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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

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MDS PAPER

**CANADA'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY:
THE NEED TO ENSURE CANADIANS UNDERSTAND**

By / par LCDR J.S.R. PETERS
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ABSTRACT

The publication of ‘Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy’, in April, 2004, demonstrated the federal government’s resolve to address the threats to national security, which were so overwhelmingly crystallized in post-September 2001 geo-political environment. Although it articulates the threats to Canada, and proposes seven chapters of security measures to counter those threats, these will not be the focus of the paper. This paper will assess the effectiveness of chapter one, ‘Canada’s Approach to National Security’, in justifying the requirement of such a policy tool. As with all government policies, there are opportunity costs which must be borne within the other government priorities. In order to ensure Canadians understand, and accept these opportunity costs, they must comprehend the political debate that precipitated such a policy decision.

This paper will submit for consideration the components, which must anchor this debate, in order to ensure that each Canadian follows the linear relationship from core national values, to national interests and goals, and then on to the development of a grand national strategy to achieve those interests and goals. Understanding this relationship, allows for the resultant policy tools to be identified as enablers to the grand national strategy. This paper will also introduce models which allow for the effective marshalling of thought, within the complex, and sometimes competing, domestic and international political challenges, necessary for the develop of said strategy and policy. In this manner, the paper will demonstrate that not only can the National Security Policy be intellectually justified to Canadians, but also scripted in a manner to ensure they comprehend the national political debate surrounding the issue.

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INTRODUCTION

The early 1950's, when North America faced a Soviet intercontinental nuclear capability, was a geo-strategic period not unlike the early twenty-first century; no longer were the ocean expanses to be considered as sufficient barriers to counter direct threats to national sovereignty. In fact, one could view the terrorist attacks against the United States, in September, 2001, as the latest in a series of international crises which began with the Persian Gulf in 1990, followed by the Balkans, Africa and then again in the Middle East. These events, and those that followed, eventually, and irrevocably, dislodged North American society from its short-lived belief that the demise of the Cold War had enabled the world to cease bi-polar brinkmanship and enter into a period of enlightened diplomatic effort, free from the need of super-power military confrontation, when addressing the seemingly minor issues that existed outside the Capitalist-Communist main arena of international politics. In fact, by early 2001, it was becoming keenly apparent that this simply would not be the case. The seemingly endless supply of political brushfires led some to opine that the world would not simply fall into a state of organized development. Lawrence Freedman alluded to the challenges ahead by stating: "... the spread of the western model is likely to depend on deliberate and determined political action as much as osmosis or market forces." He added that it was not realistic to believe that these hot spots would effortlessly emerge into emerging markets, and concludes his paper with: "if Western countries believe that they can only feel really secure through the construction of a global liberal order they are going to find it hard

work.”¹ There was also a growing realization in Canada that “Contrary to Canadian hopes during the Clinton years and pre-9/11, the twenty-first century is turning out to be all about crises involving ‘hard power’ not ‘soft power.’”²

What of course changed everything post-September 2001, was that, once again, North America could no longer view itself as imbued with the luxury of geographic deterrence. As a consequence, most, if not all nations discovered a new sense of alacrity in either updating or developing national security policies. This sense of alacrity was fueled by debate both within government, and external to it. For example, in February 2002, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD) called on the government to respond to these new challenges to Canadian security. In its report titled “Canadian Security and Military Preparedness”, the Committee stated that “at present Canada does not have a specific National Security Policy that would place defence policy, foreign policy and internal security in context, and relate them to one another.”³ The report further stated that the policy need include a clear statement of purpose, including what needs be made secure, and from what or whom, an indication of the responsibilities of individuals and the various levels of government, the establishment of a system to coordinate within, and between governments, and finally, a statement as

¹ Lawrence Freedman, “Grand Strategy in the Twenty-First Century”, *Defence Studies*, vol 1, no.1, (Spring 2001): 19-20.

² Douglas A Ross, “Foreign Policy Challenges for Paul Martin”, *International Journal* 58, no.4, Autumn 2003. 533-569.

³ Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002*, available from <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep05feb02-e.htm#14.%20Development%20of%20a%20National%20Security%20Policy> , accessed 1 December 2004, 49.

the projected necessary resources.⁴ While acknowledging the challenges of developing such a policy, particularly given the constitutional division of powers the Senate was forceful in its recommendation to develop a policy that needed to convey the justification, and proposed initial measures for the current and long term security needs of Canadians.

The Canadian government addressed these twenty-first century security imperatives with “ Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy”.⁵ The National Security Policy (NSP), was initially viewed with mixed media endorsement such as: “It was a bold statement, the kind that Martin is fond of making. But what it means in practical terms is still unclear.”⁶ However, given strong comments from politicians such as deputy Prime Minister Ann McLellen; "This national security policy is neither a beginning nor an end. It is, in fact, a living document designed to respond to changes in the threat environment,"⁷ there was finally some indication the federal government had finally begun the public debate on the necessity of such a policy, to hopefully include the national interests that therefore needed be made secure. This paper assesses that the NSP succeeded in marshalling many factors surrounding the security

⁴ Ibid., 51-52.

⁵ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (NSP)*. (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004).

⁶ T. Maccharles, “Martin to roll out ambitious national security policy” *Toronto Star*, 24 April 2004, EBSCOhost available from http://web29.epnet.com/citation.asp?tb=1&_ug=sid+ACEA46EF%2D1D10%2D48BB%2DB180%2DC71A35FC9AAF%40sessionmgr4+dbs+nfh+cp+1+FEE8&_us=frn+1+hd+False+hs+False+or+Date+f+False+ss+SO+sm+ES+sl+%2D1+dstb+ES+mh+1+ri+KAAACBZC00046219+8892&_uso=tg%5B2+%2D+tg%5B1+%2D+tg%5B0+%2D+db%5B0+%2Dnfh+hd+False+op%5B2+%2DAnd+op%5B1+%2DAnd+op%5B0+%2D+st%5B2+%2D+st%5B1+%2D+st%5B0+%2Dcanadian++national++security++policy+ex%5B0+%2Dthesaurus+mdb%5B0+%2Dimh+EFBF&fn=1&rn=1, accessed 7 April 2005.

⁷ Deputy Prime Minister Ann McLellan as quoted by the Calgary Herald, 28 April 2004, available from <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=210&did=628031051&SrchMode=1&sid=4&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1112918594&clientId=1711>, accessed 7 April, 2005.

debate into one document, especially with regard to providing Canadians a reasonable summary of the threats which Canada, and other countries, were exposed to. Most notably, the NSP captured the nation's attention, in that there is now a healthy public debate, as witnessed by the uncharacteristic confluence of media, academic and governmental attention currently being devoted to the national security issue. However, it did not successfully anchor the long-term requirement for a national security policy by clearly linking it to national interests and goals, which should be reflective of national core values. In this regard, the NSP risks being overcome by the inevitable challenges of the evolving national debate, which in a democracy, can develop changing political demands, some soundly based, others the result of political expediency. As there is a finite level of resources, this could lead to a diminishing national will in the resourcing of the NSP.

This paper will put forth the argument that in order to develop an effective national security policy, a government must take great efforts in clearly understanding what exactly need be made secure: at its most basic level, its sovereign ability to define and resource its core values, as well as defend them. Once established, government should then prioritize these core values into a coherent plan of national interests and goals, and develop a grand national strategy to achieve these goals. (Throughout this paper, the term 'national core values' will be viewed as a shared commodity of all Canadian citizens, whereas 'national interests and goals' are ascribed to Canada the nation, a single entity, and, for want of a better term, self-servingly derived at. It is further acknowledged that while 'grand national strategy' is not part of the commonly used Canadian political lexicon, it is not meant to represent a dictatorial pronouncement.

Within this paper it is used to denote the action plan, derived at from the reconciliation and/or inter-weaving of national interests and goals, such that synergistic policies can be developed to coherently achieve said interests and goals).

Finally, a nation must assess the current and conceivable future threats to these core values and national interests and goals, and then decide upon the policy tools necessary to exercise unimpeded sovereignty over the grand strategy. Without this intellectual rigor, and the resultant grand national strategy, it is impossible to measure the effectiveness of any policy, let alone the effectiveness of security efforts, thereby making the policy, at best, a good idea without the logical measurement mechanism of making it better and/or adaptable. Furthermore, the above intellectual exercise is assessed as necessary if government is to engage, and convince, stakeholders, including and especially Canadian citizens, of the requirement of the NSP as an enabler of the grand national strategy that will allow for the unfettered pursuit of their best interests.

In this regard, this paper will argue that the federal government has failed, and that the NSP requires more definition and analysis. The paper will commence by articulating the factors that surround the debate on the definition of national security and then submit a definition for use throughout the paper. In this manner, the remainder of the analysis of Canadian core values, national interests and goals, and grand national strategy, will ensure the reader considers the argument in a consistent manner. It will then address the identification of Canadian core values, as defined by current federal departmental policy statements, and then seek to summarize national interests and goals, also from published government statements. Finally, the paper will then submit for

consideration, a framework that would aid non-subject matter experts in comprehending the complex domestic and international environment within which national interests and goals are developed into a grand national strategy. With this building block approach, and use of a national strategy framework model, it will be demonstrated that stakeholders can be engaged in the national security debate, to a level that will allow them to logically deduce for themselves the merits of such a policy tool in the pursuit of national interests and goals. This paper will purposely remain at the federal level, as introducing provincial and municipal components would overly complicate the argument.

PART I

Establishing Intellectual Rigor

A country has but one duty to its citizens; the effective exercise of sovereignty to the benefit of its citizens, both in the domestic and international arena. Canadians have come to understand this as the government's execution of the introductory phrase of the Constitution Act of 1867: "Peace, Order and Good Government (POGG)".⁸ This Act outlines the distribution of powers between the central government and the provincial legislatures. The federal nature of the phrase is captured as follows: "The federal Peace, Order and Good Government power embraces these 'residuary' areas and matters falling

⁸ The Canadian Encyclopedia, "Peace Order and Good Government: The Constitution Act, 1867 (s91), grants broad powers to the federal government to legislate for "Peace, Order and good Government in Canada in relation to all Matters not coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces." available from <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0006162> and <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0002320> accessed 28 Feb 2005

under ‘national dimensions’ and ‘emergencies’.”⁹ The ‘Peace, Order and Good Government’ phrase will not be used as a fundamental building block in justifying the need for an NSP, but merely as a readily identifiable federal context in which to marshal the ensuring proposed building blocks of national core values, national interests and goals, and grand national strategy.

Based, therefore, upon the 1867 Constitution Act, Canada’s government has not only the authority, but also the obligation, to develop the country, and the society within, as the national political debate, and ensuing elections, so direct. This process, over time, is what establishes the core values and resultant national interests, or strategic goals, which define a nation. A democratic government must then nurture and protect the country and society it has built. If successful, each nation state would then accrue to itself a level of power, measured both in terms of national wealth and in terms of political influence on the world stage, which would enable it to further promote the interests of its citizens. Sir Michael Howard provides a historical perspective of this strategic duty of a nation. He states that: “ Any strategy, grand or petty, implies both an objective and the means to attain it. The objective of most states most of the time is always to maintain independence, and often to extend their influence...” He adds that the classical national tools of strategy have been: “armed force, wealth and allies.”¹⁰ Although articulated in a very ‘early twentieth century’ vernacular, his statements include an economic, foreign and defence policy component to the grand national strategy issue. Although perhaps

⁹ The Canadian Encyclopedia, Constitution Act, 1867, available from. <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0001870> , accessed 2 May 2005

¹⁰ Howard, Michael. “Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century”, *Defence Studies*, vol 1, no.1 (Spring 2001): 2.

more complex in the 21st century, these remain key components of today's debate. In the current political debate of how, and how much, national security is required as an enabler to the grand national strategy, David Dewitt submits the following: "From a national or governmental perspective, a threat to international security does not exist in the abstract; the government has to make the link between the event and national norms and values leading to the allocation of resources."¹¹

This is the essence of the exercise of sovereignty; a nation's ability to leverage its territory, and its population, into a competitive and efficient economy, thereby generating the wealth and resources necessary to fund and protect its core values and national interests and goals. Simply stated, it this ability that need be made secure.

