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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
CSC 32 / CCEM 32

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES THESIS

Nation-building and Counterinsurgency: Indivisible Concepts

By / par Maj Robert J. Ford

25 April 2006

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ABSTRACT

The intent of this paper is to study the concepts of counterinsurgency and nation-building, with a view of comparing their themes and requirements, at the operational and strategic level. What are often considered to be seemingly separate activities, with counterinsurgency considered a military activity, and nation-building considered a civilian activity, are in practice extremely similar at the operational/strategic level.

The scope of this paper will be to conduct a series of case studies relating to the topics of counterinsurgency and nation-building. The first part of the paper will be a study on the topic of counterinsurgency considering three separate theoretical views of counterinsurgency at the operational and strategic level. First will be a historical study of the successful British “Malayan campaign” from 1948-1960. Second will be a contemporary view of the requirements of operational/strategic counterinsurgency from Dr. Steven Metz of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. Third will be a view of counterinsurgency from the perspective of the Fourth Generation War theorists as expressed by William S. Lind. Despite the varying perspectives of these three case studies, the major themes and requirements of operational/strategic level counterinsurgency will be found to be very similar.

Part Two of this paper will review three views of nation-building at the operational/strategic level. A historical analysis of 20th century nation building will be the subject of the first chapter. Second will be a view of nation-building in Afghanistan from Zalmay Khalilzad US Ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq. Third will be a critique of US nation-building efforts in Iraq by Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Again despite the varying perspectives of these three case studies, the major themes and requirements of operational/strategic level nation-building will be found to be very similar.

When the major themes and requirements of counterinsurgency and nation-building are compared, it will be evident that these two concepts, at the operational / strategic level,

are extremely similar in practice and requirements, and should be considered as conceptual adjuncts to one another.

INTRODUCTION

The Bush foreign policy has made a bold and unconventional move to attempt the regime change of sovereign nations as a means of dealing with current national security threats to the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. While this regime change has been very successful in the early stages, subsequent stability operations have, at times, been criticized as ineffective and inefficient. The intent of this paper is to compare operational level counterinsurgency doctrines to “Nation-building” doctrines and concepts, and examine how these concepts have translated into a military effect in current operations. This paper will specifically concentrate on theories of achieving success against asymmetric enemies, and examine past and current lessons learned on the subject of nation-building. The intent of this analysis will be to focus on the “military strategic” and operational levels with respect to nation-building.

President Bush, both when campaigning for office and early in his first term in office, established that, in his opinion, the United States was not going to become involved in nation-building around the world. This policy was a reaction against the series of manpower draining, multi-national, and only marginally effective operations that the US had taken part in, in Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia. Bush’s intent in these early statements was to set forth the policy that the United States would save its forces for warfighting, saving them as the mechanism of decisive force. Pure, conventional warfighting however, appears to have become largely an anachronism in the new millennium. The US military is acknowledged as the preminent world powerhouse, and no other conventional military in the world can stand up to the United States on the conventional battlefield. US successes in Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom have demonstrated that the US

can bring its massive firepower to bear and defeat any enemy foolish enough to challenge the United States on the conventional battlefield. This is a lesson that has not been lost on America's adversaries. Increasingly, America's adversaries seem intent on pursuing their conflict aims through guerrilla, insurgent, or asymmetric means, dragging the United States and its coalition allies away from their area of strength in the comfortable medium of conventional war. Most recent conflicts have quickly descended into chaotic, non-linear, asymmetries, forcing an American re-evaluation of the methods of waging war in the 21st century. Counter insurgency has become the latest means of prosecuting America's wars.

It is obvious that an insurgent war is a likely by product of US and coalition involvement in the Iraqs and Afghanistans of the world. The United States' two major current conflicts have developed into, as yet, inconclusive counter-insurgency campaigns, with no short term solution in sight. This current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan has reinvigorated discussion on the subject of counterinsurgency doctrine both within the military and academia. Undoubtedly this is a topic worth re-examining and refining, and with a great deal of certainty the future effort of the US and its traditional allies will be most often focussed on defeating similar insurgent threats. What is not as clear, and has not been reviewed with similar vigour, certainly within the military community, is the re-examination of the concepts and utility of nation-building. It is the contention of this paper that at the operational and strategic levels, the major themes, activities, and requirements of a progressive and sensible counterinsurgency campaign, should be no different than those of nation-building in a conflict ridden area. A suggestion that one campaign can be conducted in the absence of most elements of the other is not realistic. Conceptually and practically,

counterinsurgency and nation-building are built upon the same themes and requirements. Separating these two activities is an artificial activity.

This paper will provide an overview and analysis of both historical and current counterinsurgency doctrine in the first half. An examination of the British counterinsurgency efforts in the Malayan campaign will lead this section, followed by an examination of two current counterinsurgency theories, the first proposed by Steven Metz, and the second an examination of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) theorists, most prominently represented by William S. Lind and Thomas X. Hammes. These first three chapters, in this first half of the paper, will be then synthesized, and a summary of the prevailing themes, concepts and requirements of counterinsurgency operations at the operational and strategic level will be put forth as the logical way ahead in a counterinsurgency campaign.

The second half of this paper will follow a similar format leading with a historical examination of successful nation-building activities as represented primarily in two Rand Corporation studies based on examples from post-World War Two to the present. This will be followed with an examination of two current nation-building views and activities, and their associated lessons learned. The first will be an analysis of the current nation-building effort in Afghanistan as expressed by Zalmay Khalilzad, former US Ambassador to Afghanistan. The second will be an analysis by Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, of the post conflict lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan as presented in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Again these three chapters will be analyzed to present a summary of prevailing themes, concepts and requirements of a successful nation-building activity. A comparison of counterinsurgency and nation-building will be conducted prior to concluding this paper. What will become

clear is that for the most part, a successful counterinsurgency effort should contain most of the elements of a nation-building approach. The logical deduction to this statement is that any nation or coalition that expects to become involved in counterinsurgency must by default be prepared to undertake a focussed and determined “nation-building” effort in order to be successful. Recommendations with respect to approach and broad suggestions for revision of current concepts will be proposed prior to concluding.

PART ONE – COUNTERINSURGENCY

INTRODUCTION

Part one of this paper will deal with historical and current views of counterinsurgency theory. Insurgency and counterinsurgency as a means of waging war is not new, however it has tended to be of a cyclical nature, coming in and out of fashion as a threats wax and wane. Counterinsurgency theory is once again a hot topic, for the first time in the west and in the US since Vietnam. Three comprehensive but different views of counterinsurgency will be presented in order to establish a basic understanding of the themes and concepts inherent in counterinsurgency doctrine at the operational and strategic levels. Significantly, despite the very diverse starting point of each theory, their final requirements and themes will be very similar. This part of the paper will establish a baseline for an understanding of the perceived demands of counterinsurgency at the operational and strategic levels.

In chapter one, a historical view of the successful British counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya will be outlined, and the lessons learned in this campaign noted as recorded by Sir Robert Thompson. In chapter two, second view of counterinsurgency will be presented as described by Dr. Steven Metz in his monograph Insurgency and Counterinsurgency In The 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat And Response.¹ Metz is a writer of significant repute in the field of strategy and counterinsurgency theory, having published extensively on the subject of counterinsurgency. Chapter three will consist of a summary of the Fourth Generation War theory and its approach to dealing with the insurgent threat as co-authored by William S. Lind in FMFM 1-A: Fourth Generation War². Lind's view was chosen due to

¹ Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency In The 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response*, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 2004).

² William S. Lind, *FMFM 1-A, Fourth Generation War*, http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/4gw_manual_draft_3_revised_10_june_05.doc; Internet, accessed 16 April 2006. FMFM 1-A stands

the topical nature of Fourth Generation War (4GW) theory, and its increasing acceptance as a theory of ordering the current threat faced in the contemporary operating environment.³

Despite the widely varying perspective of each of these three views of counterinsurgency, the major themes and requirements in these three chapters are relatively similar. It is clear upon reading these three views, that each of them, if applied to the current situation in Iraq, would offer a very similar analysis of past errors and future solutions.

for Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-A. This manual presented by Lind is a theoretical and non-official draft of what he believes a USMC FMFM dealing with 4GW should look like.

³ 4GW as a theoretical construct is gaining some acceptance in the Canadian Army. Lt Gen Caron in a recent visit to CFCSA discussed the importance of understanding the 4GW concept.

CHAPTER ONE - MALAYA

A historical look at effective counter insurgency operations and counter insurgency theory can be found in the study of the British Malayan campaign. This is an example of a successful counterinsurgency campaign, where a clear campaign plan was present and a coordinated, joint and integrated effort was undertaken to defeat the insurgency. The Malayan insurgency is considered to have occurred between 1948 and 1960. This insurgency was based around the core of Chinese communist guerrillas who had fought the Japanese during WWII. Following the failure of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to gain control of the government and cities through legitimate political means, the MCP began to focus its efforts at an insurgency in the Malayan countryside. The MCP was primarily an ethnic Chinese entity that directed its activity towards the ethnic Chinese rural squatter populations. These populations worked on the fringes of Malayan society, often working in the rubber plantations and mines, and engaged in subsistence farming on land of marginal value.⁴

The first two years of the counter-insurgency were not conducted in an ideal manner. The military was subordinated to the civil authority in the conduct of operations against the guerrillas, however, initially this was not an effective organization. “The police, caught up in the administrative difficulties of a manifold expansion, was psychologically and physically unprepared to take the lead. At the operating level, soldiers and police did not communicate well and failed to grasp each other’s problems. As a result, for close to two years, the direction of the antiterrorist effort was halting and erratic.”⁵

⁴ John Ellis, *From The Barrel Of A Gun* (London: Greenhill Books, 1995), 208.

⁵ Riley Sutherland, *Organizing Counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1947-1960* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1964); available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/2005/RM4171.pdf; Internet; accessed 17 April 2006.

By June of 1950 a formal plan had been adopted, the “Briggs Plan”, named after General Sir Harold Briggs. The intent of this plan was “to bring the population of Malaya under closer administrative control and to isolate the guerrillas”,⁶ and while doing so to win the “hearts and minds” of the local populace. The aim of this administrative control was “To dominate the populated areas and to build up a feeling of complete security which would, in time, result in a steady and increasing flow of information from all sources.”⁷ The domination of the populated areas and the security created was expected “To break the Communist organizations within the populated areas.”⁸ In part, conceived by former 77th Chindit Brigade Commander Michael Calvert, the essence of this plan was to isolate the guerrilla from his source of sustenance and protection, the rural Chinese squatter populations. These settlements were consolidated near mines and plantations to ensure the economy was maintained. The squatters were resettled into defended settlements, given land within two miles of the settlement, and were checked upon entrance and exit of the settlement to confirm identity and to ensure no foodstuffs were removed from the settlement other than perishables, and not in excess of that required for daily sustenance.⁹

The rural populations were thus provided with greater security, and support for the guerrilla was severely diminished. The new settlements were secured by the police, the army and eventually this transitioned to a local Home Guard organization. It was expected that this organization would be able “To destroy the guerrillas by forcing them to attack the security forces on their own ground.”¹⁰ Significant effort was undertaken to recruit

⁶ Scott McMichael, *A Historic Perspective On Light Infantry* (Fort Leavenworth: USCGSC Combat Studies Institute, 1987), 97.

⁷ Ellis, *The Barrel Of A Gun*, 210.

⁸ Ellis, *Barrel Of A Gun*, 211.

⁹ John J. McCuen, *The Art Of Counterrevolutionary War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), 162.

¹⁰ Ellis, *Barrel Of A Gun*, 211.

intelligence operatives to inform on the guerrilla activities, and especially by strengthening the Special Branch police.¹¹ Perhaps most importantly, the Briggs Plan “established a joint framework for coordinated activities between the civil, police, and army organizations. The Briggs Plan acknowledged that the conflict would be protracted and laid the foundations for a long-range solution. Ultimately, over 600,000 villagers were resettled under the plan.”¹² As the guerrillas were increasingly separated from their rural support they were forced to move further into the jungle. The British and Malayan forces maintained the pressure, forcing the guerrillas to continue moving to new locations with a combination of intelligence-led operations and domination of the jungle through patrolling.

