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NATO: CANADA'S ONE STRATEGIC CHOICE

By/par LCol J.A. Legere

Abstract

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been called one of the most successful alliances in history. It has survived to see its nemesis, the Soviet Union, dissolve. It stepped in to quell conflict in the Balkans and now, at the beginning of the 21st century, the alliance is turning its attention to transformation, expansion, and the establishment of security, stability and democracy well beyond the European theater. Yet, as successful as NATO appears, there are strains evident in the trans-Atlantic alliance. The European Union has emerged as a powerful political entity, and its European Security and Defense Policy stands as a potential rival to NATO, with Europeans looking for more autonomy in their foreign and defence policies. This, coupled with diverging interests between Europeans and Americans, leaves the future of NATO uncertain. Canada played a vital role in the creation of NATO, working closely with Britain to ensure continued US support for and involvement in the defence of Western Europe against aggressive Soviet expansion. Despite strong support for NATO in the beginning, Canada's relationship with the alliance waned as détente began to take hold in the late 1960s, and since that time, its approach to the organization can only be described as one of vacillation. This paper argues that Canada must renew its interest and investment in NATO because the alliance is currently the only truly effective international security organization. Canada played a seminal role in NATO and has a prominent 'seat at the table' of the North Atlantic Council, as such the alliance provides our country with a voice in affairs of international security and stability that it would not otherwise enjoy. Given the imminent foreign and defence policy review, and the debate that will likely ensue, this is an opportune time for Canada to reaffirm its commitment to NATO. The trans-Atlantic alliance must be Canada's "one strategic choice."

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Dedication

This paper is dedicated to my wife, Cathy, whose loving support, encouragement, and countless sacrifices on the 'home front' made it possible for me to pursue my dreams of service in Canada's profession of arms.

ABBREVIATIONS

ACO	Allied Command (Operations)
ACT	Allied Command (Transformation)
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defence
C2	Command and Control
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
CFITES	Canadian Forces Individual Training and Education System
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND	Department of National Defence (Canada)
DoD	Department of Defense (United States)
DPC	Defence Planning Committee
EC	European Council
EDA	European Defense Agency
ESDI	European Security and Defense Initiative
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
FLQ	Front de Libération de Québec
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IFOR	Intervention Force (former Yugoslavia)
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MTAP	Military Training Assistance Program
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Coordinating Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFTC	NATO Flying Training Center
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense
NRF	NATO Response Force
NTM(I)	NATO Training Mission in Iraq
PfP	Partnership for Peace Program
PGM	Precision Guided Munitions
PJC	Permanent Joint Council
PPC	Pearson Peacekeeping Center
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RRF	Rapid Response Force
SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defences
SFOR	Stabilization Force (former Yugoslavia)
UN	United Nations
UNCIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police Mission
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force (former Yugoslavia)
USAF	United States Air Force
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

PREFACE

> *[Canadian Defence Minister] Brooke Claxton wrote in 1947 that the missions of the Canadian Forces are to defend Canada, to defend North America with the United States, and after that we can choose whatever we want to do. Two strategic imperatives, one strategic choice.*[1]

Canada's geography is its most powerful instrument of national security. Our foreign and defence policies reflect the fact that our country is insulated by three oceans, blessed with vast natural resources, and included under the security umbrella of the world's most powerful country—a country with whom we share strong economic ties and the common values of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for individual/human rights. Canada enjoys an enviable level of security compared to most countries, but in the poignant words of Desmond Morton:

> …Canada's security depends on U.S. security…our priority…is to do what we must do to make Americans feel secure on their northern frontier. Americans may remember 9-11; we must remember 9-12, when American panic closed the U.S. border and shook our prosperity to its very core.[2]

The United States is our largest trading partner, our closest ally and, like it or not, a 'big brother' in many respects. This bilateral relationship goes to the very heart and soul of our country and we must unfailingly seek ways to nurture it. Yet, Canada dares not recede into isolationism on the North American continent, bilaterally or otherwise. This lesson was learned at the horrific expense of two bloody world wars—learning it *well* helped to thaw a Cold War that threatened humanity's very existence. Canadians, along with our American and European allies, recognize that being actively engaged in the international community is the best way to contribute to peace and global stability. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is currently the most effective means by which Canada can contribute to international security and stability; as such, it must remain Canada's one strategic choice.

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[1]Douglas Bland, "Everything Military Officers Need to Know About Defence Policy-Making in Canada," in *Advance or Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21st Century*, ed. David Rudd, Jim Hansen and Jessica Blitt (Toronto, ON: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000), 28.

[2]Morton, Desmond, "What it Means to be 'Unmilitary' in Canada." Partial text of a dinner speech given by Professor Desmond Morton, McGill University, Montreal, to the opening banquet of a Canadian conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society at Toronto on Friday, 1 October 2004.

INTRODUCTION

> *Canada remains strongly committed to NATO which we see as a) a community of values; b) the key forum for Euro-Atlantic relations and c) a growing provider of security and stability also outside its traditional area of operations. We will continue to make an active contribution to this Alliance, both politically and militarily.*
>
> --Jean-Pierre Juneau, Canada's Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council[3]

As Canadian policymakers re-evaluate foreign and defence policy, the question of Canada's continued role in NATO will likely arise. Canada's approach to this international security organization has historically been one of vacillation. Initially, Canada was a staunch supporter, but, beginning in the 1960s, it began distancing itself from NATO for a number of reasons. The first and foremost reason was that the commitment became too unwieldy and expensive as domestic considerations loomed to overshadow foreign concerns. Secondly, Canada sought more collaborative and peaceful ways to quell international tension—preferring political and economical solutions, vice the overwhelmingly 'militaristic' approach of a US-dominated NATO. Finally, as Western Europe recovered from the devastation of World War II, and détente began to take hold, Canadians, by and large, felt that Europeans should start looking after their own security. In simple terms, Canada's NATO membership was not a consistent strategic choice.

In today's environment, in which Canada is re-assessing its international posture, one can argue that NATO must be a consistent strategic choice. It is currently the only viable multilateral organization in existence that can effectively contribute to international peace and security. Its proven ability to foster cooperation and reform is evident in the burgeoning democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, in the partnership and confidence building measures

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[3]Excerpt from a speech delivered by His Excellency Jean-Pierre Juneau, Canada's Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, to the Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB) and Canadians in Europe - Belgium Chapter on Tuesday 19 October 2004, in Brussels. IRRI-KIIB Website available from http://www.irri-kiib.be/speechnotes/041014-juneau-canada.htm; Internet, accessed 21 Jan 05.

the organization has established with Russia and the Ukraine, and in the alliance's critical role in stabilizing the Balkans, Afghanistan, and soon, more than likely, Iraq. Moreover, the alliance, largely underwritten by the powerful United States, represents the transformation of military capabilities to more effectively deal with the security challenges of the 21st century. These threats include terrorism, the instability created by failed/failing, states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. NATO has become a clearinghouse for military and geopolitical strategic thought—its yeoman efforts in conflict management, scientific research, the coordination of humanitarian relief, and other similar projects to improve the European, and, as of late, the *global* security environment make it the collective security organization of choice. Finally, NATO serves to maintain a trans-Atlantic 'link' between Europe and North America. It is a symbol of success and strength, and of the primacy of democratic governance, human rights and the rule of law—all core values shared between North American and European NATO allies.

This is an ideal time for Canada to reaffirm its membership in NATO because the organization faces monumental challenges. By all logic, NATO should have declared 'Mission Accomplished!' and rolled up its operations on or about 1 July 1991 when its nemesis, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, officially disbanded.[4] After all, the alliance was conceived in 1949 to counter the threat of Soviet communist expansion into Western Europe—thus providing a security umbrella under which the war-torn Western European states could re-build. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the economic prosperity, relative stability, and peaceful cooperation that is clearly evident in today's increasingly influential European Union (EU), NATO's original *raison d'être* has all but vanished. There is certainly a belief in some corners that NATO will succumb to irrelevance in the face of a powerful EU and its Common Foreign

[4]NATO, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 445.

and Security Policy (CFSP), part of the aim of which is to provide the EU with more autonomy in matters of defence. Finally, given the seemingly divergent paths of Europeans and Americans, wrought largely in the wake of American 'hegemony,' and brought to the fore with the Bush government's foray into Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein, there are those who feel that trans-Atlanticism is *passé*—that NATO is doomed.[5]

This is an unfortunate situation, since the organization has contributed so much to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, and has the potential to do more of the same on a global scale. In these uncertain times, NATO *needs* a champion—a role Canada should seize with enthusiasm. Indeed, given our seminal influence in the alliance and the resultant experience within the NATO bureaucracy, our knack for international consensus building and our proven interoperability with both the United States and our European NATO partners, Canada still has much to offer the alliance.

We must, however, re-invest in this relationship in order to fully exploit NATO's potential as an instrument of international security. Canadian policymakers face significant challenges in this regard. Perhaps one of the most daunting of these challenges is overcoming a Canadian 'identity crisis' and appreciating that, while Canadian contributions to international security may be modest, they are unique and important nonetheless. Another key challenge is revitalizing the Canadian Forces. Faced with downsizing and budget cuts, particularly acute in the 1990s, Canada's military suffers serious shortfalls in capabilities today. In order to effectively contribute to the alliance, the country must strike a better balance between 'hard' and 'soft' power—an equilibrium that has been woefully lacking for more than a decade. Finally, we

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[5]Charles Krauthammer, "NATO is Dead: Long Live NATO," 24 May 2002; article on-line, available from http://www.townhall.com/columnists/charleskrauthammer/printck20020524.shtml; Internet; accessed 10 January 2005. See also Dianne DeMille and Stephen Priestly, "Time to Exit NATO?" *Winnipeg Free Press*, 27 February 2005, for a more recent, Canadian viewpoint, in which the authors call for Canada to leave Europe to the Europeans and embrace the UN as the key "global" security organization.

must continue to work closely with the US, the lynchpin of the trans-Atlantic alliance, and encourage its continued support for NATO and multilateralism.

Canadians are the happy and sovereign stewards of a vast paradise, the security of which is contingent upon strong alliances with like-minded states. NATO provides Canada a guaranteed 'seat at the table' as a founding member, and our vast experience and established networks within the alliance provide leverage and influence that other member states do not enjoy. The paper concludes that renewed Canadian interest and investment in NATO will serve to preserve and protect our enviable stewardship, while providing an effective means of projecting our values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in a manner we could never hope to achieve unilaterally.

NATO AND CANADA – STRONG START…

> *In the past, alliances and leagues have been formed to meet emergencies and have been dissolved as the emergencies vanished. It must not be so this time. Our Atlantic union must have a deeper meaning and deeper roots. It must create conditions for a kind of co-operation which goes beyond the immediate emergency. Threats to peace may bring our Atlantic pact into existence. Its contribution to welfare and progress may determine how long it is to survive…*[6]
>
> --Lester B. Pearson, External Affairs Minister, Speech in House of Commons, 4 February 1949

Canada played a vital role in the creation of the NATO. In fact, shortly after the February 1948 Czechoslovakian communist coup, it was Canada and Britain who held secret talks with the United States in an effort to coax American support for a multilateral, collective defence pact to counter Soviet communist expansion.[7] A little more than a year later in Washington, D.C., on 4 April 1949, this historic collective defence treaty was signed by twelve

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[6]John Gellner, *Canada in NATO*, (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1970), 14.

[7]David G. Haglund, "Canada and the Atlantic Alliance" in *What NATO for Canada?* ed. David G. Haglund. (Kingston, Ont.: Queen's University Press, 2000), 3.

countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Lester B. Pearson's words above seem incredibly clairvoyant today as NATO prepares to celebrate its 56th birthday, now boasting twice as many—plus two—charter members than it originally started with, and courting yet another twenty 'partner' countries.[8] Indeed, few could dispute NATO's contribution to "welfare and progress," certainly in Western Europe and, over the past decade, more and more in the burgeoning democracies of Eastern Europe and beyond. Britain's Lord Ismay, the Secretary General of NATO from 1952 to 1957, on assuming his post, decreed that NATO's goal was "…to keep the Americans in, to keep the Russians out, and to keep the Germans down."[9] How the alliance has changed since then! The establishment of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997, and the creation of a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) represent "…a reciprocal commitment [between former enemies] to help build together a stable, peaceful and undivided continent on the basis of partnership and mutual interest."[10] Now, almost 40% of NATO's membership is comprised of former Warsaw Pact states.[11] The Americans are still *in*, the former Soviets are 'partners in peace,' and a reunified Germany has emerged from the Cold War, touting significant economic and political clout as a centerpiece in both NATO and the EU.

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[8]These include non-NATO EU, Partnership for Peace, and Mediterranean Dialogue countries.

[9]Carl Savich, "The Origins of NATO," article on-line at www.balkanalysis.com; Internet, accessed 5 Jan 04, http://www.balkanalysis.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=418.

[10] NATO, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 83.

[11]Kirstin Archick and Paul Gallick, "NATO and the European Union", Congressional Report for Congress, (Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, January 4, 2004), 26. Available from http://www.fas.org/man/crs/index.html. Internet; accessed 23 February 2004. Of 26 member nations, 10 are former Warsaw Pact nations: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

NATO has grown to be much more than a military alliance focused on collective defence,[12] although its stated, primary aim is to "…safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their [the Parties'] peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" in accordance with the United Nations Charter.[13] Along with its military dimension, the treaty also embraces and encourages political and economic cooperation amongst its members, as stipulated in Article 2. It was at the insistence of Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and External Affairs Minister Lester B. Pearson that Article 2 (often referred to as the "Canadian article") was included in the original treaty. It calls for members to "…contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions…" and "…eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and encourage economic collaboration between any or all [of the Parties]."[14] Ironically enough, whereas the military segment of the military-politico-economic NATO 'triad' was clearly and necessarily the primary focus of NATO's first forty years, the alliance's political and economic dimensions have become increasingly important; they may, in fact, prove to be critical components of NATO's longevity. Indeed, this Canadian 'legacy' resonated loud and clear at the latest meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 22 February 2005, where Secretary General Hoop de Scheffer was emphatic in his support for a more robust 'political role' for the Alliance:

> At length, government leaders, Heads of State, discussed the political role of NATO, a stronger political role of NATO and there was a lot of support for what I have been saying over the past 8-

[12]NATO, *NATO Handbook*…, 528. Article 5 of the Treaty states, in part, that if "…an armed attack against on or more of [the Parties]…occurs…each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked…."

[13]*Ibid.*, 527.

[14]Gellner, *Canada in NATO*…, 16.

> 9 months, that this political role is important, that NATO is a political military alliance and that we should not shy away from discussing political subjects of relevance.[15]

These remarks underscore the continued importance of the political relevance of NATO in a changing Europe, something Canada has advocated from the beginning—and how this collective defence turned collective security turned global security organization arrived at this point is an amazing, if not extremely complex, story. A chronological, historical perspective is perhaps the most effective means to illustrate Canada's relationship with the trans-Atlantic alliance.

…In the Beginning

As noted above, initially NATO was focused primarily on its military mission—the provision of collective defence against an aggressive Soviet expansionist policy in post-World War II Europe. Europe was divided between West and East, initially with large conventional—and soon thereafter, nuclear—forces engaged in a mighty standoff. This ideological stalemate between the American and Soviet superpowers, representing democracy and communism, respectively, lasted for forty years and shaped the lives of two, possibly three, generations of humanity. Ironically, it was the threat of nuclear annihilation—mutual assured destruction (or MAD)—which actually contributed to relative global stability during this time.

