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MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES

**Canadian Forces Junior Leadership Training and
the Contemporary Operating Environment**

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Abstract

This paper examines the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) and the leadership abilities required by Canadian Forces Junior Leaders, both officers and non-commissioned members today. It sets out the desired leadership attributes of the ideal CF junior leader; examines the makeup of the COE; determines what leadership abilities are required to operate effectively in the COE; and then looks at the current training regime for CF junior leaders, as well as potential ways to improve the system.

The premise of the paper is that today's CF junior leader is ill-prepared for the challenges of the COE. The complexity and uncertainty of the COE have fundamentally changed the demands on individual soldiers in positions of leadership and authority. Current CF training and education no longer addresses the full range of leadership abilities required by CF junior leaders in this new environment. In order to be effective, future CF junior leaders require improved training and education tailored to the COE.

The COE consists of a series of complex environments ranging from domestic operations within Canada to Three Block War operations in Afghanistan. CF junior leaders are operating in organizations, which are usually no more than platoon size, but mostly in actions, which occur at the section level, often far from their chain of command. CF junior leaders are in an environment today in the COE where they are required to make key decisions quickly, with potentially strategic impacts, largely unsupervised. They are working multi-nationally and with numerous Non-Governmental Organizations and within the Canadian 3D+T approach.

In order to meet the challenges of today's COE, CF junior leaders need detailed cultural awareness, total situational awareness of the requirements of not only the military mission but also the requirements of the NGOs, especially with the Canadian 3D+T approach, in order to ensure that both the aims of the military and DFAIT are met. CF junior leaders are precision guided munitions - key enablers - in the information operations campaign, and must be loaded with the right warheads - the messages - in order to support the overall mission commander as well as supporting other governmental, non-governmental and like organizations. They must be media savvy, understand the basics of diplomacy, and be confident and competent decision makers, first class communicators, negotiators and mediators. They must be cognitively agile and understand the second and third order of effect of their decisions and finally these tasks, skills and knowledge must be taught and practiced to a level where the CF junior leader is competent and capable of operating independently and far from his or her chain of command.

A substantial gap exists between what is currently taught to CF junior leaders and what is required of them in order to operate effectively, without error, in the COE. The general specifications, and subsequently the leadership training and education derived from them, lack many of the tasks, skills and knowledge requirements needed for the COE. Even with TMSBP training and in-theatre training, CF junior leaders are not provided with training and education that they require to operate effectively.

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INTRODUCTION

There is no type of human endeavor where it is so important that the leader understands all phases of his job as that of the profession of arms.

Major-General James Fry,
Union Army, US Civil War

The above quotation was made by a Brevet Major General of the Union Army during the US Civil War and emphasizes the importance of well-educated leaders. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the breakup of Yugoslavia, the situation arose where Canadian Forces (CF) junior leaders¹ suddenly found themselves dealing with sensitive and politically charged situations all over the Balkans, and militaries around the world quickly realized that the decisions which junior leaders were being called upon to make have potential strategic impacts. To quote Lieutenant General Peter F. Leahy of the Australian Army: “The era of the “strategic corporal is here. . . .the soldier of [today] must possess professional mastery of warfare, but must match this with political and media sensitivity.”² This statement is but one articulation of the realities facing junior leaders in today’s operating environment, also known as the Contemporary Operating Environment or COE. Junior leaders now have to worry not only about supervising their subordinates, and making decisions that affect their subordinates’ welfare, but also making decisions that have potentially strategic effects on the overall theatre commander’s mission, and perhaps even the government’s mission.

¹ The term junior leader refers to Junior Officers who have just completed MOC training and Master-Corporals who have completed the Canadian Forces Primary Leadership Qualification.

² Leahy, LTG Peter F. Chief of Army, Australian Defence Force. Speech given at the Defence Management Seminar (Strategic and International Policy Division), Canberra, 18 October 2002, available on-line at www.defence.gov.au/army/PUBS/CAspeeches/20021018.pdf; Internet: Accessed 7 February 2006.

There are many references dealing with the COE and a survey of the existing literature highlights the following themes defining of the COE. They include works from the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT); the Canadian Army's Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts (DLSC); the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); theories posed by General Charles C. Krulak, USMC Retired, in addresses and articles; a Defence Management Speech of Lieutenant-General Peter F. Leahy, Chief of the Army, Australian Defence Force, the United States Army 2006 Posture Statement; as well as various journal articles. These references provide ample evidence of the challenges and unique leadership requirements now demanded of CF junior leaders in the COE. These requirements range from increased cultural awareness, to detailed media awareness, to an understanding of the overall makeup of the many operations ongoing in the same theatre of operations, or mission area, at the same time.

The main sources for leadership requirements and the current CF junior leadership training and education regime consist of: CF officer and non-commissioned general specifications; qualifications standards and plans; as well as leadership papers, produced for the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute; the 1969 Report of the Officer Development Board; and the doctrine documents of the Canadian Forces Individual Training and Education System. Pre-deployment training references include: the 1st Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1 CMBG) mounting order for Task Force Afghanistan Rotation One (TFA Roto 1); as well as its supporting Peace Support Training Centre Training Plan for the Peace Support Operation Basic Course. Finally the

main source for In-theatre training information is from A Battery, 1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, currently deployed on TFA Roto 1.

In reviewing the references, the changing world situation, and the Canadian approach to training and educating junior leaders, the trend is that junior leaders today require a much different set of abilities than those of the past and they have a much greater burden of responsibility than ever before. Furthermore, the training and education provided to CF junior leaders is not adequate to prepare them for this burden. For example, the current formal CF leadership training provided on courses focuses on practical skills, and little education. Likewise, pre-deployment training, although it does identify much of the educational material required, is woefully inadequate when it comes to actual dedicated training time. For example, one of the key leadership abilities required for the COE, detailed cultural awareness, receives only four hours of instruction during pre-deployment training and this is time representative of the amount dedicated to leadership abilities required in the COE.

In the references there is also general agreement on the makeup of the COE and the leadership requirements of today's junior leaders, and the real debate might be whether or not the CF is training its junior leaders to the appropriate level to operate effectively in the COE, and for the requirement to operate independently. The recurring theme in the references is the change in what is required of junior leaders in the COE, and the leadership demands, which are far more demanding and complicated than they have ever been before. A review of the references also shows the consequences of error have risen to the point where one small mistake by a junior leader can have strategic and catastrophic effects. Therefore, given current junior leader training and education, are

current CF junior leaders adequately prepared for the COE; what changes are required; and does the CF have the capacity to meet these potential changes in a training system that is already working to capacity? In essence, what is required of today's ideal junior leader for the COE?

CF junior leaders today must be thinking leaders able to deal independently with complex problems and situations in a changing world. They must work in varied locations across a broad spectrum of operations, interacting with a multitude of cultures. They must be able to analyze situations rapidly and make timely decisions based on a sound understanding of the overall mission, both political and military, as well as local culture. In summary, they should possess the following abilities:

- Ability to make timely, confident and competent decisions.
- Possess basic language skills for the operational area.
- Possess detailed cultural awareness, i.e. understand cultural context and apply cultural awareness.
- Be a thinking communicator able to:
 - Negotiate.
 - Mediate.
 - Be media aware:
 - Give media interviews.
 - Deal with the media.
 - Refer the media to appropriate agencies.
- Ability to accurately and rapidly apply:
 - The Law of Armed Conflict.
 - Rules of Engagement.
- Ability to work with Peace Partners by consulting with other government departments, agencies and private industries; providing advice to other government departments, agencies and private industries; and understand the Canadian Government approach of Defence, Diplomacy, Development and Trade.
- Understand why and conduct oneself in a manner reflecting credit on the CF, and which will not jeopardize the mission.

So where has our current approach to training CF junior leaders come from, and is it adequate? Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the operating

environment in which today's junior leaders operate has changed dramatically. Gone are the days where junior leaders had a predictable situation with a professional standing enemy, established doctrine and organizations in their enemy's military, and where he or she fit into a much bigger and very rigid organization. Junior leaders would only be called on to perform fundamental of leadership tasks, aimed mainly at leading people in set situations. In general, junior leaders only had to worry about leading their direct subordinates in either a static defensive scenario or in a well known doctrinally driven offensive scenario, without the requirement to make independent decisions with potentially strategic consequences. The United Nations mission to the Congo, the Suez and the early days of Cyprus were certainly challenging, but from the early seventies onward on the missions were relatively static and predictable, such as the later days of Cyprus and the Golan Heights.

Training of CF junior leaders has traditionally been based on fundamental tasks. These tasks included conducting a set-piece section attack, or solving a basic problem, using a basic estimate process and a "fill in the blanks" operation order approach.³ CF junior leader training in the past focused on training and provided very little in the way of education. Today the balance of training versus education is still overwhelmingly focused on training. The fundamental difference between training and education is that education deals with the acquisition of knowledge and training focuses on the acquisition of skills. Wikipedia defines training as "the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and attitudes as a result of the teaching of vocational or practical skills and knowledge that

³ Canada, Department of National Defence, A-P8-002-001/PC-H01, Qualification Standard, Officer General Specification, Basic Military Officer Qualification, Qualification Course, Ottawa: DND Canada, March 2005. Canada, Department of National Defence, A-PD-002-PLQ/PC-H12, Qualification Standard, Non-Commissioned Member – Primary Leadership Qualification, Ottawa: DND Canada, 3 March 2003.

relates to specific useful skills” and education as “a social science that encompasses teaching and learning specific knowledge, beliefs, and skills.”⁴ In the 1969 *Report of the Officer Development Board*, sometimes referred to as the “Rowley Report” named after its chair, Major-General Roger Rowley, education is generally referred to as completion of a university degree, and training is referred to as what is undertaken in the military by way of training courses.⁵ It can certainly be agreed that time spent at university is education, but military courses do contain elements of both education and training. For the purposes of this discussion education will be considered along lines similar to the Wikipedia definition where it is the acquisition of knowledge, beliefs, and the theory, whereas training concentrates on teaching of practical skills.

