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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

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EXERCISE NEW HORIZONS

**REALIGNMENT OF NATIONAL-LEVEL OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FUNCTIONS**

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*Make no mistake about this, we are moving through this transformation process at a phased, but aggressive pace.*

*General Rick Hillier, CDS<sup>1</sup>*

## **INTRODUCTION**

The transformation process undertaken by the Canadian Forces (CF) during the last twelve months is the beginning of a *journey*, an endeavour with the objective to bring together existing and emerging systems and structures to produce significantly improved capabilities relevant to future missions, roles and tasks of the CF.<sup>2</sup> Without a defined end state, the evolutionary and iterative nature of transformation suggest that the process will be a long *voyage* without a predetermined destination. CF personnel will quickly come to the realization that transformation will be part of their everyday life. The transformation process will explore various opportunities to achieve greater effectiveness and relevancy, and it will predominantly concentrate on “people, technology, ways of conducting operations and ways of thinking.”<sup>3</sup> There is no doubt that it is the emphasis on the *people* who make up the CF that will give transformation the resilience it requires to deliver the significant results and the long lasting effects on the organisation.

To guide the transformation process, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) identified six overarching principles which must be respected when proceeding with transforming the armed forces: CF Culture; Command Centric; Clear Authorities, Responsibilities and Accountabilities; Operational Focus; Mission Command; and Integrated CF - Regular,

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<sup>1</sup>Department of National Defence, “Transform and Modernize the Canadian Forces,” Canadian Forces Transformation Web site; available from [http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/cft-tfc/intro\\_e.asp](http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/cft-tfc/intro_e.asp); Internet; accessed 15 February 2006.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

Reserve and Civilian. In addition to these six principles guiding the transformation efforts, the CDS acknowledged the fact that the CF needs to become more *relevant*, *responsive* and *effective*<sup>4</sup> - three criteria essential for the CF to achieve the tasks identified in the latest Government of Canada Defence Policy Statement.<sup>5</sup> These principles and criteria constitute the foundation of the transformation process and provide the framework to shape tomorrow's CF.

Under the guidance and directions of the CDS, the efforts made by the Canadian Forces Transformation Team (CFTT) and the representatives from the three Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECS) have started to yield some tangible results. For example, the considerable task presently underway to separate the strategic and the operational levels of responsibilities within the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) by creating four new operational headquarters – Canada Command (CANADA COM), Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM), Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) and Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) – is an excellent example of the significance of the initiatives and the impact transformation will have on the CF.

Although the creation of the new headquarters will certainly produce definite results and go a long way in improving the responsiveness and effectiveness of the CF, it is also important to examine the current structure of the Department to determine whether other realignments could provide similar advantages. Using the transformation principles identified by the CDS and the doctrinal principles for logistics support, this paper will

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<sup>4</sup>MGen Natynczyk, "Canadian Forces Transformation," (presentation, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, ON, 2 November 2005).

<sup>5</sup>Department of National Defence, *Defence Policy Statement* (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 2005).

examine how the different support functions within the CF are organized and propose changes that could be made to the present structure to improve the responsiveness and effectiveness of these functions at the strategic level. This paper will demonstrate that the CF would greatly benefit from reorganizing various national level support functions within its national headquarters and creating a support organization that would regroup the major support functions under a single commander.

## DEFINITIONS

Before proceeding further with the examination of the current national level support structure, there is a need to define some of the terms that will be used in this paper :

**Logistics** – The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, the aspects of military operations which deal with: (a) design and development, acquisition, storage, transport, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of material; (b) transport of personnel; (c) acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and disposal of facilities; (d) acquisition or furnishing of services; and (e) medical and health service support.<sup>6</sup>

**Combat Service Support** – The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics.<sup>7</sup>

**Operational Support** – The delivery of specialized support functions that are not ECS-unique but routinely have direct impact on CF operations planning, deployment, execution, redeployment and reconstitution either in Canada or abroad. This is the “general” support provided from the national level to the theatre level in accordance with the supported Comd’s concept of operations. Operational support includes the aspects of military engineering, health services, military police, logistics (including movement), equipment maintenance (primarily land equipment), personnel support, resources management, CIS

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<sup>6</sup>NATO, *Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine – AJP-4(A)* (Brussels: NATO, 2003), GL-3.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., GL-1.

