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MAXIMIZING CF AIRLIFT CAPABILITY: THE PERSONNEL PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

Significant attention has been focused on the multitude of problems currently hindering Canada's Air Force. The declines in funding and reductions in force structure over the last decade have exacted a wide ranging toll. The situation facing the airlift fleet has been particularly acute. Supporting deployed operations globally with aircraft reaching the end of their useful life, the CC130 Hercules has been in a state of slow decline for years. While much of the attention has been focused on the airframe itself, little, if any, has been focused on the other elements that comprise the tactical airlift core capability. A review of the training and force generation practices within the airlift community confirms there are still options available in the near term to maximize the capability of airlift in the Canadian Forces. These options must be undertaken to enhance airlift flexibility and capability during the long road to recovery which has just begun.

INTRODUCTION

Over the previous several years, much attention has been focused on the shortfalls in CF operational capability. While these shortfalls span all three services, those evident within the air force, particularly in the area of air mobility, have received a deservedly heightened scrutiny. The Air Force has continued to attempt to maintain the construct embodied within the 1994 White Paper on Defence to ensure its interoperability and relevance.

> The retention of multi-purpose, combat-capable forces represents the only prudent choice for Canada. It is only through the maintenance of the core military capabilities that define such forces that, come what may, Canada will be able to attend to its own security needs - both now and in the future.[1]

At the same time, the White Paper called for sweeping reductions in personnel and resources and directed the life extension of equipment "wherever cost effective and prudent"[2] In the process of achieving these reductions, it was determined "…personnel reductions were necessary in order to continue to fund the Capital Equipment Modernization Program."[3] Subsequently, significant losses in highly skilled personnel and elimination or substantial reductions in air force fleets seriously eroded overall capabilities. The publication in 2004 of Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy was not much of a change in standard Canadian defence policy statements. The emphasis in the 1994 White Paper on Defence was on the protection of Canada, Canada - United States defence cooperation, and contributing to international security. In 2004, the terminology has changed somewhat, but the essential mission has

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[1] DND Policy Group, "1994 White Paper on Defence," http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/white_e.htm; Internet; accessed 24 February, 2006.

[2] Department of National Defence, A-AG-007-000/AF-002 *The Aerospace Capability Framework* (Ottawa: Director General Air Force Development, 2003), F2.

[3] Department of National Defence, A-AG-007-000/AF-002 …F5.

not. We are again addressing three primary national security interests, those being protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad, ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to our allies, and contributing to international security.[4] What had changed in that ten year span were the operational capabilities of the Canadian Forces and the requirement for continuous sustained deployments in the Middle East.

One Canadian Forces capability that has been stretched to the limit over this timeframe is tactical airlift. Tactical airlift is a uniquely military function and it provides a core capability within the Canadian Forces.

> Core capabilities are, in fact, comprised of several inter-twined elements – mainly trained people, equipment, command and control systems, training establishments, and logistical resources and units.[5]

As such, when addressing the shortfalls within a core capability one must consider all elements as a whole. Although numerous articles have been written on the requirement to replace the CC130 Hercules fleet, minimal attention has been focused on the personnel and training side of the equation.

Significant changes in training practices and overall airlift community attitudes are essential to maximize CF airlift capability and flexibility today and into the future. In support of this thesis, it is necessary to review the historical context encompassing Canadian airlift operations, identify the limiting factors in personnel and capital assets and finally, present options to enhance airlift capability in the near and long term.

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[4] Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society : Canada's National Security Policy*, (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004), 5.

[5] Douglas L. Bland, "Finding National Defence Policy in 2004," *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 3.

Unlike strategic airlift, tactical airlift cannot be chartered or leased. A commitment to ensuring all Hercules crews receive minimum tactical operating skills at the beginning of their training will better reflect the goals set out by air force leadership as described in Strategic Vectors under the 'Mission First' attribute: "The first mission theme is **to be combat-capable** for future operations."[6] Revised initial and recurrent training goals for all aircrew utilizing the CC130 Hercules will maximize progress towards this end.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The role of air mobility within the Canadian Forces has been a significant enabler of military and humanitarian missions for many years. From operations in Burma during World War II, through the Korean War, support to a multitude of UN and NATO missions, participation in Gulf War I, search and rescue to our current commitments in Afghanistan, air mobility has been an integral component of Canada's mission success. In order to fully appreciate the situation as it stands today, it is necessary to review Canadian airlift practices from the Cold war era.