The Briggs Plan was given further impetus by the appointment of Sir Gerald Templer as the High Commissioner. It was Templer who stated "Any idea that the business of normal civil government and the business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and all. The two activities are completely and utterly interrelated."¹³ All planning for operations was conducted in an interagency manner, involving Special Branch Police, British Army, Home Guard and civil administration. Operational planning was often conducted in Joint Operations Rooms that were manned in police headquarters, and often run by military intelligence personnel. The majority of these operations after 1950 were most often conducted at the company level and below, in widely spread and disparate locations deep in the jungle. This type of operation necessitated a significant devolution of authority.

Since fights took place almost exclusively at the team, squad, and platoon level, the commanders of units needed to have a free hand to exercise their own judgment in the field. Company commanders, in particular, had to be given broad discretion so that they could independently plan and execute

¹¹ McMichael, *A Historical Perspective On Light Infantry*, 97.

¹² *Ibid.*, 97.

¹³ Noel Barber, *The War of the Running Dogs*, (New York: Bantam Books, 1987), 150.

their intentions based on their own assessment of the situations in their areas.¹⁴

Also of significant importance was the emphasis placed on intelligence in the Malayan campaign. “There is no doubt that the soundest (and, in the end, the cheapest) investment against Communist insurgency in any country is in a strong, handpicked, and well-paid police intelligence organization, backed up by the funds to offer good rewards.¹⁵ Army commanders often spent significant amounts of time trying to develop actionable intelligence from discussions with locals, official, plantation owners, etc., but found that the most proficient organization in developing intelligence was the Special Branch. This intelligence was shared by the interagency organizations that were developed at multiple levels within the Malayan Emergency system. The Special Branch operated “Through the use of impressive cash awards, mild (legal) coercion, and the promise of immunity...lured many Communist sympathizers to betray their former comrades.”¹⁶

As part of this counterinsurgency campaign, significant activity was undertaken which today could be considered “nation-building.” The British in Malaya ensured that the civil service was populated with quality British administrators who had made a long term commitment to creating the conditions for a transition to Malayan independence. The British clearly shared the same goal of Malayan independence as the people, and ensured that this was clearly articulated to the population. The British civil service trained its Malayan counterparts, both Malay and Chinese to be prepared to assume the administration for the

¹⁴ McMichael, *A Historical Perspective On Light Infantry*, 103.

¹⁵ Richard Clutterbuck, *The Long, Long War: Counter insurgency in Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966), 100.

¹⁶ McMichael, *A Historical Perspective On Light Infantry*, 103.

time when independence was to be granted.¹⁷ Significant political reform was also undertaken. The citizenship requirements were liberalized to encompass the Chinese population, the first democratic elections were held, a federal legislative process and council were developed, and significant governmental restructure was undertaken.¹⁸

The British in Malaya also undertook extensive economic restructure and enhancement during the period of 1948-1960. As part of the resettlement program, new villages were created for the resettled Chinese, and the quality of life, civic infrastructure and amenities were vastly improved upon. Running water and electricity were introduced where previously there had been none. Agricultural land was developed for use by the resettled personnel that was of superior in quality to the marginal land that had been utilized for individual subsistence farming. Economic aid in the form of farmers' loans and grants ensured the success of the lower level economic development during its nascent stages. Along with economic development came an emphasis on labour and social development. Trade unions were created to help regulate working conditions in the mines and rubber plantations. Significant effort was expended in enhancing the education system, and this resulted in an increase in school enrolments. Security and justice were improved upon. Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, the civil service and military positions were opened up to all citizens, regardless of ethnic background.¹⁹

A significant information operations campaign was conducted to publicize these measures. Civic awareness courses were run in villages to ensure the mechanism of government and the reforms being conducted were understood, along with their long term

¹⁷ Riley Sutherland, *Winning The Hearts And Minds Of The People: Malaya, 1948-1960* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1964); available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/2005/RM4174.pdf; Internet; accessed 17 April 2006.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

impact and the eventual goal of independence. Not unlike a modern information operations campaign, this was a multifaceted program involving public affairs and psychological operations. This campaign targeted the insurgent and the local populations and served to further separate the insurgent from the people, as well as to demoralize the insurgent forces.

Based on his observations and involvement in the Malayan campaign, Sir Robert Thompson developed a theory expounding the “Five Basic Principles of Counter-Insurgency.”²⁰ Central to his theory of defeating insurgency was the requirement for the counter-insurgency force to win the “hearts and minds” of the local population while operating in an integrated civil-military construct. This is the groundwork for all aspects of counter-insurgency operations. First among Thompson’s principles was “The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable”²¹ The requirement in this principle is for the military and civilian organizations to be working in a coordinated manner toward the same end state. The military must, by necessity, be subordinated to the civil authority. It is worth noting that for many years of the Malayan campaign, the British were the government of Malaya. His second principle stated that “The government must function in accordance with the law.”²² It was considered imperative that the counter-insurgency must be conducted strictly in accordance with the law of the land, such that the government maintain the moral high ground and maintain the support of the people. The third principle was that “The government must have an overall plan.”²³ This must be a clearly articulated plan that derives from principle number one, and ensures that all elements of the counter-

²⁰ Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1974), 50.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 50.

²² *Ibid.*, 52.

²³ *Ibid.*, 55.

insurgency force, the local population, and the home populations of the counter-insurgency force understand. This plan must be coordinated in a joint and integrated manner with representation from civil and military planners. Thompson's fourth principle is "The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas"²⁴ This further insists that the solution does not lie purely in the military realm, but that in fact that military force is secondary to the war of ideas, of winning the hearts and minds.

Thompson's fifth and final principle directed that "In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first."²⁵ It was essential to ensure key terrain was secure and safe, at which point the focus moved outward to pacify less secure areas.

Thompson's Five Principles and the experience of the Malayan Emergency has come to represent a model for the comparison of counter-insurgency operations, and these five principles have come to be central to many current doctrines and theories of counter-insurgency.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 55.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 57.

CHAPTER TWO – METZ: RECONCEPTUALIZING THREAT AND RESPONSE

While the previous historical view of the Malayan campaign gives us a perspective of a successful counterinsurgency campaign, Dr. Steven Metz presents a view based on his perception of weaknesses in the current US operational and strategic approach to counterinsurgency. Steven Metz in his November 2004 monograph titled Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing The Threat And Response²⁶, strongly suggests a reconceptualization of US counterinsurgency doctrine is needed. At the time of writing Steven Metz was the Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, a component part of the U.S. Army War College. An acknowledged specialist in counterinsurgency issues, he has been widely published in military and international affairs journals. In his paper he begins by defining insurgency as:

“a strategy adopted by groups which cannot attain their political objectives through conventional means or by a quick seizure of power. Insurgency is characterized by protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungles, mountains, urban areas), psychological warfare, and political mobilization—all designed to protect the insurgents and eventually alter the balance of power in their favor”²⁷

In a comprehensive review of counterinsurgency Metz draws a number of conclusions that do not vary significantly from those expressed by Thompson through the lessons learned in the Malayan campaign. Counterinsurgency requires a rapid stabilization of the country and a significant interagency effort. Root causes of the insurgency need to be addressed, as victory is not reliant on merely a military campaign to destroy the insurgency. A clear emphasis is placed on intelligence, especially human intelligence (HUMINT), and

²⁶ Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency In The 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response*, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 2004).

²⁷ Metz and Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 2.

this requires winning the hearts and minds of the people. Metz is concerned with establishing the legitimacy of the government/counterinsurgent forces, and this requires strengthening the national government, while downplaying the reliance on external military forces. Metz also will be seen to place a significant emphasis on external legitimacy, demanding a multilateral approach, preferably with international sanction for counterinsurgency activities.

Metz, in his outline, divides insurgencies into two forms, “national” insurgencies and “liberation” insurgencies. National insurgencies pit a government against an insurgency developed from within the country. These insurgencies are described as triangular in nature as they have obviously the government and the insurgent holding two sides of the triangle, and any number of other actors holding the third side of the insurgency. Insurgents will be identified by political, racial, social, ideological, ethnic or economic status. Generally the third side of this triangle will be composed of the populace, whose support the government and insurgency must vie for, while at the same time attempting to weaken each other.

Metz’s “liberation” insurgent on the other hand is fighting an insurgency against a foe clearly identified as an outsider and occupier. Example of this type of insurgency provided by Metz include Rhodesia, post 1965 Vietnam, anti-Soviet Afghanistan, the current Afghanistan insurgency and the current Iraq insurgency. This is by far the most complicated and difficult insurgency to deal with from the point of view of the US as an outsider, as observed in the insurgencies of contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq. Often the outsider cannot win over the populace in the liberation insurgency, his outsider status obviously working against him. Clearly, a clear delineation between types of insurgency is not always going to be possible and many insurgencies will contain elements of both types.

The key characteristics of insurgency that makes it difficult for the US (and by extension the US allies) to counter are in Metz's opinion, protractedness and ambiguity. These characteristics "mitigate the effectiveness of the American military. Rapid decisive operations are seldom, if ever, strategically decisive; longterm involvement with extensive interagency activity and partner cooperation is the norm."²⁸

Metz argues that at the National Strategic level, the US is not appropriately directed to conduct the types of counter insurgency operations that it currently finds itself embroiled in. For example, the 2004 National Military Strategy does not use the word insurgency when describing the security environment the US military must be prepared to operate in. Instead it suggests "While the Armed Forces' foremost task is to fight and win wars, the character of conflict has changed, necessitating capabilities to defeat a wide range of adversaries—from state to non state actors."²⁹ The National Military Strategy appears to take a predominately military and conventional view of the conflict, concentrating on agility, decisiveness, integration, and combining US military power with other sources of power. What Metz would suggest is the failure to understand the true nature of the counterinsurgency campaigns the US is currently participating, is that this "perspective is not integrated fully with characteristics that history has shown to be most effective in counterinsurgency including perseverance, restrained use of force, and an emphasis on intelligence, law enforcement, and political action."³⁰ His concern is quite clearly that in the development of strategic level doctrine, the US applies the conceptual foundation and methodology developed for

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

²⁹ United States, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States* (2004); available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf>; Internet, accessed 17 April 2006.

³⁰ Metz and Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 16.

conventional combat to irregular warfare rather than developing a new or separate approach.”³¹

Metz’s analysis of current military doctrine is that the US has based its doctrine solely on the previously described “National” insurgency model, where it is envisioned that US assistance will be to a national government, and the strategy will be to win over the third side of the national insurgency triangle. US doctrine must be reworked to view insurgency as something more than the Maoist people’s war of the past. US doctrine must develop the ability to conduct counterinsurgency against the “Liberation” insurgency, when the US is a de facto occupier, as it is currently engaged in. This ability is of paramount importance at this time, as current insurgent doctrine continues to mutate.

Strategic Recommendations

Metz makes a number of strategic and operational level recommendations with respect to the requirement for a review of counterinsurgency doctrine in the US, especially in view of countering “liberation” insurgencies. First off, is the requirement for “Rapid stabilization of the state or area using the force required.”³² The requirement here is to provide a large force to rapidly stabilize the state, the larger the force the better. His argument is that “perception and presence are integral components of stabilization.”³³ This would appear to fly in the face of US decisions at the Sec Def level to lower force levels from that which the Army had recommended prior to Iraqi Freedom. A further nail in the coffin of Bush foreign policy with respect to post conflict Iraq, is the suggestion by Metz that

³¹ *Ibid.*, 16.

³² *Ibid.*, 21.

³³ *Ibid.*, 21.