What is interesting about the Rowley Report is that even in 1969 it was recognized that leaders, in this case junior officers, required much more education than they had previously been receiving. What is evident in examining today’s CF junior leaders and the training and education that they receive, compared to the requirements of the COE, is that they are reasonably well trained, yet poorly educated to deal with the leadership dilemmas that they are now facing in the COE. This is especially true for NCMs, as they do not have the same benefit that officers do of having a university education. However, even having a university education does not guarantee that all officers are educated on the abilities previously mentioned. What this situation means is that there is a gap in the identified junior leadership requirements for the COE as well as in the ability of the Canadian Forces to educate its junior leaders properly for the COE.

⁴ Wikipedia available from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki>; Internet: Accessed 8 April 2006.

⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence, Officer Development Board: *Report of the Officer Development Board*. Ottawa: DND Canada March 1969.

Therefore, today's CF junior leader is ill-prepared for the challenges of the COE. The complexity and uncertainty of the COE have fundamentally changed the demands on individual soldiers in positions of leadership and authority. Current CF training and education no longer addresses the full range of leadership abilities required by CF junior leaders in this new environment. In order to be effective, future CF junior leaders require improved training and education tailored to the COE.

PART I – THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

A leader is a man who can adapt principles to circumstances.

General George S. Patton

The Contemporary Operating Environment

During a visit to Afghanistan in early 2004 with his wife Governor General Clarkson, Ralston Saul was struck by a young Lieutenant, about 23 years old, who ran a patrol.⁶ The age and rank of the patrol commander are typical of the reality of CF junior leaders today on operations overseas. This young Lieutenant and his patrol is typical of the situation today in the COE where other young officers, Lieutenants, and non-commissioned officers, Master-Corporals, are leading platoons and patrols and making key decisions that can have strategic consequences in a variety of environments and situations.

The CF have operated at a high tempo since the fall of the Berlin Wall, deploying on numerous operations involving large numbers of junior leaders. CF units have deployed on operations in the First Gulf War, Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia, Haiti, the Central African Republic, Kosovo, East Timor, and Afghanistan. They have deployed on disaster relief operations in Central America, Turkey, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, as well as domestic operations ranging from the Ice Storms of Ontario and Quebec to the Manitoba Floods, Forest Fires in British Columbia and on Operation ABACUS, and the Year 2000 operation.⁷ The locations have ranged from safe civilized areas with adequate infrastructure, to disaster areas in extremely poor countries, to desolate locations

⁶ Ralston Saul, His Excellency John, "A New Era of Irregular Warfare," Canadian Military Journal_Vol. 5, No. 4, (Winter 2005-2006): p. 8.

⁷ Horn, Bernd. *Towards a Brave New World: Canada's Army in the 21st Century*. Director Land Strategic Concepts publication. p. 26-27.

surrounded by hostile insurgents. CF junior leaders have operated in deserts, jungles, mountains, and cities with narrow and dangerous roads. Though some Canadian soldiers have lost their lives, the world is perhaps a better and more secure place.

In conducting these operations, CF junior leaders have had to work with numerous entities ranging from foreign militaries, to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross and Doctors without Borders, and have recently become even more involved with Canadian governmental organizations like DFAIT as part of the Government of Canada's new 3D+T (Defence, Diplomacy, Development and Trade) approach to foreign policy. In addition they have had to interact with local populations including local governments, religious organizations and other similar groups. The world has become increasingly complex and CF junior leaders are challenged with a variety of domestic and international operations. The CF has witnessed only too clearly the results of poor leadership in cases like Somalia, which resulted in the torture and death of a Somali teenager, and in Bakovici where mental patients were abused.⁸ Much of the reason for these incidents is due to CF junior leaders no longer being employed in large organizations such as companies with close supervision.

In almost all these operations junior leaders were employed as part of battalion or company-sized units, but more often than not were deployed in small groups at the section level at isolated locations or patrolling at the section and platoon level. On operations outside Canada, CF junior leaders often found themselves at isolated observation posts or leading patrols or convoys on their own far from the chain of command. In domestic operations CF junior leaders worked in a similar way, often side-

⁸ CBC. Available from: <http://www.cbc.ca/story/news/national/1998/06/08/bar1980608b.html>; and http://archives.cbc.ca/IDC-1-71-375-2089-10/conflict_war/somalia_inquiry/; Internet: Accessed 8 April 2006.

by-side with civilian and government organizations such as Hydro Quebec, the British Columbia Forest Service, or city and provincial officials. It is getting rarer and rarer for junior leaders to be employed in anything larger than platoon size.

In both foreign and domestic operations, CF junior leaders have had to interact with local civilian authorities, police, foreign military and NGOs. Moreover, they do this interaction without the benefit of being able to go back up their chain of command for advice and guidance in time to make the decision. Moreover, all members of the CF, particularly junior leaders, are subjected to ever-increasing media scrutiny. According to *The Future Battlespace*, a Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts (DLSC) publication, the Reality of the Strategic Corporal is here and “the actions of a soldier at a roadblock, or in any tactical setting, can have strategic ramifications...and the...Power of CNN is no longer an idle threat.”⁹ Also according to DLSC “the CNN effect of instantaneous worldwide imaging will exponentially magnify the concept of the “strategic corporal” where a tactical decision / error can become a strategic issue as it is beamed across the globe in real time.”¹⁰ DLSC provides the example of the US Marine who raised the American flag after clearing a stronghold in Iraq and its subsequent impact of portraying the US as an occupying power and not a liberator. For the CF, the Strategic Corporal, or Lieutenant, could be the young officer at the remote outpost in Afghanistan who decides to force local Afghans out of their homes so he can set up his observation post, or the Master-Corporal working on a flood in Manitoba who complains to the media about why he is there. Both instances could potentially hurt the strategic mission, or the reputation of the CF.

⁹ Canada. Dept. of National Defence Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts: Concept for Future Army Capabilities. P. 67.

¹⁰ Ibid.

CF junior leaders today are operating more often than not unsupervised in a wide variety of locations, situations and organizations, both domestically and abroad. But what exactly are the areas of the COE that most affect CF junior leaders? A good place to start is by examining the fourteen key “observations from Soldiering in Iraq”¹¹ identified by US Army Lieutenant General David Petraeus in his recent article in the US Army Military Review. Several of these observations are pertinent to the COE with regards to CF junior leaders. The first one is that everyone must do nation building. General Petraeus points out that it is not just the CIMIC branch that does nation building; it is everyone and junior leaders are often at the forefront of nation building. His second observation is that cultural awareness is a force multiplier and he emphasizes the importance of understanding “ethnic groups, tribes, religious elements, political parties, and other social groupings.”¹² He also stresses the importance of ensuring cultural awareness is taught on exercises, included in doctrine, and taught at US Army schools. His next observation is to remember the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants. In particular, General Petraeus stated: “relatively junior commissioned or noncommissioned officers...often have to make huge decisions, sometimes with life-or-death as well as strategic consequences, in the blink of an eye.”¹³ He suggests that commanders are obligated to “do everything possible to train them [junior leaders] before deployment for the various situations they will face, particularly for the most challenging and ambiguous ones.”¹⁴ And finally he observes that there is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders, stating, “the key to many of our successes in Iraq, in fact, has been leaders – especially

¹¹ Petraeus, Lieutenant General David H., “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” Military Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 (January-February 2006) p. 3.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

young leaders.”¹⁵ Clearly General Petraeus recognizes the importance of well-educated junior leaders.

As General Petraeus’ observes, junior leaders and their actions are critical in the COE, and integral to nation building. Junior leaders must be flexible and adaptive and have a very sound understanding of local culture if they are to be successful. These first-hand operational lessons and observations apply equally to CF junior leaders given our recent and current operations. In Afghanistan today an understanding of the local culture can assist the leaders in the mission, as demonstrated in the approach taken by the PPCLI Battle Group when attending meetings with local elders. By sitting down with local elders in an informal setting, with helmets removed, they are showing that they are open to including the local elders in the rebuilding of stability and are showing signs of respect by removing their helmets. This willingness to communicate informally comes in part from Canada’s peacekeeping legacy and an understanding that showing aggression does not often work in these situations. If aggressive junior leaders attempt to negotiate from the turret of their light armoured vehicles, or in hostile stances with weapons pointed towards the locals, they are not very likely to succeed. The recent axe attack during one of these negotiation sessions is somewhat of a setback, but one of the realities of the COE. CF junior leaders need to be able to read the situation, and act in the way which best suits that particular situation. The point is that they must be adaptive thinkers and be able to read the group they are dealing with, hence understanding culture is key.

Another view of the COE comes from Dr. George A. Van Otten, the Dean at the US Army Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Otten states: “US soldiers and their leaders must prepare to fight and win under extremely fluid and complex

¹⁵ Ibid.

conditions.”¹⁶ This statement may sound trite, but it is key to understanding the realities of the COE. The stability and predictability of the Cold War are gone forever and the junior leader today must be prepared to work in that fluid and complex environment. Dr. Otten also quotes from a TRADOC White Paper, *Capturing the Operational Environment*, published on 2 February 2000, which gives eleven variables which TRADOC sees as forming the basis of the COE: the Physical Environment; the Nature and Stability of the State; Sociological Demographics; Regional and Global Relationships; Military Capabilities; Information; Technology; External Organizations; National Will; Time; and Economics.¹⁷ He further suggests that these variables should be the basis for military intelligence training. From a CF junior leader perspective many of these variables might also serve as a good basis for training and education on the COE, and warrant further examination.

