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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
CSC 32 / CCEM 32

EXERCISE NEW HORIZONS

**THE NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
US NORTHCOM AND CANADA COMMAND:
IS THIS THE END OF NORAD?**

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La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

INTRODUCTION

With the release of both *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* in April of 2004, and *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* in 2005, the Canadian government of the day committed the nation to a foreign and defence policy that, remarkably, has not altered greatly in the years since World War Two.¹ What is indeed remarkable is that the government, for the first time ever, has issued a National Security Policy (NSP) that utilizes an integrated approach to the security issues facing the nation in this post 9/11 era of asymmetric threats. The three core national security issues from the NSP are:

- protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad;
- ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and
- contributing to international security.²

The International Policy Statement (IPS) builds on these core issues and goes on to state, especially with respect to North American security, that one of the initiatives for the Government of Canada in ensuring the security of the continent is to “negotiate renewal of the NORAD agreement, while pursuing other measures to strengthen maritime and land defence cooperation with the United States.”³ Unfortunately, it would appear that the United States (US) does not put as much emphasis on what Canada sees as a critical bi-national relationship. The recently released US National Security Strategy of

¹ Phillippe Lagasse, “Northern Command and the Evolution of Canada-US Defence Relations,” *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2003). His article from CMJ Spring 2003, provides further detailed information on history of CANUS military relations since 1938.

² Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*. Ottawa: April 2004, vii.

³ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Overview*. Ottawa: 2005, 7.

March 2006 mentions Canada in the Western Hemispheres section of the policy and simply states, “Our strategy for the Hemisphere begins with deepening key relationships with Canada and Mexico, a foundation of shared values and cooperative policies that can be extended throughout the region.”⁴ This is hardly a ringing endorsement of the value of our unique relationship. Notwithstanding the apparent lack of concern from the United States at the political strategic policy level, Canada published a complementing defence policy to the IPS known informally as the Defence Policy Statement (DPS). In the foreword of that policy, it states that

The effective defence of Canada and North America has always required working collaboratively with the United States. We will build on the successful defence arrangements currently in place, such as NORAD.⁵

These three high level policy documents all agree on the effectiveness of the solid foundation between Canada and the US in the overarching agreement to secure their shared continent from attack. The events of September 11th, 2001, served to further solidify that foundation. The DPS went on to state that Canada would reorganize its operational focus and stand up a new command focused exclusively on domestic and continental operations. This new command has become known as Canada Command (CANCOM).⁶ This fledgling organization

⁴ United States, Office of the President of the United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf> ; Internet; accessed 15 March 2006, 37.

⁵ Department of Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence*. Ottawa: 2005, foreward.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 11.

can be compared in its mission focus to its brethren in the US, known as United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).

Canada may have indeed had an opportunity to become an integrated part of USNORTHCOM, but it opted out and instead pursued a different path that led to the establishment of the Bi-National Planning Group (BPG). This group was established and tasked to coordinate bi-national level planning for the maritime and land environments. More importantly, although the BPG is a military organization, it was formalized through an agreement signed on December 5th, 2002, between the Governments of both Canada and the US.⁷ This level of commitment serves to heighten the importance of this bi-lateral agreement. It is a government to government agreement, not merely an informal agreement between the nations' two military forces. This point will be critical to the arguments to come in this paper.

NORAD, a bi-lateral command, formalized in a treaty, has been responsible for the aerospace defence of the continent since 1957. These 49 years of bi-lateral relations have formed the backdrop for a superb cadre of command and control (C2) capabilities. This command is unrivalled in any other bi-lateral relationship that the US maintains with other friendly nations. It is this outstanding capability, a keystone in the Canada-US bi-lateral relationship, which could be jeopardized if the ongoing NORAD renewal negotiations of 2006 do not

⁷ United States. Department of Defense. *Bi-National Planning Group, Interim Report on Canada and the United States (CANUS) Enhanced Military Cooperation*, 13 October 2004. Appendix 1. The diplomatic notes from both Canada the U.S. are found in this appendix.

reflect the new realities of continental defence in the post September 11th, 2001 era.

