administrative and judicial reform;
> > c.　　Assistance for modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and establishing a new police force with the presence of United Nations personnel in these fields.[26]

This concept is fundamental to our understanding of the current and future situation of Haiti as it is from this genesis that subsequent decisions on how to achieve initial stability are based. Essentially there is an assumption even within this early agreement that the existing structures will simply be reformed to achieve success. Such a solution holds many benefits. First, it is the cheapest way for the international community to contribute; if they do not have to either provide the full gamut of security infrastructure this expense remains wholly a national one. Second it is a homegrown solution that should, by its reliance on existing Haitian structures permit quicker and more honest acceptance from Haitians themselves vice an imposed solution from the international community. Initial thinking on the Haitian problem can therefore be seen as a reasonable proposal to re-

---

[26] United Nations, *Governors Island Agreement, 1994* available from the Combined Arms Research Library, Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth Kansas http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/kretchik/appendixd.asp; Internet, accessed 12 September 2004.

establish a secure environment. What is left unclear is how the country is to continue along the path to recovery following the establishment of a secure environment.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 940, 31 July 1994 provided the mandate for the establishment of UNMIH based on the initial thoughts expressed in the Governor's Island Agreement. It also authorized the establishment of Multi-national force for intervention purposes in advance of the full deployment of UNMIH. What is of particular note is that the mandate deals exclusively with the establishment of a secure and stable environment:

> 4. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, on the understanding that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the participating Member States;
>
> 9. Decides to revise and extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for a period of six months to assist the democratic Government of Haiti in fulfilling its responsibilities in connection with:
> (a) sustaining the secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase and protecting international personnel and key installations; and
> (b) the professionalization of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force;
>
> 10. Requests also that UNMIH assist the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti in establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections to be called by those authorities and, when requested by them, monitored by the United Nations, in cooperation with the Organization of American States (OAS);[27]

---

[27] UNSCR 940.

The reason for the long quote above is to demonstrate that even from the very first United Nations mandate in Haiti there is little understanding of the underlying economic realities facing the Haitian people. Instead the focus is clearly on the establishment of a secure environment and the guarantee of an open political process. Without a plan for the establishment of a viable Haitian economy the creation of a secure and stable environment and the holding of free elections have repeatedly failed to resolve the core issues. Simply put the Haitian population is too large to be supported by the countries economy.[28] Each time the international community intervenes it establishes a secure environment, guarantees free elections and leaves the Haitians to best resolve an irresolvable economic crisis on their own. This is a fundamental flaw in the approach taken to the Haitian reality for the past century. The solution is not just in the creation of a secure environment, or in the establishment of a democratic government but in the imposition and funding of a viable economic reality for the nation. The end-state solution for the Haitian problem must proceed through stability, the creation of a capable government to the establishment of a viable economy. Only when a viable economy is established can an intervention be deemed successful. In the case of the 1994 intervention the international community established a secure environment and a credible government but withdrew before those institutions had the necessary economic foundations to ensure their continued success. The clear lessons taken from this intervention were that re-building Haiti will be a long-term process that continues long after the reduction of violence. It will require a process of economic stabilization and

---

[28] For an examination of the underlying factors preventing Haitian economic success see Mas Lundahl, "The Haitian Dilemma Reexamined: Lessons from the Past in the Light of Some New Economic Theory" in *Haiti Renewed, Political and Economic Prospects* ed. Robert I Rotberg, (Brookings Institute Press, Washington, DC: 1997) 60-92.

democratic reform over many years to ensure that progress made is not wasted once international attention is reduced.

The current United Nations mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has a very similar mandate to that of the previous mission. While it deals specifically with security and stability, the establishment of a viable government and the guarantee of human rights it does not provide for any measure of economic success prior to United Nations withdrawal from the island. This is a key weakness in the mandate; one that if not addressed will ensure a repetition of the failure of previous missions. This part of the paper will look at each component of the current mandate to point out some areas that have caused problems in the past and may in the future. Many old lessons have been learned and incorporated into the new United Nations' mission; there are however some important flaws. Solutions for these problems will be proposed in the next portion of this paper.

The Multi-National Interim Force (MNF) and the United Nations Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

If we view the current intervention in the same light we can see where the lessons have been applied. Since 2004, MINUSTAH has been actively working on establishing a secure environment, a task that is not yet complete. The most recent report of the Secretary General on the mission identified shortcomings in the areas of physical security in Port-au-Prince due to continuing gang activity, a distinct lack of progress in the creation of a viable Haitian National Police force, a lack of progress in the provision of

justice through the courts and a lack of forward progress in the disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process of the former rebels and Haitian army.[29]

It is clear that the rest of the mission mandate cannot be complete until such time as

security and stability within Haiti can be assured. This has been evident in both

interventions into Haiti sponsored by the United Nations. It is the contention of this

paper that, while this is an important facet of the mission it is often over-emphasized to

the point that once basic security is achieved many members of the international

community believe that they may safely withdraw from Haiti. In truth security and

stability can only be assured once economic stability is assured as well. It is also

important to note that the ability to ensure security and stability has been prejudiced by

the abilities of the military force deployed. Colonel Jacques Morneau, who was deployed

as the Mission Chief of Staff, has written of the lack of intelligence provided to the force,

the inability of certain contingents to fulfill their tasks, a lack of air support to ensure the

success of the mission in Port-au-Prince and the lack of staff for the military

Headquarters.[30] These shortfalls must be addressed if the mission is to succeed in

attaining true stability and security. The ability of the mission to provide for these needs

is in question, as they have been identified from within without resolution to date. In the

1994 intervention the commitment of the United States and later Canada to lead the force

alleviated some of these problems. A potential change in the lead nation, or a significant

change in commitment from Canada, is a possible solution that will be examined in the

next part of this paper.

---

[29] United Nations, *Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, 2 Feb 2006*; available from, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.htm; Internet, accessed 24 March, 2006.
[30] Colonel Jacques Morneau, "Reflections on the Situation in Haiti", unpublished, March 2006.

The mission has furthered the course of Haitian democracy in its support and

supervision of national elections. The recent election of René Préval is a positive sign for

Haiti, even if a controversial result. While Mr Préval may owe some allegiance to the

previous regime and certainly to the majority of poor Haitians who elected him, the fact

that a democratic election could be held in Haiti speaks well for the future once again.

However the ability to sustain the process of democratization in Haiti is dependant upon

the ability of the government to resist the traditional regression to corruption that has

been part of Haitian history since its independence. As a recent Chief of Staff for the

MINUSTAH commented, "One obstacle to success lies with the Haitian public sector

which is unable to deliver services to the population. This is due to historic and endemic

corruption as well as insufficient resources at the national, regional and municipal

levels."[31] Until adequate resources are available, officials at all levels in Haiti will

incorporate graft into the natural way of doing business. Jennifer L McCoy in an

Introduction to the World Peace Foundation book "Haiti Renewed" published as an effort

to provide academic analysis and ideas to increase the chances of Haitian success,

pointed out the impact of corruption on the organs of the state before Mr Préval's first

term as President. As the same situation remains extant to this day it is worth quoting her

recommendation on how to deal with the predatory state:

> The old corrupt state must be dismantled before a new productive one can
> be built. The reasoning behind this argument is that graft and inefficiency
> are self-perpetuating, since the individual costs of corruption are low when
> the probability of being detected is low and when, even if a person is
> caught, the most punishment he or she will have to endure is to share the
> take with a detecting colleague. In other words, a corrupt administration
> tends to corrupt new employees. Therefore the old state cannot be grafted

---

[31] Morneau, "Reflections on the Situation in Haiti", unpublished, March 2006. p. 1.

onto or reformed, but instead must be dismantled before it can be recreated.[32]

It is clear then that simply holding elections, as has been done in the past, will not create a viable government. The international community will have to provide significantly more support to the new Haitian government that it has in the past. This support must go beyond simply providing cash and guidance to the point of providing professionals deep within the Haitian public sector who have the power and authority necessary to make and impose decisions and are free from the pressures that compel Haitian functionaries to succumb to corruption.

MINUSTAH is also responsible to bring about changes to the problems of human rights evident in Haiti. As the Secretary-General's report points out, the situation is not good. Due process is not provided to most Haitian prisoners, many are imprisoned without trial and privilege allows others to avoid justice all together. Part of this problem is part of the lack of effective policing and part is the lack of a functioning system of justice. This is not a problem easily solved from within. Haitian lawyers and judges are not protected from those with power and weapons, the HNP is simply too weak and corrupt to do that. In addition the resources needed to create a working justice system are simply not there. The international community has attempted to help through the provision of guidance to the HNP and training for those in the justice system. This has proven inadequate in the past and is unlikely to succeed in the future. Once again there is a requirement more directive leadership in this process on the part of the international community if we wish to see it succeed. The imposition of an internationally supervised

---

[32] Jennifer L McCoy, "Introduction: Dismantling the Predatory State – The Conference Report" in *Haiti Renewed, Political and Economic Prospects* ed. Robert I Rotberg, (Brookings Institute Press, Washington, DC: 1997). p. 9.

system of justice may initially be difficult for Haitians to accept, but the current situation, in which justice is not available in any manner to the average citizen, can only be improved upon by such a solution. Judges and police officers must be equipped, remunerated and confident that they will not be subject to persecution by the state. It is apparent that the international community will have to take a far more paternalistic stance if the Haitian justice system is to be made to function.

Economics will be essential if Haiti is to survive the eventual withdrawal of MINUSTAH. Donor countries like Canada have poured money directly into Haiti in terms of foreign aid for many years with few positive results.[33] What is needed is economic leadership in terms of real and sustainable investment. While the solutions may sound colonial in nature it is clear that the endemic corruption of Haitian society will prevent the establishment of a sound economic solution to Haiti's problems under Haitian control. Rather, foreign investment under foreign control is required to establish a new Haitian economy based on industries that will directly benefit the rural Haitian population. In the most recent Secretary-General's report to the Security Council it is apparent that the international community is willing to help, over $600 million has been provided to the Interim Government, through the Interim Cooperation Framework.[34] Unfortunately this money is unlikely to truly help the Haitian economy recover. The

---

[33] The World Bank's Country Assistance Evaluation for Haiti in 2002 noted that "The outcome of Bank assistance to Haiti since 1986, consequently, is being rated unsatisfactory, with institutional development impact negligible, and sustainability of the little achieved, unlikely." The World Bank, "Haiti – Country Assistance Evaluation" 12 Feb, 2002; Internet http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000094946_02030704005684 26 March, 2006.

[34] United Nations, *Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti*, 2 Feb 2006, p. 13, and United Nations, *Interim Cooperation Framework*, *Summary Report*, *2004-2006*, available from http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/LACInfoClient.nsf/8d6661f6799ea8a48525673900537f95/9b4b6a763 c2a18e885256ed0005dc4a9/$FILE/WholereportEnglish.pdf; Internet, accessed 12 February 2006.

Haitian government is so full of corruption and mis-management that aid money, even if directed to specific projects will be squandered.[35]   A new development paradigm must be considered, one that at least temporarily takes the control of aid money away from those most likely to be corrupt. This theme will be explored in more detail later in the paper.

Conclusion

Two of the interventions covered by this paper failed to ensure the security and stability of Haiti. The third, MINUSTAH, may suffer the same fate as its predecessors. The table at Annex A provides the reader the dates and mandates of the various UN Missions in Haiti. During the United States' occupation of Haiti it became clear that the intervention was one purely based on the national interest of the United States. This ensured that when those interests waned the United States would withdraw, leaving a country with little ability to govern itself and weak institutions. Further the lack of a solid economic foundation for the country doomed its subsequent governments to failure. The occupation clearly established the United States interest in Haiti, a real political fact that cannot be ignored. The second large intervention into Haiti was also primarily a United States exercise. In 1994 the United States worked with the United Nations to establish a stable environment in Haiti and established what appeared to be a viable democratic government. Unfortunately for Haiti the international community withdrew before the Haitian economy could be re-built to the point of success. The pre-mature

---

[35] The level of corruption within the Haitian government is so extreme that the interim Prime Minister ordered a formal investigation into all government officials on 11 April, 2006. Holly Manges Jones, "Interim Haiti PM orders government corruption probe"**,** *Jurist*, *Legal News and Research*, available from http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/04/interim-haiti-pm-orders-government.php; Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.

withdrawal ensured that those credible institutions developed during the 1994-97 intervention would be co-opted by the corrupt and that the state would be unable to provide for the basic needs of the citizens. While the current United Nations mission has the support of the United States, has made inroads into the provision of security and stability, and has seen through the conduct of democratic elections it has yet to realize success, a condition that will only come as a result of economic development. It is development that will ensure the success of Haiti over the longer term and it is the lack of focus on development that has plagued interventions in Haiti. The Interim Cooperation Framework provides the current plan for national recovery of Haiti but it is significantly flawed as it leaves control of that recovery within the control of a state that is far from ready to exercise power in a responsible manner. It is clear from our examination of the situation above that the current intervention needs to change if it is to achieve its mandate. It is also clear that, in the absence of a major power, Haiti needs the support and leadership of a strong regional power. Currently this role is provided by Brazil, although Brazil's resources are limited and some of the problems of the MINUSTAH mission may require different leadership from a country able to invest more into Haiti. Leadership in Haiti has normally been assumed by the US because of its strong national interest in that country.   The next portion of this paper will examine why Haiti is important to Canadian interests and how Canadian involvement in Haiti may alleviate some of the problems faced by MINUSTAH today.