[computer and information systems] support and C2 [command and control] for the support organisation.<sup>8</sup>

Unlike logistics and combat service support, the term operational support is not defined in the NATO terminology, therefore the paper will use the Canadian definition. As indicated above, the scope of the NATO definition of logistics is somewhat more limited than the CF definition of operational support given the fact that it does not include areas of expertise such as military police, personnel support or CIS. When looking at the support functions, the paper will refer to the broader definition of operational support rather than logistics. For the purpose of this paper, the terms support and operational support and will be used interchangeably.

## **DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT**

To better understand how operational support works, it is useful to review the fundamental principles provided by doctrine. Since “Logistic Support to Canadian Forces Operations”<sup>9</sup>, the only CF logistics doctrine publication still in effect, does not offer any logistic support principles, U.S. doctrine will be used as a substitute to validate the changes proposed in this paper. The U.S. Joint Publication 4-0 – Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations identifies seven principles of logistics that have been proven important during the planning and the execution of logistic support for joint

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<sup>8</sup>Gen R.J. Hillier, *Chief of Defence Staff Initial Planning Guidance – Canadian Operational Support Command* (National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa: file 3000-1 (CDS), 26 Jan 06).

<sup>9</sup>Department of National Defence, *B-GG-005-004/AF-013 Logistic Support to Canadian Forces Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1998).

operations : Responsiveness; Simplicity; Flexibility; Economy; Attainability; Sustainability; and Survivability.<sup>10</sup>

### **Responsiveness**

Described as “the right support in the right quantity in the right place at the right time,”<sup>11</sup> responsiveness is the basis for all other logistic principles. The logistic organization must be capable of supporting the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC) concept of operations. If the concept of logistic support is not sufficiently responsive to the JFC’s scheme of manoeuvre, the other logistic principles become pointless.

Under the current Canadian construct, the responsibilities for the operational support functions at the strategic level are divided among several organisations. These large organisations are also responsible for several other non-support related functions. Regrouping all national level support functions under one single organisation will create a logistic structure much more responsive to the overall JFC’s requirements.

### **Simplicity**

The principle of simplicity is about making complex problems simpler. When put into practice, simplicity will normally help achieving greater efficiencies during both the planning and the execution phases of the logistic operations.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>United States, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 4-0: Doctrine for Logistics Support to Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 2000), II-1.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., II-1.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., II-1.

With no single organisation presently responsible for all operational support functions across the CF, the development of the support concept for contingency operations is performed essentially in isolation as each force generator develops its own support plan. The proposed new construct would facilitate the harmonisation of a single support concept for an operation. The development of standardized interoperable procedures and the establishment of priorities would greatly simplify logistics support.<sup>13</sup>

### **Flexibility**

Similar to the Principle of War, “[f]lexibility is the ability to adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts of operation.”<sup>14</sup> Although flexibility is not more important than the other logistic principles, responsiveness and economy cannot be achieved without some degree of flexibility. Concepts such as redundancy, anticipation, reserve assets and contingency planning all contribute to achieving greater logistics flexibility.

Although this principle is more applicable at the tactical level, the proposed new support construct would certainly be more flexible than the existing one. For the same reasons it would improve responsiveness and add simplicity, having a single national level support organisation would create a logistic structure much more capable to adapt to changing situations.

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<sup>13</sup>United States, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 4-0: Doctrine for Logistics...*, II-2.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., II-2.



## **Economy**

The principle of economy in the context of logistics is achieved when successfully accomplishing the JFC's mission by "using the fewest resources at the least cost, and within acceptable levels of risk."<sup>15</sup> Always struggling with a shortage of resources, logistics must strive to optimize the use of the available resources to ensure effectiveness and mission success.