The physical environment is often a factor affecting a junior leader’s decisions but more in the sense of understanding or being empathetic to the local population or military forces in a country where the junior leader is operating. For example, if the local population or military force is without adequate food, clothing, or shelter, it would not be wise to flaunt the wealth of equipment, food, and supplies that a CF junior leader might have available, as was the case in Somalia. This action might make the junior leader appear insensitive and might jeopardize local cooperation. Good junior leaders assess the physical environment and whenever possible will do whatever they can to help the local population and build good relations. A failure to do so might not result in a strategic

¹⁶ Van Otten, George A. "Educating MI Professionals to Meet the Challenges of Changing Geopolitical and Modern Asymmetric Warfare." *Military Intelligence*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (July-September 2002): p. 34.

¹⁷ Ibid.

effect, but it will surely affect the local situation. A rocket attack was averted during Operation ATHENA when a local civilian came to the Canadian unit, 3 RCR, and told them he had observed local insurgents setting up some rockets. 3 RCR was able to neutralize the rockets before they could be fired at the Canadian camp. This interaction was wholly due to good relations established by 3 RCR with the local population and could well have been a spin-off benefit of providing food or help with a local building project. By showing the locals that they were there to provide stability, and a chance for a better life, good junior leaders enticed them into informing on the members of their society, who are against this progress. In order to do this interaction they also needed to be able to communicate with the locals. Interpreters are very valuable, but the ability of the CF junior leader to say a few key phrases before the interpreter takes on the detailed discussion, in effect meeting the locals halfway, goes a long way towards improving relations. Thus an understanding of the local environment and some local language is required; knowledge is key to being an effective junior leader in the COE.

The nature and stability of the state is another key area of knowledge that junior leaders require if they are to operate effectively. Without understanding the key underlying factors contributing to the situation, or the instability in the region, a junior leader is less effective and runs the risk of making a strategic mistake. It makes no sense for a junior leader to make a decision or complete a task if that task contributes to instability. If one of the causes of instability is ethnic or religious tension, for example, making decisions that further separate these ethnic or religious groups, as opposed to trying to get them to cooperate on common projects, could have a negative strategic effect. Likewise there may be times when it is just as important to keep these groups

apart, for the very same reasons. The point is that CF junior leaders must be aware of these factors if they are going to make the right decision and lead effectively in the COE. A good knowledge of sociological demographics, another component of culture, falls into this same category, and would be required for the very same reasons.

Regional and global relationships are important, but are an area where junior leaders only require a basic knowledge. This requirement for basic knowledge is because there would be less of a chance of junior leaders making a decision at their level that would be affected by this attribute, or that would have strategic effects. It is still important for junior leaders to understand these relationships, but more as background knowledge. Officers, who have university education, are more likely to have an understanding of these relationships, but NCMs generally do not. However, even officers arriving with a university education are not guaranteed to have this background, as there is no set requirement on what a degree must contain when accepting officers into the CF, other than meeting generally accepted national university standards.

Dr. Otten's emphasizes understanding military capabilities, information, and technology, and all are required background information that could assist a CF junior leader, but they are neither new attributes nor have they changed noticeably in the COE. Therefore no specific training would be required beyond that provided during general military training.

A good knowledge of external organizations, or the other non-military organizations working in the operational area that are not part of the junior leaders' unit, is also key to be an effective leader in the COE. The Government of Canada's 3D+T approach to foreign policy as well as the concept of the Three Block War both envisage

the military working closely with these organizations, and will need to be looked at more closely. However, a junior leader must understand what external organizations are attempting to achieve in his or her area of operations so that he or she does not make a decision, probably for good reasons, that goes counter to the aims of these organizations. This level of knowledge of these organizations and their missions will not always be possible, but at least if the junior leaders understand the aim of these organizations, working side by side with them in the COE, there is a better chance of success. By understanding the aims of these organizations CF junior leaders could try and ensure that their actions were either complementary to their missions or, at a minimum, would not directly interfere with their mission. For example, members of A Battery, 1st Regiment Royal Canadian Horse Artillery currently serving in Afghanistan have many volunteers back home sending over basis school supplies, which members of the battery provide to local children and local schools, an effort which directly supports the 3D+T approach.

National will is an interesting attribute and really means how far a nation is willing to go to solve a given problem or situation. For example, is Canada willing to accept multiple casualties on operations in Afghanistan, or as many as it takes to achieve peace and stability in the region? Is Canadian national will willing to accept such an event in order to undertake or continue a mission? Would a large-scale rocket attack on the base camp in Kandahar resulting in dozens of casualties be accepted by Canadians? Would losing most of a platoon or section supporting a defence against a Taliban attack be acceptable? The CF junior leader's dilemma is balancing the decision to support the local friendly Afghan military forces, thus building trust and stability, against the potential for Canada to pull out of the mission completely due to a large number of

casualties or other misfortune. We have already seen the movement by the opposition party, and other parties, forcing a parliamentary debate on the mission in Afghanistan, and this over relatively few casualties. A very real example exists in the example of Spain's national will to fight in Iraq, which changed dramatically following the Madrid bombings when they pulled their troops out.¹⁸ So far Canada has been lucky and has not suffered an attack similar to the Madrid bombings nor have there been mass casualties in Afghanistan.

Relating this national will to the junior leader level is difficult, however, because junior leaders are not often placed in the position of making a decision that could result in large numbers of casualties that might go beyond the expectations of the national will. However, it is important that CF junior leaders have a feeling for the national will, as best as can be related to them. CF junior leaders need to understand the limitations of national will on the one hand, while on the other hand they must be told that they will not be held responsible simply because they end up in a situation where a large number of their troops are lost, as this would be unfair to them, and would make them hesitant, potentially undermining their effectiveness.

Another view of the COE comes from Colonel LaMoe and Captain Read of the US Army Engineer School who describes the COE in Afghanistan today as "part legacy environment with a conventional force and part asymmetric, with the added complexity of terrorist organizations. The contemporary operational environment (COE) is a complex composite of all three of those elements."¹⁹ This view sees an environment

¹⁸ Heritage Foundation. *Spain's Retreat After The Madrid Bombings Rewards Terrorism*. Available from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm448.cfm>; Internet: Accessed 23 March 2006

¹⁹ LaMoe, Colonel and Read Captain. *Countermining operations in the contemporary operational environment*. Engineer: The Professional Bulletin for Army Engineers, April, 2002, Available from

where CF junior leaders could be dealing with a conventional military situation with conventional threats, plus asymmetric threats, and at the same time terrorist threats, all within the same operating area. The Three Block War theory articulated by General Charles M. Krulak, former Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, where a junior leader could be involved in war fighting, stability or peacekeeping operations and humanitarian operations all within a three block radius within a city, as shown is applicable.²⁰




Figure 1. Three Block War. Integrated CF Effort²¹

General Krulak gained fame both for his articulation of the Three Block War theory as well as his famous article describing the “Strategic Corporal”, which appeared in Marines Magazine in January 1999. In this article General Krulak predicted that: “The lines separating the levels of war, and distinguishing combatant from “non-combatant,” will blur, and adversaries, confounded by our “conventional” superiority, will resort to

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0FDF/is_2002_April/ai_87415099 ; Internet: Accessed 18 March 2006.

²⁰ Krulak, Gen Charles C. “The Three Block War: Fighting In Urban Areas,” presented at National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 10 October 1997, *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 15 December 1997, p. 139.

²¹ Caron, J.H.P.M, LGen, Chief of the Land Staff, Presentation to CFCSC, 23 January 2006.

asymmetrical means to redress the imbalance. Further complicating the situation will be the ubiquitous media whose presence will mean that all future conflicts will be acted out before an international audience.”²² General Krulak’s Three Block War theory and the Strategic Corporal have been proven correct since their articulation and are certainly applicable to the CF.

Three Block War theory applies to CF junior leaders today as witnessed in Afghanistan where the same battle group has soldiers attending meetings with local Afghani elders in one area, engaging Taliban in another area, and handing out school supplies, or escorting members of DFAIT in another area. One can also see from the current situations in both Iraq and Afghanistan that General Krulak’s predictions have certainly come true. The attacks of September 11th 2001, the use of improvised explosive devices, and the imbedded media of the Second Gulf War are real examples of these predictions coming true.

CF junior leaders not thinking about the potential worldwide strategic effects of their decisions can have disastrous effects in the COE. The supposed flushing of a Koran down the toilet by an interrogator at the US Detainee Centre at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba resulted in worldwide riots and deaths.²³ A CF junior leader in the complex COE, without adequate preparation, could just as easily cause such a situation. The US recently had another incident where the bodies of two dead Taliban fighters were burned, probably in an attempt by the perpetrators to send a message to the Taliban.

²² Krulak, General Charles C. *The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three-Block War*. Marines Magazine, January 1999 Available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.html; Internet: Accessed 18 March 2006.

²³ There is still debate on whether or not the Koran was actually flushed but this example still serves to illustrate the strategic effects that such a simple act can have. If the act did take place, it is a key example of how a lack of cultural understanding can allow anyone to make a simple mistake with potentially strategic results. The same issue is at play with the caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed.

Unfortunately, because it is an offence against the Muslim faith to burn the deceased, the act “harmed the U.S. image, already tarnished with the numerous scandals involving the abuse of detainees held in U.S. custody in Iraq’s Abu Ghraib jail, Guantanamo, and elsewhere.”²⁴ This act of burning bodies is certainly another case of underestimating the strength of the Muslim faith and the strategic impact of such an action. This incident was costly for the US as it set them back in their attempt to win the hearts and minds campaign in Afghanistan. Accordingly, “the incident sparked uproar among Muslims in Afghanistan and the Muslim world, that’s already angered by the U.S. policies after numerous scandals uncovered abusive and inhuman tactics used by the American forces against Muslim detainees in several detention centers.”²⁵ These examples underline the importance of educating our CF junior leaders to understand the second and third order effects of their actions; in other words, the ability to be able to think ahead about the potential results of their actions remains important.