Chapter 3 - Haiti and the Canadian National Interest

Interventions in the affairs of nation states are not simple, nor are they inexpensive. Any nation that engages in an intervention must do so not only for altruistic reasons but also for purposes reflected in the intervening state's national interest. To pretend that anything else is the case would be to ignore the fundamental motivation behind the actions of states, the national interest. It is important, therefore, to analyse why intervention in Haiti is important to the Canada if one is to argue that we should be involved in that state. This portion of the paper will argue that Canadian involvement in Haiti is important as Haiti is a failed state in our hemisphere, a threat therefore that cannot simply be ignored. The nature of the threat posed by Haiti as a failed state is not one of terrorists attacking Canadians directly, however the threat of Haiti's continued participation in the drug trade as a safe transit point for shipment and the exportation of Haitian gang violence to expatriate communities in Canada is one that requires not just acknowledgement but action as well. In addition to the argument of Haiti as a failed state there is credibility in the moral argument that justifies Canadian intervention in Haiti, an argument that finds standing with the Canadian public on a cyclical basis depending on the media coverage of the plight of Haitians. Finally, Canadian interests are directly tied to those of the United States. In the case of Haiti the US, as previously demonstrated in this paper, has been forced to intervene for a number of reasons over the past century. This role has been costly for the US and has been repeatedly abandoned quickly. Canadian leadership in a Haitian intervention would alleviate a perpetual American problem, putting us in an advantageous position with our southern ally and provide

Canada a role as a regional power, a role which Canadian retrenchment has largely

abandoned.[36] In a world which recognizes hard power as the pre-requisite for the

granting of soft power[37] a credible and long-term Canadian intervention in Haiti would

provide a example of Canadian engagement as a power in the region and an important

and useful ally of the US. In short, intervention in Haiti does meet the Canadian national

interest, and if done correctly, will provide credibility to our newly sought role in the

world and to the application of Canadian soft power in other regions.

The Threat of Haiti as a Failed State

The Canadian national interest in the affairs of failed states is clearly explained in

Canada's National Security Policy:

> "Failed and failing states are potential havens for international terrorists
> and organized criminal networks. Terrorist and criminal networks are already
> cooperating in money laundering and other illicit activities, all of which bodes ill
> for these host states and the rest of the world.
> Our preferred approach is to help states avoid slipping into conflict
> and fragile situations. Canada's international development cooperation program
> already devotes significant resources to this end and these efforts will be

---

[36] Canada's International Policy statement identifies this fact: "Recent years witnessed a relative decline in the attention Canada paid to its international instruments, as priority was given to getting our domestic house in order. Our diplomatic network, our foreign and trade policy capacity, our defence capabilities, and our commitment to development suffered as a result." Canada's International Policy Statement, Overview p.2.

[37] Soft Power was first defined by Joseph S. Nye is his article "U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1, 2003 as " Soft power lies in the ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce. It means that others want what the United States wants, and there is less need to use carrots and sticks. Hard power, the ability to coerce, grows out of a country's military and economic might. Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When U.S. policies appear legitimate in the eyes of others, American soft power is enhanced. Hard power will always remain crucial in a world of nation-states guarding their independence, but soft power will become increasingly important in dealing with the transnational issues that require multilateral cooperation for their solution."

enhanced. However, when states do fail, Canada's expertise must also be brought to bear to re-establish security and to rebuild institutions."[38]

Canada's policy on the necessity of dealing with failed or failing states is thus clear. Does Haiti however, constitute a failed or failing state? It is after all the beneficiary of recent supervised elections and the product of a number of international interventions over the past century.   Haiti was identified as a failed state in the Failed States Index conducted by The Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as the tenth worst failed state on the planet. The results of this study were published in Foreign Policy, "The Failed States Index" July/August 2005.[39] The definition of a failed state in the report is

> "…a government that has lost control of its territory or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force has earned the label. But there can be more subtle attributes of failure. Some regimes, for example, lack the authority to make collective decisions or the capacity to deliver public services. In other countries, the populace may rely entirely on the black market, fail to pay taxes, or engage in large-scale civil disobedience. Outside intervention can be both a symptom of and a trigger for state collapse. A failed state may be subject to involuntary restrictions of its sovereignty, such as political or economic sanctions, the presence of foreign military forces on its soil, or other military constraints, such as a no-fly zone."[40]

As almost all of the conditions noted in this definition are present in Haiti today it is clear that the nation fits within the category. It should also be noted that the Index also uses twelve separately measured criteria to ascertain that a nation-state has failed and the

---

[38] Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society Canada's National Security Policy*, available from http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/Publications/NatSecurnat/natsecurnat_e.pdf ; Internet, accessed 2 March 2006, p.50.

[39] The Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, published in Foreign Policy, "The Failed States Index" July/August 2005 available from, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3098; Internet accessed 13 March, 2006.

[40] Ibid.

degree to which that failure extends. While most observers rate Haiti as a failed state

there are others who are more conservative in their approach.

Not everyone agrees that Haiti is a failed state. Ernest H. Preeg, who was the

American ambassador to Haiti in 1981-83 and is the author of *The Haitian Dilemma: A*

Case Study of Demographics, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy, wrote during the

tumultuous period of June 2004 that Haiti was not a failed state for six principle reasons:

" (1)   The experience of free and open elections. …
(2)   The emergence of a broadly based, pro-democracy civil society. …
(3)   The demonstrated capability to create labor-intensive industry at a rapid pace. …
(4)   The beginnings of a modern system of justice under the rule of law. …
(5)   The deepening interaction with the American diaspora. …
(6)   Private sector-driven reconciliation between Haiti and the Dominican Republic (DR). …"[41]

Ambassdor Pregg's arguments run against the majority of published opinion but

nonetheless deserve our attention, as they allow a balanced analysis of the the situation

and provide some hope for future interventions. Ambassador Pregg's arguments will be

analyzed, admittedly with the benefit of hindsight from the two years since the

publication of his article, to determine their validity.

Pregg's first argument, that Haiti has experienced free and open elections is easily

criticized in the wake of the 2006 presidential elections in which ballots were tampered

with and the results had to be decreed to avoid significant internal security problems.[42] [43]

While there is little argument that Haitians desire free and open elections there remains

---

[41] Ernest H. Preeg, Haiti Democracy Project, 16 June 2004, "Why Haiti Is Not a Failed State" available from http://haitipolicy.org/content/2430.htm; Internent accessed March 11, 2006.
[42] PBS Online, "Election Protests in Haiti" 14 Feb, 2006, available from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/jan-june06/haiti_2-14.html; Internet accessed March 14, 2006.
[43] CNN, "Preval declared winner of Haiti vote" Feb 17, 2006, available from http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/americas/02/16/haiti/?eref=yahoo, Internet, accessed March 14, 2006.

serious questions as to the nation's ability to conduct them. As the New York Times editorial for the week of the 2006 election opined "The internationally brokered deal that declared René Préval the official winner of last week's Haitian election provided the best available exit from a bad and worsening situation. It required reinterpreting the election rules after the votes had been counted, which tarnishes the democratic legitimacy this election was supposed to provide."[44] While the elections may have produced the desired choice of the majority of Haitians it is clear that irregularities and difficulties persist within the process itself, reflecting that Haiti is still not capable of conducting open and free elections without the assistance of the international community.

In his second argument Pregg points to the emergence of a broad-based pro-democracy society. This argument hinges on the desire of Haitians for true democracy within their nation and fails to consider the daily hardships of those scrabbling for survival in the worst slums in our hemisphere. There is little doubt that the average Haitian would respond positively when asked if they wished a democratic society, what is not so clear is how they would respond if offered clean water, a decent house and a regular income if they were willing to support a particular candidate. This was how Aristide managed to consolidate his power in Port-au-Prince, through the corruption of the local gangs, poverty stricken young men living in the slums of Port-au-Prince. As Roger F. Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, pointed out in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, on 14 April, 2004

> "As years passed, Aristide increasingly relied on chimeres, violent gangs, to maintain his authority, intimidate opponents, and control the streets. A notorious example: On December 5 of last year, a day that came

---

[44] The New York Times, " Stumbling forward in Haiti", February 17, 2006, available from http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/17/opinion/edhaiti.php; Internet, accessed March 11, 2006.

to be known as "Black Friday," chimeres assaulted State University students who were gathering for a demonstration in Port-au-Prince. An estimated 30 students were injured, at least 10 by gunfire. The University Rector suffered 2 broken kneecaps from a brutal beating by chimeres."[45]

Any democratic efforts towards reform must consider how easily bought the starving and poor can be, and how the remainder can be intimidated by violence.

The third argument to be addressed is the demonstrated ability of Haiti to create labour-intensive industry, particularly in the light industrial genre. While there has been some recovery of the economy since the interventions of 2004 it is clear that the Haitian economy is broken and will require more than just the emergence of native urban industries if it is to create the sustained development necessary to foster state recovery. Pregg's focus on the creation of light industry fails to take into account that the vast majority of the Haitian population is rural based, as is the Haitian economy. In his article "Priorities in the Economic Reconstruction of Rural Haiti" Anthony V. Catanese pointed out that the true priority for Haitian economic reconstruction must be rural, as: "A prosperous rural population will provide benefits beyond the nonurban areas to the urban population. In contrast, however, a vigorous urban economy will not have comparable spillover benefits to the rural population because it will encourage more migration to urban areas."[46] The focus of effort on the economic recovery of the cities may produce some immediately visible results but it fails to address the fundamental nature of the problems of soil erosion and a failed rural economy. To date there has been little effort made to ensure the success of the Haitian rural economy. It is telling that the most recent

---

[45] Roger F. Noriega, "Haiti at the Crossroads of Democracy", available from http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/7ed7186e73a70acec1256e77004a302a; Internet, accessed 11 March, 2006.

[46] Anthony V. Catanese, "Priorities in the Economic Reconstruction of Rural Haiti" 189-198, in *Haiti Renewed, Political and Economic Prospects* ed. Robert I Rotberg, (Brookings Institute Press, Washington, DC: 1997). 191.

Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations does not even address the

problems of rural development in his latest report on the situation in Haiti.[47]

Pregg's fourth argument, that Haiti is seeing the emergence of a modern justice

system is refuted by a study completed by for the Centre for the Study of Human Rights

at the University of Miami entitled "Haiti, Human Rights Investigation, November 11-21,

2004"[48] that clearly outlines the complete lack of justice and human rights in Haitian

society post the 2004 arrival of the current intervention forces. While MINUSTAH

continues its efforts at reformation and rebuilding of the justice system the results are less

than those desired as the most recent report of the Secretary-General to the Security

Council points out:

> "Based on MINUSTAH findings, many legal cases are not being
> addressed in conformity with international standards. The few court
> decisions rendered are rarely executed. The court system is not accessible
> to many Haitians owing to great distances between courts and the lack of
> human and material resources, public information or a legal aid system.
> Throughout the country, justice appears arbitrary and citizens cannot count
> on the fair and impartial application of the law."[49]

 Pregg's fifth argument, that of the increasing interaction between Haitians and

the American population is valid not just for the United States[50] but for Canada as well.

---

[47] United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, 2 February 2006.

[48] Thomas M. Griffin, "Haiti, Human Rights Investigation, November 11-21, 2004" Jan 14, 2005 available from http://www.law.miami.edu/cshr/CSHR_Report_02082005_v2.pdf ; Internet accessed March 6, 2006.

[49] United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, 2 February 2006.

[50] For a good examination of the impact of the diaspora on Haitian politics and democracy from the US perspective see Michel S. Laguerre, "The Role of the Diaspora in Haitian Politics" in "Haiti Renewed, Political and Economic Prospects" ed. Robert I Rotberg, (Brookings Institute Press, Washington, DC: 1997) 170-182.

Our Haitian population is significant, a community of some 120,000 in Montreal alone[51], and the recent appointment of a Haitian born Governor-General indicates that these links will drive a greater sympathy for the people of Haiti and more insistence on government action from both the United States and Canada. The impact of the Haitian diaspora in Montreal was recently covered in a Maclean's Magazine article that stated, "As one of the biggest expat communities in North America, Montreal's Haitians are a key part of the beleaguered country's economy (every year, the Haitian diaspora, estimated at two million, sends over $1 billion to Haiti)."[52] This key point identified by Ambassador Pregg, while not sufficient to avoid the definition of Haiti as a failed state, will prove a key component in any recovery plan and will be examined in more detail later in this paper.

Pregg's final point that the economic links between the Dominican Republic and Haiti will help in the economic development of Haiti is flawed. The Dominican Republic can hardly afford to create industry in Haiti at the expense of its own limited economy, nor can it provide large numbers of jobs for Haitians willing to cross the border, except for basic labourers. The reality of the Dominican Republic situation is that it has to maintain a large armed force on its border with Haiti to prevent the crossing of illegal immigrants in search of jobs. Simply put there is no excess capacity of industry looking for new places to expand in the Dominican Republic.[53] While the contacts between the

---

[51] CTV News, "Montreal Haitians prepare to rally storm relief" September 22, 2004 available from http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1095810168418_34?hub=Canada; Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.

[52] Maclean's Magazine, "Accusing Canada of Corruption" March 6, 2006 available from http://www.macleans.ca/topstories/world/article.jsp?content=20060306_122761_122761#continue; Internet, accessed 14 March 2006.

[53] For an outline of the foreign relations between the Dominican Republic and Haiti see the US Congress Country Study of the Dominican Republic, "Foreign Relations" http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/77.htm Internet, 14 March, 2006.

two countries are improving, the hope that cooperation between the two will pull Haiti out of its current economic crisis is simply not realistic. Those few Haitians lucky enough to find work in the Dominican Republic are poorly treated, revealing the deep-seated suspicion of Dominicans for Haitians and an underlying feeling of protectionism.[54] The reality of the Haitian impact on the economic well-being of the Dominican Republic is an important factor for consideration. In time, as Jared Diamond points out in his book "Collapse"[55] the Dominican Republic will have to become more involved with Haiti. That collaboration is still, however, in the future.