While there have been many initiatives since the fateful events of September 11th, 2001, none have served the nations of Canada and the US better than the professional efforts of the men and woman of NORAD. This unique institution, unparalleled anywhere else between two nations, is uniquely placed to adopt additional responsibilities in the new mission areas of maritime defence in particular, but potentially land based operations as well. The formation of USNORTHCOM, in 2002. as well as the formation of CANCOM in 2006 is seen as a natural fit to coordinate military responses of interest to both of the nations of Canada and the US. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Rick Hillier, has gone so far as to direct CANCOM to establish working relationships with USNORTHCOM.⁸ While superficially this would appear to be a beneficial arrangement, it has limitations, in that the relations established would simply be at the military to military level.

The Canadian Forces (CF) and the Armed Forces of the US have enjoyed an exceptionally close working relationship in the years since the Ogdensburg Agreement.⁹ However, these continental defence arrangements, set up during this agreement, are limited in practical effectiveness when it comes to real time

⁸ Department of National Defence, *Canada Command – Command and Control Authority*, CANFORGEN 012/06 CDS 007/06 031900Z Jan 06; available from http://barker.cfc.dnd.ca/Admin/Canforgen/2006/cfg06012_e.html ; Internet; accessed 5 February 2006. CDS direction to CANCOM is found in paragraph 12 of the CANFORGEN.

⁹ Phillippe Lagasse, “Northern Command and the Evolution of Canada-US Defence Relations,” *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2003). His article provides further detailed information on history of CANUS military relations including the Ogdensburg Agreement.

application, especially in the area of movement of both nations' forces across borders to assist in operations. Whereas NORAD, a nation to nation treaty and not merely a military to military ad hoc arrangement, has mechanisms in place that have been exercised and refined over the 49 years of the agreement to a well-honed instrument of effective bi-lateral policy. The concern that this paper will address is that, while the well intentioned staffs of both CANCOM and USNORTHCOM will charge forward in true military fashion, their efforts may overlook or potentially overshadow the capability that NORAD brings to this unique bi-lateral relationship.

The burgeoning relationship between CANCOM and USNORTHCOM threatens to marginalize the highly effective command and control capability of NORAD in the conduct of bi-lateral defence operations in support of homeland defence. The ongoing NORAD renewal negotiations serve to provide an excellent opportunity to capitalize on 49 years of investment in bi-lateral homeland defence in expanding the agreement to encompass, initially, the maritime component of homeland defence. The paper will examine the capabilities to be provided by the operational commands of CANCOM and USNORTHCOM and review the rhetoric being pursued between the two commands. Additionally, the role of the BPG will also be examined, notably the interim report issued in late 2004 and the final report issued in March 2006. These reports detailed several differing recommendations for a future bi-lateral command and control structure to support effective homeland defence of the continent. Finally, it will be argued that NORAD, as an existing, highly

successful bi-lateral organization is best suited to conduct the command and control of bi-lateral operations in support of homeland defence.

THE CAPABILITIES OF CANCOM

Announced in the DPS of 2005, CANCOM was established as “ a single operational command headquarters that will enable them to more effectively meet their fundamental responsibility to protect Canadians at home.”¹⁰ This new operational command is intended to ensure future military responses to incidents or crises requiring military support to civil authorities are conducted in an organized and planned manner. The ad hoc nature of these operations that have been conducted in the past, such as the CF response to the Red River Floods of 1997 (OPERATION ASSISTANCE) or the response to the recovery operations of Swissair flight 111 off of St. Margaret’s Bay, Nova Scotia (OPERATION PERSISTENCE) will be led under a regional Joint Task Force (JTF) commander reporting to CANCOM. The CDS has laid out in very specific terms what he expects this command to achieve which is shown in the Canadian Forces General Message (CANFORGEN) 012/06. The Commander of CANCOM has operational responsibility as follows:

The Comd Canada Com has been allocated Canada Com HQ, Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) and the remaining regional Joint Task Forces (RJTFs). In addition, the Comd

Canada Com is delegated the following command, control, and liaison and planning authorities:

A. Operational command (OPCOM) of forces assigned by the CDS for the execution of routine, contingency or rapid response contingency operations within the Canada Com AOR. These forces will normally be assigned for a specified duration;

B. OPCOM of the Canadian forces situated in Canada for the purposes of coordinating provision of services and assistance to civilian authorities;

C. OPCOM of high readiness units (immediate reaction units and ready duty ships). Comd Canada com will transfer operational control (OPCON) back to respective force generators for force generation activities until such time as those units are required for force employment;

D. OPCOM of identified units upon declaration of a national rapid response contingency operation as set out at para 7;

E. Tactical control (TACON) of the Canadian forces situated in Canada (less CEFCOM, CANSOFCOM and

¹⁰ Department of Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence...*, 11.