As mentioned for the principle of simplicity, centralizing the national level support functions would allow one single organisation to harmonise the support concept for the entire mission and create a more efficient logistic plan. The development of standardized interoperable procedures and the establishment of a single set of priorities would reduce redundancy and produce logistic economy.

## **Attainability**

Also referred to as adequacy, the principle of attainability is the capability to make available the minimum essential stocks and support services necessary for an operation to commence.<sup>16</sup> It is the sole responsibility of the logistic staff to ensure that the essential support is readily available in quantities that are suitable to support the JFC's requirements and priorities.

By eliminating the "stove-pipe" approach used under the current support construct in developing support plan for contingency operations, the creation of a new organisation responsible for all national level support functions would allow the CF to meet the

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<sup>15</sup>United States, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 4-0: Doctrine for Logistics...*, II-2.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., II-2.

principle of attainability more rapidly. The preparation of a harmonised and more efficient logistic plan would eliminate excess redundancies by centralising resources and establishing priorities for the operation. These measures would reduce the overall support requirements and therefore make available the minimum essential stocks and services required to commence operations at an earlier stage.

### **Sustainability**

Sustainability is “a measure of the ability to maintain logistic support to all users throughout the theatre for the duration of the operation.”<sup>17</sup> Conceivably the ultimate test for any logistic organisation, the principle of sustainability brings logistics one step further than attainability. Providing the supplies and services required to launch an operation is critical, but once the operation has commenced, the logistic staff must undertake the particularly challenging task to sustain the operation with the minimum essential material until the completion of the mission.

For the same reasons identified for the principle of attainability, centralizing the national level support functions under a single organisation would also improve the sustainability of the logistic support during contingency operations.

### **Survivability**

Survivability refers to “the capacity of the organisation to prevail in the face of potential destruction.”<sup>18</sup> Due to their significant impact on the ability to continue

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<sup>17</sup>United States, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 4-0: Doctrine for Logistics...*, II-3.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., II-3.

operations, logistic installations are attractive military objectives and therefore they must be protected from potential attacks. Force protection measures such as dispersion, decentralization and redundancy must be in the logistic planning process.

Unlike the other principles of logistics, the proposed new construct would have little or no effect on the principle of survivability.

## **OPERATIONAL SUPPORT IN THE CANADIAN FORCES**

The quality of the operational support provided to CF units during operations has made enormous progress since Canada deployed to the Persian Gulf as part of a United Nations coalition force in the early 90s. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War had a profound impact on the CF. “The focus... shifted from territorial defence of Western Europe and North America to the projection and sustainment of Canada-based expeditionary forces on a large number of contingency operations in austere theatres around the globe.”<sup>19</sup> The high operational tempo and the expeditionary nature of the deployments that followed quickly revealed “that the CF structure [was] not organized to efficiently generate the combat support, military engineering, and combat service support forces required to support combat forces engaged in these operations.”<sup>20</sup> The implementation of initiatives such as the creation of the National Military Support Capability (NMSC) Project and the subsequent formation of the Canadian Forces Joint Support Group (CF JSG) greatly “enhanced the capability to deploy CF Task Forces within the DPG [Defence Planning Guidance] readiness levels and sustain them for the

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<sup>19</sup>Department of National Defence, *Joint National Military Support Capability: Statement of Operational Requirement* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2001), 1.