Pregg's analysis of the Haitian situation was hopeful, but not practical. The situation in Haiti that one can observe today is clearly one that reflects not a recovery from trouble but the descent into further difficulty. It is therefore clear that we can assess Haiti as a failed state, with all that judgment implies for Canada in accordance with our current National Security Policy. The specific threats that Haiti poses to Canada as a failed state will be examined next.

There are two legitimate components to Haiti's threat as a failed state. Neither of them constitutes a threat to the survival of Canada and as such cannot be classified as a threat to a vital national interest. Both, however, impact on our national security and therefore lend credence to the requirement for Canadian involvement. Specifically we must consider the use of Haiti as a transshipment point for narcotics from Central America to North America and the exportation of Haitian gang violence through the

---

[54] Danna Harman, "Haitian migrants face rising backlash next door" Christian Science Monitor, Vol 98, Issue 40 24 Jan, 2006, available from http://web104.epnet.com; Internet, accessed 24 March 2006.
[55] For a good examination of the links between Haiti and the Dominican Republic see Jared Diamond, *Collapse, How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*. Chapter 11, Pp. 329-357.

Haitian diaspora and into Canadian society. Both of these problems are a direct result of the failure of the Haitian state and both impact on Canada.

There should be little doubt about the impact of the drug trade on violence and organized crime in Canada. As the 2001 Report of the Auditor General noted, "Illicit drugs have a significant negative impact on Canada and on individual Canadians. They are a major source of funding for organized crime and for terrorism."[56] The impact of the drug trade in Canada is enormous financially. As the RCMP report on the Drug Situation in Canada – 2001 noted: "Drug trafficking remains the principal source of revenue for most organized crime groups. In Canada, the drug trade has the potential to generate criminal proceeds in excess of $4 billion at the wholesale level and of $18 billion at the street level."[57] The same report clearly points out the importance of Haiti as a major transshipment point for Cocaine from South America,

> "Haiti and Jamaica are the two main transshipment points for the importation of South American cocaine into the United States and Canada. Approximately 271 kilograms of cocaine were seized on board flights originating from Haiti and 478 kilograms on flights originating from Jamaica. Authorities in Dorval airport seized 179 kilograms of cocaine hidden in the false bottom of wooden statues and 70 kilograms hidden in 4 boxes used to transport goods in bond (duty free) in two different flights from Haiti."[58]

Haiti continues as a large transshipment point for drugs as the state cannot police those who ship their product through the country. In a report for the BBC by Nick Caistor, the history of the drug trade in Haiti was traced back through the Duvalier regime and

---

[56] Office of the Auditor General, Government of Canada, *Report of the Office of the Auditor General 2001*, available from http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/0111ce.html; Internet, accessed 12 March, 2006.

[57] Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Drug Analysis Section, Criminal Analysis Branch, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, *Drug Situation in Canada – 2001* dated April 2002, available from http://www.rcmp.ca/crimint/drugs_2001_e.htm; Internet, 12 March, 2006.

[58] Ibid.

forward through the Aristide regime and included links to those rebels who deposed

Aristide in 2004.[59] The existence of possible links between the leaders of Haiti, the

current President René Préval, was a close ally of Aristide for many years, and the history

of Haitian corruption and dependence on the drug trade are indicative of a clear threat to

the national security of Canada.

The spread of criminal activities through the Haitian diaspora in Canada is

another national security problem that has only recently been identified. Two of the

major street gangs in Montreal today are composed of Haitian immigrants.[60] A

conclusion that was also supported by Criminal Intelligence Service Canada in their

"2004 Report on Organized Crime in Canada"[61] In his report published by Carleton

University, Stewart Prest analyzed the possible connections between Haitian Street

Gangs (HSGs) and criminal organizations in Haiti. He concluded that:

> Direct open source evidence of a connection between Canadian HSGs and
> criminal organisations in Haiti is quite limited, though not non-existent.
> Moreover, conditions in Haiti and Canada favour the continued growth of
> a formalised and structured nexus between criminal organisations in the
> two countries over the medium to long term. Though there are no formal
> links currently apparent between criminal actors in Haiti and in Canada,
> individual HSG members have established criminal links with the island;
> evidence also suggests that the HSGs as a whole may also be cultivating
> informal inter-group links with counterparts in Haiti. Moreover, the
> continuous flows of people, money, and materiel between the two
> countries ensure such links will remain viable in the long term.
>
> A formalised and sophisticated criminal nexus between criminal
> organisations in Haiti and HSGs in Canada could have significant impact

---

[59] Nick Caistor, BBC News, "Haiti's Drug Money Scourge" 19 March, 2004 available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3524444.stm; Internet, accessed 12 March, 2006.

[60] Stewart Prest *Upheaval in Haiti: The Criminal Threat to Canada*, *A Background Study* June 2005available from http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/haiticriminalthreat.pdf; Internet, accessed March 12, 2006. p.21

[61] Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, *2004 Report on Organized Crime in Canada* available from http://www.cisc.gc.ca/annual_reports/annual_report2004/frontpage_2004_e.htm; Internet, accessed 14 March, 2006.

on criminal activity in Canada. It would give HSGs a competitive advantage over rival groups, and provide Caribbean trafficking networks with a new point of entry to the Canadian market. Possible consequences include an increased flow of drugs to Canadian streets, a shift in the balance of power in the Montréal underworld in favour of HSGs, and the growth of HSG activity in jurisdictions beyond Montréal.[62]

While direct links between Haitian based criminal gangs in Canada and criminal organizations in Haiti remain tenuous it is not a significant leap of logic to see the ramifications for Canadian security should the links become more structured in the near term. The potential for increased drug trafficking is obvious. It is therefore in the national interest of Canada to ensure that criminal organizations in Haiti are pressed as hard as possible from within their own state if we wish to have an impact on the emergent threat now manifesting itself in Montreal. The only way in which we can ensure pressure on the criminal element of Haitian society is through the creation of a stable and capable Haitian government.

The Case for Moral Responsibility

An analysis of Canada's interest in Haiti would be incomplete without due consideration of our moral responsibility to the Haitian people. Prime Minister Paul Martin expressed the latest recognition of our morale responsibility to Haiti when he announced the commitment of 100 police officers to assist the Haitian National Police with training on 6 July 2004. The Prime Minister's announcement noted that Canada had

---

[62] Stewart Prest. *Upheaval in Haiti: The Criminal Threat to Canada, A Background Study*. p. 26.

a "hemispheric and moral responsibility"[63] to support the Haitian people. Published

Canadian policy now recognizes a moral imperative to help other nations, as the

International Policy Statement outlines:

> In a world of independent states, governments carry an obligation to look after their own people. However, this presents a fundamental dilemma. Unless we act collectively on the basis of our common humanity, the rich will become richer, the poor will become poorer and hundreds of millions of people will be at risk. We have to think beyond our own national borders and take responsibility for one another.[64]

It is now Canadian policy to respond to those international crises where our intervention

will make a difference. The case of Haiti is specifically cited in our International Policy

Statement no less than five times as an example of where Canada can, is making and

should continue to make a difference. While some may argue that Canada has no

obligation to a country that has routinely disintegrated into chaos following intervention,

and one that has repeatedly squandered foreign assistance for no result other than the

enrichment of the ruling elite, it is clear that our repeated deployments into that country

are indicative of a general national feeling that we must do something to help our

neighbours in the Caribbean. As David Rudd, the Executive Director of the Canadian

Institute for Strategic Studies identified in his article "What to do about Haiti?"[65] the

Canadian government was pressed to do something about the conditions in Haiti from the

concerns of the public. This analysis is supported by the calls for assistance for Haiti that

were presented in the Canadian press before the announcement of the provision of a

---

[63] CTV News, "Canada sending 100 police to Haiti mission" July 6, 2004, available from http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1089140391116_84549591?s_name=&no_ads; Internet, accessed 14 March 2006.

[64] *Canada's International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World.* 20.

[65] David Rudd, "What to do about Haiti?" Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies Commentary, March 2004, available from http://www.ciss.ca/Comment_Haiti.htm; Internet, accessed March 23, 2006.

Canadian contingent to the Multi-National Interim Force in March 2004. As Paul Knox

wrote for the Globe and Mail on Feb 25, 2004:

> "The choice for Canada and other nations trying to help Haitians find a
> way out of their bitter and seemingly endless conflict is beginning to
> simplify. We can send a multinational police or military force to keep
> order until Haiti can hold elections. Or we can toss all that high-minded
> talk about respect for democracy in the Americas out the window, and
> expect the already alarming death toll here to keep climbing"[66]

Pressure was also exerted from the international community during the visit of the

United Nations Secretary General when Koffi Annan called for Canadian intervention

and assistance in Haiti during his visit to Canada in March 2004[67], requesting more than

just military support:

> Yes, not just on peacekeeping troops because if we are going to help the
> people of Haiti, you need security, of course, but you also need to help
> them deal with their economic and social issues. You need to help them
> strengthen institutions. You need to help them build a society based on
> rule of law. And so, there are many ways one can contribute. We may
> need personnel from Canada who have expertise in these areas. Canada
> may need to offer some financial assistance or advice in these areas, as
> well as military. So, I'm not just focusing on the military.[68]

It is clear then that at least in 2004 Canadians and the international community felt that

there was a moral connection to the plight of the Haitian people that deserved our action.

While the situation in Haiti has improved only slightly since then it is logically apparent

that our moral duty to that country remains extant if we are to fulfill the high ideals

espoused in our International Policy Statement.

---

[66] Paul Knox, "Aristide's fate must not be left to the thugs and cynics" Globe and Mail, February 25, 2004, p. A21.

[67] Colin Freeze, "Canada must do more for Haiti, Annan says" Globe and Mail, March 8, 2004, p.A8.

[68] Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "An Interview with Koffi Annan" CBC News Sunday, March 8, 2004, available from http://www.cbc.ca/sunday/kofiannan.html; Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.

The Advancement of the Canada - United States Relationship

In addition to the moral imperatives inherent in helping those less fortunate, and the security ramifications posed by a failed state in our own hemisphere, it is also important that we examine how Canadian intervention in Haiti is likely to impact on Canada's most vital national interest, our relationship with the United States. The importance of this relationship is evident to all Canadians, as evidenced in the Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade of December 2002, which concluded:

> "Canada is a North American nation. That is an inescapable fact of geography reinforced by historic ties of friendship and international alliance. Given that Canada is neighbour to the world's unrivalled superpower, moreover, its international role will be shaped to a large extent by how well it manages evolving relationships with continental partners. Canada's ability to advance its relations with the United States, and increasingly with Mexico as well, will have an important bearing on its overall future success in pursuing a distinctive Canadian foreign policy serving Canadian interests and projecting Canadian values beyond our borders."[69]

If Canada is to act within the hemisphere, it is critical that we consider how such action will be viewed by the United States. Glen Milne, in a paper written for the Centre for Hemispheric Studies of the National Defence University clearly identified that one of the key reasons for recent Canadian involvement in Haiti was "Respect gained from doing everything feasible to help Haiti in turn that could help our economic relationships with

---

[69] Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade of December 2002, *Third Report*, Bernard Patry, MP, Chair; available from http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/2/FAIT/Studies/Reports/faitrp03/17-conc-e.htm; Internet accessed March 14, 2006.

USA, OAS and United Nations members and other hemispheric partners."[70] In the

specific case of intervention in Haiti we can assess that the reaction of the United States

would be positive, if the results of such an intervention meet the aims of previous

interventions led by that United States and do not conflict with their national interests.

The United States' national interests in Haiti were summarized by Marc

Grossman, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in testimony before the

Senate Foreign Relations committee on July 15, 2003.[71] In his testimony Under

Secretary Grossman identified four key components of United States Foreign policy

towards Haiti. The first two dealt with strengthening democracy and protecting human

rights. These components are similar to the national interests of Canada, as identified

earlier in the paper. Both the United States and Canada have strong desires to see the

growth of a strong, just democracy in Haiti. This may only be achieved through the

establishment of strong democratic institutions and a reinforced commitment to justice.

Given the United States' history with interventions in Haiti it is fair to assess that even

stronger moral obligations exist with the United States. In this manner the national

interests of Canada and the United States directly coincide and any support Canada

shows to attain the same foreign policy goals as our southern neighbour should meet with

a positive reaction.