Definition of Security

As stated above, the sense of vulnerability currently being experienced by North America is not new. The beginning of the Soviet nuclear-capable phase of the Cold War forced American and Canadian strategists to closely analyze the security implications of the Soviet Union's ability to strike North America. In his 1952 article, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol"¹², Arnold Wolfers submits that security is a value "of which a country can have more or less", and that "in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked"¹³. He further articulates that there is a cost for every measure of

¹¹ David Dewitt, "Directions in Canada's International Security Policy, *International Journal*, (Spring 2000), 6.

¹² Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", *National and International Security*, ed. Michael Sheehan, 3-24. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, c2000

¹³ *Ibid.*, 5.

additional security, and therefore a societal burden to be paid for from other government commitments and that “ the extent of external threats, numerous domestic factors such as national character, tradition, preferences and prejudices” will influence the amount security a nation wishes to implement.¹⁴ This interrelationship with other national priorities is an extremely important component of the overall national security debate, and will be further analyzed later in this paper.

In reading the Wolfers article it is clear that it is not a prescription of security measures for the ongoing Cold War, but an attempt to encapsulate the essence of security, so that a democratic government may logically deduce its own definition and level of security. This encapsulation is further enhanced by the inclusion of the moral factors surrounding a security debate. Specifically, Wolfers introduces the moral dilemma between allocating finite resources towards the duty of securing a society from external threat, and allocating them towards further domestic development of the society. Additionally, he states that in order for a security policy to be expedient it cannot but accumulate power. However, “Efforts have to be made simultaneously toward the goal of removing the incentives to attack”.¹⁵ My interpretation of these statements is that there is peril in increasing security solely as a means of accumulating state power in the international arena.

From the Wolfers article it is clear that the definition of a nation’s security is in fact a process of understanding the core values that need be protected and then developing a security policy that reflects those core values. Dewitt uses the following

¹⁴ Ibid., 11.

¹⁵ Ibid., 19.

definition: "... the capacity of the government to control or manage entry or exit across recognized boundaries, which define the locus of control- territory, intellectual or cultural space, identity."¹⁶ From these definitions it is logical to deduce that national security policy possesses a symbiotic relationship with all other national policies developed for the successful achievement of the national interests and goals. A 2002 article by Gen(retd) W.D. Macnamara and A. Fitz-Gerald's, using the 1980 Canada National Defence College (CNDC) definition of national security, supports this premise of a close relationship: "National Security is the preservation of a way of life acceptable to Canadian people and compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of others. It includes freedom from military attack or coercion, freedom from internal subversion, and freedom from the erosion of the political, and social values which are essential to the quality of life in Canada".¹⁷ The Macnamara article further supports Wolfers' contention that core values are the first principle in the security debate in the he states: "certain strategic tools and techniques exist for a nation-state to use to protect its core values and national interests, which include their political integrity and territorial sovereignty".¹⁸

Review of the NSP reveals that the final seven of eight chapters are prescriptive solutions to currently assessed security issues. Chapter one is therefore assessed as the venue where the academic debate for defining the Canadian nature of, and necessity for, national security, articulating its linkages to national interests and goals, and providing

¹⁶ David Dewitt, "Directions in Canada's International Security Policy, *International Journal*, (Spring 2000), 5.

¹⁷ Gen(retd) W.D. Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald, 'A National Security Framework for Canada', *Institute for Research on Public Policy- Policy Matters*, available from <http://www.irpp.org/pm/index.htm> ,accessed 7 Feb 2005

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

some insight into the government wide framework within which it was developed, should have taken place. However, its opening statement does not inform the reader of any of this; it almost apologetically tells the reader what the policy is not: “There is no conflict between a commitment to security and a commitment to our most deeply held values”.¹⁹ From this mild opening statement, the chapter illuminates Canadians with the simplistic statement that “national security deals with threats that have the potential to undermine the security of the state or society” and that it is “ closely linked to both personal and international security”.²⁰ The NSP simply does not define national security.

From these superficial paragraphs the NSP then informs the reader of the government’s three core national security interests; “ 1-Protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad. 2-Ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to our allies. 3-Contributing to international security.”²¹ The chapter then concludes by providing the reader the most basic, yet almost media like in its sensationalist tone, of threat assessments. Given the prescriptive nature of the remainder of the policy document, it is clear that the opening chapter merely succeeds in moving the reader’s attention away from a debate on the ‘why’, the ‘to what effect’, and the ‘at what opportunity cost’. The NSP then takes on a cheerleader tone in presenting what the government has assessed as being immediately required. The chapters on ‘Building an Integrated Security System’, ‘Intelligence’, ‘Emergency Planning and Management’, ‘Public Health Emergencies’, ‘Transportation Security’, ‘Border Security’ and

¹⁹ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (NSP)*,...,1

²⁰ Ibid., 3.

²¹ Ibid.,5.

‘International Security’ are implementation instruments, not policy articulation instruments. It is interesting to note that the NSP has taken a negative approach in that its formulation is anchored on the threats. In comparison, the 1980 CNDC statement on national security, combines the positive approach, in this case the presence of the preservation of a way of life, with the negative approach of threat mitigation. The latter is assessed as depicting a more balanced, and justifiable case for national security.

The above analysis of chapter one of the NSP reflects a purely national security prospective. It does not factor in the nature of Canadian society, which will be addressed within the core values, and national interests and goals, section of this paper. It is usefso999[CI be addres9e

resources. Chapter one of the NSP, ‘Canada’s Approach to National Security’ should therefore have introduced a simple model which would have allowed citizens to comprehend the link between core values and a requirement for a national security policy. An example would have been the use of following algorithm: ‘core values + national interest/aims = grand national strategy (whereas the symbol, =, means ‘allows for the development of’). An alternate depiction of these three building blocks is that of a structure, whereby the core values represent the foundation, national interests and goals the framing, and grand national strategy the walls and roof. In both characterizations, each component is separate, and necessary, in order to complete the model. It is acknowledged that one could endeavour to define core values and national interests as a single component, as depicted in some of the strategic frameworks models presented later in this paper, however, it is assessed that this could overly complicate the justification process advocated for chapter one of the NSP, thereby negatively affecting the ability of Canadians to fully comprehend the logical argument for such a policy.

Although both are simplistic models, and perhaps overly simplify the debate, they are useful in forming the basis necessary to demonstrate that Canada has developed a discernable set of core values, with which Canadians define themselves as a nation. They also demonstrate that Canada also has national interests and goals, which are reflective of its intent to further pursue the national interests of its citizens. Finally, these models also demonstrate that grand national strategy is the holistic, interdependent mechanism, which is implemented to achieve the national interests and goals. In this manner, Canadians could have clearly understood the concept that “grand strategy is characterized by its long-term validity, which drives from external constants (i.e. geography), external

invariants (international structure) and constant national values. In short, a grand national strategy is informed by national interests²² and values. Intellectual engagement of the citizenry would have helped ensure that the country's attention to national security would not wane as other 'political imperatives', such as say health care, consumed the national political debate, and that the exercise of Canadian sovereignty was always supported by the required measures and resources, all of which could be measured for effectiveness against the national interests, and adjusted as required.

Given the above description of the essence of national security, this paper will use the aforementioned 1980 Canada National Defence College definition of national security as the foundation for the subsequent proposed content of chapter one of the NSP. From an academic perspective, this definition is chosen as it uses a more balanced articulation (positive and negative approach) of national security. From a pragmatic perspective, it is assessed that this definition possesses the appropriate tone and vocabulary to allow Canadians to willingly internalize the necessity of national security.

First Principles

Given the premise that the national interest must be founded upon a clear understanding of a nation's core values, it is this paper's contention that the NSP must endeavor to clearly articulate the set of values that reflect the nation. It is not, however, the intent of this paper to submit a set of national core values for consideration, but to use what has been already articulated by government as a basis for input into the grand

²² Jens Fey, 'Searching for a Grand National Strategy: The Security Debate in Canada After the East-West Conflict', *The McNaughton Papers, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies*, No14 (March 2001): 2.

national strategy algorithm. As previously mentioned, ‘Peace, Order and Good Government’ (POGG), is the fundamental first principle of governing for the people of Canada. This first principle is achieved through the policies and the day-to-day bureaucratic efforts the federal departments and agencies.²³ From this list of departments and agencies this paper assigns the federal government’s duties and efforts into the following broad categories of governmental functions:

Sovereignty and Security: Foreign Affairs Canada, International Trade Canada, DND, PSEPC, Justice, Supreme Court

Social: Dept. of Canadian Heritage, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Health Canada, Human Resources and Skills Development, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Justice, Social Development Canada, Veterans Affairs Canada

Economic and Resources Management: Treasury Board, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Finance, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Industry, International Trade Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Transport Canada, Atlantic Opportunities Agency, Bank of Canada, Business Development Bank of Canada, Canada Revenue Service, Economic Development Agency for the Region of Quebec, Western Economic Diversification Canada

Secretariat/Administration/Executive/Judicial: PCO, PWGSC, Justice, Supreme Court

It is acknowledged that the above categorization is subject to interpretation, and many in, and out of government, may find reason to re-allocate certain departments or agencies to another group. It is this paper’s assessment that the departments and/or agencies in the security and sovereignty grouping, reflects the federal government’s powers under Peace. The same holds for the relationship between those within the Social grouping and the powers under Order, which for this paper is interpreted as social order.

²³ Answers.com, *Structure of the Canadian Federal Government*, available from <http://www.answers.com/topic/structure-of-the-canadian-federal-government>, accessed 9 March 2005
The complete listing of departments and agencies, from the website is articulated in Annex A

It is further assessed that the Economic and Resource Management grouping, and the Secretariat/Administrative/Executive/Judicial grouping represents those departments primarily charged with Good Government. It is equally acknowledged that management of the economy and resources is sufficiently complex to warrant a separate grouping. However, this paper has chosen to strictly remain within the three-pillar structure of POGG; a structure, the terms of which all Canadians are familiar with, and can easily relate to, thus ensuring the academic debate as to the necessity of national security is more readily accepted by the citizenry. This POGG structure is not a component of the models to be used in illustrating the necessity of national security, but is used to marshal public thought within an identifiable context, prior to presenting the intellectual justification.

Having grouped government into the POGG structure, this paper will now refer to governmental sources in order to ascertain the national core values, as articulated by government itself. The first grouping will be that of Peace. The departments and governmental bodies in the Sovereignty/Security functional grouping are primarily charged with the authority to legislate and diplomatically and/or physically enforce the state of peace. In simplistic terms, a state of peace exists whereby the state, to the limits of its territorial and maritime claims, freely exercises its authority domestically to improve the quality of life of its citizens, as well as freely pursuing an international agenda in support of its national interests. This includes the ability to successfully challenge impediments to the exercise of sovereignty within the domestic agenda, the economic agenda, and the international agenda. In addition to specific threats, requiring specific capabilities for deterrence and direct response, there are threats from political

conflict. R.J. Sutherland describes these threats as follows: “sources of major political conflict are unsatisfied aspirations, emotional nationalism and political instability.”²⁴ The pursuit of peace, and the autonomy such a state of existence affords a nation, is therefore readily understood to be an intertwined effort by many government departments and agencies.

As with the other functional groupings, there are publicly available vision and mission statements, which describe the responsibilities assigned to this group of departments. The Department of National Defence mission statement is to “defend Canada, its interests and its values, while contributing to international peace and security” and it does so by filling the three major roles of “protecting Canada, defending North America in co-operation with the United States of America, and contributing to peace and international security”.²⁵ Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) is mandated to fulfill “the fundamental role of government to secure the public's safety and security. PSEPC is dedicated to minimizing a continuum of risks to Canadians – from risks to personal safety from crime or naturally occurring events.... to threats to national security from terrorist activity.”²⁶ It accomplishes this mandate by providing “policy leadership and delivers programs (sic) and services in the areas of national security and emergency management, policing, law enforcement and borders, and corrections and

²⁴ R.J. Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation”, *International Journal*, vol17, no 3, (Summer 1962): 201.