From a Canadian perspective Brigadier General G.R. Thibault, the ISAF V Theatre Information Officer, highlighted the recent experience in Afghanistan and the importance of individual actions: “every action is an influence opportunity that have either a significant positive or negative effect on COG [centre of gravity].”²⁶ Although the COG for ISAF during General Thibault’s mission was at the operational level, it was affected by soldiers and leader at all levels. Commander ISAF’s stated COG in this case was “credibility” and the key messages that all members of the force, particularly junior leaders, were asked to stress to the people of Afghanistan were: “We are ‘In Support;’

²⁴ Al Jazeera. *U.S. Army admits burning Muslim bodies*. Available from http://www.aljazeera.com/me.asp?service_ID=10188; Internet: Accessed 18 March 2006.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Thibault, BGen G.R., Comd LFCA. Presentation to CFCSC, *International Security Assistance Force, Theatre Information Coordination*, 24 February 2006.

We are ‘Guests’ of the Afghans; and We must garner the consent of all.”²⁷ BGen Thibault described leaders at all levels as precision guided munitions in the military information campaign and further provided the key components of credibility as being impact, action, and value. In other words, ISAF, and the CF in Afghanistan, must have an impact and take actions that add value to the situation in Afghanistan. This approach meant that junior leaders needed to internalize this approach and ensure that every action they took was supportive of these messages and did in fact add value. For example, the decision by a junior leader to support a local authority figure, and allow him to take action, rather than taking action himself, would support this COG.

General Thibault also described various target audiences for these messages, and at the junior leader level one of the key audiences is the general population: “General Population – the local Afghan population, as well as the international audience in order to maintain popular support for the ATA, ISAF and IC efforts within the country and within the International Community at large including the ISAF Troop Contributing Nations.”²⁸ Finally he described how: “Close coordination of all aspects of information activities must be established and these “non-lethal fires” must support all ISAF operations, tactical action and activities.”²⁹ The most important lesson to be drawn here is that a common theme and understanding of the importance of every decision taken by leaders at all levels, and how those decisions and actions can affect the COG, is key to achieving the mission. Providing CF junior leaders with practical examples and advice, such as the example of supporting the local authority figure, will go a long way towards supporting the commander’s COG and getting the mission done.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

Summary of the Contemporary Operating Environment

The COE consists of a series of complex environments ranging from domestic operations within Canada to Three Block War operations in Afghanistan. CF junior leaders are operating in organizations, which are usually no more than platoon size, but mostly in actions, which occur at the section level, often far from their chain of command. CF junior leaders are in an environment today in the COE where they are required to make key decisions quickly, with potentially strategic impacts, largely unsupervised. They are working multi-nationally and with numerous Non-Governmental Organizations and within the Canadian 3D+T approach.

**PART II - THE CANADIAN FORCES JUNIOR LEADER IN THE
CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT**

The final test of a leader is that he leaves behind him in other men the conviction and the will to carry on.

Walter Lippmann, 1889-1974

Required Junior Leadership Abilities

The various junior leadership abilities required in the COE are now becoming clearer and include such requirements as the importance of a sound understanding of the operating environment, and in particular a sound understanding of local culture, to name one. Most low-level mistakes today resulting in strategic impacts occur due to a clear lack of understanding of local culture. Major General Robert H. Scales of the US Army in his article on the *Learning Revolution* believes that “all young soldiers should receive cultural and language instruction, not to make them linguists, but to equip them with just enough sensitivity and linguistic skills to understand and converse with the indigenous citizen on the street” and he refers to this as “cultural preparation for battle.”³⁰ This understanding helps provide credibility and shows the locals that the military cares enough to have this understanding. Perhaps it would be even better to go so far as to have soldiers doing this cultural preparation for battle eat the country’s food, and listen to the country’s music, in order to help them bridge the cultural divide. Perhaps having the messes and field kitchens provide indigenous food during final work-up training, based on the mission area, would also help to bridge the cultural gap.

In order to understand culture, it is worth providing some definitions of what it encompasses. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

³⁰ Scales, Major General Robert H., “The Second Learning Revolution,” Military Review, Vol. 88 No. 1 (January-February 2006), p. 40.

(UNESCO), defines culture as “a set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.”³¹

The Colorado State University Research Center provides another definition of culture in that “cultural awareness is possessing an understanding, sensitivity, and appreciation of the history, values, experiences, behaviors, interactions, affective understanding and lifestyles of groups that include, but, are not limited to: Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Religious Affiliation, Socio-economic Status and Mental/Physical Abilities.”³² Finally retired US Army Major-General Geoffrey Lambert defines culture as “the ‘human terrain’ of warfare. Human terrain is key terrain.”³³ So from these various definitions what could be the basis for cultural education for CF junior leaders?

From each of these definitions elements can be drawn like spiritualism, which is probably one of the most important. Western societies becoming increasingly secular and many recent events, which were strategic errors on the part of junior leaders, like the burning of Muslim bodies, have a spiritual or religious base. Understanding the interactions of the culture, or who does what, is also very important for CF junior leaders as they must understand who is in charge culturally, and who is not. The emotional features of a society would be another key element that would be important to CF junior leaders. Human emotions are one of the hardest things to deal with at the best of times, and understanding the emotional aspects of a culture would help a CF junior leader avoid making mistakes that could cause emotional reactions that would be very difficult to

³¹ Wikipedia. Available from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture>; Internet: Accessed 19 March 2006.

³² Association of the United States Army, Panel V, Training for Certainty and Educating for Uncertainty. Available from <http://www.USA.org/am2005/TrainingPanel.ppt>; Internet: Accessed 25 February 2006.

³³ Ibid.

reverse. Finally a good understanding of the value systems, history and traditions of the culture will help a CF junior leader make the right decision that supports these values and respects the local history and traditions.

Culture is complex and given its complexity, in order to understand a culture a junior leader must be educated in a thorough manner, and not just by reading a pamphlet or getting one or two cultural awareness lectures. Being immersed in the food, music, language and religion of a culture is probably the most effective way to do this, particularly during pre-deployment training. Another solution might be to educate CF junior leaders over time on all major cultures of the world, as they develop toward their first junior leader position. What is clear is that one cannot educate CF junior leaders effectively on a culture during a short junior leader course, or as part of basic officer training, nor in the short period of time allotted to pre-deployment or theatre mission specific training (TMST). Nor can one wait until the junior leader is in theatre to do this training, as by that time it is too late. The US Army is now looking at educating potential officers on different world cultures the minute they sign up by using a series of précis that the officer applicant has to work through, along with some other basic military knowledge, in a distributed learning (DL) fashion.³⁴ This is a practical way to ensure that all new junior officers achieve a minimum level of education on cultural awareness, and sets the threshold for further education and training.

This DL approach to some initial cultural awareness training for new officers is a direct result of lessons that the US Army has learned from the costly cultural errors committed in Iraq and Afghanistan by junior leaders. In the US Army Posture Statement

³⁴ Discussion with Colonel Richard Dixon, G3, United States Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth Kansas, 20 March 2006.

of 2006, much emphasis has been placed on growing adaptive leaders because “the actions of individual Soldiers and leaders can have strategic consequences. To be effective today and tomorrow, we are growing a new breed of leader — one more akin to a pentathlete who is able to transition rapidly between complex tasks with relative ease.”³⁵ Figure 2 below shows the attributes that the US Army sees as required of 21st Century leaders, based on their experiences in the COE, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan:



Figure 2. Army Leaders in the 21st Century³⁶

The US Army Pentathlete approach is interesting, encompassing both the ideals of the Multi-skilled Leader as well as the attributes that this leader requires. In Canadian parlance the points under the multi-skilled leader side would be comparable to task statements in our specifications, and the attributes on the right would be comparable to skill and knowledge statements required to complete these tasks.

³⁵ US Army Posture Statement 2006. Available from <http://www4.army.mil/aps/>; Internet: Accessed 15 February 2006, p. 15.

³⁶ Ibid.

Media awareness stands out as another major requirement for a CF junior leader in the COE. An understanding of the media, what they want, and why they are there, as well as interview and on-camera techniques are important. Generally the CF has improved greatly in this area by adopting the open media policy where soldiers may talk to the media about their particular area of expertise. This open media policy allows soldiers to show that they are thinking people but always runs the risk of them talking beyond their level of expertise. Junior leaders require training beyond this, as they must be trained so that they do not inadvertently say something sensitive which could have a strategic effect. If they are well grounded in the other skills required in the COE, then sound interview techniques and substantial media awareness training would suffice.

The US Pentathlete approach also provides ideals and attributes for leaders. Ideal leaders are strategic and creative thinkers; builders and leaders of teams; competent full spectrum warfighters or accomplished professionals who support the soldier; skilled in governance, statesmanship and diplomacy; and being able to understand the cultural context and work across it. Attributes include being decisive, with integrity and character; a confident and competent decision-maker in uncertain situations: i.e. prudent risk taker; innovative; and adaptive; being empathetic; professionally educated and dedicated to life-long learning; and lastly being an effective communicator.

Many of these ideals and attributes are beyond the scope of junior leader training and education, as they are part of general soldier or officer skills, so this paper will focus on the ones that are directly linked to CF junior leader training and education, and which fit the COE. Under ideals the last two, skilled in governance, statesmanship and diplomacy; and being able to understand the cultural context and work across it are the

most important for the COE. The cultural aspect has already been covered but the understanding of governance; statesmanship and diplomacy are applicable to CF junior leaders given the Canadian 3D+T approach.

In DFAIT and DND's International Policy Statement the requirement for the CF to work closely with both governmental and non-governmental organizations is very clear. That makes the ideal of being skilled in governance, statesmanship and diplomacy very interesting in its potential application to CF junior leaders, and is key in avoiding mistakes with potential strategic impacts. The question that arises then, is how much training and education do you put towards this ideal? The CF certainly cannot afford to train every junior leader to be a diplomat, but what it can do is make sure that for each mission, the soldier has a solid understanding of the diplomacy "D" in the 3D+T approach currently being employed on operations. The 3D+T approach to operations consists of Defence, Diplomacy, Development and Trade.³⁷ The CF's the main interest is in providing the secure environment "the Defence" to allow the other Ds and the T to take place. The CF junior leader requires a solid understanding of what the other Ds and the T are, so that he can ensure he or she does not inadvertently jeopardize them through a minor mistake. Having a strong grounding or sense of self, nation, military and public expectations is the basis on which this understanding should be built.

