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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
CSC 32 / CCEM 32

EXERCISE/EXERCICE NEW HORIZONS

**COMMAND-CENTRIC: WHAT IT IS AND
WHY IT IS THE FOUNDATION
FOR CF TRANSFORMATION**

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While I realize that this transformation will be challenging in the short term, I believe that a return to a command-centric organization will be critical in adapting to the changing world situation.¹

General Hillier, CF Transformation Planning Guidance

INTRODUCTION

The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has articulated the strategic end state of Canadian Forces (CF) transformation to be a strategically relevant, operationally responsive and tactically decisive (SRORTD) CF.² Further, the CDS has stated that the centre of gravity (fundamental foundation) for transformation is institutional credibility- “[t]he condition of being recognized as a trusted and reliable national institution.”³ Like any military campaign, it is suggested that CF transformation, in order to be successful, must have a clear commander’s intent, unambiguous responsibility and accountability, a mission command culture, and perseverance towards the end state throughout the CF. However, transformation must also be implemented over an extended period, requiring a consistency in command philosophy, by successive commanders, over many years, and at all levels of command. This will be essential for transformation to have any realistic chance of enduring success.

¹ General R.J. Hillier, *CDS Planning Guidance – CF Transformation* (National Defence Headquarters: file 1950-9(CT)), 18 October 2005, 6.

² *Ibid.*, 2.

³ *Ibid.*, 2.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, to be successful, a command-centric CF is required as the foundation for CF transformation (and not just operations). It will be shown that command-centric, as the main effort, must be more than a concept to adequately support CF transformation and must include a clear definition and acceptance across the CF. Command centric will be clearly defined, and then it will be shown why and how it is the fundamental foundation (center of gravity) in ensuring that the transformation of the CF is enduring and the end state achieved. The criteria for success will be that commanders at all levels share common intent (including command and leadership philosophy), use campaign design as the context for all military plans (including transformation) and incorporate the operational planning process as the foundation for knowledge based decision-making for transformation.

COMMAND-CENTRIC DEFINED

Current Definitions

The Army has focused its definition of command-centric around how a Commander makes decisions. “Operating in a future battlespace that is likely to be more chaotic...all levels of command will have to adapt and act more quickly, and therefore require access to the appropriate level of knowledge.”⁴

⁴ Department of National Defence, *Advancing With Purpose- The Army Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Land Force Command, 2002), 32.

The CDS has stated the following vision for command-centric:

The CF command and control structure must be optimized to provide the most effective and responsive decision and operational support to designated strategic, operational and tactical commanders. This principle imposes the requirement to clearly delineate and separate line and staff functions, establishing a distinct and unambiguous chain of command that coherently integrates strategic, operational and tactical headquarters and elements. It further establishes the need to effectively group capabilities under the appropriate command to best meet operational needs – coupled with the ability to rapidly shift these capabilities from one command to another to meet unforeseen or higher-priority commitments. The key is the allocation of mission-essential capabilities to operational and tactical commands, formations and units coupled with the ability to rapidly re-group and re-task capabilities between these entities as required.⁵

These are two different interpretations of command-centric and neither really describes what exactly command-centric means. Obviously, command-centric is about ensuring commanders are able to command. But what exactly does it comprise, and what is the relation to mission command and CF decision-making? Occasionally, command-centric seems to be defined by what it is not: network centric, staff centric or management centric. In order to propose a clear definition of command-centric, these relations will be looked at first followed by an examination of command, leadership and decision-making.

Not Network Enabled, Staff or Management Centric

Network enabled operations (NEO) has been defined as: “[t]he ability of commanders to access an information network that allows the timely sharing of information and data from

⁵ General R.J. Hillier, *Annex A to CDS Transformation SITREP 02/05*. (National Defence Headquarters), 07 September 2005, 1.

various sources and one that connects all sensors and weapons of the joint force.”⁶ NEO is about human and organizational behavior and is based on adapting a new way of thinking – network centric thinking – and applying it to military operations. NEO is not narrowly about technology, but broadly about an emerging military response to the information age.