“Preferably, the stabilization force should be a multinational and integrated interagency organization operating with a United Nations mandate.”³⁴

Following this large stabilization and presence force, it would be preferable that the US minimize its presence as rapidly as possible to negate what is likely a growing “liberation” insurgency movement. Along with external stabilization, significant effort is required at the strategic level for the “Rapid creation of effective local security and intelligence forces.”³⁵ By minimizing the US presence and enhancing the local capability, the intent is to begin to shift the perception of the insurgency from that of a “liberation” insurgency to one of “national” insurgency. As discussed earlier, it is much easier in the “national” insurgency to win over the local population, and to address the “root causes” of the insurgent dissatisfaction. Addressing these root causes should be supported by the US, it will be important at this stage to adjust “the actions of the local regime by encouraging sustained reform.”³⁶ Lastly in his list of strategic recommendations, Metz suggests strengthening the regimes of neighbouring states, lest the developing insurgency spread to create a weakening throughout the region.

Lastly, at the Strategic level, Metz suggests that if the US is truly engaged in a transnational, global insurgency of a liberation ideology, and based on radical Islam, then the US must consider the creation of a US national grand strategy based on counterinsurgency to combat the Global War On Terror, not based on the massive application of military might. Given possible extent of this insurgency, and the huge overseas commitments of the US military abroad, Metz suggests that perhaps this national Grand Strategy might be best served if it is one based on the containment vice total eradication.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 21.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 21.

Operational Considerations

Metz's views on the operational considerations that should be taken into account when dealing with a counterinsurgency are extremely useful. First, Metz would suggest that the type of organization that should be created to deal with the insurgent threat is an interagency organization "of functionally organized teams from across the U.S. Government and, for military units themselves, a networked structure with central coordination but local autonomy."³⁷ Secondly, he suggests that the counterinsurgent organization must be very adaptive, and must be able to continually learn from experience. The counterinsurgent force must be able to collect, analyze, disseminate and implement lessons learned rapidly, and at lower level that possible today. This again calls for autonomous leaders at the lowest levels.

Metz's assessment is that operational design to combat insurgency must necessarily be different from that of conventional combat. Noting that the insurgent operates less in the military domain, and more often in the political and psychological, interagency planning should be "effects based" and focused on a number of desired outcomes. Metz lists these outcomes as fracturing, delegitimizing, demoralizing, delinking, and deresourcing. Fracturing must be attempted across the entire spectrum of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities, "through military, psychological, and political means."³⁸ This could include direct action, attempts to exploit rifts within the insurgency, and amnesties to strip insurgents away from their leadership. Delegitimizing should target the support of the local population, demoralizing should target the insurgents themselves. Delinking would involve "understanding and destroying the political, logistics and financial connections",³⁹ of the insurgent movement to its internal and external support. Lastly, deresourcing would be

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 25.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 25.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 26.

achieved by “curtailing funding streams and causing it (the insurgency) to waste existing resources.”⁴⁰

A second suggestion with respect to the operational design of the counterinsurgency “is to use preemption/prevention as a guideline.”⁴¹ The intent here would be to prevent the development of certain adverse capabilities within the insurgency. These capabilities are listed as the development of a serious insurgency, the development of military capabilities that can threaten the regime, the development of public support that threatens regime legitimacy, the development of linkages to organized crime, the development of the perception that the insurgency will ultimately prevail, and the development of “a coherent insurgent political organization.”⁴² Again this would require an effects based campaign, with offensive and defensive means of achieving success against each of the adverse capabilities the insurgency was being measured against. At the heart of both of these examples of campaign design is the application of interagency efforts, effects based planning, decentralized decision making, and a wide range of kinetic and non kinetic capabilities.

Metz makes it very clear that at the operational level, seizing the initiative as early as possible is very important. The early application of smaller amounts of counterinsurgency support will stave off much larger requirements at a later date. He further suggests that insurgencies may reach a critical mass beyond which they cannot be defeated within a reasonable cost, in which case disengagement should be sought.⁴³ Metz emphasizes the requirement for host nation support in counterinsurgency. Obviously the US should not become involved in counterinsurgencies without the support of the host nation. Many

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 26.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 27.

aspects of the counter insurgency campaign, especially in the information operations domain (psyops, public affairs, etc), cannot be effectively prosecuted without the specific and nuanced understanding of the historical and cultural context. Metz suggests that history has also proven that the use of local troops and the establishment of local and Special Forces guerrilla organizations to fight the counterinsurgency is also important.

Metz concludes his reconceptualization with a consideration of the organizational and force structure implications of the theoretical discussion put forth. Of primary importance is the “full integration of all government agencies under unified control (and preferably unified command) is the only way to synchronize the elements of national power effectively.”⁴⁴ He places a similar importance on the requirement of intelligence/counterintelligence, suggesting extremely wide sourcing for intelligence collection and extremely wide dissemination of the product. He places the priority on the ability to gain human intelligence (HUMINT) vice the use of technological means of collection. Emphasis is further placed on the seamless integration of police and military, as the counterinsurgency process is more akin to policework than traditional military operations, and Metz suggests that command of a counterinsurgency effort should as a result be led by a police administration vice a military one, with a staff of widely disparate disciplines, the emphasis not being placed on military but rather civilian capabilities. The endstate in the short term should be a smaller military element supporting a larger civilian and law enforcement effort. The military element and emphasis in Metz’s analysis should be placed on intelligence and engineer capabilities that are particularly useful in the counterinsurgency campaign, albeit with a greater autonomy than current employment of the “combat support” units currently operate under.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 29.

Metz's final recommendations for the Army suggest a redirection of effort into better understanding the nature of insurgency operations that are currently being combated. He underscores the requirement for more refined counterinsurgency planning, analysis and wargaming, and suggests that the Army act as the advocate for a similar increase in emphasis across other elements of the government. He strongly emphasizes the continued development of the interagency effort, going so far as to suggest the integration of the Department of Homeland Security into counterinsurgency strategic planning. He also suggests that the US Army needs more emphasis placed on the non kinetic enablers to combating insurgency, such as Psyops, Civil Affairs, Intelligence and Engineers.

In this monograph, Metz's arguments and recommendations are clear, unambiguous and achievable. His concerns for internal and external legitimacy in the counterinsurgency campaign are valid, and certainly reflect the difficult situation in the Iraq campaign to date with both international support for the campaign and Iraqi acceptance of the internal status quo. It is widely accepted that the initial troop deployment numbers for Phase IV of the Iraq campaign (counterinsurgency, stability, reconstruction) were not large enough to rapidly achieve the secure environment required, and the less than complete international support for this campaign has undoubtedly exacerbated this problem. This has led to a situation where the US has not been able to transfer security operations to indigenous troops, and consequently has had to continue to place an overly large emphasis on the military aspect of the counterinsurgency, and without enough resources or security to complete the larger interagency part of the counterinsurgency. Internal legitimacy has suffered as a result.

In his monograph, Steven Metz has done a superb job of analyzing the contemporary operating environment, and of placing the current counterinsurgency campaigns in the

context of this environment. He has in one document, captured much of the concern and analysis that is evident in current and disparate writing on the renewed subject of counterinsurgency. What is significant about Metz's monograph is the wider view he takes on the subject of counterinsurgency in writing on the subject at the operational and strategic levels. From Metz's analysis, counterinsurgency is viewed as much larger than the military component, and this is a significant departure from the tactical/military point of view normally envisioned under the title of "counterinsurgency." Despite dealing with a significantly different threat from the Malaya campaign, his analysis of the weaknesses of the current campaigns, especially in Iraq, has led him to a series of recommendations that are very similar to those that achieved success in Malaya 50 years previous.

CHAPTER THREE – FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE THEORY

Unlike the development of counterinsurgency theory by Steven Metz, in the case of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) theory, we have a completely distinct view of the evolution of warfare that suggests that the current operating environment and the asymmetric enemy we face is the latest evolution in modern warfare. Lind, and his 4GW theory, has been selected for analysis due to the increasing attention being paid to this theory, and the fact that this theory is able to place the current counterinsurgency campaigns inside an original and unique warfare construct. Yet within this construct, 4GW theory achieves very similar recommendations and requirements to defeat counterinsurgency as has Thompson in the Malaya campaign, and Steven Metz in his reconceptualizing of response.

4GW theory is a concept that suggests that the types of wars we find ourselves engaged in, against an asymmetric enemy, are a result of the declining relevance of the state in warfare. This is a theory that was first postulated in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989 by William S. Lind et al.⁴⁵ The four generations of this theory should be thought of as evolutions, vice literally as generations. Each generation represents a different way of viewing and conceptualizing war. Multiple generations of warfare may be present at any one time. While somewhat sequential, this theory by no means exclusively so. The primary source of 4GW counterinsurgency discussion and response in this paper will be FMFM 1-A: Fourth Generation War.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ William S. Lind, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette*, October, 1989; http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm; Internet; accessed 17 April, 2006.

⁴⁶ Lind, *FMFM 1-A, Fourth Generation War*, http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/4gw_manual_draft_3_revised_10_june_05.doc; Internet, accessed 16 April 2006. FMFM 1-A stands for Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-A. This manual presented by Lind is a theoretical and non-official draft of what he believes a USMC FMFM dealing with 4GW should look like.

The four generations begin in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia and the monopoly of the state in waging war. First Generation War (1GW) was characterized by mass of troops, and the tactics of line and column. 1GW is both a response to technology as well as a response to social conditions and ideas. The technology at play is the smoothbore musket, requiring mass to achieve firepower, and the social conditions and ideas are a reflection of the levels of training and the discipline required to achieve success. 1GW is about attrition, and a culture of order.

The Second Generation Warfare (2GW) begins around 1860, is characterized by fire and movement, and is primarily a response to changing technology on the battlefield. The accuracy of rifled weapons, the rapid fire of the machine gun and especially the development of indirect fire led to greater lateral dispersion on the battlefield, however the tactics were essentially linear. In essence, massed firepower replaces massed manpower. In 2GW “The focus was inward on rules, processes and procedures. Obedience was more important than initiative (in fact, initiative was not wanted, because it endangered synchronization), and discipline was top-down and imposed.”⁴⁷ 2GW continues to be about attrition, and maintains the culture of order from 1GW.

Third Generation warfare (3GW) is what we know as Manoeuvre Warfare, first observed at the end of World War I, and most prominently observed in the German Blitzkrieg of WW II. “In the blitzkrieg, the basis of the operational art shifted from place (as in Liddell-Hart’s indirect approach) to time. This shift was explicitly recognized only recently in the work of retired Air Force Col John Boyd and his “OODA (observation-

⁴⁷ William S. Lind, *Understanding Fourth Generation War*, <http://antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702>; Internet; accessed 17 April, 2006.

orientation-decision-action) theory.”⁴⁸ The battlefield loses its linearity and 3GW “is based not on firepower and attrition but speed, surprise, and mental as well as physical dislocation. Tactically, in the attack a Third Generation military seeks to get into the enemy's rear and collapse him from the rear forward.”⁴⁹

The Fourth Generation Warfare sees the emergence of non-state warfare gaining precedence for the first time since the Treaty of Westphalia. The state is seen as losing its monopoly on war, with states facing non-state actors, and the re-emergence of wars of culture. This is the “non-trinitarian” warfare of van Crevald’s “The transformation of War” from 1991:

As war between states exits through one side of history's revolving door, low-intensity conflict among different organizations will enter through the other ... Extensive conflict of this nature will cause existing distinctions between government, armed forces, and people to break down. National sovereignties are already being undermined by organizations that refuse to recognize the state's monopoly over armed violence. Armies will be replaced by police-like security forces on the one hand and bands of ruffians on the other, not that the difference is always clear even today. National frontiers, that at present constitute perhaps the greatest single obstacle to combating low-intensity conflict, may be obliterated or else become meaningless as rival organizations chase each other across them. As frontiers go, so will territorial states ... As new forms of armed conflict multiply and spread, they will cause the lines between public and private, government and people, military and civilian, to become blurred as they were before 1648.⁵⁰

4GW theorists would argue that 4GW “is not a military but a political, social and moral revolution: a crisis of legitimacy of the state. All over the world, citizens of states are

⁴⁸ Lind, *Marine Corp Gazette*, 1989.

⁴⁹ Lind, *Understanding Fourth Generation War*,. <http://antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702>.