²⁵ Department of National Defence, available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/about/mission_e.asp, accessed 7 February 2005

²⁶ Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, available from http://www.psepc.gc.ca/publications/news/20041008-2_e.asp#PSEPC, accessed 7 February 2005

crime prevention”²⁷. The department is supported in this regard with six agencies, including the RCMP, CSIS and the Canada Border Services Agency.

Canada’s ability to yield international influence is managed through Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) and International Trade Canada (ITCan). Logically, both these departments should execute their mandate in a manner that would, first and foremost, directly further Canadian interests. This is reflected in ITCan’s mission statement that reflects a mandate to expand Canadian trade abroad, hence increasing the wealth of the nation.²⁸ However, a review of FAC’s web site will reveal a less than focused vision in this regard.²⁹ This implied shift in the priority of Canadian foreign policy belittles the great strides that have been achieved since the early part of the century, when Canada’s foreign policy was influenced as much by Britain as by the Canadian parliament. An extract from the publication ‘Foreign Affairs’, illustrates the beginnings of Canadian sovereignty in this regard: “From the time when she first achieved economic self-government, Canada has followed what she thought to be to her own economic self-

²⁷ Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, available from http://www.psepc.gc.ca/publications/news/20041008-2_e.asp#PSEPC , accessed 7 February 2005

²⁸ International Trade Canada, “[ITCan] is responsible for positioning Canada as a world business leader for the 21st Century. ITCan accomplishes this by helping large and small Canadian companies expand and succeed internationally, by promoting Canada as a dynamic place to do business, and by negotiating and administering trade agreements”, available from <http://www.itcan.gc.ca/department/menu-en.asp> , accessed 6 February 2005

²⁹ Foreign Affairs Canada, “(FAC) supports Canadians abroad, works towards a more peaceful and secure world, and promotes our culture and values internationally”, available from <http://www.fac.gc.ca/menu-en.asp> ; FAC Foreign Policy Page: “we develop and implement strategies to promote the Government of Canada’s agenda abroad: global peace and security, prosperity and employment for Canadians. We also work to better worldwide understanding of Canada, our values, our culture and our capabilities”, available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/menu-en.asp ; About FAC page “Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) represents Canada around the world through our network of embassies and trade and diplomatic offices and by participating in multilateral institutions and international treaties and arrangements. We work to promote prosperity, ensure Canadians’ security within a global framework and promote Canadian values and culture on the international stage.”, available from <http://www.fac.gc.ca/department/menu-en.asp> , all accessed 7 February 2005

interest first and given second place to the needs of Empire solidarity.”³⁰ From the Second World War to the repatriation of the constitution, Canada moved to a level of self-determination that fully enables her to exercise all the authority of an independent state. It is therefore unclear why there is a reluctance to clearly articulate that Canadian foreign policy is the process of exerting influence with the clear purpose of supporting national interests and goals. Although the emphasis of current foreign policy affects, and is affected, by Canada’s grand national strategy, and is an element to be factored into any policy with an international element to it, the further dissection of this emphasis is not germane to this paper.

Careful review and analysis of the mission and vision statements of the Peace (Sovereignty/Security) grouping reveals the following national core values:

- territorial, maritime and aerospace integrity
- freedom from criminal threats to society, the economy and infrastructure
- freedom from externally sponsored (state and organization) threats to Canadian interests at home and abroad
- unfettered ability to pursue domestic and international policies in the achievement of national goals (including treaty and alliance responsibilities)
- public safety in the case of natural or man-made threats to society, the economy and critical infrastructure

The next pillar of ‘Peace, Order and Good Government’ to be addressed is Order. Again, the mission statements and vision from the federal departments and agencies will provide the data to establish the government’s assessment of the core values within this grouping. Canada has evolved into a nation for which the social needs of its population

³⁰ F.R. Scott, “The Permanent Bases of Canadian Foreign Policy”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 10, July 1932, 627-628

have ascended to become a significant priority.³¹ This development is amply reflected by the number of the federal departments and agencies within the social grouping described above. Each not only endeavours to fully implement the rule of law and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but also to fulfill the nation's expectation of what a relatively wealthy country should reasonably provide to its citizens. An example of this expectation is Health Canada's mission and vision statement: "... committed to improving the lives of all of Canada's people and to making this country's population among the healthiest in the world as measured by longevity, lifestyle and effective use of the public health care system".³² Our national character is further revealed in the Citizenship and Immigration Canada vision statement: "Canada attracts and welcomes people from all parts of the world, both to enrich our economic, social and cultural development and to protect those in need of Canada's protection".³³ The departments of Human Resources and of Skills Development and Social Development Canada similarly possess a very proactive social vision in that it is responsible for "providing all Canadians with the tools they need to thrive and prosper in the workplace and community. We support human capital development, labour market development and are dedicated to establishing a culture of

³¹ "Health Care (36%) Increases 14 Points to Return as Most Important Issue Facing the Country According to Canadians However, Terrorist Attacks/National Security (33%), Despite Dropping Seven Points, Remains a Major Concern. However, Canadians Still Choose More Spending on Healthcare (82%) Over Increased Security (16%) Expenditures." Ipsos News Centre, available from <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=1374> , <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=1361>, accessed 10 March 2005

³² Health Canada, available from <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/about/about.html> , accessed 10 march 2005

³³ Citizenship and Immigration Canada, This vision statement is further amplified by a commitment to "delivering the highest quality immigration, refugee protection and citizenship programs inspired by integrity, efficiency and responsiveness to community needs. CIC is also committed to being a model of public service management.", available from <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/mission.html> , accessed 2 March 2005

lifelong learning for Canadians” and is mandated with “with helping to secure and strengthen Canada’s social foundation.”³⁴ In fact, there is a social dimension within most, if not all, federal departments. An example is the DND use of its interpretation of Canadian social values in the development of its military ethos. The stated societal components in the development of the Canadian Forces military ethos³⁵ are:

- democratic principles;
- peace, order and good government;
- rights and freedoms;
- respect the dignity of all persons; and
- obey and support lawful authority.

From these official statements within federal departments it is simple to identify the common threads, and to ascertain the following core values of Canada’s social order:

- equality within society and under legislation;
- universality of access;
- a sense of duty towards the less fortunate.

As with each of the three functional groupings, there is a cost to our core social values. For example, the Health Department budget was \$4.7B (exclusive of health transfers to the provinces), Human Resources Development spent \$29.6B, Indian Affairs and Northern Development spent \$5.5B. Again, as is the case for each of the functional groups, there needs to be reconciliation and prioritization of available resources in order to fund each of the departmental and agency initiatives and overhead. This obviously makes the means of wealth generation important enough to consider the protection of

³⁴ Human Resources and Skills Development, available from http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/cs/comm/hrsd/about_us.shtml , accessed 2 March 2005

³⁵ Department of National Defence, Chief of Defence Staff, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003

said means one of the government's top priorities. These duties are charged to departments and agencies within the Good Government grouping.

The remit of good government, although a responsibility of all in government, is especially charged to the departments, and other bodies, found in the Secretariat / Administration / Executive / Judicial and the Economic/Resources Management groupings.³⁶

It is here that the laws of the land are established and enforced within the federal level of the legal system, and where the nation's wealth is marshalled for reallocation. This functional grouping would have the greatest insight into the opportunity cost of a given policy or programme, hence, has much influence in the debate to resource specific aspects of the grand national strategy.

There is a clear link between the generation of wealth, and the allocating of resources to meet national interests and goals, and the resultant influence and power to exercise sovereignty both domestically and internationally. It is therefore beneficial to quickly review current fiscal environment so that there is a basic understanding of the nation's revenues and expenses. The federal government's 2003-2004 overall budget, a surplus of \$9 billion was achieved with revenues of some \$198.5 billion and expenditures of \$189.5 billion. The three major expenditure components are as follows: transfer payments- \$103.6B, programmes-\$52.1B, public debt charges- \$37.6B. These figures, as depicted in Table 1, clearly indicate the competing demands for limited resources, and

³⁶ To re-iterate, the Economic and Resource Management group and the Secretariat/Admin/Executive/Judicial groups have been combined so that there are three functional groupings of governmental responsibilities, which can then be ascribed to the appropriate of three POGG pillars. It is conceded that the grouping charged with economic responsibilities represent sufficiently complex responsibilities to be identified separately. However, it is assessed that a linear path from POGG to functional groupings would be more effective in ensuring that citizens grasped the intellectual argument for a national security policy.

the requirement for sound management of the sums involved. It also affords insight into the complexity, and necessity, involved in the effective management of the means by which the government meets the expectations of Canadians.

Table 1
2003-2005 Fiscal year Budget (net basis)³⁷

	2004		
	Budget	Actual	Difference
	(in millions of dollars)		
Income tax revenues	122,100	123,530	1,430
Other taxes and duties	43,100	41,365	-1,735
Employment insurance premiums	17,600	17,546	-54
Other revenues	14,500	16,106	1,606
Total revenues	197,300	198,547	1,247
Transfer payments	103,600	102,378	-1,222
Other program expenses	52,100	51,317	-783
Public debt charges	37,600	35,769	-1,831
Total expenses	193,300	189,464	-3,836
Annual surplus	4,000	9,083	5,083

This is especially well understood within the PCO where the primary responsibility is to “provide public service support to the Prime Minister, to ministers within the Prime Minister's portfolio, and to the cabinet in order to facilitate the smooth and effective operation of the Government of Canada”.³⁸ Fulfilling these duties requires consultation and coordination with all of government so that grand national strategy and resource allocation is reconciled with the initiatives and demands of all federal

³⁷ Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, *Public Accounts of Canada 2004, Volume 1*, Publishing and Depository Services PWGSC, Ottawa, 9

³⁸ Privy council Office, available from <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=aboutpco> ; accessed 10 March 2005

departments as well as other levels of government. Finally, PCO provides “non-partisan advice and support to the government, and leadership, coordination and support to the departments and agencies of the government”.³⁹

The review and analysis of the mission and vision statements within this functional grouping yields the following national core values:

- the establishment of , and judicial protection of, the rule of law (to include the Charter of Rights and Freedoms);
- the transparent, effective and efficient functioning of government, including wealth generation and resource allocation;
- the free exercise of sovereignty in the marshalling of economic resources and means of wealth generation; and
- governmental accountability.

Summarizing the above review and analysis from the three functional groupings of ‘Peace, Order and Good Government’, the following is a list assessed as the federal government’s interpretation of Canada’s core values:

Peace:

- territorial, maritime and aerospace integrity;
- freedom from criminal threats to society, the economy and infrastructure;
- freedom from externally sponsored (state and organization) threats to Canadian interests at home and abroad;
- unfettered ability to pursue domestic and international policies in the achievement of national goals (including treaty and alliance responsibilities); and
- public safety in the case of natural or man-made threats to society, the economy and critical infrastructure

Order:

- equality within society and under legislation;
- universality of access; and
- a sense of duty towards the less fortunate.

³⁹ Idid., accessed 10 march 2005

Good Government:

- the establishment of , and judicial protection of, the rule of law (to include the Charter of Rights and Freedoms);
- the transparent, effective and efficient functioning of government, including wealth generation and resource allocation;
- the free exercise of sovereignty in the marshalling of economic resources and means of wealth generation; and
- governmental accountability.

The above lists indicates that Canada values the rule of law, an egalitarian⁴⁰ society that is socially responsible, as well as the ability to freely, and without threat, exercise its sovereignty in marshalling and allocating its wealth, and in establishing and perpetuating these values. From this foundation of core values, arguments can then be formulated to articulate what could/should be Canada's national goals

National Interests and Goals

Further populating the previously introduced algorithmic model for a grand national strategy, this paper will now focus on ascertaining logical national interests and goals, given the list of core values extracted from current governmental mission and vision statements. As with the determination of core values, this paper will not make a recommendation based on an academic or personal interpretation of the country's needs, but will summarize current, and recent past, government statements on governmental priorities, such that trends can be identified and logical deductions made as to the national interests and goals.