NORAD assigned forces) for the purposes of force protection, changing readiness levels and readiness reporting;

F. Planning authority over the Canadian forces situated in Canada (less CEFCON, CANSOFCOM, and NORAD assigned forces) for the purposes of deliberate operations planning, and coordination of joint operational training exercises;

G. Planning authority with USNORTHCOM and other US combatant commands, and Mexican military authorities as required; and

H. Authority to liaise with municipal, provincial and federal authorities, in coordination with the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS), in support of operational planning and the execution of assigned operational missions.¹¹

This is undeniably a massive shift in focus, and arguably a necessary shift in the command and control structure of the CF to bring it in line with the stated requirements of our foreign policy from the IPS, i.e. “Protect Canada and Canadians by implementing the National Security Policy, and updating the approach that the Canadian Forces take to domestic operations.”¹² This Canada

¹¹ Department of National Defence, *Canada Command – Command and Control Authority, CANFORGEN 012/06 CDS 007/06 031900Z Jan 06...*, paragraph 4.

¹² Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Overview...*, 8.

first priority is also reflected in the NSP, where in the opening lines of the Executive Summary it states that “there can be no greater role, no more important obligation for a government, than the protection and safety of its citizens”¹³ The commitment of the Canadian government is quite clear in the IPS and thus, with the formation of CANCOM, the CF will be able to fully implement the military aspects of this policy. CANCOM will utilize a multi-agency integrated approach, as well as a combined approach, by having terms of reference that include the engagement of both US and Mexican military authorities to conduct planning for the defence of both Canada and North America.

While this seems to be a long overdue capability in light of the historical focus, which successive governments of Canada have placed on the importance of protecting Canada and Canadians, this is the first truly combined, joint, and integrated approach to this effort...except, arguably, for one other operational command, NORAD.

THE CAPABILITIES OF USNORTHCOM

Established in the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 attacks, USNORTHCOM came into being after the US Unified Command Plan (UCP) was revised by the Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld and came into effect 1 October 2002. This newly established command included, for the first time, Canada as part of a US combatant commander’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) and succeeded Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as the command responsible for

¹³ Department of Defence, *Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence...*, vii.

the military aspects of homeland defence and homeland security.¹⁴ The present commander of USNORTHCOM, Admiral Timothy J. Keating laid out his vision to his people on July 15th, 2005. His core themes are to deter, prevent, defeat and mitigate. These themes are stated in relation to the defence of the American Homeland.¹⁵

With these overarching themes, USNORTHCOM is organized as follows to affect its mission of homeland defence:

Joint Force Headquarters –National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR) - based at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. is responsible for land-based homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), and incident management in the National Capital Region.

Joint Task Force – Alaska (JTF-A) - headquartered at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, coordinates the land defense of Alaska as well as defense support of its civil authorities.

Joint Task Force – North (JTF North) - based at Biggs Army Airfield, Fort Bliss, Texas, JTF North, formerly known as Joint Task Force Six, coordinates military-unique support to law

¹⁴ Phillippe Lagasse, “Northern Command and the Evolution of Canada-US Defence Relations,” *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2003), More detailed information on the establishment of USNORTHCOM is available in this article.

enforcement agencies and supports interagency synchronization in order to deter and prevent transnational threats to the homeland.

Joint Task Force – Civil Support (JTF-CS) - headquartered at Fort Monroe in Hampton, Va. JTF-CS plans and integrates DoD support to the designated Primary Federal Agency (PFA) for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence management operations.

Standing Joint Force Headquarters – North (SJFHQ-N) - headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colo. The mission of SJFHQ-N is to maintain situational awareness of the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) in order to enable rapid transition to a contingency response posture, and when directed, rapidly deploy a joint command and control element to support homeland defense and civil support operations in order to deter, prevent, defeat and mitigate crises in the USNORTHCOM AOR.¹⁶

¹⁵ USNORTHCOM press release available at http://www.northcom.mil/newsroom/news_release/2005/080405.htm .

¹⁶ Mission statements are all available from http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/about_us.htm .