⁵⁰ Martin Van Crevald, *The Transformation Of War* (Toronto: The Free Press, 1991), 225.

transferring their primary allegiance away from the state to other things: to tribes, ethnic groups, religions, gangs ideologies and so on.”⁵¹ In FMFM 1-A, which William S. Lind helped to conceptualize and draft, it is made obvious that the solution to 4GW cannot be purely military. “The fact that the root of Fourth Generation war is a political, social and moral phenomenon, the decline of the state, means that there can be no purely military solution to Fourth Generation threats.”⁵² The solution must be greater than the use of military force alone, and that “this is especially the case when the military force is foreign; usually, its mere presence will further undermine the legitimacy of the state it is attempting to support.”⁵³ Obviously this is a significant dilemma, and one that FMFM 1-A keeps in mind while developing its 4GW doctrine.

One of the characteristics of 4GW is the difficulty in operationalizing it. 4GW theorists argue that operational centres of gravity are not as clear as they would be in preceding generations of war. “Often Fourth Generation opponent’s strategic centers of gravity are intangible. They may be things like proving their manhood to their comrades and local women, obeying the commandments of their religion, or demonstrating their tribe’s bravery to other tribes.”⁵⁴ Thus the argument goes, that the essence of the operational art, “focussing tactical actions on enemy strategic centers of gravity.... becomes difficult or even impossible in such situations.”⁵⁵ The 4GW argument thus suggests that warfare must be viewed from a different perspective than the tactical, operational and strategic levels that we are most familiar with.

⁵¹ William S. Lind, *FMFM 1-A, Fourth Generation War*, http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/4gw_manual_draft_3_revised_10_june_05.doc; Internet, accessed 16 April 2006, 4.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

In 4GW, the argument first put forth by Col John Boyd (of the OODA loop fame), is that this new warfare must be fought on three new levels, being the physical, the mental and the moral levels of war. The physical level is about “killing people and breaking things,”⁵⁶ and the argument states that in 4GW, this is the least important level of warfare. The moral level conversely is the most important level of war, with the mental level somewhere in between. 4GW theorists suggest that the central dilemma of Fourth Generation war is that “what works for you on the physical (and sometimes mental) level often works against you at the moral level. It is therefore very easy in a Fourth Generation conflict to win all the tactical engagements yet lose the war.”⁵⁷ In 4GW, firepower can win your war at the physical level, however the ensuing collateral damage to civilian property and life moves your force closer to moral defeat.

The FMFM 1-A view of fighting 4GW brings with it a number of themes and viewpoints that are considerably different from the Western conventional warfighting mindset. One difference is the requirement for an outward focus on the situation and the results or effects required, as opposed to focusing “inward on set rules, processes and methods.”⁵⁸ Imagination and ingenuity will be required to be successful in 4GW, not “by the book” methods. Another suggestion for dealing with 4GW is the emphasis on intelligence, and this manifests itself in a number of ways. First is the decentralization of intelligence collection and dissemination. Along with this decentralization of intelligence, there must also be a decentralization of authority (and the increase in trust) to act on this intelligence. The importance of intelligence is further emphasized by the 4GW theorists belief in the rethinking of the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) Loop. In 4GW, no

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 19.

longer is the speed of the OODA loop cycle the dominant requirement as it was in 3GW. In 4GW it is the accuracy of the Observe and Orient portions that is expected to be pre-eminent. A failure in the Observe-Orient portion causes inaccurate targeting, with the resultant alienation the local population in support of the 4GW insurgent.

Other considerations must be made when 4GW theorists insist that the moral level of war is dominant over the mental and the physical. One of the spin offs from the dominance of the moral level is the decreasing importance of physical strength. It is suggested that physical weakness is more than counteracted by the increase in moral authority that comes with physical weakness. Thus a western force that uses overwhelming physical force against a weak insurgent enemy, risks losing the moral high ground. The suggestion is that as opposed to escalating conflict on the physical level, a counterinsurgency force should seek de-escalation of conflict, in a manner more akin to police work. “If a police officer escalates a situation, he may find himself charged with a crime. This reflects society’s desire for less, not more, violence. Most people in foreign societies share this desire. They will not welcome foreigners who increase the level of violence around them.”⁵⁹ Given the fact that this is essentially a fight on the moral level of war, de-escalation allows the friendly force to maintain its moral high ground by avoiding the use of overwhelming force when this force is not appropriate. De-escalation and proportionality must become the mantra for the counterinsurgency force. Combat training must still provide the counterinsurgent force with the means to react and escalate when necessary. However in most cases the counterinsurgent force is going to have to resist the urge to escalate a confrontation. Winning on the moral level will often mean not wanting to fight, and finding the self discipline to avoid the overreaction that will cause the loss on the moral level. It is argued in 4GW theory that

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 20.

killing the insurgent is far less important than avoiding the killing of the innocent civilian. Remembering that weakness in the physical level has an ability to manifest itself as strength on the moral level, is well worth noting in this instance.

In keeping with this idea is the suggestion that “less is more”. Care must be taken in fighting the Fourth Generation war to keep the footprint of the occupying or assisting force small. This too helps to avoid the perception of a bullying level of strength on the physical level and the consequent diminishment of moral authority and righteousness on the moral level. Limiting our exposure in a foreign state also helps ensure the legitimacy in of the state government and removes the “occupying force” tool the insurgent can use to his benefit. 4GW theorists would argue that if a western presence must be obvious in a foreign state, then our duration must in exchange be very short. “If all else fails, and only then, Marines will invade and occupy another country, usually as part of a joint or combined force. This is the least desirable option, because as foreign invaders and occupiers, we are at a severe disadvantage from the outset at the moral level of war.”⁶⁰

In keeping with the spirit of minimizing the coalition footprint inside a country as a means of maintaining the moral high ground in Fourth Generation war, theorists also suggest that we must make a very serious effort at preserving the enemy state. In essence this means following the defeat of an enemy state, attention must be focused on maintaining their civil service, police, judicial and military organizations to the greatest extent possible. The Iraq invasion is a clearly egregious violation of this requirement, in that the Iraq military and the top six layers of the Iraqi civil service were removed, virtually resulting in no Iraqi

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 25.

government infrastructure remaining to cooperate with.⁶¹ In 4GW theory it is argued while we might very easily defeat an opposing state's military forces, we will likely be far more challenged when it comes to maintaining order following a regime change. It will be considered a serious failure on our part to defeat an enemy regime, and to consequently destroy the state as well. "If this happens, it may prove difficult or impossible for us or for anyone to re-create a state. The result will then be the emergence of another stateless region, which is greatly to the advantage of Fourth Generation entities."⁶² Key to the achievement of this aim is the idea that new codes of conduct are required for dealing with defeated elements of state apparatus. Keeping in mind that military personnel and civil servants who had been working against us will now be required to maintain the state following a coalition imposed regime change, how we treat them during and immediately after conflict will be of significant importance maintaining order and effectiveness of the state in the post conflict phase. Instead of humiliating those who we defeat, we should put our efforts into ensuring their transition from enemy to potential supporter is conducted with dignity and honour. The intent is to ensure that they will work with us in the new regime. These people are the ones most able to assist our maintenance of law, order and good governance in the post conflict phase.

The type of military force that we employ in a Fourth Generation war will be of significant import also. In keeping with the theme of "less is more" and noting the requirement to put a human face on the force that we use to counter Fourth Generation entities, the suggestion in FMFM 1-A is that a true light infantry force is what is best suited

⁶¹ M.W. Shervington, "Small Wars And Counterinsurgency Warfare: Lessons From Iraq," (master's dissertation, Cranfield University, 2005), 88-89 <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/shervington.pdf> Internet; accessed 17 April 2006.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 25.

to 4GW work. This should be a physically fit force, primarily foot borne, and not tied to vehicle suites that rely on road networks and extensive logistics organizations. Light infantry will have the advantage of being less intrusive than heavily armoured forces and among the most discriminate in terms of firepower and its effects. Light infantry will also show the local population a human face, and will be far more able to interact with the local population than any other combat arm. “They can be courteous and even apologize for their mistakes. They can protect the local people from retaliation by the irregulars, assist with public works projects or help form and train a local defense force.”⁶³ Using light infantry avoids the impression of overkill on the physical level, and helps establish credibility on the moral level by committing a relatively equitable force against the 4GW opponent.

Given that the 4GW should be fought with a focus on the moral plane, it is crucial that an effort be made to connect with the population that the 4GW insurgent operates within. In this effort the counterinsurgency force must strive to empathize with the local population. This empathy cannot be obtained by operating from a heavily fortified western base camp, with western standards of living, as this will only serve to create an “us versus them” mentality in the population. “American-style ‘Force Protection’ is highly disadvantageous in Fourth Generation war, because it seeks security by isolating American troops from the surrounding population.”⁶⁴ In FMFM 1-A, the recommendation is that the counterinsurgency force be integrated into the local population, decentralizing the living arrangements and increasing the everyday visibility of the friendly force. Effectiveness will be gained by living in the same village as the locals, living in similar conditions to them, gaining their trust, and above all putting a human face to the counterinsurgency effort. As

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 27.

our troops become known and respected, the local population will also protect them, provided they have earned the trust and respect of the locals.

Along with this trust and respect will also come valuable human intelligence (HUMINT). Integrating with the local community will also provide a better understanding of local politics. In a situation where the influence of the host nation state is waning or non-existent, local politics will be all important as a means of resolving conflict, avoiding conflict and playing competing factions of the enemy force against each other as opposed to against the coalition forces or those of the weakened or fledgling national authority. Again this will come down to intelligence and a detailed understanding of the local situation. This type of intelligence and understanding will not be developed in the current intelligence structures that operate top down and fail to place an appropriate priority on HUMINT.

Developing local intelligence and achieving influence at the local level has requirements other than the human face, de-escalation, and understanding of local politics. FMFM 1-A suggests “What artillery and air power are in Third Generation war, cash is in the Fourth Generation: your most useful supporting arm.”⁶⁵ As this cash is logically going to be used for local infrastructure development, as well as to buy intelligence, bribe local officials and other sorts of unsavoury activities, some thought must by necessity be put into how accounting rules will be reworked to allow this to occur. In many locations around the world right now, Islamic fundamentalist organizations (Wahabbi/Salafist) operate social welfare organizations to look after the families of less fortunate, and often less fundamentalist, co-religionists. The downside of some of these programs is that they require those receiving the aid to adopt fundamentalist customs of dress and behaviour, while at the same time providing indoctrinating schooling for the children. Breaking this cycle with the appropriate infusions

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 30.

of cash will go a long way to stemming the flow of over indoctrinated and underemployed young teenage males who form significant portions of the 4GW recruiting pools.

At the most powerful level of war, the moral level, the key to victory is to convince the local people to identify with us, or at least to acquiesce to us, rather than identifying with our enemies. Because we are foreign invaders representing a different culture (and sometimes a different religion), this is a difficult challenge.

Meeting this challenge will depend to a significant degree not on what we do, but on what we do not do. We cannot insult and brutalize the local population and simultaneously convince them to identify with us. We cannot represent a threat to their historic culture, religion or way of life. We cannot come across as Goliath, because no one identifies with Goliath. Nor do people identify with Paris, the Trojan champion in the Iliad, who fought from a distance (he was an archer) and was therefore a coward...In terms of ordinary, day-to-day actions, there is a Golden Rule for winning at the moral level, and it is this: Don't do anything to someone else that, if it were done to you, would make you fight. If you find yourself wondering whether an action will lead more of the local people to fight you, ask yourself if you would fight if someone did the same thing to you.⁶⁶

William S. Lind's 4GW theory approaches counterinsurgency from a significantly different perspective than the two previous theories; however in the end 4GW theory suggests very similar responses to dealing with insurgency. The military requirement is de-emphasized, and the interagency aspect is given greater prominence. Achieving success on the moral plane translates into winning the hearts and minds. A similar emphasis on operating through the existing government structures is as a means of achieving legitimacy as opposed to appearing as a colonial or occupying power. The next chapter will present a summary of the themes and concepts presented in these three views of counterinsurgency.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 34.

