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MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES.

**UPCOMING INTEROPERABILITY CHALLENGES TO
SOUTH AMERICAN NAVIES WITHIN 21ST CENTURY
TERRORIST THREATS**

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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE

CSC 32

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ABSTRACT

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After the terrorist attacks of New York, Madrid and London at the beginning of the 21st century, the domestic side of maritime operations for South American countries has changed dramatically. The South American region has set the conditions to move from territorial integrity defence to collective regional defence. All these address the new asymmetric nature of threats in the new century. This situation for the South American scenario is even more complex, presenting a merger between traditional criminal activities and terrorist groups.

A stronger relationship and regional integration within South American countries is required to ensure an effective neutralization and control of the threat and generate the required stable maritime security environment. This aspiration seeks to neutralize the threat instead of dealing with its consequences. In that process, naval forces have a great contribution to do, ensuring covering the gaps of capabilities in regional coast guard forces. This contribution of the naval forces would avoid the terrorism asymmetric threat to overwhelm the capabilities of coast guard forces, especially when threats evolve showing military capabilities. Only integration and cooperation would ensure success.

Asymmetric threats in the 21st century generate an ideal environment to identify regional policy challenges and opportunities to strengthen diplomatic and military ties between South American countries, as a natural growth from the previous economic integration processes. These new challenge on collective regional defence represents an ideal opportunity to leave in the background a past of highly consumable endless borders disputes, and evolve towards a better regional stability to ensure the required development of the states. The European Union provides a possible model to follow.

INTRODUCTION

Most South American countries were ruled by military Governments within the last 40 years. In 2002, George Kourous, described this process as part of U.S. Cold War, after which military forces returned to their natural responsibilities:

Under U.S. tutelage, militaries in the region assumed political control according to the principles of the ‘national security doctrine’, which held that the overall wellbeing of nations hinged on internal stability, and emphasized the repression of internal ‘subversives’. Ultimately, the focus of cold war proxy battles in the region was on suppressing internal threats, rather than resisting external attacks. The end of the cold war and the return of civilian-led democratic governments saw Latin American militaries retreat from political affairs and ‘return to the barracks’.¹

Even if those countries had re-established their democracies, there is still an environment of mistrust between political power and military forces. In those countries where political parties had not been capable of bringing the benefits of democracy to the people, either because of lack of efficiency, corruption or incompetence, the politicians normally see the military forces as threats. This threat is perceived mainly because military forces are capable, responsible and are part of the deepest traditions of South American culture. Therefore, most South American countries created many barriers in order to impede any attempt for military forces to operate in their own territory, even if in some situations those same forces are desperately needed for use in domestic operations. South Americans therefore face the situation that highly capable forces are currently employed neither outside nor inside the country.

Developing and emerging threats to security within the South American continent create the proper environment to close distances and achieve a common agenda between political powers and military organizations. More than ever, clear national strategic guidance is required to achieve synchronization and integration of operations with assets of national and regional military forces, as well as interagency operations. Such

¹ Kourous George, International Relations Center, “*Return of the National Security State?*” November 1, 2002. Internet source, <http://www.irc-online.org/content/1837>, accessed December 12th, 2005.

operations also require a clear understanding of their objective and purpose. These operations should be always in support of the stated political objectives, requiring clear command aims; in other words, clear boundaries should be established based on potential constraints.

Within the South American region, counter drug measures and now the new U.S. war on terror are refocusing the center of effort on internal security threats. Intelligence sharing on potential threats has increased. Illegal immigration is now being considered as a national security threat and as a result most of the countries are coordinating migration control efforts.

As clearly identified by Alvaro Uribe to The Miami Herald in September 2003,² the Colombian problem is a common enemy where the drug trade, insurgency, and paramilitary forces threaten one of South America's oldest democracies and the continent's stability. These violent groups in Colombia have the potential to destabilize all democracies in the region. The new South American internal regional threats are represented by guerrilla insurgents, crime, and international drug syndicates. Clearly, organized drug trafficking is having a destabilizing and corrosive effect on societies across the region; Colombia's destructive civil war is now spilling over across its borders. Also, taken into consideration guerrilla operations concepts, means and ways of doing things, and the wide regional security problem they generate, classification of guerrilla groups as terrorists is entirely accurate. Within this context, all threats are closely interrelated, where drugs provide a revenue stream for terrorist and insurgents.

There are problems with involving the armed forces in internal security and intelligence operations, given the historical role of military establishments in South America and the legacies of the Cold War's national security states. Many argue that these are issues of crime, not war, and that civilian police forces, rather than military establishments, should be tasked in handling them; therefore, this paper will be oriented

² Oppenheimer Andres, The Miami Herald, September 2003. "*Uribe Wants Colombia's Neighbors to Help in War.*" September 22, 2002.

to identify if military forces are required for domestic operations and when and how to use naval forces specifically.

The global information environment is accessible to all and presents unique challenges previously unseen in warfare.³ Information and its control have never been before so essential to success in future military operations. Access to information by both authorities and their enemies has been enhanced by the amazing automation available. Terrorist and international crime organizations have had access to technology that has developed them into flexible and mutation entities that may easily transform themselves into a threat with military capabilities. Therefore, information dominance is a condition where more is known about the operations area, than any other element. It makes the need to be able to fully integrate the information required horizontally and vertically the essential requirement to be successful. The requirement is to put available information to best use. In particular, terrorists using information control try to hide their activities through fronts or legitimate businesses, are hard to find.

The role of South American naval forces within an asymmetric terrorist regional scenario has not change dramatically from traditional areas, the difference is that the main effort has move towards constabulary role rather than military ones. This constabulary role would be accomplish in cooperation and fully integrated with other national forces, agencies and when required also regional ones. That is not other thing than achieve a timely, effective, and coordinated sea control within regional areas of interest. The growth of asymmetric threat within South American countries, has allow identifying the need to use military forces – naval forces- instead of or in conjunction with maritime security forces -coast guard forces- in order to effectively neutralize the threats. In other words, it should be an integral approach considering all states resources. This approach to employ military assets in domestic operations requires clear political support, specially considering this decisions are heavily affected by a regional political historical background that has limited the capability of military forces to take action on

³ Thomas, Charles W. Major General and Harbaugh Cary C, Captain.. *“The Military Intelligence Vision for the XXI Century”*, Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin . Internet source, <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/tradoc/usaic/mipb/1996-2/thomas.htm>, accessed December 11, 2005.

internal matters; it is nevertheless clear that fully integrated and interoperable military forces to National Strategy, ensures and improves success in fighting new threats within a national and regional environment according to the demands of each scenario, integrating the military effort to an interagency synchronized architecture.⁴

In order to develop this analysis, first, some relevant features of the asymmetric threat will be highlighted, followed by identification of aspects concerning the security problem with specific application to the threat environment within South America. This would allow showing the complexity of the challenge and the need for regional cooperation to ensure success. Afterwards, the need of use the naval forces concerning internal and maritime security must be defined to justify the use of military forces against regional 21st century asymmetric terrorist threats; focus can then be obtained on the Naval Forces role in the regional security problem.

It is important to understand the nature of terrorism as an asymmetric threat. The term asymmetry is used to describe the employment of systems and tactics, in a certain way that usually would be sanctioned by morality or international law. In this terms Terrorism should be considered as an asymmetric threat, able to generate massive casualties, with no distinction on civilians or environmental damage. Terrorism is a highly hazardous threat for the nation state where it originates and also for the whole South American region. Its effects do not have frontiers and could be easily spread if unstable conditions are generated. The priority is then given to deal with the threat instead of the consequences of a disaster. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a wider conception on cooperative security and prepare structures to interact effectively within this new scenario. The main concern now aims towards collective security under a comprehensive approach as the only way to be effective; terrorism does not differentiate borders.

⁴ Krepinevich Andrew, Executive Director. "Emerging Threats, Revolutionary Capabilities And Military Transformation". Published by CSBA 03/05/1999, Internet source, http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/T.19990305.Emerging_Threats,_/T.19990305.Emergin_g_Threats,_.htm, accessed dec 11th, 2005.

The lack of economic opportunities is an element that contributes to increased organized crime and terrorism activity in the region; therefore, initiatives to ensure growth, in particular economic and living standards will generate a more stable environment to support security measures. These measures are not isolated; they are a necessary part of a wider strategy and closely interconnected with actions to detect, deter and neutralize maritime terrorism in order contribute to the generation of the required stability to achieve regional growth; measures require regional cooperation and integration to be workable.

This regional integration approach creates an opportunity for cooperation that twenty years ago was unthinkable, when the emphasis was linked to border disputes and discrepancies between neighbour Nation States within the region. The whole process is political driven, requiring countries to think cooperative rather than competitive, internally and externally; therefore, very much of the result is based on political initiative. Development of such regional maritime cooperation demands to build confidence, where interoperability is the major challenge. Interoperability should be seen not only from the technological perspective, also involves practice, common doctrine, procedures, exercising, connectivity and command and control.

Most South American countries coast guard forces are reduced and hold limited capabilities to control and neutralize a threat that has evolved presenting military capabilities. With the constraints of unstable economies and high levels of poverty, it is not possible for the governments to increase investments in developing more forces, nor to delay taking action against those threats. Therefore, naval forces should be considered as part of the solution of the problem. In order to face the situation in an operational and efficient way, joint action between the Maritime Police Forces and the Naval Forces is needed.

The new century has changed the threats from a military threats domain towards a more diffuse and ambiguous one, one that cannot be recognized until it develops and presents itself. Effective maritime counter-terrorism requires regional Intelligence capability. This intelligence effort demands regional and international co-operation. On

the other hand to reinforce this cooperation concept, individual navies in South America have limited regional power projection, but under a coordinated cooperative effort, it is possible to generate a respectable force able to take effective actions within regional asymmetric threats. In that context the main contribution of naval forces to maritime security is to establish sea control on areas of interest, in accordance with intelligence assessments; where the aim is to prevent potential terrorist threats and deter actual attacks.

CHAPTER 1

THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT

America, in this new century, again faces new threats. Instead of massed armies, we face stateless networks; we face killers who hide in our own cities. We must confront deadly technologies. To inflict great harm on our country, America's enemies need to be only right once. Our intelligence and law enforcement professionals in our government must be right every single time.

President George W. Bush
December 17, 2004

South America is not isolated from this reality, addressed by President Bush in 2004. An integrated South American regional approach to maritime security is the correct course towards an efficient and secure maritime system. In order to understand this approach, the nature of the threats to neutralize must first be understood. Only then it could be identified the right strategy of how to focus the effort to counter the new threats. This maritime counterterrorism strategy should provide a system perception approach, where all nations' resources are available to be used. Therefore, all nations have something to offer in contribution against terrorism and related criminal activities. As will be seen terrorists and criminal actors seek to merge within legitimate activity in the maritime domain; therefore, different capabilities are required to ensure strong law enforcement and presence in order to detect, interdict and effectively dislocate the threat they present.