<sup>20</sup>Department of National Defence, *National Military Support Capability: NMSC Support Concept* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000), 1.

duration of operations.”<sup>21</sup> One of the main objectives of the NMSC was to put an end to the *ad hoc* approach in providing support to operations and create a single CF organisation capable of providing or arranging operational support to contingency forces within the required readiness levels.<sup>22</sup>

However, despite the notable initiatives of the last decade to improve the ability of the CF to generate operational support organisations capable of supporting expeditionary forces, there are still significant shortfalls that must be surmounted. The condition of operational support was criticized as recently as 2002 when the CF contributed Naval, Air and Land elements to the U.S.-lead “War on Terror” as part of Operation APOLLO in South West Asia. The analysis of the lessons learned resulting from the first year of the operation revealed that some of the problems identified in the mid-90’s still existed. In particular, the report stated that “[t]he lack of a joint logistic concept to guide the formation and tasking of the NSU [National Support Unit] meant that there continued to be some misunderstanding about the function of the NSU.”<sup>23</sup> The report then goes onto saying that the situation was in part due to “...a TO&E [table of organisation and equipment] problem, but it is also appears to be primarily due to the fact that the NSU was cobbled together from elements which were deployed to support a single element, not a joint task force.”<sup>24</sup> These statements demonstrate the situation with

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<sup>21</sup>Department of National Defence, *National Military Support Capability: NMSC...*, 3.

<sup>22</sup>Department of National Defence, *Joint National Military Support Capability: Statement...*, 2.

<sup>23</sup>Department of National Defence, *Operation Apollo Lessons Learned: Staff Action Directive* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), B-39/41.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, B-39/41.

the operational support provided to contingency operations during one of the most recent CF deployment, and more than ten years later the same problems were first identified.

## **OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AS PART OF CF TRANSFORMATION**

Some of the CF Transformation initiatives that were recently implemented will certainly improve the provision of operational support to CF operations. In particular, the creation of CANOSCOM<sup>25</sup> will create a single focal point for operational support and give the support functions a much-needed champion. As stated in the CDS Initial Planning Guidance for CANOSCOM, the aim of this new operational level organization is “to create one organization that encompasses all national level operational support disciplines with one Commander responsible to provide or arrange for support to CF domestic, continental and international operations.”<sup>26</sup> As such, the Commander (Comd) CANOSCOM will be responsible to either coordinate the generation of a task tailored theatre-level support organization for international operations or in the case of domestic operations, assist the supported operational commander in augmenting or generating such an organization.<sup>27</sup>

Even if the new command will be the focal point for the CF operational support, it will not necessarily *own* all the necessary capabilities and units to provide the required support. CANOSCOM will have to rely on a rather cumbersome structure of a mixture of integral units and capabilities along with command and control arrangements with

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<sup>25</sup>Gen R.J. Hillier, *CDS Organization Order – Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM)* (National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa: file 3000-1, CANFORGEN 184/05 CDS 009/09, 011330Z Feb 06).

<sup>26</sup>Hillier, *Chief of Defence Staff Initial Planning Guidance - Canadian Operational Support...*, 1.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, 3.

other national level support organizations.<sup>28</sup> In addition, the decision to have the Comd CANOSCOM report to the Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) during the initial phase of its implementation emphasizes the complexity in determining where the new command can be best linked to the strategic level. The formation of CANOSCOM is certainly a step in the right direction and an improvement on the current approach of providing operational support to CF operations. However, this is only a partial solution and a realignment of the support functions at the strategic level is necessary to improve significantly the CF's ability to deliver operational support. There is no doubt that CANOSCOM will provide an enhanced command and control structure and a joint voice at the operational level by consolidating some of the operational support functions. Nevertheless, it will be difficult to truly enhance the effectiveness and responsiveness of the operational support provided to CF operations until the command and control structure of the national level support functions better reflects that of the operational level; the unity of command found at the operational level does not exist at the strategic level.