CHAPTER FOUR – AN ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR THEMES AND CONCEPTS

An analysis of the major themes and concepts indicate significant commonality between the approach taken by the British in Malaya and Borneo, and the theory and concepts espoused by Steven Metz in his reconceptualization, and those of William S. Lind in 4GW theory. One of the more significant areas of agreement between these theories is the clearly stated requirement that counterinsurgency must be considered to be an interagency effort. Briggs, Templar and Thompson in Malaya were adamant about this requirement, noting the subordinate and supporting role the military must play in a successful counterinsurgency effort. Metz echoes this sentiment, and he clearly articulates the need for the interagency effort and insists on the full integration of all government agencies. It is the 4GW theorists who minimize the military aspect of counterinsurgency the most, insisting that the physical level of war, that of the military, is the least important aspect of counterinsurgency, after the mental level of war and most importantly maintaining the moral high ground. Quite clearly the concept of unified command by civilian authorities and the subordination of the military to these authorities is an overriding factor.

When discussing minimizing the military aspect, all three theories agree that the counterinsurgency effort must work through the local government and forces, so as not to appear as occupiers. A common thread throughout the three previous chapters on counterinsurgency theory is the requirement to empower local authorities and to minimize the overt foreign presence as soon as possible. This was certainly the case of the British in Malaya who understood the requirement for a strong indigenous police force, and worked within the civil service to strengthen it. Steven Metz strongly makes the case that the counterinsurgency force must be seen to operate within or in support of the national security

forces. In Metz's view this should prevent the creation of the "liberation" insurgency or at least allow it to mutate into a "national" insurgency, which can be more easily contained and dealt with. And as seen in the 4GW theory the same requirement to operate within the mechanisms of the state exists, and Lind suggests that we must at all costs preserve the state, for once it is destroyed it is very difficult to recreate. This is recreation is currently being achieved with significant difficulty in Iraq. A further common belief that supports this empowerment of local authorities is the requirement for the counterinsurgency force to have an understanding of the culture that they will be working in. Without the understanding of culture, the counterinsurgency force will be oblivious to the nuances of their mission and their dealings with their supported force. These nuances have enormous impact on those less physical (and more important) aspects of the campaign, information operations, psyops and public affairs.

Understanding these cultural and social nuances further sets the conditions to achieving one of the greatest enablers to the counterinsurgency campaign, and this is the gaining of actionable intelligence. Thompson, Lind and Metz all believe that the current conventional view of intelligence must be reviewed. HUMINT vice technological collection of intelligence is viewed as the solution to winning the counterinsurgency campaign. Gaining solid HUMINT is achievable in the military campaign; however the military's true strength in HUMINT is the military structure, processes and ability to conduct detailed analysis. Gaining the HUMINT required to win the counterinsurgency war must be gained through paramilitary police type organizations, and that a foreign power will never defeat the insurgency without the involvement of the local government structures.

The subject of intelligence drives all three theories to discuss the requirement to decentralize not only the collection of intelligence, but also the dissemination of intelligence. Centralized collation and maintenance of intelligence data, while effective in the conventional war scenario, is ineffective in the counterinsurgency campaign. Intelligence must be rapidly collected from the lowest levels and disseminated equally as rapidly to the lowest levels. Once disseminated, all of the authors agree that the ability to act on this intelligence must be devolved to the lowest levels. Authority to conduct operations must be devolved to much lower levels than it would normally be held, and that those planning and conducting operations should be those collecting and operating in their individual areas of operations.

In conducting counterinsurgency, these theorists would have the reader believe that this work is more akin to police work than it is to soldiering. As in police work, de-escalation should be the order of the day. All three suggest that killing the insurgent is not the answer to winning the insurgency. Thompson suggests that defeating the insurgent is less important than defeating the conditions that spawn the insurgency. Lind ensures that the reader understands that killing an insurgent is less important than not killing an innocent civilian. All three theorists agree that it is winning the hearts and minds of the local population that will achieve the greatest success in battling an insurgency.

In winning the hearts and minds of the local population, and in maintaining the moral high ground, a theme that runs through all the discussions of counterinsurgency presented here is the idea of legitimacy and the requirement to act within the bounds of the law. Legitimacy must begin at the highest levels, and this necessarily requires that the counterinsurgency must have gained strategic legitimacy. At the strategic level this

obviously means that the counterinsurgency must have international sanction. Unilateral action, or a weakened multilateral action, not endorsed by respected bodies such as the UN or NATO places the counterinsurgency effort in a weakened state from the very beginning. Especially in a post conflict situation, (read Iraq) the concern of Metz and Lind is that if the strategic situation is not defensible under international law, the operational and tactical action credibility can be easily subverted by the insurgent through their own information operations campaign.

Failing to achieve a multilateral consensus is also thought to place the post conflict and counterinsurgent activities in an unfavourable situation in that this situation makes the leveraging of the required resources of personnel and money much more difficult. When personnel strength is in short supply, the necessary preconditions for a rapid security and stability situation cannot be easily achieved. The inability to achieve a stable and secure environment plays into the hands of the insurgent who is able to subvert attempts by overwhelmed security forces to maintain order. The lack of a multilateral consensus internationally also makes the availability of cash and the dissemination of cash based aid that much more difficult. Without the multilateral donations and dissemination through UN agencies, NGOs and international governments, the limited amount of cash must necessarily be funnelled through the already undermanned and over tasked security forces. As Lind states “What artillery and air power are in Third Generation war, cash is in the Fourth Generation: your most useful supporting arm”⁶⁷

What should be obvious at this point is that a progressive and wider view of counterinsurgency encompasses much larger themes and requirements than might be initially apparent from an unstudied point of view. Tactical counterinsurgency tends to concentrate

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 30.

on tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that are often applied and viewed solely in a military context. The consideration of counterinsurgency at the operational and strategic levels has been seen through the previous three examples to be much larger than tactical military operations. Economic development, the requirement to operate through and if necessary strengthen the existing state, the minimization of military effect and the military subordination to civil authority has focused prominently in all three counterinsurgency theories. The military is proposed to be the least important aspect of the counterinsurgency campaign following a rapid stabilization process. Legitimacy and rule of law, both internationally and internally have also figured in all of the counterinsurgency theories. Part Two of this paper will outline some nation-building theories and examples, which, when themes, requirement and concepts are compared against operational and strategic level counterinsurgency, will be found to be very similar.

PART TWO - NATION-BUILDING

INTRODUCTION

Nation-building has recently become a topic of significant interest in the post 9-11 world, primarily as a result of the US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Those who consider the concept of nation-building and write on it tend not to be the same authors who have recently been writing on the topic of counterinsurgency. The conclusions of these two seemingly different schools of thought, especially when applied to the issues of Afghanistan and especially Iraq today, are surprisingly very similar when the problems are viewed at the operational and strategic levels. This portion of the paper will first touch on some historical analysis on the subject of nation-building, most importantly two historical analyses of nation-building published by the Rand Corporation and a series of essays edited by William J. Lahneman entitled Military Intervention: Cases In Context For the Twenty-First Century.⁶⁸ This historical analysis will be followed by two current views of nation-building successes, failures and requirements. The first will be an assessment of nation-building in Afghanistan from Zalmay Khalilzad originally published in the journal The National Interest.⁶⁹ The second assessment will be from Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies that summarizes his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Increasingly the problems and possible solutions presented in a study of nation-building in a conflict ridden area mirror those of the counterinsurgency theorists.

⁶⁸ William J. Lahneman, "Military Intervention: Lessons For The Twenty-First Century" In *Military Intervention: Cases In Context For The Twenty-First Century*, ed. William J. Lahneman, 165-199. (Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004)

⁶⁹ Zalmay Khalilzad, "How To Nation-Build," *National Interest*, no. 80 (Summer 2005)

CHAPTER FIVE – HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The historical perspective on nation-building in the twentieth century has been one of mixed results, long term commitments and a consequent drain on resources, most importantly manpower and money. Nation-building as a concept, post World War II languished somewhere in the netherworld of well intentioned UN peacekeeping operations and military interventions of national strategic importance. Nation-building as a concept and in practice, tended to be approached somewhat haphazardly and in an environment of limited resources of personnel (military, civil, paramilitary) and under less than adequate financial constraints. While great success was achieved in the cases of Germany and Japan, the record in the last 20 years has been less consistent, the results of which left the US less than enthused with the use of military forces in these types of endeavour.

During the mid 1990s, the U.S. military was involved in several peacekeeping operations with significant nation-building components, especially Somalia and Haiti. In Somalia, besides assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid, the U.S. led UNITAF was engaged in road and bridge building, well-digging, and the establishment of schools and hospitals. In Haiti, in the absence of civilian personnel, the U.S. military became involved in revamping the police, judicial, and prison systems as part of their primary task of establishing security. These two experiences stigmatized peacekeeping and nation-building for many Members as an inefficient use of military resources.⁷⁰

What has become clear in the current environments of Afghanistan and Iraq, is that those previously scorned or ignored nation-building lessons, gained in the peacekeeping experience of the 1990s, required some revisiting and review. What has been recognized, as a minimum is that “In immediate post-conflict situations, or extremely dangerous

⁷⁰ Nina Serafino, “Peacekeeping and Related stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military involvement,” *CRS Report For Congress*. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/61443.pdf>; Internet; accessed 16 April 2006.

environments, military forces may be the only personnel available to perform such tasks”⁷¹ and that “some analysts view U.S. military nation-building as an essential element in the U.S. toolkit to respond to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation (p. 367) to use all elements of national power ‘to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run....’”⁷² Most clearly understood is the requirement to deal with situations such as Iraq where the old truism “if you broke it, you own it” is clearly the order of the day. As such, numerous studies and significant academic work has recently put into analyzing recent historical examples of nation-building, with a view to creating a series of lessons learned to aid current and future requirements for post-conflict, nation-building expertise.

The Rand Corporation recently published two detailed analyses on the subject of nation-building entitled America’s Role In Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq⁷³ and Establishing Law and Order After Conflict⁷⁴ in 2003 and 2005 respectively. Between these two books the situations in Germany, Japan, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq were reviewed. A number of broad lessons learned were obtained from these series of case studies that are a valuable point of departure for discussion on this topic.

One of the main conditions for success in nation-building, and one that is controllable by the international community was the issue of resources. Quite obviously a correlation was found between the effort expended by external participants, measured in terms of time, manpower and money, and the success of the nation-building operation. The example cited is the success of Kosovo versus the measured success of Afghanistan currently. The Rand study suggested that Kosovo has received 50 times the allocation of personnel and money

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ James Dobbins *et al*, *America’s Role In Nation-building From Germany To Iraq* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003).

⁷⁴ Seth Jones *et al*, *Establishing Law and Order After Conflict* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2005).

than Afghanistan has, and the authors believe this is a telling determinant in the rapidity and effectiveness of the nation-building progress. This same success was observed in comparing Germany and Japan, where Japan's renewal lagged significantly behind that of Germany post WW II, until the Korean war and the associated economic spin offs renewed the Japanese economy.

This theme was further developed in the 2005 Rand study that suggested a key component of success was the rapid mobilization of personnel and funds to achieve success. One of the key concepts was "In most post-conflict situations, there is a 'golden hour' of perhaps between one and three months during which the external intervention army enjoy popular support, and international legitimacy, and during which insurgents or criminals will be off-balance."⁷⁵ The Rand study 2003 further observed that with respect to force structure, that there "appears to be an inverse correlation between the size of the stabilization force and the level of risk. The higher the proportion of stabilizing troops, the lower the number of casualties suffered and inflicted."⁷⁶

Another lesson was that of multi-lateral nation-building. This was perceived overall as a positive, however the issue of unity of command was considered a negative aspect of multi-lateral nation-building. Success from the multi-lateral viewpoint was the ability to share the resource costs, time, personnel and money. A further strength of the multi-lateral approach was the ability to "produce more thoroughgoing transformations and greater regional reconciliation than can unilateral efforts."⁷⁷ Kosovo was cited as the example in this lesson, where the nation-building efforts were conducted under the auspices of the United

⁷⁵ Seth Jones *et al*, *Establishing Law and Order After Conflict* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2005), 208.