Within South America, maritime drug trafficking generates vast amounts of money for international organized crime and are available for terrorist organizations. This money represents a source of almost undetectable funds, after a sophisticated money laundry process.⁵ The potential of this huge money resource makes the criminal activity an attractive area for terrorists to use those networks on their benefit, with a low

⁵ The White house; "U.S. Homeland Security: The National Strategy for Maritime Security"; September 2005; Internet source, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/4844-nsms.pdf>; accessed March 19, 2006.

traceability in an environment difficult to control. As effective initiatives are taken in other areas to reduce terrorism freedom of action, it is likely they will seek for less dangerous operating areas, seen as undefended coastlines for unlawful access to regenerate capabilities.

The Military Forces and Police Organizations –security forces - of the South American States are facing new threats, where terrorism, drug-trade and armed delinquency acquire more importance every day. Criminal and terrorists organizations have increased their aggression and lethal capability. The appearance of new means of communication, increased people and resource mobility, and the difficulties in identifying them, are transforming South American criminal and terrorist groups into asymmetric high-risk threats. They are increasingly operating through networks instead of formal channels. This arrangement provides them with diversity, flexibility, and low visibility.

This situation imposes the review of the present state's organization structures and the modification of the doctrines and procedures that are actually in use, thus establishing a solid and efficient basis for the cooperation and interoperability among the military forces, specifically for South American navies. This condition is basic and fundamental to confront these new threats. That interoperability would generate the required collaborative effect able to neutralize these organizations in different fronts, dislocating their organizations. As Joseph Nye said, globalization should be seen as an interdependent concept as at the same time as politics try to create sensitiveness in this matter, under the view that we are all in the same boat; and therefore, we must cooperate between each other, because it affects all without distinction.⁶

In this context, prior to start a threat environment analysis, it is important to understand the nature of terrorist asymmetric threat and then move towards a more specific analysis of the South American threat environment, where the regional effort should focus.

⁶ Nye, Joseph S, Jr. "Understanding International Conflicts: An introduction to Theory and history". 5th edition, Pearson Education Inc. 2005. Chap 7 p 197

1.1 Asymmetric concept

Over the last ten years most analysts describe terrorism as an asymmetric threat. They use the term asymmetric as if the reader knows what the word means to this specific context of threat environment, revealing that the term asymmetric threat, normally used for describing terrorist organisations, is not clearly defined; therefore, through examination of some reference doctrine allows to establish a reference to be used in the analysis of our case. All this is necessary, prior to analyse maritime terrorism in South America, as a threat to be addressed by the participation of naval forces.

In wars, there had always been a difference in potential and capabilities within belligerents. Those differences can be significant and locate one of the parties in advantage, or minimal, with almost no effect in the final results. In strategy, asymmetry, understood as the difference in potential capabilities, is an old concept, as old as war itself. Sun Tzu put great interest in psychological and deceptive asymmetry; he based the war in deception and being able to defeat the enemy through his weakest points.⁷ Liddell Hart defended his concept of indirect approach, highlighting the need to avoid enemy's strengths and seek weaknesses.⁸ This approach opens alternatives to search for alternatives to attack and pursue objectives utilizing unorthodox methods, especially by less capable sources; such would be considered the case for terrorism. The difference is in the ethical application of the methods, where terrorism has no respect for human life and seeks to generate society instability and spread of terror effect on population more than defeating the conventional forces.

Through history, great generals had had an instinct for the asymmetric war; they exploited their strength and attacked their enemy's weaknesses, such as: superior mobility, operational tempo, intelligence, synchronization, training and high morale of its forces. Asymmetry was also present in different colonial's independence wars, guerrillas, Intifadas, etc...

⁷ Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu, "*The Art of War*", London, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 66-67.

⁸ Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, New York, Signet, 1974, 2nd edition.

Asymmetric conflict is as old as the concept of war. As Lambakis stated, the asymmetric concept has been misused, and nowadays it presents a lack of basic definition:

It is a question of whether ‘asymmetry’ can help establish a useful conceptual and analytical framework for conveying the complexity and addressing current and emerging security challenges.⁹

The significance of this statement is that social opinion is more sensible to the effects of terrorism; generating this way a path to exploit asymmetry against nation’s conventional forces; therefore, prior to use this term to describe the terrorism activity, it is necessary to establish a clear framework for the application of it within this essay, as the main descriptor of terrorism activity.

1.2 Actual application of Asymmetric concept.

Though an old concept, asymmetry was first explicitly used by U.S. Joint Doctrine in the year 1995.¹⁰ In a very basic and simplistic manner, it was defined as combats within uneven forces. Asymmetry was also related in this doctrine to the concepts of terrorism, use or threat to use weapons of mass destruction and information operations as asymmetric combats.

In 1997, the “National Defense Panel” (NDP) recognized that potential enemies of the U.S.A. would have learned the Iraq’s lesson of the Gulf War; therefore, it was probable that they would avoid fight against American forces in a conventional way, due to the overwhelming superiority of U.S. military forces. This huge unbalance of forces

⁹ Lambakis, Steven and others; National Institute for Public Policy; “Understanding ‘Asymmetric’ Threats to the United States”, September 2002, Internet, <http://www.nipp.org/Adobe/Asymmetry%20%20final%2002.pdf>, accessed 10th January, 2006.

¹⁰ Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, 10th January 1995, p IV-10 / IV-11.

left enemies of U.S. and its allies to search and find new ways to attack and inflict damage.¹¹

In 1999, the Joint Strategy Review provided a deeper analysis on asymmetric threats. It highlighted the situation that threats were exploiting forces weaknesses using unexpected, non traditional methods, identified as asymmetric attacks. Those attacks were aimed at affecting their liberty of action and will, by achieving psychological effect and confusion.¹²

These approaches gave a notion of the asymmetric concept. But, as stated by Douglas V. Jonson II and Steven Metz, these are limited approaches to the phenomena.¹³ They do have two limitations; first, they are referred to a specific scenario, applicable to America's security environment, but not necessarily to other situations; and second, they approach the problem from a negative perspective, only what the enemy is capable to do against American security, but do not consider what can be done exploiting the asymmetry onto America's own benefit. Therefore, it is necessary to provide a wider view of asymmetric concept apply in a general form to actual threat environment

As a way to generalize the asymmetric theory application it can be highlighted Doctors Metz and Johnson proposal. They proposed to include some new concepts and reinforced the fact that asymmetry remains been the existence of a significant difference between belligerents. That difference could be exploited on behalf of any of the parts.¹⁴ Nowadays, the globalization increases the chances to exploit the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the societies by terrorist activities.¹⁵ They use the media on their benefit, increasing its effect by exposing the effects to the public almost instantaneously and creating a greater terror effect. Terrorist asymmetric effect remains due to the diverse

¹¹ NDP Report, "*Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*", Washington, December 1997, p 11.

¹² *Joint Strategy Review* 1999, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1999, p 2.

¹³ Dr. Steven Metz, Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II, "*Asymmetry And U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts*", Strategic Studies Institute, Special Report, U.S. Army War College, January 2001.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ The strength of terrorist activity is the lack of value assigned to their life. Normally our societies, based on occidental values, put a higher value to it. In this environment, governments face a high political cost for own forces' life loses. Therefore it is normally used overwhelming military power to reduce the probabilities of own casualties.

technology available for its materialization on a global projection, without knowing who, where, how or when it will be developed. Technology allows innovating in terrorism, in such a way that cannot even be thought by opponents. But, the fact to having available specialized units, highly trained and with a high degree of readiness, reduces the risk. The physical asymmetry normally produces psychological advantages. Nevertheless, there exist forces that exploit psychological manipulation showing a fierce image. Sun Tzu related the use of normal and extraordinary forces; using the first in a conventional way to establish the battle and the extraordinary ones to defeat, been the key element to deceive in order to produce confusion in which are the normal and which the extraordinary ones.¹⁶

Another aspect, not mentioned, is that globalization has allowed the appearance of new international actors, able of executing asymmetric attacks. These organizations or individuals have no respect for the International Law and possesses a dynamic threat characteristic, with a high flexibility to evolve in its capability. Therefore, preventive mechanisms to combat them are difficult to achieve, been crucial to have a solid intelligence structure, in order to ensure timely and proportionate reaction.

1.3 Terrorism as Asymmetric Threat.

In 1999, the Joint Strategic Review identified as asymmetric threats the weapons of massive destruction- both, chemical and biological; informatics and computer based attacks; mines and projectiles attacks within straits and littoral; terrorism; narco-terrorism; organized crime and similar threats.¹⁷ Terrorism, in its various forms, is the most common source of asymmetric threat, and uses means out of the norms of international law, legitimizing any mean to degrade the will of their opponents.

Also, information warfare is considered an important asymmetric strategy. Strategy, that in accordance with the high level of technology that is available, would

¹⁶ Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu, "*The Art of War*", London, Oxford University Press, 1971; p.90-95.

¹⁷ *Joint Vision 2020*, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2000, p. 5.

allow to some groups to develop cyber-terrorism. That capability enables those groups to be capable of damaging or spying on systems, and high sensitive nets.¹⁸

The term asymmetry is used to describe the employment of systems and tactics, in a certain way that usually would be sanctioned by morality or international law. Asymmetric threats are frequently identified by possessing the ability to generate massive casualties, with no distinction on civilians or environmental damage. Asymmetry in this context is related with the ways more than the means; therefore, they maximize the use of unorthodox methods, presenting a great challenge for the nation states. These threats are capable to access and use readily available technologies for military purposes, and execute attacks involving mass casualty agents and munitions. They are normally associated with non state actors, who act to exploit their differences related to the established accepted norms in society. In the current security environment, the characteristics of asymmetric threats are related to pose a considerable danger, which make them worthy, therefore, of more focused attention by policy-makers and defence planners.

Narco-terrorism and organized crime constitutes a type of trans-national asymmetric threat. They are actively present in South America and become an activity that operates under the protection of organizations that uses such activities to profit and produce instability necessary to execute their illegal activities. Those organizations are melded in the society and target it as a whole, with no distinction. They constitute an asymmetric threat, exploiting the society vulnerabilities and weakness of their legal systems.¹⁹ That is said, especially considering that they hide their activities through fronts or legitimate businesses, hard to unravel. These actors are different from nation-state's structure, and are willing to use any means available to achieve their objectives. Those actions can involve the use of available technology within a globalize world to improve its effect. These groups present high capability to change in its nature; therefore, they are difficult to neutralize if there is not a timely response. These special characteristics will

¹⁸ Schwartau, Winn; "*Asymmetrical Adversaries*", Orbis R., The Foreign Policy Institute's Quarterly Journal of World Affairs, Elsevier Science Publishers, Spring 2000. Internet, infowar.com,p.2.