However, it is still focused on having the right information, in the right form, at the right time, to the decision-maker. NEO is viewed as complimentary and an enabler for a command-centric CF, however it does not define command-centric.

The issue of staff centrality is a bit more complex. It is contended that the CF completely embraces the following principle: “[that] [t]he staff has no authority by itself; it derives authority from the Commander and exercises it in his name. Therefore, all of its activities are undertaken *on behalf of the Commander*.”⁷ The staff does make decisions on behalf of the Commander, but equally the staff’s sole purpose is to inform and support the Commander.⁸ How centric a staff becomes in the decision-making process is based on the desire of the Commander. However, to ensure the system is never completely staff centric, it will be shown that a Commander must implement/lead campaign design and operational planning for all activities, including for CF transformation.

The ability to separate command, leadership and management is not easy.

“Command, management, leadership...are integrally rolled up in the behaviour and actions of

⁶ *Army Strategy*..., 40.

⁷ Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Land Force, Vol 3, Command* (Ottawa: Chief of Defence Staff, 1996), 68.

⁸ *Ibid*, 73.

one person, so that sorting out what aspects of performance and effectiveness demonstrate good leadership, what shows command, and what reflects something else is not always possible.”⁹ However, management is a function a Commander must perform but, while an outcome of command-centric, it does not define command-centric. Having demonstrated that command-centric cannot be defined by network centric, staff centric or management; a definition will now be developed based on the vital components of command, leadership and decision-making.

Command, Leadership and CF Decision-Making.

Command

The CF definition of command is: “The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, co-ordination, and control of military forces ...Commanders exercise command over their own forces at all levels, under the authority of the CDS.”¹⁰ The following is an evolved definition of command that has been incorporated into both Army and CF Leadership doctrine:

Command is the uniquely human activity of creatively expressing will, but one that can be expressed only through the structures and processes of control. A commander, as a manifestation of Command, is a human who works within a defined military position with assigned authorities (i.e., control structures) to achieve mission objectives.¹¹

⁹ Department of National Defence, A-PA 005-000 AP-004 2005 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005), 12.

¹⁰ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 *Canadian Forces Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2004), 2-1.

Pigeau and McCann have also created a model combining the three command factors of competency (physical, emotional and interpersonal), authority (legal and personal) and responsibility (extrinsic and intrinsic).¹² Interpersonal interactions “require the ability to articulate one’s thoughts, ideas and vision — especially verbally, but also in writing.”¹³ Extrinsic responsibility “is the degree to which an individual feels accountable both up to superiors and down to followers [while] intrinsic responsibility is associated with the concepts of honour, loyalty and duty, those timeless qualities linked to military ethos.”¹⁴ It has been stated, “if Command is a combination of intellect, knowledge and character then character is by far the most important.”¹⁵ Pigeau and McCann have also postulated that, of all the factors involved with command, that the internal factors of shared military ethos is the most fundamental to command.¹⁶ Based on these views of command then, shared intent, loyalty and common internal values must be viewed as vital components of a command-centric CF.

¹¹ Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, “What is a Commander?” in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, ed. Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, 79-105 (St. Catherines, ON: Vanwell, 2001.), 101.

¹² Pigeau, Ross & Carol McCann. “Re-conceptualizing Command and Control.” *Canadian Military Journal*, Spring 2002, 56.

¹³ *Ibid*, 56.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 56.

¹⁵ Desmond Morton, “The Political Skills of a Canadian General Officer Corps, in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, ed. Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, 361-373 (St. Catherines, ON: Vanwell, 2001.), 371.

¹⁶ Pigeau and McCann, *Re-conceptualizing...*, 56.

The CDS has also been quite clear on the importance of a mission command culture in the CF.