⁷⁶ James Dobbins *et al*, *America's Role In Nation-building From Germany To Iraq* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003), 166.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, xxv.

Nations and NATO, allowing significant burden sharing, a reasonable element of unity of command, as well as internal and international credibility. This legitimacy factor is significant in the analysis of William J. Lahneman in his 2004 study Military Intervention. His contention is that “imbuing a military intervention with legitimacy is important because it strengthens adherence to the rule of law in the international community.”⁷⁸ This is a concern that was revealed in previous portions of this paper when discussing counterinsurgency doctrine.

The issue of dealing with neighbouring states was also brought forth in 2003 Rand study. The external strategic conditions must be set in order to achieve success internally in the nation-building exercise. “It is exceptionally difficult to put together a fragmented nation if its neighbors are trying to tear it apart. Every effort should be made to secure their support.”⁷⁹ This effort must be linked to an emphasis and requirement for planning both well in advance continuing during the nation-building activity. The Rand 2005 study argues that a significant failure in prewar planning has had catastrophic results in Iraq at the present when considering this among other issues. The Rand 2005 analysis weighed in on planning and preparation also stating that “the price for inadequate planning, as in the case of Iraq, can be catastrophic. Once an operation begins, there is never time for policymakers to reflect on the strategic priorities or to adjust their standard templates to the peculiarities of the circumstance.”⁸⁰ This failure manifests itself in an inability to understand local cultures, language, and results in an insufficient level of resources to deal with the requirements of the previously mentioned “golden hour” following intervention. Of a high priority in this

⁷⁸ William J. Lahneman, “Military Intervention: Lessons For The Twenty-First Century” In *Military Intervention: Cases In Context For The Twenty-First Century*, ed. William J. Lahneman, 165-199. (Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 177.

⁷⁹ Dobbins, *America's Role...*, 166.

⁸⁰ Jones, *Establishing Law and Order...*, 209.

planning gap, more noticeable in Iraq than in the relative successes of Kosovo and East Timor, is the interagency planning required. Both Rand studies suggest that under the auspices of the UN and NATO greater success was achieved in interagency planning and effects than under the more unilateral Iraq mission. There is obviously concern that the United States and its allies have not created the conditions for their success in the process of nation-building for Afghanistan and more noticeably in Iraq. Quite clearly the US effort in Iraq has been found wanting in comparison to previous nation-building operations regardless as to whether one considers Germany, Japan, East Timor, or Kosovo. Lahneman highlighted this concern when he quite accurately raised the concern that “No single group or organization is structured to take over responsibility from the military.”⁸¹ This is significant in that it raises the concern that the military is forced to remain in control of nation-building activities longer than it should or reasonably would want to. This is less of a concern in a multilateral situation, and especially in a UN scenario, where the structure to assume nation-building is developed to a greater extent than that of the US. This concern of a rapid transition from military to civilian control, and the subordination and minimizing of military activity after the transition is the exact concern expressed by all three counterinsurgency papers presented earlier.

Between the two Rand articles and Lahneman, many other similar themes are raised under the heading of nation-building as what were previously developed under the subject of counterinsurgency in part one of this paper. Not surprisingly, the issue of resources available to conduct the required infrastructure development was noted as an issue of concern with respect to nation-building. This was a concern throughout the counterinsurgency portion of this paper, where an over reliance on military force at the expense of a failure to mobilize

⁸¹ Lahneman, 186-187.

sufficient cash resources was considered to have significant potential to cause mission failure.

The military requirements of nation-building in this chapter and those of the counterinsurgency chapters are also extremely similar. The discussion of the “golden hour” and the requirement to rapidly achieve a secure environment is not unlike the requirement expressed in the counterinsurgency chapters. Along with the rapid establishment of security, the Rand studies, as do the counterinsurgency chapters, also discuss the need to include and rely on the security apparatus of the nation involved. This cannot always be case obviously; however as with counterinsurgency, achieving internal legitimacy in the operation is always a key concern. The historical perspective of nation-building, like counterinsurgency, stressed the requirement of multilateralism to help bolster this legitimacy, both internally and externally, and with this multilateralism it was also noted that multilateralism brought with it far greater access to resources, be they personnel, financial or materiel, again the very same comment as brought forward in the counterinsurgency discussion. Of the major lessons derived from the Lahneman study and the two Rand studies, none is in significant conflict with the operational and strategic views of counterinsurgency presented in part one of this paper. The following two chapters will examine nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq and provide operational and strategic lessons learned.

CHAPTER SIX – ZALMAY KHALILZAD ON AFGHANISTAN

Zalmay Khalilzad was the US Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005. Near the end of his term in Afghanistan he wrote an article in The National Interest entitled “How to Nation Build”. This article was a comprehensive and articulate piece that clearly laid out Khalilzad’s perceptions as to those factors that had contributed to the successful nation-building experience in Afghanistan up to that date. Not surprisingly given the thesis of this paper, a number of the points that Khalilzad articulates are the same points that we have seen discussed in the first chapter of this paper under the subject heading of counterinsurgency.

In his paper, Zalmay Khalilzad outlines ten specific lessons that he feels help to explain what has worked in Afghanistan to date. These lessons spring from a number of factors. First is his belief in the universality of the ideals of democracy, popular sovereignty, individual rights and the rule of law. Some aspects of this are certainly debateable, and will be discussed later. Secondly, there was the perception of a significant Afghan yearning for “normalcy, development and democracy.”⁸² Thematically the US conducted its operations in Afghanistan in such a manner that set the conditions for the success of the Afghanistan “nation-building” exercise. Khalilzad argues that the US conducted itself as a liberator or partner, not as an occupier, and that their military footprint was appropriate (small) to the situation. The US conducted their operations with an integrated approach in mind that ensured appropriate military, political and economic activity was occurring in a synchronized manner. The engagement of local leaders with tangible influence was important, along with the fact that the US engaged in Afghanistan in a multilateral manner and supported the multilateral activity with a strong US commitment. Lastly, the US engaged neighbouring countries and avoided as much as possible the development of enemy sanctuaries that US

⁸² Zalmay Khalilzad, “How To Nation-Build,” *National Interest*, no. 80 (Summer 2005): 19.

operations could not influence. Obviously Khalilzad is not an impartial observer in the Afghanistan nation-building process. The strength of his paper is the succinct nature of the ten lessons he presents in “How to Nation Build”. In the next few paragraphs I will briefly cover Zalmay Khalilzad’s ten specific lessons. Undoubtedly, parallels can begin to be drawn to the counterinsurgency theories that have been previously presented.

Khalilzad’s first lesson is key: “Any effort to build the post-war order must be based on a fundamental understanding of the aspirations or political center of gravity of a newly liberated society and must be implemented by civilian and military leaders who know how to align the United States with those goals.”⁸³ Clearly the conditions were set in Afghanistan for success in the move towards democracy. The Afghans had experienced a constitutional monarch and significant moves toward parliamentary democracy prior to the Soviet invasion. The democratization process wisely worked in conjunction with the traditional Loya Jurga system, which thus added credibility to the process. Obviously a US Ambassador, of Afghan extraction, was a powerful intermediary who understood how to reconcile the aims of two cultures into one endstate. This is rarely the case, however it should always strived for as the starting point for success.

In his second point, Khalilzad states that “If the US military forces are used to effect regime change or are deployed to stabilize a country after a regime has been toppled by internal forces, it is vital for the United States to position itself as an ally, not a conqueror or occupier, and to ensure that indigenous leaders take ownership of the new order.”⁸⁴ Clearly in the case of Afghanistan, the US forces achieved regime change in conjunction with some elements of Afghan forces. A credible Afghan government in waiting had been created that

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 20.

had the backing of the International Community and the United Nations as a result of the Bonn Conference. Clearly the US in this instance was an ally and supported a credible interim government headed by Hamid Karzai. Karzai headed a government with workable internal support that cut across ethnic lines, and had a solid multilateral external support backstopped by the UN.

Khalilzad in his third lesson on nation-building states that “Intensive political and diplomatic engagement with national leaders is needed to craft a national compact among competing groups and to form a partnership to execute a mutually agreed strategy for reconstruction”.⁸⁵ This certainly supports the contention among counterinsurgency theorists that the solution to preventing or solving an insurgency requires more than a military solution. In the Afghanistan situation this meant the US was required to maintain a dialogue with many different factions and interest groups, and the solution was by necessity not an American directed solution, but the result of negotiation and consensus. Undoubtedly the military portion of the Afghanistan solution was the easiest piece to achieve, and in the long term, likely one of the least important. The creation/rejuvenation of the Afghan National Army, the disarming of militias, the equitable representation of the numerous factions in Afghan society are all issues that in hindsight were probably more difficult to achieve than the initial military solution to the Taliban and Al Qaeda problem in 2001 and 2002.

The fourth lesson is an almost exact view expressed by William S. Lind and the drafters of FMFM 1-A, as well as Steven Metz. Khalilzad states “The United States must size and configure its footprint to avoid creating unnecessary friction or over-reliance on any one instrument of policy.”⁸⁶ What the US and the international community accomplished, at

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 22.

least in the initial couple years in Afghanistan, was to keep the US military component relatively small and unobtrusive. Where force was required it was projected out from its bases, but the image that was avoided was that of an occupying force. By keeping the footprint small, the US and coalition militaries did not become the “Deus Ex Machina” that could be counted on to solve every problem that occurred within Afghanistan. The difficult steps of disarming militias, apportioning influence and agreeing to structure came about as a result of the requirement to use non military means. Military force in the early stages was neither readily available, nor desirable. To date, the solution imposed from within, achieved through diplomacy and by consensus with a wide range of actors, has proven to be much more durable, resilient and simple, than it one would have initially expected

The fifth lesson revolves around the requirement for the evolution of a political elite. “Post-conflict reconstitution involves the reconstitution of a country’s political elite. Success depends on the emergence of an elite that has roots in the society and the vision and capability to build a new and better political order.”⁸⁷ This was a multi-faceted program that was achieved through a number of means. Most importantly this was achieved through the trade off achieved by the disbanding of the local militias and the political legitimization of warlords who accepted disbandment of their militias and the cantonment of their heavy weapons. Political legitimization was achieved either through the appointment into government positions or the approval to enter into electoral politics. Legitimization was the carrot, and the stick in this instance was the insistence that warlords and militias would not be allowed to gain positions of power and prestige in the new Afghanistan. The second approach to the creation of a political elite, was through the process of education to create leaders who could function in positions of importance within the new Afghanistan, whether

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

that was coordinating the efforts of a market economy, leading the civil service by holding key positions of responsibility, or forming the basis of a rebuilt and modernized judiciary. “Rapidly building up Afghan human capital—both through aggressive training programs and enabling the return of elements of the Afghan diaspora—is essential.”⁸⁸

The sixth lesson from the Afghanistan experience is that “Effective communication is vital to the success of any reconstruction program.” Within the military context this would include all of the aspects of information operations, and essentially this is the route that had to be taken in Afghanistan, from a coalition, interagency and host nation synthesis. This is in essence, no different than winning the hearts and minds in an insurgency context.

Ambassador Khalilzad was fortunate in that he was able as an Afghan, a Muslim and a Pashtu and Dari speaker, present the view of the United States and place it in an appropriate context for the people of Afghanistan and to the specific audience being addressed. This was a multi-faceted campaign, of television, radio and print, as well as dependent on numerous meetings at the provincial and local levels, utilizing “the traditional networks of Afghan social leaders.”⁸⁹ It probably cannot be stressed enough how important this dialogue must have been to the success of the US and coalition activities in Afghanistan, with the ability of the world’s sole superpower to present its aims and intentions through an articulate and fluent ambassador of Afghan descent, and in close coordination with the Afghan government. This effort would have certainly put a human face on the US and coalition project, at the very highest of national strategic levels.