### **CREATION OF A CHIEF OF SUPPORT**

Changes to two aspects of the current command and control construct would improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the CF operational support capability. The first of these C2-related changes is the allocation of responsibility and the command and control construct for the different CF support functions at the strategic level. These changes will not only respect the CF principles of transformation but they will also

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<sup>28</sup>Hillier, *Chief of Defence Staff Initial Planning Guidance - Canadian Operational Support...*, 3.

achieve other CDS stated objectives of separating the strategic and operational level responsibilities and the policy making from the service delivery functions.<sup>29</sup>

The responsibilities for national level support organizations at the strategic level are divided among several stakeholders. There are no less than five Level 1 organisations – Level 1s are those organisations that are responsible for strategic-level objectives and activities and have the primary role to advise the CDS and Deputy Minister (DM) – responsible for national level support functions. For example, the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM) reports to the VCDS, the Canadian Forces Health Services (CFHS) organization and the Canadian Forces Personnel Support Agency (CFPSA) to the Assistant Deputy Minister for Human Resources (Military), J4 Material/Director General Logistics (J4 Mat/DG Log) to the Assistant Deputy Minister for Material and the Canadian Forces Information Operations Group (CFIOG) and the Communication Reserve (Comm Res) to the Assistant Deputy Minister for Information Management. The widespread allocation of the support responsibilities across the Level 1s makes achieving any sort of unity of effort among the national level support functions that much more difficult.

To give CANOSCOM access to certain national level support organizations, there have been different command and control arrangements established between a number of Level 1s identified above and the Comd CANOSCOM. For example, the Canadian Forces Health Services Group (CF H Svcs Gp), 202 Workshop Depot (202 WD) and the Comm Res are now under operational control of the Comd CANOSCOM with some

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<sup>29</sup>Hillier, *Chief of Defence Staff Initial Planning Guidance - Canadian Operational Support...*, 3.

limitations imposed by the CDS.<sup>30</sup> Additionally, organisations such as the CFPM, J6 / Chief of Staff – Information Management and J3 Engineer / Director General Military Engineer have been designated as responsive to the Comd CANOSCOM for operational support matters within their respective jurisdictions.<sup>31</sup> Finally, the last challenging aspect of the present command and control structure concerns the situation where the Comd CANOSCOM reports to the VCDS. With no actual operational focus, the mission of the VCDS Group “is to coordinate and, when appropriate, direct the activity necessary to ensure that the Department of National Defence achieves its Defence and Support Objectives.”<sup>32</sup> Although the VCDS is responsible for some national level support functions and is the Level 1 organisation best suited to oversee CANOSCOM at this time, it does very little to achieve the CDS’s intent to bring all national level support operational support functions under one commander.

The present arrangements will allow the new command to execute its mission by providing access to the support capabilities over which it does not have direct command and control. However, this construct is certainly not the most responsive and efficient approach to an integrated support construct. To eliminate the potential problems and conflicts of such a command and control relationship, and provide a clearly identifiable chain of command structure, it would be preferable and beneficial for the CF to group the national level support functions at the strategic level under a single organization.

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<sup>30</sup>Hillier, *CDS Organization Order – Canadian Operational Support...*

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Government of Canada. “National Defence.” *Sources of Federal Government Information 2004-2005*; available from [http://www.infosource.gc.ca/inst/dnd/fed04\\_e.asp](http://www.infosource.gc.ca/inst/dnd/fed04_e.asp); Internet; accessed 15 March 2006.



The creation of a *Chief of Support* as a Level 1 organization answering directly to the CDS would allow the CF to align the support functions at the strategic and operational levels by reassigning CANOSCOM from the VCDS to this new organisation. Having the national level support organizations reporting to the same individual would significantly improve the coordination of the operational support provided during operations, both domestically and internationally. Reporting directly to the Chief of Support, the Comd CANOSCOM would coordinate the support functions at the operational level and would greatly facilitate the command and control relationship between the support functions from the strategic to the tactical levels. As previously indicated, this realignment of the national level support functions would also meet the CDS's intent to separate the policy making from "the service delivery within each of the operational support functional domain."<sup>33</sup>

Although some of these organizations such as CFHS, CFPM and CFIOG are involved to some extent in the policymaking, their primary role or *raison d'être* is really the service delivery aspect of their support function. Having all national level support organisations working for the same Level 1 would create a strong unity of effort and purpose among the support community with a greater focus on providing support to CF domestic, continental and international operations. Moreover, considering the significant breadth of responsibilities that most of the Level 1 organizations have to manage, reducing the span of control of some of these organizations would certainly be beneficial to the efficiency of the Department.