The early part of NATO's history represents Canada's "heyday"[16] as both a military power and a staunch NATO supporter. By 1953, Canada's contribution to the European theater included a robust brigade group and a large air wing of twelve squadrons, and the country was

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[15]Opening statement by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the press conference following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and Government, Available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050222i.htm; Internet; accessed 25 February 2005.

[16]Gellner, *Canada in NATO*…,19. This term is actually used in the title of Gellner's chapter on NATO from 1949-1957.

allocating an incredible 8% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) towards defence.[17] Following West Germany's integration into the NATO fold in 1955, the Soviets countered with the Warsaw Treaty, a mutual defence pact signed in Warsaw, Poland, on 14 May 1955 by Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. Canada was literally 'front and center' in NATO, at the beginning of the Cold War, with the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group occupying a key position on the Central Front.[18]

Détente

Canadian fervour for West European security would seriously wane over much of the 1960s, and on into the 1970s and 1980s. The advent of nuclear weapons, the requirement to secure the Arctic approaches to the North American continent against Soviet bombers and, perhaps most importantly, domestic concerns, all trumped Canada's contributions to NATO. Moreover, the idea of *détente* began to take form. Not surprisingly, it was Canada who "was in the vanguard" of pursuing détente; in 1955, Lester B. Pearson was the first NATO foreign minister to visit Moscow. Equally lacking in surprise is the fact that history seems to have ignored this subtlety.[19] Pearson's adept handling of the Suez Crisis a year later, and subsequent Nobel Peace Prize, undoubtedly overshadowed this minor event. It would be almost ten years before the idea of détente amounted to anything of substance.

Indeed, the thawing of the Cold War was a gradual process. The seeds of détente only began to germinate in the late 1960s. The *NATO Handbook* acknowledges three watershed

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[17]David G. Haglund, "Canada and the Atlantic Alliance: An Introduction and Overview" in *What NATO for Canada?* ed. David G. Haglund. (Kingston, Ont.: Queen's University Press, 2000), 6.

[18]Maloney, Sean, *War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany 1951-1993*, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Limited, 1997), xxvii.

[19]Haglund, "Canada and the Atlantic Alliance…," 6.

events which contributed to this East-West *rapprochement*.[20] The first was the North Atlantic Council's adoption of the Harmel Report on "The Future Tasks of the Alliance" in 1967. This report, named after Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, bore striking similarities to a report submitted eleven years earlier by the "Wise Men"—the foreign ministers of Canada, Norway and Italy—recommending that the smaller members have a larger voice in the alliance.[21] The report recognized the complementarities of "military security and a policy of détente" and called for "a more stable relationship and increased cooperation between East and West."[22] The second key development was German Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* (translated—*Eastern Policy*), which sought to improve political and economic relations between East and West Germany. This bold policy served to solidify the pursuit of détente, eased East-West tensions, and eventually led to mutual recognition of the Federal German Republic and the German Democratic Republic, as well as their inclusion in the United Nations.[23] Thirdly, the adoption of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Final Act in 1975 (also known as the *Helsinki Final Act*) served to further improve East-West relations. Although the Soviet Union had initially tried to entice Europe into a security arrangement in early 1954, the NATO alliance had been understandably leery. However,

> …in 1969 the Alliance indicated its readiness to participate in such a conference provided certain conditions were met. These included full participation of the United States and Canada, reconfirmation of the legal status of Berlin, a discussion of conventional disarmament in Europe and the inclusion of human rights issues on the agenda of the conference.[24]

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[20]NATO, *NATO Handbook*…, 35.

[21]Kaplan, 43.

[22]Andreas Wenger, "The Multilateralization of Détente: NATO and the Harmel Exercise 1966-68," available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_Harmel/texts/intro_wenger.htm; Internet; accessed 16 March 2005.

[23]Kaplan, 60.

[24]Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), *OSCE Handbook*, available at http://www.osce.org/publications/handbook/files/handbook.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 March 2005, 9.

Although not a legally binding international treaty, the establishment of the CSCE in 1973 (renamed the *O*SCE in 1995, in recognition of its elevated status as an international *organization*) and the ratification of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act by the United States, Canada, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the countries of Europe (including Turkey, but excluding Albania), led the way for increased cooperation between East and West. It also served as a mechanism (albeit non-binding, but nonetheless likely regarded by the Soviets as insipid) for Eastern bloc dissidents to voice concerns about communist regime oppression.[25] After all, signatories agreed to respect the human rights and civic freedoms of their citizens—both hallmarks of democracy—as well as to undertake various forms of international cooperation. It seemed Canada's bid to strive for political and economic solutions to the tensions in the Euro-Atlantic theatre was finally coming to fruition.

It was in the hopeful glint of détente that Canada slowly began distancing itself from NATO. David Haglund points to three main reasons for Canada's slow 'withdrawal.' The first and foremost was that Canada's military contribution simply became too expensive to maintain. For example, maintaining a strong military presence in Europe began to conflict with increasing responsibilities for North American air defence. The second reason he aptly and succinctly calls "policy perspectives"—Canada was disenfranchised by the lack of energy given, particularly by the larger NATO partners, to the pursuit of politico-economic cooperation, as embodied in Article 2. Thirdly and finally, there was a growing feeling in Canada that Europe had recovered sufficiently from World War II to start taking care of its own security. He adds to this last reason

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[25]OSCE, "OSCE Celebrates 25 Years of Helsinki Final Act," *OSCE Newsletter* Vol VII/7/8, (July/August 2000)[journal on-line]; available from http://www.osce.org/publications/newsletter/2000-07/nl072000e.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 March 2005.

that certain "left-leaning" elements of Canadian society felt that resources expended in Europe would have been better spent elsewhere in the world, like in Indochina, where war was raging.[26]

The "de-emphasization" of NATO in Canadian defence policy was particularly evident when Prime Minister Trudeau came to power in 1968.[27] Under Trudeau's Liberal government, Canada's heretofore 'heyday' in NATO would come to an abrupt halt. The Canadian government's decision to withdraw its troops from Germany was met with disappointment (and, arguably, disgust) in Canadian military circles and amongst NATO allies. The vitriolic tone of eminent British soldier and historian General Sir John Hackett, in his foreword to a book on the history of Canada's NATO brigade, illustrates this point dramatically:

> …what I can pass judgment on is his [Prime Minister Trudeau's] notable disservice to Canada's position in the outside world in the treatment of the Canadian brigade in NATO…No one who holds Canada in high regard, and finds its standing as a world power important, can fail to regret Canada's wanton withdrawal from a responsible position in the defence of western freedom…[28]

According to Normal Hillmer, the effect of Trudeau's desire to distance Canada from the US, and by extension, NATO, reverberates to this day:

> Canada preferred to regard NATO as a political arrangement, doing only as much militarily as was necessary to maintain a modicum of credibility inside the alliance … Witness Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's 1969 decision to withdraw half of the Canadian force from NATO Europe, and the malnourishment of the military which has followed over the decades since. All those who are lining up to write the country off as internationally invisible and irrelevant at the beginning of the twenty-first century will find rich ammunition in the long neglect of an alliance Canada helped to found and shape in the brief moment when it really mattered in the world.[29]

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[26]David Haglund, "Canada and the Cooperative-Security Alliance," in *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security*, ed. Charles Philippe David and Jacques Levesque, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 143.

[27]Ibid, 144.

[28]Maloney. *War Without Battles…*, xxx.

[29]Norman Hillmer, "NATO: When Canada Really Mattered", *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Params=A1ARTFET_E45; Internet; accessed 19 January 2005.

In all fairness to Mr. Trudeau, it must also be remembered that domestic concerns, such as the Front de Libération de Québec (FLQ) Crisis and subsequent rise of the Québec *séparatiste* movement, staggering inflation and a marked economic slow-down, and an introspective public mood dominated the 1970s and 1980s.[30] Even when Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservatives succeeded Trudeau's Liberals in 1984, Canada paid paltry attention to trans-Atlanticism and the NATO alliance. The project to close Canadian Forces Bases Lahr and Baden-Soellingen, and repatriate the majority of Canadian troops stationed in Europe, was finalized in 1993.[31] By that time, the Berlin Wall had fallen and the Soviet Union was but a memory. Ironically, as members of the Canadian Forces returned from Europe, more and more would be leaving for other overseas operations in the European theatre.

The Nineties – A Decade of Turmoil

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990, and the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991, serious discussion over the dissolution of NATO resonated both within and outside the alliance. There was speculation that the CSCE would emerge as a pre-eminent collective security organization, given its "Vancouver to Vladivostok"[32] mandate, and consideration was even given to using the United Nations' Military Staff, pursuant to Article 47 of the UN Charter,[33] as an alternative for managing international peace and stability, reflecting optimism that a Russian veto on the UN Security Council would now be less

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[30]Kim Richard Nossal, "Dominant Ideas in Foreign Policy,." in *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1996), 160.

[31]Haglund, "Canada and the Cooperative-Security Alliance…," 144.

[32]Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), *OSCE Handbook…*, 1.

[33] United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations," available from http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ ;Internet, accessed 23 March 2005. This article deals with the role of the UN military staff in the direction of military forces placed under the authority of the Security Council.

of an impediment in international affairs.[34] Any hopes for lasting peace that followed the end of the Cold War were quickly dashed when Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in August of 1990. When UN Security Council resolutions and an embargo failed to persuade Saddam Hussein's forces to leave Kuwait, a 'coalition of the willing,' led by the US, prepared for action.

While the 1991 Gulf War was not a NATO operation *per se*, 12 of the 16 member nations took part, and it was due largely to their NATO experience that this 'coalition of the willing' (a phenomenon to figure prominently in US foreign policy thereafter) was so interoperable.[35] In all, 22 countries, including the Arab states of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, participated in the campaign to restore Kuwait's control to the Kuwaitis. Canada was quick to support UN sanctions and join the coalition, initially providing two destroyers and a supply ship to enforce the blockade in the Persian Gulf under the auspices of Operation Friction. Once combat operations began, Canada provided additional resources, including an Air Task Group, comprised of a squadron of CF-18 Hornets; an Air Transport Group with CC-130 Hercules and Boeing 707 aircraft; a field hospital; and a joint headquarters. In all, about 4,000 CF personnel were deployed over the course of the operation.[36] It was the first time since the 1950 Korean War that Canada was involved in combat operations—and it was their experience working in NATO that provided the key to interoperability with the coalition.

The fact that the 1991 Gulf War was a US-led operation, and *not* conducted under the auspices of a NATO command structure is interesting. The allies clearly could not have invoked Article 5, since none of them had been attacked. (The potential use of this article in the event

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[34]Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United*..., 110.

[35]*Ibid.*, 111.

[36]Department of National Defence, "Canadian Forces in the Gulf War: 1990-91," available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=957 ;Internet, accessed 23 March 2005.

aggression spread from Iraq to Turkey did evoke some angst on the part of Germany, since the US used Turkey as a transit and logistical point for aircraft, which might be deemed to be provocative).[37] Nor could any of the Parties, in good conscience, claim that their "territorial integrity, political independence or security" was threatened, which would have allowed for 'consultation' between them, pursuant to Article 4.[38] Finally, the Persian Gulf fell outside the geographical limits imposed on NATO operations under Article 6.[39] Regardless, the coalition's triumph was unquestionable, and NATO's legacy of interoperability and cooperation had prevailed—the allies had worked extremely well together in a common cause.

Lawrence Kaplan in his comprehensive (albeit US-centric) 'post-9/11' overview of the alliance entitled: *NATO Divided, NATO United*, goes so far as to suggest that the success of the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf in 1991 revitalized the trans-Atlantic relationship and "…serv[ed] as a life preserver for the alliance."[40] This was only the beginning of what would arguably prove to be NATO's most challenging decade, and renewed Canadian appreciation for the trans-Atlantic alliance.

Not long after the Gulf War, bloody civil war and rampant ethnic cleansing began to fill the vacuum left behind by communist domination in the Former Yugoslavia. This instability in Europe's "backyard," and the inability of the Western European Union (WEU), Eurocorps, the

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[37]Kaplan, 111.

[38]NATO. NATO Website, The North Atlantic Treaty, document on-line available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm; Internet, accessed 16 March 2005.

[39]*Ibid.* Article 6 limits NATO operations to the North American continent, member states' territory, and the European members' territories North of the Tropic of Cancer, or Parties' vessels, aircraft, on the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area North of the Tropic of Cancer. Article 6 would change drastically in the new millennium.

[40]Kaplan, 112.

United Nations, or the CSCE/OSCE, to manage the crisis, left no choice but for the Americans, and NATO, to intervene.[41]

Canadians who had been stationed under the auspices of NATO in Western Europe had all but disappeared, leaving only a handful in Geilenkirchen, Germany in the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force and a smattering of staff officers and support personnel in the various headquarters in Europe;[42] but over the next decade, Canada would send close to 5,000 CF personnel back into the European theatre, this time into the Former Yugoslavia.[43] Initially, Canadians were sent as 'peacekeepers' under the auspices of the UN, as part of a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). It soon became clear there was no peace to keep. The UNPROFOR mission was in an untenable position, lightly armed and with restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE), which placed peacekeepers in grave danger, and made their 'protection' mission impossible. By summer 1995, Canadians traded in their UN blue helmets for green ones[44] and joined in with a US-led NATO force of almost 60,000 troops, mostly European, in an Intervention Force (IFOR), and follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR) conducting more robust "peace enforcement" operations. It was US leadership and NATO intervention that would finally put an end to the fighting between the Bosnians, the Serbs and the Croatians and force

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[41]Alexander Moens et al., "Introduction: NATO in Transition" in *NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism*, ed. Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G Sens, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2003), xx.

[42]Canada, DFAIT Website, "Canada and NATO," article on-line available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/nato/nato_careers-en.asp ; Internet, accessed 18 February 2005. According to the DFAIT website, as of 2002, there were approximately 335 Canadian military and civilian personnel working in various NATO organizations in Europe.

[43]Lenard J. Cohen, "Blue Helmets, Green Helmets, Red Tunics," in in *NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism*, ed. Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G Sens, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2003), 127.

[44]Hence the title of Cohen's article "Blue Helmets, Green Helmets, Red Tunics."

Slobodan Milosevic, the nefarious Serbian leader, to the negotiating table to sign the Dayton Accord in the November of 1995.[45] Peace in the Balkans would not last.

In the autumn of 1998, a looming humanitarian and refugee crisis erupting in Kosovo, one that threatened the stability of southeastern Europe, offset the relative calm reached in Bosnia. There, Milosevic's Serbian forces were forcing ethnic Albanians from their homes and, when negotiations with the Serbs broke down, NATO—without a UN mandate—proceeded to employ air strikes against Serbian positions between 24 March and 10 June 1999. Canada participated in the Kosovo War, providing CF-18s in what Canadians dubbed Operation Allied Force, and flying an impressive 10 per cent of the missions.[46] While the CF members performed admirably, it was during the Kosovo campaign that Canada's "commitment-capability" gap really began to show.[47] Following the conflict, the senior Canadian commander in Kosovo opined that Canada would be hard-pressed to repeat such an effort, given its "increasingly outdated equipment."[48]

Kosovo underscored the fact that Canada's defence budget declined almost 30 per cent from 1992 to 1998.[49] The Department of National Defence (DND) bore a large portion of the Chrétien government's deep cutbacks in the mid- to late-nineties to curb an unwieldy national debt—while defence commitments actually increased significantly during the same timeframe.