⁴⁰ Oxford Concise definition: Egalitarian-believing in or based upon the principle that all people are equal and deserve equal rights and opportunities.

The most recent Speech from the Throne, opening the First Session of the 38th Parliament, in October 2004, represents the latest articulation of the government's interpretation of national goals. The speech indicates seven broad commitments, including fiscal discipline, accountable government, the defence of the Charter, and the ideal of inclusion as well as equality of opportunity.⁴¹ The speech then focuses on specifics for the economy, health care, social initiatives for children, caregivers, seniors and Aboriginals as well as specifying programme goals for cities and communities, as these are identified as enablers of social and economic goals. It also identifies environmental goals for sustainable development as well as linking domestic and international policies, such that synergies are accrued between defence, diplomatic, development, trade and security goals⁴². This Throne Speech clearly sets national goals for many, if not most, of the national core values deduced above. The speech, unlike some Throne Speeches, also briefly describes components of the strategy to obtain them. Obviously, this speech is very much a product of the challenges facing the 38th session of parliament, however, specific measures aside, it is but the latest reflection of the nation's aspirations which have, by and large, remained constant since the opening of the second session of the 35th parliament in February 97.

⁴¹ "The Government of Canada's actions on behalf of Canadians will be guided by these seven commitments: to be unwavering in the application of fiscal discipline, the foundation of so much of Canada's success over the past decade; to promote the national interest by setting the nation's objectives and building a consensus of toward achieving them; to pursue these objectives in a manner that recognizes Canada's diversity as a source of strength and innovation; to aim for tangible, practical results for Canadians and report to them so that they can hold their governments to account; to defend the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and to be a steadfast advocate of inclusion; to demand equality of opportunity so that prosperity can be shared by all Canadians; and to assert Canada's interests and project our values in the world"; Canada, *Speech From the Throne to Open the First Session of the 38th parliament of Canada*, Ottawa, October 2004, 2.

⁴² Prime Minister of Canada, available from http://www.pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/sft_e.pdf; Internet, accessed 24 January 2005

The following summary of each speech will demonstrate this consistency in the government's choice of national interests and goals. It will use the section titles as articulated in each speech, then briefly describe the intent of the section. Although somewhat lengthy, the summary is deemed necessary as it not only clearly demonstrates the long-term governmental commitment to the goals they have set, but is also useful in enabling the reader to see they are reflective of the national core values that had been previously summarized in this paper.

3rd Session , 37th Parliament (2 Feb 04)⁴³

1. Changing the Way Things Work in Ottawa:
 - Restoring trust and accountability through transparency, ethical standards and financial accountability and enhancing role of individual MPs and strengthening relations with provinces.
2. Strengthening Canada's Social Foundations:
 - Ensuring timely access to health care for everyone;
 - Emphasis on ensuring children including early learning and aid communities in reducing children at risk;
 - Opportunity for Canadians with disabilities;
 - Particular attention to ensure Aboriginals fully exploit available to programmes in support of better quality of life; and
 - communities are key to social and economic goals. Money not only for infrastructure but for community based social programmes as well as cultural and environmental issues particular to each community.
3. Building a 21st Century Economy:
 - social and economic goals are inseparable and Canada is a trading nation
 - commitment to lifelong learning;
 - science and research including using BDC to get Can ideas to market
 - regional and rural development; and

⁴³ Privy Council Office, available from http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=InformationResources&sub=sftddt&doc=sftddt2004_1_e.htm ; Internet, accessed 24 January 2005

- sustainable development and view that Can is steward of its geography and resources.
4. Canada's Role in the World
 - distinctive and independent role in making the world more secure, peaceful cooperative and open;
 - rule of law, liberty, democracy equality of opportunity and fairness; and
 - interdependence of diplomacy, development and defence.

2nd Session, 37th Parliament (30 Sept 02)⁴⁴

1. Canada and the World:
 - pluralism, freedom, democracy, respect for international law; and
 - multi-lateral efforts towards safety of Canadians.
2. Health care system for the 21st Century:
 - a practical expression of our values.
3. Helping Children and Families Out of Poverty:
 - break out of welfare trap;
 - special attention to needs of Aboriginals; and
 - protect children from exploitation.
4. The Challenge of Climate Change and the Environment:
 - linked to health, quality of life and economic prosperity.
5. A Magnet for Talent and Investment:
 - skills, learning and research; and
 - smart regulation.
6. Competitive Cities and Healthy Communities:
 - infrastructure programme and community based social programmes;
 - special needs of aboriginals; and
 - public safety with respect to crime.

⁴⁴ Privy Council Office, available from http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=InformationResources&sub=sftddt&doc=sftddt2002_e.htm ; Internet, accessed 24 January 2005

7. New partnership Between Government and Citizens:

- engage citizens by articulating rights and responsibilities;
- strengthen First nation Governance; and
- meet citizens expectations of accountability and responsibility.

1st session of 37th Parliament (30 Jan 01)⁴⁵

1. Creating Opportunity:

- innovative economy by every sector and region;
- R&D;
- Skills and learning; and
- trade and investment, including effective laws and regulations.

2. Sharing Opportunity:

- economic and social success must be pursued together;
- children and families, with special mention of Aboriginal issues;
- health: uphold Health Act and promote community based health promotion;
- healthy environment part of a sustainable economy: national water guidelines (Walkerton, May 2000); and
- strong and safe communities through local solutions.

3. Creating and Sharing Opportunities Globally:

- international partners for global governance: democracy, justice and social stability worldwide.

2nd Session of the 36th Parliament (12 Oct 99)⁴⁶

Strong and United Canada through:

1. Develop our children and youth:

- early childhood development;
- break cycle of poverty; and

⁴⁵ Privy Council Office, available from http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=InformationResources&sub=sftddt&doc=sftddt2001_e.htm ; Internet, accessed 24 January 2005

⁴⁶ Privy Council Office, available from http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=InformationResources&sub=sftddt&doc=sftddt1999_e.htm ; Internet, accessed 24 January 2005

- skills and learning for youth.
2. Build a dynamic economy:
 - prudent fiscal management;
 - lower taxes;
 - increase trade and investment; and
 - skilled and knowledgeable workforce.
 4. Strengthen health and quality care for Canadians:
 - good health and quality care; and
 - modern and sustainable system.
 5. Ensure quality of environment:
 - dependence of long-term economic and social well-being on environment
 6. Stronger Communities:
 - social efforts targeted at the local level; and
 - promoting safer communities.
 7. Strengthen relationship with Aboriginal peoples
 8. Advance Canada's place in the world:
 - status as trading nation;
 - priority of human security in foreign policy; and
 - growing concern over demonstration of sovereignty of the north.

1st Session of the 36th Parliament (23 Sept 97)⁴⁷

1. Building a Stronger Canada:
 - openness;
 - tolerance;
 - social and linguistic diversity; and
 - a more collaborative social union.
2. Investing in Children:

⁴⁷ Privy Council Office, available from <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=Informat>

- prepare them to fully participate;
 - aid for low income families, and
 - safe supportive communities.
3. Investing in quality care and good health:
 4. Building safer Communities:
 - community based crime prevention; and
 - improve efficiency of criminal justice system.
 5. Create opportunity for young Canadians:
 - addressing high unemployment of 18-25 year olds; and
 - access to post secondary education and marketable skills.
 6. Acknowledge growing importance of knowledge sector of economy through targeted public/private programmes.
 7. Commitment to Aboriginal communities.
 8. Looking Outward:
 - responsible, engaged, committed world citizen;
 - liberalized trade;
 - promote sustainable development and practical solutions to global environmental problems; and
 - land mine treaty

2nd Session of the 35th Parliament (27 Feb 96)⁴⁸

1. Strong economy:
 - necessary for the pursuit of other Canadian values;
 - sound fiscal management;
 - economic renewal of rural Canada; and
 - budget deficit and dept targets.
2. Youth development for the future workforce.

⁴⁸ Privy Council Office, available from http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=InformationResources&sub=sftddt&doc=sftddt1996_e.htm ; Internet, accessed 24 January 2005

3. Investment in science and technology.
4. Liberalization of trade.
5. Secure Social safety net:
 - sustainable social union; and
 - sustainable health system.
6. Environmental security.
7. Personal Security:
 - crime and efficiencies in the justice system.
8. International security:
 - multilateralism and alliances; and
 - human rights and dignity.
8. Modern and United Country:
 - targets areas where federalism can be made to look adaptive and renewed.
(Largest part of the speech, however not surprising as this one was the first Throne Speech after the 1995 referendum).

Each speech speaks to core values found in each of the three pillars of POGG, and details goals for those values. For example, in each of the speeches there is a commitment to social programmes. Health is invariably addressed, initially in the context of ensuring the tenets of the Health Act are enforced, and most recently, with the goals of making it a sustainable programme with measures of effectiveness. Likewise for the issues surrounding children and families. There is constant support for initiatives that ensure Canadian children are prepared to learn. This includes financial aid for the lowest income earners, programmes at the local level for targeted results, as well as efforts to improve the safety of the communities in which they live. There is also a

continuous acknowledgement that the Aboriginal community has special needs and that additional effort need be exercised to ensure they have access to the opportunities of the nation.

The economy is also a recurring topic. In addition to responding to emerging sectors, the government has increasingly linked a strong economy to our ability to develop and protect a strong society. It has further linked economic growth to some of its social programmes, such as initiatives for life-long education and skills development, as well as the concept of sustainable economic growth and the economy's relationship to the environment. The renewed emphasis on communities, both with regard to infrastructure, the security thereof, and community based social programmes, has also been linked as enablers of a robust economy. Regional and sector factors remain key components of the economic agenda.

Canada's place in the world is equally visible in each speech. The statements have evolved from those primarily pertaining to efforts centered on international human security, to more broadly based statements of a commitment to international security, rule of law, and the interdependence of diplomacy, development and defence. Most of the speeches also acknowledge Canada's place as a trading nation, and the continuing efforts to expand this trade, especially through free trade.

In summary, the Throne Speeches have enunciated national goals that reflect the three pillars of national goals: Peace, Order and Good Government. There are goals to ensure security and sovereignty. There are goals to ensure the protection of our social order, and goals to enhance that order. Finally, there are goals for good government, which includes sound management of the economy and the means of wealth generation,

as well as the state of the domestic political relations and overall governmental accountability.

What is also clear to see, is that each Throne Speech is flavored by the current challenges to government. Those of the 35th and 36th Parliament have a more significant portion addressing the issue of good government, and the nature of federalism, as they were in the immediate post '95 referendum period. The 37th and 38th Parliament saw speeches which saw increased emphasis of safe and strong communities; perhaps, in part, a reflection of the May 2000 Walkerton water crisis. They also spoke of bolstering the social safety net in a period of weakening economic growth.⁴⁹ The post 9/11 period saw our foreign policy goals shift from a human security/dignity agenda, to one that acknowledged that many international problems would best be addressed with the current 3D+T (diplomacy, development, defence and trade) approach. Reference to national security issues was also made in these speeches.

Acknowledging that the process of deducing core values and national goals might also be undertaken within a model that has the two coincidentally derived at, this paper has purposely not done so. The interdependent model is assessed as a more intellectual or academically based exercise, whereas in this case, the deductions were to be purposefully arrived at from existing governmental sources.

Grand National Strategy

Having summarized, from government sources, Canadian core values and national interests and goals, what remains to be articulated is the complexity in

⁴⁹ Government of Canada, Canadian Economy On-line, available from <http://canadianeconomy.gc.ca/english/economy/#top> , Internet, accessed 17 March 2005

developing a grand national strategy to achieve these goals. Analyzing some of the works written about the development of a Canadian grand national strategy will provide the basic intellectual foundation necessary to assess what could be the basis for a Canadian developmental tool.

David Haglund supports the previously mentioned characterization of grand strategy by Jens Fey. In his 1998 *Canadian Defence Quarterly* article, he states that such a strategy must ideally be as concerned with peace as with war, be inclusive of diplomatic concerns, national morale, political culture, balance ends with means and be guided by, and responsive to, national interests.⁵⁰ It must, therefore, be a synergistic statement that mutually supports the stated interests and goals, while also acknowledging that realities of resource limitations, politics, both foreign and domestic, and national will, can at times be irreconcilable. When reviewing the subtleties of the referenced Throne Speeches, this becomes imminently apparent. That said, there need therefore be a mechanism in which to grasp the intellectual exercise of holistically assessing these realities while overlaying them over the national interests and goals.