¹⁹ Cyruulik, Joseph, "*Asymmetric Warfare and the Threat to the American Homeland*", U.S.A. Institute of Land Warfare ATTN: Landpower Essay Series, N° 99-8 Nov. 1999. Internet, <http://ausa.org.p.1>.

allow determining the means and ways required to neutralize effectively these asymmetric threats. In that sense, nation states should consider all available means to be used in accordance to each scenario demands; therefore, naval forces should be considered as available resources to be employed, and they are capable to provide significant capabilities to ensure effectiveness in overall strategy to combat maritime terrorism.

1.4. The threat environment within South America.

Terrorism is a highly hazardous threat for the nation state where it originates and also for the whole South American region. Its effects does not have frontiers and could be easily spread in unstable conditions are generated. Unfortunately, certain residual aspects of the Cold War still influence countries in the region, in a form of ideological fight. As long as Castro's dictatorship administration continues in control, Cuban support of regional terrorist groups persists. Clear examples of that situation are the Marxist guerrillas in Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Colombia. In Colombia there is a strong relationship, known as *narcoterrorism*, between these guerrilla organizations and the drug cartels. That relationship is used to facilitate and finance their illegal activities and further more, obstruct the government's law enforcing efforts. Also, Peru has problems with this issue; the *Sendero Luminoso* and, lately, the revolutionary movement *Tupac Amaru* generate instability, preclude economic recuperation, deteriorate democratic institutions, and even worse, they aggravate the drug trafficking problem; therefore, it constitutes a complex problem, with multiple approaches, and different perceptions in each regional community.

Terrorism benefits from migration issues to indigenous militancy, to the explosion of gang violence. Within South America, this situation has varied causes and requires targeted local, national, and regional strategies to avoid it spread in the entire region. In the 1990s the U.S. Southern Command identified South American emerging and non-

traditional security threats. Foremost among these is mainly drug trafficking.²⁰ In March 2003 the U.S. Southern Command's General James Hill, postulated that the terrorist threat "is a weed that is planted in the fertile ground of ungoverned spaces such as coastlines, rivers, and unpopulated border areas."²¹ According to his perception, "this threat is watered with money from drugs, illegal arms sales, and human trafficking and respects neither geographical boundaries nor moral boundaries."²² In these aspects all the conditions are set for terrorism activity to grow in the region, benefiting from the fact that the amounts of radical groups are staggering.

Current South American threats are complex and have multiple components; as an example, the Peruvian terrorist movement *Sendero Luminoso* has engaged in particularly brutal forms of terrorism, including the indiscriminate use of bombs. Almost every institution in Peru has been a target of sendero luminoso violence. *Sendero Luminoso* has bombed diplomatic missions of several countries in Peru. It carries out bombing campaigns and selective assassinations. Membership is unknown but estimated to be at some 400 to 500 armed militants. Its strength has been vastly diminished by arrests and desertions but appears to be growing again, possibly due to involvement in narco-trafficking. Another example is Colombia, where the government is dealing against two leftist insurgencies, and a right-wing paramilitary organization. The country's largest guerrilla group, the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, and the rightist United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia are involved in the drug trade to raise money for their struggle. A smaller leftist rebel group, the National Liberation Army, relies on kidnapping and extortion for its funding. Alliances of convenience between guerrillas and traffickers are also present, mainly in order to secure protection for drug interests. At other times, the drug traffickers have financed their own private armies to provide security services. Some insurgent and paramilitary groups have, in fact, become little more than well-armed bands, selling their services to drug traffickers. The presence

²⁰ Barry, Tom. "Mission' Creep in Latin America—U.S. Southern Command's New Security Strategy" Americas Program, International Relations Center (IRC) July 2005. Internet source http://americas.irc-online.org/reports/2005/0507creep_body.html. Accessed December 13th, 2005.

²¹ Hill James, "Remarks by Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, North-South Center", March 3, 2003. Internet source, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2003/03/sec-030312-usia03.htm>, accessed December 12th, 2005. n.p.

²² Ibid., n.p.

of the insurgents in Colombia's primary coca cultivation and cocaine processing regions hinders the Colombian government's ability to conduct counter-drug operations. The two terrorist groups are heavily involved in lucrative narcotics and kidnapping activities. Kidnapping has become a serious security risk with an estimated overall activity of US\$500 million per year. Colombia's neighbours remain concerned that increased military activity and coca eradication programs will cause the relocation of drug production to spread across Colombia's borders.²³ Therefore, it is clear that coordinate efforts and execution of regional combined operations are required to avoid such a thing happen.


Political instability creates a good environment in which terrorist organizations can take root and grow, while economic disparity generates a pole of attraction for new members to join them.²⁴ A good example of this situation can be seen in the fig No. 1, where the level of poverty and the level of internal security expressed in terms of probability of occurrence of civil wars is correlated. When poverty is added to ethnic or regional inequalities, the causes of distress that strengthen civil violence are mixed. While it may not reach the level of war, the combination of a surging youth population, poverty, urbanization and unemployment has resulted in creating the conditions to increase gang violence and terrorism.²⁵ Other example of political instability is represented by Venezuela, which has experienced massive civil unrest, which the recent referendum on the leadership of Hugo Chavez has done little to temper. Also, in October 2003 Bolivia's elected president was ousted in a popular and violent uprising.²⁶ All this instabilities demand clear actions from more stable regional nations to ensure regional stability is maintained, and terrorism activity does not find save heavens for its benefit.

²³ The Global security organization. "The World at War". Internet source, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/index.html>, Accessed December 15, 2005.

²⁴ Lombardi, Ben DND Policy Group. "Strategic Assessment 2004". Functional Issues: Failed and Failing States August 2004. CFC IRC Net Source. Accessed December 13th, 2005.

²⁵ United Nations, General Assembly. 2 December 2004 "Transmittal letter dated 1 December 2004 from the Chair of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General", Internet source <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf>, accessed December 13th, 2005.

²⁶ Kellett, Tony. DND Policy Group. "Strategic Assessment 2004" Functional Issues: Eyes Forward August 2004. CFC IRC Net Source. Accessed December 13th, 2005.



Source: Research undertaken by Macartan Humphreys (Columbia University), based on data provided by the World Bank, the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

Figure 1- Link between poverty and civil war

While the war on terror is being carried out in other areas of the world, the instability in South America creates a pole of attraction to terrorists and organized crime groups who use it, as a safe-haven in U.S.'s back yard. These groups see this area useful for many purposes such as financing, procuring illegal travel documents or as a point of access to the US through narcotics and migrant smuggling routes. In June 2004, with the detection in Honduras of al-Qaida linked Adnan G. El Shukrijumah, it was clear evidenced of al-Qaida activity in the area as well.²⁷ This situation shows signs of international terrorist seeking to establish a base and staging area in Latin America, where there is no shortage of lucrative targets, including the Panama Canal. Terrorist groups have become more diffuse and decentralized and are actively seeking for more aggressive means for their attacks; this situation makes the maritime environment most

²⁷ Morrissey, Charles – DND Policy Group. “Strategic Assessment 2004”. Regional Trends Latin America and the Caribbean September 2004 CFC IRC Net Source. Accessed December 13th, 2005.

likely to be exploited,²⁸ affecting trade and generating a sense of insecurity within the region that would put at risk any chance to achieve the required growth condition to solve main regional social problems; therefore, governments' efforts should address this situation to ensure economical growth and living standards in critical areas, as well as improve security.

1.5 Terrorism and asymmetric threat in the South American maritime environment.

A direct connection between piracy acts, drugs activity and terrorism has been established. Also, the first two activities are considered as key tactics to obtain resources and as a way to perform new types of terrorist attacks. This relation between piracy acts, drugs activity and terrorism can be seen more clearly in Figures 4 and 5, where the major concentration points of piracy attacks coincide with the major drugs maritime routes.

The hijacking of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro*, in October 1985, marked one of the first actual terrorist acts recorded in modern maritime history. The recorded attacks to maritime vessels in 2003 have been doubled relative to its previous year.²⁹ Even if the main concentration of these activities has been established in the Strait of Malacca area, today those groups own dozens of phantom ships that have been adapted to operate anywhere with false documentation and a new appearance.³⁰ Those units could be used to threaten a major port or what could be worst a focal choke point, as the Panama channel, causing a major damage on regional and international trade and economies. Indeed, South America is not immune to piracy acts; in accordance with the International Maritime Organization records, there have been reported piracy acts in Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela.³¹ These range from highly organized commando-style raids to the opportunistic raider, from groups who thinks they can get away with it.

²⁸ Knowlton, Brian; World news; "*Greater-than-ever risk of terror feared by U.S.*"; International Herald Tribune, February 3rd, 2006.

²⁹ Luft, Galand Korin Anne; "Terrorism goes to sea". Foreign Affairs, Vol 83, No 6, December 2004. p 66-71.

³⁰ Ibid, p 66-71.

³¹ Hesse, Hartmut and Charalambous, Nicolaos L; "*New Security Measures for the International Shipping Community.*" Piracy and armed robbery at sea; International Maritime Organization. Journal of Maritime Affairs, 2004, Vol. 3, No.2, 123–138. Internet source, available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D10606/hesse_chara_sec.pdf. Accessed February 11th, 2006.



Figure 2- Major drug routes in South America

Source: Marin, Cécile Le Monde Diplomatique; Internet source, available at www.englisheditionondediplo.com; accessed January 15th, 1998.



Figure 3- 2005 Piracy attacks in South America

Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau; Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships, Annual report 1 Jan-31 Dec 2005.

Apart from Colombia, Peru and Bolivia aforementioned terrorist activities, the Tri-Border Area (TBA), shown in Figure N 6, where Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay converge continues to be concern as an unlawful activities area, which could easily, become an international terrorism safe heaven. As professor Griffard clearly stated: “The TBA has long been a hub of arms and drug trafficking, counterfeiting and money laundering. It is also an area where Hezbollah and Hamas conduct fund raising and recruitment activities.”³² Therefore, such area and similar ones that could be generated, shall be avoided and rejected by establishing effective law enforcement; only then can terrorism activity be effectively eliminated in the South American region.



Figure 21- Tri-Border Area

Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau; Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships, Annual report 1 Jan-31 Dec 2005.

As a product of globalization, the development of the oceans remain the area of major concentration of international economic, military, and nation state power activities. The oceans hold a great potential for wealth generation, from them it can be access major regional population concentration points, and they are extremely sensitive to

³² Griffard Bernard F Professor, and Wheeler Todd M. LTC, “*Assisting Professional Militaries in Latin America*”, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, October 2003, Volume 10-03. CSL1.

environmental issues.³³ Within the maritime environment several areas could be targeted by terrorism in order to produce a massive effect, either against the global economy or directly to the society itself, all of them exploiting the asymmetric effect produced by surprise and uncertainty of the attacks.³⁴ In the following paragraphs a more clear view of these areas and its effects will be provided.