Since its initial arrival in the early 1960's, the Hercules has been the workhorse of the air mobility fleet. Joined in 1970 by the venerable Boeing 707, these two airframes carried the vast majority of Canadian Forces personnel and equipment world wide in support of operations. The Boeing 707 was replaced in 1997 by the Polaris (Airbus A310), another civilian pattern strategic airliner of which four were converted with 'doors and floors' to enable palletized cargo capabilities and two of these combi versions are currently completing modifications to enable strategic air-air refueling.[7] During the Cold War era,

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[6] Director General Air Force Development, *Strategic Vectors : The Air Force Transformation Vision* (Ottawa: NDHQ/Chief of the Air Staff, 2004), 39.

[7] Canada's Air Force Homepage, "Aircraft," http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/equip/equip1_e.asp ; Internet; accessed 3 March 2006.

the primary military mission for both fleets would have been the movement of military personnel and equipment in response to NATO commitments in Europe following a Soviet invasion of western Europe. With the great bulk of heavy and out-sized equipment already positioned at Canadian Forces bases in Germany, the airlift community was reasonably well postured to meet expected mission requirements. Training was predicated upon a global airlift capability to build crew experience for the expected role of a trans-Atlantic air bridge to Europe. Tactical training followed in the next few years and given the operational tempo, and resources available, this training progression model worked effectively. The closure of these European bases by 1994 following the end of the Cold War era and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991[8] would be the beginning of a significant change that the airlift community would be slow to recognize and adapt to. The end of the Cold War, accompanied by the globally expected 'peace dividend' or reduction in defence spending, was unfortunately accompanied by an increase in operational tempo.[9] With Canadian Forces members deploying overseas in ever increasing numbers, the demands for airlift support increased at the same time funding for national procurement (long term maintenance and supplies for fleet support) was being reduced across the board to fund international operations.[10]

THE CURRENT PROBLEM

Effectively, the Hercules is a tactical or intra-theater air lifter, designed to carry combat troops and/or loads over medium distances and deliver them via airdrop or via operations on austere and relatively short landing strips. This, coupled with its palletized cargo

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[8]Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, "Cold War," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_war; Internet; accessed 15 March, 2006.

[9] Department of National Defence, A-AG-007-000/AF-002 ... 43.

[10] Brian MacDonald, "The Capital and the Future Force Crisis," in *Canada Without Armed Forces?*, ed. Douglas L.Bland, 29-54 (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 29-31.

system, rear ramp and door loading capability and its near strategic or "stratactical"[11] flight distances at reduced payloads, have made the Hercules extremely adaptable to a multitude of roles. The United States currently employs the Hercules in 17 distinct mission roles.[12] Accordingly, Canadian CC130 Hercules roles have also increased to meet evolving needs including air-air refueling and search and rescue in the early 1990's.[13]

Currently the Canadian Forces operates a fleet of 32 CC130 Hercules. These aircraft carry out four mission roles: strategic airlift, tactical air transport (TAT), air-air refueling (AR) and search and rescue (SAR) operations. Hercules aircraft are currently based at 14 Wing Greenwood (SAR), 17 Wing Winnipeg (AR and SAR) and 8 Wing Trenton (TAT and SAR). All wings and crews carry out strategic airlift missions. In addition, 8 Wing is also the base for the CC130 operational training unit (OTU) as well as the TAT and SAR conversion courses. The AR conversion course is generated in Winnipeg which retains the five CC130T tanker versions of the Hercules.[14]

Although they all use the same basic airframe and all crews attend the same initial course on the CC130 Hercules, for the most part, this is where the similarities end. Those personnel moving into the SAR role attend the SAR conversion course that immediately follows the initial course. Upon completion, approximately two weeks later, they return to their respective units and are operationally employable in the SAR and strategic airlift role. In the AR role, personnel are selected within the unit as required to meet manning

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[11] Martin Shadwick, "The Strategic Airlift Enigma," *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 63.

[12] Federation of American Scientists, "C-130 Hercules," http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/c-130.htm; Internet; accessed 1 March 2006.