The remaining two points of his testimony however, clearly identify the practical

nature of United State's national interests in Haiti. The third key point is the threat of

[70] Glen Milne, "Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned for the Canadian Peace-Keeping Operation in Haiti, 2003-2005", Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada; available from http://www.ndu.edu/chds/journal/PDF/2005/Milne_article-edited.pdf; Internet accessed 8 Feb, 2006.
[71] US Department of State, Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, *Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, Washington, DC, July 15, 2003, available from http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/22490.htm ;Internet, 14 March, 2006.

narcotics smuggling from Haiti into the United States, a significant problem that has

already been discussed in this paper but is an order of magnitude bigger for the United

States given the geography of the region. Canadian action in Haiti would have to deal

with the problem of narcotics smuggling as we have discussed above and therefore the

national interests of our two nations in this respect are identical. The fourth key point is

illegal immigration from Haiti into the United States. In order to escape the harsh

realities of the economic and human rights situation in Haiti, significant numbers of

Haitians resort to illegal emigration to the United States. The prevention of illegal

immigration is a significant incentive for United States policy towards Haiti. During the

2004 deployment of the Multi-National Interim Force one of the key elements of the

deployed force was a United States Coast Guard contingent tasked with intercepting and

returning illegal Haitian immigrants. The policy that ensured the prevention of increased

illegal immigration during the 2004 rebellion was clearly stated by the Whitehouse even

before the deployment of the Multinational Interim Force.[72] Any action in Haiti must

consider that this reality of international politics is a key motivator. Actions in Haiti that

are likely to increase illegal immigration into the United States are therefore likely to

cause a negative United States reaction. Actions that serve to diminish such immigration

will permit the United States to leave any Haitian intervention in the hands of another

lead nation. The key United States interests in Haiti can therefore be summarized as,

---

[72] On Feb 28, 2004 the Whitehouse Press Secretary issued a Statement on Haiti, part of which read, "The United States is preparing to support a multinational interim security force in the context of a sustainable political solution in Haiti. The Department of Homeland Security is interdicting Haitian migrants at sea and repatriating them to Haiti. As necessary, the U.S. military is prepared to support that effort and to assist in the evacuation of U.S. citizens." Government of the United States, Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement on Haiti" 28 Feb, 2004 available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040228-2.html ; Internet, 14 March, 2006.

ensuring the restoration of democracy, the protection of human rights, the prevention of

narcotics smuggling and the restriction of illegal Haitian immigration to the United

States. Understanding and accepting these interests is a key component to any action in

Haiti, as one of Canada's reasons for action in Haiti must be to strengthen the ties

between the United States, and us not weaken them.

In the case of Haiti it is clear that any Canadian action must take the United States

national interest into account. As those interests largely coincide with our own it is

reasonable to expect that Canadian action would draw a positive response from the

United States. Given the current United States commitment to other theatres such as Iraq

and Afghanistan, with the likelihood of these deployments lasting for many years,

Canadian leadership in Haiti would ensure that United States intervention is not needed

in the near term, alleviating one regional pressure that draws in United States combat

forces at seemingly regular intervals. These inferences can be drawn relatively safely as

we recall that the United States withdrew from Haiti when another regional power,

Brazil, took the leadership of the United Nations Force. It follows that the United States

would not only allow but also encourage Canadian leadership of the same mission, in the

manner it did when Canada led the previous United Nations mission in Haiti.

Conclusion

Haiti is important to Canada. The country currently poses a security threat as a

failed state through the transshipment of narcotics and potentially through the exportation

of violence and criminal links with the Haitian diaspora. The suffering of the Haitian

people weighs on the conscience of many Canadians, especially those with links to Haiti.

Canada has clearly stated that we will be more aggressive in a role that assists struggling

nations. Haiti is unmistakably a nation that desires democracy and needs help. From a

morale standpoint Canadian intervention and leadership in Haiti fulfills our promise of

re-engagement in the world and in the region. Finally, Canadian action in Haiti is likely

to draw only a positive response from the United States. Our interests overlap in Haiti,

both countries want a stable democracy not a failed state in the region, both nations

would prefer a country that does not require periodic interventions simply to prevent

absolute collapse, and both countries want action on the movement of illegal narcotics

into North America. On the one issue that is not common, illegal immigration; any

intervention in Haiti has to ensure that life gets better in Haiti to help avoid the exodus of

illegal immigrants. In the end, the United States will use her own resources to intercept

and return Haitian immigrants, even if an intervention force does not. It is critical for

Canadians to realize that Haiti matters; if such a realization is not forthcoming then any

intervention in that state is doomed to fail.

Chapter III – Haiti and the Future

The current situation in Haiti is a reflection of the failures of previous

interventions and the failures of the Haitian state. As demonstrated in other parts of this

paper it is likely that the current intervention will continue to have many of the same

problems of previous interventions. It is also probable that Haiti will require years of

international support to emerge from its present crisis, abandonment would be

disastrous.[73] Previous attempts at rectifying or even modifying the desperate situation in

Haiti have met with donor fatigue and eventual withdrawal from participating nations

after a few years, followed by Haitian descent into violence and a new intervention. It is

critical that this cycle be arrested. This part of the paper will look at a variety of possible

solutions for the Haitian problem, with particular emphasis on the Canadian role in Haiti.

Canada is in a unique position to assist the Haitian people, not only through the direct

provision of resources to the Haitian government but also through the provision of

leadership of in international programs established to re-create the under-pinnings of a

credible and successful nation state. As there is no single solution the problems will be

examined by their functional groupings: security and stability, governance, justice and

human rights and development. The key area to ensure a long-term solution for Haiti is

development. While all of the other areas are important, it is development that will

ensure a lasting change in Haiti. Previously, interventions have stabilized the situation,

emplaced a democratic government and justice system but left before the foundation for a

---

[73] "If the new administration is to be successful, it will require continued international institution- and capacity-building at all levels in the longer term." United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti*, 2 Feb 2006.

successful Haitian economy was in place. Many of the solutions explored in this part of

the paper will seem paternalistic, even colonial. While a United Nations Transitional

Administration is not considered the ideal solution due to a lack of Haitian acceptance,

many actions will have to be taken outside of the control of the Haitian government. This

is a requirement as in the past Haitian solutions to Haitian problems have failed due to

endemic corruption and an inability to break the cycle of violence, intervention and

government failure. As the Executive Director of the National Coalition for Haitian

Rights explained:

> Haiti's institutional deficiencies, including the absence of well-trained and
> accountable security forces, a functioning judiciary and administrative
> agencies and a strong civil society and the ensuing lack of human rights
> and civil liberties protections as well as the death of basic goods and
> services, have repeatedly led to illegitimacy and unrest resulting in even
> greater crises.[74]

Solutions that require the temporary removal of power from the hands of national leaders

will in turn necessitate that trust be placed into the hands of external administrator's. In

the case of Haiti the only realistic solutions to this problem are the acceptance of

additional powers by the United Nations or by a lead nation. Such a solution will require

that the new government of Haiti accept its limitations and acknowledge its need for

direct outside intervention. As the United States is not suitable due to its specific national

interest in restricting Haitian immigration and its previous interventions in Haiti[75] this

part of the paper will also consider which nations should be the lead nations under the

United Nations umbrella in Haiti. It should come as no surprise to the reader that this

---

[74] Jocelyn McCalla, "Haiti :Lurching Towards 2006" *National Coalition for Haitian Rights*, November 2005, available from http://www.nchr.org/reports/lurching2006.pdf; Internet, accessed 31 March, 2006.

[75] Ivan Eland, "Déjà vu All Over Again in Haiti" *The Independent Institute*, March 2, 2004 http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1270 ; Internet, accessed 29 March 2006.

paper will advocate a central role for Canada. Trusted by the Haitians and the United

States, rich and democratic, Canada has also recently adopted a foreign policy of

commitment and coordinated action that fits the needs of the Haitian problem perfectly.

As distasteful as it may be for some, it is clear that the solution to the Haitian problem is

inevitably tied to Canadian effort. In the end, many of the solutions proposed have

already been considered but either abandoned or not pursued due to a lack of either

political will or resources. Some of the solutions are directly addressed in the Interim

Cooperation Framework (ICF), which outlines the international communities plan for the

future rejuvenation of Haiti. Unfortunately, despite the promise of the ICF the

channeling of power and resources under that arrangement is still through the power

structure of the Haitian government.[76] The control of aid and development funds by the

Haitian government has consistently failed, resulting in a serious degeneration of the state

to the point of collapse. For Canadians and Americans in particular this is no longer

acceptable. Nations within our hemisphere cannot be allowed to deteriorate into narco-

criminal states without presenting genuine security threats. In addition our moral

responsibility to the people of Haiti will always ensure that there is support for positive

nation-building actions, although that support will wax and wane with the interest of the

press and the immediacy of the suffering. If we are to avoid perpetual interventions in

Haiti it is critical that we develop and resource a workable plan. For this reason each of

the suggestions in this paper will also present a possible solution for sourcing. While the

---

[76] The ICF itself outlines the power structure as "Leadership of the coordination of the ICF will be by the Haitian Government with active participation of civil society. It is foreseen that a Joint Committee for the Implementation and Monitoring of the ICF will be created and chaired by the Prime Minister, with participation of other representatives from the government, civil society and the international community." United Nations, *Interim Cooperation Framework, Summary Report, 2004-2006*, available from http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/LACInfoClient.nsf/8d6661f6799ea8a48525673900537f95/9b4b6a763 c2a18e885256ed0005dc4a9/$FILE/WholereportEnglish.pdf; Internet, accessed 12 February 2006. 45.

demands are high, perhaps higher than our politicians are willing to consider at this time, the rewards over the long-term will exceed the costs of perpetually funding aid projects and interventions in a chronically failing state.

Security and Stability

The first aspect of the Haitian problem to be examined for possible solutions is the problem of security and stability. Traditionally, interventions in Haiti have started because of the breakdown of stability in that country. The United States sees an emergent threat manifested by violence and reacts. The re-establishment of security is initially the most important aspect of the intervention's mandate and it is achieved quickly once foreign military forces are brought to bear on the problem. However, it is also true that security and stability in Haiti do not seem to last once the military forces are withdrawn from the island.[77] In the past either the Garde, or in more modern times the Haitian National Police become corrupted and are used by those in power as the muscle to establish or perpetuate the regime. While unofficial means are also used, Duvalier's *totoun makouts* and Artistide's *chimères* it is the inability of the government forces to deal with these problems that permits their rise. This portion of the paper will deal with three facets of security and stability that must be addressed to ensure the long-term success of MINUSTAH. First, the current military commitment to the operation must be reinforced, second the impediments to certain actions by MINUSTAH must be removed to permit the neutralization of former members of the Haitian army and the disruption of

---

[77] Marian L. Tupy, "Haiti: Will We Ever Learn?" *The CATO Institute*, March 04, 2004 available from http://www.cato.org/dailys/03-04-04-2.html; Internet, accessed 29 March, 2006.

the drug trade, and finally the HNP should be removed from Haitian national control and placed under MINUSTAH control to ensure their non-corruption and capability. Of course the HNP will eventually have to come under the Haitian government, however, all previous attempts to create a genuine native Haitian security force have failed. There are other factors, that will be addressed later, that will, in this model, predicate the return of the HNP to national command. The establishment of security in Haiti is achievable with the commitment of some extra resources and a change in mandate, maintaining it over the long-term will be the result of a number of significant reforms outside of that specific area of responsibility.

There are difficulties in the military portion of MINUSTAH's security and stability mandate. As the Secretary-General's most recent report[78] and a recent press release from Médecins Sans Frontières indicate[79] Port-au-Prince is not yet a safe place. The gangs that operate within large portions of the city have not yet been disarmed, the HNP cannot deal with the threat and thus far MINUSTAH appears important to remedy the situation despite a number of efforts.[80] There are a number of solutions to the

---

[78] "However, there was a significant decline in the security situation in other parts of the capital, such as Cité Soleil and the adjacent Route Nationale 1, during the month of December, and gangs remained active in such areas outside the capital as Artibonite and Oanaminthe." United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti*, 2 Feb, 2006, p. 5.

[79] "With violent attacks intensifying and spreading to many parts of Haiti's capital, Port-au-Prince, the international medical humanitarian organization Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) today called on all armed groups in the city to respect the safety of civilians and allow those wounded during clashes to have immediate access to emergency medical care. The organization also called for the safety of national and international aid workers to be respected." Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières "Escalating Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti Inflicts Heavy Civilian Toll, MSF Calls on All Armed Groups in Haiti's Capital to Respect Safety of Civilians and Allow their Immediate Access to Emergency Medical Care" Jan 19, 2006; available from, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/pr/2006/01-19-2006.cfm; Internet, March 24, 2006.

[80] United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti*, 2 Feb, 2006. p. 5-7.

problem that should be considered if MINUSTAH is to be able to establish the first pre-requisite for Haitian recovery, security.

It has been noted that the MINUSTAH mission is short of an intelligence capability; the mission staff cannot readily identify gang members, intentions or movements. While active intelligence gathering has long been anathema to the United Nations Haiti presents a situation in which this restriction, normally imposed to prevent opposing forces from becoming nervous, should not be applied. It is important that MINUSTAH be provided an intelligence-gathering component that is effective and well resourced. At present there are serious shortfalls as Colonel Jacques Morneau, a MINUSTAH Chief of Staff identified, "At present, the main MINUSTAH internal difficulties have been and, in some instances, continue to be: … The lack of reliable intelligence in support of operations. There is a need for Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) to increase the efficiency of the operations aimed at the gangs and the corrupt elements of the HNP."[81] An effective capability was deployed during the deployment of the Multi-national Interim Force. It is important that such a capability be returned into Haiti. There are only a few nations capable of mounting such an operation. France or the United States could provide the resource. Canada, while heavily committed to Afghanistan, could also provide the resource assuming it could permit individual rotations in and out of theatre on a regular basis. The caveats of national intelligence means and the sensitivity of sharing intelligence with other nations will mean that specific arrangements will have to be made before deployment of such a

---

[81] Colonel Jacques Morneau, *Reflections on the Situation in Haiti*. 13.

capability if it is to be effective. [82] This in turn means that the capability is most effective

if it is supported by a national contingent that can act on the intelligence provided without

having to allow for that intelligence to be processed through a multi-national HQ.

Therefore, the nation providing the intelligence collection and analysis should also

provide a combat-capable contingent deployed in the Port-au-Prince area to physically

action the intelligence without the concern of violating national caveats. From a military

perspective this would mean that a nation like Canada would have to commit not only an

intelligence capability but also at least a small battalion group to Haiti once again. It is

worth noting that the International Crisis Group made a similar recommendation to the

United Nations Security Council in its recent report on the Haitian situation: "Increase

the military component with additions including a rapid reaction force, and intelligence

and command structures, to assure adequate security during the upcoming electoral

period and the installation of the new government."[83] While the election has passed, the

situation that predicated this recommendation has not changed, nor can we consider the

new government fully installed yet. What is lacking is a source for these resources; a

Canadian contingent of an infantry battalion, properly supported by an intelligence

component would be ideal for this task.