The work of Macnamara and Fitz-Gerald on the subject of national strategy proposes a basic model, Figure 1⁵¹, with which to analyze a country's interests, defined as a combination of national values and goals, and the environmental factors which influence the development of a strategy to achieve them. In the current configuration, this model forms a skeletal check list, which would require population of the individual

⁵⁰ David Haglund, "Here Comes M. Jourdain: A Canadian Grand Strategy out of Moliere", *Canadian Defence Quarterly* vol 27, no.3 (Spring 1998): 17

⁵¹ Gen(ret'd) W.D. Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald, 'A National Security Framework for Canada', *Institute for Research on Public Policy- Policy Matters*, available from <http://www.irpp.org/pm/index.htm> ; accessed 8 March 2005, 11.

line items in order to deliberate the relationship, and the cause and affect of the items in the first two columns, thus enabling the development of the items in the third column.

Figure 1
A Strategic Planning Model

Interests	+	Environment	Strategy
National Values and National Goals		Domestic/International - Political -Economic -Technological -Socio-Cultural -Military/Defence	National Policies -Foreign/Diplomatic -Economic -Technological -Economic -Military/Defence

In its current form, this tabular model has combined national values and goals. As previously stated, this is assessed as a more complex representation of the argument. In order to maintain the linear, and easily assimilated nature required in chapter one of the NSP, the model could be reformulated as follows:

Figure 2

Core Values	⇒	National Interests and Goals	+	Environment	=	Grand National Strategy
Derived at from Government Sources		Arrived at from Government Sources		Domestic/ International Political Economic Technological Socio-Cultural Military/Defence		National Policies Foreign/Diplomatic Economic Technological Military/Defence

This model easily lends itself to be populated in a fashion whereby the user will be able to follow the algorithm from values, to goals, to strategy. Assuming the national values and goals are deduced in the manner presented in this paper, from existing governmental statements, the effectiveness of the strategy will then be dependant on the

fidelity achieved in ascertaining both the nature, and the interdependence of the realities which populate the “Environment” column of the model. (These environmental realities were previously described as governmental challenges.) It is worth noting that the linkage to the POGG statement is accomplished by populating the first two columns, with values and national interests and goals retrieved from the mission and vision statements within the three-pillar functional grouping of federal departments and agencies. In this manner the model is assessed at being exceptionally useful if incorporated into any policy statement, thus allowing for the for a greater understanding of why the policy was formulated, particularly if the intended audience is broader than the assembly of subject matter experts which developed the policy document.

In order to complete to description of the path from values to strategy, the following Macnamara diagram, from a lecture presented to Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course 31, illustrates how the strategy can then transformed into political will and finally implemented in the national interest.⁵²

⁵² Gen(ret'd) W.D. Macnamara, Lecture “*Introduction to National Security Studies*”, C/SS/CNS-301/LE-1, presented 27 August 2004

Figure 3



What may not be readily apparent in these models is the complexity of the analysis required in order to transform national interests into a realistic strategy, then into workable policy, and finally into effective implementation. It is further complicated by the fact that the core values and national interests are based upon an interpretation of the national will through elections and other opinion seeking mechanisms, thereby making the establishment of ground truth somewhat subject to interpretation by the government in power. However, what is important with models such as these, and the intellectual exercise they allow, is that they are user friendly enough for politicians, bureaucrats and average Canadians to understand the flow from values to policy implementation. They also allow each reader to analyze the development process from individual perspectives, and for the marshalling of thought at various levels of detail.

As previously stated, the difficulty lies in sufficiently understanding the “realities” of the environment within which national strategy must enable the achievement of national interests. Again, there is much research into this, however it can be overly complex to directly use these sources when attempting to educate average Canadians within the constraints of an introductory chapter of a policy document. Throne Speeches also offer some insight into the nature of the analysis of such political realities, as each incorporates the challenges of the day for the government.

In order to demonstrate this complexity, this paper will review a number of recent individual policies developments and then weave them together to reflect a strategy.

An example is the evolving strategy surrounding the national goals for the core value of equitably accessible health care. In the above summaries of the Throne Speeches from the 35th through 38th Parliaments, it is evident that

knowledge were emerging sectors, as well as incorporating the new force of globalization and the increasing positive effects of NAFTA. The latter Throne Speeches spoke of economic initiatives, which, in tougher economic circumstances, targeted preparing the workforce more effectively. It also clearly linked a strong economy to the freedom to resource other policy goals. These speeches also began to link sustainable development, colloquially understood as environment goals, with both economic and social prosperity.

A final example of matching ‘environmental realities’ to national interests and goals, can be drawn from Canada’s foreign policy. The 1995 foreign policy statement, “Canada in the World”, articulated three pillars for this foreign policy; promotion of prosperity and employment, protection of Canadian security, and the projection of Canadian of Canadian culture and values.⁵³ It was the template employed by Minister Axworthy during his tenure as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1996-2000), but the three Throne Speeches during this period⁵⁴ seemed to place priority on the ‘Axworthian’ third pillar. The result was the pillar of prosperity, notwithstanding Canada’s self-proclaimed status as a trading nation, and the security pillar, were overshadowed by pronouncements that our primary goal was to help provide the world with a human security blanket woven from the diplomatic export of our values of respect for the rule of law, belief in democracy and human rights. Darryl Copeland assessed Minister Axworthy as showing “almost no interest in commercial or trade files, in international economic institutions, or a variety of other tools” that precluded the “delivery of a broader agenda attuned to a

⁵³ Foreign Affairs Canada, *Canada in the World, Canadian Foreign Policy Review 1995*, available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp; Internet, accessed 19 Jan 2005

⁵⁴ 27 Feb 96 to open the 2nd session of the 35th Parliament.; 23 Sept 97 to open the 1st session of the 36th Parliament; and 12 Oct 99 to open the 2nd session of the 36th Parliament.

wider spectrum of Canadian interests.”⁵⁵ This assessment is concurred with by Jockel and Sokolsky who viewed this period as follows: “The human security concept will endure as the justification for Canadian military intervention overseas, especially because it has opened the door to abandoning the Canadian national interest as the touchstone for decision-making.”⁵⁶ The Throne Speeches of the 37th and 38th Parliament were also crafted with the 1995 policy paper as their basis, however, ‘environmental realities’ of a stressed economy, and changing international security demands, dictated the use of language that included all three pillars of the ’95 policy paper.

It is therefore clear to see that Canadian grand strategy is in fact developed within the symbiotic relationship of national core values, national interests and the evolving environmental realities (read governmental challenges or political realities) of the day.

PART II

Making the Case for a National Security Policy

From the above dissection of the Throne Speeches, it is evident that the departments and agencies in each of the POGG functional groupings must have followed a similar version of the intellectual exercise conducted in this paper, the summation of which being reflected in the speeches. The Throne Speeches represent the most current iteration of the national interests and goals for the core values, and a broad statement on the strategy to achieve them. What remains to be executed in a government’s mandate is

⁵⁵ Daryl Copeland, *The Axworthy Years: Canadian Foreign Policy in the era of Diminished Capacity*, in *Canada Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy*, ed Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot, 152-172 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), 167

⁵⁶ Joe Jockel, and Joel Sokolsky, “Lloyd Axworthy’s Legacy: Human security and the Rescue of Canada’s Defence Policy,” *International Journal* (Winter 2000-2001): 2.

for each department/agency is to develop the policy tools to effect that strategy. Whether the resultant policy statements/papers include some description of the linkage between core values and government policy depends on whether the department or agency assessed it as being necessary.

An example whereby this may not be necessary is policy dealing with health care. There are countless research findings which corroborate the government's assessment that Canadians not only view health care as a national core value, but also ascribe to the national goal to keep it universally accessible. In essence, the commonly accepted view that "the overwhelming majority of Canadians are definitive about their strong attachment to the current health care model and its principles"⁵⁷, as articulated in the 2002 Health Canada research paper, precludes the requirement 'make the case' to Canadians.

This is not the reality for the national security policy. Even in the post September 2001 world, the requirement for a national security policy is lost on some citizens and politicians. The three volume report by the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, titled "National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines", provides some clear indications as to the nation's low propensity to view national security as a priority to be resourced. Statements such as; "Perhaps Canada's low-key, laid back approach is part of our survival strategy" and "Canadians, alas, have a chronic

⁵⁷ Health Canada, *Canadians' Thoughts on Their Health Care System: Preserving the Canadian Model Through Innovation*, commissioned by the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, available from <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/care/romanow/hcc0094.html> , accessed 21 March 2005

history of unreadiness”⁵⁸, reflect the Senate’s findings based on extensive questioning of the stakeholders.

With this understanding of the Canadian mindset towards national security, it is therefore not unreasonable to submit that the Canadian government must include in its NSP, a description of the intellectual process by which the NSP was derived at, thus allowing citizens to plainly comprehend the political cause and effect in the present day execution of ‘Peace, Order and Good Government’.

The articulation of national core values and national goals provides an anchor for subsequent grand national strategy and resultant policy. In this manner, a national security policy immediately positions itself as much more than an instrument to safeguard territorial sovereignty, both national and those guaranteed in alliances. It also logically justifies the demand for resources beyond those most readily associated with security; namely those capabilities solely of a military or constabulary nature. Thus begins the process of educating citizens as to the underpinnings of the NSP.

The flukes of the anchor can therefore be forged with the national core values deductions found in Part I, and summed up as follows:

- geographic integrity;
- freedom from domestic and foreign threats;
- unfettered exercise of domestic and foreign policy;
- societal equality and universality, societal duty towards less fortunate;
- rule of law;
- transparent, effective and accountable government; and
- free exercise of sovereignty in marshalling economic resources and means of wealth generation,

⁵⁸ Senate, Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines*, Vol I, March 2004, 6 and 3 respectively..

It would not be necessary to fully articulate the data mining process utilized in this paper to determine these core values, however, a brief description of their lineage back to the mission and vision statements of the respective departments and agencies, would lend additional legitimacy to the list. A list of governmental Internet links, such as Annex A of this paper, directing readers to these statements could also be included for those so inclined. In this manner, each reader would then be immediately convinced that the policy paper is borne of the national fibre to which they ascribe to Canada, as democratic governments, over the long term, must reflect the character of their constituency. The importance of this connection is crucially important as the national political debate which will have preceded the policy paper will certainly have included the issues surrounding resource allocation and the opportunity cost of implementing a security policy as part of the grand national policy. There is also a political exigency in assuring the public views government policy soundly anchored by CANADIAN core values. This is especially true of policies which have an American aspect to them, as is the case for the NSP. Jack Granatstein, in his paper for the C.D. Howe Institute Benefactors Lecture of 2003, lists a number of historical examples whereby Canadian Prime Ministers were made keenly aware of this public opinion peculiarity. His paper, “The Importance of Being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada’s National Interests Through Tighter Ties with the U.S.”⁵⁹ uses the relationships of Diefenbaker and Kennedy (Cuba/nuclear weapons), Pearson and Johnson (Vietnam), Trudeau and Reagan (83/84 peace initiative), Mulroney and Reagan/Bush (nationalist concern over the tightening of relations and participation in the 1991 Gulf War) as examples of the thrust and parry

⁵⁹ Earnest: intensely serious; sincere and serious in intention. Oxford Concise Dictionary

nature of the Canada-U.S. relationship. He prefaced these examples with the statement that the government's weak spot was a Canadian public "that wanted to be independent of the U.S. but also fretted continually about getting out of step with the southern giant."⁶⁰ Suffice to say, Canadian governments must be seen to be striving for national interests which are grounded by Canadian national core values. All policy papers and/or statements need therefore ensure that this can be easily inferred from, or clearly articulated within, the document.