The seventh lesson was that “In post-conflict settings, the United States should utilize a flexible, multilateral model backed up by an energetic and robust American policy and

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

program.”⁹⁰ Again this is a lesson that was evident in the counter insurgency chapter of this paper, both in the 4GW discussion, and even more prominently in Steven Metz’s requirements for fighting counterinsurgency. This is a crucial lesson, and one that has not been well applied to the Iraq situation and in hindsight has likely hindered the progress in that country. This lesson is significant in that it plays to a number of issues that have been discussed in the counterinsurgency chapter. First and foremost, a strong multi-lateral model avoids having the US or a “coalition of the willing” having the appearance of occupiers to the local populace. A strong multi-lateral, and in this case UN led international effort, allows a far greater range of international support to be funnelled into Afghanistan under the auspices of the United Nations. Again this is weakness in the current US led coalition in Iraq. Certainly the UN involvement gives the activity in Afghanistan a higher degree of international credibility than a “coalition of the willing”. Lastly a strong multilateral model involving the UN allows the US to focus its efforts in what it views are the “no fail” elements of the involvement in Afghanistan, the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and police forces, and the continued military activities against Taliban and Al Qaeda elements that the ANA is not yet prepared to take on.

Lesson eight again draws contrasts to the current situation in Iraq. “If neighboring countries can help or harm our effort, the United States should encourage them and shape their conduct to the extent possible, even if we have deep differences with those countries.”⁹¹ Key to this lesson is a combination of a solid combined and interagency information operations campaign, cooperative and coercive diplomacy, economic pragmatism, and the conviction and strength of purpose of the US, coalition, and international community. This

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 25.

conviction was especially required in order to maintain the charted course with respect to Afghanistan. Regional neighbours, most notably Pakistan, were engaged to allow some ability to influence the notoriously difficult border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Again the military component of this engagement is likely to be far less effective than the diplomatic or economic components, less the overt deterrence capability of coalition forces by virtue of their presence.

Zalmay Khalilzad's ninth lesson has been evident throughout his previous lessons, and is a common thread in most counterinsurgency doctrines and theories that "A closely integrated civil-military structure and set of policies and programs are the best way to achieve success."⁹² The US forces made a definite and conscious effort to coordinate and synchronize their efforts closely with those of the diplomatic and economic communities. This included joint, combined and interagency planning with respect to reconstruction (PRTs and USAID), thus ensuring a coordinated effort and a clearly understood endstate. NATO security and Western money have brought a certain measure of stability to the Afghan Kabul where none clearly existed before. Certainly this again speaks to the concern that the military portion when nation-building or conducting counterinsurgency, is just one piece of the overall effort.

Khalilzad's last lesson states that "Success requires the U.S. government to provide adequate resources and to find more efficient ways to operate."⁹³ His concern in this instance is that reconstruction and nation-building must be very well resourced and financed. As discussed in FMFM 1-A, cash (and by extension) other resources will be the most important asset in conducting counterinsurgency as it clearly is too in the nation-building context. The

⁹² *Ibid.*, 26.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 26.

concern is that the US, UN and the Afghan government seriously underestimated the cost of reconstruction. In this case, if funding and resourcing is seriously limited, within reason, then nation-building will likely fail. As can be observed in Afghanistan, the development of opium production has become quite significant within the last few years since the removal of the Taliban government. This does not have to be the case, and had enough financing been available, with a well thought out economic and reconstruction plan, much of the fall back into opium production could likely have been avoided.

Khalilzad, as mentioned previously, is anything but an impartial judge of the success of Afghanistan as a nation-building effort. What is most important is the lessons he suggests as baselines to consider the effectiveness of a nation-building activity. While the success achieved in each one of the lessons presented is debateable, they serve as a good template with which to judge the success of a nation-building effort. Most importantly, in the context of this paper, a counterinsurgency theorist could easily have presented these ten lessons in part one of this paper. Khalilzad does not present a single lesson that does not resonate with the previously presented counterinsurgency views. If these lessons were proposed to a counterinsurgency theorist as measures of success in a counterinsurgency at the operational or strategic level, they could likely be agreed to as reasonable measurements. Khalilzad recommends a comprehensive interagency effort, recommends minimizing the foreign military aspect as much as possible, and while he does not propose winning the “hearts and minds” of the population, his actions are the same as those a counterinsurgency theorist would suggest. Every attempt appears to have been made by Khalilzad to allow the legitimate government of Afghanistan to be seen to govern, with the US in a supporting role, which is again a major theme of the counterinsurgency portion of this paper.

From Khalilzad's paper, with its arguably positive view of the Afghan nation-building situation, we will now consider Anthony Cordesman's testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations committee from 2005. His nation-building analysis of the Iraq situation again is very much in line with the counterinsurgency concepts presented in part one of this paper.

CHAPTER SEVEN – ANTHONY CORDESMAN “POST CONFLICT” LESSONS

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has published an impressive document titled The “Post Conflict” Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan⁹⁴ which was his testimony to the Senate and Foreign Relations Committee dated May 19, 2004. This piece insightfully analyzes the United State’s place in the world, and suggests that some serious rethinking is required with respect to attitudes toward nation-building and preparation for post conflict activities. In this document, Cordesman has touched on many of the issues that were raised previously under the subject of counter-insurgency.

What Cordesman believes is the first mistake with US policy in Afghanistan, and especially in Iraq, is a very basic misunderstanding of the current global situation that the US is a part of, and the nature of asymmetric warfare. Cordesman would argue that the US is engaged in a war, not unlike the Cold War, that will require the US to become engaged in operations similar to Afghanistan and Iraq in the years to come. He argues that there is a very real tension, derived from economic issues, as well as political and ideological differences. This tension is not going to disappear, but will have to be dealt with to ensure the security of US and Western allies around the world. Cordesman’s contention is that “defeat or victory in this struggle will be shaped largely by the success of American diplomacy, deterrence and efforts to created and sustain alliances that occur long before military action.”⁹⁵ Continual effort must be expended toward shaping the global political environment through information operations and further that “Victory can only come through

⁹⁴ Anthony Cordesman, *The “Post Conflict” Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan: Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/cordesman_testimony040519.pdf; Internet: accessed 16 April 2006.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, ii.

the equivalent of a constant program of political, psychological, and ideological “warfare” that is design (sic) to win a peace more than to aid in the military phases of a conflict.”⁹⁶ Even after acknowledging the global situation and understanding the nature of the conflict, the reality will be that the US will be forced to “make hard strategic choices which should be made well before it uses military force.”⁹⁷ These decisions will have to be made pragmatically, not as a result of an ideological persuasion. The long term strategic benefits and the understanding of the requirement of a long term commitment are essential when considering becoming involved in a regime change or stability operation that will result in a requirement for nation-building. What is clear is that “The present contest between neoconservatives and neoliberals to see who can be the most self-deluded, intellectually ingenuous--and use the most naive and moralistic rhetoric--is not a valid basis for either war or dealing with its aftermath.”⁹⁸

Cordesman also deals with the interagency aspect of nation-building in this paper. “Preparation and training for the security and nation-building phases of a conflict require that planning, and the creation of specialized combat units and civilian teams with suitable resources and regional expertise to carry out the security and nation-building missions, take place long before the combat phase begins.”⁹⁹ In this point he clearly advocates that planning be complete well before Phase III (combat operations) starts, and that aspects of the Phase IV (post combat) plan will need to be implemented prior to phase III, especially the aspect of information operations and heart and minds. The situation in Afghanistan was far more effectively planned for than the subsequent Iraqi Phase IV. Clearly the scope of the

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, ii.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, ii.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, ii.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, ii.

problem was far greater in Iraq than in Afghanistan. Afghanistan had no history of a strong centralized government; therefore achieving a central government was by necessity a long term plan. Afghanistan and its transition was far better supported by the International Community and therefore the government was positioned to start governing with far more legitimacy than the similar activity in Iraq. In Iraq on the other hand transition was poorly handled first by the subordination of Jay Garner to the Pentagon, inhibiting his freedom of action, and by the inadequacy of resources he was provided to carry out the immense reconstruction and nation-building. The poor quality of Phase IV planning was made evident by the failure of the US forces to maintain law and order in the immediate aftermath of the regime change. Lastly there was the deconstruction of the Iraqi state carried out by Paul Bremer that stripped most capable existing government apparatus away from the state. This ran contrary to earlier assertions that Iraqi forces would be used to assist in achieving success in Phase IV.¹⁰⁰

Cordesman opined that the US and its allies must remain aware that Phase IV activities will be every bit as crucial as Phase III, but are likely to take longer, and will be more difficult to achieve. In achieving Phase IV it is also crucial to remember that in Cordesman's opinion "the US cannot succeed through a mix of arrogance and ethnocentrism."¹⁰¹ Especially in the implementation of the Iraq solution, the US has presumed that a Western, democratic and secular model of government, and a free market economy are the solution to Iraq's future success. The solution for Ph IV, post conflict nation-building, must be a solution that is derived with the culture, history and religious

¹⁰⁰ For an excellent analysis of the transition from Phase III OIF to Phase IV OIF see Shervington's "Small Wars And Counterinsurgency Warfare: Lessons From Iraq," (master's dissertation, Cranfield University, 2005), 88-89 <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/shervington.pdf>

¹⁰¹ Cordesman, *Post Conflict Lessons.*, iii.

mores of the nation being built. The solution to the nation-building exercise cannot be the imposition of a Western, or worse yet, a US solution to the problems of a foreign country. In keeping with many of the principles discussed in the counterinsurgency portion of this paper, the solution must be seen to be that of the local population.

Cordesman offers a number of “Grand Strategic” lessons from the US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan that are quite honest and enlightening, especially given the 2004 timeframe that his paper was written in. Key among his lessons is the requirement for multilateralism. Unilateralism has no future in US foreign policy from Cordesman’s perspective. The US must be prepared to negotiate and compromise with allies in order to achieve consensus. With the consensus of the international community comes access to a significant amount of resources in the form of NGO, UN donors and troop contributing nations, that the US does not have access to in a unilateral position. What the US must keep in mind is that despite being the worlds only superpower, its resources, as we are finding out in Iraq are anything but infinite.

Cordesman argues that the concept of “military victory in asymmetric warfare can be virtually meaningless without successful nation-building at the political, economic and security levels.”¹⁰² Despite a declared end to major combat operations, a lack of preparation for nation-building in Iraq set the conditions for a slide into a predominately military counterinsurgency operation under significant disadvantage.¹⁰³ As the thesis of this paper would suggest, a counterinsurgency operation without the conditions set for nation-building success does not bode well for the military organization having to conduct a mostly military

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, iii.

¹⁰³ For an excellent analysis of the transition from Phase III OIF to Phase IV OIF see Shervington’s “Small Wars And Counterinsurgency Warfare: Lessons From Iraq,” (master’s dissertation, Cranfield University, 2005), 88-89 <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/shervington.pdf> Internet; accessed 17 April 2006.

counterinsurgency campaign. This lack of preparation was in part due to an over reliance on technology and an under reliance on manpower. When the SecDef limited the number of US military allowed in theatre, and when the US administration subsequently destroyed most ability of the occupation to govern through the existing national apparatus, a significant delta with respect to manpower was created.

What has been demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq is that technology is an enabler and a combat multiplier, the real solution to security, counter insurgency and nation-building is manpower based. This manpower needs to be skilled in those aspects of nation-building and reconstruction that can be expected in a post conflict scenario. The manpower based solution to nation-building must be an interagency effort, one where the same skill sets are present in each agency of government supporting the reconstruction/nation-building effort. HUMINT, language skills, local experience, civil military relations and economic development are all skill sets that must be present in each element of the interagency spectrum. It is human skills, not technology that will create the conditions for success in the nation-building environment. Nowhere is this more evident than in the ability to collect and analyse intelligence, and this has been clearly understood. End states such as “viable political systems, economic stability and growth, effective military and security forces, and public information system and free press”¹⁰⁴, will only be achieved through the coordinated effort of the National Security Council, State department and the Department of Defense.