Within the attributes of a leader there are several pertinent to the COE. Being empathetic is very important to the COE but is really based on a good understanding of the local culture and so would be a spin-off benefit of providing good in-depth cultural awareness training as previously described. The attribute of being a confident and

³⁷ Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada's International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Overview, Available from <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/IPS/IPS-Overview.pdf>; Internet: Accessed 5 March 2006.

competent decision-maker in uncertain situations is probably one of the more important attributes for the COE, as prudence and adaptiveness in delicate situations will go a long way towards getting things done without committing strategic errors. The only way to prepare a leader well in this area, or to make him or her into a confident and competent decision maker, is through practice and experience. The more that a junior leader practices decision making in difficult scenarios, the better that leader will become, and the better that leader will be placed when it is time to make that critical decision for real. One of the best ways to achieve this confidence in decision-making is with realistic and demanding training scenarios, either during formal junior leader training, or during pre-deployment training. Along with confidence and the ability to make good decisions goes the ability to communicate those decisions effectively to both internal and external audiences.

Junior leaders in the COE are constantly required to interact with a myriad of government officials, civilians, and foreign militaries. Besides basic communications skills, junior leaders more than ever require effective negotiation and dispute resolution skills. The Interests-Based Negotiation training offered through the CF Dispute Resolution Centres is an excellent form of potential training for CF junior leaders, as it provides a foundation for understanding the position of the person with whom the junior leader is negotiating. Interests based negotiation training provides the training and education required for a negotiator to listen critically to what the other party is saying and determine what they really mean to say, or what interest lies behind the words they are communicating. This type of education would help the junior leader better understand religious or cultural boundaries as well as the key issues being discussed or negotiated.

An October 2005 training panel of the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) recommended a Desired Skill Set of an Adaptive, Self-Aware Leader: “comfortable with being uncomfortable; adept at handling massive amounts of information; possesses technical savvy; able to devise creative solutions to complex challenges – thinkers; able to interact with indigenous populations; understands 2nd and 3rd order effects of actions – have global implications; and imbues Warrior Ethos – commands trust and confidence of Soldiers.”³⁸ This skill set echoes many of the attributes mentioned above in the Pentathlete approach and most probably served as some of the initial work that led to that approach. These skills reinforce the leadership requirements already identified for the COE. Moreover, the second to last skill, understands second and third order effects of actions – have global implications, succinctly explains why CF junior leaders need to know the effects of their actions. All these abilities are key to lead at the junior leader level in the COE and quite different from what was required ten or fifteen years ago, when the military focused on purely military missions, and normally didn’t even plan on interacting with local populations, politics, rebuilding and so on. Those activities were normally left to other agencies, and the military only worried about fighting the battles.

The Canadian Forces Leadership Institute regularly commissions research papers on leader development and several will be covered here. The first paper from 2002 written by Dr. John Walsh, and Dr. Michael Cox of the Faculty of Management of the University of Guelph provides some interesting views on the importance of a leader being self-aware. They discuss leadership’s first commandment being “Know Thyself” and the importance of being self-aware and, quote Tennyson’s reference to leaders

³⁸ Ibid.

needing “to have self-reverence, or a knowledge of ones own leadership character, having self-knowledge of ones leadership competency and having self-control or control of ones leadership capability.”³⁹ This view is a very interesting and readily applicable to today’s CF junior leaders in the COE as they must have the capability to know their own limitations in any given situation whether they be giving a media interview, making a key decision with potential strategic impacts or in simply exercising self-control in a difficult politically charged situation. Thus being self-aware and knowing oneself is a desirable attribute of a CF junior leader.

In March 2003 Jacques J. Gouws et al wrote a paper on leader development in which they emphasize the fast changing world and future warfare. Some key elements they see in the future for leaders, that support the other views so far presented, and which are applicable to CF junior leaders in the COE, are the requirements to be: strategic opportunists; globally adept; capable of learning across organizational boundaries with alliance partners; keen data analysts; learning evangelists, sensitive to issues of diversity, interpersonally competent; skillful communicators; and community builders.⁴⁰ It is interesting to see that many of the same required leadership attributes being presented by senior military personnel with operational experience are being reflected in the academic world. Most of these attributes have already been commented on already, but the attributes of being keen data analysts and learning evangelists are a new way of showing that leaders today need to be able to assess situations quickly and be willing and eager to learn from them. Likewise the attribute of being a community builder is true in more

³⁹ Walsh, J., & Cox, M. (2002). Leadership Development and Knowledge Transfer . (CFLI Contract Research Report #CR01-0083). Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, p. 14.

⁴⁰ Gouws, J.J., Beukes, J.A., & H. Ellmann. (2003). Leader Development . (CFLI Contract Research Report #CR02-0609). Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, p. 4.

ways than one. Not only do CF junior leaders today have to build their own community within their own section or platoon with their own subordinates, they have to help build real communities on operations, both in the sense of establishing working relationships with local indigenous communities, and sometimes helping to build actual infrastructure.

Another research paper by Jennifer Palmer Crawford of the University of Waterloo titled *Leader Development and Constructivism*, discusses both the diversity of military missions, as well as the issue that “the political direction of a mission may be changed unexpectedly and even inconsistently in response to such circumstances as changed in domestic policies of a major troop-contributing state.”⁴¹ This observation ties in with junior leaders requiring an understanding of national will, and also highlights the changes that CF junior leaders face today in the COE. Crawford also notes existing leadership literature “stresses the importance of cognitive processes in leadership.”⁴² Leaders must be mentally agile and adaptive to challenging situations with a sound basis of educational knowledge, as well as continual practice in scenario based training, junior leaders will be much more agile, or cognitively developed, and able to make rapid decisions in challenging scenarios.

Summary of CF Junior Leader Leadership Requirements for the COE

In order to meet the challenges of today’s COE, CF junior leaders need detailed cultural awareness, total situational awareness of the requirements of not only the military mission but also the requirements of the NGOs, especially with the Canadian 3D+T approach, in order to ensure that both the aims of the military and DFAIT are met. CF junior leaders are precision guided munitions - key enablers - in the information

⁴¹ Crawford, J.P. (2003). *Leadership Development and Constructivism* . (CFLI Discussion Paper). Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, p. 7.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

operations campaign, and must be loaded with the right warheads - the messages - in order to support the overall mission commander as well as supporting other governmental, non-governmental and like organizations. They must be media savvy, understand the basics of diplomacy, and be confident and competent decision makers, first class communicators, negotiators and mediators. They must be cognitively agile and understand the second and third order effect of their decisions and finally these tasks, skills and knowledge must be taught and practiced to a level where the CF junior leader is competent and capable of operating independently and far from his or her chain of command.

**PART III – PRODUCING THE CANADIAN FORCES JUNIOR LEADER FOR
THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT**

Current CF Junior Leadership Training and Education Versus Abilities Required for the COE

How does current CF junior leader training measure up against the key leadership requirements identified so far? Current CF junior leader training and education, as it exists in formal leadership courses, pre-deployment training and in-theatre training on operations is deficient.

CF formal junior leader training has its roots in the Officer (OGS) and Non-Commissioned Member (NCMGS) General Specifications, which provide the tasks, skills and knowledge statements (TSKs) required of all CF members at various points in their careers. These TSKs provide the basis on which basic officer training and the Primary Leadership Qualification (PLQ), the current name of the CF junior leader course for NCMs, is based. Careers of CF members are broken into developmental periods (DPs) that further delineate to what level, if any, the CF member needs to be trained or educated on these TSKs. Within the specifications there are tables that indicate which tasks a CF member must do at each DP level, and these are supported by skills and knowledge statements with levels that correspond to the numbers in Table 1 below.

Skill	Knowledge	
Definition	Value	Definition
the level of proficiency required to perform parts or elements of duties and tasks under continuous supervision	1	an awareness of the basic definitions and concepts associated with a topic or a body of knowledge
the level of proficiency normally required to perform duties and tasks under supervision	2	the level of understanding of definitions and basic concepts which enables the relating of this knowledge to job requirements

Skill		Knowledge
Definition	Value	Definition
the level of proficiency required to independently and correctly perform duties and tasks	3	the level of understanding of theory and principles of a topic or body of knowledge which enables critical thought and independent performance and is usually gained through formal training and job experience
the level of proficiency which usually can be acquired by considerable training and extensive practical job experience	4	the level of knowledge which enables the synthesis/integration of theory facts and practical lessons learned to support the identification of solutions to non-routine problems. This knowledge is gained from formal training and education and considerable job experience.
the level of proficiency indicated by a mastery of techniques and expert application of procedures	5	a recognized level of expertise, which includes a mastery of theory and application, related to a given body of knowledge

Table 1 – Levels of Skill and Knowledge⁴³

What is interesting to note, and which has always been a point of contention between training development officers (TDOs), subject matter experts for specifications, and operators, is that a five is almost never given and the numbers tend to be always on the low side. For example, many skills and much knowledge required by CF junior leaders fall into the number one and two levels, which clearly show that the individual in question must be performing the task under supervision, often under maximum supervision. The reason given by the TDOs is that it is too time consuming to bring trainees to a level three without extensive training, education and practice. However, given the realities of the COE does this assumption make sense? CF junior leaders are quite frequently called upon to make decisions on the spot, often far from their supervisors, which can have critical strategic consequences. Part of the dilemma however, is that to reach a level three, and be able to complete the task independently, the member must have both training and experience, as pointed out by the TDOs.

⁴³ Canada, Department of National Defence, A-PD-055-002/PP-001, Canadian Forces Officer General Specification - Provisional, Ottawa: DND Canada, 24 August 1999, p. 3-2.