The first area that terrorism could threaten at sea is the Global economy. To do so primary terrorist targets of interest may be maritime terminals, strategic passages - as Panama Cannel or the Magellan Strait-, and the least probable the maritime vessels and its cargo. Any of these targets to be attacked would disrupt the free passage of merchandise through the seas by both, the terrorism attack actions and the governments reactive restrictive measures. As clearly Haydon identified “it is not trade, per se, that has to be protected, it is the overall system in which it takes place that has to be protected.”³⁵ Also in this matter, on August 6, 2004, Admiral Sir Alan West of the British Navy was quoted as saying that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups had identified the magnitude of global maritime trade and could start on attacks against merchant ship:

Sea-borne terrorism could potentially cripple global trade and have grave knock-on effects on developed economies. We’ve seen other plans from intelligence of attacks on merchant shipping...and they realize how important the navy is to actually protect them.³⁶

The second area that terrorism could threaten is aiming directly to society’s sense of security by targeting passenger sea liners and similar forms of transportation. Some of these means of transportation carries over 3,000 tourists on board, a situation that under a terrorist action could cause a major impact in society; generating a general sense of fear and insecurity, dramatically amplified by the media effect.

³³ Haydon, Peter T; “*Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century: a ‘Medium’ Power Perspective*” The Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Maritime Security Occasional Paper No. 10. p13-69

³⁴ Chief of Maritime Staff, Canada; “*Leadmark: The Navy’s strategy for 2020*”; Directorate of Maritime Strategy, ISBN 0-662-30934-0; p 72-90.

³⁵ Haydon, Peter T; “*Sea Power and Maritime...*”, p17.

³⁶ Michael A. Morris, "Challenges for Latin America," in *Maritime Policy for Developing Navies*, ed. Greg Mills (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1995), p. 171.

The third area that terrorism could threaten would be the environment; and the potential to cause a major environmental disaster by terrorism actions. An example could be the possibility to attack the sea transport of nuclear or other hazardous material through its navigation close to continental areas. This possible situation could cause a major environmental disaster with regional or even international implications. An example of this apprehension could be the Japanese need to acquire plutonium for its reactors as an energy source. For that purpose Japan gets it from Europe and is transported by sea lift:

In 1984, the United States and environmental groups expressed great concern when an unescorted Japanese cargo vessel carrying 253 kilograms of reprocessed plutonium applied for a permit to transit the Panama Canal; passage was approved only after provision was made for armed naval escort. A 1988 bilateral agreement now requires Japan to get approval from the U.S. Government for any plan to transfer reprocessed plutonium from Europe.³⁷

The last area that terrorism could exploit to their benefit is the illegal sea-borne trafficking or smuggling of different types, either towards South American territories or to others destinations through its waters. This trafficking could be of different nature, such as weapons, drugs or trafficking of people inclusive. Nations need to be prepared to execute maritime interdiction operations at sea, ports and isolated shores as well.

There is a condition necessary to ensure success against terrorism; namely keeping control of the time line of the events. Therefore, it is essential to obtain the initiative and disrupt this time line. All this could be only possible by managing timely information –provided by intelligence- and timely response in order to prevent terrorism activity to occur. The priority is then given to deal with the threat instead of the consequences of a disaster.

³⁷ Nincic, Donna J.; “*Sea Lane Security and U.S. Maritime Trade: Chokepoints as Scarce Resources*”; Chapter 8, Internet source, available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/09_ch08.htm; accessed Feb 15th, 2006.

CHAPTER 2

REGIONAL COOPERATION

Complexity and ambiguity are recognized challenges to the security environment. These characteristics are especially applicable to the maritime environment, where apart from the main military role for navies; terrorism has increased the potential for maritime trans-national threats. Terrorist groups are non-state organizations that alter standard naval scenarios. This alteration can be better understood in terms that adversaries and theatres of action become more diffuse, and frequently demands more than just naval or military actions to be destroyed. In that sense, different actors can contribute to success in the defeat of terrorist threats; as well, regional governments are responsible for the orchestration and participation of the required assets.

In today's world, the state is still the main international actor, and the human being has risen as the subject which the state has the responsibility to protect. Owing to this responsibility, state should focus its effort to provide a secure environment. Nonetheless, it is necessary to recognize that other actors have acquired increased relevance; these actors include international organizations and enterprises. In this context, state intervention is more susceptible collateral effects, affecting the interest of multinational organizations or investments.

In fact, the exclusively "State-central" vision has gradually varied towards a situation in which, principles of state sovereignty and non intervention on internal affairs of other States are no longer absolute. In that sense, sovereignty is more related to the accomplishment of the duties imposed by the international environment, identified as serving the people - the people's Common Good - and discharging the international duties - the Common Good of the international community. To be clearer, traditional States' rights are somehow conditioned to the imperative fulfillment of those duties; therefore they should be included in the respective national objectives; considering in the first place, the obligation to provide security, opportunities, development and well-being to its inhabitants; and the responsibility to neutralize the threats that could damage the system, either if they operate from within their territory, or towards other state's territory.

In brief, to the traditional national security concept, associated with State sovereignty, security of people and international security should be added. In that context, three very closely related security levels can be identified - peoples' security, national security and international security- So, a national responsibility to protect should drive every state's actions. Unfortunately, the political framework within which states are involved does not always allow the security expectations of these three levels to be satisfied. This condition leads to the need to establish priorities. Therefore, the need to advance in the updating and systematization of the principles and agreements that coordinate the functioning of a regional South American Security System has direct impact in the international or global security.³⁸

Traditional security concepts, focused towards the protection of territorial integrity and national sovereignty are no longer sufficient to cope with the challenges which the regional scene demands. Hence, it is necessary to develop a wider conception of cooperative security and prepare structures to interact effectively within this new scenario.³⁹ The main aim is collective security under a comprehensive approach, involving all means available; neither military nor police ones by themselves. The way to achieve an effective solution requires a level of synergy and inter-agency involvement. So what does this mean? It should be understood as a strategy that includes regional navies as the main contribution from the military side, within a grander solution that incorporates all needed resources; driven by political initiative and the military's participation as a subordinate and collaborator of a wider process. Considering this view, a regional cooperative approach is needed to become effective in neutralizing terrorism at sea.

³⁸ This problem has been brought forth at the V Conference of the American Defence Ministers, carried out in Santiago Chile, at the end 2003.

³⁹ Buzan, Barry and Waever, Ole. "Regions and Powers: The structure of International security". Post Cold war changes. Cambridge University Press, CSIR, 2003. p 321

2.1 South American countries relations and terrorism, an opportunity for integration and cooperation.

Argentina, Brazil, and Chile hold significant common geopolitical interests in South America. They represent the strongest economies of South America and had assumed the leader role for regional stability. Also, these countries share other factors, such as the distribution of their population and locations of their most important economic centers are close to or in the coast. This situation makes the coastline of their economic alliance MERCOSUR attractive for asymmetric attacks or actions.

South America presents two geographical difficulties to connect land infrastructure, the Amazon forest and the Andes Mountains. This difficulty makes it imperative to use the sea as the main means of regional economic integration. The geographical situation of South America, far from the world's main markets and linked to the rest of the world only by air and sea, emphasizes the importance of maritime trade.

The region not only is a growing market, attractive to international investors, but also represents an important source of resources, vital for the modern world, such as oil, copper, fish, grains, meat, wood, and fresh water. From the economic and political perspective, Brazil leads the South American Common Market, MERCOSUR, which also includes Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Chile became the fifth member in 1996 and Bolivia the sixth in 1997. In order to be successful in this initiative, the most important point is that the region as a whole must achieve stability. Thus, one key element required for stability will be economic integration. Therefore, protection of commerce and populations remain the center of effort of hemispheric security issues. Commerce is the enabler for regional political and military stability.

South America presents historical problems between countries. Therefore, it is essential to create a stable environment and build confidence to allow movement into the next step of military integration. Colombia and Venezuela are two neighbors that traditionally have had territorial disputes and conflicts. The last crisis was in 1987, over maritime delimitation in the Venezuelan Gulf. On the other hand, the situation between Ecuador and Peru is complex. Peru was the aggressor during the last century against

Ecuador twice. This is the main reason why Peru has always pursued a strong naval capability.

Argentina, which had in the past been Brazil's and Chile's common long-established adversary, is not so today. The three countries have reached an economic adjustment through MERCOSUR. Furthermore, Argentina and Chile signed a peace treaty in 1984, showing the world an excellent example of the possibilities of international conflict resolution and cooperation. Today, Argentina, Brazil and Chile have moved one step forward and integrated their navies into coordinated combined operations.

The Free Trade Area of the Americas should become a reality soon, in order to facilitate solutions for many of the hemisphere's security and economic problems. The incorporation of new members ought to be gradual and selective, beginning with integrating into NAFTA, countries that have stable democratic governments and growing economies. This step can be followed by the absorption of MERCOSUR, the strongest economic bloc of South America. In this way, the desired stability of a regional free trade system will result. And with that, the need to cooperate, generate confidence and united effort to provide South America a secure environment becomes paramount to ensure success in all these initiatives.

The aim shall be to exploit transnational challenges like terrorism and organized crime as an opportunity to integrate effort and achieve desired regional common good and stability. This integration would be able by taking advantage of having a strong and working block that could initially deal with the challenges and integrate other players through the process. A good example to follow is the European Union evolution, which started as an economical agreement, followed by defense alliance initiatives and continued to further efforts to achieve the consolidation of political integration; therefore, cooperation and integration in the require areas should be seen as an opportunity instead of a threat to nations' sovereignty.

2.2 Political Framework

Even if the 21st century regional system appears to be blurred in South America, at least maritime security seems to be crystallizing. The effect of maritime terrorism does not only influence of policy-makers and economic managers of the targeted state, but also on those of other States in the region and even in the rest of the globe, even though they might not be directly targeted. Since terrorists focus more and more on economic targets, it would be practical to anticipate more acts of maritime terrorism; therefore, it is necessary to create between political leaders, policy-makers, and in public opinion an understanding of the threats to human life, national and regional economies, trade, and the environment, that could occur from maritime terrorism. All this leads one to identify the need to create national and regional capabilities for intelligence gathering, and physical security.⁴⁰

The new century has changed the threats from the military domain towards a more diffuse and ambiguous one that cannot be recognized until it develops and presents itself. Unfortunately within this environment, neither the Organisation of American States nor the International Maritime Organization have the resources necessary to ensure law enforcement in the maritime arena; therefore, when it is required, the Naval Forces and the Maritime Security Forces – coast guard forces- are the only forces capable to satisfy the needs of surveillance and enforcement.