The next step advocated by this paper in educating Canadians about the relevance of the national security policy is in demonstrating to them that national interests and goals not only reflect core values, but that they are by definition in their personal interest. This paper has extracted these national goals from nearly a decade of Throne Speeches. There is a remarkably consistent trend in these goals. It is reasonable to assume that this is the result of the ongoing public political debate that evolves (some may say mutates) into national party platforms and are then acted upon by the electoral victor. Hence, the Throne Speeches should generally reflect the mood and the will of the nation, understanding there are always political realities, which must be reconciled. The result of which has been national goals for 'Peace, Order and Good Government' that can, as described earlier, generally be ascribed to the following areas; ensuring security and sovereignty, the protection and enhancement of our social order, sound management of the economy and the means of wealth generation, effective domestic political relations and accountable government.

⁶⁰ J.L. Granatstien, *The Importance of Being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada's National Interests Through Tighter Ties with the U.S.*, Prepared for the C.D. Howe Institute Benefactors Lecture 2003 (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, October 2003), 1.

As was the case for national core values, there need not be the requirement to provide a detailed description in the NSP as to how these national interests and goals are deduced. A brief description as to their lineage to the Throne Speeches is assessed as sufficient.

It is clear from the above discourse that national security, in and of itself, cannot be viewed as a national goal. As described by Wolfers, and previously presented in this paper, it is an objective measure of the absence of threat to values, and a subjective measure of absence of fears that these values will be attacked. Unlike health care, accountable government, a vibrant economy, or unchallenged territorial sovereignty, it does not, in the mind of many, directly enhance a country's standard of living. In fact, Wolfers states it is a societal burden. It is however an enabler within the grand national strategy, devised to achieve national interests: one that is required as a consequence of analysis of the domestic and international environment in which these national interests are to be achieved. In short, national security policy is part of the strategy response deemed necessary within the 'environmental realities' of Macnamara's model.

Hence, a national security document must clearly articulate the linkage from national goals to government policy in support of the grand national strategy. Whereas Throne Speeches inform the public of the direction the country will strive towards, due to practicality, Throne Speeches cannot fully articulate all the goals, nor the full strategy to achieve them. As seen by the models proposed by Gen(ret'd) McNamara and A. Fitzgerald, the process of formulating a grand strategy and resultant policy can become exceptionally complicated due to the many "environmental realities" and political challenges of the day.

Herein lies the greatest challenge in persuading Canadians to internalize the necessity of a national security debate. Having rolled up core values and national interests into a legitimized, yet digestible, list, the government needs then provide an equally digestible explanation how national security facilitates the execution of the national strategy. Models such as the ‘Strategic Continuum’ (depicted on page 41 of this paper) and the ‘Strategic Planning Model’ (depicted on page 39 of this paper), represent tools which are assessed as being highly effective in articulating the complex debate. They are not, however, sufficient in and of themselves. Having developed a model which, although perhaps a derivative of one and/or both of the above models, or another model, but certainly identifiable as a Canadian model, there will also need to be some description of the iterative process involved in the development of a national security policy.

The debate concerning national security has had many in government, in academia, in the media, and from many other interested arenas, provide opinions on the desired nature of the debate. There have been germane, and not so germane arguments from all points of view within this stakeholder group. There have also been interlopers, both within government, and from outside government, that have detracted from the debate. This is reflective of the complexity, and the health, of the debate, and therefore warrants attention to the various arguments currently in circulation. One such point of view is the previously incorporated paper by Gen(retd) Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald.⁶¹ It advocates the development of a framework in which to marshal, and then systematically assess, the factors surrounding the development of a national security

⁶¹ Gen(retd) W.D. Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald, ‘A National Security Framework for Canada’, *Institute for Research on Public Policy- Policy Matters*, available from <http://www.irpp.org/pm/index.htm> ; accessed 8 March 2005.

policy. Not unlike the Wolfers paper, it clearly uses national core values as a foundation. Macnamara and Fitz-Gerald then introduce the need to define national goals and/or interests. Finally, they consider system models that incorporate most of the major considerations a state need superimpose on these values and goals in order that a national strategy and policy tools may be developed to achieve those goals. From these deliberations, the authors submit a Canadian national security policy framework for consideration. It is a very linear paper, logical in its sequence, which also incorporates a recommended matrix for prioritizing national interests and or goals. The framework model and prioritization matrix are depicted below:⁶²

⁶² Gen(ret'd) W.D. Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald, 'A National Security Framework for Canada', *Institute for Research on Public Policy- Policy Matters*, available from <http://www.irpp.org/pm/index.htm> ; accessed 8 March 2005, figure 5 and 6..

Figure 4

Strategy and Force Planning Framework for the United States (Lloyd)




Figure 5

Nuechterlein's National Interest Matrix

Intensity of Basic National Interest	Survival Level (Critical)	Vital Level (Dangerous)	Major Level (Serious)	Peripheral Level (Bothersome)
Defense of Homeland				
Economic Well-Being				
Favourable World Order				
Promotion of Values				

The prioritization matrix obviously does not reflect the national interests and goals proposed in this paper. However it is a simple matter to replace those currently in the model, with those that reflect the Canadian government's position. Therefore, both the framework model and the matrix are assessed as being particularly suitable in that they both capture the essence of the required factors, yet are sufficiently reader friendly to allow for broad based understanding of their utility and the deductions they would produce. It is again worth noting that it is not the intention of this paper to populate either in order to advocate a particular national strategy or security policy. It is the composition of chapter one of the current NSP that is the subject of this paper.

Other dissertations on Canada's security policy have chosen to investigate the issue in relation to other federal policies. Douglas Ross is one such analyst. In his paper;

“Foreign Policy Challenges for Paul Martin”⁶³, Ross focused on the relationship with the U.S., as an example of the diminishing ability of Canada’s foreign policy to exercise influence on behalf of its citizens. He states that because of “...Canada’s 15-year-long extraction of a deficit fighting ‘peace dividend’ from the Canadian Forces, Ottawa’s ability to influence American grand strategy choices is minimal to nil.”⁶⁴ He goes on to describe the foreign policy approach advocated in the 2003 FAC titled “A Dialogue on Foreign Policy: Report to Canadians”⁶⁵ by using Michael Ignatieff’s characterization: “naïve narcissism”.⁶⁶ Ross believes that Canada has failed to acknowledge the priority in which national security plays in all U.S. relations and concludes by advocating the need to “guide Canadians back onto the path of responsible partnership in building international peace and security by endorsing the ‘cooperative security’ grand strategy option in the U.S. policy debate...”⁶⁷

Ross is correct in depicting Canadian foreign policy with the U.S as a matter that must be accommodated within our security policy, and vice versa. In fact, given that there is a shared border, both Canada’s domestic and international security policy components need to be considered in this relationship. However, his article detracts from the debate in that it does not clearly state that Canadian security policy is required, in of

⁶³ Douglas A Ross, “Foreign Policy Challenges for Paul Martin”, *International Journal* 58, no.4, (Autumn 2003): 533-569

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 535.

⁶⁵ Foreign Affairs Canada, “A DIALOGUE ON FOREIGN POLICY: REPORT TO CANADIANS, A Message from the Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs”, available from <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/participate/dialoguereport-en.asp> ; accessed 29 Jan 05

⁶⁶ Michael Ignatieff, “Canada in the Age of Terror: Multilateralism Meets a Moment of Truth”, *Policy Options*, (February 2003): 14-18.

⁶⁷ Douglas A Ross, “Foreign Policy Challenges for Paul Martin”, *International Journal* 58, no.4, (Autumn 2003): 567-569.

and of itself, for other Canadian national interests and goals, and not merely as an enabler of the foreign policy with the U.S. Without a direct link to Canadian goals and grand national strategy, readers could view his position as appeasement towards U.S. international policy. In fact, his use of Ignatieff's characterization is taken somewhat out of context. Although Ignatieff does use the term 'naïve narcissism', it is done in relation to a diverging vision of how the threat of terrorism should be addressed. He contends that Canada and Europe have a vision of a "multilateral world in which the legitimacy for the use of force must reside in the UN: sovereignty is not unconditional, it is limited and bound by human rights agreements, by multilateral engagements, which limit and constrain the sovereignty of states in the name of collective social goods."⁶⁸ The Ignatieff paper deals with a very specific component of Canadian foreign policy and the issue of multilateralism versus bilateralism. Although both Ross and Ignatieff indulge in useful debate, their articles are very focused and therefore assessed as not entirely suitable in informing a reader as to the greater debate on the necessity of a national security policy.

Denis Stairs is more successful in this regard, with his article "Challenges and Opportunities for Canadian Foreign Policy in the Paul Martin Era."⁶⁹ Stairs debates the merits of multilateralism, and international aspirations, but is clear in his statement that "the first priority of Canadian foreign policy must be the maintenance of a fundamentally

⁶⁸ Michael Ignatieff, "Canada in the Age of Terror: Multilateralism Meets a Moment of Truth", *Policy Options*, (February 2003): 15.

⁶⁹ Denis Stairs, "Challenges and Opportunities for Canadian Foreign Policy in the Paul Martin Era", *International Review*, Vol59, No 4 (Autumn 2003): 481-506.

healthy relationship with the U.S.”⁷⁰ He then provides the most powerful justification possible for this view: “...one obviously essential requirement, one singularly vital national interest: a continental border kept fully open to commerce with the U.S.”⁷¹ Although not out of step with the Ross paper, in term of the importance of the Canadian-American relationship, Stairs has allowed the reader insight into the link between national interest, grand strategy and the policy tools which must be meshed, in this with case national security and foreign policy, in order to further the interests of all Canadians.

A final, and perhaps best, example of a paper which deals with both national security policy and foreign policy, is the aforementioned Granatstein paper ‘The Importance of Being Less earnest: Promoting Canada’s National Interests Through Tighter Ties with the U.S.’ Although also a paper about the Canada-U.S. relationship, it effectively builds its argument with the premise of defining the foundation upon which national strategy must be built, and hence the policy instruments to achieve them. Acknowledging that core values define the nation, he states that the “fundamental truth is that few but important Canadian traits aside, values or principles are for individuals, while nations have interests above all.”⁷² He then states the following list of four Canadian national interests:

- Canada must protect its territory, the security of its people and its unity;
- It must strive to protect and enhance its independence ;
- It must promote the economic growth of the nation to support the prosperity and welfare of its people; and

⁷⁰ Denis Stairs, “Challenges and Opportunities for Canadian Foreign Policy in the Paul Martin Era”, *International Review*, Vol59, No 4 (Autumn 2003): 485.

⁷¹ *Idid.*, 485.

⁷² J.L. Granatstien, *The Importance of Being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada’s National Interests Through Tighter Ties with the U.S.*, Prepared for the C.D. Howe Institute Benefactors Lecture 2003 (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, October 2003): 7.

- It must work with like-minded states, in and outside international forums, for the protection and enhancement of democracy and freedom.

Prior to going onto some of the factors which affect the Canada-U.S. relationship, and his views on how that relationship should be nurtured, Granatstein quotes David Malone, advocating that a “sensible foreign policy should be based on established national values and the country’s national interests, with the two categories properly balanced.”⁷³ It is interesting to see that Malone supports Macnamara’s premise that core values and national interests must be developed in tandem. What is more important however, is that the Granatstein paper purposefully guides the reader from first principles, through the ‘core value + national interests/goals = grand national strategy (remembering the assigned definition to the + symbol)’ algorithm, and finally to advocated policy positions. Granatstein captures the essence of what chapter one of the NSP should deliver to Canadians, and need only include a diagram model in which to fully focus his reader. Although it would not be possible to fully include such a paper in one chapter of the NSP, a similarly scripted, yet less detailed dissertation would lend great credibility to the framework diagrams which seek to visualize the complex, and ever evolving, interactions between national strategy and policy development.

Another example of this public policy debate is the federal initiative on the identification of critical infrastructure, which involves a process which includes the engagement of the private sector through such measures as the National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program.⁷⁴ These academic, media and public forums, are a

⁷³Ibid., 8.