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[45]Ibid., 130.

[46]Bashow, David L., et al, "Mission Ready: Canada's Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign", Canadian Military Journal, Vol 1, no 1, (Spring 2000), 55.

[47]Cohen, 128.

[48]Bashow, 58. The article states that Canada was the only nation without anti-jam radios. Moreover, the lack of Forward Looking Infra Red pods, and a shortage of Precision Guided Missiles were among other capabilities that were lacking.

[49]Allen G. Sens, "The Widening Atlantic, Part II: Transatlanticism, the 'New' NATO, and Canada" in *NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism*, ed. Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G Sens, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2003), 32

The wear and tear on personnel and equipment was evident by the time the war in Kosovo was over. In November 1999, Canada repatriated most of its troops from NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), leaving only a small contingent of about 1,800 in SFOR.[50] Then-Prime Minister Chrétien acceded to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy's focus on 'soft power' and 'human security,' in an allegedly more cost-effective, "non-coercive" means of pursuing national interests through international endeavours such as the provision of development aid and support to non-military roles like UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) missions.[51] Domestic concerns once again trumped Canada's commitment to NATO. At the beginning of the 21st century, Canada's "rapprochement" with the alliance—as David Haglund calls it—was waning once more.[52]

2000 and Beyond?

As the new millennium dawned, NATO's transformation into a collective and cooperative *security*—vice collective *defence*—organization appeared to be a *fait accompli*. The enlargement of the alliance (the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO in 1999), continued cooperation with Russia, and the broadening of security arrangements in the Euro-Atlantic area seemed to herald a NATO that would "…fulfill the Canadian dream of a well-established collective-security system in Europe."[53] With this new face on NATO, Canada could "…inhere to the lightness of the burdens of Alliance," continuing

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[50]Cohen, 131.

[51]Ibid., 132.

[52]Haglund, "Canada and the Atlantic Alliance…," 10.

[53]Charles Philippe David, "Will NATO Live to Celebrate Its 100th Birthday?" in *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security*, ed. Charles Philippe David and Jacques Levesque, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 220.

to enjoy the benefits of membership and demonstrate support for trans-Atlanticism and European security, while paying minimal dues.[54] However, this complacent Canadian attitude toward defence and security, indeed, one shared by most North Americans, would be shattered as the Islamic fundamentalists of Al-Qaeda brought their fight to our continent.

Following the horrific 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, NATO, for the first time in its history, invoked Article 5. Ironically, it was the European partners who would now assist the US, sending five NATO AWACS aircraft to patrol the continental US in Operation Eagle Assist.[55] Canadians were involved in this NATO-led operation, as well as the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Operation Noble Eagle, which also performed Combat Air Patrols over populated North American centers and along civilian air corridors. Solidarity within the alliance seemed impenetrable as NATO allies, including the new, Eastern European members of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, lined up in support the US. Yamamoto's "sleeping giant"[56] had stirred and was "…filled with a terrible resolve," leading to President George W. Bush's declaration of a 'Global War on Terrorism.'

However, it was clear from the outset that the US offensive against the Taliban in Afghanistan, dubbed Operation Enduring Freedom, was going to be an American show:

> Even after September 11, when the Europeans offered their very limited military capabilities in the fight in Afghanistan, the United States resisted, fearing that European cooperation was a ruse

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[54]Haglund, "Canada and the Cooperative-Security Alliance…," 152.

[55]Canada, DFAIT Website, Article on-line available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/nato/nato_cnd_contribution-en.asp; Internet; accessed 21 January 2005.

[56]Yamamoto is credited with stating "I fear that all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant" after the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. Interestingly enough, there is no proof that he ever said this and it was a clever Hollywood scriptwriter for the movie *Tora! Tora! Tora!* who put these now-famous words in Yamamoto's mouth. See http://www.japan-101.com/history/isoroku_yamamoto.htm.

> to tie America down. The Bush administration viewed NATO's historic decision to aid the United States under Article V less as a boon than as a booby trap…[57]

Notwithstanding US apprehension, no doubt seeded in the Kosovo experience where a cumbersome alliance decision-making process mired predominantly US operations, NATO allies rallied behind the US in their bid to root out Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Canada, in particular, "…provided the first coalition task group to arrive in the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Operations"[58] in November 2002. Canada's military contribution (called Operation Apollo) to the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom was significant, and included:

- a National Command Element at Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, with 60 personnel
- a Naval Task Group comprising six warships and 1500 personnel
- 3rd Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group with 750 personnel
- a Strategic Airlift Detachment comprising one CC150 Polaris (Airbus 310) and 40 personnel
- a Long Range Patrol Detachment comprising two CP 140 Aurora Maritime Patrol aircraft and 200 personnel
- a Tactical Airlift Detachment comprising three C-130 Hercules and 180 personnel
- a Communications Detachment with 90 personnel
- a Strategic Line of Communications Unit comprising 50 logistics support personnel[59]

Canadian Forces once again proved their ability to fight effectively alongside US and NATO allies, and brought "unique capabilities that contributed to mission success," such as light

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[57]Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review,* no. 113, June 2002, 19; Internet, accessed 17 January 2005, http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html

[58]United States of America, Department of Defense, Central Command Website, information on-line available at http://www.centcom.mil/Operations/Coalition/Coalition_pages/canada.htm; Internet; accessed 28 March 2005.

[59]*Ibid.*

armoured reconnaissance vehicles with long-range sensors, and the lethal sniper platoon of the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Light Infantry (PPCLI), both of which afforded critical security as Canadians and Americans fought Taliban in the mountainous caves of Afghanistan.[60] The interoperability of Canadian frigates with US naval forces was vital to the Maritime Interdiction operations, as NATO naval forces began arriving in theater to help prosecute the expanding war on terrorism.[61]

With the Taliban effectively neutralized in Afghanistan, the US, with the UK as their staunchest ally, began to set sights on Saddam Hussein and Iraq in late 2002. Iraqi refusal to cooperate with UN weapons inspection teams renewed fears of that country's bid to obtain weapons of mass destruction, a risk the US was not willing to take, particularly in light of the attacks in New York and Washington, even though no connection had been established between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. Canadian policymakers, along with their French and German NATO allies, were strongly opposed to military intervention in Iraq without a UN Security Council mandate.[62] In this regard, Canada's NATO membership paid dividends for the Canadian government.

Operation Apollo was, at the time, transitioning to Operation Athena, with plans for a 1900-person strong Canadian contingent to begin stability and support (or nation building) operations as combat operations in Afghanistan drew to a close.[63] This NATO-led, and UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) allowed the Canadian government a

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[60]Joseph R. Nunez, "Canada's Global Role: A Strategic Assessment of its Military Power," *Parameters*, (Autumn 2004), 82.

[61]Capt(N) Peter Avis, "Seductive Hegemon: Why NATO is Still Important to Canada," *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol 5, 1, (Spring, 2004), 10; available on-line at http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol5/no1/nato_e.asp; Internet, accessed 10 Feb 05.

[62]Kaplan, 142.

[63]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Annual Report of the Chief of Defence Staff 2003-2004," 12; available from http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/reports_e.asp; Internet, accessed 18 Feb 05.

way out of the controversial US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom. Canada felt it was "…better served by NATO in Afghanistan than by a questionable US-led coalition, based on questionable rationale, in Iraq."[64] Canadian policymakers could easily point to ISAF as Canada's robust contribution to the 'War on Terror.' Thus, NATO's role as a strategic choice for Canada proved critical at a time when Canadian policymakers wanted to avoid US unilateral (and non-UN sanctioned) action. However, the toll on the tiny CF would be high in terms of personnel operations tempo and equipment sustainment. A little more than a year after Operation Athena began, in the summer of 2004, Canadian troops who had deployed with NATO in Afghanistan, as well as those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were drawn down for a 12-month "operational pause," to refit, refocus and recharge.[65]

On 22 February 2005, a NATO Summit was held in Brussels. This two-day event served several purposes, not the least of which was an attempt by US President George W. Bush to soothe strained relations over American intervention in Iraq. It was also an opportunity for the Canadian Prime Minister to assert Canada's continued support for NATO. However, his speech did contain thinly-veiled warnings that NATO's future is an uncertain one, and he called for allies to work through what he termed "small differences", undoubtedly referring to the rift between continental Europe and the United States over Iraq and what is perceived as an American foreign policy that is too aggressive and/or too unilateral:

> The trans-Atlantic relationship has withstood the stresses of time, because we are drawn together by common interests and values. But this extraordinary and successful partnership must be nurtured or it will wither … [i]f we neglect this relationship, if we allow small differences to fester and sour our relationship, we run the serious risk of undermining our ability to effectively

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[64]Avis, 7.

[65]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Annual Report of the Chief of Defence Staff 2003-2004," 14; available from http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/reports_e.asp; Internet, accessed 18 Feb 05.

> deal with the serious and growing threats we face today, including terrorism, failed states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[66]

NATO, it seems, is back 'in vogue' in Canadian foreign policy circles, at least for the time being.

As the preceding history has shown, Canada's relationship with NATO has been a rocky one. Our commitment reached its zenith in the 1950s and, while we were present for all of NATO's major engagements since that time, it was never to the extent of our initial contribution. David Haglund asserts that this trend will likely continue, with Canada's support for NATO dependent upon "a) costs and risks…b) the degree of voice it gets in exchange…and c) the extent to which NATO… [is]…congruent with and useful for the attainment of broader Canadian security interests."[67] In the cold, harsh light of the international political scene, this may very well be true—the question 'what have you done for me lately?' springs to mind. Yet, one can successfully argue that NATO comes through as Canada's strategic choice to the satisfaction of all three of Haglund's variables.

NATO: CANADA'S STRATEGIC CHOICE

> *NATO is still about European security broadly defined and Canada's political and economic interests are still served by European stability. But NATO at the military level goes well beyond Europe's needs. NATO has a military multiplier effect that is literally world-wide.*
>
> --Alexander Moens, "Canada and Europe: The Primacy of the New NATO"[68]

Among the many reasons NATO has survived for over a half century, perhaps the most enduring one is that it was founded upon the common values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—with a mandate "…to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe."[69]

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[66]Statement by the Right Hon. Paul Martin, Prime Minister of Canada at the NATO Summit. http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050222l.htm Internet; accessed 25 February 2005.

[67]Haglund, "Canada and the Atlantic Alliance…," 10.

[68]Alexander Moens, "Canada and Europe: The Primacy of the New NATO," article online available from http://www.ccs21.org/ccspapers/papers/moens-nato.htm; Internet, accessed 22 February 2005.

It embodies the recognition that, while indispensable, military force must be a last resort in dealing with international conflict and that political cooperation and dialogue are essential tools to achieving international stability and security. It is the belief in this common set of values that binds the North American and European 'pillars' of the alliance together, and it is this same commitment that allows NATO to play a key role in building new democracies within the Euro-Atlantic region—and beyond. This idealism is the first reason Canada must continue to support NATO. Secondly, as a mature international organization—one that has embraced transformation—NATO is a clearinghouse for military and geopolitical thought. It behooves Canada to maintain close links with the alliance because it provides access to valuable information, technology, military capabilities, and intelligence. Thirdly, NATO provides Canada some leverage to influence US policy within a multilateral framework, and provides Canada a 'voice' in the international security structure.

Stability, Cooperation, and Democracy

At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the North Atlantic Council formally recognized the need to project stability beyond the Euro-Atlantic area as an essential element of security for member nations. NATO is prepared to expand its influence, not only to respond to threats, but also to promote the democratic values upon which it was founded. NATO leaders at this summit agreed that they would turn over NATO's nine-year mission in Bosnia (one which brought stability to a war-torn Balkans) to the EU, that the ISAF nation-building mission in Afghanistan would continue to be a priority, and that NATO would launch the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) as that country struggles to achieve democracy following years of tyranny by a

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[69]NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, (Brussels: NATO Publishing,1999), 4.

repressive Hussein regime.[70] This dogged pursuit of peace and nation-building, based on common democratic values—and the success obtained thus far in Southeast, Central and Eastern Europe—illustrates why NATO is such an attractive choice for implementing Canadian strategic objectives and as an instrument of Canada's foreign policy. This is widely (and sometimes grudgingly) recognized within Canadian foreign policy circles:

> It must first be recognized that NATO is, by far, Canada's most solid anchor in Europe. This idea doesn't please everyone. People who, like me, spent a great deal of time and effort constructing bilateral relations with European countries, or others who for thirty years have tried to negotiate an agreement with the EU to give life to that relationship, don't necessarily like to be reminded that our participation in NATO is the one that opens the most doors and gives us the most weight in Europe. [Free Translation][71]

Andre P. Donneur and Martin Bourgeois suggest that the alliance also offers Canada a vehicle to "…to forge vital new diplomatic ties in Europe…" and is a "…means of implementing Canadian strategic objectives…and an instrument of Canadian foreign policy."[72] This is particularly true when viewed in the context of NATO's desire to establish partnerships beyond the European theatre.

As the instability of the Balkans and the former Soviet bloc countries began to percolate, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) met in Rome in November of 1991. Five main issues dominated the agenda. First, and foremost, the Council agreed to forge new relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the hopes of helping them transition to stable democracies. The creation of the North Atlantic Coordinating Council (NACC) to foster closer cooperation with Russia and the East and Central European countries of the former Soviet Union

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[70]NATO, *Istanbul Summit Reader's Guide,* (Brussels: NATO Publishing, 2004), 10.

[71]Marie Bernard-Meunier, ""Les relations transatlantiques se conjuguent-elles au passé ?", *Policy Options*, (February 2005), 81; available at http://www.irpp.org/po/index.htm; Internet, accessed 13 March 2005.

[72]Andre P. Donneur and Martin Bourgeois, "Canada and the Enlargement of NATO," in *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security*, ed. Charles Philippe David and Jacques Levesque, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 137.

followed, mainly to address NATO concerns over Russia's control of nuclear weapons in an increasing volatile environment.[73] This move would lead to Partnership for Peace (PfP), a program that commenced in 1994 to assist mainly the former Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe to restructure their militaries to be more in line with the democracies they now served. A year later, in 1995, NATO established the Mediterranean Dialogue to promote regional stability and cooperation in the Middle East and included Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and, subsequently, Algeria.[74] Finally, in 1997, NATO signed bilateral agreements with Russia and the Ukraine, respectively, to discuss a host of important issues including peacekeeping in the Balkans, non-proliferation of WMD, environmental planning and civil-emergency planning. Of note, in 2002, NATO cemented relations further with Russia, creating the Permanent NATO-Russia Joint Council, "…a forum in which all countries participate as equals."[75] Clearly, NATO's influence has grown as it makes an effort to expand cooperation and security within and beyond Europe. Canada's place in the alliance—its ability to participate in and positively affect these cooperative ventures—puts the country in a good position to further Canada's national security and foreign policy objectives.

The 'inclusiveness' of the NATO of the 21st century certainly accommodates Canada's stated foreign policy goals of "…maintain[ing] international peace and prevent[ing] violent conflict…."[76] NATO's recognition that it shares responsibilities with other, important

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[73]NATO, NATO Handbook…,80.

[74]NATO, *NATO in the 21st Century*, (Brussels: NATO Publishing, 2004), 13.

[75]Ibid., 13.