The CF will continue to develop and exemplify mission command leadership – the leadership philosophy of the CF. In essence, mission command articulates the dynamic and decentralized execution of operations guided throughout by a clear articulation and understanding of the overriding commander’s intent. This leadership concept demands the aggressive use of initiative at every level, a high degree of comfort in ambiguity and a tolerance for honest failure.¹⁷

However, there are some who contend that the CF does not have the cultural or philosophical capacity to achieve real mission command. “Almost daily, technology gains in importance, and although officers speak of embracing chaos, or of allowing more freedom to subordinates, the words do not reflect the reality of the current situation.”¹⁸ However, the same individual acknowledges that if there is tacit trust among Commanders at all levels, and complete buy in to higher Commanders intent, then mission command is achievable.¹⁹ This is exactly what a command-centric approach will ensure for CF operations but also, and just as important, for CF transformation. This will require a CF command culture that is based on shared common intent, a clear responsibility to execute the intent across the CF, and timely decision-making.²⁰

¹⁷ Hillier, *CDS SITREP 05/02*, 2.

¹⁸ Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Chuck S. Oliviero, “Trust, Manoeuvre Warfare, Mission Command and Canada’s Army,” *The Canadian Army Journal*, Volume 1 No. 1 (Summer 1998), 3.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 3.

²⁰ Land Force, Vol 3, Command..., 30.

Given command is based on the expression of human will, then it is postulated that the concept of commander's intent is the key component for sharing this expression of will and further, that the intent must be shared across all Commanders. "Nearly everything a commander does – planning, directing, allocating resources, monitoring – is driven and governed by the commander's vision, goal, or mission, and the will to realize or attain that vision, goal, or mission."²¹ Command-centric must ensure the articulation and sharing of intent among Commanders and staffs, to enable consistency of decision-making, and the ability to make decisions at the lowest possible level. This 'command-by-influence' philosophy is purported by many, including the US Marine Corps, as the only command system likely to be successful in the military environment of the 21st Century.²²

Leadership

Leadership in the CF is defined as "directly or indirectly influencing others, by means of formal authority or personal attributes, to act in accordance with one's intent or a shared purpose."²³ General Omar Bradley stated that the ultimate effectiveness of a leader could be measured by the achievements of those he led.²⁴ This is directly applicable to the current CDS, in that transformation will only ultimately be successful based on the actions of those

²¹ *Leadership in the Canadian Forces...*, 8.

²² Allan D. English, "Contemporary Issues in Command and Control." *Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Air Symposium 2001*, Canadian Forces College, 2001, 100.

²³ *Leadership in the Canadian Forces...*, 7.

²⁴ General (ret'd) Omar Bradley, "On Leadership," *Parameters*, Vol 11, No. 3 (September 1981): 1.

who will lead it once he is gone. This again emphasizes the necessity for a shared command and leadership philosophy among Commanders at all levels over an extended period of time.

CF doctrine does make a distinction between leading people and leading the institution. “*Leading people* involves developing individual, team, and unit capabilities...to execute tasks and missions. *Leading the institution* is about developing and maintaining... strategic and professional capabilities and creating the conditions for operational success.”²⁵ It is recommended that leading the institution for CF transformation is all about ensuring that a command-centric culture is implemented, with a shared commander’s intent, and shared ethos. “Culture and leadership are two sides of the same coin in that leaders first create cultures when they create groups and organizations.”²⁶ (This is exactly what the CDS is currently trying to do with CF transformation). Further, he and his successors will have to lead the institution by carefully selecting those people who are best able to carry out the objectives of transformation. “An essential qualification of a good leader is the ability to recognize, select, and train junior leaders.”²⁷ It is argued that a shared leadership philosophy is absolutely vital to a command-centric CF, as short and long-term leadership behaviour, intentionally or otherwise, will guide the CF as to what is important and what is not.²⁸

²⁵ *Leadership in the Canadian Forces...*, 5.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 117.

²⁷ General Bradley..., 1.

²⁸ *Leadership in the Canadian Forces...*, 23.