In addition to the lack of intelligence, Col Morneau also identified that the

military mission needs air support to ensure security in the city of Port-au-Prince.[84]

During Operation HALO, the Canadian Task Force deployed into theatre with its own

---

[82] This is an observation from the author's own experience with the MNF.
[83] International Crisis Group, "Spoiling Security in Haiti", 31 May 2005, available from
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3485&l=1 ;Internet, accessed March 04, 2006.
[84] Colonel Jacques Morneau, *Reflections on the Situation in Haiti*, 13.

helicopter support.[85] This resource proved invaluable in patrolling in urban operations as

night equipped helicopters provide a level of observation from the air that is impossible

to attain with extra troops on the ground. Without this capability United Nations troops

have thus far been ineffective in patrolling certain parts of Port-au-Prince,

> The Jordanian battalions have yet to secure Cité Soleil in Port-au-Prince
> due in part to their reluctance and refusal to patrol the slums on foot. They
> have been patrolling in armoured personnel carriers on the main streets
> only. This, combined with the fact that Cité Soleil constitutes the most
> difficult security challenge given that it consists almost exclusively slums,
> an extremely difficult terrain to patrol, means that it continues to be the
> country's main security challenge.[86]

 As Canada has not deployed helicopters to Afghanistan it appears reasonable that this

task, that was supported during the UNMIH deployment, and the deployment of the

Multi-national Interim Force in 2004 could be supported again. One of the largest

problems was the funding of the aircraft by the United Nations, which could not afford to

keep the resource.[87] This is a matter of importance as the capability is critical to the

establishment and maintenance of security in Port-au-Prince. In this case it is apparent

that Canada should offer to provide a contingent of helicopters, nationally funded, for

United Nations use in Port-au-Prince.

Thus far the problem of narcotics trans-shipment through Haiti has not been a

major concern for MINUSTAH forces. [88]   The HNP are not capable of dealing with the

problem and the trade is so lucrative for those in power that it fuels a high level of

---

[85] Canadian Forces, "*Op HALO* : Canadian Forces Commitment in Haiti" 17 Aug, 2004 available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1378; Internet 25 March, 2006.
[86] Colonel Jacques Morneau, *Reflections on the Situation in Haiti*. 9-10.
[87] From the author's personal experience in theatre.

[88] "The drug traffic, in which Haiti acts as a transhipment point for cocaine on its way from South America to the United States, goes virtually unchecked." Editorial, The Washington Post, 24 January, 2006, p. A16, available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/23/AR2006012301539.html; Internet, accessed 24 March, 2006.

corruption at all levels of government. As Tyler Cowen has written "But ultimately a Haitian politician must at least acquiesce in massive drug smuggling. A leading Haitian politician with no links to the drug trade would be like a Saudi prince with no connection to oil money -- in other words, don't believe it."[89] In order to deal effectively with the problem the concern must become part of MINUSTAH's mandate. The force, at its current strength is not resourced to deal with this issue. A solution must be found through direct cooperation between MINUSTAH and United States forces and agencies in the region already deployed against narcotics trafficking.   Making landfall on Haiti should not be a safe haven. The narcotics trade is so lucrative that it fuels corruption through all levels of Haitian government, creating a climate of corruption impossible for Haiti to break from. As most nations have already committed those forces they can to Haiti it is clear that a United Nations request for forces to deal with the drug trade in Haiti would not be well received. One of the principle reasons for United States interest in Haiti, however, is stopping the drug trade, as Jane's Magazine points out: "The other United States concern is drugs: …, where the virtual absence of a functioning administration and the corruptibility of most public officials have provided ideal conditions for organised crime to flourish.".[90] It seems only reasonable that a United Nations force, commanded by a close ally of the United States would be likely to receive United States support if the mandate to attack the drug trade was issued to that force. The result of MINUSTAH involvement in this key aspect of the Haitian problem would draw

---

[89] Tyler Cowan, "Public choice theory and Haiti" *Marginal Revolution*, March 05, 2004, available from http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2004/03/public_choice_t.html ; Internet, 30 March 2006.

[90] Jane's Magazine Online, "Haiti -Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central America And The Caribbean" 2 November, 2004, http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/CACS_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=Haiti&Prod_Name=CACS&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/cacsu/haits010.htm@current; Internet, accessed March 30, 2006.

extra external support for the mission and would also deal directly with one of the central components of corruption, a key threat to security. From a political perspective much of the anti-narcotics work could be left to United States interception outside of the mandate of the UN mission. The UN mission would provide intelligence and support with United States assets conducting the interception of the smugglers in their own territorial waters, permitting the UN mission to avoid the internal problems of directly confronting the narcotics smuggling problem during the early phases of the mission.

Another distinct problem with security and stability previously identified in this paper has been the inability of the HNP to provide the services necessary. This is due to low pay, which renders them vulnerable to corruption, low numbers and limited resources. In addition their unacceptable tactics and sometimes-brutal violation of human rights has ensured that the Haitian community no longer trusts the force.[91] The HNP has demonstrated that despite the best efforts of the international community they cannot establish themselves as a legitimate force. As the International Crisis Group Report, "Spoling Security in Haiti" points out:

> The Haitian National Police faces a critical situation. More than one year after establishment of the transitional government, the HNP seems unable to protect Haiti's citizens and a significant number of its agents continue to be deeply involved in human rights violations, crime, including violence against women, and corruption. Its poor performance has had a serious negative impact on the transition, weakening the image of the Latortue government and calling into question its ability to ensure peaceful elections.

> Many fear the HNP is increasingly a source of criminal violence, rather than an effective institution to reduce crime and guarantee public security. This trend has accelerated in the last months and threatens to generate the same hostility in citizens that developed against the army and contributed

---

[91] International Crisis Group, "Spoiling Security in Haiti, Latin America/Caribbean Report N°13 – 31 May 2005". p. 10-12.

to its dissolution. That would be a real tragedy for Haiti's fledgling democracy and could spill over onto MINUSTAH and especially CivPol.[92]

It is time to recognize that the HNP cannot be effectively established under the control of the Haitian national government. As Gerard Latortue, prior to his appointment as the head of the Interim Government of Haiti said himself:

> However, as long as the institutions of the country, particularly the Police and the Judiciary are under the control of the party in power, allowing for persecution of dissenting voices by supporters of the government, there will be no security and there will NOT be enough confidence for non-lavalas candidates to participate in the elections, even with the presence of foreign monitors.[93]

In two different but influential reports interested observers on the Haitian situation have suggested that the force be placed under the direct supervision of MINUSTAH.[94] France, recognizing the past failures of the HNP, proposed the creation of an international police force even before the commitment of the Multi-national Interim Force.[95] Such an action would require that the United Nations also fund the force. In this manner the HNP could develop into an effective policing agency as reasonable salaries would be guaranteed, the force would be free of politicization and corruption, and it could focus on guaranteeing security and stability vice the simple survival of its officers. While this is an expensive solution to the problem it is the only manner in which the HNP can be made effective in a timely manner.

---

[92] Ibid, 10.

[93] Gerard Latortue, "Haiti: Ideas for Political and Economic Development" *Inter-American Dialogue Conference*, March 13, 2003 – Washington, D.C. http://www.oplpeople.com/message/1470.html ; Internet accessed 21 April, 2006.

[94] International Crisis Group, "Spoiling Security in Haiti" 31 May, 2005, and Carlo Dade and John W. Graham "The Role for Canada in Post-Aristide Haiti: Structures, Opinions and Leadership" *Focal Canadian Foundation for the Americas* available from http://www.focal.ca/pdf/haiti_post_aristide.pdf ; Internet, accessed April 15, 2006.

[95] The Economist, "Haiti – A Coup Unfolds", 26 February, 2004 http://www.economist.com/world/la/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2463235; Internet, accessed 15 February, 2006.

Security and stability is the initial component of an effective solution to the problems in Haiti. While MINUSTAH has made strides in this area, establishing a stable environment in much of the country it is clear that there are many problems still to be dealt with. First the United Nations force must be reinforced with a capable intelligence capability and the troops who can exploit that capability. This will likely mean that those resources must be tied nationally; a caveat that restricts which nations could provide forces for the task. Canada has been able to do so in the past, although it might be stretched to do so in the future. In addition, the force needs helicopter support if it is to effectively stabilize Port-au-Prince, this is a task that Canadians are familiar with and one for which we have the available resources. One of the fundamental problems spoilers of security is the narcotics trade that breeds corruption. The Haitian government cannot deal with this problem; it must become a part of the United Nations mandate, although strong support from United States agencies will be required to make a difference. Finally the HNP is ineffective and will continue to be so unless drastic changes are made. The force is not funded, nor is it professional. As an interim measure it should be placed under the United Nations Civilian Police and the Force Commander until it is deemed capable through measures of effectiveness laid out in consultation with both the UN and the Haitian government. This will require a large influx of funding, however it is better spent for direct controlled results rather than the black hole of funding that currently characterizes the HNP. Security and stability is just the first step in providing for the effective governance of Haiti, it has not yet been achieved.

Governance

The success of the recent elections in Haiti is once again a hopeful sign for the future. However, the failures of previous administrations strongly indicate that without substantial changes the newly elected government will not be able to effectively provide the services needed by the Haitian people. Corruption seems to take hold of every Haitian administration. The reasons for this have already been explained in this paper. It is important to realize that the pressures of narcotics trafficking, limited security, a failed system of justice and a lack of economic capacity will not disappear even with the establishment of a democratic government with the best intentions. The recent successful completion of elections is just the start in the establishment of good government, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations has reported:

> The completion of the elections will only represent a first step in the political transition process and in the consolidation of democratic institutions. When the newly elected officials assume their positions, they will inherit weak state and local institutions that suffer from a lack of trained personnel and insufficient administrative infrastructure. [96]

Canada is well positioned to make a significant contribution in this area. In a report prepared for for the House of Commons Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Carlo Dade and John W. Graham wrote that the key to the creation of good governance for Haiti is control of the incoming monies from donor nations. Control of these monies is currently vested in either NGOs or the Haitian government. Control should be vested in a board composed of United Nations, Haitian and major donor

---

[96] United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti, 2 Feb, 2006*, p. 4.

representation, with disbursements being directed only at approved projects.[97] This

approach would still allow for NGOs to carry on their work apart from the governmental

process and it would also ensure control of donor monies and avoidance of corruption. It

would be important that such a solution, however be supported over the long term, as the

report explains:

> It is well known from experience with Haiti and elsewhere that
> commitment erodes and funding declines as the crisis that first precipitated
> international engagement fades from media attention. This situation has
> been avoided only when a major donor nation has taken on the
> responsibility to lead and sustain the initiative, as did Australia in East
> Timor and Norway in Sri Lanka. This is not something that the United
> Nations has proven able to do by itself. The US will be the main donor,
> but with other more pressing responsibilities and a troubled history in
> Haiti, it appears to be actively seeking another nation to assume leadership
> on Haiti. Canada is a natural candidate. Brazil already has committed
> troops to the planned long-term UN peacekeeping force. But, it is unlikely
> that Brazil would be able to offer the political leadership to guide UN
> intervention. Again, Canada has the credentials.[98]

The solution to good governance in Haiti then, would appear to be the international

communities resolve to commit funds and resources to assist with all of the issues that

have repeatedly ensured the failure of past governments. In addition, however, there is a

clear call for leadership and guidance, executed by a lead nation and supported by real

financial power, to ensure the survival of the new Haitian government. While appearing

colonial, such an arrangement would allow the new Préval government to establish itself

without the problems of invasive corruption and with a relative guarantee of donor

---

[97]"Donors should be encouraged to pool funds needed to support an interim Haitian government into a trust fund managed either by an international organization or a private firm. A board including Haitian, UN and major donor members would oversee the fund and sign off on disbursements." Carlo Dade and John W. Graham, *Focal, Canadian Foundation for the Americas*, "The Role for Canada in Post-Aristide Haiti: Structures, Opinions and Leadership".

[98] Carlo Dade and John W. Graham, *Focal, Canadian Foundation for the Americas*, "The Role for Canada in Post-Aristide Haiti: Structures, Opinions and Leadership".

monies being used to advance democratic purposes instead of enrich the Haitian elite. It

is a critical component of any workable solution to the Haitian problem.

Justice

Governance will only be successful in Haiti if the justice system is re-established

in a manner that is both credible to Haitians and effective. At the present time the court

system in Haiti is not functioning and regular violations of human rights occur at the

hands of the HNP, armed gangs, and former army rebels. These criminals are rarely

prosecuted, those who are often later released and because of the level of corruption there

is no confidence in the system. Haitian jails are full of prisoners who have been

incarcerated without due process. Those Haitian judges who do conduct court are often

subject to threats, intimidation and violence. The system has collapsed.[99] In the case of a

nation's justice system however, it is not appropriate to impose an external remedy. The

creation of United Nations courts to sit over Haitian criminal matters would not be

acceptable to the population at large, nor would it hold the moral authority necessary to

sit in judgment. Instead, what is required is the funding and protection of the Haitian

justice system. Sources of funding, including a commitment from Canada, are already

apparent, and while inadequate to ensure a modern prison system if properly invested

---

[99] Jocelyn McCalla, "Haiti: Lurching Towards 2006". 4 - 5.

could alleviate many of the problems evident in the current situation.[100] The more difficult component of the solution is the protection of courts and judges. While this may seem an elemental issue of security, dealt with through more troops or police it is not that simple. Haitian judges must be able to exercise credible impartiality to both the government and the United Nations.