[76]Canada, DFAIT, "Global Issues, Peace and Security," available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/global_issues-en.asp; Internet; accessed 16 March 2005.

international organizations like the UN, the OSCE, the EU, and the WEU makes it that much more valuable to Canada as a vehicle for international networking.[77]

A Clearinghouse for Military and Geopolitical Thought

NATO can be characterized as a 'learning' organization—an international organization whose vast experience in military and political affairs is unequalled, serving to further cooperative international security in an era of uncertainty. The turmoil of the nineties led NATO to recognize that, in order to remain an effective security organization, it had to alter its Cold War *modus operandi*. The first step towards transformation began at the Washington Summit of 1999, with the Defence Capabilities Initiative. Five key capability areas were identified for improvement, namely: deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, effective engagement, survivability, and consultation and Command and Control (C2).[78] This initiative was spurred mainly to address a widening capabilities cap between the US and the remainder of the allies, including Canada. It was also an opportunity for the US to "chide" its allies for spending 60 percent of what the US spends on defense but getting far less military capability.[79] This initiative was refined in November 2002, when NATO leaders met in Prague to further cement the idea of a 'transformational' NATO.

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[77]Haglund, "Conclusion and Policy Implications," in *What NATO for Canada?…*, 88. David Haglund's assessment of Canada is that of an "inveterate joiner of clubs" and, although he rightly reminds us that we must constantly assess the cost and worth of these international organizations lest they become "feckless," he notes that it is highly unlikely we will ever opt out of any of these clubs.

[78]NATO, *NATO Briefing: Improving Capabilities to Meet New Threats*, (Brussels: NATO Publishing, 2004), 5.

[79]Allen G. Sens, "The Widening Atlantic, Part II: Transatlanticism, the 'New' NATO, and Canada" in *NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism*, ed. Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G Sens, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2003), 29. Sens adds that this "chiding" did not seem to work, as European defence budgets continue to decline and DCI "…looks increasingly moribund." However, it should be noted that his paper was written prior to the Prague Summit.

The Prague Summit was perhaps NATO's most ambitious push towards transformation, a meeting where the North Atlantic Council mapped out a three-pronged approach to improving defence capabilities. Firstly, the Council established the Prague Capabilities Commitment, which represents a political commitment on the part of member nations' to improve capabilities in eight major areas: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence; intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; deployable and secure command, control and communications; combat effectiveness, including precision guided munitions (PGM) and suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD); strategic air and sealift; air-to-air refueling; and, deployable combat support and combat service support units.[80] Secondly, the NATO Response Force (NRF) was established. This force of 21,000 troops was conceived to provide NATO with a "quick reaction capability," to respond to emergencies, including humanitarian disasters, across the globe. It will include land, sea and air assets and be capable of performing the full range of NATO missions within 5 days of call-out, for a sustained period of 30-days. The NATO leaders committed the NRF to interim operating capability by 2004 and full operational by 2006.[81] Finally, NATO reorganized its headquarters to create a leaner, more responsive military command, creating a strategic command for operations (Allied Command Operations (ACO)) in Mons, Belgium, and a strategic command for transformation (Allied Command Transformation (ACT)) in Norfolk, Virginia. Both headquarters are to reach full operating capability by 2006.[82]

This "transformational" approach NATO, taken with regards to collective security makes it the most potent multilateral defence and security institution in the world, and Canada not only

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[80]NATO, *NATO Briefing: Improving Capabilities to Meet New Threats*, (Brussels: NATO Publishing, 2004), 5.

[81]NATO, "The Prague Summit Declaration," NATO website available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm ; Internet, accessed 16 March 2005.

[82]*Ibid.*

contributes, but also benefits greatly from the resultant research and development initiatives. For example, a Canadian Lieutenant-General holds the Chief of Staff position at HQ ACT in Norfolk, Virginia, and therefore retains a pivotal position from which gain access to and affect education, experimentation and concept development within the alliance.[83] Moreover, NATO is well-staffed by scientists and academics whose collaboration on research projects related to defence, security, civil-emergency response and environmental issues make it a clearinghouse for matters of strategic military importance. One need only visit the NATO website to appreciate the vast collection of strategic geopolitical and military thought the organization maintains—and that is only the information in the *public* domain. Canada's membership ensures access to and participation in these important endeavours—endeavours that are designed to help improve the alliance's (and arguably, the global) security environment.

Counterbalance to US Hegemony

One enduring argument for maintaining NATO as a strategic choice is its ability to provide Canada a 'counterbalance' to US global influence. One need only briefly scan any Canadian literature on NATO and Canada's quest for a place in international affairs outside the shadow of 'the elephant' figures prominently as a key reason to continue supporting NATO. The issue of Canada's quest for 'identity' will be covered later on in the paper; yet, one can see how NATO, as a cooperative security organization based on consensus, can be construed as a vehicle through which Europe, and to a lesser extent, Canada, can influence US policy.

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[83]Letter from Supreme Allied Commander Transformation to NATO Secretary General and NATO Chairman of the Military Committee dated 10 June 2004. This letter provides a status report of HQ ACT's activities during its initial year of operation. It highlights the achievements in Defence Planning, Lessons Learned, battle staff training and education and other areas, with a specific focus on the NRF. It also underscores the close relation ACT enjoys with US Joint Forces Command, in which lessons learned, particularly from the Iraq conflict, are shared and injected into NATO's Joint Warfare Center training processes.

Pascal Boniface warns that Canada "...should not want to be excluded [from European affairs] and left alone in a bilateral relationship with its North American neighbour,"[84] espousing multilateralism and championing the emergence of Europe as a strategic power to create, once again, a multipolar world. Another viewpoint is that: "…NATO offers more to Canada than simply a place at the table. It presents a collectivity of close allies who can work together to counterbalance American drive when necessary."[85] The preceding argument from Captain (Navy) Avis' article "Seductive Hegemon: Why NATO is Still Important to Canada" goes on to assert that the country needs to find a position of balance between domestic, continental security and international security. He affirms that NATO is the pre-eminent forum in which to ensure Canada's voice is heard. Allen G. Sens writes that "…NATO is an institution that can be employed as a 'counterweight' to the United States," offering Canada the ability to act with other states to "constrain US unilateralism and encourage US multilateralism."[86] Finally, David Haglund points out that the European Security and Defence Initiative, (ESDI) could undermine NATO, and thereby threaten Canada's voice in the multilateral organization, not to mention NATO's utility as "…a vehicle for providing at least some access into the shaping of US national interest."[87] The US, with a defence budget approaching $400 billion in 2004, spends more on

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[84]Pascal Boniface, "European Security and Transatlanticism in the Twenty-first Century," in *NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism*, ed. Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G Sens, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2003), 64.

[85]Capt(N) Peter Avis, "Seductive Hegemon: Why NATO is Still Important to Canada," *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol 5, 1, (Spring, 2004), 11; available on-line at http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol5/no1/nato_e.asp ; Internet, accessed 10 Feb 05.

[86]Allen G. Sens, "The Widening Atlantic, Part II: Transatlanticism, the 'New' NATO, and Canada…,"30.

[87]David Haglund, "'Community of Fate' or Marriage of Convenience?," in *NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism*, ed. Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G Sens, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2003), 13.

defence than the next 15 countries of the world combined.[88] As such the measure of influence that NATO affords is a matter of considerable debate.

It must also be remembered that the US already recognizes multilateralism as a strength in their National Security Strategy, which states, in part, that "…there is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe."[89] Notwithstanding seemingly divergent views on certain issues within the alliance, particularly vis-à-vis US intervention in Iraq, the US does share common values with its European (and Canadian) allies. Even though Stephen M. Walt argues that Canada "…used NATO's European members to dilute American dominance in the Western hemisphere," he concedes that, in the event trans-Atlanticism wanes, "…US power is unlikely to be a malevolent force in Canadian affairs, although it is certain to require awkward adjustments from time to time."[90] Certainly, US hegemony is not to be feared in the same way as, let us say, dictatorial communist hegemony. The bottom line is that NATO does offer a forum to discuss Euro-Atlantic security issues of mutual concern and, within this forum, Canada does enjoy an equal voice among the partners—large or small.

Canada and NATO - Haglund's Variables

Having shown that NATO is an organization whose goals include stability, cooperation and democracy, one which provides Canada access to a vast array of military and geopolitical

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[88]Christopher Hellmer, "Last of the Bigtime Spenders: US Military Budget Still World's Largest and Growing," article on line available from http://www.cdi.org/issues/wme/spendersfy04.html;Internet, accessed 30 March 2005.

[89]United States, Executive Office of the President of the United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), 25; available on-line at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf; Internet; accessed 14 October 2004.

[90]Stephen M. Walt, "NATO's Fragile Future," in *What NATO for Canada?* ed. David G. Haglund. (Kingston, Ont.: Queen's University Press, 2000), 82.

knowledge, and which, arguably, serves to influence US policy, we return to Haglund's variables of cost and risk, degree of Canadian voice, and congruence with Canadian policy objectives. As an organization founded on consensus and cooperation, NATO provides Canada a voice on issues of international security at a relatively low price. As Melissa Rudderham, a member of NATO's Public Diplomacy Division points outs, "…Canada pays only one-third of what the UK, France or Germany pay for the same seat at the table. Unlike the UN Security council, Canada has a permanent seat at the North Atlantic Council, and is party to all decisions."[91] As far as risk is concerned, notwithstanding that military activities will always involve risking national treasure—and CF personnel understand and wholeheartedly accept that risk—Canada's military contributions to NATO are modest, with less than a thousand troops currently deployed on NATO operations.[92] Finally, with respect to congruence with Canadian policy objectives, it was shown that NATO offers Canada choices it might not otherwise have, such as opting out of a US-led invasion of Iraq. As a sovereign nation, Canada retains its right to accept or decline NATO missions, bearing in mind, of course, our obligations under Article 5. On the balance, NATO's objectives of cooperative security, democratic values, human rights and the rule of law are wholly congruent with those of Canada. Haglund's variables are indeed satisfied—NATO must continue to be Canada's strategic choice.

The alliance does, however, face several challenges and is not without its critics. Clearly, NATO needs to be nurtured, and it must continue on its path of transformation if it is to remain relevant in a changing international security environment.

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[91]Melissa Rudderham, "Time to Exit NATO? Definitely Not," Winnipeg Free Press Online Edition, 6 March 2005, article online available from http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/westview/; Internet, accessed 6 March 2005.

[92]Canada, Department of National Defence Website, available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/nato/nato_cnd_contribution-en.asp; Internet; accessed 21 January 2005.

NATO'S CHALLENGES…

> *NATO died in Afghanistan--the very same place where that other top-heavy and obsolete multinational construction, the Soviet Union, expired. (History is not just cruel. It is witty.) The proximal cause of the Soviet Union's death was painful defeat in Afghanistan. The proximal cause of NATO's death was victory in Afghanistan--a swift and crushing U.S. victory that made clear America's military dominance and Europe's consequent military irrelevance.*[93]
>
> --Charles Krauthammer, "NATO is Dead: Long Live NATO"

The above quote contains several messages relevant to this study, some more subtle than others. Cynically, it encapsulates some of the key challenges facing the trans-Atlantic alliance. Firstly, NATO was conceived to thwart Soviet aggression in Europe. The USSR has disappeared, and with it, NATO's primary reason for existence—leaving some to argue, as American neo-conservative Charles Krauthammer does above, that NATO has become a "top-heavy and obsolete multinational construction." The USSR's disappearance has also left a 'unipolar' world—with the US an unrivalled superpower (or *hyperpuissance*, as it is referred to by France's foreign minister, Hubert Védrine), both militarily and economically. [94] Secondly, it underscores the 'capabilities gap' between the US and the rest of the allies, and the resultant tensions on both sides of the Atlantic. From the American perspective, Europeans are not 'keeping up' with changing military technology and capabilities, leaving the US to shoulder the lion's share of the defence and security burden in Europe, and making interoperability more and more difficult. However, the US also understands that NATO provides it with a significant degree of influence in European affairs:

> … [American foreign policy analyst] Zbigniew Brezinski bluntly describes the U.S.-Europe postwar relationship as a "hegemon and its vassals," with NATO as the principal instrument through which the U.S. controls Western Europe. ... Military power underpins … [this] …vital

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[93] Charles Krauthammer, "NATO is Dead: Long Live NATO," 24 May 2002; article on-line, available from http://www.townhall.com/columnists/charleskrauthammer/printck20020524.shtml; Internet; accessed 10 January 2005.

[94] Stephen M. Walt, "NATO's Fragile Future," in *What NATO for Canada?*…, 74.

> strategic relationship. Removal of U.S. forces from Germany, with the inevitable reduction of power, even *raison d'etre*, of NATO, means declining U.S. political influence over Europe.[95]

From the European perspective, they welcome the 'peace dividend' that was supposed to occur with the end of the Cold War, and question the requirement to spend precious national resources on defence in the absence of a *bona fide*, overwhelming threat.[96] US dominance in Europe is becoming more and more unpalatable to the Europeans, and as the EU grows and becomes stronger, so, too, will the quest for more European economic, political and military autonomy. With the threat of the Soviet Union gone, Europe—specifically, the EU—will seek to pursue "…wider array of options" when it comes to matters of security, trade, and foreign policy.[97] The US is no longer the automatic choice as a supplier of or partner in security.

This has led to divergent views on the ways and means to handle international affairs, with the US able to flex its unilateral muscle when it so desires, and the Europeans seeking more independence and multilateralism, outside the American shadow. As a result, unity in the trans-Atlantic alliance has weakened.

The Threat that Binds

Disagreement between the North Atlantic partners is certainly not a new phenomenon, but recognition of a common threat provided ample cause for smoothing over strained relations. As Lawrence Kaplan points out, "…Tensions and frictions were built into NATO by virtue of a free association of its component parts."[98] As any modern, democratic organization built upon

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[95]Eric Margolis, "Empire of the 21st Century", *The Toronto Sun*, 22 August 2004.

[96]Colonel David W. Read, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: NATO's Need for a Niche Capability Strategy," *Canadian Military Journal*, (Autumn 2000), 17.

[97]Walt, 74.

[98]Kaplan, *NATO Divided*…, 148.

consensus, trust and common principles, NATO is a bureaucracy with built-in release valves, allowing for civil disagreement between its members, without the threat of complete breakdown when such discord occurs. However, these tensions are now exacerbated by the lack of "…a single, overwhelming threat"[99] to the European continent.

Perhaps one of the most poignant examples of divisiveness and tension within the alliance occurred when NATO bid *adieu* to France as a full-fledged military partner in 1966, the result of French President Charles DeGaulle's increasing frustration with American dominance in the alliance, and France's desire to become a nuclear power in its own right, much to the chagrin of the United States.[100] This would lead to France's withdrawal from NATO's Integrated Military Structure, and an ultimatum that NATO commands on French soil be removed within twelve months from the receipt of DeGaulle's letter to President Lyndon B. Johnson in March of 1966.[101] While this rupture in the alliance soured relations between France and the United States—and the undercurrents of this animosity exist to this day—the overall effect was minimal, particularly since France maintained its political ties to NATO, as well as military representatives in every one of the NATO headquarters.[102] The alliance was able to survive its first major fissure, mainly because the Soviet threat continued to provide a common cause.

Another telling instance of discord between the trans-Atlantic partners—especially between France and the US/UK—occurred shortly after the 1991 Gulf War. In anticipation of

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[99]Worner, Manfred, "NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit," article online (NATO official website), available from http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9106-1.htm; Internet, accessed 24 March 2005.