USNORTHCOM has been operating since 1 Oct, 2002, and has conducted numerous validation exercises since that time to ensure it is capable of all aspects of its mandate. Additionally, it has been called upon during the hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005, and has shown the breadth and depth of its capabilities. It is particularly active in the National Capital Region of Washington, DC, where the JTF-NCR is a key player in concert with NORAD, on the Integrated Air Defense capability deployed in support of the defence of vital infrastructure in the region.

The relationship between NORAD and USNORTHCOM has been one of a developing character since there have been multiple overlaps in perceived responsibilities. As the relationship matures between the two commands, these overlaps will be minimized particularly since the two commands share a common Chief of Staff, J1, J2, J4, J6, J7, and J8 organizations, as well as sharing the commander. This unique command relationship was previously successful when US Space Command (USSPACECOM) was headquartered in Colorado Springs, the home of both commands. Although NORAD and USNORTHCOM have distinct J3 organizations, the integration of the other divisions ensures interoperability between the two commands and will continue to enhance the mutually supportive missions between the two commands.

Recent events in Colorado Springs have seen a change of view at NORAD and USNORTHCOM. The commander of these two distinctive commands has been challenged by simultaneously leading two separate

commands. As a result, he has made the major step of merging his separate J5 staffs into a combined NORAD/USNORTHCOM J5. One planning and policy staff makes for economy of effort and should serve to enhance bi-lateral planning. The downside is that, although the other directorates are merged, they are only supporting directorates. The jeopardy of having the NORAD/USNORTHCOM planning and policy staff merged into one could potentially see NORAD issues subjugated to USNORTHCOM priorities.¹⁷

THE BURGEONING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CANCOM AND USNORTHCOM

The previous discussions laid out the great capabilities inherent in each of CANCOM and USNORTHCOM. These two operational commands are indeed charged with great responsibilities which, in the interest of continental security, requires them to work together to achieve this most vital effect – defence of our two nations’ homelands. How well are these two commands working together? This is what will be examined in this part of the paper.

Both of these commands have requirements to work with each other on issues of bi-national interest. The Commander of CANCOM has been given “planning authority with USNORTHCOM and other US combatant commands”¹⁸ while the Commander of USNORTHCOM has directed his personnel to

¹⁷ The author was the NORAD J3 Maritime LNO and then the CMOC J62 from July 2001 to July 2005. These are observations from my experience during this period which included the evolving issues of the newly forming relationships between the two commands.

“(E)ngage nations and territories in our area of responsibility through an active theatre security cooperation program...”¹⁹ The media interest in recent natural disasters within the United States, principally Hurricane Katrina, highlighted the critical roles that these military forces will play in supporting each other, as well as other government agencies.

The nascent Joint Task Force – Atlantic (JTF-A) in Halifax, one of CANCOM’s six regional commands, planned for and deployed a four ship (three naval vessels and one Canadian Coast Guard vessel) task group in support of the US Navy’s (USN) efforts in the humanitarian operations in support of clean up operations after Hurricane Katrina. Interestingly, this task group was deployed as part of a Navy to Navy initiative. The Task Group Commander, Commodore Dean McFadden, speaking to reporters in Ottawa stated “Admiral McNeil (Commander JTF-A) spoke with his counterpart in the United States, the Commander of 2nd Fleet Vice-Admiral Fitzgerald last week and made the offer of help to him directly.”²⁰ While it is understood that CANCOM was not stood up for operations at this moment, the intended flow of events should have been for either the DCDS group in Ottawa to offer assistance or for USNORTHCOM to request assistance from the Canadian military.

It is in areas such as this that the developing relationship between these two operational commands will ensure that the military capability of both nations

¹⁸ Department of National Defence, *Canada Command – Command and Control Authority, CANFORGEN 012/06 CDS 007/06 031900Z Jan 06...*, paragraph 12.

¹⁹ Commander USNORTHCOM vision statement available at http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/vision.htm.

²⁰ Remarks from transcript of news conference regarding Canada’s response to Hurricane Katrina available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/unison/view_news_e.asp?id=1740.

can be brought to bear in support of that vital homeland defence mission. The question that must be asked is how these two commands will find a mutually workable arrangement to ensure that the interests of both nations are maintained, while ensuring independence for operations that are conducted in the national interests of either nation.