The ICF has set our priorities for change to the Haitian justice system that recognize the problems with the system and the reality that it is ineffective.[101] However the ICF also envisions that changes to the Haitian system of government will occur under the authority of the Haitian government. The Haitian government has never been able to rid its judiciary of corruption, entrusting it to do so once again with the provision of foreign aid money is not a practical solution to the problem. Realistic reform will require control from outside of the extant corrupt system.

Jocelyn McCalla, in the report quoted above has called for greater control by the United Nations over the Haitian judiciary.[102] The Secretary-General of the United Nations has recommended the international community provide a far greater level of

---

[100] "Today, the partners committed US$5,655 in new resources towards the Programme of Support for Reform of the Justice System in Haiti, which will include activities in the areas of institutional strengthening, reinforcement of case-management procedures (chaîne penale), the prison system, legislative reforms and training. Of the total budget, estimated at US$11.6 million, an amount of US$5.655 million is currently committed (Can$5 million from Canada and US$1.5 million from UNDP)", United Nations Development Program Press Release, Port-au-Prince, 7 March, 2006, available from http://www.undp.org/dpa/pressrelease/releases/2006/february/haiti-070306.shtml ;Internet, accessed 31 March, 2006.
[101] "The poor functioning of institutions, the obsolescence of many laws, and the absence of basic guarantees relating to judicial authorities have led to an endemic dysfunction of the institution, which is also affected by corruption and omnipresent drug smuggling. There is also a strong dependence and politicization of the judicial branch. This problem has led to a deep mistrust of the judicial system by all citizens, within a context where access to law and justice remains difficult and random." United Nations, *Interim Cooperation Framework, Summary Report, 2004-2006,* available from http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/LACInfoClient.nsf/8d6661f6799ea8a48525673900537f95/9b4b6a763c2a18e885256ed0005dc4a9/$FILE/WholereportEnglish.pdf; Internet, accessed 12 February 2006. 14.
[102] Jocelyn McCalla, "Haiti: Lurching Towards 2006". 7.

assistance to the Haitian judiciary.[103] It is apparent that the solution must be the creation

of an international body to supervise and approve of appointments and removals of

Haitian judges, to train those judges and to provide professional advice. Such and

organization would also have to be funded to maintain the courts and to ensure the

security of judicial proceedings. As the organization must be neutral it should be

administered by the United Nations, but at arms length from the Special Representative

and the Force Commander. Such an organization need not be terribly large; it would

have to have a board to oversee appointments, a technical branch to provide expertise, a

security branch to protect judges and an audit branch to provide reports on progress and

implementation. It would require sufficient funds to operate and to initially pay the

salaries of the Haitian judiciary. While this solution would not solve the problems of

prison reform in Haiti it would at least ensure that the provisions of normal justice are at

least exercised and would reduce the threat and corruption evident in the current system

of Haitian justice. It would also avoid the imposition of foreign judges, a solution that

would serve only to alienate the Haitian people from the United Nations. The creation of

a judicial support organization under the United Nations would provide the Haitian

government with a credible source of justice, something that does not exist now and is

unlikely to create itself in the near future without significant international intervention.

---

[103] United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti, 2 February, 2006*. 10.

Development

The most critical component of international help needed in Haiti is development. Twice interventions in Haiti have left the country in relative peace only to see that condition evaporate with rapidity due to a lack of economic stability. Haiti has been, for much of its history, a predatory state.[104] The powerful take from the poor for their own self-interest. This state of affairs results in permanent corruption, national poverty, disenchantment, leading inevitably to violence and the overthrow of the government. The very nature of the Haitian economy discourages development, as Johanna Mendelson-Forman, director of the United Nations Foundation's Peace, Security and Human Rights Programme explains: "The main sources of income in the Caribbean nation are remittances sent by relatives living abroad, followed in second place by drug trafficking, weapons trafficking and other criminal activity like kidnapping,..."[105] Even during the period when foreign aid and remittances from the Haitian diaspora were the lowest they were still a significant part of the Haitian economy as Figure 1 shows:

---

[104] Jennifer McCoy in her introduction to Haiti Renewed defined the predatory state thus, "For nearly 200 years Haiti was a classic predatory state. The state preyed on its people without providing political or economic goods. Lacking accountability, governments used their power to destroy rather that to create." Jennifer McCoy, "Introduction: Dismantling the Predatory State – The Conference Report". 1.

[105] Marcela Valente, 'Development-Haiti:A Non-Military Solution" IPS News, March 16, 2005 available from http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=32534; Internet, accessed, March 18, 2006.

G D P   2 0 0 2

□ foreign aid 4%   ■ diaspora money 19%   ■ 77%

Figure 1.[106]

 The Haitian economy does not support its population. While Haiti has many needs none

is more critical than economic development. For many years international donors have

tried different solutions, with repetitive failure resulting in donor fatigue.[107] The

international community has poured millions of dollars of aid directly into Haiti to be

administered by the Haitian government. During periods of poor government sanctions

have been applied. During the recent crisis funding was channeled through NGOs to

avoid putting it into the hands of corrupt government officials, a policy that was both

[106] United Nations, *Interim Cooperation Framework*, *Summary Report*, *2004-2006*, available from http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/LACInfoClient.nsf/8d6661f6799ea8a48525673900537f95/9b4b6a763c2a18e885256ed0005dc4a9/$FILE/WholereportEnglish.pdf; Internet, accessed 12 February 2006. 3-4.
[107] "Conditionality, the earmarking of funds to specific sectors and the provision of additional funding based on results, is a contested aid instrument in unstable and difficult environments. Haiti exemplifies some of the negative consequences of conditionality for both recipient and donor. 1994 to 1997 was marked by donor-driven reform agendas and conditionality-based financing in Haiti. Results from this period are unsurprising. Donor-driven agendas contributed to poor commitment and ineffective implementation on the part of the Government of Haiti and to frustration and 'Haiti fatigue' for the donor community. This in turn contributed to the withdrawal of some donor agencies." Canadian International Development Agency, *Canadian Cooperation With Haiti:Reflecting on a Decade of "Difficult Partnership "*, December 2004, available from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/45/34095943.pdf Internet; 19 March, 2006. 11.

applauded and criticized.[108] During the United States occupation the United States

directly controlled the development of the island's economy.[109] Most recently the UNDP

has been a major conduit of aid funds for the Haitian government.[110] The current

approach, that of funneling aid money and projects largely through the UNDP and NGOs

appears to be the best solution to the problem of distributing aid.[111] This solution

deserves the opportunity to progress with international support as it provides the distance

required from Haitian government intervention while still allowing Haitian direction of

aid money to those projects deemed the most essential. It has been recently announced

that this is the manner in which Canada intends to continue with its development

assistance to Haiti.[112] There have been a number of successful projects that combine the

resolution to a number of problems. The Organization for the Rehabilitation of the

Environment for example has been working with Haitian farmers to create high-profit

fruit orchards quickly. Solutions like this combine rural economic well-being with the

critical requirement to remediate Haiti's deforestation problem.[113] While NGO solutions

---

[108] Daniel P. Erikson, "Haiti: Challenges in Development Assistance" Inter-American Dialogue, Haiti – Conference Report, October 2002, available from http://www.thedialogue.org/publications/country_studies/Haiti_erikson.pdf ; Internet, 23 March, 2006. 6.
[109] Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1914-1934*. 13.
[110] United Nations Development Program, *Plan-Cadre des Nations-Unies pour l'Aide au Développement 2002 – 2006*, available from http://www.ht.undp.org/UNDAF/CD%20PNUD/UNDAF/UNDAF%20FRAMESTTEST.HTM ; Internet, accessed 23 March, 2006.

[111] "Haiti represented the first time that a UN peacekeeping mission integrated economic programs run by the UNDP into its command structure. Especially in situations where poverty is a root cause of conflict, this model is promising" Chetan Kumar and Elizabeth M. Cousens *Policy Briefing: Peacebuilding in Haiti*, International Peace Academy, available from http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Research/PublRepoReseHaitPrint.htm#economy; Internet, accessed April 3 2006.
[112] Yves Petillon, Director of the Canadian International Development Agency's Americas Branch as reported in Sarah McGregor, Sticking with Haiti, *Embassy*, March 1, 2006, available from http://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php?display=story&full_path=/2006/march/1/haiti/ ; Internet, accessed 1 April, 2006.
[113] For an overview of the ORE project see http://www.oreworld.org/.

are an important part of the solution the Haitian economic problem is so vast that it will

require enormous commercial external investment. It must be noted that the funneling of

money through NGOs has the disadvantage of only being used in the manner specifically

designated by the NGO. While this addresses many important needs such a commitment

normally deals with a specific problem, not with the larger concern of generating a

national economic recovery.

The problem that must be addressed now is how to attract international business

to the island. Haiti cannot survive on aid money alone, it needs outside investment into

profitable ventures if it is to recover.   In 2003 Gerard Latortue provided some ideas of

where investment in Haiti might be successful, including tourism, cash fruit crops and

assembly manufacturing.[114] Key to two of these ideas is foreign investment and security.

While limited tourism is already starting to re-emerge in Haiti, Royal Caribbean Cruise

Lines currently uses one area in Haiti as a day stop on its cruises,[115] it is an

underdeveloped area that Haiti could take advantage of. While the idea of North

American tourists flying into Port-au-Prince for Haitian vacations the idea of creating

easily secured coastal resorts accessible by major cruise lines would bring some foreign

capital into Haiti and would provide the genesis of a tourist industry. It will be a key

realization for the Haitian government that they will initially draw in little cash during the

development of such an industry; nonetheless it has the potential to be a key area of

development. One need only examine the importance of the tourist industry to Haiti's

much better off neighbour, the Dominican Republic, where tourism accounts for

---

[114] Gerard LaTortue, "Haiti: Ideas for Political and Economic Development"

[115] Danna Harman, "Could this paradise really be poor, desperate Haiti?" *The Christian Science Monitor* Jan 25, 2006, available from http://www.wehaitians.com/could%20this%20paradise%20really%20be%20poor%20desperate%20haiti.html; Internet, accessed 1 April, 2006.

approximately 12% of the GDP.[116] Haiti has the potential to exploit its tourism potential

if it can ensure the security of tourist locations. The creation of assembly plants would

exploit Haiti's abundant supply of unskilled labour. Unfortunately the security of plants

in the higher population areas would be impossible to guarantee. It is difficult to imagine

large foreign investment into an area where that investment would be completely lost if

the country were to collapse again. The Haitian government cannot provide guarantees

of security. Significant investment in Haiti may therefore require that donor nations

provide the initial capital investment to be managed on a profit-taking basis by civilian

firms. While this would initiate a slow process of development it is likely the only

manner in which to attract investment in Haiti given the current situation.

The solution to initiating Haitian development rests with the correct use of donor

money. The development of agriculture to support the dual purpose of re-forestation, the

creation of a tourist industry and direct investment by donor nations into light industry

are three areas in which development could be initiated that would stimulate initial

growth. Once initial growth has commenced, opportunities in the service industry must

be reserved for local Haitian investors. The ability of foreign investors to provide

services for profits and take significant profits out of Haiti would negatively impact on

initial growth. The monitoring of these policies would be the exclusive purview of the

Haitian government although it will need significant support and analytical capability

from key donor nations.   It is clear that leadership outside of the Haitian government is

---

[116] Megan Epler Wood, , "Inter-American Development Bank Sustainable Tourism Policies & Directions", Interview with: Asunción Aguilá, Chief of the Environment and Natural Resources Division; Antonio Vives, Deputy Manager for Private Enterprise and Financial Markets in the Sustainable Development Department and Carmen Altes, Tourism Consultant in the Environment and Natural Resources Division, *Planeta*, Oct 14, 2005, available from http://www.planeta.com/planeta/05/0504bankidb.html; Internet, accessed 1 April, 2006.

needed, although that leadership must be fully integrated with the Haitian government. While the UNDP and NGOs can provide direction on aid money, significant investment from donor nations will be needed to stimulate the kind of economic growth that will initiate Haitian recovery. In this case the key foreign nations that must assist are France, Canada and the United States. It is important that these three nations provide not only the investment but also the management through the creation of a multi-national commission with input from the Haitian government, an idea that was already discussed above. Only with a significant, direct, guaranteed and well-managed development program will it be possible to stimulate Haitian economic regeneration. This approach will also have the advantage of relieving donor fatigue, as control of the investments will be vested in those authorities providing the money, with the profits being used to offset the investment. While it is a colonial approach, one that appears to exploit cheap Haitian labour, it is the spin-offs that will provide the impetus needed in the Haitian economy. The management of these investments will have to rest in the hands of the board for a significant period of time, decades at least, until they are profitable and secure. The arrangement will have to be guaranteed in Haitian law to avoid problems of nationalization and over-taxation. Canada, as one of the major donors to Haitian development and as the only one of the three major donors not to have a previous colonial relationship with Haiti has a key role to play in an arrangement of this nature, specifically in the Chairmanship of such an organization. This would assist in the palatability of a foreign board controlling investment in Haiti with the Haitian government.

Donor money is the primary impetus Haiti has to re-start its economy; in the past it has been poorly managed by the Haitian government and tied to very specific projects

when funneled through NGOs. It is time for a very directive approach that exploits the

expertise available in those donor nations willing to invest in Haiti.