[100]Kaplan, 32

[101]*Ibid.*, 33.

[102]*Ibid.*, 34.

downsizing forces, and recognizing the potential for instability in Western Europe's periphery caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO's Defense Planning Committee (DPC) hatched a plan to create a multinational Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). The force would be comprised of four NATO divisions, based in Germany, and under British command, with its headquarters in London. France, who was not included in this plan (indeed, there was no French representation on the DPC), and who resented the UK's leadership position in this scheme, responded by creating a Franco-German "Eurocorps." This force, initially comprised of 35,000 WEU personnel, would ostensibly serve the same purpose as the RRF, but under French leadership.[103] This episode had the potential to create a major rift within the alliance; however, the collapse of the Soviet Union was still only a recent development, and the fear of a resurgent Russia, with its nuclear weapons, still kept NATO intact.

This Soviet 'unifier' is no longer present. Indeed, NATO's solidarity after the 9/11 terror attacks was relatively fleeting, with Germany and France particularly incensed as the US' 'policy of pre-emption' and obvious willingness to conduct unilateral operations became apparent.[104] Unlike 'Deterrence,' 'Combating Terrorism,' 'nation-building' and 'peacemaking'—however legitimate these roles may be for NATO—are activities where subjectivity reigns, where national interests can be divergent, and where threats are not easily identifiable. Measures of performance and success indicators will be even harder to establish. But building consensus among 26 NATO members based on these intangibles—finding common ground and a common threat—will become increasingly difficult, if not impossible.

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[103]Kaplan, 112.

[104]John Bryson, "The Future of International Security Organizations", article online available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/strat_2003/sa03_14_e.htm; Internet; accessed 16 March 2005.

The Capabilities Gap

The 1991 Gulf War showcased the awesome power and capability of the US military. It also served to demonstrate the widening "capability gap" between the US and its NATO allies, with the latter showing serious deficiencies in the areas of "…intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), communications, precision attack, long- range transport, and force protection."[105] This American 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA) contrasted starkly against the other NATO allies' military inadequacies—their lack of technological advancement and continued 'Cold War posturing'—and became a recurring theme in NATO thereafter. The gap was even more pronounced in NATO's war in Kosovo in 1999, as previously noted, and was such that during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, the US ran the war independent of NATO from Southern Command in Florida. Obviously, if NATO's European allies cannot fight alongside US forces, then NATO will becomes less relevant. While NATO's DCI in 1999, and the subsequent Prague Capabilities Commitment in 2002, were designed to enhance interoperability between the US and its NATO allies, Europe, for its part, has been slow to achieve "higher and better defence spending," especially when it comes to the critical areas of "force projection and network-centric warfare." [106] The importance of Europe's ability to meet the Prague Capabilities Commitment to NATO's continued relevance, and in particular, the importance of standing up the NRF, is certainly recognized within European political circles. A slight bristle of resentment to US hegemony is evident, as well:

> There is no denying that the NRF is an American idea, a "last chance" the US has given its European allies to reform the Atlantic Alliance and adapt it to the security requirements of the 21st century. This proposal, on which the 11 September 2001 attacks clearly had a strong impact,

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[105]Elinor C. Sloan, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO,* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 80.

[106]*Ibid.*, 31.

> places the emphasis on high-technology warfare involving a limited number of ground forces, as was the case in Afghanistan and now in Iraq.[107]

Recent, US-led operations like Operation Enduring Freedom and, of late, Operation Iraqi Freedom, also highlight two other important points. First, they underscore the fact that contemporary threats to security (terrorism, the threat of WMD, and rogue/failing states) are emanating from beyond the European theater. Secondly, they demonstrate US willingness to act alone, or with 'coalitions of the willing,' outside of NATO to counter these threats. While multilateralism is a preferred option, as long as the US retains its superpower status and the wherewithal to provide economic incentives, there will always be nations lining up to join US-led 'coalitions of the willing.' Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reaffirmed this continued "with or without NATO participation" *modus operandi* at the Munich Security Conference in February 2005.[108]

The establishment of Prague's NRF as a "…strike force for highly demanding contingencies far from NATO territory" was designed to address the 'out of area' issue and, although promising, its success remains to be seen.[109] Tackling increasingly divergent interests between Americans and Europeans is a much harder problem to solve.

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[107] Western European Union, "The EU Headline Goal and the NATO Response Force (NRF) - Reply to the Annual Report of the Council," Document A/1825, WEU Website 3 June 2003, , available on-line at http://assembly-weu.itnetwork.fr/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2003/1825.html#P183_39419 ; Internet, accessed 3 March 2005.

[108] Judy Dempsey, "For EU and NATO, a Race for Influence," *International Herald Tribune*, 18 February, 2005, 1.

[109] Steve Larrabee and Francois Heisbourg, "How Global a Role Can and Should NATO Play?," in *For and Against: Debating Euro-Atlantic Security Options*, (Brussels: NATO Publishing, 2004), 31

Diverging Interests?

Stephen M. Walt points to three "unifying forces" within NATO which are either gone or slowly disappearing: the Soviet Union, economic interests, and European and American "elites" in whose heritage was found a strong commitment on both sides of the Atlantic.[110] The disappearance of the USSR has already been discussed at length. With its disappearance, however, economic interests have shifted. US trade has shifted toward Asia, with US trade in that region now almost two times larger than its trade with Europe.[111] Moreover, with the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 and the follow-on European monetary union in 1999, the EU has emerged as a significant economic rival to the US.[112] This has led to economic tensions between the two 'pillars,' the most recent dispute being over the desire of the EU to lift the arms embargo against China, much to the chagrin of the US:

> … The Bush administration and the U.S. Congress are up in arms at this prospect and threaten to curtail military technology transfers to the EU, and even impose trade sanctions. This issue is further aggravating badly damaged U.S.-EU relations just when the White House has been trying to repair them.[113]

A spillover effect into NATO is inevitable, notwithstanding the fact that security and trade should be separate issues. As the EU strengthens economically, the US will have less leverage in European affairs, and will likely be less inclined to continue to sustain an expensive military presence in Europe.[114]

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[110]Stephen M. Walt, "NATO's Fragile Future," in *What NATO for Canada?*…, 72

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[111]Walt, 76.

[112]John Bryson, "European Security and Defense Policy: What's in It for Canada?" in *NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism*, ed. Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G Sens, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2003), 88.

[113]Eric Margolis, "Beijing Turns Up Heat," *Toronto Sun*, 6 March 2005; available on-line at http://www.canoe.ca/NewsStand/Columnists/Toronto/Eric_Margolis/2005/03/06/pf-951653.html; Internet, accessed 6 March 2005.

[114]Walt, 76.

Waning trans-Atlanticism is also the product of shifting demographics, according to Walt. The generation that fought in World War II, conceived NATO, and stood their ground during the Cold War is disappearing. Moreover, ethnicity plays a key role, with the majority of immigrants to the US and Canada coming from Asia or Latin America.[115] Similarly, Europe is looking East toward the new democracies of the old Warsaw Treaty. Add to this the increasing cooperation and expansion of the EU, and the 'new regionalization' of the world, and the future does not look particularly bright for NATO or trans-Atlanticism. If interests are indeed diverging, as it appears they are, then North America and Europe will drift further apart.

Finally, NATO may be facing competition from the EU, which has been working to take on a greater security role in Europe with its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Defence Agency (EDA).[116] Complete autonomy, however, is an unlikely prospect for the foreseeable future, since the EDA has neither the experience, nor the organizational structure to sustain any credible military capability, but it is clear the EU has its sights on more control over its security and defence.[117] The burden-sharing so eagerly sought by the US in NATO's European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) is beginning to take shape; however, if NATO-EU cooperation does not improve, former NATO Secretary General Worner's "Alliance of the Future" may turn out to be a pipe dream.[118] Even with the adoption of the "EU-NATO Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)" in 2002, and the subsequent

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[115]*Ibid.*, 77.

[116]Bryson, "European Security and Defense Policy…," 88.

[117]Rob De Wijk, "The Reform of EDSP and EU-NATO Cooperation," *The International Spectator*, Vol 39, No 1 (January-March 2004), 73. The author points to the lack of deployable forces and capabilities of most European countries, save perhaps the UK and, arguably, France.

[118] Worner, Manfred, "NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit," article online (NATO official website), available from http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9106-1.htm; Internet, accessed 24 March 2005.

"Berlin-Plus" arrangements on cooperation between NATO and the EU in crisis management, strains are still apparent between the two organizations, particularly with respect to command and control. NATO still provides an operational planning function and operational control is still exercised through NATO's Commander Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) in Naples, Italy.[119] Although, for the time being, the EU's security capabilities are more suited to low-intensity, peacekeeping operations, there are those who believe that Europe should acquire more 'robust' capabilities, including "…strengthening such capacities as strategic lift, intelligence and precision guided missiles…[and] special forces."[120] How such obvious duplication (if and when it happens) will play out within NATO—and, more ominously, be received by the US—remains to be seen.

Given the existential challenges faced by NATO, and the nascent divide between the two pillars, one might conclude that the alliance's days are numbered. As David Haglund points out, Canada may have to face this possibility, but he qualifies this assertion by adding that "…greater practical utility might attach to a policy review intended to enable Canada to do what it can…to preserve the alliance structure most congenial to its European…[and]…world order interests."[121] In other words, keeping NATO around would be good for Canada. Some might question what a Canada *can* do affect such colossal international affairs. They just might be surprised.

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[119]Annalisa Monaco, "Operation Concordia and Berlin Plus: NATO and the EU Take Stock," *ISIS-Europe*, Vol. 5, no. 8, (December 2003), 3, article online available from http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/Download/Concordia%20and%20BP-NN%20v5n8.PDF; Internet, accessed 2 April 2005.

[120]Robert M. Cutler and Alexander von Lingen, "The European Parliament and European Union Security and Defence Policy," *European Security*, Vol 12, no 2, (Summer 2003), 13.

[121]David Haglund, "Conclusion and Policy Implications" in What NATO for Canada?…, 93.

…AND HOW CANADA CAN HELP

> *Our reputation, abilities and values make Canadians highly suitable for…command positions [within NATO], enhancing the legitimacy and credibility we bring to the task of leading coalition forces in highly volatile and dangerous regions.*[122]
>
> --General R.R. Henault, Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff, (June 2001 – February 2005)

It has been established that Canada's support for NATO has been inconsistent, at best, and ambivalent at its worst. Yet, even under Trudeau, there was little danger of Canada leaving the alliance altogether, since isolationism has never truly taken hold in Canada.[123] Canadian policymakers recognized the value of remaining part of the cooperative defence organization, and contributed to the extent they felt a more domestically focused Canadian public would allow. It has also been argued that NATO must remain the strategic choice for Canada, despite the many challenges facing the organization. So what can Canada do to buttress NATO? One certainly should not want to overstate Canada's ability to affect NATO—we do not wield the military or political clout of some of the larger members like the UK, Germany, or France. However, we do still wield enough influence to champion NATO's cause and provide some unique capabilities to the alliance. To begin with, however, Canada's current status vis-à-vis the alliance should be examined.

In terms of real contributions to NATO, Canada still ranks sixth of 26 nations, behind only the US, UK, France, Germany and Italy. Canada continues to be the third largest contributor of personnel to the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force, stationed in Geilenkirchen, Germany. Moreover, on 16 June 2005, General R.R. Henault, the former Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff, will take on the duties of Chairman of the Military

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[122]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Annual Report of the Chief of Defence Staff 2003-2004," 12; available from http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/reports_e.asp; Internet, accessed 18 Feb 05.

[123]Haglund, "Canada and the Atlantic Alliance," in *What NATO for Canada?*…, 7.

Committee, only the third time in NATO's history that a Canadian has held this prestigious appointment. (Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes held the position from 1952-53 and Admiral Robert H. Falls held it from 1980-83).[124] Ostensibly, General Henault's appointment reaffirms the confidence NATO's leaders place in Canada's military leadership and on Canada's continued role, both in the alliance and in preserving trans-Atlanticism. But beyond a few well-placed members of the CF—individuals who, incidentally, are appreciated within the alliance and, owing to their renowned professionalism and exceptional training, really do make a difference—Canada offers some unique capabilities and resources that can help buoy NATO.

Firstly, Canada has a proven track record of consensus building—it is the very fabric of our country of 'two solitudes.'[125] Canadians seem to have a knack for navigating through seemingly impossible labyrinths of diplomatic and bureaucratic clutter, getting to the heart of the contentious issues, and providing a voice of moderation. Secondly, Canada's proven interoperability with the US and with NATO allies provides us with a unique ability to 'translate' NATO doctrine into US doctrine, and vice versa. Finally, Canada can provide NATO with exceptional training opportunities designed to further integrate allies, particularly the newer NATO members and NATO partner countries. By forging partnerships between the CF (who, although small, are extremely professional and offer not only first-rate leadership but world-class military training), civilian industry, and other government departments, Canada can leverage its potential as a 'trainer-of-choice' in areas like flying training, cultural awareness and language training, peace-support operations, and a host of other skills that will be necessary for future

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[124]Canada, DFAIT, "NATO and Canada," website available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/nato/nato_and_canada-en.asp; Internet, accessed 1 March 2005.

[125]Canadian author Hugh MacLennan wrote a book entitled "Two Solitudes" in 1945. It is a fictional chronicle of the struggle between English and French Canada that won MacLennan the Governor General's Award for Fiction.

NATO missions. These capabilities, however modest, are nonetheless tangible means for Canada to 'champion' NATO's continued role and relevance as a cooperative security and defence organization.

Consensus Building

As a country steeped in pluralism and tolerance, Canada prides itself in its ability to build consensus and peacefully resolve differences. Arguably, this has provided considerable credibility in international diplomacy, as evidenced by Canada's reputation for moderate success and international activism in areas such as peacekeeping, human rights, and international justice. As Michael Ignatieff asserts:

> Our capacity to resolve our conflicts peacefully means that we have survived where many other multinational, multi-ethnic, regionalized societies have failed. … Canada remains one of the best governed countries in the world. Our commitment to human rights, tolerance and diversity is not abstract and it is not optional: given how diverse we have become, it is the very condition of our survival as a distinct people.[126]

These qualities provide Canada distinct advantage within an organization such as NATO, comprised of 26 countries with diverse cultures, language and military capabilities. Furthermore, Canada does not carry with it the baggage of an imperial past, as do many of the other NATO partners like Britain, France, the Netherlands or Belgium. Nor do we wield the 'hegemonic' power of the US, allowing Canadians to present a less threatening and more palatable footprint when pressed into the difficult tasks that NATO currently has in its transformational sights, like peace-support and nation-building operations. As Pascal Boniface notes, "…Canada's experience and expertise, its almost automatic ability to work with European forces…in coalitions of the willing and able, and the undoubted political legitimacy Canada

[126]Michael Ignatieff, "Peace, Order and Good Government: A Foreign Policy Agenda for Canada," *Foreign Policy Review*, Issue 22 (Summer 2004), article online available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-magazine/issue22/menu-en.asp; Internet, accessed 15 March 2005.

endows upon any coalition are…valuable assets."[127] John Bryson further affirms that "…[Canada] certainly possesses the intellectual skills and diplomatic resources…to foster a better understanding of respective views and ways of pursuing common interests…" within NATO. He adds, however, that, in order to fully exploit this potential, we would have to deal with "lingering skepticism…about long term Canadian commitment to the alliance."