⁷⁴ PSEPC, National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program, available from http://ocipep-bpiepc.gc.ca/critical/nciap/synopsis_e.asp, accessed 12 April 2005

reflection of a healthy democracy and are a necessary part of the national security debate to be articulated to Canadians as part of a greater national strategy and security policy debate.

COMPARISONS

The final exercise which will be used in the analysis of how Canada's NSP could best be presented to the Canadian public, is a review and comparison to other national security policies. First to be reviewed will be the December 2003 security policy of the European Union. As can be imagined of a document which is meant to reflect the interests of many nations, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy"⁷⁵, it is written from pan-European perspective. That is to say, use of generally grand philosophical statements, but with very limited direct links to the fundamentals which define a nation, or in this case a union of nations. This paper has developed an argum

democracy”⁷⁶ are the only words which, even fleetingly, deal with core values. It is followed by a paragraph that introduces the EU as a participant in the globally economy, then, only sparingly describes the issue of international security as an enabler of that economy. The policy then closely mimics the Canadian NSP by articulating the assessed threats and measures which have been, or will be, implemented to counter them. Like the Canadian NSP, the policy reads as a mostly prescriptive document, but is far less concrete in describing these measures that the NSP is. Given that the EU faces immeasurably more complex challenges in the political arena, for the EU must accommodate the competing demands of many federal governments, it is not surprising that the EU security policy has not used a linear algorithm to articulate the need for a security policy. Nor is it surprising that it has not attempted to populate a framework model to help educate Europeans about the development of grand strategy and policy tools. This omission does however jeopardize the ability of the EU to justify to its citizens the long-term opportunity costs of resourcing its security policy.

An interesting observation of the EU security debate presents itself within a statement given by Javier Solana, the EU High representative for the Common Foreign and security Policy. In his address to the panel on “Security in the Middle East: New Challenges for NATO and the EU”⁷⁷, at February 2005 Munich Conference on Security Policy, he provides specific comments on the Middle east peace process, Iraq and Iran. Of particular note, however, are the following statements: “For Europe, the Middle East

⁷⁶ *Idid.*, 1.

⁷⁷ Javier Solana, statements to the panel on “*Security in the Middle East: New Challenges for NATO and the EU*”, available from http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/83704.pdf, accessed 13 April 2005

is our immediate neighbor. Many factors tie us together: history, economic links, shared interests, and close personal relationships. EU engagement with the region is deep and has a long history.”⁷⁸ Although not within the scope of this paper, this apparent prioritizing of the Middle East region within the EU security debate can easily be equated to the overshadowing effect that the Canada-U.S. component sometimes exerts in the Canadian security and foreign policy debate. The above brief description reveals interesting similarities and particularities between the Canadian and EU national security debate.

The U.S. national security policy has been developed within a markedly different paradigm. Although never a dormant debate in the U.S., it has received a much higher priority since the autumn of 2001. It can be generally assessed that Americans view this debate as far less of a distraction, or intrusion, than Canadians do, and as such, are a more receptive audience in matters of national security and sovereignty.⁷⁹ President Bush’s statement, “as a matter of common sense and self-defence, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed”⁸⁰, in his introduction to the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the USA (US NSS), can therefore be seen as a reflection of the national psyche on this policy matter. Although the above characterization does not necessarily equate to a more engaged citizenry, it may reflect

⁷⁸ Ibid., 2.

⁷⁹ A 14 April 2004 Associated Press poll found: “Public worries about the economy have dropped since last summer, while fears about terrorism and war have been on the rise” available from <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=2123>, accessed 8 February 2005

A 24 March 2004 Associated Press poll found “Democratic rival John Kerry must convince voters that he can protect the country”, available from <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=2093>, accessed 8 February 2005

⁸⁰ United States. The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C., US Government printing Office, September, 2002

the more marshal tendencies of a population that is currently more willing to accept the opportunity costs of the US NSS. This admittedly superficial analysis of the American mood is used to submit that the US government probably has a less difficult task in convincing its citizens of the need for national security. Given the growing deficit and debt, this task may become increasingly difficult, but that analysis is outside the scope of this paper.

Notwithstanding the above noted American predispositions, the US NSS did, nonetheless, allocate portions of the document to anchor the argument for national security to core values and national interests and goals. However, not unlike Canada's NSP, the US document does not clearly articulate the linear relationship between national core values, national interests and goals, and the grand national strategy to achieve these goals. The first chapter of the NSS, titled 'Overview of America's International Strategy', expends but one paragraph to encapsulate this:

"The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity."⁸¹

The chapter then concludes by listing the title of the remaining eight chapters, which will articulate the measures to achieve its goals. Somewhat surprising (or not, given that the US NSS was published some eighteen months prior to the NSP) is that these chapters closely resemble those in the NSP, both in title and in content.

⁸¹ United States. The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C., US Government printing Office, September, 2002, 1.

A notable difference is that the U.S. NSS includes a chapter dealing with economic issues, both domestic and global. It links a strong global economy directly to national security: “We want our allies to have strong economies for their own sake, for the sake of the global economy, and for the sake of global security.”⁸² The chapter then also includes the economies of developing nations as part of this security component.

A final aspect of the U.S. national security debate to be commented upon is the use of additional policy instruments to address specific aspects of the national security issue. These include the National Strategy for Homeland Security, which addresses terrorism in the U.S.; the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which defines the U.S. war plan against international terrorism; the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, which describes initiatives to secure information systems against deliberate attack; the National Money Laundering Strategy, which is aimed at illegal flows of money used in international terrorism and crime; and the National Drug Control Strategy, targeting drug smuggling and consumption.⁸³ (These documents are more successful in presenting a

⁸² Ibid., 21.

⁸³ United States, The White House, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, (Washington, D.C., US Government printing Office, July 2002), available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf , Accessed 22 February 2005
 United States, The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington, D.C., US Government printing Office, February 2003), available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf , accessed 11 April 2005
 United States, The White House, *The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace*, (Washington, D.C., US Government printing Office, February 2003), available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/cyberspace_strategy.pdf , accessed 11 April 2005
 United States, Department of the Treasury, *The National Money Laundering Strategy*, (Washington, D.C., US Government printing Office, July 2002), available from <http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/publications/ml2002.pdf> , accessed 11 April 2005
 United States, The White House, *The National Drug Control Strategy*, (Washington, D.C., US Government printing Office, February 2005), available from <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs05/ndcs05.pdf> , accessed 11 April 2005

link between policy and first principles, however these links are not always clear as they are articulated within complex chapters.)

In summary, the U.S. approach was to develop a capstone document, the U.S. NSS, which was then buttressed by more detailed documents, which address specific security areas, is able to remain at a higher level, establishing it as an enabler for the grand national strategy. The document uses many references and links to domestic, foreign and economic policies to solidly its capstone nature; a characteristic which is lacking in the Canadian NSP.

It is not the intent of this paper to cross-reference the EU and U.S. documents with Canada's NSP, for detailed comparison. The intent is to demonstrate that Canada is not unique in its efforts to develop a national security policy, nor burdened with challenges different from other nations in doing so.

PART III

CONCLUSION

In the two and a half year period immediately after September, 2001, the Canadian Government redistributed the responsibility for security from a paradigm of residing in each department and agency, for each to assess, prioritize and resource, to one where the responsibility primarily resided within one department, with overall coordinating authority. There is obviously some residual security responsibility throughout government, however, the task of marshalling those departmental and agency specific initiatives, is now charged to one minister with the role of security "policy

leadership.”⁸⁴ This significant overhaul to the structure of departments and agencies, was a clear indication that the federal government recognized the validity of the observations of the February 2002 SCONSAD report, which called for, amongst other things, the creation of an accountable federal authority for national security matters, and a system to coordinate the vast effort which would be required “ across and between governments”.⁸⁵ The magnitude of this structural realignment speaks clearly to the evolution of the national debate on national security, placing it in at an uncharacteristically high position within national concerns and governmental priorities. This structural change also speaks to the complexity of devising policy in the achievement of national interests and goals. SCONSAD has favourably acknowledged these developments; “To its credit, the new government has introduced some significant reforms, most notably the consolidation of much of the security file under the Deputy Prime Minister and the release of the national security policy” and “Politicians and bureaucrats at the federal level deserve a measure of credit for introducing these improvements to security for Canadians in recent years.”⁸⁶ Although these structural changes do not guarantee effective, synergistic policies, they do significantly improve the effectiveness of government to debate the policy tools required to support the nation’s grand strategy in that, the overall responsibility for national security now resides within one department.

⁸⁴ Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, available from http://www.psepc.gc.ca/publications/news/20041008-2_e.asp#PSEPC , accessed 7 February 2005

⁸⁵ Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002*,, available from <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep05feb02-e.htm#14.%20Development%20of%20a%20National%20Security%20Policy> , accessed 1 December 2004, 51.

⁸⁶ Canada, Senate, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, “*Canadian Security Guide Book, 2005 EDITION: An Update of Security Problems in Search of Solutions, December 2004*”, available from <http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep03nov04-e.htm> , accessed 2 April 2005, 1-2.

As stated in the introduction, the intent of this paper was not to assess the effectiveness of the prescriptive measures incorporated within the NSP, but to analyze the effectiveness of the argument for justification, within the document, of a national security policy. If Canadians do not accept, on an intellectual level, the fundamental requirement, then the national debate and resultant governmental strategy and policy, is restricted to myopic and short term consideration; a situation which would not allow for the synchronization of national security policy with all the other federal policies developed as tools to enable the execution of a grand national strategy in the pursuit of national interests and goals.

This paper based its analysis firstly on seeking to define the concept of national security. By reviewing current and historical research on the issue, the 1980 Canada National Defence College definition was assessed as an accurate reflection of a Canadian definition of national security, and therefore a sound basis from which to further analyze the NSP.

The next stage in this analysis was deducing the capstone fundamentals of the grand national strategy algorithm introduced in part one. These capstone fundamentals are Canadian national core values, and national interests and goals. This was accomplished by data mining current federal sources for the information necessary to make such deductions. In the case of national core values, current mission and vision statements from federal departments and agencies provided clear insight into what is considered to be the core values of Canadians. What was also mined from these mission and vision statements is that there is also a significant national resource requirement in ensuring these core values are adequately funded. The resultant list of summarized

national core values is articulated in three functional pillars: peace, order and good government. The values in each of these pillars are not only those which reflect the Canadian social fabric, but also the values which enable Canada to exercise unfettered sovereignty over the territorial and domestic agenda, including economic matters. In this manner, the list clearly establishes the foundations of the desired Canadian society, and what needs to be made secure in order to ensure the independent decision making ability necessary to marshal the national wealth for developing that society.

From this national core values foundation, this paper then sought to present a fact based summary of publicly stated national interests and goals. The federal government was also assessed as being the source most reflective of Canada's national aims, as elected governments are, in theory, the party that has most closely reflected the aspirations of the majority of its citizens. Although it is acknowledged that many political factors are at play within an election campaign, longevity is not a characteristic any party can expect if it deviates for long, from the majority wishes of its constituency. Therefore, the Throne Speeches of the last decade were assessed as the 'mise-en-train' statements of the party platforms of the electoral victors. The analysis of these Speeches clearly demonstrates that there have been no revolutions in the articulation of national interests and goals. Although the tone and emphasis of each speech clearly reflects the political challenges of the day, each speech follows a general trend, which includes goals to enhance and protect Canada's social order; goals to ensure security and sovereignty; goals for effective and accountable government; and goals for the sound management of the economy and the means of wealth generation. It assessed that the national interests and goals in the subject Throne Speeches reflect not only the national core values, but

also the wishes of Canadians. Electoral success is the measure by which this assessment is derived.

This paper then sought to apply the fundamental building blocks of core values and national goals to the grand national strategy algorithm. Development of a grand national strategy is complex, necessitating the reconciliation and of the many domestic and international political, economic and social demands. Additionally, a challenge of any government policy statement is to ensure citizens can clearly identify the policy as an enabler of the grand national strategy that has been devised to achieve the vision of national interests and goals for which the government has been elected. While pronouncements on core values, national interests, and national goals, are more easily digested by citizens, the subtleties of grand national strategy development does not lend this debate to be as engaging to most. Therefore, when such strategy enablers are announced, there may have developed, for non-subject matter experts, an intellectual chasm, and therefore no readily identifiable link between the national interests and goals for which citizens have voted. The result of which can be a societal reluctance to support such a policy, both ideologically, and with resources from other priorities.