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<sup>33</sup>Hillier, *Chief of Defence Staff Initial Planning Guidance - Canadian Operational Support...*, 3.

## **CANOSCOM AS A FORCE GENERATOR**

The second area of the current command and control construct that the CF must address relates to the ability of the new command to force generate operational support organizations to support operational commanders. In its current form, CANOSCOM will have only a limited force generation capability, even when it will achieve Full Operational Capability (FOC). Units such 1 Engineer Support Unit (1 ESU), 3 Canadian Support Group (3 CSG), 4 Canadian Forces Movement Control Unit (4 CFMCU), and those assigned to the newly created Canadian Material Support Group (CMSG) will provide an excellent planning capability and a skilled nucleus for generating theatre-level support organizations. However, with the exception of the Joint Signal Regiment (JSR), CANOSCOM will still have to rely on the ECS or other Level 1s to force generate the bulk of the task-tailored support organizations it will require to support CF operations. Without the capabilities to force generate its own forces, CANOSCOM's effectiveness will be greatly reduced.

For the last decade, lessons learned and post-operations reports have identified the requirement to do away with the ad hoc approach in forming operational support organizations such as National Support Elements (NSEs). The Croatia Board of Inquiry<sup>34</sup> that was established in 1999 to investigate the operations during Operation HARMONY in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia is one of the several reports that have identified this enduring problem. As identified in Statement of Operational Requirement for the National Military Support Capability (NMSC), "...deployments have had tactical level and operational level support tasks assigned to an ad hoc organisation... [t]hese NSEs

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<sup>34</sup>Department of National Defence, *Board of Inquiry Croatia - Final Report* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000).

have been generated primarily from tactical level support units because of the lack of national level support capability of the CF.”<sup>35</sup> This statement reflects the deficiencies that have existed in the past, and unless CANOSCOM receives additional resources to force generate task tailored support organisations, the practice of relying on augmentees and ad hoc organizations to support deployed CF operations will continue.

In addition, the fact that CANOSCOM will be dependent on the ECSs and other Level 1s to generate task-tailored support organizations will affect negatively the level of training and the readiness of the new command, particularly for contingency operations, which typically provide little or no warning. Considering the fact that the support personnel from the same tactical level support units will be required to form both the operational support organisations and the tactical level units, there will be conflicting priorities when mounting contingency operations. The limited number of personnel in the support trades will force the ECSs to fill their own TO&E before making their support personnel available to CANOSCOM to form its task tailored theatre-level support organisation.<sup>36</sup> This situation will create great difficulties for CANOSCOM, particularly in its theatre activation role, as it needs to deploy in-theatre ahead of the operational force to establish the support infrastructure. To avoid having to rely on the ECSs to form *ad hoc* organizations to support operational commanders and to maintain a high readiness deployable operational support capability, there is a requirement to allocate to CANOSCOM additional core resources to those presently identified as part of CF Transformation.

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<sup>35</sup>Department of National Defence, *Joint National Military Support Capability: Statement...*, 2.

<sup>36</sup>This practice was observed by the author while he was involved with the planning of three separate deployments while working at the CFJSG HQ in Kingston, Ontario.

The proposed change to reallocate some of the national support organizations of the Level 1s at the strategic level, and to regroup them under a Chief of Support organization that would become the single support authority within the CF, would also greatly facilitate command and control at the operational level. For example, having the CFPM report to the same individual as the Comd CANOSCOM would certainly yield great benefits in terms of training, readiness and command and control.

### **CDS PRINCIPLES OF TRANSFORMATION**

Due to the nature of the changes proposed, only three of the six principles identified by the CDS to guide CF Transformation are actually applicable in an analysis of operational support : Command Centric; Clear Authorities, Responsibilities and Accountabilities; and Operational Focus. These three principles, however, provide ample arguments to support the creation of a Chief of Support and the allocation of additional core resources to CANOSCOM in order to sustain the intent of CF Transformation.