The Canadian desire to build consensus and cooperation was also evident in Canada's support for NATO expansion, a fact not lost on the newest East and Central European members, as well as other prospective members currently enrolled in the Membership Action Plan and vying for membership (currently Albania, Croatia and Macedonia).[128] Canada was, after all, the first NATO member to ratify the accession of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to the alliance, and the Canadian government made it clear, as early as 1998, that it would "...work for the accession of all democratic states which are likely to respect the organization's basic commitments."[129] This provides some degree of leverage not only with members, but also with partner countries like the Ukraine, Russia and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, and allows Canada to work as a bridge and voice of moderation during negotiations on matters of defence and cooperative security.

Canada's diversity can be a valuable tool for the NATO alliance, politically and operationally. It has been recognized as a definitive strength for the CF in a recent draft Strategic Operating Concept:

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[127]Julien Lindley-French, "Is Canada a European Country?" in *NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism*, ed. Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G Sens, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2003), 120.

[128]NATO, Official NATO Website, "Membership Action Plan (MAP)," article online available from http://www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html; Internet, accessed 4 April 2005.

[129]Andre P. Donneur and Martin Bourgeois, "Canada and the Enlargement of NATO" in *The Future of NATO…*, 136.

> The CF is uniquely positioned to leverage the multinational/multiethnic character of the Canadian population. By focusing recruiting efforts on recent immigrants the CF can gain high value language and cultural/regional awareness skills, the nuances of which would be otherwise extremely difficult to obtain.[130]

The CF brings this unique capability to NATO operations, drawing from our 'cultural mosaic' to provide language and culture skills to build consensus within the organization, and in support of future missions NATO may choose to undertake in far-flung areas of the globe.

Closely related to consensus building is Canada's proven ability to integrate our operations both within the CF (joint operations) and with other NATO partners, large and small (combined operations). This 'interoperability' is yet another key capability Canada brings to the NATO table, and one which is a key component of NATO's 'transformation.'

Functional Interoperability

Interoperability is the "…integration…and synchronization of complementary and supplementary activities produced by disparate organizations, creating synergistic effects and…a dilemma for adversaries."[131] Interoperability is comprised of four broad areas: information interoperability (information sharing, including harmonization of technology and procedures); cognitive interoperability (perception, which includes doctrinal and decision-making processes); behavioural interoperability (training and mission performance); and, physical interoperability (compatibility of combat systems and supporting equipment).[132] Canada has sought and achieved an enviable level of interoperability with NATO allies, in particular, the US, whose standards are those to which the majority of NATO allies aspire, and will continue to follow

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[130]Canada, Department of National Defence, "DRAFT 3.1– Canadian Forces Strategic Operating Concept", dated 26 February 2004, 23.

[131]*Ibid.*, 18.

[132]*Ibid.*, 19.

closely.[133] Given Canada's proximity to the US, our bilateral military arrangements like NORAD, increasingly interdependent economies, and closely-linked defence industries, Canada has managed to keep abreast of the US military's incredible transformation and modernization over the past two decades, even if we have been unable to fully embrace this "revolution in military affairs" in terms of equipment procurement, given our significantly smaller mandate, military and budget. Nonetheless, our close relationship with the US is the "…one key asset that other emerging states do not [have]."[134] In fact, Canadian ships were "…the only units in the world (other than American units) who could integrate completely in the US naval forces."[135] This relationship proved invaluable during Operation Apollo because it was the Canadian naval task force, with a destroyer as a flagship, which commanded the bulk of Coalition naval forces for close to two years from 2001 to 2003.[136] Thus, Canadian ability to translate NATO doctrine and procedures into US doctrine, and vice versa, gave our CF a unique and vital role in Coalition operations. It is this interoperability that gives Canada an important role as a 'bridge' between NATO partners in NATO operations, and even between NATO and non-NATO partners in *ad hoc* coalitions. As Captain (Navy) Peter Avis notes:

> Canada has over 50 years of experience, priceless interoperability knowledge of ***both pillars***, networks inside networks in the NATO bureaucracy, and history that binds tight. If Canada needs to get its voice into the international community, there is no better multilateral forum in the current international system than NATO.[137] **[*Author's emphasis*]**

Moreover, as Alexander Moens points out, it is not only between NATO members and partners where Canada can make a difference for NATO. He passionately argues that Canada should use its influence to "…keep the transatlantic connection unambiguously based on NATO." He further asserts that Canada, "…by maintain[ing] a modern military capability and…act[ing] more assertively to keep the US-European approach to security indivisible," can help smooth the current tensions between NATO and EU. While this may be a tall order, our interoperability between allies, coupled with our ability to build consensus, places Canada in a unique position to help to forge a better security framework that will combine, but not duplicate, the best aspects of NATO and ESDP, thus creating a pool of resources designed to address threats along the entire spectrum of conflict.

Training

Having established that Canada brings consensus-building skills and interoperability to the alliance, the next logical step is to share this knowledge and experience with other NATO members through cost-effective and meaningful training programs. Canada has a proud history when it comes to the provision of military training to allies. Its vast, open spaces and secure environment made it an ideal location for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan at the beginning of World War II, a plan that saw over 130,000 pilots, navigators, bombardiers, radio operators, air gunners, and flight engineers trained to combat Nazi aggression in Europe.[138] It also provided training for American crews of medium-range bombers after World War II in Labrador and Quebec; low-level flying training for NATO allies in Goose Bay; advanced fighter training in Cold Lake; and the German Army trained at CFB Shilo, Manitoba, from 1974 to

[138]Canadian War Museum, "The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan," article online available from http://www.warmuseum.ca/cwm/chrono/1931air_training_plan_e.html; Internet, accessed 8 April 2005.

2000, taking advantage of the vast training ranges there to conduct combined arms training for armour, artillery and infantry.[139]

Unfortunately, with downsizing of defence budgets among NATO allies following the end of the Cold War, many of these initiatives have been scaled down or cancelled altogether. However, Canada can and should transform its training to be more responsive to NATO's needs, and more affordable for NATO allies. The CF has considerable intellectual, if not infrastructural and equipment, resources at our disposal. The Canadian Forces Individual Training and Education System (CFITES) has long been recognized as world-class, and is this training system to which the CF owes much of its professionalism.[140] Combining this proven training methodology with some of the efficiencies of private enterprise can prove beneficial to both Canada and its NATO allies.

Such an approach has met with considerable success when it comes to the NATO Flying Training Center (NFTC). NFTC is based out of Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan, and has been in operation since 2000. It is operated jointly by Bombardier Canada Limited and DND to provide basic, advanced and fighter lead-in training to foreign militaries, including, but not limited to, NATO partners. Currently, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Italy, Hungary and Canada participate in this training program.[141] The Pearson Peacekeeping Center is another, albeit somewhat less successful, example of a Canadian training initiative that NATO could find

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[139]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Future of Land Forces in Manitoba," report by the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, 2000, available online from http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dfppc/lfcmb/ch1_e.asp; Internet, accessed 5 April 2005.

[140]Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence Administrative Order and Directive 5031-2 *Individual Training and Education Management Framework* available online from http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/admfincs/subjects/daod/5031/2_e.asp; Internet, accessed 5 April 2005. CFITES is a six-phase systems approach model which includes analysis, design, development, conduct, evaluation and validation. It is the basis for all individual training in the CF.

[141]NATO Flying Training Center Website, available from http://www.nftc.com/nftc/en/flash/nftc.jsp.

useful. The PPC was set up in 1994 to train the CF and other multinational units in peacekeeping operations. Its relatively remote location in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, coupled with competition from other, more established centers in Europe, led to marginal success.[142] In 1999, however, it was turned into a not-for-profit organization, and opened satellite offices in Ottawa and Montreal. Since this time it has taken its courses on the road, traveling across the world to deliver its curriculum. In what is a hopeful sign for the center's operations, the PPC recently signed a million dollar contract with NATO to provide exercise and simulation peace support training for the commander and staff of the First German/Netherlands Corps. The training will take place at the Cornwallis, Nova Scotia campus in November 2005 and will include about 260 soldiers, civilians and police officers.[143]

Canada provides military assistance and training to over 52 countries. This is accomplished through the Military Training Assistance Program, a DND-led program which manages all of Canada's bilateral, UN and NATO military assistance efforts. This includes coordination of training provided by the NFTC and the PPC, as well as an English language training program for foreign students conducted at Canadian Forces Base Borden, located in Central Ontario.[144] There is certainly room for training in other areas, as well.

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[142]Erika Simpson, "The Looming Costs of NATO Expansion," *International Journal* 54:2 (Spring 1999), 39. Simpson makes a compelling argument that Canada could pay its NATO dues through alternative and less costly measures like the provision of airspace, underwater ranges and the lease/sale of Canadian military equipment. She also warns that Canada could also be asked to provide underground nuclear waste burial sites, an option that is wholly unpalatable.

[143]Press Release from the Pearson Peacekeeping Center Website, available online from http://www.peaceoperations.org/downloads/pdf/press/en/2004_12_17_PPC%20WinsMajorContract.pdf ; Internet, accessed 5 April 2005.

[144]Canada, Department of National Defence, "Canada and NATO: The Canadian Forces and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," article online available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/defence/forces_e.htm; Internet, accessed 4 April 2005.

With NATO expanding and focusing more and more on combating terrorism in failed and failing states, this will lead to an increase in stability and support operations, not unlike those currently conducted in Afghanistan and, likely, soon to be conducted in Iraq through NTM-I. Canada could play a larger role in training NATO members and partner countries for these complex missions. This might include training to improve interoperability and C2, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear defence training, or even Special Operations training, such as that conducted by Joint Task Force 2. DND should also work in close concert with DFAIT and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to better integrate training with other government departments and Non Government Organizations, since Civil-Military Cooperation will clearly be within the purview of future NATO missions. This would not only enhance NATO capabilities and interoperability, but it would send a strong message to our allies that Canada will continue to support the alliance and trans-Atlanticism in cooperative security endeavours.

Canada can certainly provide political, intellectual and operational expertise in support of NATO. We can also provide ample training grounds—airspace, maritime training areas, and land in which to exercise combined and joint forces. However, attracting customers may not be that easy. This is because it is becoming increasingly difficult for Canada's leaders to speak with credibility on the international stage, given declining influence in international affairs,[145] our w,to trakelyw beaoinh tongssagi Internationkelyr

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diplomacy" during the 1990s has been costly in terms of Canada's international reputation.[146] In order to regain lost ground and fully exploit NATO's potential as a strategic choice, Canadian policymakers face significant challenges in the years ahead.

POLICY CHALLENGES: WALK PROUDLY AND CARRY A MAPLE LEAF

> *Beyond self-defence, it is in no nation's interest to shrink on the world stage. Loss of influence not only means loss of respect; it means loss of political influence and economic opportunities. With the emergence of new global powers like China and India, the world stage is growing. Canada can't afford to shrink on that stage if it is to advance the interest of Canadians. But that is what is happening, because when global problems need contributions from all significant players, too often all Canada has to offer are words.*[147]
>
> --2004 Report by the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence

It has been shown how Canada's support for NATO has ebbed and flowed throughout the years. It has also been argued that NATO must continue to be Canada's strategic choice as a multilateral institution for collective security and nation building, and that, despite the many challenges the organization faces, Canada can play a unique and valuable role in strengthening the trans-Atlantic alliance. However, in order to fully exploit NATO as a strategic instrument of choice, Canadian policymakers must first deal with some significant issues on the home front.

Canada, dwarfed on the North American pillar by its superpower Southern cousin, has long suffered an identity crisis, which has damaged our national psyche. Rather than neurotically trying to distinguish ourselves from our American neighbours, we must embrace both our similarities and our differences, re-taking our place as a 'bridge' between the North American and European pillars of NATO. This will, however, require a renewed investment in

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[146]Daryl Copeland, "The Axworthy Years: Canadian Foreign Policy in the Era of Diminished Capacity," Chapter 8 from *Canada Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy*, eds. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot, (Toronto, ON: Oxford University Press, 2001, 171.

[147]Canada, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "An Update of Security Problems in Search of Solutions," *Canadian Security Guide Book, 2005 Edition,* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2004), 5; available online fromt http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep03nov04-e.pdf. Internet; accessed 13 December 2004.

our defence and foreign policies, since deeds, not words, define our status on the international scene; we must be able to contribute to international security using a variety of national assets—diplomatic, economic, and military. The latter, in particular, requires revitalization, since downsizing and failure to invest in capital has left the CF undermanned and ill equipped to conduct the missions policymakers are so eager to have them perform—missions that earn considerable political capital both internationally and domestically. Finally, we must continue to work closely with the US to reinforce the importance of trans-Atlanticism and multilateralism. This must be accomplished diplomatically, not sanctimoniously, recognizing that, deep down, our values are not so divergent. Both North American countries value freedom, democracy and the rule of law, and both share the same desire for international peace and stability. We must work together to secure the future—and working closely with our European allies through the auspices of NATO is the best means to achieve this.

Treating Schizophrenia – The Canadian Identity Crisis

Both David Haglund and Joel Sokolsky seize upon the alluring theme of Canada's 'neurosis' in the trans-Atlantic alliance in the dissertation *What NATO for Canada?*, an authoritative study of Canada/NATO relations conducted by Queen's University Center for International Relations in 2000. This theme is one that easily applies to Canada's foreign and defence policies writ large.

The study of Canada's foreign and defence policy is not an undertaking for the faint of heart; clearly, there is a long list of confused academics, historians, and politicians who continue to struggle with a uniquely 'Canadian' approach to these issues. To pretend to be able to encapsulate such a complex issue in a paper of this scope is not only foolish and arrogant—it is tantamount to academic suicide. However, there are some policy truths that warrant discussion

and that assist in conceptualizing Canada's part on the world stage—and how NATO complements this role. One of the most important of these truths is a function of our geography: Canada does not have much of a *security* problem, but it certainly has an *identity* problem.

This is reflected in the very astute observations of Professor Neil MacFarlane, Director for the Center for International Studies at Oxford University. He asserts that ESDI, NATO's response to US insistence that European allies shoulder a greater portion of Europe's defence burden, is seen by some Canadian "foreign policy elites" (as he calls them) to be "profoundly threatening…to the objective of sustaining a distinct Canadian identity in international relations."[148] He puzzles at the Canadian sensitivity to this initiative, as it has little effect on security policy; rather, he observes, it has everything to do with Canada's "identity crisis." MacFarlane points out that Canada has tried to manage its proximity to the US, and the resultant feeling of insignificance next to the behemoth, through trans-Atlantic ties. He recommends a closer Canada-EU relationship, increased defence spending, and that Canada and the EU work together to "design linkages with other organizations with human security and peace support functions…."[149] While his assertions are contentious, and may not represent staunch support for NATO, they do a marvelous job of highlighting the angst that the European 'pillar' of defence causes Canadian foreign policymakers—a bone-chilling fear that Canada will be overshadowed by the US on the opposing North American 'pillar.' This distinct lack of confidence in Canada's leadership and our perceived inability to persevere independently, if necessary, in global affairs, is disconcerting.

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[148]S. Neil MacFarlane, "Canada and the 'European Pillar of Defence,' in *What NATO for Canada?* ed. David G. Haglund. (Kingston, Ont.: Queen's University Press, 2000), 65.

[149]*Ibid.*, 67.