Effective maritime counter-terrorism, like effective counter-terrorism on land, is dependent on regional intelligence capability. This intelligence structure requires being capable of providing evaluation of risks, vulnerabilities and timely monitoring of alert indication of threats development. This intelligence effort demands regional and international cooperation in the form of intelligence sharing, mutual operational assistance, mutual legal assistance and effective enforcement of internationally agreed measures to prevent maritime terrorism. Only then can employment of naval and maritime security forces allow effective physical security. Also, in case of terrorism prevention failure, when an act of maritime terrorism might be carried out, a good crisis

⁴⁰ Michael A. Morris, "Challenges for Latin America," in *Maritime Policy for Developing Navies*, ed. Greg Mills (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1995), p. 171.

management capability should be included. Measures to minimize the effects of terrorist acts' can then be taken.

In order to permit the implementation of an inter-operative South American system of Naval and Maritime Security Forces a political framework considering at least formal and public agreements among Governments would be required. These formal agreements would show a clear political will and establish a political leadership in the initiative of using the available resources for hemispheric cooperation in maritime security. This process is needed to state clear and explicit national rules in relation to their competence, scopes and procedures; these rules should ideally be compatible with those of other regional States to ensure interoperation compatibility. The effectiveness would be optimized by incorporating policies to increase interoperability among the naval and maritime security forces of the different countries within the South American region. This aspect is particularly important, especially considering that at the present time most regional navies are involved in modernization programs.

Upon obtaining the required political guidance, effort should be transfer into operational actions to ensure interoperability. Therefore, establishment of procedures and coordination is paramount. This interoperability capacity would be the main enabler to succeed in any attempt of regional synergic effort, allowing timely, coordinated and effective actions in the presence of illicit and threats.

This regional integration approach creates a cooperation opportunity that twenty years ago was unthinkable, when the emphasis was linked to border disputes and discrepancies between neighbour nation states within the region. To develop such regional maritime cooperation demands to build confidence, where interoperability is the major challenge. Interoperability should be seen not only from the technological perspective, also involves practice, common doctrine, procedures, exercising, connectivity and command and control.

2.3 South America's maritime terrorism threat approach.

The approach towards international security related to new emerging threats requires a much wider and comprehensive view. It should exclude the assignment of guilt and accept the multi-cause origin of the threats. Furthermore, it should incorporate the participation of all the nations affected, such as on the diagnosis, as much as on the solution to the security problems the new threats presents. This wide approach is important, because the nature of the threat does not recognize origin victims, and as far as the potential space to be developed is early rejected, a collective benefit will be obtained. It is a fact that new threats have appeared, or rather new versions of old threats, with features that make them look new. They affect all states, independent of their size or potential for their defence. Today there are no countries which can act just as spectators of the security problems because, given the existence of the threat of terrorist organizations, nobody can take security for granted; and then we are all protagonists.⁴¹ We should always retain in our minds the concept that no one is immune to terrorism, unless effective measures are taken to neutralize it, and to avoid conditions that could facilitate its activities and any attempt to grow within the region.

Disregarding the nature and number of threats for the purpose of performing an analysis, they may be grouped into two general types; firstly, the threats that are limited to one state and that may be faced internally as an intra-state problem, retaining each country the independence and prerogative to use the resources and procedures each government determines according to existence legal framework. Having said so, there is always present the possibility and the flexibility to appeal for the assistance and support of other countries when it would be considered needed and convenient, regardless of the moment; so, there is always space for cooperation; and secondly, threats that are spread in various states or part of them, and may be efficiently countered only if they are faced collectively with the active participation of all of them. Thus, cooperation and coordination becomes an imperative to ensure success. Although this differentiation

⁴¹ Quigley Samantha L . “Commanders: Shifting Threats Require New Approaches”, American Forces Press Service. Internet source, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/03/mil-050311-afps02.htm>, accessed December 12th, 2005.

contributes to clarify the way to face the problem, being part of a global system should not be disregarded and potential threats for the whole regional community continue to exist; therefore, there is a need to agreed upon regional strategy and structures, to ensure cooperation against the new asymmetric threat, represented by active terrorism merged with criminal activities. The maritime problem is only part of a bigger regional security situation, where coordinated actions in all spheres would ensure better results, avoiding gaps in addressing the new challenges. But this approach to the problem still does not allow recognizing space for a clear naval role to be part of the solution.

Another approach to the threat analysis is based on the capabilities and nature of each one. This approach may give a better view of the type of means required to neutralize the threats. When are naval forces required to provide a better solution, or when are naval police forces-coast guard- needed? Some threats may show an exclusively delinquent nature and others, a clearly military one. Moreover, threats can change in nature and evolve from one condition to the other through the course of time. In some areas of South America for example, the drug business is so strong that the same threat may introduce a different nature, delinquent or military, at different times and moments. In that environment, drug's producers and dealers usually resist the action of governmental forces with minor weapons, but they can also act with methods and weapons of war, equivalent to a military force. Drug lords have means to protect their activity, and have developed well organized transportation over land, air and sea, supported by their own forces. In the maritime aspects, the use of different types of vessels for transport has been detected. Those vessels vary from larger types to *Go-fast cigarette boats* that provide drug traffickers additional means to evade capture because of their high speed abilities. A remarkable situation that revealed the real extreme capabilities of those groups was the discovery, on September 7/2000, of a partially constructed submarine in Colombia.⁴²

⁴² D.E.A.; "*Learning opportunity; Air, Land and sea*". Available from Internet; <http://www.dea.gov/deamuseum/students/als.pdf>; Accessed 22nd January, 2006. p 07-11



Figure 5- Different types of boats used for Drug transport.
Source: D.E.A.; Learning opportunity; Air, Land and sea. Available from Internet;
<http://www.dea.gov/deamuseum/students/als.pdf>; Accessed 22nd January, 2006. p 07-11




Figure 6- September 7 /2000, partially constructed submarine from a warehouse in Bogota, Colombia.

Source: D.E.A.; Learning opportunity; Air, Land and sea. Available from Internet; <http://www.dea.gov/deamuseum/students/als.pdf>; Accessed 22nd January, 2006. p 07-11

This type of situation highlights the nature of interactions between Government Forces and delinquents. In the maritime case, the first, are framed within two categories of well defined forces, Police Organizations – coast guard (Safety Forces) - and Military Forces – naval forces-, each of them with their own features, capabilities, areas of competence and legal framework. Delinquents, by contrast, may move freely between the two categories, since they count on the possibility to protect themselves, appealing to civil or military rights, according to their convenience.

Consequently, a group that performs terrorism for political reasons may face the police forces at their choice or convenience, with military weapons and procedures, having the capability to overwhelm them; or rather, appeal to their condition of civilians

when confronted by military forces with greater potential, demanding to be treated like common civilian delinquents, with the corresponding prerogatives.

An efficient addressing of the new threats must acknowledge the complexity of the problem and the variety of military and non-military factors at stake. Furthermore, a legal and organizational framework must be defined so as to provide support for the interoperation of police and military forces. Interoperation that implicates the participation not only among police and military forces themselves, but also between the rests of the state's agencies that participate in this effort. This joint effort shall be oriented to achieve the objective of reaching the efficiency level that the new challenge demands, and thus contribute to the collective hemispheric security. This new problem bears legal and operational aspects within every state, whose omission may affect the whole region. The required political freedom of action allows employment of the most suitable assets in accordance with the situation. This condition should not be seen as restricted to only one type of force. The best solution might demand the participation of either the military or police forces or the cooperative use of both of them. This method of selecting the most appropriate option would accommodate political constraints that restrict the use of military forces within domestic operation. The justification of this is not solely based on restrict military forces employment just because actual law impedes it. Instead it would be a natural selection result of the most appropriate capability in accordance with each situation, adapting and updating the law as required. A clear example of the employment of military assets in domestic operations will be used to demonstrate that this dilemma is present not only in South America, and the solution to the restrictions can be properly addressed if political will deems it necessary.

It is clear that the whole process is political driven, requiring countries to think cooperatively rather than competitively, both internally and externally; therefore, the result is based on political initiative, leaving behind old problems and seeking for a better national future within a generated stable regional scenario. The solution to the problems can only be addressed by confronting them in all areas to create a sustainable security improvement. In these initiatives military forces have important capabilities to contribute, even if some legislation restricts actual use in domestic operations. An example of the

need to redefine legislation to allow forces to be employed under national authorities' requirement will be shown in the next point. Legal restrictions are only the reflex of the national needs, and such limitations are not justified to impede the use of military forces against war on terror and organize crime in South American region.

2.4 Example of employment of Military Forces in Domestic Operations.

South American countries invest a large part of their budget to develop forces with certain strategic capabilities. Those forces are used as part of national power to achieve different national interests. But most of the states limit the ability of these forces to operate within their own territories. It is normal to think in using those capabilities in war type operations and in military operations other than war. They are the main resources to generate a safe environment within *Military Operations Other Than War*, as far as they are employed in other countries. These operations are normally related with failed or rouge states countries, but never within modern stable democracies environments. But today the regional reality and needs are different. For different reasons maritime police forces – coast guard- are not capable of re-establishing order and enforce laws, and if organized crime and terrorism drives the agenda, anarchy comes; therefore, governments require committing more capable resources in accordance with the situation, which normally can be found only within the military forces. So, there is a role for navies within domestic operations.

A good and also fresh example of the need to consider military forces to domestic operations is what happened in the United States after Katrina devastated New Orleans. In the search and rescue aspects; U.S. Coast Guard forces began with the first response of what would become the largest rescue mission of this service's history:

Coast Guard crews began immediately saving lives, assessing environmental damage, and restoring ports and waterways. It was an all-

hands effort that has been widely praised... when so many other parts of the federal, state and local response was inadequate.⁴³

In internal security aspects, the National Guard was not capable of keeping a secure and controlled environment. The intervention of military forces under U.S. Northern Command (Joint Task Force Katrina) was necessary to re-establish local order and control riots and vandalism under a clear civil law enforcement operation. A clearer view can be obtained in Captain. James Kelly, U.S.N.'s article to the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings in Nov 2005, which highlights the effectiveness of military resources in comparison with civilian or police type forces, and the need to review legal restrictions in the U.S. Congress to permit them to be used whenever necessary:

While federal, state, and local authorities took turns blaming each other for flawed responses to Katrina, one federal department, the Department of Defense, was receiving praise from all quarters for its effective performance. So effective, in fact, that the president suggested that Congress look at the possible use of the military as a first responder, including, presumably, a role in maintaining law and order, always an urgent initial priority when catastrophic disasters overwhelm local law enforcement ... It is not unfair to say that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), state, and local authorities were foundering until the military arrived ... Civilian authorities could neither communicate nor coordinate with each other. The military services, trained in joint operations and employing reliable satellite communications systems, functioned smoothly. Military police units and other troops, in addition to National Guard forces, restored law and order while the New Orleans Police Department went into meltdown... Local police and fire departments must of necessity be first responders, because they are already close to the scene. But the military has the equipment, the transportation, the command and control, the discipline, and the structure to take charge in catastrophic emergencies that overwhelm local authorities.⁴⁴

But in order to be effective, it is not enough to have the means. They have to have an adequate operational readiness. That would allow necessary timely response, required

⁴³ White, Matt; Lieutenant Commander U.S. Coast Guard; "Learning from the Storm."; U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings; Nov 2005, Vol. 131 Issue 11, Available from <http://web26.epnet.com/citation.asp?>, accessed 11th Jan 2006. p.19-29.