[13] 17 Wing Winnipeg, "435 Transport and Rescue Squadron," http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/17wing/squadron/435_e.asp; Internet; accessed 3 March, 2006.

[14] Canada's Air Force Homepage, "Aircraft," http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/organization3_e.asp ; Internet; accessed 3 March 2006.

levels just prior to the respective course dates and approximately two weeks later, they are operationally employable in the AR and strategic airlift role. For TAT, the training is divided into two distinct courses. The Basic (BTAT) course is loaded with personnel who have generally spent an extended period on the squadron employed in the strategic airlift role. Subsequently, personnel with several years of TAT training and experience will form the pool from which a smaller cadre will attend the Advanced (ATAT) course. This latter course deals with an enhanced ability to plan for and counter the more advanced radar guided threat systems and hostile fighter activity. Of the 22 potential TAT crews that could be generated, no more than four current ATAT crews are maintained at any one time because of the additional training requirements.[15] These ATAT crews form the vanguard of any tactical airlift effort where there is the risk or a known threat in an operational theatre.[16]

One significant problem that presents itself is that all available crews at 436 Squadron (the sole remaining tactical airlift squadron) do not have the initial tactical course and as a result, are not employable in a tactical environment. Given a four to five year posting cycle for most Hercules aircrew, approximately 15 - 20% of crews will not be employable in the tactical airlift role. Although both the SAR and AR roles struggle to maintain their respective operational force levels, the current force generation model for the TAT role is particularly problematic in the face of a sustained period of force employment, as has been witnessed since late in 2001 when ATAT crews were first employed for operations in Afghanistan continuing through to today.

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[15] Confirmed via telecom with Maj M. Ferries, A3 Tpt Sys, 1 Canadian Air Division

[16] LCol M. Cournoyer, "Time for the Creation of a Canadian Special Operations CC130 Hercules Flight" (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course New Horizons Paper, 2002), 9-10.

A multitude of factors over the last 15 years plus have contributed to the reduction in the level of service provided in all roles accomplished with the Hercules. The reduction in defence spending has been felt by all services across the board. These reductions not only required the standing down of a number of utility and support squadrons but also resulted in under funding the major air force fleets in the area of national procurement while for many, including the Hercules, support to deployed operational tempo was rising.[17] The Force Reduction Program and ensuing downsizing of highly experienced personnel had a significant impact on the Air Force MOC 500 series trades (aircraft maintainers). The resultant hole in the maintenance demographics is being felt at its worst now with a significant shortfall of qualified maintenance personnel at a time they are needed most. The 19 remaining E-model CC130's are rapidly reaching the end of their service life and are currently the high time military C130's in the world. This has also caused both second and third line (depot level) maintenance repair times to be excessively long as these airframes consistently suffer additional maintenance problems not originally factored into the timelines for second and third line repairs.[18] This, coupled with attempts to meet the current force generation and increased force employment requirements, places a maintenance driven non-sustainable flying rate on the remaining aircraft in service, further exacerbating the fleet's long term health. Put simply, for every flying rate surge in excess of maintenance sustainability, an equal reduction in flying rates is required to return the fleet to a balanced state. As second and third line maintenance facilities have an extremely limited capability to expand production, any long term surge beyond the current maintenance capabilities will result in aircraft sitting on the ramp, out of hours

[17] Department of National Defence, A-AG-007-000/AF-002 *The Aerospace Capability Framework* (Ottawa: Director General Air Force Development, 2003), 43.

[18] Brian MacDonald, "The Capital and the Future Force Crisis," … 30.

and waiting extended periods for a maintenance slot.[19] This is exactly the situation the Canadian Forces has been operating in since the late 1990's.