¹⁰⁴ Cordesman, *Post Conflict Lessons*, iv.

CHAPTER EIGHT – AN ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR THEMES AND CONCEPTS

A number of key themes run through the three summaries of the theory of nation-building and the effectiveness of current nation-building operations. Again a common theme that was present in the counterinsurgency portion of this paper is also present in the nation-building section, and that is the understanding that ultimately the solution to a nation-building exercise is greater than a mere military response. This is clear in Rand studies, and Zalmay Khalilzad emphasizes the importance of political and diplomatic engagement in his lessons learned, and de-emphasizes the reliance on the military aspect of nation-building. Anthony Cordesman insists that winning the peace is key to the nation-building imperative, not the military phase of operations, and that the current wars the US finds itself engaged in will be won through diplomacy, not through military action. He asserts, as would Metz and Lind, that military victory in asymmetric warfare is meaningless without successful nation-building at the political, economic and security levels.

The military's greatest attribute is recognized as the ability to rapidly stabilize the security situation, thus creating the conditions for the more important work to be carried out through the interagency effort. Creating an effective civil service, a civilian security and legal apparatus, and transferring the military effort to a local security solution was seen as the short term goal of any required military intervention. As with the counterinsurgency piece, the military was expected to minimize its footprint as soon as possible, first minimize the perception of an army of occupation, and more importantly to empower the local authorities. It is in this empowerment that the local and national legitimacy was expected to be achieved.

International legitimacy and the requirement for a multilateral effort in nation-building were discussed in all three nation-building chapters, and with a similar prominence

that it received in the counterinsurgency portion of this paper. International legitimacy clearly allowed for an easier transition to national legitimacy throughout the nation-building process. The multinational requirement for nation-building was also significant for the belief that the nation-building effort had greater access to resources such as personnel, and more importantly money than the nation-building process that was operating from a unilateral or more limited multilateral perspective. The reliance on personnel and the need to draw from a multi-lateral personnel pool was considered of significant importance in the nation-building portion of this paper. As with counter-insurgency, nation-building was seen to be a human skill based endeavour, not a technology based activity. The current Iraq operation has highlighted that qualified personnel are a very finite resource.

This section on nation-building also shares with the counterinsurgency theorists the belief that understanding the culture of the nation is of paramount importance when undertaking the rebuilding of a nation. From understanding the aspirations of the society and the political centers of gravity as expressed by Khalilzad, to the concern from Cordesman that “the US cannot succeed through a mix of arrogance and ethnocentrism”,¹⁰⁵ the overwhelming requirement to understand the culture of the area of operations achieves as much prominence as it did in counter insurgency theory. The Rand studies further highlighted that a failure to understand local culture and language would be the result of poor planning for the nation-building operation. In part three of this paper the congruence of the major themes and requirements of nation-building and counterinsurgency will be discussed in the context of Iraq.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, iii.

PART THREE – OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER NINE - COUNTERINSURGENCY/NATION-BUILDING AND IRAQ

A number of major themes and requirements for success in both counterinsurgency and in nation-building have been revealed in the preceding chapters. In this paper three chapters have been devoted to counterinsurgency operations, covering Thompson and the Malayan campaign, Steven Metz and his reconceptualization, and William S. Lind et al, and the 4GW theorists view of the requirements for fighting the asymmetric, “Fourth Generation” foe. A further three chapters were devoted to the study of past and current nation-building activities covering the full range of operations from WW II to the present. Within these six seemingly disparate chapters there is significant congruence as to the requirements of nation-building and of counterinsurgency at the operational and strategic level. What cannot be found in these six theories and observations is a belief that could be found antithetical to the beliefs or requirements of any of the other five. All of these authors reveal differing views of the world, some deal with different eras, but all arrive at very similar conclusions. The various themes discussed clearly resonate in the various lessons and observations from the current Iraq campaign.

All of the examined case studies would suggest that the military solution in each case is but a small part in the overall solution. Each case study emphasized the belief that the solution to counterinsurgency and nation-building problems requires a multi-faceted, interagency approach, where governance, security and economics were more important than killing insurgents. This has not necessarily been the case in Iraq to date, where the emphasis has in many cases been placed on the military aspect of the solution. “Having left the

business of waging counterinsurgency warfare over 30 years ago, the U.S. military is running the risk of failing to do what is needed most (win Iraqis' hearts and minds) in favour of what it has traditionally done best (seek out the enemy and destroy him).”¹⁰⁶

Where the military was required to be strong, in the initial security vacuum of post conflict, it has been seen to have failed, though in large part not as a result of its own doing. The coalition military in Iraq failed to ensure security, in large part due to a severe shortage of personnel as a result of SecDef imposed personnel caps in theatre. Where Gen. Shinseki had suggested more than 300,000 US troops for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the SecDef imposed a 150,000 troop limit on OIF. The rapid transition to post conflict, phase IV operations found the coalition military forces wanting for personnel to ensure basic security to the people of the nation. 150,000 troops were enough to win the war, but not enough to ensure security in the “golden hour” and therefore not enough to win the peace. This inability to play to achieve a stable and secure environment plays into the hands of the insurgent who is able to subvert attempts by overwhelmed security forces to maintain order. This speaks to a number of issues or themes that were constant throughout the counterinsurgency and nation-building portions of this paper.

Primarily, this is noted in the required subordination of the military to civilian authority, and the interagency planning required for success in counterinsurgency and in nation-building that was never achieved. The coalition military was left to its own devices, with inadequate numbers, and with a hamstrung civilian administration in Garner, and later in Bremer, an administration that did not understand the requirements the security situation, and how that fit into their larger governance role in post conflict Iraq. Garner was essentially hamstrung and not allowed to adequately plan a transition to Phase IV and was not able to

¹⁰⁶ Andrew Krepinevich, “How to Win In Iraq,” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 93.

ensure that the needs of transition (military force numbers primarily) were met. Bremer, to compound matters, through his de-Bathification, removed the preponderance of the Iraqi civil administration that could have aided his management of Iraq, post hostilities. The dismissal of all Iraqi security forces compounded (to the point of failure) the already dire security situation that had come about as a result of poor interagency planning.

A perusal of either counterinsurgency doctrine or nation-building theory would have outlined the common themes and requirements that were not being followed through in planning for Phase IV. Both the counterinsurgency and the nation-building constructs would have insisted that adequate planning for Phase IV be completed in a robust and interagency manner. This certainly did not occur. Metz, Lind, Khalilzad and Cordesman all would agree to this requirement, and would hopefully all see the failure in this case. Secondly, both the counterinsurgency theorists and the nation-building writers would have agreed that the most effective way ahead in Phase IV OIF would have been to govern as much as possible through the local authorities. Empowering Iraqi authorities and ensuring security as much as possible through Iraqi elements would have allowed the US and coalition forces to appear much less as the occupier. These actions would certainly have played to the requirement for internal legitimacy, a theme that is present throughout counterinsurgency and nation-building writings. This would have aided Metz's proposal of delegitimizing the insurgency, and would have played well to the 4GW view of the moral level of war. Both Khalilzad and Cordesman also deal with this legitimacy issue and insist on ensuring the empowerment of the national authorities in their nation-building writings.

Iraq is likewise an example of failure in external legitimacy as well as internal legitimacy given the rather limited nature of the "coalition of the willing" and the tentative

support of the UN to the coalition regime change. I would not view the lack of a more robust coalition as due to a moral failure. The lessened coalition however, has failed to have the required impact that a larger more multilateral coalition would have had in strengthening internal legitimacy, and in creating the conditions for a greater availability of resources from the international community. On one hand the lack of a robust multilateralism strikes a blow to the external and internal legitimacy of the regime change and occupation/reconstruction. Obviously with significant portions of world opinion against the Iraqi invasion, this situation has presented the Iraqi insurgency with a significant information operations opportunity to present the situation as a legitimate “liberation” insurgency.

The failure of the US and the “coalition of the willing” to achieve true international multilateral support has likely had serious impact on the ability to resource the rebuilding/counterinsurgency effort in Iraq. Without full support of the UN and other of the US traditional allies, the funding burden of reconstruction has had to be primarily borne by the US. The US has also had less success in sourcing international troop commitments to the stabilization of Iraq than it would likely have had with a stronger international multilateral commitment.

One difference between the counterinsurgency portion of this paper and the nation-building section is the concept of winning the “hearts and minds”. While this is a theme that is prevalent throughout the counterinsurgency chapter of this paper it is not a prevalent theme in the nation-building chapters. The means and the ends of counterinsurgencies requirement for “hearts and minds” is however fully supported within concepts of nation-building presented in this paper. The means of succeeding in the hearts and minds campaign: economic well being, empowerment of local authorities, discriminate use of military power

are all well articulated in the nation-building section. The ends to this hearts and minds campaign is clear in both counterinsurgency and nation-building writings, and that is the requirement to leverage local intelligence, HUMINT, in order to achieve success in either venture. In all case studies, it was commented that human skills and human intelligence were the keys to success in the counterinsurgency and nation-building. This necessarily means putting a human face on the “occupation”, engaging the locals and being seen to be playing a supporting role. This has not always been the case in Iraq; however Anthony Cordesman makes a number of strong recommendations in this vein throughout his paper.

Both counterinsurgency and nation-building doctrines when viewing the application of the DIME principle (elements of national power being Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic) would agree that the military portion, after the initial security period becomes the least important aspect. An outside view of the Iraq situation does not appear to have achieved this as of yet. This does not mean that following the initial difficulties in Iraq that the US and the coalition will not achieve success. The reasons for the initial failures are well understood, and as evidenced by the component nation-building and counterinsurgency elements of this paper, the solutions to the current Iraq situation exist conceptually in which ever theoretical point of view (nation-building or counterinsurgency) one wishes to find them.

CONCLUSION

This paper has compared the requirements of two seeming separate endeavours that Western militaries are increasingly finding themselves a part of, counter-insurgency campaigns and nation-building exercises. Interestingly the current US administration came to power claiming to wish to avoid becoming ensnarled in a continuation of the nation-building exercises of the 1990s, while at the same time becoming embroiled in a series of regime changes and the consequent counterinsurgency campaigns. When one reviews historical precedent and current theorists and writing on both counterinsurgency and nation-building, I believe it becomes clear that the major themes, requirements and considerations, at the operational and strategic levels, are very similar, if not often identical between counterinsurgency and nation-building in a conflict ridden area.

In both counterinsurgency and nation-building doctrines we find similarity in the themes of internal and external legitimacy, subordination of the military, increasing reliance on the diplomatic, information and economic aspects of national power vice the military aspect as the secret to long term success. And along with this, that the use of military power must be discriminate. Both nation-building and counterinsurgency theories understand that success will be achieved though strength of human resources vice technical. Both the theories also understand the requirement to achieve legitimacy both internally to the conflict and externally to the international world opinion. Both theories generally agree on how this will be achieved ideally. Externally this legitimacy should be achieved through a strong multilateral coalition, one with UN or NATO endorsement if at all possible. And internally this legitimacy will be achieved by operating through the host nation government and security apparatus to the greatest extent possible.

When Phase IV of the Iraq campaign is examined in view of what are now the generally acknowledged weaknesses and failures, these weaknesses and failures can be accounted for from a counterinsurgency or nation-building perspective. The solution to the weaknesses of Phase IV OIF can be found by comparing in the context of either an operational/strategic level counterinsurgency problem, or as an operational/strategic level nation-building problem. In practice, the military role and interaction in either case will be very similar.

When the broader view of counterinsurgency doctrine is taken into account, in practice it is not very dissimilar from the nation-building activities that many militaries have desired to avoid. In theory and in practice, operational and strategic level counterinsurgency and nation-building overlap very significantly. Those who would become embroiled in a counterinsurgency action will, by necessity, find themselves, in order to be successful, engaging in nation-building activities. Those who would undertake a successful nation-building operation had best be prepared to engage in counterinsurgency operations.

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