Decision Making in the CF

Commanders have to make decisions, that is what they do. However, in order to make decisions, the Commander must have situational awareness and the ability to ensure that the decision is supporting the higher commander's intent. Further, it is clear that a Staff has to, and should, make decisions on the Commander's behalf but, again, must do so clearly within the Commander's intent. Major General J.F.C. Fuller emphasized in all his teaching that decision-making on key issues is the province of the commander, while routine decision-making should be delegated to the staff.²⁹

Broadly speaking there seems to be two types of decision-making: analytical or intuitive. Analytical is based on the view that human decision making can be modelled in terms of probability and logic, while intuitive theories are based on the premise that people use informal procedures to make decisions.³⁰ It has been mistakenly suggested that the CF operational planning process (OPP) only supports an analytical approach. As will be discussed later, the OPP has been designed to support either approach and can be adjusted to meet the requirements of a given situation. Within the CF, it is generally concluded that decision makers will likely use a more intuitive approach. "Intuitive theories have the advantages of being closely linked to what expert decision makers actually do in real-world

²⁹ Land Force, Vol 3, *Command...*, 37.

³⁰ Dr. David J. Bryant, Dr. Robert D.G. Webb and Carol McCann, "Synthesizing Two Approaches to Decision Making in Command And Control, *Canadian Military Journal* (Spring: 2003), 29.

situations and of being applicable to dynamic, uncertain, and high risk environments, as demonstrated in numerous empirical studies.”³¹

A command-centric CF will focus on ensuring that all decision makers have the ability to put problems in context and ensure that the impact of decisions directly support the Commander’s intent. This type of situational awareness and impact assessment should be done for all decisions regardless of whether it is a force generation, force employment or CF transformation issue.

Command-Centric Defined

Fredrick the Great stated that the ideal General would have:

[t]he courage, fortitude and activity of Charles XII, the penetrating glance and policy of Marlborough, the vast plans and art of Eugene, the stratagems of Luxembourg, the wisdom, order and foresight of Montecuccoli, and the grand art, which Turenne possessed, of seizing the critical moment, should be united. Such a phoenix will with difficulty be engendered.³²

The CF is not trying to create the perfect or homogeneous Commander. However, it must ensure a command-centric organization for success of both operations and transformation. It has been argued above that a command-centric organization is defined by having the following three main characteristics:

³¹ *Ibid*, 31.

³² Jay Luvaas, *Frederick the Great on the Art of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 360.

- *Shared command philosophy based on mission command and adherence to command intent.* Fortunately, this concept is already captured in Canadian doctrine: “essence of command is the *expression of human will*, an idea that is captured in the concept of *commander’s intent*.”³³
- *Shared leadership philosophy* based on shared culture (internal values/ethos) and selection/development of subordinates. With the publication of leadership doctrine and development of an operational culture, the CF is also moving ahead in this area.
- *Consistent and knowledge-based decisions making* based on shared situational awareness and ability to ensure alignment with Commander’s intent. This is an area requiring significant improvement for CF transformation.

Having defined command-centric, the intent now is to prove both its essentiality and implementation means to ensure the success of CF transformation.

TRANSFORMATION

By far the biggest mistake people make when trying to change an organization is to plunge ahead without establishing a high enough sense of urgency in

³³ *Leadership in the Canadian Forces...*, 8.

fellow managers and employees... [T]hey underestimate how hard it is to drive people out of their comfort zones.³⁴

John Kottler, Leading Change

General Transformation

Transformation is about changing the culture of the organization, the way in which people work together everyday.³⁵ “Transformational change... is so significant that it requires your leaders and employees alike to change their mindsets and behavior in order to succeed in the future state.”³⁶ It means that an evolutionary path for the organization is no longer viable or, more bluntly, incremental change will not suffice. People must do things fundamentally different, which will mean a change in culture, which can only be brought about by transformational leadership. “In fact, experts in organizational culture maintain that leaders’ most important functions in an organization are the creation, management, and sometimes the destruction, of organizational cultures.”³⁷

³⁴ John Kottler, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business Scholl Press, 1996), 4-5.