The formation of the BPG in 2002 was the genesis of this effort. The part that this group played in the relationship between Canada and the US in matters of continental security extends beyond just the two operational commands.

USNORTHCOM is a massive organization that was stood up in 2002 to coordinate the military aspects of homeland defense efforts driven by the larger Homeland Security office in Washington. CANCOM, a much smaller organization, was brought about from the vision of the current CDS and incorporated in the Defence portion of Canada's IPS. This "single integrated structure that will be able to bring the best available military resources from across Canada"²¹, known as CANCOM, is now analyzing the best method by which it can foster this vital relationship. These commands envision the defence of the two nations from a continental perspective in a way that can only enhance their relationship.

In order to enhance the bi-lateral approach, Canada sent a Flag officer as the Canadian Liaison Officer to USNORTHCOM. This allowed an additional insight, beyond the efforts of the NORAD staff, to interface with USNORTHCOM, and provide the Canadian perspective on matters requiring a bi-

²¹ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Overview...*, 18.

lateral approach or even in matters requiring assistance from either nation. This was further supplemented by Canadian officers from the BPG being placed into the USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center (NC-JOC). These Canadian Watch Officers are responsible for ensuring the exchange of strategic and operational information between the National Defence Command Center (NDCC) in Ottawa and the NC-JOC. A seam here is that NORAD, through the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center is responsible for the same exchange of information with NDCC.

This initial effort is now being furthered to expand upon the success of this initial effort. An implementation plan is underway to secure additional positions for Canadians in USNORTHCOM and for Americans in Canada Command. This plan has various courses of action being developed as an interim solution, which requires flexibility due to the growing relationship that is developing between these two commands. Building on the initial liaison officers, this implementation plan is reviewing the viability of additional officers being made available to various directorates, such that they are able to place the main effort on “information sharing, coordination of operations, and planning”²² with a secondary effort on “net-centric communications, training, exercises, and lessons learned.”²³ The plan, approved by the CDS and Admiral Keating, is considering having up to 15 additional Canadian officers with USNORTHCOM in Colorado

²² *Information Brief, Implementation Plan for NORAD, USNORTHCOM and CANADA COM Coordination Construct*, March 2006, 5. This information is from a brief given by BGen McQuillan, the Canadian LO to USNORTHCOM to the Deputy Commanders of NORAD and USNORTHCOM.

²³ *Ibid.*, 5.

Springs, while the US would provide, presumably, a similar number of officers to CANCOM to conduct the same efforts on behalf of USNORTHCOM.

It has become a fact that these two commands are seeing a tighter relationship develop, as they pursue the missions of military assistance to homeland defence. They have set up differing doctrinal structures to support their efforts, but what is not easily determined is how each command interacts with the truly bi-national command – NORAD. The next section of this paper will deal with this thorny issue through the eyes of the BPG.

THE ROLE AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BPG

The formation of this unique group came about in 2002 through an exchange of diplomatic notes and after the change in the US UCP brought about the formation of USNORTHCOM. As was previously indicated, this command is charged with military assistance to the Department of Homeland Security in support of the homeland defence mission. This command, co-located in Colorado Springs with NORAD, happens to be commanded by the same General / Flag officer. The events that lead to the formation of this command also lead the Governments of Canada and the US to re-examine continental defence beyond the existing NORAD construct.

Existing Canadian officers at NORAD as well as US officers at both NORAD and USNORTHCOM were brought together to begin working this new organization called the Bi-National Planning Group. Work started immediately and newly positioned officers and non-commissioned members from Canada

started to flow into Colorado Springs to replace the NORAD assigned officers to work the issues that the BPG was charged with pursuing. The Deputy Commander of NORAD, a Canadian General officer, was designated as the Head of the BPG, with the Deputy Head of the BPG going to the Deputy Commander of USNORTHCOM, an American General officer. The staff of the BPG is lead by American and Canadian Colonels designated co-directors of the BPG. The initial team was a 50/50 split with the Canadians being all military personnel and the American side consisting of half military and half military contractors.²⁴ This team set to work on the BPG aim “to determine the changes in concepts, policies, authorities, organization or technology needed to facilitate improved military cooperation between Canada and the United States.”²⁵ A daunting and challenging task placed upon this newly formed group was to “determine the optimal defense arrangements in order to prevent or mitigate threats or attacks...in Canada or the United States.”²⁶