In view of this potential intellectual chasm, this paper has submitted for consideration, framework planning models which are assessed as useful in enabling Canadians to comprehend the complexity of formulating grand national strategy and the subsequent necessarily synergistic policies to achieve the national interests and goals. The final model will obviously need to not exceed the assessed capacity of the target reader to absorb the material presented, however must include sufficient detail to ensure the intellectual linkage from core values, through to an interrelated policy tool, aimed at

ensuring the grand national strategy is successful. The diagrams used in this paper convey the general framework within which the national security debate must develop, and incorporate sufficiently broad descriptors of the major factors within such a debate. The text which supports these diagrams will require sufficient thought as to ensure that the reader is not overwhelmed by an overly specialized description, however leaves no doubt in the reader's mind as to the validity of the national security policy being advocated. It is assessed that such a mechanism, in chapter one of the NSP, would allow Canadians to more constructively re-engage into the national security debate, and more intuitively assess the proposed policy from a more holistic perspective. As chapter one, in its current iteration, is but eight pages long, of which fully two pages contain a threat assessment, this paper contends there is not only scope, but a requirement to expand the chapter in order to effectively incorporate the 'Peace, Order and Good Government' based justification for a national security policy. In fact, if the NSP were restructured as solely a policy statement, with the prescriptive measures in chapters two through eight parsed out as stand-alone documents, there would then be greater flexibility to more fully capture the justification component of the policy. The American national security documents are structured thusly, however, they represent a far more voluminous body of work, which may not sufficiently engage a Canadian population that is characterized by lower level of concern for matters of national security and defence.

When comparing the Canadian NSP to that of the security policies of the EU and the U.S., it is evident that Canada has not embarked on a bold new path. There are remarkable similarities in the structure, as well as individual political realities to differentiate them. All three documents were developed under the somewhat compressed

timelines dictated by the post 9/11 political realities. They were devised to illustrate bold action against easily identifiable threats to each nation. They also, however, all failed in linking the requirement for such a policy, to the longer term good of the respective nations. This is clearly a complex task, whereby sufficient detail must be included to ensure the full debate is understood, however, where inclusion of all the factors, and their relationship to all the component policies, from the economy, to health, to territorial sovereignty, would push the explanation beyond the ability, and perhaps the willingness of citizens to comprehend. Complexity and difficulty cannot be used as an excuse to shy away from this duty to educate Canadians. It should be recalled that “the most important social service that a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free.”⁸⁷ Canada’s ability to freely exercise sovereignty is directly impacted government’s ability to deliver this important social service.

Peace, Order and Good Government is expected and demanded by Canadians. Replacing the apologetic opening statement in chapter one of the NSP with “Preventative measures are a tenet of good government and an indicator of an enlightened society”⁸⁸, would perhaps more effectively signal to Canadians that is exactly what they are getting in “Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy.”

⁸⁷ John Slessor, *Strategy for the West*, (London, Cassell & Co LTD, 1954), 68.

⁸⁸ Senate, Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines*, Vol I, March 2004, 2

EPILOGUE

During the research for, and compilation of, this paper, existing federal government, academic, and other public sources were used to develop the argument that the National Security Policy need clearly support the grand national strategy which in turn need be anchored by the national interests and goals, and national core values. Although the April, 2005, publication of the Canadian government's long awaited International Policy Statement⁸⁹, along with its four companion statements on Diplomacy⁹⁰, Defence⁹¹, Development⁹², and Commerce⁹³, regrettably precluded their full academic inclusion, they are briefly reviewed and analyzed in this epilogue. This review will not focus on determining the success of meeting Canada's international policy needs, but on the success in providing the necessary linkages for justification of the policy measures advocated within the documents, and especially the need to factor in national security.

This compendium of federal policy papers speaks to the foundation of this paper's assertion that policy tools need be developed in a holistic manner, as enablers of the grand national strategy, and as a reflection of the compromise necessary within

⁸⁹ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World; Overview*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005)

⁹⁰ DFAIT, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Diplomacy*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005)

⁹¹ Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005)

⁹² DFAIT, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Development*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005)

⁹³ Canadian International Development Agency, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Commerce*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005)

competing national interests and goals, and the political realities and challenges which face democratic governments. The opening section of the Overview document states “ the problems we face are interrelated. Security threats can diminish economic prosperity by hindering free flow of people, goods, and services across national borders. Conversely, long-term commercial engagement and development assistance can prevent impoverished states from becoming sources of instability.”⁹⁴ From this statement the reader can readily infer the interdependence of diplomacy, defence, development and commerce, and clearly understand the government’s position that its fundamental responsibility is “ensuring continued prosperity and security for Canadians.”⁹⁵

This relationship is present in each of the companion documents. Of particular note, is the inclusion of the national security element in three of the four policy priorities articulated in the Diplomacy document. The first, ‘fostering the North American partnership’, demonstrates the importance of this partnership, not only in economic terms, but in terms of cooperating on other common global objectives. It states that Canada’s participation in the tri-lateral 2005 Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, is an example of Canada’s commitment to its responsibility with respect to continental security, and how initiatives in this regard will provide cooperative stability in the remaining aspects of the partnership.⁹⁶ The second priority, ‘making a distinctive

⁹⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World; Overview*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005), 1.

⁹⁵ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World; Overview*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005), 4.

⁹⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World; Diplomacy*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005), 4-8.

contribution to Canada's efforts to help build a more secure world', clearly links the threat of failed and fragile states to Canada's national security challenge, especially as they relate to terrorism, organized crime and weapons of mass destruction.⁹⁷ Canada has further assessed that through its third diplomacy priority, 'promoting a new multilateralism', it also addresses security concerns as well pursuing a goal orientated foreign policy. By directly allocating resources to these three priorities, Canada not only fulfills obligations as an affluent global citizen, but more importantly, to the security of its citizens.

The defence statement is equally imbued with references to the inter-relationship of government policies. The articulation of defence capabilities is justified by, amongst other things, the need to address failed and failing states, terrorism and participating in goals orientated multilateralism.⁹⁸ It then justifies transformation and the establishment of Canada Command through the need to protect Canadians and its continental responsibilities.⁹⁹ This document is also a much-improved exercise in relating policy to the grand national strategy. The same holds true for the Development document that states that "Security and development are inextricably linked" and "Development has to be the first line of defence for the collective security system that takes prevention

⁹⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World; Diplomacy*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005), 9-21.

⁹⁸ Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World; Defence*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005), 5-9.

⁹⁹ Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World; Defence*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005), 16-22.

seriously.”¹⁰⁰ Finally, the Commerce document acknowledges that the “ Government’s commercial strategy is articulated around the international and domestic drivers of our prosperity.”¹⁰¹

In all five documents, the government has sought to articulate its vision as a function of three main pillars: Security, Prosperity and Responsibility. The first two reflect what can perhaps be viewed as national selfishness with regards to the well-being of Canadians, while the third reflects our a determination to be a good global citizen. Although not quite the same foundation as, Peace, Order and Good Government, a more in depth analysis could develop an argument to establish logical links between the two sets of pillars. Taken as a whole, the International Policy Statements have been more successful, when compared to the NSP, in allowing Canadians to see the justification of these policy tools. They are however lacking in making the link all the way back to national core values and in utilizing a model which would allow for a visual representation of the complexity of all such policy debates. However, what has been made clearer is that the NSP is more than a policy in, and of, itself.

In this manner, the Canadian government has already achieved a measure of success with regards to the oft repeated aim, within the international policy statements, that there need to be a greater interdependence in the workings of governmental departments in order to achieve national interests and goals. It has clearly understood the peril of the SCONSAD observation that “Canada does not have a specific National Security Policy that would place defence policy, foreign policy and internal security in

¹⁰⁰ DFAIT, *Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Development*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005), 1.

¹⁰¹ DFAIT, *Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Commerce*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005), 1.

context, and relate them to one another”¹⁰², and has chosen a more synergistic path to policy development. Perhaps it will also see the wisdom in the need to ensure Canadians understand the requirement for a National Security Policy and re-promulgate chapter one of the NSP.

¹⁰² Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002*, available from <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep05feb02-e.htm#14.%20Development%20of%20a%20National%20Security%20Policy>, accessed 1 December 2004, 49.

ANNEX A

Structure of the Canadian Federal Government¹⁰³

The following list outlines the Structure of the Canadian federal government: Cabinet-level Departments, Agencies, Secretariats and Offices are denoted in **bold** with the corresponding Minister listed alongside

Privy Council Office -- Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister & President of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada

-**Intergovernmental Affairs Secretariat** -- Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs.

Office of the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons -- Leader of the Government in the House of Commons

-**Office of the Leader of the Government in the Senate** -- Leader of the Government in the Senate

Treasury Board Secretariat -- President of the Treasury Board

Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada -- Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food

-Canadian Dairy Commission

-Canadian Food Inspection Agency

-Canadian Grain Commission

Canadian Heritage, Department of -- Minister of Canadian Heritage

-Office of the Minister of State (Multiculturalism) -- Minister of State (Multiculturalism)

-**Sport Canada** -- Minister of State (Sport)

Citizenship and Immigration Canada -- Minister of Citizenship and Immigration

-Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

Environment Canada -- Minister of the Environment

-Parks Canada

Finance, Department of -- Minister of Finance

Fisheries and Oceans Canada -- Minister of Fisheries and Oceans

-Canadian Coast Guard

Foreign Affairs Canada -- Minister of Foreign Affairs

-**Canadian International Development Agency** -- Minister for International Cooperation

Health Canada -- Minister of Health

-Canadian Health Network

-**Public Health Agency of Canada** -- Minister of State (Public Health)

Human Resources and Skills Development Canada -- Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development

-Canada Student Loans Program

-Employment Insurance Program

-**Labour Program & Canada Mortgage and Housing Authority** -- Minister of Labour and Housing

-Office of the Minister of State (Human Resources Development) -- Minister of State (Human Resources Development)

Indian and Northern Affairs Canada -- Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development

-Office of the Minister of State (Northern Development) -- Minister of State (Northern Development)

Industry Canada -- Minister of Industry

-**Federal Economic Development Initiative for Northern Ontario** -- Minister of State (Federal Economic Development Initiative for Northern Ontario)

-**Infrastructure Canada** -- Minister of State (Infrastructure and Communities)

International Trade Canada -- Minister of International Trade

¹⁰³ Answers.com, *Structure of the Canadian Federal Government*
<http://www.answers.com/topic/structure-of-the-canadian-federal-government> , accessed 9 March 2005

Justice, Department of -- Minister of Justice

National Defence, Department of -- Minister of National Defence & Associate Minister of National Defence

-Canadian Forces

Natural Resources Canada -- Minister of Natural Resources

-Canadian Forest Service

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada -- Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

-Canada Border Services Agency

-Canada Firearms Centre

-Canadian Security Intelligence Service

-Correctional Service of Canada

-Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Public Works and Government Services Canada -- Minister of Public Works and Government Services

Social Development Canada -- Minister of Social Development

-Office of the Minister of State (Caregivers and Families) -- Minister of State (Caregivers and Families)

Transport Canada -- Minister of Transport

Veterans Affairs Canada -- Minister of Veterans Affairs

Standalone Agencies, Offices etc., with Subsidiary Units

Governor General of Canada

Parliament of Canada

-**Elections Canada**

-**Office of the Auditor General of Canada**

-**Office of the Ethics Commissioner**

-**Office of the Privacy Commissioner**

Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency -- **Minister for the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency**

Bank of Canada

Business Development Bank of Canada

Canada Revenue Agency -- **Minister of National Revenue**

Economic Development Agency of Canada for the Regions of Quebec -- **Minister of the Economic**

Development Agency of Canada for the Regions of Quebec

Supreme Court of Canada

Western Economic Diversification Canada -- **Minister of Western Economic Diversification**

<http://www.answers.com/topic/structure-of-the-canadian-federal-government>

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