³⁵ Frances Hesselbein, “The Key to Cultural Transformation,” *Leader to Leader* (Spring 1999): 6-7.

³⁶ Linda Ackerman Anderson and Dean Anderson, “The Ten Critical Actions for Leading Successful Transformation,” *Results from Change* (December 2003): 1.

³⁷ Allan D. English, “Contemporary Issues in Command and Control.” *Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Air Symposium 2001*, Canadian Forces College, 2001,101.

In order to be able to adapt to the changes in society, it is postulated that an organization must clearly understand its values, vision and mission.³⁸ In fact, many in the transformational advocacy business use terms very similar to those previously described for command-centric. For example, transformation is best achieved by “[d]ispersing the responsibilities of leadership across the organization, so that we have not one leader but many leaders at every level of the enterprise [who]...in their behavior and language, embody the mission, values and principles.”³⁹ Another advocate, apparently referenced by the CDS, states “[t]he capacity for self-reference...each part of the system must remain constant with itself and with all other parts of the system as it changes... [using] something as simple as a clear core of values and vision”⁴⁰

So, as discussed in the definition of command-centric, if transformation is about changing culture, then it must have integrated leadership at all levels of the organization. Further, this type of leadership is absolutely essential to overcoming institutional inertia, and in ensuring that structural change does produce the required behavioral change throughout the organization.⁴¹ To emphasize, this is something the CDS must achieve given that his time in leading transformation will be relatively short.

³⁸ Peter F. Drucker, *Managing in the Next Society* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002), 291.

³⁹ Hesselbein..., 7.

⁴⁰ Margaret J. Wheatley, *Leadership and the New Science* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1992), 147.

CF Transformation

The call for transformation of the CF is nothing new. “The officer corps of the CF must itself undergo a cultural evolution that it has successfully...avoided since 1964. [It must]...find a corporate expression, a higher loyalty, to the nation and abandon particular service interests.”⁴² The CDS has made his intent for transformation with respect to command and control very clear:

The CF will rapidly establish an operational command structure,...[t]his structure will be command-centric with a clear and unambiguous chain of command from the strategic level to tactical level, with commanders at all levels clearly understanding their assigned authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities. This command structure will be shaped by the doctrine of mission command with Commanders at every level possessing a comprehensive understanding of their commander’s explicit and implicit intent and an overriding operational focus dedicated to the realization of this intent.⁴³

CDS Concept of Operations: CF Strategic Command

In addition to the above, the CDS has stated his objectives for cultural change. “The transformation of the CF will focus on the establishment of new integrated (beyond joint) organizations and structures, including a unified national command and control system.”⁴⁴ However, the CDS has also identified that the most significant impediment to CF transformation is institutional inertia. “[Institutional inertia is] the condition whereby the lack

⁴¹ Kottler..., ,6

⁴² Douglas L. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence, Government and the United Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: Brown Book Company Limited, 1995), 205.

⁴³ General R.J. Hillier, *Concept of Operations: CF Strategic Command* (National Defence Headquarters: file 1950-2-4(CFTT/DTP)), 18 October 2005, 2.

⁴⁴ Hillier, *CDS Planning Guidance...*, 3.

of strategic coherence, unity and trust inhibits the CF from being strategically relevant, operationally responsive and tactically decisive.”⁴⁵

Negativity towards CF transformation can and will come from all angles, and has already started as is indicated by two recent articles from a prominent Canadian newspaper. The first identified the core problem of recruitment and force structure, which must be addressed for transformation to be meaningful. “The massive facelift to the Canadian Forces Command structure may exacerbate some of the very problems that it was meant to solve... the embarrassing position of having the Command staffs in place but no forces in the field to command.”⁴⁶ The second commentary raised the requirement for command-centric as being essential for CF Transformation (the very topic being explored in this paper). “Hillier is also short of time...he must find the first of a series of successors who share his goals and will strive to reach them...[c]asualties and ugly incidents will erode public commitment...and Canadian tolerance for a General aggressively advancing a political agenda is unknown.”⁴⁷

The above clearly demonstrates that CF transformation is about changing culture, overcoming institutional inertia, and ensuring momentum despite criticism/set backs. The CDS has said that “[t]he transformation of the CF command and control structure is the key first step in ensuring the responsiveness, effectiveness and relevance of the CF in decades to

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 2.