 Conclusion

        Many of the problems with the current intervention in Haiti are based on a lack of

resources. As this part of the paper has shown, MINUSTAH needs reinforcement in

many areas, the justice system needs significant investment if it is to become credible and

the Haitian economy needs dramatic amounts of investment if it is to provide for the

needs of the people. It is only now that re-investment in Haiti is making up for the

decrease suffered during the period of economic sanctions between 1994 and 2002 when

foreign aid plummeted as Figure 2 shows:

Figure 2[117]

 The ability of the Haitian government to govern is predicated on the infusion of all of

these resources. Solving Haiti's problems will be expensive. However, it is not just

---

[117] United Nations, *Interim Cooperation Framework*, *Summary Report, 2004-2006*. 3.

resources that are needed. Previous assistance from the international community has been squandered through corruption and mis-management. The Haitian government has repeatedly failed to create the conditions necessary for the recovery of the state. This paper has demonstrated that there is a need for far greater leadership from donor nations in the actual application of resources to resolve the Haitian problem. Haitian input is critical in this process but external leadership will be the primary means in which to obtain success. The creation of a board of governors tasked with the management of donor funds and Haitian economic development appears to be a reasonable solution that removes the spectre of governmental corruption while providing the necessary management expertise. This is another potential role for Canadian leadership as one of the principle donor states to Haiti and as an interested country that has never had colonial designs on the nations. Haiti needs the guarantee of security that can only be provided with appropriate resources and equipment, a role Canada has taken on before and one we should consider doing so again. It is possible that Brazil will not remain as the lead nation in MINUSTAH indefinitely,[118] Canada should be ready not only to reinforce MINUSTAH with a credible contribution but also should be prepared to assume the lead should Brazil withdraw. In addition, it is clear that the HNP cannot be successfully developed under Haitian authority; it should be removed from Haitian governmental influence and placed under the control of MINUSTAH. Finally Haiti needs to ensure the complete reconstruction of its justice system. This will require a lead nation to accept

---

[118] In addition the UN intervention in Haiti is heavily reliant on the provision of troops and leadership from Brazil, a situation that may not last much longer. Despite Brazilian reassurances that their troops will stay as long as needed in Haiti concern over their withdrawal led President elect René Préval to call on the Brazilian government to keep their troops in Haiti during his recent visit to Brasilia. Bloomberg, "Haiti's Preval Calls on Brazil-Led Forces to Stay", *kwabs news*, March 10, 2006, available from http://www.kwabs.com/artman/publish/article_3167.shtml; Internet, accessed 18 March, 2006.

responsibility for the training of the judges and the security of the system. Canada is already heavily involved in the area of justice reform in Haiti and is in a strong position to take on the role of lead nation in this regard. All of the possible tasks mentioned in this portion of the paper are beyond the capabilities of one nation. Canada cannot afford to re-build Haiti itself. Canada can, however, provide leadership in a number of areas as a lead nation that would benefit Haiti. Resources for many of these tasks will be more readily available through principle donor countries like France and the United States if there is more confidence in the manner in which the resources will be managed, confidence that Canadian leadership can provide.

CONCLUSION

Interventions in Haiti have repeatedly failed. Critical lessons have been taken from each intervention and in many cases they have been recorded but not applied. The world still expects leadership on the Haitian problem from the regional hegemony, the United States. While the United States maintains direct influence in Haiti and has significant concerns with the development of that state the current world situation makes it very apparent that the United States is not in a position to provide the level of leadership needed to ensure Haitian recovery. As a former colonial power the degree of control needed to execute the requisite changes in Haiti would not be acceptable to Haitians if it were exercised by the United States. The United Nations has once again taken on the mantle of responsibility for Haiti through the ICF and its in-country mission. The MINUSTAH mission and the UNDP are working diligently to provide the resources and the guidance needed to ensure the future success of Haiti. The United Nations, however, has failed in the past when it was forced to withdraw after donor fatigue and lack of international interest allowed Haiti to degenerate into violence and corruption. Haiti runs the risk of the same fate if the Haitian government is allowed to manage the in-flow of resources through the ICF. Corruption has not disappeared with diplomatic elections; it must be eradicated through long-term efforts. The Haitian government has failed in this task in the past, there is no credible reason to believe it will succeed in the future. Another organization must lead, with the full participation of the elected government.

One lesson stands out from previous interventions; a credible lead nation must accept responsibility for the Haitian problem. It is equally clear from the evidence presented in this paper that any nation that would accept such a mantle of responsibility must do so out of its own national interest. Canada has a strong national interest in Haiti. Haiti represents a potential security threat through the transshipment of narcotics and the potential for Haitian violence to be exported to Canadian cities. Canada has identified a moral responsibility for resolution of the Haitian problem. Finally accepting more responsibility for resolving the situation in Haiti would alleviate some of the pressure on an already over-burdened United States, strengthening our ties with that nation, a reality that Canadians may not want to accept but one that is fundamental to our success as a nation. Canada is in a unique position to provide direct leadership and resources to help solve many of the problems that plague Haiti. Canada is strengthening its military to provide for missions in addition to the commitment in Afghanistan. A battalion commitment to Haiti is not far removed from our current capabilities. We have experience in Haiti from our continued participation in United Nations missions and aid programs. The Haitians accept Canadians far easier than they accept intervention from former colonial powers like the United States and France. Canada has a fundamental foreign affairs doctrine that is tailor made to deal with the issues in Haiti, the 3D&T approach. It is not those resources most scarce to Canada, military ones, which are most needed in Haiti. Rather Haiti needs leadership in the development sector, expertise in re-creating a justice system and resources to help re-build and lead the HNP.

Canada is in a unique place in the world community to accept responsibility for solving the Haitian crisis. What is needed is an unequivocal commitment from the

Canadian government that it will accept such responsibility by announcing that we will accept the leadership of the MINUSTAH mission and the post of Special Representative for the Secretary General if Brazil withdraws. This would provide Brazil with an acceptable exit strategy and would ensure that Canada becomes the new lead nation in Haiti. Haiti is a regional responsibility. Canada has always advocated that the best approach to the resolution of problems is from within the region. Haiti is within our region. The other powerful nations in the region cannot provide the leadership needed to resolve the Haitian problem. The United States because another unilateral intervention is not acceptable either domestically or to the rest of the world and Brazil as it simply does not possess the hard won expertise of Canada in a myriad of missions over the past 50 years. The best solution to the Haitian crisis involves not just Canadian participation, but Canadian leadership.

It is clear from the information presented in this paper that an exclusive "Made in Haiti" solution has not worked. The current UN intervention has many positive aspects upon which to build, but it requires leadership in all disciplines from outside of that organization. Leadership that must come from an interested nation, one that has strong national reasons for being involved, and one that has the expertise, resources and experience to take on the task. This paper has demonstrated that both Canada and Haiti would benefit from Canada accepting the mantle of lead nation for the UN intervention in Haiti. Canada's doctrine of 3D&T is strongly applicable to the Haitian situation, we have significant experience in the type of civilian and military operations required in the country and our own national interest clearly indicates that pursuing a resolution to the Haitian situation is important to our nation. Such action would strengthen our ties with

our most important partner, the United States, would reinforce our support of the UN

during a very troubled period and would be popular with the domestic Haitian diaspora.

As Canada has already committed enormous resources to Haiti in the past and is likely to

continue contributing in the future it is also in our best interests to ensure that those

resources are wisely used, to eventually provide the return on investment of a secure and

stable Haiti that contributes to the economy of the hemisphere vice existing as a state

addicted to foreign aid. Governmental acceptance of an expanded Canadian role in Haiti

is important in the near term, as it will signal that Canada is committed to a new course of

action in the world and it will announce that Canada is once again a credible power

within the region.

Annex A – UN Missions in Haiti

	UN MISSIONS IN HAITI 1993 - Present	
MISSION	MANDATE	DATES
International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH)	Verify respect for human rights as laid down in the Haitian Constitution and the international instruments to which Haiti was a party.[119]	Established February 1993 – departed 2000
United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)	Assist in modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and establishing a new police force After the restoration, in October 1994, of the Haitian Constitutional Government with the help of a multinational force led by the United States and authorized by the Security Council, UNMIH's mandate was revised by the Security Council [resolutions 940 (1994) and 975 (1995)] to enable the Mission to assist the democratic Government of Haiti in fulfilling its responsibilities in connection with: sustaining a secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase and protecting international personnel and key installations; and the professionalization of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force. UNMIH was also to assist the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti in establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections to be called by those authorities.[120]	23 September 1993 - 30 June 1996
United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)	Assistance to the Haitian authorities in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police; Assistance to the Haitian authorities in maintaining a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of the current efforts to establish and train an effective national police force; Coordination of activities by the United Nations system to promote institution-building, national	28 June 1996 – 31 July 1997

---

[119] International Peace Academy, *Lessons Learnced: Peacebuilding in Haiti*, IPA Seminar Report 23-24 January 2002, New York City available from http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/LESSONS_LEARNED.pdf; Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.
[120] United Nations, *United Nations Mission in Haiti*, available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmih.htm; Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.

	reconciliation and economic rehabilitation in Haiti.[121]	
United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)	To assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP). Tasks of UNTMIH's police element included training HNP specialized units in crowd control, the rapid reaction force and Palace security, areas considered to be of distinct importance. Once reinforced, these units would considerably improve HNP's effectiveness while it pursued its own development. UNTMIH and the United Nations Development Programme continued preparation of an assistance programme to provide HNP with law enforcement expertise. Tasks of UNTMIH's military security element included ensuring, under the authority of the Force Commander, the safety and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel implementing the mandate. The Special Representative continued to coordinate the activities of the United Nations system to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation.[122]	August 1997 - November 1997
United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)	To assist the Government of Haiti in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police. MIPONUH, which succeeded the previous United Nations Missions in Haiti in December 1997, placed special emphasis on assistance at the supervisory level and on training specialized police units. Other tasks included mentoring police performance, guiding police agents in their day-to-day duties and maintaining close coordination with technical advisers to the Haitian National Police funded by the United Nations Development Programme and bilateral donors. MIPONUH's special police unit was tasked with providing assistance to MIPONUH personnel and protecting its property.[123]	December 1997 - March 2000
International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH)	To consolidate the results achieved by MIPONUH and its predecessor missions of the United Nations in Haiti as well as by the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), …. The new mission is tasked with further promoting human rights and reinforcing the institutional effectiveness of the Haitian police and the judiciary, and with	16 March 2000 -

[121] United Nations, *United Nations Support Mission in Haiti*, available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsmihmandate.html; Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.

[122] United Nations, *United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti*, available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untmih.htm; Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.

[123] United Nations, *United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti*, available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/miponuh.htm; Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.

	coordinating and facilitating the international community's dialogue with political and social actors in Haiti.[124]	
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	Secure and Stable Environment: (*a*) in support of the Transitional Government, to ensure a secure and stable environment within which the constitutional and political process in Haiti can take place; (*b*) to assist the Transitional Government in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police consistent with democratic policing standards, including through the vetting and certification of its personnel, advising on its reorganization and training, including gender training, as well as monitoring/mentoring members of the Haitian National Police; (*c*) to assist the Transitional Government, particularly the Haitian National Police, with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes for all armed groups, including women and children associated with such groups, as well as weapons control and public security measures; (*d*) to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti through the provision inter alia of operational support to the Haitian National Police and the Haitian Coast Guard, as well as with their institutional strengthening, including the re-establishment of the corrections system; (*e*) to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensure movement of its personnel, taking into account the primary responsibility of the Transitional Government in that regard;	1 June 2004 - Present

---

[124] Ibid.

| | (*f*) to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Transitional Government and of police authorities;

Political Process:

(*a*) to support the constitutional and political process under way in Haiti, including through good offices, and foster principles and democratic governance and institutional development;

(*b*) to assist the Transitional Government in its efforts to bring about a process of national dialogue and reconciliation;

(*c*) to assist the Transitional Government in its efforts to organize, monitor, and carry out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections at the earliest possible date, in particular through the provision of technical,
       and continued security, with appropriate support to an electoral process with voter participation that is representative of the national demographics, including women;

(*d*) to assist the Transitional Government in extending State authority throughout Haiti and support good governance at local levels;

III. Human Rights:

(*a*) to support the Transitional Government as well as Haitian human rights institutions and groups in their efforts to promote and protect human rights, particularly of women and children, in order to ensure individual accountability for human rights abuses and redress for victims;

(*b*) to monitor and report on the human rights situation, in cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, including on the situation of returned refugees and displaced persons;

The Council also requested that MINUSTAH cooperate and coordinate with | |

	the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in carrying out its mandate[125]	

[125] United Nations, *United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti*, available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/;   Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.

Bibliography

BOOKS

Ballard, John R., *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti 1994-1997*, Praeger Publishers: Westport CT,1998.

Catanese, Anthony V., "Priorities in the Economic Reconstruction of Rural Haiti" 189-198, in *Haiti Renewed, Political and Economic Prospects* ed. Robert I Rotberg, Brookings Institute Press, Washington, DC., 1997.

Diamond, Jared, *Collapse, How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*. New York: Viking, 2005.

Kumar, Chetan, "Peacebuilding in Haiti" 21-52, *Peacebuilding as Politics, Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies* ed. Elizbeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kuma, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 2001.

Laguerre, Michel S., "The Role of the Diaspora in Haitian Politics" 170-182 in *Haiti Renewed, Political and Economic Prospects* ed. Robert I Rotberg, Brookings Institute Press, Washington, DC., 1997.

Lundahl, Mas, "The Haitian Dilemma Reexamined: Lessons from the Past in the Light of Some New Economic Theory" in *Haiti Renewed, Political and Economic Prospects* ed. Robert I Rotberg, 60-92, Brookings Institute Press, Washington, DC., 1997.

McCoy, Jennifer L, "Introduction: Dismantling the Predatory State – The Conference Report" in *Haiti Renewed, Political and Economic Prospects* ed. Robert I Rotberg, 1-26, Brookings Institute Press, Washington, DC: 1997.