⁴⁴ Kelly Jr., James F.; retired U.S.Navy captain; "*Using the Military in Domestic Crises*"; U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 0041798X, Nov2005, Vol. 131, Issue 11 Section: KATRINA FOLLOW-UP; Available from Internet; <http://web26.epnet.com/citation.asp?>, Accessed 15th January, 2006.

in different emergencies, such as natural disasters, local riots out of police control or even reactions against terrorist attacks; such as happened in U.S.A. 9/11, the most suitable means to neutralize possible further attacks after the twin towers in New York, were military means. The aftermath results have produced an active debate within U.S.A. in order to change limitations and define a proper role for military forces in domestic response operations. These arguments are completely valid to any other nation, including South American region. The requirement is generated from the recognized civilian authority and the employments of them are in accordance to the legal system in force.

To do this a systematic approach is required to define responsibilities, create standards, assess vulnerabilities and provide incentives to address those vulnerabilities. Clearly, partnerships are key factors to the future success of a regional security strategy. President Bush spoke of the need for cooperation in the introduction to the National Strategy for Maritime Security: "The tasks of the 21st century cannot be accomplished by a single nation alone".⁴⁵ The need is a reality and fully applicable to the South American regional needs. In this sense, it is necessary to adopt a growing partnership initiative, starting with existing commercial agreements within MERCOSUR towards collective regional defense and security initiatives including the full spectrum of regional, interagency communities.

⁴⁵ Collins, Thomas H., Commandant, Admiral U.S. Coast Guard; "*Maritime Security: An Integrated Approach*"; Sea Technology, January 2006 ; p 14 y 15.

CHAPTER 3

ROLE OF THE NAVAL FORCES

An integrated regional approach to maritime security is the right path to a more efficient and more secure maritime system. How do we get to it? In 2005 the United States gave clear guidelines in this regard by approving its National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS). The NSMS is fully applicable to the South American situation and needs. This strategy has coordinated the initiatives of several agencies within the maritime sphere. It recognizes four major components that can be extrapolated and considered in a regional security approach:

First, it is needed a unifying maritime strategy; second, an overarching global security regime; third, it is we need an outcome-focused productive partnership-tactical, operational and strategic; and fourth, we need greater transparency and accountability throughout the maritime community.⁴⁶

The strategy to be implemented should provide a system perspective of the problem, recognizing maritime security as an all possible threatsup to and including terrorism, but also all other regional related criminal activities such as drug smuggling, illegal immigration, human trafficking and piracy .As part of their nature, terrorists and criminal actors will likely seek to blend into the normal course of legitimate activity in the maritime domain; therefore, strong law enforcement capabilities and persistent presence on the water to detect, interdict and disrupt them is required; this requirement can be provided either by naval or coast guard forces.

3.1 The Maritime Forces and internal security.

The South American region threat environment demands more active actions from its political leaders. States management is the only structure capable of administrating the required actions to neutralize those threats on the national and regional scope. Most South

⁴⁶ Collins, Thomas H., Commandant, Admiral U.S. Coast Guard; “*Maritime Security: An Integrated Approach*,” Sea Technology, January 2006; p 14 y 15.

American countries have developed capable naval forces, most of them with regional projection capability. On the other hand, coast guard forces are reduced and hold limited capabilities to control and neutralize a threat that has evolved presenting military capabilities. With the constraints of unstable economies and high levels of poverty, it is not possible for governments to increase investments in developing more forces, nor to delay taking action against those threats. Therefore, all available means should be analyzed as alternative solutions, in order to comply with government's responsibility to protect and generate a proper environment to grow as a country. To be able to fulfill this responsibility in the maritime scenario nation states count on naval forces and coast guard - security forces- trained to operate where their interests demand.

The fact is that normally naval forces and coast guard forces have different spheres of action and organizational characteristics, according to the type of missions each of them may perform and the environment where they may act. For this reason, their actions normally are limited and regulated in order to comply with different legal frameworks. This system of limited action of each force type is justified to allow stricter political control over those forces, concerning the specialty in areas for each one of them. But, on the other hand it may limit the capabilities to action against delinquents when, according to their capabilities and methods, they transit and evolve from one domain to the other, producing the weakness to a fail in the effort of generating the required means to control the threats. On the other hand, such limitations are not required because political control is always present; it is not just a matter of law. The military forces are subordinate to political authorities; it is clearly stated in that way in all South American Constitutions, and is the international accepted norm. Therefore, the aim should be to concentrate effort in achieving efficiency by more integration and not by separation. It is a collective effort whereby governments and institutions are part of a whole; all members are critical components of the initiatives. The solution to this situation could be identified in Donald Rumsfeld words when addressed the Central America's defence Ministers in October 2005:

Differing threats require differing instruments of national power, and each country needs to determine the role of the military and its security forces

in its own way, according to its own history and distinctive constitutional principles. Yesterday's convenient division of bureaucratic duties has been deemed today to require some adjustment...divisions between police and military roles are viewed as old and bureaucratic, new divisions of labor should be devised.⁴⁷

Therefore, a different way to approach this problem would allow identifying an alternative course of action to solve this limitation of specific areas of jurisdiction. All this effort should be aimed to eliminate restrictions and to ensure a more efficient and effective employment of state's resources, keeping forces differentiation. But, such forces differentiation would not be due to their sphere of action and organizational dependence; instead, it is suggested to differentiate forces in reference to the type of the group that they are confronting, considering the classification of these groups in accordance with combat ability. Based on this concept, an *equivalent military capability* can be identified and applied to identify which is the most suitable type of national force to neutralize a specific threat. As a way to give an operational meaning to this concept, it can be translated into the fact that if a delinquent threat has enough capability to challenge a coast guard force and eventually defeat them, it becomes a military threat. And when that threat can be controlled just by the coast guard, it is treated and remains as a delinquent threat.

Responses to asymmetric threat leads to the conclusion that the analytical process behind it is nothing more than to choose an effective strategy. Asymmetric activity merges with an approach such as Sun Tzu's precepts for doing what the enemy does not expect. These threats work defeating our strategic structure; they create possible harm so terrible and tremendous that governments ought to effectively and efficiently respond.⁴⁸ That response shall be timely and involve the required assets in such a way that would ensure to disrupt any attempt of terrorist attack prior to its materialization. In that context,

⁴⁷ Rumsfeld, Donald H., Secretary of Defense USA, "*Erasing the Lines Trends in U.S. military programs with Latin America*". Speech before the plenary session of the Central American Ministers Conference, October 12, 2005. Internet source, available at <http://ciponline.org/facts/0512eras.pdf>, accessed February 07th, 2006. p9

⁴⁸ Lambakis, Steven and others; National Institute for Public Policy; "Understanding 'Asymmetric' Threats to the United States", September 2002, Internet, <http://www.nipp.org/Adobe/Asymmetry%20%20final%2002.pdf>, accessed 10th January, 2006.

for the maritime environment the dilemma becomes in deciding which would be the most appropriate resources to employ: naval forces, coast guard forces or both.

3.2 Naval Forces or Coast Guard.

The existence of new threats at sea constitutes a coordination and interaction problem between the maritime police, normally known as Coast Guard services, and the Naval Forces. Therefore, the solution to the potential problem is to decide if it would fall under the control or application of one or the other type of forces, thus applying the *equivalent military capability* concept.

Nonetheless, in order to face the situation in an operational and efficient way, joint action between the maritime police forces and the naval forces is needed. This action should be quick and efficient, since the combat capability of the threat will be known only at the time of action or even, they will be able to evolve its capabilities between both types through action.

Different solutions have been selected by different countries to face this problem. Some of them have the maritime police forces (coast guards) integrated as an organic branch of their navies, where the coordination is given by the unity of command, facilitating operational level integration. In other cases, they have kept the naval forces and maritime police forces as separate and autonomous organizations. This separation normally generates problems to operate coordinated under an efficient joint environment. Problems related especially with the application of different doctrines and procedures; condition that is critical and often arises under situations of high risk and changing dynamics. In the latter case, recognized mentioned limitations, could present difficulties that might obstruct interoperation. Such difficulties would not exist if the coast guard service was powerful enough to face new challenges by itself, a situation that is so far beyond of South American realities. Therefore a coordinated effort within the region is required.

In order to face and neutralize the maritime threats in the State's jurisdictional area, a clear definition of national legal regulations is required. These regulations would allow to establish a clear framework to permit the employment of either naval or coast guard forces, in accordance with the nature of the threats. In order to facilitate maritime forces regional cooperation, standardized regulations are necessary. If such condition were achieved it would create adequate conditions to employ both types of forces under a regional global dynamic environment; therefore, it would allow a more efficient use of the required assets; also, by this means it would be possible to establish clearer political governance and guidance over the forces available to be employed. These regulations and political guidance becomes particularly sensitive and important in the South American situation, an environment where the drugs and organized crime are merged and often interlinked with the terrorism.

On the other hand, if the threat that is faced exceeds the capabilities available to be neutralized by a certain nation state, it may become necessary to appeal to external support.

3.3 Overview of South American Naval Forces.

South American naval capabilities are limited and permit in most cases a local operation with restricted regional projection capabilities. A broad view of the South American Naval situation and of the means available shows and reinforces the need of coordination and integration to ensure success against the regional asymmetric threats within the maritime environment.

In order to provide a sense of the South American naval reality, the Canadian Forces Leadmark naval Typology will be used in term of capabilities definitions.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Directorate of Maritime Strategy; "*Leadmark: the navy's Strategy for 2020*"; ISBN 0-662-30934-0; p 43-49.

Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, are recognized as the major military and naval power within the South American region.⁵⁰ Within this scenario, Brazil has consolidated its regional naval primacy.⁵¹

Table No.1 summarizes the main South American navies' composition and provides a relation of different national military efforts. They are also ordered according to the number of military personnel forming their forces.