All of these factors have contributed to a steady decline in the flying capacity of the current Hercules fleet from 21,000 hours in the late 1990's to a low of 15,500 hrs in fiscal 2005 - 2006. Through the same time period, a significant increase in the flying hours dedicated to deployed operational support greatly impeded the hours available for routine continuation and aircrew upgrade training domestically.[20] Aircrew specialty categories are achieved through formal instructional courses and on the job training (OJT) at the squadrons. In addition, detailed quarterly, semi-annual, and annual currency requirements are laid out for each specialty role to ensure a minimum level of proficiency is maintained in all tasks included within that specialty. These flying tasks, some of which must be conducted with a designated training officer, are further reinforced with non flying requirements which include mandatory simulator training and a multitude of exams covering all aspects of flight operations from aircraft systems to flight procedures to domestic and international aviation rules and regulations.[21] With deployed aircrew, operations can be a bit of a double edged sword and the current mission in Afghanistan is a classic example. As a result, crews participating in an operation can fly a disproportionate amount of the hours available yet, when they complete their tour, find themselves with a large number of expired currencies. The fact of the matter is operational requirements drive the flying tempo and a multitude of currencies, currently in the airdrop category, are not going to be maintained in the theatre of operations.

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[19] *Ibid*., 29.

[20] 1 Canadian Air Division, "A3 Airlift Task Planning," http://winnipeg.mil.ca/a3airlift_planning_e.htm; Intranet; accessed 20 March 2006.

[21] 1 Canadian Air Division, "1 Canadian Air Division Orders, Volume 5-Training and Standards," http://winnipeg.mil.ca/HQSec/1cadordr/orders_word_e.htm; Intranet; accessed 3 March 2006.

Certain of these deficiencies can and are overcome with diligent pre-deployment training. Other shortfalls have been addressed utilizing the variable tour length construct developed by the tactical aviation community which was subsequently adopted by the air mobility and maritime patrol communities. This has greatly mitigated a number of problems including distributing flying hours amongst all crews at a much more equitable rate and allowing crews to meet their overall currency requirements prior to them lapsing.[22] In addition, aircrew actively engaged in the upgrade process do not spend extended periods in theatre unable to progress in through the OJT process. All of this enhances the overall balance of current capability as well as allowing the ongoing upgrade training schedules at the squadrons to continue thereby ensuring the longer term production of qualified aircrew. Unfortunately, the variable term construct poses problems of its own.

The primary problem with the variable tour length approach is that it requires more crews to implement and maintain a sustained operation. As a result, additional crews from the AR role have been utilized to support the ongoing operations with a detrimental impact on force employment and force generation in the AR role due to its already limited force structure of five crews. Starting in 2002, 435 Squadron has provided two crews on two separate occasions to augment shortfalls evident in tactical airlift capability. In the first instance it completed a modified BTAT course, essentially a BTAT course without the airdrop qualifications. During the second period of augmentation in 2005 – 2006, the entire BTAT course was completed to satisfy the requirements of the existing

[22] Department of National Defence, A-AG-007-000/AF-002 ... 49.

qualification standard, as none has been formally developed for an abridged BTAT course to date.[23]

The flying hours needed for currency requirements and ongoing training represents a fixed or baseline percentage of the overall fleet capability for a given number of crews. As the Hercules flying rate reduced based on the maintenance sustainability issues discussed earlier, this baseline percentage increased relative to the total hours remaining resulting in fewer hours available for operational support. This led 1 Canadian Air Division to complete an analysis of the crew force structure with the goal of optimizing operational support in the near term. With no ability to increase the Hercules flying rate, a decision to reduce the number of crews from 58 to 51 across all roles was undertaken in late 2003 which would reduce the fixed force generation baseline and free up hours for operational support as well as increases in training hours available for the remaining crews.[24]

These competing demands for flying hours amongst the four primary roles have lead to a deepening of the divisions within the air mobility community. Most notably, the fixation on domestic SAR operations as a drain on the deployed operational capabilities (support to war fighting) of the Hercules fleet. Currently, the CC130 Hercules covers domestic fixed wing Search and Rescue from Alberta's western border, through the far north and into the middle of the Atlantic Ocean and the CC115 Buffalo, ideally suited for operations in the mountains, covers British Columbia and a small portion of the Pacific Ocean to which Canada has responsibility in accordance with federal government

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[23] As witnessed by the author in both A3 Airlift Task and 435 Squadron Pilot Leader positions from 2002 through 2005.

[24] Confirmed via telecom with Maj M. Ferries, A3 Tpt Sys, 1 Canadian Air Division and constitutes a summary of the details in Comd 213 and 239 messages issued in November and December 2003.

mandates.[25] Contrary to some opinions within the air mobility leadership, the CC130 Hercules is an ideal platform for fixed wing SAR in Canada. Given Canada's extremely large geographic size, an airframe with its extended flight range is ideally suited to meet the strategic challenges that SAR in Canada routinely presents. Another critical advantage is the lengthy on scene periods for conducting search operations that the CC130 Hercules provides, reducing the frequency of transiting for fuel. In many instances, this capability makes searching in the remote north possible given the limited number of airfields and the unpredictability of the weather.