#### **Command Centric**

As described by the CDS in one of his first transformation communiqués, “[t]he CF command and control structure must be optimized to provide the most effective and responsive decision and operational support to designated strategic, operational and tactical commanders.”<sup>37</sup> Grouping all the national level support functions under a single Level 1 and having the Comd CANOSCOM report to that same individual will establish a clear and responsive operational support chain of command from the strategic to the

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<sup>37</sup>Gen R.J. Hillier, *CDS Transformation SITREP 02/05 – Annex A* (National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa: file 3000-1, 7 Sept 05), A-1/1.

tactical level. As a result, the new command structure will streamline the decision making process and improve the responsiveness and effectiveness of the operational support provided to CF operations, both continentally or internationally, by making all support functions the responsibilities of a single commander.

### **Clear Authorities, Responsibilities and Accountabilities**

The second guiding principle for CF Transformation suggests that “[c]ommanders must be provided a clear articulation of their assigned authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities... and that they, in turn, provide equivalent clarity in the provision of their guidance to their subordinate commanders.”<sup>38</sup> The implementation of the proposed changes and the establishment of a single authority for all support functions, rather than having several Level 1 organizations each responsible for a component of the support function will help achieving this transformation principle by creating a unambiguous command and control structure. As for the previous principle, the establishment of a single chain of command from the strategic to the tactical level will provide commanders at the different levels of operations a clear command structure and ensure their responsibilities and accountabilities are harmonized. When there is a situation where a problem arises, identifying the accountability will be simplified by the fact that there will be only one individual responsible at each of the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

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<sup>38</sup>Hillier, *CDS Transformation SITREP 02/05...*, A-1/1.

## Operational Focus

Certainly, the most significant effect of implementing these changes in the CANOSCOM command and control structure will be the additional operational focus that it will generate. As indicated by the CDS, “[w]ithin the CF, operations and operational support take primacy over all other activities and considerations... [t]ransformation initiatives that increase CF operational focus should be given the highest priority.”<sup>39</sup> The separation of the policy making from the service delivery responsibilities in the support functions at the strategic level and the creation a single focal point for all national level support functions will have two important benefits. It will undoubtedly give the affected Level 1 organizations the opportunity to truly concentrate their efforts on policy making rather than service delivery, but most significantly it will establish a new organization that will be solely concerned and focussed on the operational support provided to CF operations.

## CONCLUSION

With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990’s, and the subsequent shift in operational focus from an mainly static force to an expeditionary force deploying in austere environments anywhere in the world, the CF found itself in a “...situation where operational demands are today weighted far more heavily in favour of combat support and combat service support organisations - logistics functions, communications, medical services and engineering support - than at any time in the past.”<sup>40</sup> Although there has

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<sup>39</sup>Hillier, *CDS Transformation SITREP 02/05...*, A-1/1.

<sup>40</sup>Department of National Defence, *Joint National Military Support Capability: Statement...*, 1.

been a number of reorganisations that have taken place within the CF since the early 1990's, such as those initiated by the Management, Command and Control Re-engineering Team (MCCRT) project, they have accomplished little to improve the structure of the support organisations at the strategic and operational levels. In fact, one of the assumptions made by the MCCRT was that the "new structure would emphasize an improved tooth-to-tail ratio."<sup>41</sup> With today's heavy emphasis on operational support, the CF must maximise the effectiveness and responsiveness of its support capability. The creation of a Chief of Support organisation at the strategic level responsible for all national level support functions would significantly improve the CF operational support capability required for supporting its expeditionary forces. Without considerable changes to its support command and control structure, the CF will limit its capability to generate, deploy and sustain its contingency operations, both at home and abroad.

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<sup>41</sup>G.E. Sharpe and Allan D. English, *Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces* (Winnipeg: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2002), 15.

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