To further illustrate this point is a passage from the first paragraph of a section on 'Security,' from a summary of the key recommendations coming out of a 5 September 2002, DFAIT-sponsored plenary session held under the auspices of the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy:

> Participation in NATO has distinguished Canada from the U.S.; opened the door for our participation in the G7; allowed Canada to become an observer at the Council of Europe; and given Canada some measure of influence. However, the lack of a serious security threat in Europe has led to the decline in importance of NATO, which heralds a declining role for Canada on security issues. Canadian investment in building partnerships with Europeans as a non-U.S. military ally would yield large benefits relative to the costs. There are opportunities where Canada might join efforts with the Europeans, for example in Macedonia.[150]

The group acknowledged the fact that NATO has "…opened the door for our participation in the G7; allowed Canada to become an observer at the Council of Europe; and [provided] Canada some measure of influence." However, the altruism of "…contribut[ing] toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions…" and "…eliminat[ing] conflict in…international economic policies and encouraging economic collaboration…,"[151] the inclusion of which Canada fought so hard for in the original treaty, is decidedly lacking. Rather, it seems NATO has been relegated to the role of a 'counterbalance' to US dominance, serving only to distinguish Canada from its southern neighbour.

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[150]Canada, DFAIT Website, "Summary Note from the Thinkers' Retreat on Canada - Europe Relations," available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/retreat_europe-en.asp; Internet, accessed 28 March 2005. Aptly dubbed a "Thinker's Retreat," (as opposed to anything resembling 'action' or 'achievement') this seminar's attendee list reads like a 'who's who' of Canadian liberal academia, and includes several guests from Europe. Representation from any of the DFAIT-sponsored Canadian Studies programs in the United States, from Canadian staff at NATO, the Department of National Defence, or any of our three military-academic institutions (the Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces College, or the Royal Military College) is glaringly absent. The credibility of this quorum is further eroded by their shamelessly self-serving recommendation to "…increase use of, and funding for public diplomacy, drawing on exchanges and partnerships between scholars, scientists, business contacts, students, and others to increase visibility."

[151]Gellner, *Canada in NATO*…, 16.

The unabashed, almost fanatical quest for a 'non-US' identity is almost embarrassing. The summary goes on to note that Canadian relations with Europe help "…others see us a more than a 'U.S.A. North,'" and that "…cross learning/cultural re-enforcement can emphasize our 'non-US' culture." That there are well placed, educated Canadians who cannot recognize and appreciate the uniqueness of Canada's rich culture and heritage is unfortunate enough; that we must publicly display this neurosis on a government-sponsored website is well beyond pathetic. Our pre-occupation with identity—the 'nots': *not* American, *not* British, *not* French—belies a negativism that can only stifle the country's potential unless resolved.

Robert Kagan's analogy of the differences between Americans and Europeans goes to the heart of this matter and is particularly relevant at this juncture. He postulates that the key difference between the trans-Atlantic partners can be found in their perspectives on power. This fascinating argument finds some merit in apparent differences between the "United States of America" and the "United States of Europe." He claims "Europe is…moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation." whereas the Americans are "…mired in history" and "exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world," a world where "military might" is the only real currency.[152] He further proclaims:

> That is why, on major strategic and international questions today, ***Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus*** [***Author's emphasis***]: They agree on little and understand one another less and less. … When it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways.[153]

This begs the question: "Are Canadians from Mars or Venus?" Are we European or are we American? This Canadian 'identity crisis' has been a defining national characteristic since

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[152]Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review*, no. 113, June 2002, 1; available from http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html; Internet, accessed 17 January 2005.

[153]*Ibid.*, 2.

the American Declaration of Independence and the subsequent—although not entirely related—decline of British and French influence on the North American continent.

Canada got her taste of true power after World War II, but she found she didn't like it much, mainly because she is frugal and it proved to be a more expensive undertaking than her limited budget could sustain. Moreover, any real quest for increased global influence invariably put her at odds with her superpower American neighbour. The prospect of re-establishing especially close European ties did not hold much appeal, either, especially after having sacrificed so many of her young on European soil. Rather than the finality of 'divorce' from Europe, Canada has opted for a gradual, albeit amiable, 'separation'—never quite severing the ties completely, much to the chagrin of both her estranged European partner(s) and her American paramour. Now, she risks not being invited out at all: she's attractive and has enormous charm, but her idealistic, often sanctimonious[154] nattering—on issues like the environment and her 'human security agenda'—coupled with her frustrating oscillation on the way ahead and her apparent unwillingness to apply resources or commit to a deeper relationships, would all seem to belie an underlying and serious neurosis. Without treatment, Canada could find herself sidelined. She just might become a lonely spinster managing a slowly decaying halfway house for the world's transients—dreamily regaling her indifferent charges with tales of glory days past, while they avariciously avail themselves of her generous social programs and vast natural resources.

This admittedly flippant and unflattering portrayal holds but a shred of truth. Firstly, Canada is a country of immigrants and this legacy continues today. Indeed, with an aging

[154]See Denis Stairs' "Speak Loudly and Carry a Bent Twig," *Policy Options,* (January-February 2001), 43-49) for a scathing analysis of Canada's 'human security' agenda in which he asserts that Canada's words ring hollow in the face of its declining international engagement and severe military cutbacks.

population and a declining birthrate not unlike most developed, Western countries,[155] Canada's future prosperity depends a great deal on its ability to attract skilled immigrants—and it is these 'new' Canadians who will ensure the 'experiment' endures. Secondly, with its enviable record for tolerance, the pursuit of justice, democracy and human rights; its vibrant economy; its advanced technology; its vast supply of natural resources; and, its highly skilled, well-educated and industrious population, Canada's leadership role among world nations should be incontrovertible—its untapped potential, enormous. And maybe this really is the case. Maybe Canadians are, by their very nature, insecure, unassuming and maladroit in their self-promotion on the world stage, a product of a colonial past and, for the past century, trying too hard to keep up with the superpower 'Joneses' next door. Canadians often forget, and need to be reminded occasionally, that we do pretty well for a country with approximately one-tenth the population of the United States, and half the population of the UK and France.[156] Our European allies in NATO also need gentle reminding now and again because, as David Haglund points out, Europeans do not understand the "…true extent of the Canadian involvement in the security affairs of their continent…and still seem to believe that Canada somehow 'left' Europe militarily—this notwithstanding that the same proportion of the country's military remained deployed in Europe a decade after the Cold War's ending."[157]

As far as our frugality is concerned, perhaps our climate has a great deal to do with it—harsh winters make for tough times, and survival makes it imperative that we use 'every piece of

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[155]United States, Central Intelligence Agency Website, "World Factbook," available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2054rank.html ; Internet, accessed 26 March 2005. Canada ranks 187 of 226 (highest to lowest birthrate) countries listed in the CIA Factbook, with a birth rate of .92%.

[156]United States, Central Intelligence Agency Website, "World Factbook," available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/. The population of the United States is estimated at 293 million, and the populations of the UK and France are estimated at 60.2 million and 60.4 million people, respectively.

[157]Haglund, "Conclusion and Policy Implications," in *What NATO for Canada?...*, 93.

the buffalo.' This is exceedingly apparent when it comes to our "how much is just enough"[158] approach to defence spending. This brings us to another 'truth' in Canadian policymaking: since we enjoy the security of sharing a continent with the US, our security and defence policies have largely been predicated upon 'domestic' considerations.[159] Unfortunately, however, successive (predominantly Liberal) governments have taken this to the extreme over the past few decades—and seem to have substituted 'frugality' for 'neglect' when it comes to Canada's military.

Revitalizing Canada's Military

The Foreword of Canada's national security strategy boldly states that there is "…no greater role, no more important obligation for a government, than the protection and safety of its citizens."[160] One wonders whether Canadians truly understand the commitment such a proclamation entails, and to what extent the CF's capability to live up to such a commitment has been degraded over the past few decades. As discussed previously, despite increasing commitments for the CF over the past decade, Canada saw concurrent drastic reductions to its federal budget, brought about primarily to service a large national debt. With DND taking more than its fair share of these cuts, manning levels in the CF fell from 87,000 to under 60,000 and military spending dropped to 1.1 percent of Canada's Gross Domestic Product, compared to the

[158]Sokolsky, 31. The concluding chapter of this article is entitled "How Much Is Just Enough?" Here, Sokolsky asserts that the Canadian tradition is to maintain only the minimal level of forces necessary to support multilateral, overseas operations. He further asserts that the CF's "…unrealistic desire always to play in the big leagues" should be tempered, and that maintaining "niche roles" with "modest improvements" to Canadian military capabilities will more than suit the government's foreign policy objectives. In other words, in Canadian policymaker's eyes, participation is more important than substance, given the US' overwhelming power and Canada's modest capabilities.

[159]Douglas Bland, "Everything Military Officers Need to Know About Defence Policy-Making in Canada…," 21.

[160]Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*…, vii.

NATO allies' average of 2.1 percent.[161] True to form, Canada once again leveraged its security to pay for domestic concerns, stripping the country of any real muscle to back up the strong words offered in Canadian foreign policy circles.[162] This has led to marginalization on the global stage and, it certainly left Canadian policymakers vulnerable to harsh, albeit deserved criticism. However, it must also be remembered that Canadian policymakers are simply doing the bidding of their constituents, as Martin Shadwick notes:

> …the embarrassing and hypocritical disconnect between public opinion polls showing strong public support for a meaningful Canadian role in the world and a marked reluctance to pay for such a role. … In a country where it is too easy to bask in the reflected (but mythologized) glory of "Canada as peacekeeper", where DND's ability to cobble together resources for overseas operations leads some Canadians to doubt the warnings of military decay, and in a country preoccupied with domestic issues, we may well have settled for illusions rather than visions.[163]

Alan Gotlieb provides yet another, damning perspective in his analysis of Canada's foreign policy, acknowledging the role the military plays in Canada's international influence:

> In two decades, Canada went from honest broker to norm-entrepreneur, from doing good to feeling good in foreign policy. With declining influence in Washington, neglect of the military and emphasis on projecting our values, Canadians, at the end of the Chrétien decade had little reason to believe their country any longer influenced the major issues of the time.[164]

The quotes above illustrate three key issues. The first, and foremost, is that Canada's military capabilities have been neglected and are in need of revitalization. The second is that Canada's influence in foreign affairs is in no small way connected to its military capability. Finally, Canadians, by and large, are still under the impression that their soldiers, sailors and

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[161]Sloan, 140.

[162]Joseph R. Nunez, "Canada's Global Role: A Strategic Assessment of its Military Power," *Parameters*, (Autumn 2004), 84. Nunez contends that Canada requires the ability to project military force to protect her exports and must work closer with the US in the current security environment. He warns that "…Ottawa can no longer offer glittering platitudes and then duck out when the global work must be done and the bills come due…freedom is not free…."

[163]Martin Shadwick, "Visions and Illusions," *Canadian Military Journal*,Vol 5, no 1, (Spring 2004); available from http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol5/no1/commentary_e.asp; Internet, accessed 5 February 2005.

[164]Alan Gotlieb, "Romanticism and Realism in Canada's Foreign Policy," *Policy Options*, (February 2005); available from http://www.irpp.org/po/index.htm; Internet; accessed 13 March 2005.

airmen perform traditional 'peacekeeping' duties. This latter perception is cause for grave concern, especially for our military, who must bear the task of undertaking these increasingly complex overseas operations. Furthermore, it is a reflection of a lack of understanding on the part of Canadians—understanding as to what Canada's military does and the capabilities it requires to perform its mission, and a lack of understanding as to how the CF contributes to their security.[165]

Since the end of the Cold War, peace support operations, such as those in the Balkans, Afghanistan and, soon, in all likelihood, Iraq, are much more complex and do not entail simple monitoring functions. Whether the operations are for humanitarian assistance, nation building, or post-conflict Support and Stability Operations, in today's world, and in the regions to which Canadians are likely to deploy, lightly armed peacekeeping forces are no longer viable. Canadians must be made to understand that, if Canada "…is serious about promoting international peace and security…[the]…harsh reality [is] that at times this goal can only be achieved through the use of hard (military) power."[166]

Unfortunately, public debate and participation in defence issues is rare. It often takes tragic events to bring issues to the fore, and this holds true in matters of Canadian defence policy. The Canadian public became acutely aware of the growing gap in CF capabilities following the tragic loss of a sailor on board Her Majesty's Canadian Ship Chicoutimi in October 2004. Noted military historian, Jack Granatstein, offered a vitriolic editorial response to this incident in the *Ottawa Citizen*:

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[165]Chris Wattie, "9 years later, Canadians get honours: Bravery in Croatia," *National Post*, 4 July 2002, available on-line at http://www.balkanpeace.org/wcs/wct/wctc/wctc002.shtml; Internet, accessed 21 February 2005.

[166]Andrew Latham, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for the Canadian Armed Forces," McCallister College, St. Paul, Minnesota, article online available from http://www.ccs21.org/ccspapers/papers/latham-rma.htm; Internet, accessed 15 January 2005.

> . . . No one does traditional lightly armed peacekeeping any more. Instead, the Canadian Forces of the next decades will operate within coalitions of the willing or as part of UN or NATO forces at a place on the spectrum of conflict where a full kit of weaponry will certainly be required. That peacekeeping brigade idea could only have been dreamed up by a consultant (probably from Lloyd Axworthy's human security team) who is completely unaware the world has changed from the Pearsonian era . . . Get it right this time, Prime Minister. Give us a real defence review… [167]

The tsunami disaster that followed two months later further highlighted the CF's lack of capability, when the CF's Disaster Assistance Response Team arrived almost three weeks after the fact, unable to get to the disaster area due to a shortage of airlift capacity.[168] Realizing that Canada's international reputation had suffered, public interest in defence matters increased significantly.

Public outrage was short lived, however, because on 24 February 2005, a glimmer of hope arrived with a federal budget that allocated an additional $12B to the beleaguered CF over the next five years. While a defence policy is still forthcoming as part of the foreign and defence review, and will likely further map out plans for this money, this represents the largest increase to the defence budget in almost 20 years.[169] Not surprisingly, the budget was met with some skepticism, as well. It is a five-year budget, with only modest increases in the first couple years and a majority of the funding due in the fourth and fifth years. The first priority of the budget will be the recruitment of an additional 5,000 Regular force and 3,000 Reserve personnel, and

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[167]J.L. Granatstein, "Who's to Blame?" *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 October 2004.

[168]CBC News, "DART Response 'Amateur,' CARE Chief Says," article online available from http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2005/02/03/tsunami-care050203.html; Internet, accessed 3 February 2005. It should be noted that the team arrived on 10 January 2005. They were lauded for providing exceptional assistance including purified water, medical care, and logistics planning support for rebuilding the ravaged areas around Ban Aceh, Sri Lanka.

[169]Mike Blanchfield, "Military is Promised $12.8B Raise: Critics note largest portion of increase weighted near end of 5-year plan," Canada.com, article online available from http://www.canada.com/finance/rrsp/budget_2005/story.html?id=2c6721ed-310d-495f-9090-70244ce774dd; Internet, accessed 26 February 2005.

equipment purchases, like transport aircraft, are on hold until the defence review is completed.[170] This seriously impedes Canada's ability to conduct expeditionary operations, a capability which will remain a cornerstone of NATO's future, given the priority the alliance has placed upon the NRF. Given Canada's size, one might argue that the CF should already have a well-established expeditionary capability—yet this is hardly the case.