The proposed fixed wing SAR replacement project (often erroneously referred to as the 'Hercules get well project') is viewed by many as a major step in the right direction to free up resources in support of deployed operations. This line of thinking stems from the 'fleet centric' school of thought which remains prevalent in the air force and does not adequately address certain critical issues, key of which is personnel. The establishment of an additional airframe will result in a significant drain of personnel resources from the CC130 Hercules, both in aircrews and maintenance personnel. Although the simultaneous stand down of the CC115 Buffalo will provide offsets to this, an additional training cadre will have to be established to bolster the current structure to enable ongoing force generation requirements for 25 or more fixed wing SAR crews in Canada on a new platform. These problems will be further compounded by the reduction in available personnel with the requisite experience to fill numerous positions in joint and coalition headquarters.

Surprisingly, this runs counter to then Chief of the Air Staff, LGen Pennie's statement:

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[25] Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GA-209-001/FP001 *International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2001) A1-1.

> While aircraft and equipment acquired for combat can generally be used to execute peacetime roles, aircraft and equipment acquired for purely peacetime roles often have little if any value in combat. Combat-capability, therefore, should form the basis of other capabilities.[26]

Utilizing this direction, it would make eminently more sense to fix the problems inherent with the existing aircraft type than to proceed with a procurement process which most likely will deliver equipment unsuitable to support operations in a combat theatre of operations.

NEAR TERM SOLUTION

What options are available? First, we must consider what cannot be accomplished in the near term and what can be affected quickly from within current guidelines and resources. Second, it is imperative to ensure that any measures undertaken in the near term are consistent with both current needs and anticipated long term requirements. Recent announcements under the Liberal government of an invigorated defence budget were further enhanced by the current Conservative government's defence platform.[27] However, much of this funding and increases in force manning levels will take many years to yield productive results. Certainly the announcement to pursue the acquisition of 16 J-model Hercules aircraft will go a long way to reducing second and third line maintenance requirements, increasing serviceability rates and mitigating the current issue of significantly reduced flying rates.[28] Again, this will provide much needed improvement in air lift capability in the long term, but no benefits will be forthcoming in the near future given our lengthy procurement process. While the current fleet of 32 aircraft is

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[26] Lieutenant-General K. Pennie, "Transforming Canada's Air Force: Vectors for the Future," *Canadian Military Journal* 5, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 41.

[27] Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform 2006, "Stand Up For Canada," http://www.conservative.ca/media/20060113-Platform.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 March 2006.

[28] Martin Shadwick, "The Labours of Hercules," *Canadian Military Journal* 6, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 107.

definitely strained under the operational commitments, it is still meeting these requirements. Barring the discovery of an unanticipated structural problem, a serious possibility given the age of the fleet, the current aircraft should continue to provide their current level of support assuming replacements are procured in a timely fashion.

As was previously indicated, the limiting factor in TAT operations has been qualified aircrew. The provision of additional crew to the TAT role with its present force generation structure would not be supportable due to the excessive training costs associated and the more than eight years required to train new recruits.[29] However, a review of the current requirements in our operational deployments and an honest assessment of the roles we will be committed to in the future does provide an opportunity to increase our capability both in the short and long term. The current BTAT course provides a number of training intensive skill sets including air drop procedures for both equipment and personnel that are not utilized in our current support role in Afghanistan. It is also highly probable that Canadian Forces air mobility assets will continue to be involved in similar types of operations well into the future and is clearly articulated in our need to "…adapt their capabilities and force structure to deal, in particular, with threats that arise from the kind of instability that we have seen abroad, especially in failed states.".[30] In order to increase the flexibility of these assets, CC130 Hercules aircrew training needs to refocus its basic qualification from strategic airlift, to tactical air land operations. Tactical air land operations would encompass most of the skill sets of the current BTAT qualification with the exception of the training intensive airdrop skills. This change in core competency would require a considerable change in the current

[29] Department of National Defence, A-AG-007-000/AF-002 ..., 47.