⁴⁶ David Rudd, “Tough Days for Defence Minister,” *Toronto Star*, 14 February 2006, A18.

⁴⁷ James Travers, “Hillier’s muscular new military,” *Toronto Star*, 16 March 2006, A23.

come.”⁴⁸ However, the implementation of new structures could be argued to be the easiest part of CF transformation; what will be more difficult is changing how people think, the culture of the CF. Having clearly shown what command-centric is and the challenges for CF transformation, the paper will now clearly show why command-centric CF must be the main effort in overcoming the opposing centre of gravity and how it needs to be implemented to ensure CF transformation is successful.

COMMAND-CENTRIC AS FOUNDATION FOR TRANSFORMATION

In all the CF transformation documentation referred to in this paper, the CDS has consistently used command-centric terminology such as shared intent, values, culture and integrated decision-making. However, he has used them as the objectives for transformation. What is being advocated is that the application of these same principles is absolutely essential for CF transformation itself. In order to transform, the CF must change its culture and be led by individuals who share the same command philosophy, and who make decisions from a basis of shared situational awareness and intent. This section will show how command-centric (shared command, leadership philosophy, knowledge based decision making) will ensure alignment of culture and the appropriate leadership essential for CF transformation to succeed.

⁴⁸ Hillier, Concept of Operations..., 5.

Cultural Change through Shared Command and Leadership Philosophy

Cultural Change

As mentioned previously, the CDS has stated his intent to evolve the CF to ‘beyond jointness’.⁴⁹ If this does not imply cultural change for the CF, then nothing does. If true jointness can only be created by shared dangers, decisions, and death⁵⁰, then how is ‘beyond jointness’ created? Some argue that shared trust and understanding are only really created in service environments, implying they cannot be adequately developed in a joint environment.⁵¹ To further complicate matters, some articulate that service and jointness cannot really co-exists as “there are only so many truly excellent people in any enterprise and to concentrate them at a single point in an organization may well create an imbalance of skill which endangers the health of the entire organization.”⁵² This concept of ‘beyond jointness’ will be a significant cultural challenge for the CF.

One of the other cultural issues of transformation is that of force development and force generation. It has been stated “Canada Command taking over force generation makes sense in terms of having the employer involved in generation but is resisted for some very

⁴⁹ Hillier, *CDS Planning Guidance*..., 3.

⁵⁰ Lawrence B. Wilkerson, “What Exactly is Jointness”, *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer 1997), 67.

⁵¹ Wilkerson..., 67.

⁵² *Ibid*, 67

good reasons by the environments.”⁵³ However, what is also clear is that if any part of the organization resists the move towards ‘beyond jointness’, they must be immediately aligned for the sake of the organization and transformation momentum.⁵⁴ It can easily be accepted that the issue of command and control among environments and the ‘beyond joint’ context will cause significant CF cultural upheaval. In order to deal with this risk of cultural change, the foundation of command-centric becomes absolutely vital in ensuring shared intent, values, development of subordinates and consistent decision-making.

Unity/Cohesion through Shared Intent

“Cohesion is seen as the glue that solidifies individual and group will under the command of leaders.... [i]t includes the influence of a well-articulated commander's intent focused at a common goal and the motivation and esprit de corps of the force.”⁵⁵ In fact, the common intent based upon mutual understanding, trust and doctrine, is crucial in the conduct of operations.⁵⁶ In line with the definition of command-centric, unity and cohesion is achieved by adherence to the commander’s intent at all levels, shared values and consistent development of subordinates. It is contended that this type of unity and cohesion provided by

⁵³ Nic Boisvert, “Canada Command – “We Have Seen the Enemy and It Is Us,”” *Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century*, 05 September 2005, 2.