Within this data it is important to highlight the so called ABC countries⁵², where A stands for Argentina, B for Brazil and C for Chile. First, the Argentine Navy has 16.200 personnel, including 2.390 officers and 4.000 marines. Despite the fact that the country's economy has rebounded to an 8.3 % growth in the last two years, it is still too early to increase the defence budget; but Argentina has kept a constant upgrade program on their Meko-140 and Meko-360 vessels; also, their submarine flotillas are in the process to perform mid-life refit in Argentine shipyards. Their surface fleet holds a balanced mix of units, from corvettes up to destroyers. This mix allows them to operate from brown to limited blue waters, presenting limited regional projection capability. Their main weakness is the lack of mine countermeasures. Argentina has a Coast Guard service -*Prefectura Naval Argentina*- that operates independently from the navy and the defence minister. The coast guard service is under the Interior Ministry control, which holds all the police forces within its jurisdiction. The coast guard holds under in its inventory 108 patrol vessels of various sizes.

Secondly, the Brazilian navy has 50.000 personnel, including 5.900 regular naval officers, 1.300 naval aviation officers and 15.000 marines; the Brazilian navy is the strongest navy in South America. It has a balanced mix of different types of units that varies from corvettes up to an aircraft carrier. This combination of units allows Brazilian navy to operate a full range of operational environments, from brown to blue waters with

⁵⁰ English, Adrian J; "*Focus on Latin American Navies*"; Naval Forces; 2002; 6; Military Module; p 53.

⁵¹ González, Edmundo, Commander Chilean Navy; "*Redefining U.S. Hemispheric Interests: A Bold Naval Agenda for the Twenty-First Century.*"; NWC Review; Summer 1998 Press; Internet source, available at <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1998/summer/art3su98.htm>; accessed February 14th, 2006.

⁵² Jane's; "*Fighting Ships 2005-2006*"; One Hundred and Eight Edition; Edited by Commodore Stephen Saunders RN.

no limitations up to a Carrier group; therefore it presents a full capable regional projection naval force. Due to defence budget restrictions, the frigate force was reduced from 12 to 10 and the modernization projects were restricted only to the Niteroi Class. Brazil holds a submarine building programme of at least five new vessels. The Brazilian coast guard service is integrated with the navy under the same operational command; it holds up to 182 patrol vessels, mainly used for river patrols.

Thirdly, the Chilean Navy has 27.500 personnel, including 1.988 officers, 4.500 marines and 1.300 conscripts; their surface fleet holds a balanced mix of units, from fast attack missile crafts up to destroyers, allowing them to operate from brown to limited blue waters, presenting limited regional projection capability. Chile presents one of the most active regional naval renewal programmes. The programme includes both a new submarine flotilla and main surface fleet by acquiring seven second-hand vessels from the Netherlands Navy and the British Royal Navy. As well, it has considered implementing a project to build in its own facilities an offshore patrol vessel. The Chilean coast guard service – Direccion del Territorio Maritimo- is fully integrated with the navy, and it holds up to 110 patrol vessels of different types.

Finally, most South American countries face open seas and have traditionally promoted fairly strong military forces, especially naval ones. In general terms the navies in the region could be classified between limited regional projection capabilities up to purely small constabulary forces. Those capable of regional projection are represented mainly by the abovementioned ABC navies plus Peruvian Navy.

Peru has always pursued a strong naval capability. Ecuador, on the other hand, has traditionally aimed at a defensive naval force. These two countries are also combating the drug problem. Peru is the main producer of basic cocaine in the world, exporting this to Colombia for processing; Ecuador is an active corridor for trafficking; therefore, rigorous control of such trafficking is needed in this maritime region, and the best way to achieve it is by means of an offshore territorial defense navies or stronger coast guards services, capable of sustained operations and effective controlling their own territorial waters.

Source: Jane's; "Fighting Ships 2005-2006"; One Hundred and Eight Edition;
 Edited by Commodore Stephen Saunders RN

Country	Military spending (US\$ bn)	Military personnel (1000s)	Naval Patrol vessels	Coast Guard Patrol vessels	Subs	Aircraft carriers	Cruisers	Destroyers	Frigates and corvettes
Brazil	6.4	295	35	Integrated to Navy	4	1		1	14
Colombia	0.9	146.4	12	78	4				4
Peru	0.8	115	10	56	6		1		6
Chile	1.1	99	110	Integrated to Navy	4			2	4
Venezuela	0.8	79	82	Integrated to Navy	2				6
Argentina	3.1	67.3	15	108	3	1		5	9
Ecuador	0.5	57.1	3	58	2				8
Bolivia	0.1	33.5	54	Integrated to Navy as a river and lake forces					
Uruguay	0.3	25.6	36	Integrated to Navy					3
Paraguay	0.1	20.3	19	Integrated to Navy					

Table 1 - South American Navies and Military effort

Colombia is the focal area for drug activity. It represents the main regional drug processing point for the entire cocaine traffic. Venezuela is close to and connected with Colombia by jungles and rivers. Those rivers constitute an ideal drug-traffic node. Although, both countries aim to develop adjacent force projection navies, it would be more suitable for the threats needs and confidence building between both countries, to develop inshore capable navies to perform effective constabulary roles.

Uruguay is a special situation. It is a relatively small country surrounded by the two largest South American nations: Argentina and Brazil. The probability of disputes and border conflicts with either neighbor is remote. Uruguay's major contribution to hemispheric security would be the local protection of maritime commerce through the

choke point of the delta of the Río de la Plata, in conjunction with Argentina. To make such a contribution, it needs an offshore territorial defence navy.

Bolivia is the second-largest producer of cocaine in the world, and Paraguay contributes to the drug trafficking with its complex network of rivers, which act as bridges between the two oceans. Therefore, both nations need robust internal maritime security forces, but due to their situation of not having territorial access to open oceans, they would not require more than an inshore territorial or river defence and constabulary navies.

After the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the Organization of American States (OAS) began efforts to address terrorism by creating legal standards, denying sanctuary, and cooperating to punish offenders. In 2001, those efforts expanded to bolster ports security. But apart from U.S. initiative to conduct combined exercises - as UNITAS that evolved from bilateral to regional coverage exercises- there have been only few initiatives for real and effective regional naval integration.

As shown in Table No. 1, South American countries generally have a degree of naval power that matches their sovereign national interests, but their coast guards contributes with limited military capabilities; therefore, South America has the maritime resources and if it had the political will to develop and integrate its naval capabilities, it would be able to assume regional security functions, either through collective security or cooperative security, against a rogue regional country, asymmetric or external threats. It is clear that today there exist the adequate political conditions for South American countries to achieve a comprehensive regional maritime security environment. It is essential to assume the responsibility of generating a reliable regional force, and not to be dependent on the U.S., which is busy elsewhere concentrating its main military efforts on the war on terror in other areas of the world. The region had become reliant on U.S. assistance, but it is not a U.S. responsibility. It is the task of every individual government to fulfill the demands of providing a multidimensional secure environment to ensure national development. So, in accordance to the threats faced, the solution would be individual, cooperative or either integrated.

3.4 Naval Forces and regional Security

Military forces in South-America are built around doctrinal principles anchored in core values of honor, respect, and devotion to duty to their country. Their history is deeply attached to each country's life and they have developed themselves through professional proficiency. Therefore, there is no reason to doubt their loyalty either to country or to authorities. They should therefore be considered available to perform any task required by their recognized national democratic authorities either domestically or regionally. As clearly quoted by Peter Haydon about what is a naval force: "It is exercised by fighting ships manned by disciplined sailors at the direction of a central command responsible to the political leadership of a state."⁵³ Under this perspective naval forces have a function to contribute against 21st century terrorist threats.

The role of naval forces in the confrontation of threats that affect all, or various states, at the same time is to provide effective sea control of areas of interest, supporting actively the constabulary functions in order to disrupt criminal and terrorist activity. In this case, the general interest that focuses the effort is the neutralization of the common threats that affect the region in the maritime environment. This interest could be satisfied by mainly fulfilling just one objective of the traditional naval roles - the achievement of an effective control of the maritime spaces of interest within the region. Therefore, all this application of naval power can be summarized saying that even if the scenario has changed, the main objective of naval strategy is still applicable; in the terms of obtaining sea control.

Even if national policy should always balance the three naval traditional roles - military, constabulary and diplomatic- for the asymmetric terrorist threat at sea it is more directly related with constabulary and military ones. But, by exploiting the attributes and characteristics of naval forces, the forces' contributing countries obtain the benefit of diplomatic presence, thereby facilitating and creating a positive environment for higher levels of political regional integration.

⁵³ Haydon, Peter T; "*Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st century: a medium power perspective*"; Maritime Security Occasional Paper No 10; Dalhousie University; p 43.

Sea control can be obtained not only by acts of war; but sea control can also be obtained by the effective presence of naval and maritime security forces as well. Thus, to be effective requires the willingness to use force if necessary, generating the required deterrence or actual neutralization of the threats in a certain area for a determined period of time. The early threat neutralization would allow regional maritime activity to grow and contribute to achieve the required regional stability. This counterterrorism and counter criminal activity should be considered as an integral role, not only a naval task, under a proactive approach instead of reactive. Therefore, if no terrorist attack happens in the maritime regional scenario, it is not necessary because there is not threat. It could also be that, based on situational awareness and intelligence, the measures taken had been timely and efficient in deter or neutralize emerging threats.

U.S. coast guard Admiral Thomas H. Collins gives a better understanding of the complexity of the maritime security problem:

The need for a strong and effective coalition is reinforced by the fact that most of the maritime domain is under no single nation's sovereignty or jurisdiction. Additionally, increased economic interdependency and globalization, largely made possible by maritime shipping, underscores the need for a coordinated international approach. Minimum percentage of the international waterborne trade is carried on vessels owned, operated, and crewed by the same nation state. More robust international mechanisms will ensure improved transparency in the registration of vessels and identification of ownership, cargoes, and crew of the world's multinational, multi-flag merchant marine. The lack of complete transparency into the registration and ownership of vessels and cargoes, as well as the fluid nature of the crewing and operational activities of most vessels, offer additional opportunities for concealment and challenges for those attempting to maintain maritime security. Domain awareness requires integrating all-source intelligence, law enforcement information, and open-source data from the public and private sectors. It is heavily dependent on information sharing and requires unprecedented cooperation among the various elements of the public and private sectors, both nationally and internationally.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Collins, Thomas H., Commandant, Admiral U.S. Coast Guard; “*Maritime Security: An Integrated Approach*”; Sea Technology, January 2006; p 14 y 15.

From this perspective, to achieve this main objective it is essential to obtain a recognized maritime picture (RMP). This process of obtaining a RMP could not be efficient without improving maritime surveillance, the exchange and sharing of information between national inter-agencies and also by international cooperation. These efforts, to be effective should be integral, and reach the naval forces and the maritime security forces. Moreover, the activities should be carried out within a framework of clear and formal agreements among the Governments, respecting their interests and privileging transparency and legitimacy of their functions, always in accordance with the legality of their respective nation states. In this sense collaboration should be seen as an opportunity to achieve integration.