Over the next three and a half years, seeing their original mandate extended for a further two years, this team worked diligently on the assigned tasks producing the Interim Report in October 2004 and the Final Report in March 2006. These landmarks reports blew the dust off of generations of bi-lateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs), documents, operations plans, and contingency plans, which, in some cases, were decades out of date. The BPG compiled this library of 366 classified and unclassified documents into one

²⁴ United States. Department of Defense. *Bi-National Planning Group, Interim Report on Canada and the United States (CANUS) Enhanced Military Cooperation...*, Appendix III.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, i.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, i.

place.²⁷ Tackling this mountain of data took a massive amount of effort from the entire staff, which then was able to forge a path ahead to make recommendations on suggested ways ahead to further Canadian and US military cooperation in all domains.

The initial difficulty encountered by the team was in orienting themselves to the existing constructs, once comfortable with existing arrangements within NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) J3 Continental. Although their efforts ranged across the spectrum of information sharing, reviewing and renewing contingency plans, to exercises and training, the truly transformational part of their efforts revolved around future levels of cooperation between the two nations when it came to continental defence. The other efforts are supporting pieces to the new view of how Canada and the United States would approach issues of bi-national concern in the post 9/11 era of homeland defence.

In their Interim Report, the BPG recommended four different approaches to a new look command and control arrangement for continental security. These included: a virtual approach with only information sharing being utilized; parallel commands sharing a Joint and Combined Operations and Information Center (JCOIC); a difficult and unwieldy Joint and Combined Operations, Information, and Interagency Center (JCOIIC) concept; and a bi-national command with

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Appendix IV

functional sub-commands.²⁸ None of these concepts are seen as truly workable solutions given the sovereignty concerns expressed by Canadians and the overarching national interest concerns expressed by the US.

The final report issued by the BPG expanded on these initial concepts and refined them after receiving a great deal of input from Canadian and US sources. Some factors had changed since the interim report was issued and primary amongst these changes was the creation of CANCOM and the new ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), with each having parallel structures in the US – USNORTHCOM and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In Chapter Seven of the Final Report, four new bi-national command concepts were developed, all of which were variations on a central theme. The theme being that there are four cornerstones to the Canada – US security relationship, those cornerstones being CANCOM and PSEPC in Canada, and USNORTHCOM and DHS in the US. The variations to this theme are how these cornerstones interact on bi-national and unilateral issues.²⁹

In my opinion, one concept that has merits over the others is the establishment of a North American Defense Command, which would build upon the 49 years of bi-national command and control that NORAD has conducted in an exemplary fashion. The BPG's **government directed** mandate, not a military to military cooperative venture, was indeed to look at how to best enhance Canada

²⁸ United States. Department of Defense. *Bi-National Planning Group, Interim Report on Canada and the United States (CANUS) Enhanced Military Cooperation...*, Chapter 5. Further detailed information is available in the Interim Report pgs. 58-72.

²⁹ United States. Department of Defense. *Bi-National Planning Group, The Final Report on Canada and the United States (CANUS) Enhanced Military Cooperation*, March 13, 2006, Chapter 7. Further detailed information is available in the Final Report pgs. 35-41.

– US military cooperation. They have done this in the best traditions of military service, and the upcoming NORAD renewal agreement will provide us with the first view of how our two great Nations will work together to provide the best capability to conduct that most vital of missions – defence of the homeland.

NORAD PRIMACY IN COMMAND AND CONTROL OF BI-NATIONAL OPERATIONS

A unique 49-year old relationship stands to be fundamentally changed in May 2006, as the NORAD agreement finishes another round of negotiations. There has been much speculation that this renewal of the agreement will include a maritime component to the agreement. Proponents of this new mission set include the former Chief of Naval operations, Admiral Vern Clark, who has stated that “(a) maritime NORAD is essential.”³⁰ Agents of change to the NORAD agreement are also at the highest levels of government in Canada. The former Defence Minister, The Honourable Bill Graham, in a speech to the Empire Club in April of 2005 stated, “it’s appropriate to consider the possibility of expanding our current defence cooperation to include maritime and land-based elements as well.”³¹ Notwithstanding a change of government in Canada, the new Defence Minister, The Honourable Gordon O’Connor, echoed these same sentiments in an address to the Conference of Defence Associations where he agreed that “this