Schmidt, Hans, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1914-1934*, Rutgers University Press, New Jersey: 1971.

Shawcross, William, *Deliver Us From Evil*, Toronto: Simon & Schuster, 2000.
United Nations, *The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, 3rd Edition, United Nations: New York, 1996.

JOURNAL ARTICLES

Nye, Joseph S. "U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1, 2003.

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

Freeze, Colin, "Canada must do more for Haiti, Annan says" *Globe and Mail*, March 8, 2004, A8.

Knox, Paul, "Aristide's fate must not be left to the thugs and cynics" *Globe and Mail*, February 25, 2004, p. A21

INTERNET SOURCES

Bloomberg, "Haiti's Preval Calls on Brazil-Led Forces to Stay", *kwabs news*, March 10, 2006, available from http://www.kwabs.com/artman/publish/article_3167.shtml; Internet, accessed 18 March, 2006.

Caistor, Nick, BBC News, "Haiti's Drug Money Scourge" 19 March 2004 available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3524444.stm; Internet, accessed 12 March 2006.

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "An Interview with Koffi Annan" CBC News Sunday, March 8, 2004, available from http://www.cbc.ca/sunday/kofiannan.html; Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.

Canada, Canadian Forces, "*Op HALO*: Canadian Forces Commitment in Haiti" 17 Aug, 2004 available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1378; Internet 25 March, 2006.

Canada, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, *2004 Report on Organized Crime in Canada* available from http://www.cisc.gc.ca/annual_reports/annual_report2004/frontpage_2004_e.htm; Internet, accessed 14 March, 2006.

Canada, Canadian International Development Agency, *Canadian Cooperation With Haiti:Reflecting on a Decade of "Difficult Partnership"* December 2004, available from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/45/34095943.pdf Internet; 19 March, 2006.

Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/IPS/IPS-Overview.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 April 2006.

Canada, *Securing an Open Society Canada's National Security Policy*, available from http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/Publications/NatSecurnat/natsecurnat_e.pdf ; Internet, accessed 2 March 2006.

Canada, Office of the Auditor General, *Report of the Office of the Auditor General 2001*, available from http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/0111ce.html; Internet, accessed 12 March, 2006.

Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Drug Analysis Section, Criminal Analysis Branch, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, *Drug Situation in Canada – 2001* dated April 2002, available from http://www.rcmp.ca/crimint/drugs_2001_e.htm; Internet, 12 March, 2006.

Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade of December 2002, *Third Report*, Bernard Patry, MP, Chair; available from http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/2/FAIT/Studies/Reports/faitrp03/17-conc-e.htm; Internet accessed March 14, 2006.

Caputo, Dante, "Governor's Island Accord" July 3, 1993, available from http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/kretchik/appendixd.asp; Internet, accessed 20 March 2006.

CNN, "Preval declared winner of Haiti vote" Feb 17, 2006, available from http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/americas/02/16/haiti/?eref=yahoo, Internet, accessed March 14, 2006.

Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada*, *Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform 2006*, available from http://www.conservative.ca/media/20060113-Platform.pdf ; Internet; accessed 2 April 2006.

Cowan, Tyler, "Public choice theory and Haiti" *Marginal Revolution*, March 05, 2004, available from http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2004/03/public_choice_t.html ; Internet, 30 March 2006.

CTV News, "Canada sending 100 police to Haiti mission" July 6, 2004, available from http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1089140391116_84549591?s_name=&no_ads; Internet, accessed 14 March 2006.

CTV News, "Montreal Haitians prepare to rally storm relief" September 22, 2004 available from http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1095810168418_34?hub=Canada; Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.

Dade, Carlo and John W. Graham "The Role for Canada in Post-Aristide Haiti: Structures, Opinions and Leadership" *Focal*, *Canadian Foundation for the Americas* available from http://www.focal.ca/pdf/haiti_post_aristide.pdf ; Internet, accessed April 15, 2006.

Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières "Escalating Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti Inflicts Heavy Civilian Toll, MSF Calls on All Armed Groups in Haiti's Capital to Respect Safety of Civilians and Allow their Immediate Access to Emergency Medical Care" Jan 19, 2006; available from, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/pr/2006/01-19-2006.cfm; Internet, March 24, 2006.

The Economist, "Haiti – A Coup Unfolds", 26 February 2004 http://www.economist.com/world/la/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2463235; Internet, accessed 15 February, 2006.

Eland, Ivan, "Déjà vu All Over Again in Haiti" *The Independent Institute*, March 2, 2004 http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1270 ; Internet, accessed 29 March 2006.

Erikson, Daniel P., "Haiti: Challenges in Development Assistance" Inter-American Dialogue, Haiti – Conference Report, October 2002, available from http://www.thedialogue.org/publications/country_studies/Haiti_erikson.pdf ; Internet, 23 March, 2006.

Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, published in *Foreign Policy*, "The Failed States Index" July/August 2005 available from, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3098; Internet, accessed 13 March, 2006.

Griffin, Thomas M., "Haiti, Human Rights Investigation, November 11-21, 2004" Jan 14, 2005 available from http://www.law.miami.edu/cshr/CSHR_Report_02082005_v2.pdf ; Internet accessed March 6, 2006.

Grossman, Marc, US Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs**, *Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, Washington, DC, July 15, 2003, available from http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/22490.htm ; Internet, 14 March, 2006.

Harman, Danna, "Could this paradise really be poor, desperate Haiti?" *The Christian Science Monitor* Jan 25, 2006, available from http://www.wehaitians.com/could%20this%20paradise%20really%20be%20poor%20desperate%20haiti.html; Internet, accessed 1 April, 2006.

Harman, Danna, "Haitian migrants face rising backlash next door" *Christian Science Monitor*, Vol 98, Issue 40 24 Jan, 2006, available from http://web104.epnet.com; Internet, accessed 24 March, 2006.

International Crisis Group, "Spoiling Security in Haiti", 31 May, 2005, available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3485&l=1 ;Internet, accessed March 04, 2006

International Peace Academy, *Lessons Learnced: Peacebuilding in Haiti*, IPA Seminar Report 23-24 January 2002, New York City available from http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/LESSONS_LEARNED.pdf; Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.

Isykan, Kim, "Why Is Haiti Such a Mess? It takes a rebellion to get America's attention." *Slate*, available from http://www.slate.com/id/2097722/; Internet; accessed March 24, 2004.

Jane's Magazine Online, "Haiti -Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central America And The Caribbean" 2 November 2004, http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/CACS_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=Haiti&Prod_Name=CACS&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/cacsu/haits010.htm@current; Internet, accessed March 30, 2006.

Jones, Holly Manges, "Interim Haiti PM orders government corruption probe"**,** *Jurist, Legal News and Research*, available from http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/04/interim-haiti-pm-orders-government.php; Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.

Kerns, Fleurimond W. translated by Greg Dunkel, "The Haitian Flag – Birth of a Symbol" May 18, 2003; available from http://www.iacenter.org/haiti/flag.htm; Internet; accessed 19 March 2006.

Kumar, Chetan and Elizabeth M. Cousens *Policy Briefing: Peacebuilding in Haiti*, International Peace Academy, available from http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Research/PublRepoReseHaitPrint.htm#economy; Internet, accessed April 3 2006.

Latortue, Gerard, "Haiti: Ideas for Political and Economic Development" *Inter-American Dialogue Conference*, March 13, 2003 – Washington, D.C. http://www.oplpeople.com/message/1470.html; Internet accessed 21 April, 2006.

Maclean's Magazine, "Accusing Canada of Corruption" March 6, 2006 available from http://www.macleans.ca/topstories/world/article.jsp?content=20060306_122761_122761#continue; Internet, accessed 14 March 2006.

McCalla, Jocelyn, "Haiti :Lurching Towards 2006" *National Coalition for Haitian Rights*, November 2005, available from http://www.nchr.org/reports/lurching2006.pdf; Internet, accessed 31 March, 2006.

Milne, Glen, "Objectives, Decision-Making and Lessons Learned for the Canadian Peace-Keeping Operation in Haiti, 2003-2005", Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada; available from http://www.ndu.edu/chds/journal/PDF/2005/Milne_article-edited.pdf; Internet accessed 8 Feb, 2006.

New York Times, " Stumbling forward in Haiti", February 17, 2006, available from http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/17/opinion/edhaiti.php; Internet, accessed March 11, 2006.

McGregor, Sarah, Sticking with Haiti, *Embassy*, March 1, 2006, available from http://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php?display=story&full_path=/2006/march/1/haiti/ ; Internet, accessed 1 April, 2006.

Noriega, Roger F., "Haiti at the Crossroads of Democracy", available from http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/7ed7186e73a70acec1256e77004a302a; Internet, accessed 11 March 2006.

Organization for the Rehabilitation of the Environment, http://www.oreworld.org/; Internet, accessed 17 March 2006.

PBS Online, "Election Protests in Haiti" 14 Feb, 2006, available from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/jan-june06/haiti_2-14.html; Internet accessed March 14, 2006.

Preeg, Ernest H., *Haiti Democracy Project*, 16 June 2004, "Why Haiti Is Not a Failed State" available from http://haitipolicy.org/content/2430.htm; Internet accessed March 11, 2006.

Prest, Stewart *Upheaval in Haiti: The Criminal Threat to Canada, A Background Study* June 2005 available from http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/haiticriminalthreat.pdf; Internet, accessed March 12, 2006.

Préval, René, *Letter dated 29 October 1997 from President René Préval to the Secretary-General* in *Report of the Secretary-general on the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti*, available from, http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1997/documentation/security/s-1997-832.htm; Internet, accessed 3 March 2006.

Rudd, David, "What to do about Haiti?" *Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies Commentary*, March 2004, available from http://www.ciss.ca/Comment_Haiti.htm; Internet, accessed March 23, 2006.

Tupy, Marian L., "Haiti: Will We Ever Learn?" *The CATO Institute*, March 04, 2004 available from http://www.cato.org/dailys/03-04-04-2.html; Internet, accessed 29 March, 2006.

United Nations, *Interim Cooperation Framework, Summary Report, 2004-2006*, available from http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/LACInfoClient.nsf/8d6661f6799ea8a48525 673900537f95/9b4b6a763c2a18e885256ed0005dc4a9/$FILE/WholereportEnglish .pdf; Internet, accessed 12 February 2006.

United Nations, *United Nations Mission in Haiti*, available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmih.htm; Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.

United Nations, *United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti*, available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/miponuh.htm;   Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.

United Nations, *United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti*, available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/;   Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.

United Nations, *United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti*, available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untmih.htm;   Internet, accessed 23 April, 2006.

United Nations, *Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, 2 Feb 2006*; available from, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.htm; Internet, accessed 24 March, 2006.

United Nations, United Nations Development Program Press Release, Port-au-Prince, 7 March, 2006, available from http://www.undp.org/dpa/pressrelease/releases/2006/february/haiti-070306.shtml ; Internet, accessed 31 March, 2006.

United Nations Development Program, *Plan-Cadre des Nations-Unies pour l'Aide au Dévelopement 2002 – 2006*, available from http://www.ht.undp.org/UNDAF/CD%20PNUD/UNDAF/UNDAF%20FRAMES TTEST.HTM ; Internet, accessed 23 March, 2006.

United Nations, *United Nations Security Council Resolution 940*, 31 July 1994, available from http://www.thewednesdayreport.com/twr/Haiti/pdf/N9431222.pdf; Internet, accessed March 12 2006.

United Nations, *Governors Island Agreement, 1994* available from the Combined Arms
    Research Library, Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth Kansas
    http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/kretchik/appendixd.asp; Internet,
    accessed 12 September 2004.

United States Government, *Inquiry Into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and The
    Dominican Republic, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Report No. 794, April
    20, 1922, Appendix B*, available from
    http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/haiti_inquiry.htm ; Internet, accessed
    17 March, 2006.

United States Government, *Haiti – The United States Occupation 1915-1934*, Library of
    Congress document available from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/httoc.html;
    Internet, accessed March 19, 2006.

United States Government, Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement on Haiti" 28
    February 2004 available from
    http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040228-2.html; Internet, 14
    March, 2006.

United States Congress, "Haiti – A Country Study - Christophe's Kingdom and Pétion's
    Republic", available from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/httoc.html; Internet;
    accessed March 19, 2006.

Valente, Marcela, 'Development-Haiti:A Non-Military Solution" IPS News, March 16,
    2005 available from http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=32534; Internet,
    accessed, March 18, 2006.

Washington Post, 24 Jan, 2006, p. A16, available from
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
    dyn/content/article/2006/01/23/AR2006012301539.html; Internet, accessed 24
    March, 2006.

Weiner, Tim and Lydia Polgreen, "Rebels Threatened to Attack Capital
     Unless Leader Resigned", *The New York Times*, Sunday 29 February 2004,
    available from http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/6/3731;
    Internet, accessed 15 March, 2006.

Wood, Megan Epler, , "Inter-American Development Bank Sustainable Tourism Policies
    & Directions", Interview with: Asunción Aguilá, Chief of the Environment and
    Natural Resources Division; Antonio Vives, Deputy Manager for Private
    Enterprise and Financial Markets in the Sustainable Development Department and
    Carmen Altes, Tourism Consultant in the Environment and Natural Resources
    Division, *Planeta*, Oct 14, 2005, available from
    http://www.planeta.com/planeta/05/0504bankidb.html; Internet, accessed 1 April,
    2006.

World Bank, "Haiti – Country Assistance Evaluation" 12 February, 2002; available at
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000094946_
02030704005684; Internet, 26 March, 2006.

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Morneau, Colonel Jacques, "Reflections on the Situation in Haiti", unpublished, March
2006.