Undoubtedly experience is the best way for an individual junior leader to mature and grow, and find their leadership abilities; however, there is rarely enough time available for all junior leaders, particularly junior officers, to do so.

Experience is normally developed over time and is not something that can be provided quickly. The dilemma, therefore, is that CF junior leaders are being deployed on operations immediately or soon after basic officer training or immediately after completing the PLQ course. CF junior leaders receive pre-deployment and in-theatre training, but the level and quality of this training is not nearly sufficient to provide the experience to bring the junior leader up to a level three. Another issue with training directed in the specifications is that it does not cover all requirements of the COE, nor is it consistent between junior officers and NCMs, who at the most junior leadership level operate in similar or identical situations, and have the same leadership challenges. The Master-Corporal leading a section on a foot patrol through an Afghan village will be called upon to make the same types of decisions that a Lieutenant will be called upon leading his platoon or negotiating his way through a roadblock.

The tasks, skills and knowledge requirements of the COE have been identified, and the next step is to relate them to the existing specifications and see what tasks, skills and knowledge statements relating to junior leadership in the COE are contained therein. Annex A compares the tasks, skills and knowledge related to junior leadership in the COE in the OGS and NCMGS.⁴⁴ Where statements are the same or similar they have been placed beside each other. Statements that appear on one side only are currently taught solely to that group of junior leaders. Where the word 'none' appears, the statement is in the specification, but education on that task skill or knowledge does not

⁴⁴ This comparison is based on the conclusions from Parts I and II and is not exhaustive.

start until a later developmental period. Interestingly, few tasks are actually in the specifications relating to the requirements of the COE, and the two specifications have inconsistencies. The way in which specifications are developed partly explains the discrepancy. Working groups using their best judgment and experience but not necessarily supported by written reports on past experiences or future trends, and without academic rigour work up the specifications. How skills and knowledge statements are related to tasks is also significant. For example, in the OGS fourteen tasks under leadership are supported by nine skills and fifteen knowledge statements. Much required training and education is actually captured in the skill and knowledge statements. An examination of Annex A suggests that standardization of tasks, skills and knowledge statements is required, as well as a review of the requirement for the item and the level to which it is taught. For example, cultural awareness appears in the OGS but not the NCMGS, while it is clearly a requirement of both and certainly at a level higher than a two. As shown at Annex A, most of the required junior leadership abilities for the COE are missing, or under-represented. However, before a full determination of what the delta of missing abilities can be made, pre-deployment and in-theatre leadership training requires examination.

Pre-Deployment Leadership Training

Pre-deployment training typically lasts from three to six months and is composed of both generic combat skills based on Army Battle Task Standards as well as theatre mission specific training, which is called Theatre Specific Mission Battle Procedure (TMSBP) by 1 CMBG in their mounting directive.⁴⁵ For Task Force Afghanistan (TFA)

⁴⁵ 1 CMBG 3350-5 (G5 Plans (Rear)) March 2006, *1 CMBG Mounting Order Task Force Afghanistan Roto 1*.

Roto 1, the generic combat skills training took place both before and during the Brigade Training Event (BTE) run in Wainwright during August-October 2005. Although the BTE did focus on a Three Block War approach, the TMSBP training occurred after the BTE and so junior leaders received much of the training they would need before the exercise, afterwards. This unfortunate situation was simply a result of scheduling of the BTE, which took place in October not long after the annual posting cycle, and allowed insufficient time for TMSBP training beforehand. The 1 CMBG TMSBP occurred during the period 1 November to 9 December 2005 followed by block leave, final preparations, and then deployment into theatre between 20 January and 1 February 2006.

TMSBP training focuses on both established training, much of it based on the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) Peace Support Operations Basic Course, as well as guidance provided by the designated Task Force Commander. In this case, Commander 1 CMBG, made decisions based upon strategic reconnaissance into theatre and his personal experience.⁴⁶ Lessons learned from past rotations are also taken into account, although few specific examples of junior leadership lessons from past operations are available.

Within the 1 CMBG mounting instructions and its direction for TMSBP, there is no special emphasis placed on leadership training as a distinct entity. This lack of emphasis on leadership training is somewhat understandable as the approach to date in preparing for CF operations has been a building block approach with various training and education requirements being built, one upon the other, with leadership being assumed to be an underlying activity that occurs naturally, or that it in effect is achieved by training

⁴⁶ Canada, Department of National Defence, A-P3-002-PSO/PH-B01, *Training Plan, Peace Support Operations Basic Course*, Ottawa: DND Canada, 1 March 2005.

the leader in all the various elements that make up the pre-deployment training.

Examination of the 1 CMBG TMSBP training also shows that the areas of: language and culture; code of conduct; personal conduct; law of armed conflict; rules of engagement; and media awareness were covered, albeit very superficially. For example, four forty-five minute periods are given on cultural awareness, which is not nearly enough for a junior leader to get a real feeling for a complex culture, such as the one in Afghanistan. Earlier in this paper it was shown that culture could include such things as an: “affective understanding and lifestyles of groups that include, but, are not limited to: Race; Ethnicity; Gender; Sexual Orientation; Religious Affiliation; Socio-economic Status; and Mental/Physical Abilities.”⁴⁷ This cultural awareness education is simply not something that can be covered in four forty-five minute lessons. Eating indigenous food prepared by the field kitchens or mess halls during final pre-deployment training would help the soldier to get mentally prepared for the location and, if the proper local language names were used, it would provide the soldier with some basic of language, at least in the area of food. Language itself had twelve forty-five minute allocated, which is somewhat better, and will help the CF junior leader be more effective in the COE. Nonetheless, there is a requirement for more cultural awareness training because neither the training and education received during basic officer training, cultural awareness up to a level two – basic definitions and concepts, nor on the PLQ where no cultural awareness takes place whatsoever, is adequate for the COE.

Two areas of knowledge related to CF junior leadership and the COE, which are complementary, personal conduct, the code of conduct, and the law of armed conflict (LOAC), are each given one hour and are taught by the “unit chain of command.” This

⁴⁷ Wikipedia. Available from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture>; Internet: Accessed 19 March 2006.

approach makes sense for the personal and code of conduct portions, as it is the chain of command, or the senior leaders, who will set or not set the conditions for success of their junior leaders. However for TFA Roto 1 this same chain of command provides law of armed conflict training, a subject best left to legal personnel, or at least someone who has had LOAC training. The first place where a senior leader must take the full law of armed conflict course, and so really be in a position to instruct this subject, is at the Canadian Forces College. This timing is too late and training should really be given to junior leaders before they assume leadership positions. CF junior leaders require the full LOAC course if they are to operate effectively, given that they will not always have a law of armed conflict graduate available to supervise their decisions. This need for the full LOAC course should be a requirement identified in the specifications at the appropriate DP level, and should be taught prior to members assuming junior leader positions on operations.

Rules of engagement (ROE), on the other hand, are given four hours of training time, which combined with practice, should place junior leaders in a position to make sound decisions on whether or not to engage with deadly force, and TMSBP is the right place to teach the actual rules for the theatre and practice them with realistic scenarios. Junior leaders should still get a solid basis for understanding ROE as part of their CF junior leader training, but pre-deployment training and TMSBP is where the practical application of ROE for a real theatre should be refined, and they should continue to be reinforced through in-theatre training.

The importance of being able to deal effectively with the media is clear; however, only one hour is devoted to media awareness training during TMSBP. Very little media

training is covered as part of the NCMGS/OGS based training; a level one knowledge for officers and nothing for NCMs, this level is clearly not enough. Based on experience with the 1 CMBG Public Affairs Officer, one full day is the minimum required to have junior leaders both understand the media, and to practice on-camera techniques.⁴⁸ CF junior leaders need to be able to be interviewed by the media, and also need to understand the reasons the media are there and how to get the commander's key messages across effectively, as part of the information operations campaign. As with all key tasks, skills and knowledge required in the COE, a minimum level three is required; in other words they should be able to operate without supervision.

Negotiation and the use of interpreters are taught within TMSBP but again, only very superficially with a half day devoted to these areas, which is not nearly enough time to provide a sound foundation on which to practice during practical training. Current operations in Afghanistan have shown the importance of being able to negotiate and interact with the local population and local officials, in order to establish trust and create a safe and harmonious environment. This key area must be substantially enhanced in order to make an effective CF junior leader in the COE. The best way to enhance this area would be to provide a formal negotiation/mediation course or component as part of TMSBP.

On examining the Peace Support Operations Basic Course Training Plan it is interesting to note that there are two other learning or enabling objectives which are not covered as part of the 1 CMBG TMSBP training, but which naturally fit the requirements identified in Part I for the COE: Peace Partners; Force Directives; and ROE. As

⁴⁸ Comment is based on media awareness training provided to junior officers in 1 RCHA by the 1 CMBG Public affairs Officer. This was considered the minimum requirement, and was followed by practical training in the field during exercises with real media players.

mentioned, ROE are taught in the 1 CMBG TMSBP, but it is not clear whether or not force directives are included. A clear understanding of the force directives behind the ROE is very important to their application. The enabling objective on Peace Partners provides a good description of the sort of information that CF junior leaders require on other organizations operating within the theatre or mission area, especially with the 3D+T approach. The enabling objective as written in the PSO Basic Course training plan provides a good description of the required knowledge:

Introduce the concept of “Peace Partners” as: what they are; who they are; what they do; why they are important to the population and the peacekeeper, the categories of peace partners; identify specific examples within the categories; types of governmental non-military organizations (i.e. UNHCR, UNCIVPOL); types of non-governmental, non-military organizations (i.e. Doctors without Borders CARE, etc) and their strengths and weaknesses; relationship between and responsibilities of the CF member and non-military Peace Partners; and validity / authority of non-military peace partners.⁴⁹

This enabling objective would serve as an excellent basis for the description of the training and education requirements of CF junior leaders for the 3D+T approach as it directly supports the requirement already identified.