³⁰ Robert K. Ackerman, “Pace of Change Accelerates for the U.S. Navy,” *Signal, AFCEA’s International Journal*, December 2004. online version; available from <http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/anmviewer.asp?a=579&z=41> ; Internet; accessed 15 October 2005.

government is committed to renewing and strengthening it (the NORAD agreement) – notably by giving NORAD a role to play in maritime surveillance and early warning.”³² Although the specific function of maritime surveillance and early warning is mentioned, this could be viewed as a stepping stone to the enhanced cooperation between the two nations in continental defence. This is seen as an early look ahead at what may become an entirely new NORAD; unlike the Cold War dinosaur that it was, but a command postured and prepared to bi-laterally defend North America from not only the traditional threats but the insidious asymmetric threats. NORAD has a unique command and control (C2) arrangement in North America in that the commander, by the wording of the agreement, is responsible equally to the Prime Minister of Canada as well as the President of the US for the defence of the homeland from aerospace threats. The NORAD agreement is not simply an ad hoc military to military agreement but a formalized nation to nation agreement. It is this unique aspect that stands to ensure that both nations prosper from the defensive capabilities inherent within this command. The agreement has been providing C2 of bi-lateral operations for 49 years, ensuring both nations operate seamlessly in the conduct of aerospace defence of North America. This seamless C2 capability provided by a bi-national team of Americans and Canadians is the strength of NORAD.

³¹ Department of National Defence, Minister’s Speeches Archive – 22 April 2005, *Speech to the Empire Club of Canada*; available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1655; Internet; accessed 7 March 2005.

³² Department of National Defence, Minister’s Speech – 23 February 2006, *Speaking Notes for the Honourable Gordon J. O’Connor, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute Annual General Meeting*; available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1860; Internet; accessed 6 March 2005.

A well-defined C2 arrangement, which presently exists at NORAD, is vital to **further advance** the effort of certainly the maritime and, perhaps, the land defence of North America. The C2 issue has been critical in the deliberations of the BPG. As mentioned earlier in this paper, the final report of the BPG detailed four different concepts for a continental defense C2 structure. The C2 arrangement is a critical pillar that needs to be fully supported in whatever format it takes but it is the opinion of this officer that the structure indicated below best supports the interests of both nations.



BPG Final Report – Concept for Single Command for Continental Defense³³

The statement below the box best sums up the simplicity of this structure and ensures that the evolution of NORAD from aerospace defence to full-

³³ Department of Defense. *Bi-National Planning Group, The Final Report on Canada and the United States (CANUS) Enhanced Military Cooperation...*, 38.

spectrum defence is fully realized and remains in the best interest of both nations. Full-spectrum operations ensure that a complete picture of threats to North America is compiled and that responses requiring bi-national efforts are fully supported and those requiring unilateral responses are conducted by the appropriate authority.

CONCLUSION

“(T)he US wants to add maritime surveillance to NORAD’s traditional workload of watching air and land.”³⁴

Admiral Timothy J. Keating,

Commander NORAD/USNORTHCOM

The proponents of the maritime mission, in whatever form it takes, are many, as has been discussed in the paper. Having the present Commander of these two commands espouse these same views is highly encouraging for the future of the military efforts in support of the homeland defence of continental North America. The watershed moments that were provided as a result of the tragedy of 9/11 awoke the governments of both Canada and the US in that our shared continent is not invulnerable to attacks; either traditional or asymmetric threats.

NORAD, the older brother, with its infant siblings, USNORTHCOM and CANCOM, are poised to provide an unprecedented

level of cooperation to ensure our citizenry remains safe from attack to the best of shared abilities. The seams are evident and have been discussed throughout this paper. The staff of the BPG has put a concerted effort into identifying the gaps in continental defence. The problems have been identified to the governments of Canada and the US. It is up to them to utilize a construct that has worked for 49 years and remains unprecedented in bi-lateral synergistic effects. They must ensure that NORAD, with its proven capability in command and control of bi-lateral operations, remains as relevant today in defence of the continent, as it did so stalwartly during the Cold War era. NORAD stood the test against the symmetrical threat and stands poised to transform itself to defeat the insidious asymmetric threat.

³⁴ Pam Zubeck, "NORAD doesn't rely on Canadian backing," *The Gazette* (Colorado Springs: April 8, 2005)

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