⁵⁴ Bland, 283.

⁵⁵ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Army of Tomorrow: Capstone Operating Concept*, Final Version (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Army Doctrine, 2003), 14-15.

⁵⁶ Land Force, Vol 3, *Command...*, 8.

a command-centric CF is also absolutely essential for transformation to be enduring, and to have the capacity to overcome the many challenges that will be faced.

One of the other vital components of achieving the command-centric common intent will be the unceasing communication and adoption of the CDS's intent for transformation, both across and at all levels of the CF. "To have motivating force, the vision of the desired end state must be widely shared and accepted...by the leadership team, effective networking to obtain the support of other key people, and, above all, the persuasive use of words and images."⁵⁷

Shared Military Ethos/ Values

Duty with Honour defines a profession essentially as an exclusive group of people voluntarily performing a service to society and unified by a common body of expertise and code of conduct.⁵⁸ Further, military ethos is defined as "the spirit that binds the profession together. It clarifies how members view their responsibilities, apply their expertise and express their unique military identity."⁵⁹ It is further argued that, in line with a command-centric CF, the transformational intent, to be of lasting and effective value, must be received and executed by leaders who share the same military ethos and values. "[T]he civic, legal,

⁵⁷ *Leadership in the Canadian Forces...*, 111.

⁵⁸ Department of National Defence. A-PA 005-000 AP-001 2003 *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), 21.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 21.

ethical, and military values at the heart of the military ethos must be reflected in day-to-day decisions and actions. They cannot be just words on paper or empty commitments. They must be publicly visible consistent patterns of behaviour.”⁶⁰

Development and Selection of Subordinates

Upon assuming command of the Third Army during early 1944, Patton replaced most of the senior staff officers with either the veterans who had served with him in Africa and Sicily or with cavalymen he had known before the war. They were totally loyal and carried out his orders in an unobtrusive and highly efficient manner. He, in turn, trusted, rewarded and backed them to the hilt.⁶¹

As discussed under general transformation and given the definition of command-centric along with the extreme challenges facing CF transformation, it is suggested that Commanders will have to place appropriate people in those positions essential for implementing CF transformation. This may require significant changes, at least at the senior level, to how such positions have been filled in the past. “Only through an interlinked system of selection, education and training will... general officers emerge who can fill these stringent requirements.”⁶² Further, to truly go ‘beyond joint’, officers will need special training and perhaps even protection from their own environmental cultures.⁶³

⁶⁰ *Leadership in the Canadian Forces...*,126.

⁶¹ Lt. Col. Paul G. Munch, “Patton’s Staff and the Battle of the Bulge,” *Military Review* (May, 1990), 5.

⁶² David J. Bercuson, “A Man (or Woman) for All Seasons: What the Canadian Public Expects from Canadian General Officers,” in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, ed. Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, 409-423 (St. Catherines, ON: Vanwell, 2001.), 416-7.

⁶³ Bland, 205.

Even with this command-centric approach to sharing of Commander's intent, shared values, and personnel development, it is foreseen that the senior commanders of the next several years will face exceptional intellectual and complex challenges.⁶⁴ Further, they will have to be more politically astute and capable than ever before (especially following in the shadow of the current CDS).⁶⁵ It is strongly advocated that a command-centric approach of shared intent, military values, and subordinate development is essential in enabling the cultural change and ubiquitous leadership required for transformation.

CF Transformation Leadership based on Command-Centric Decision-Making

Given that real transformation will only take place over years, a fundamental prerequisite will be consistent decision-making based on common situational awareness and alignment with commander's intent across the organization. It is argued that the use of campaign planning for transformation and the operational planning process (OPP) will ensure command-centric decision-making over time, consistent with the goals and objectives of transformation.

⁶⁴ Brigadier-General (retired) W. Don Macnamara, Intellectualism in the General Officer Corps, in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, ed. Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, 491-507 (St. Catherines, ON: Vanwell, 2001.), 505.