In summary, pre-deployment and TMSBP training provide a part of the required tasks, skills and knowledge required for CF junior leaders in the COE but not all of it and not to the required level. This training is the last real chance that CF junior leaders get to train in a truly safe environment and it is at this point that they should be fully prepared to operate in theatre. However, in-theatre training is still potentially valuable and could provide the final tuning of these abilities.

⁴⁹ Canada, Department of National Defence, A-P3-002-PSO/PH-B01, *Training Plan, Peace Support Operations Basic Course*, Ottawa: DND Canada, 1 March 2005, p. 15.

In-Theatre Junior Leadership Training

In-theatre training normally focuses initially on acclimatization to the theatre and local situation, but should be continuous throughout the operation. Traditionally there has been time to do in-theatre training, but this opportunity is now becoming a thing of the past. As recent experience has shown, the enemy starts to test the new arrivals in theatre from the first day, and the death of a key Foreign Affairs diplomat like Glyn Berry as well as attacks on CF junior leaders like Lieutenant Trevor Greene, show that there is often no longer the luxury of time in-theatre to finish training not conducted in Canada. Furthermore, based on the local situation, and the probing as an example, CF units might need to allocate all available time to adjust or change their tactics to meet the local situation. Discussions with the Commander of A Battery, 1 RCHA, in Afghanistan show that there is no junior leadership training related to the required abilities taking place at all in-theatre and that junior leaders have to operate with the abilities they arrive with.⁵⁰ Therefore, either better preparation must take place before leaving Canada, given that in some theatres there is insufficient time for any substantial training, or provision of in-theatre training through innovative means is required, given the constraints on time and the ongoing operations, which commence in some case immediately on arrival in theatre.

Summary Of CF Junior Leadership Abilities Not Adequately Covered By Training and Education

A substantial gap exists between what is currently taught to CF junior leaders and what is required of them in order to operate effectively, without error, in the COE. The

⁵⁰ E-mail discussions with Major Stephen Gallagher, Battery Commander of A Battery, 1 RCHA, 3 and 20 March 2006.

general specifications, and subsequently the leadership training and education derived from them, lack many of the tasks, skills and knowledge requirements needed for the COE. Even with TMSBP training and in-theatre training, CF junior leaders are not provided with training and education that they require to operate effectively. The following key tasks, as presented in the introduction are in fact currently missing or underrepresented in the general specifications:

- Ability to make timely, confident and competent decisions.
- Possess basic language skills for the operational area.
- Possess detailed cultural awareness, i.e. understand cultural context and apply cultural awareness.
- Be a thinking communicator able to:
 - Negotiate.
 - Mediate.
 - Be media aware:
 - Give media interviews.
 - Deal with the media.
 - Refer the media to appropriate agencies.
- Ability to accurately and rapidly apply:
 - The Law of Armed Conflict.
 - Rules of Engagement.
- Ability to work with Peace Partners by consulting with other government departments, agencies and private industries; providing advice to other government departments, agencies and private industries; and understand the Canadian Government approach of Defence, Diplomacy, Development and Trade.
- Understand why and conduct oneself in a manner reflecting credit on the CF, and which will not jeopardize the mission.

Underlying each of these key tasks are skills and knowledge requirements, which are similar to the existing skills and knowledge currently in the general specifications for some of the tasks listed above which currently do exist in the specifications. It is recommended that any skill or knowledge required by a CF junior leader today must be at a minimum of a level three; otherwise junior leaders are being set up for failure, and the

possible strategic impact that could follow on operations. So what can be done in order to meet this substantial CF junior leadership training and education deficit?

Meeting the CF Junior Leadership Training Delta for the COE

Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men.

General George S. Patton

Among the constants of training and education in the CF is that courses have become longer as more tasks, skills and knowledge requirements are added to the various specifications. This trend combined with higher operational tempo means that CF members of all rank levels are away from home on training and education courses more and more often. To help address this situation, elements of the CF training and education system such as the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) and the Land Force Doctrine and Training System (LFDTS), to name two, have been making great progress in distributing much of this training and education requirement either to the locations of the CF members for completion at their home garrison, or even allowing them to do it at home. For example, the Army Operations Course run by the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College (CLFCSC) has three phases: “Phase 1 - Preliminary Studies, conducted at their unit (58 hours) and as self-study (123 hours); Phase 2 - Distributed Learning (DL), conducted at home, on duty time, over seven weeks; and Phase 3 - Residential Training, conducted at CLFCSC over 11 weeks.”⁵¹ This method contrasts with the previous method where students would find themselves in residence in Kingston for over four months. Another good example of how in-residence training time is reduced is the method used for CF junior leader course, the PLQ. The course is broken into five

⁵¹ CLFCSC Web Site. Army Operations Course. Top Questions About the AOC. Available from <http://armyapp.dnd.ca/clfcsc-cccf/c/faq.asp#How%20is%20the%20AOC%20organized>; Internet: Accessed 26 February 2003.

modules with the first four being taught at the unit, fifteen and a half days, and the final module being taught in-residence, 31 days.⁵² These initiatives help balance the ever-growing requirements against the every day demands on CF members both at home and abroad.

Another method used very successfully by CDA by means of the Officer Professional Development System (OPDS), are the courses given as part of the Officer Professional Military Education (OPME) program. The OPME Programme is intended:

To orient the junior officer to select topics within a common body of knowledge related to the military profession. From this body of knowledge, officers will begin to enhance their critical thinking skills and develop innovative responses to a myriad of issues. This is supported by a collaborative learning culture that begins the life long appreciation for professional military development.⁵³

The OPME programme consists of five university equivalent courses covering material from the second developmental period of the OGS. The courses are undertaken once an officer is MOC qualified and must be completed prior to entry in DP3 or promotion to Major. There is currently no equivalent for NCMs, although many NCMs take the OPME courses as a means towards a university degree.

Although distributed learning is an excellent way to reduce the training burden on both the individual and the training and education system, it is not suitable for all aspects of CF junior leadership training. Distributed learning does not normally allow for practical discussion or group interaction nor does it provide the practical experience so vital to junior leaders in order to become proficient, especially for junior officers who do not have the same luxury of time that NCMs do to develop their skills under maximum

⁵² Canada, Department of National Defence, A-PD-050-PLQ/PH-H17, Training Plan, Non-Commissioned Member – Primary Leadership Qualification, Ottawa: DND Canada, 10 March 2005.

⁵³ Canadian Defence Academy OPME Website. Available from http://www.opme.forces.gc.ca/engraph/about/programme/background_e.asp; Internet: Accessed 26 February 2006.

supervision. NCMs typically have up to four years of experience in a unit from the time they join until they are placed in these leadership positions. The COE demands rapid and well-informed decision-making, without supervision, the results of which can have strategic effects and training for this in-theatre is often too late. The training and education dilemma, therefore, is not only how does the CF provide the missing leadership tasks, skills and knowledge required for both officers and NCMs, but also how does the CF provide the necessary experience to junior officers that NCMs get over time?

Another interesting concept to provide some of this training via in-theatre training is a concept that was put forward by His Excellency John Ralston Saul during his presentation to the Faculty and Cadets of the Royal Military College (RMC) in Kingston on February 4th 2004. Although it would be difficult, and is somewhat contrary to the earlier observation of little time for any real in-theatre training, it is an interesting idea that might work for less active theatres, or for any theatre where the junior leaders are operating out of a fixed base camp. The idea is to have RMC professors go on operations for a minimum of two months to provide support to on-site distributed learning, “to advise and to encourage.”⁵⁴ The concept is interesting and could be applied as a method of ensuring that someone with the right background was available to advise and educate CF junior leaders; in fact all leaders, on many of the leadership abilities identified in this paper as being lacking. Ideally the junior leader will get the education long before deploying, but the academic advisor could provide updated and specialized local information, and any information that the junior leader did not have a chance to get before deploying. This specialist advisor could also be available as a source of information throughout the tour for the junior leaders and on up through to the

⁵⁴ Ralston Saul, *A New Era of Irregular Warfare...*, 19.

commander. The Canadian Navy uses a special advisor, Dr. Jim Boutilier, Special Policy Advisor, MARPAC, in a very similar fashion.

Both officers and NCMs should receive the required educational foundation upon which to build the experience that is currently lacking in many CF junior leaders, particularly junior officers. One possible way to address much of the educational training delta would be to utilize a system like the OPME for Development Period One training for officers and Development Period Three for NCMs, the developmental periods in which CF junior leaders are created. The content of this Professional Military Education (PME) should be identical or near-identical for both officers and NCM junior leaders, as CF junior leaders, both officers and NCMs, are required to undertake the same leadership tasks in the COE. There is a convergence of skills and knowledge requirements at both the newly commissioned junior officer level and at the Master-Corporal level. In effect, most theory required to support key leadership tasks identified could be taught in this manner, via a PME programme. The practical training and application would still need to be taught during formal course training however, and validated during pre-deployment and TMSBP training. Implementing the proposed PME programme could require novel approaches.

As mentioned the US Army is already looking at having potential officer candidates complete self-learning packages on cultural awareness as part of their enrolment procedure and throughout their training.⁵⁵ This approach would make sense for the CF as well, because all officer applicants joining the CF require either to already have a degree, or must undertake one as part of the Regular Officer Training Plan at the

⁵⁵ Discussion with Colonel Richard Dixon, G3, United States Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth Kansas, 20 March 2006.

Royal Military College (RMC) or a civilian university. It would be relatively easy to include subjects like cultural awareness as a university course for RMC candidates, and the same course could be used as a PME course for officers taking degrees at civilian universities, direct entry officers who already possess a degree, and for NCMs as part of their DP 3 training. A similar approach could be taken with the understanding of diplomacy and peace partners. A course using the 3D+T as its basis, and having components on the peace partners identified earlier, such as the UN for one, would ensure that the two key areas requiring extensive knowledge would be adequately covered and would provide a sound basis upon which to build.