[30] Department of National Defence, A-JS-005-000/AG-001 *Canada's International Policy Statement A Role of Pride and Influence in the World DEFENCE* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005) 11.

initial Hercules course but could begin to produce results in the near term. The additional flexibility in personnel available for deployment would broaden the burden across all CC130 Hercules operators, not just the limited crews trained to the BTAT or ATAT standard. This would ensure the ability to maintain operations in a low threat environment either independently or in a coalition while still ensuring there is a core group fully trained in the more specialized areas of tactical airlift to respond to any contingencies that may occur.

With a renewed emphasis on joint and combined training, the existing limited numbers of TAT qualified aircrew within the Canadian Forces is going to face even more pressures in the future. Focusing the initial CC130 Hercules qualification on tactical air land would greatly assist air mobility's capability in meeting these challenges and enhance its ability to operate efficiently both in joint and combined training and deployed operations. In addition to changes in the initial OTU, significant adjustments can be affected during routine training and airlift mission to truly reinforce this shift in core competency. The routine use of secure communication equipment, crypto, and a focus on tactical flying skills can easily be managed within existing training envelopes. The majority of these tasks would become a routine part of domestic operations and training, with no additional costs in terms of flying hours. Those currency items requiring dedicated flying time to accomplish would require balancing and in some cases replacement with similar, yet less demanding, existing capabilities. Routine domestic operations such as Op Boxtop, executed twice each year to effect the re-supply of CFS Alert, would make an ideal template for a concentrated TAT exercise. As the primary focus would then move to core military capabilities for all personnel involved with CC130 Hercules operations, some of

the airline mentality noted within the CC130 Hercules community could be reduced ensuring they are "…morally, physically and intellectually fit for combat operations, disciplined and committed to the primacy of operations.".[31] Such a change would be a much welcomed improvement.

CONCLUSION

The problems currently facing the Canadian Forces air mobility community and the resultant pressures on tactical airlift are going to continue for many years into the future. SAR operations are going to continue as a Canadian military mandate and the great majority of the fixed wing portion of this capability will be provided by the CC130 Hercules and its 19 crews at least for the immediate future. The shortages of qualified maintenance personnel will also continue to limit the rate of sustainable growth within the fleet. The acquisition of new aircraft to replace the aging fleet of CC130's is definitely a large part of the long term solution; however, it is not by any means a solution in and of itself.

The critical capability for sustained tactical airlift operations has proven to be trained personnel. As the timelines for injecting new personnel into these positions are lengthy and there is only a very limited ability to redirect other personnel from other aircraft fleets, any additional capacity relative to the aircrew portion of this core capability has to be met from within the current fleet crew structure. There is an obvious requirement to address, at a minimum, the manner in which BTAT and ATAT crews are generated. Ideally, this should be expanded to include all CC130 Hercules aircrew operating in any role to be capable in the air land role. This larger number of tactical crews will provide

[31] Lieutenant-General K. Pennie, "Transforming Canada's Air Force: Vectors for the Future," *Canadian Military Journal* 5, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 42.

far greater flexibility at our current operational tempo and provide far greater latitude for growth in capability for the future. Addressing this critical component in the training environment offers both near and long term benefits for the Canadian Forces.

There is some reason for optimism that a measure of relief on the aircrew element may soon appear. During a meeting of the Air Mobility Advisory Group in February 2006, 1 Canadian Air Division's Deputy Commander of Force Generation directed that a means to enable the CC130 Operational Training Unit to produce aircrews that would be immediately employable in our current theatre of operations had to be achieved. As a result, numerous staff efforts are currently underway to provide a detailed solution to the problem. The change from a strategic to tactical focus in CC130 Hercules airlift operations is long overdue. This would provide a much greater degree of flexibility for the Canadian Forces as a whole. In addition, it would ensure that all elements of the crew force are "Properly trained forces able to conduct operations throughout the spectrum of conflict."[32] This would properly address the current shortfall in personnel training practices on the CC130 Hercules and provide a considerable enhancement in tactical airlift capability in both the near term, and into the future.

[32] Department of National Defence, A-AG-007-000/AF-002 *The Aerospace Capability Framework* (Ottawa: Director General Air Force Development, 2003), 60.

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