Another consideration is implementation of the Automated Identification System (AIS), an initiative driven by the International Maritime Organization.⁵⁵ Increased maritime domain awareness, based on a common operating picture would permit to distinguish routine maritime activities from possible threats. Huge issues are involved; where intelligence, information sharing and effective coordination between assets and multi-agencies are paramount, and focused on high priority areas. All these initiatives as whole constitute enablers to achieve a comprehensive maritime regional security. Only then can an effective maritime forces presence be ensured in time and space against critical targets of interest. The priority is concentrated in ensure neutralize the threats prior they develop their threat capability.

To neutralize the emerging maritime asymmetric threat a variety of strategic capabilities are needed, where not all tasks can be conducted efficiently by blue water assets. Therefore, all resources are usable, and every regional navy has something to contribute. In this sense, the regional maritime security system is required to be capable of gathering sufficient tactical capabilities in order to be able to neutralize the threats, either national-wide or together within a regional effort, with the support of units from other countries. And to do so, common doctrines and procedures are needed; joint and combined operations of national Naval and Maritime Forces among themselves, and with

⁵⁵ Avis, Peter, Captain(N), CMS/DMPOR; “The terrorist changed the battlespace - surveillance and Canadian maritime domestic security”; The Canadian Maritime Tactical Newsletter, 2003; p5-11.

Forces of other States are also needed. Only then can a real interoperability be achieved, provided all other technical aspects are solved to ensure interoperation.

Another aspect not exclusive of the maritime environment is creation of the capability to inter-operate with other agencies belonging to one's own State or friend States. The existence of such a structure would benefit maritime security by integrating other actors such as police, customs, immigration and identification. But this system requires a wider approach to permit interaction with non-government and other international organizations as well, that are related for example to drug control and environmental control.

Considering the stated strategic capabilities and the fact that the center of the effort of the maritime environment is aimed at neutralizing of common threats that affect the region, it is necessary to state the main purposes the Naval and/or Maritime Forces. Particularly important becomes the inter-operability capability among the participants involved in this task in order to provide an answer to the demands of society as a whole. Naval and/or Maritime Forces should be able to provide security to international trade, assuring that the transit of cargo destined to other countries will be effectively controlled from point of origin until the final consignee - that is represented by the physical origin, the loading port, permanence on board, unloading on the final port and the arrival to the final destiny-. The effort is then focussed in ensure that that what was loaded should arrive with no interference and exactly the same to the consignee, making sure no illicitness has taken place during the process. Another aspect is to neutralize the illegal and criminal activities at sea, according to present conventions and agreements, prioritizing human security over material aspects. Movement of persons by sea should become in a safe manner without any threats. This task is not easy, especially considering the unclear responsibilities in an environment with multi-actors, where there is a lack of transparency:

Minimum percentage of the international waterborne trade is carried on vessels owned, operated, and crewed by the same nation state. More robust international mechanisms will ensure improved transparency in the registration of vessels and identification of ownership, cargoes, and crew

of the world's multinational, multi-flag merchant marine. The lack of complete transparency into the registration and ownership of vessels and cargoes, as well as the fluid nature of the crewing and operational activities of most vessels, offer additional opportunities for concealment and challenges for those attempting to maintain maritime security.⁵⁶

Areas can be identified where it is necessary to establish general agreements in cooperation and inter-operation; for both situations is applicable that the geographic areas of interest involve international maritime spaces and the national jurisdiction spaces. To achieve this cooperation and inter-operation, it is necessary to advance development of regulations and procedures to allow implementing an effective materialization of these concepts, always keeping undamaged own states' rights, sovereignties or interest.

The problem is wide in application, complex in solution, and every nation has something to contribute in order to benefit ethically from a stable maritime environment. Admiral Collins reflected on the issue:

Because of the extensive global connectivity among businesses and governments, any nations' maritime security policy would affect other nations, and that significant local and regional incidents will have global effects. Success in securing the maritime domain will not come from any nation acting alone, but through a powerful coalition of nations maintaining a strong, united, international front. The need for a strong and effective coalition is reinforced by the fact that most of the maritime domain is under no single nation's sovereignty or jurisdiction. Because of the extensive global connectivity among businesses and governments, any nations' maritime security policy would affect other nations, and that significant local and regional incidents will have global effects. Success in securing the maritime domain will not come from any nation acting alone, but through a powerful coalition of nations maintaining a strong, united, international front. The need for a strong and effective coalition is reinforced by the fact that most of the maritime domain is under no single nation's sovereignty or jurisdiction.⁵⁷

The objectives to be controlled cannot be achieved by only one country. It is just out of reach for the isolated capacity of each South American country. However, if it is

⁵⁶ Collins, Thomas H., Commandant, Admiral U.S. Coast Guard; "*Maritime Security: An Integrated Approach*"; Sea Technology, January 2006; p 14 y 15.

⁵⁷ Ibid. p 15.

seen as a coordinated regional effort within an international community that is committed to stability and security, it is an imperative to act in a coordinated fashion with all the means available without excluding any effort to ensure results will be better than the isolated sum of the individual capabilities.

To enjoy the benefits of the globalization, it is necessary to take the related responsibility. In other words, each country needs to participate in the effort of conservation and re-establishment regional maritime order and in that way contribute to the global stabilization and development.

3.5 Applicability of these concepts within South-American Navies

Individual navies in South America have limited regional power projection. However, under a coordinated cooperative effort, it is possible to generate a respectable force able to take effective actions within regional asymmetric threats. That would give a more efficient response to act within the new global security requirements;⁵⁸ an example of this is the Panama Channel Asymmetric attack defense exercise led by U.S. Southern Command, the Chilean Navy and the Panama Defense Force. This exercise has grown from the first time it was carried out in 2003. In 2004 it included participation from the navies of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, the United States, Honduras, Panama, Peru, and the Dominican Republic.⁵⁹ The aim of this exercise is to contribute to the global effort against emerging threats that could seriously affect our overseas commerce, in this particular case by an attempt to disrupt operation of the Panama Channel.

Through this and similar operations it can be clearly shown that interoperability is the base line to achieve success in any type of military operations, and particularly in joint and combined naval operations. Therefore, as the Brazilian Navy Commander in Chief said in 2005, many countries are using alliances and coalitions as a means to

⁵⁸ Vergara Villalobos, Miguel A., Admiral, CinC Chilean Navy, "*The Commanders Respond*", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 0041798X, Mar2005, Vol. 131, Issue 3, Database: Academic Search Premier. Available from <http://web26.epnet.com/citation.asp?>, Internet source, Accessed 13th January, 2006.

⁵⁹ Godoy, Jorge O., Admiral, CinC Argentine Navy, "*The Commanders Respond*", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 0041798X, Mar2005, Vol. 131, Issue 3, Database: Academic Search Premier. Available from <http://web26.epnet.com/citation.asp?>, Internet source, Accessed 13th January, 2006.

reduce, manage or control the asymmetry in different conditions, and in any case “interoperability among their armed forces plays a very important role, contributing to the enhancement of potential strengths or to offset common weaknesses. Participation in multinational exercises is one of the ways to improve interoperability”.⁶⁰ Through effective interoperable forces, countries can assume a responsible place within a regional cooperative initiative. Developing an interoperable capability is a long term effort; therefore it should necessary be considered in the wide sense. Interoperability involves not just technical aspects; it also is related with doctrine, standard procedures and especially command and control and connectivity. Collectively it allows a timely and common picture sharing for command decision making process and effort coordination, ensuring to materialize the maritime forces’ generation and operations in the magnitude, time and space required by the challenge the threat imposes.

⁶⁰ de Guimaraes Carvalho, Roberto, Admiral CinC Brazilian Navy; “*The Commanders Respond*”, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 0041798X, Mar2005, Vol. 131, Issue 3, Database: Academic Search Premier. Available from <http://web26.epnet.com/citation.asp?>, Internet source, Accessed 13th January, 2006.

CONCLUSION

Given the presence of asymmetric threats, the difficulty to achieve identification of either the organizations or the people responsible for acts that threaten human security in South American maritime areas, challenges to maritime security have increased. This condition, together with the effects that the systems and weapons employed by those who attempt to jeopardize regional or global safety, make it necessary and imperative to develop a protection system. Through this system, with adequate support and coordination, stronger control and supervision of the maritime areas would be achieved, and with that the South American community may be protected.

Undoubtedly, asymmetric scenarios present a significant challenge when the enemy has a considerable ability to change and alter tactics and strategy; vast accessibility to economic resources, and advantages in mobility that a globalized environment provides. In order to confront this threat within the maritime scenario, the maritime forces, namely naval and maritime security forces should develop their interoperability level, in concert with encouraging mutual confidence and trust. The goal is secure maritime trade, clean seas, and management capability instead of illicitness to provide a better hemispheric security level for the countries' development and welfare.

To achieve this security environment it is necessary to have a clear politically driven process, capable of developing the necessary clear political framework, leaving aside old restrictions and moving forward towards a new level of regional cooperation and integration. In this process naval forces have an important role to fulfill, acting within national and international legal systems, framed by standardized ethical rules at a regional level, so as to guarantee the moral superiority and legitimacy of the use of force when necessary. All available assets should be considered to counter the threat. In that context it is essential to be flexible and able to operate integrated not only with other naval forces but also with maritime security forces and with different civil agencies. Agencies from the own country, as much as from other nation states should be considered in this integration process, respecting their interests and legal requirements. The development of common doctrines and procedures would allow an efficient inter-

operability, under a joint and combined effort. South American intelligence cooperation is the main enabler to allow effective operations to be conducted. Where the contribution of each country should be at least is to, the optimization of the early detection and warning of the presence of threats in each area of responsibility

The main contribution of naval forces to maritime security is to prevent potential threats from attacking or executing unlawful acts. This would be achieved by stopping such activities at any stage of development or deployment, being required to have an effective presence for monitoring and patrolling exclusive economic zones, territorial waters, and maritime accesses. The aim is to detect the threats before attacks materialize; if they fail achieve this, then the effort should concentrate in minimizing and controlling its effects. Regional measures to deny safe havens to terrorists and organized crime, and effective blocks to their covert drug related financial activities are also needed to disrupt their activities.

The condition necessary to ensure success against terrorism is to keep control of the time line of the events. It is essential to obtain the initiative and this is only possible by timely managing information –provided by intelligence- and timely response in order to prevent terrorist activity to occur. The priority is then given to deal with the threat instead of the consequences of a disaster. The only way to move forward is with a combined military and civilian multi-agency approach that shares and builds confidence between regional nation states. This approach must be capable to fill in the gaps so as to deny their exploitation by the terrorists. The key is to ensure cooperation so that the synergized results are larger than the sum of the multinational military and civilian multi-agencies contributions.

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