⁶⁵ Morton..., 370.

Campaign Planning

Campaign planning allows for the formalization of the operational art, which ensures that military operations and campaigns achieve the goals of policy. The effective application of the operational art will answer:

- what conditions must be produced to achieve strategic goals;
- what sequence of actions are most likely to produce that combination; and
- how should force resources be applied to accomplish sequence of actions?⁶⁶

Fundamentally, a campaign is the integration and sequencing of operations and engagements to achieve a desired strategic effect by sequencing and synchronizing decisive points along line of operations.⁶⁷ This type of formal alignment of transformation initiatives is considered absolutely essential for command-centric decision making both now, and in the future. All decision makers must have a context against which to make their decisions and against which to measure success. Campaign planning tools and techniques must be applied to CF transformation in order to be able “to adapt, to learn and to evolve, which can be argued to be at the heart of practicing the operational art.”⁶⁸ The actual planning for a campaign is conducted using the CF operational planning process.

⁶⁶ Richard M. Swain, “Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army.” In *The Operational Art: Development in the Theories of War*, edited by B.J.C. Mckercher and Michael A. Hennessy, 147-173 (Westport CT: Praeger, 1996), 165.

⁶⁷ *CF Ops*, 3-1.

⁶⁸ Bruce W. Menning, “Operational Art’s Origins,” *Military Review* (September-October, 1997), 15.

Operational Planning Process

The OPP is a “continuous and dynamic process, involving concurrent activity and interaction between the commander, the staff and subordinate commanders.”⁶⁹ The objectives of the planning process are as follows:

- to standardize the planning process within the CF;
- to ensure strategic/political control is maintained during the development of a plan;
- to enable the commander and staff to translate strategic political objectives provided by the Government of Canada into strategic/ operational-level military objectives;
- to enable commanders to guide development of the plan; and
- to maximize the commander’s and staffs’ creative thinking and associated thought processes.”⁷⁰

It is strongly recommended that the use of the OPP at all levels of command is vital for a command-centric CF to be able to lead transformation. This will ensure that all decision-making is coordinated and aligned with the Commanders intent and appropriate opportunities exploited, using the mindset of mission command. The flexibility inherent in the OPP allows it to be easily tailored to any situation while still ensuring a suitable appreciation of risk and alignment. Further, used within the context of campaign planning, it enables creative approaches within a thorough analysis of the problem space. Given the

⁶⁹ Land Force, Vol 3, *Command...*, 98.

complexity and risks of transformation, it is strongly recommended that commanders at all levels use both campaign planning and the OPP to ensure alignment and consistent decision making for CF transformation.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this paper was to demonstrate that, to be successful, a command-centric CF is required as the foundation for CF transformation (and not just operations). It has been shown that command-centric, as the main effort for transformation, must be more than a concept to adequately support CF transformation, and must include a clear definition, acceptance and successful implementation to be a viable and lasting construct. Command-centric was defined as ensuring common intent throughout the organization based on shared command and leadership philosophy. Further, for transformation to succeed, a command-centric CF must have in place the mechanisms for ensuring that decision-making is based on common situational awareness and internal consistency within the overall objectives of transformation.

Having clearly defined command-centric, it was determined that the core requirements for transformation were to ensure culture change and transformational leadership. This proved that the construct of command-centric is the fundamental foundation (centre of gravity) to achieving the transformational end state, and in ensuring that the transformation of the CF is enduring. Fortunately, several of the major tools for a command-

⁷⁰ *CF Ops*, 4-2.

centric CF already exist with unity/cohesion, military ethos, campaign planning and the operational planning process.

The criteria for success for successful transformation within a command-centric CF will be that Commanders at all levels share common intent (including command and leadership philosophy), use campaign design as the context for all military plans including transformation, and incorporate the operational planning process as the foundation for knowledge based decision making. CF transformation can succeed, but only in a command-centric CF.

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