The final method for teaching the missing junior leadership abilities is of course formal training on residential courses, either during initial basic officer training or on the PLQ for NCMs. Formal residential training is among the best ways to pass on education but it must be balanced against time and quality of life. The easiest solution is to ensure that everything required of CF junior leaders is included in residential courses, but this method is neither practical nor acceptable in terms of cost and time away from home. Furthermore, some subjects are better taught in the unit during regular or pre-deployment training and some are more suited to in-theatre training. Others are better suited to a distributed learning approach like the OPME program. The key is to strike a balance that provides the required education at the right time and in the most practical manner.

Summary of Possible CF Junior Leader Training and Education Methods

Given the required CF junior leadership abilities needed to operate effectively in the COE, certain abilities require in-depth knowledge that is well suited to an OPME-type programme, such as cultural awareness, the law of armed conflict and an understanding

of Peace Partners. Others such as the media related areas, the basics of rules of engagement, negotiation and mediation, are best taught during formal residential courses. Producing adaptive and competent leaders who can make sound rapid decisions can only be taught by practice during unit training, pre-deployment and TMSBP training, and continued practice during in-theatre training. Finally, the idea to have RMC professors go on operations for a minimum of two months to provide support to on-site distributed learning, and to advise and to encourage should be investigated further and trialed.

CONCLUSION

Reason and calm judgment, the qualities specially belonging to a leader.

Tacitus, 55-177

This examination of the COE, the required junior leadership abilities, and the current CF junior leader training regime, have certainly shown that today's CF junior leader is not adequately prepared for the challenges of the COE. The range of missions expected of today's CF junior leaders are increasing in number and in complexity and have put differing demands on CF junior leaders. The CF junior leader training regime, although a well developed system that does produce good general leaders, is very weak when it comes to the specific leadership abilities or attributes required for today's COE, nor does not address the full range of leadership abilities required by CF junior leaders.

The COE consists of a series of complex environments ranging from domestic operations within Canada to Three Block War operations in Afghanistan. CF junior leaders are currently operating in platoon or smaller sized organizations, often far from their chain of command. CF junior leaders are working multi-nationally and with numerous Non-Governmental Organizations and within the Canadian 3D+T approach.

To operate effectively in this environment, CF junior leaders today require training and education that is quite different from what they required ten or fifteen years ago. Detailed cultural awareness and total situational awareness of the requirements of not only the military mission but also the requirements of the NGOs, especially with the Canadian 3D+T approach, are vital. CF junior leaders today must understand the strategic centres of gravity of their own military commander as well as those of other governmental, non-governmental and similar organizations, in order to support the

various missions. CF junior leaders must be media savvy, understand the basics of diplomacy, and be confident and competent decision makers, first class communicators, negotiators and mediators. These tasks, skills and knowledge must be taught and practiced to a level where the CF junior leader is competent and capable of operating independently and far from his or her chain of command. In essence, the ideal CF junior leader must be a thinking agile leader capable of dealing with complex problems in a variety of situations. They must be culturally savvy and understand not only the military mission but also the political one. They must have a skill set that is quite different from what they required in the past and must understand the second and third order effects of their decisions.

A considerable gap currently exists between what is currently taught to CF junior leaders, and what is required of them in order to operate effectively, without significant error, in the COE. General specifications, and subsequently the leadership training and education derived from them, lack many of the tasks, skills and knowledge requirements needed for the COE. The training provided to CF junior leaders is generally adequate; in other words they get good instruction on the technical skills required of a leader, but what they are really missing is required in-depth education. Providing this missing education will not be easy, but some ideas on how to provide it have been provided. If CF junior leaders are to be expected to operate effectively in the COE, both NCMs and officers must receive the same education on its key leadership requirements.

Given the ideal attributes of a CF junior leader and the current training regime, it is clear that several things should be done to improve the situation. Firstly a formal review should be conducted by the Canadian Defence Academy to confirm the CF junior

leadership abilities required in the COE following which the officer and non-commissioned general specifications should be amended to accurately reflect these requirements. Once these requirements are confirmed, certain key areas of knowledge, such as cultural awareness, the law of armed conflict and an understanding of Peace Partners, need to be developed into an OPME-like program to be given to officers before commissioning and to NCMs prior to PLQ training. Other key abilities such as the media related areas, the basics of rules of engagement, negotiation and mediation are best taught during formal residential courses and should continue in this way but at a higher level. The production of adaptive and competent leaders who can make sound rapid decisions can only be taught by practice during unit training, pre-deployment and TMSBP training, and continued practice during in-theatre training, and should continue this way with emphasis on practical application and practice. Finally the idea to have RMC professors go on operations for a minimum of two months to provide support to on-site distributed learning and to advise and to encourage should be investigated further and trialed.

**COMPARISON OF TASKS, SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE STATEMENTS CURRENTLY CONTAINED IN THE OGS
AND NCMGS WHICH RELATE TO JUNIOR LEADERSHIP IN THE COE**

TASKS CURRENTLY IN THE OGS/NCMGS RELATING TO THE JUNIOR LEADERSHIP REQUIREMENTS OF THE COE⁵⁶

OGS			NCMGS		
Task	Required	Not Required	Task	Required	Not Required
Lead subordinates in peace and war	X		Lead subordinates	X	
Make Effective and timely decisions	X				
Consult other government departments, agencies and private industries		X			
Provide advice to other government departments, agencies and private industries		X			
Resolve personal and inter-personal conflicts	X		Resolve interpersonal conflicts	X	
			Apply the CF code of conduct principals IAW the Law of Armed Conflict	X	
Give media interviews		X	Respond to media inquiries	X	
Refer media to appropriate agencies	X				

⁵⁶ Canada, Department of National Defence, A-PD-055-002/PP-001, Canadian Forces Officer General Specification - Provisional, Ottawa: DND Canada, 24 August 1999. Canada, Department of National Defence, A-PD-055-002/PP-002, Canadian Forces Non-Commissioned Member General Specification-, Ottawa: DND Canada, 29 October 2003.

**COMPARISON OF TASKS, SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE STATEMENTS CURRENTLY CONTAINED IN THE OGS
AND NCMGS WHICH RELATE TO JUNIOR LEADERSHIP IN THE COE**

SKILLS CURRENTLY IN THE OGS/NCMGS RELATING TO THE JUNIOR LEADERSHIP REQUIREMENTS OF THE COE⁵⁷

OGS		NCMGS	
Task	Level	Task	Level
Applying ethical principles and values	2		
Counseling	2	Counseling	2
Interviewing	2	Interviewing	2
Applying Law of Armed Conflict	1		
Applying Rules of Engagement	1	Applying Rules of Engagement	3
Mediating	1	Mediating	2
Negotiating	1	Negotiating	2
		Applying ethical principles and values	2
		Applying principles of leadership	2
		Decision making	2
		Analyzing	2
		Managing risk	2
		Assessing	2

⁵⁷ Ibid.

**COMPARISON OF TASKS, SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE STATEMENTS CURRENTLY CONTAINED IN THE OGS
AND NCMGS WHICH RELATE TO JUNIOR LEADERSHIP IN THE COE**

**KNOWLEDGE STATEMENTS CURRENTLY IN THE OGS/NCMGS RELATING TO THE JUNIOR LEADERSHIP
REQUIREMENTS OF THE COE⁵⁸**

OGS		NCMGS	
Knowledge Statement	Level	Knowledge Statement	Level
Principles and techniques of military leadership	2	Leadership principles and techniques	2
Ethics of military leadership	2		
Conflict resolution techniques	2		
Role of the military in a Constitutional Democracy	1	Role of the military in a Constitutional Democracy	1
Relationship between the military and society	1	Relationship between society and the military	1
Gender integration	2		
Cultural awareness	2		
Diversity	2		
Principles and techniques of interviewing	2	Interviewing principles and techniques	2
Principles and techniques of counseling	2	Counseling principles and techniques	2
		Problem solving principles and techniques	2
		Effective listening principles and techniques	2
		Logical thinking principles and techniques	2
Defence team concept	None	Defence team concept	1

⁵⁸ Ibid.

**COMPARISON OF TASKS, SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE STATEMENTS CURRENTLY CONTAINED IN THE OGS
AND NCMGS WHICH RELATE TO JUNIOR LEADERSHIP IN THE COE**

OGS		NCMGS	
Knowledge Statement	Level	Knowledge Statement	Level
Joint and combined doctrine, plans and operations	None	Joint and combined doctrine, plans and operations	None
		Information operations/warfare	None
Civil/Military Co-operation Doctrine (CIMIC)	None		
Geopolitical areas of interest for Canada	None		
Aims and types of peacekeeping operations	None		
Law of Armed Conflict	1	Law of Armed Conflict	1
		Code of conduct for CF personnel	2
		Rules of engagement	2
Interviews by the media	1		
Individual responsibilities pertaining to public relations and the media	1		
Principles and techniques of mediating	1		
Principles and techniques of negotiation	1	Negotiation principles and techniques	2
		Creative thinking principles and techniques	2
		International protection afforded to the Red Cross	1
Role and objectives of non-government organizations	None	Role and objectives of non-government organizations	None
		CF role in NATO, NORAD, and	1

**COMPARISON OF TASKS, SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE STATEMENTS CURRENTLY CONTAINED IN THE OGS
AND NCMGS WHICH RELATE TO JUNIOR LEADERSHIP IN THE COE**

OGS		NCMGS	
Knowledge Statement	Level	Knowledge Statement	Level
		International peacekeeping operations	
Role and objectives of the United Nations	None	Role and objectives of the United Nations	1
Role and objectives of NATO	None	Role and objectives of NATO	1
International affairs and global balance of power	None	National and international affairs	1
		Impact of domestic and foreign policy on the CF	None
Canada's obligations to international treaties and organizations	None		
United Nations command and control structure	None		
UN Charter chapter 6 and 7	None		

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