While the increased funding is certainly a welcome sign of improvement to the capabilities of the CF, there are indications that more systemic problems plague the revitalization of the CF. Following the budget announcement, the Conference of Defence Associations Institute published a compendium of essays in response to a Senate Committee on National Security and Defence call for input into its ongoing review of Canadian defence policy. Entitled *Understanding the Crisis in Canadian Security and Defence*, it provides a strong framework for the revitalization of the CF that will hopefully be reflected in the long-awaited defence policy. It "…address[es] fundamental recurring problems related to the way Canada approaches national defence; problems that cannot be solved by a 'simple' increase in the defence budget."[171] These problems include the ineffective communications strategy employed by the government and the CF to educate Canadians on matters of defence and security,[172] the over-bureaucratization of DND and the CF, the overabundance of non-military objectives in defence spending,[173] and the inability to translate money into equipment in a timely manner, thus leaving a "capabilities gap"

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[170]Ibid.

[171]Richard Gimblett, "Introduction," in *Understanding the Crisis in Canadian Security and Defence*, (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, March 2005), 5.

[172]Sarah Noble, "Talking to Canadians About Defence: Giving to Whom You Trust," in *Understanding the Crisis in Canadian Security and Defence*, (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, March 2005), 9.

[173]Howard Marsh, "Sensitivity Analysis of Canadian Defence Spending Value for Money—Cost of the Canadian Forces," in *Understanding the Crisis in Canadian Security and Defence*, (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, March 2005), 24.

that will keep the CF from operating outside Canada in the very near future.[174] These issues will need to be tackled before any true 'revitalization' of the CF can occur, and before Canada can make any kind of a renewed investment in NATO.

Managing a Canadian 'identity crisis' and revitalizing the CF are certainly daunting challenges, but their success is linked to the final ingredient necessary for Canada to effectively 'champion' NATO. Continued US support for NATO is critical and Canada must do what it can to keep the US engaged in trans-Atlanticism and the alliance.

Garnering US Support for NATO

It may seem ironic to suggest that, in order to boost NATO, Canada should work closer with the US, especially given the prevalence of the argument that NATO provides Canada a counterbalance *against* US dominance. However, it must be remembered that it was the US to whom Canada and Britain turned for assistance in defending Europe from Soviet aggression in 1948. Moreover, US economic and military capabilities have kept NATO strong and relevant since the end of the Cold War, and the US continues to be the driving force behind NATO's ongoing transformation. It will continue to be US leadership that carries NATO and, by extension, trans-Atlanticism. Canada must do what it can to keep the US engaged in NATO.

Canada and the US enjoy a privileged partnership of interdependence that includes numerous agreements, including the North American Free Trade Agreement, NORAD, the Smart Border Agreement, and other "security-based memoranda of understanding."[175] This relationship is so close that often "…values and interests converge so pervasively that each side

[174]Brian MacDonald, "Update: Canada Without Armed Forces? Chapter 2: The Capital and the Future Force Crisis," in *Understanding the Crisis in Canadian Security and Defence*, (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, March 2005), 34.

[175]Avis, 6.

takes the other for granted, akin to a long-married couple."[176] Yet, like a marriage, it is a relationship that does require nurturing, and is not without its 'ups' and 'downs.'

Over the past few years, the relationship has seen more 'downs' than 'ups.' Much of this tension has revolved around policy perspectives on the international scene, although domestic issues like trade disputes over softwood lumber and cattle tend to amplify these differences, particularly when the North American media gets involved. The fact is that the 9/11 terrorist attacks put Americans on the defensive (and rightly so), leading to President Bush's adoption of a more aggressive stance, as enunciated in the US' 2002 *National Security Strategy*.[177] Since this time, security has been at the forefront of American political issues, while Canadian politicians have not had to contend with such a direct threat against their population. Differences were further aggravated by Canada's failure to back US intervention in Iraq in 2003, a decision that strained relations to perhaps the greatest extent in recent memory—leading to American neo-conservatives referring to Canada as "Canuckistan"[178] and Liberal Members of Parliament engaging in childish name-calling and debasing effigies of the US President on Canadian national television.[179] Prime Minister Martin's less-than-adept handling of the Ballistic Missile

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[176] Nunez, 75.

[177]United States, Executive Office of the President of the United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002); available on-line at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf; Internet; accessed 14 October 2004. The policy states: "The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."

[178]Nancy Carr, "US Talk Show Host Calls Canada 'Whining,' 'Freeloading' Nation," Canoe News, article online available from http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2002/10/31/3057.html; Internet, accessed 5 April 2005.

[179]BBC News World Edition, "Canadian PM Expels Anti-Bush MP," article online available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4024379.stm; Internet, accessed 19 November 2004.

Defence issue only served to further fuel tensions, especially after relations seemed to be on the mend after President Bush's visit to Canada in November 2004:

> Canada's position on BMD is analogous to the conscription crises of the two world wars. Back then, the issue of compulsory military service was so contentious that the government feared an internal revolt. Thus the mantra, "Conscription if necessary, but not necessarily conscription." Fast forward to the BMD muddle of 2005 and you have "Participation if necessary, but not necessarily participation." Only a Canadian could have forged (fudged?) such a compromise. Mr. Martin could have done worse. But he could also have done better.[180]

Canadian policymakers undoubtedly had good reason to make the decisions they did and the point here is not to pass judgment on these decisions. Canada and the US have disagreed before on policy issues; yet, relations have hit a low not seen in recent memory. This need not be the case. In fact, it is in both countries' best interest to work toward *rapprochement*, and quickly. Fortunately, cooler heads normally tend to prevail, particularly where economics are concerned and it is unlikely that sour relations will last, given the annual multi-billion dollar trade that takes place between Canada and the US.[181]

For Canada's part, given the current (and understandable) US emphasis on security, the most effective and meaningful course of action is the continued integration of Canadian and US security mechanisms, thereby demonstrating a continued commitment to continental defence, and making Americans feel secure on their northern border. Canadian policymakers must consistently nurture our relationship with our southern neighbours because, as Alan Gotlieb points out:

> …Canada has a unique relationship with the US, which should rightly be regarded as special. Far from posing a threat to our existence, it is a necessary condition for our economic well-being and

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[180]David Rudd, "Canada's Missile Defence Muddle," Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies web site, available at http://www.ciss.ca/Comment_MissileDefenceMuddle.htm, Internet; accessed 2 March 2005.

[181]Statistics Canada, "Imports, exports and trade balance of goods on a balance-of-payments basis, by country or country grouping," article online available from http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/gblec02a.htm; Internet, accessed 15 April 2005. In 2004, Canadian exports to the US reached $430.3 billion.

> our international effectiveness. Our potential for influencing the world's greatest power is our comparative advantage in the world.[182]

It is this influence that will also allow Canada to continue to champion NATO, and the US' continued support of the alliance. This may prove challenging, but Canadian diplomacy can surely win the day. Given the stated American desire to remain engaged globally, and given the inability of any other international organization to currently organize, train, equip, and rapidly deploy forces for contingency operations, NATO will likely remain the US' (and Europe's) *multilateral* security institution of choice. As argued throughout this paper, NATO should certainly remain *Canada's* strategic choice.

Canadian policymakers have a significant task ahead of them. Canada must stand up and be counted as an important player on the international stage once again, shedding its identity crisis, taking pride in its past accomplishments, but more importantly, looking to the future with a confidence equal to its vast potential. It must also work hard to revitalize its military—a key component of Canadian national security policy, since the CF is an extension of Canadian values and national interests, and is an important means for Canada to 'show the flag' at home and abroad. Finally, by cooperating closely with the US, Canada can achieve a strategic balance between the North American and European 'pillars' of NATO. Attention to the former relationship will secure Canada's domestic future; attention to the latter will secure Canada's international future. Ensuring both pillars continue to work together is critical to NATO's future.

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[182]Alan Gotlieb, "Romanticism and Realism in Canada's Foreign Policy," *Policy Options*, (February 2005), 24; available from http://www.irpp.org/po/index.htm; Internet; accessed 13 March 2005.

CONCLUSION

> *The worst modern tyranny in the twenty-first century will not come from armies but from their lack, from the lack of capacity and courage to use them wherever they are needed to protect justice, freedom, and truth.* [183]
>
> --James V. Schall, "When War Must Be the Answer"

NATO is arguably one of the most successful alliances in history. It brilliantly fulfilled it purpose—to provide a secure and stable environment within which a ravaged, post-World War II Western Europe could rebuild, safe from the threat of looming Soviet expansionism. It survived to see its nemesis, the USSR, dissolve, and, despite predictions that the trans-Atlantic alliance would fade away into irrelevance, it moved ahead to forge peace in the Balkans, where other international organizations had tried and failed. Meanwhile, the North Atlantic Council set the conditions for more inclusive and cooperative security arrangements, first with former adversaries in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, then with Russia. Now NATO has created Mediterranean partners—a ray of hope for lasting peace in the Middle East. It has also taken over support and stability operations in the fledgling democracy of Afghanistan and will soon undertake to do the same in Iraq. Today, while still in the throes of transformation, NATO's goal is to create an effective response force capable of global projection, thus extending its cooperative security reach giving it the means to tackle the new threats of the 21st century—threats to stability such as rogue and failed/failed states, terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, and transnational organized crime. NATO has pledged to conduct its missions in close concert with other international bodies like the UN, OSCE and the EU, further indication that its metamorphosis into a 'cooperative security' organization is all but complete. In essence, the

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[183] James V. Schall, "When War Must Be the Answer," *Policy Review*, no. 128 (December 2004). Journal on-line; available from http://www.policyreview.org/dec04/schall.html; Internet; accessed 19 January 2005.

alliance symbolizes the protection of the greatest values of humanity—human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and security for those who are unable to protect themselves.

Notwithstanding NATO's accomplishments, and its potential to be a 'force for good' in the world, there are certainly challenges ahead. The lack of a single, unifying threat and the expansion of the alliance will undoubtedly make it more difficult to reach consensus, particularly among 26 members. Moreover, the growth of the EU, and its struggle for more autonomy in matters of security and defence, outside the shadow of the US, will continue to strain relations, particularly among the 'big three' European partners—the UK, France, and Germany. Certainly, the economic might of the EU, and its potential as a rival to the US, may have a profound effect on the future NATO and trans-Atlanticism. Moreover, diverging European and American interests and perspectives on international policy have caused considerable angst within NATO, with the US' unmatched military capabilities allowing for more unilateral action with 'coalitions of the willing.' The trans-Atlantic relationship will require continued nurturing, with consistent reference back to NATO's 'first principles' of the need for cooperation and trust among members. Otherwise, NATO may be relegated to nothing more than a simple military 'toolbox,' rather than a cooperative and effective security alliance—a path that will eventually lead to obscurity and irrelevance.

Canadians can and should take pride in the fact that their country played an instrumental role in NATO's creation, and, in particular, that the alliance has evolved into the more political and cooperative organization our leaders envisioned and enshrined in Article 2 over a half-century ago. Canadians should also be aware that our relationship with the alliance has not been consistent, leaving some doubt as to our continued commitment to the alliance and, thus, marginalizing our influence in NATO's affairs. This need not be the case. Canada has much to

offer NATO, and can make important and unique contributions to the alliance, not the least of which is building consensus among members and 'bridging' the two trans-Atlantic pillars, especially since we have privileged insight into both European and American perspectives. Canada's proven interoperability with both US and European allies provides depth in NATO operations, and is also extremely useful in the conduct of training, which is yet another key contribution Canada can make to the alliance. Finally, Canadians should be made to understand that the alliance provides Canada a strong, clear 'voice' in matters of international peace and stability, more so than any other international organization. For this reason, NATO must be Canada's "one strategic choice."

In order for Canada to reap the full potential NATO offers as a strategic choice, there are policy challenges that must first be addressed. First, Canadians must overcome their 'identity crisis' and better appreciate their proud history and the awesome potential this country has to make a positive difference in the world (and in NATO). Secondly, policymakers must revitalize the military, following through with this government's pledge to inject significant funding into new equipment and enhanced expeditionary capabilities. The commitment to a strong military must be more than an injection of funding, it must engender a better communications strategy to educate Canadians on what their military does for them, and it must be a pledge to fix systemic over-bureaucratization in DND and under-investment in capital. Finally, Canada must work closer with its US neighbour, because it is this relationship that ensures Canada's economic prosperity, and it is our close friendship that provides no small measure of international influence. By leveraging our close relationship with the US to buoy NATO, Canada can make an important contribution to the alliance, trans-Atlanticism, and to international peace and security.

The NATO emblem comprises a compass rose with a circle around it. According to the NATO Handbook, "…the circle is the symbol of unity and cooperation and the compass rose suggests the common road to peace taken by member countries of the Atlantic Alliance."[184] I always assumed that, because it represents the *North* Atlantic Alliance, the emblem was actually the North Star, and it was not until researching this paper (I am ashamed to admit, especially having worked with NATO a number of years ago) did its true meaning become apparent. Either way, compass or north star, it is a wholly appropriate symbol because it represents a means to determine direction. NATO, as an organization, has undergone a successful course change and is now headed in a direction that is the best chance for truly global security and stability. The path is fraught with uncertainty, as is always the case in international, and more broadly, human affairs. Yet, with continued cooperation, and willing commitment on the part of member and partner countries, NATO's success as a global stabilization force is virtually assured. Canada will do well to follow this compass (star) because it represents the best the world has to offer in terms of cooperative international security, and because we have a vested interest in finishing what we started.

[184]NATO, *NATO Handbook…*, 4.

EPILOGUE

The penalty good men pay for indifference to public affairs is to be ruled by evil men.
– Plato

They say "timing is everything," and the timing of the government's long-awaited international policy statement—released ten days before this paper's deadline—could not have been any worse, at least for this author.[185] Had it been a month or two previous, I might have been able to incorporate many of the aspects of the policy statement into the paper, given that it represents Canada's first serious look at defence since the 1994 White Paper. Conversely, had the policy statement been released even a few days later, this epilogue would likely not have been written at all, since there really is only so much vetting and fretting one can do before hitting a wall and throwing one's arms up in resignation. But I could not, in good conscience, let it go without at least some comment. If the truth be known, I actually started trying to incorporate some of the aspects of the new policy into the finished product and quickly realized just how much additional work that would entail. As such, I will attempt to reconcile a few of the paper's assertions with the government's International Policy Statement in a short quasi-rejoinder. Frugality or sloth? Your call.

As far as NATO is concerned, the policy statement holds both good news and bad news. The good news is that NATO is actually mentioned—and in a positive way. The bad news is that it is relegated to couple obscure paragraphs in the bowels of the document, and sandwiched between the UN and the EU in a sub- sub-section under the heading "International Organizations." So much for Canada's "one strategic choice." The policy does, nonetheless, state clearly that duplication between NATO and the EU is unacceptable. [186] However, it fails to call for subordination of the EU and its ESDP to NATO, a flaw that opens the door for Canadian participation in autonomous EU operations, something Canada

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[185]Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "*Canada's International Policy Statement—A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*," available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-home-en.asp; Internet, accessed 19 April 2005.

[186]*Ibid.*, 26.

should avoid because it is "…of low value… [and] … at cross purpose with our NATO priority."[187] Revitalization of the Canadian Forces also figures prominently in the paper; yet, it is still a five-year plan, with the majority of funding slated for the fourth and fifth years. It may not, therefore, survive future governments.

More good news is that this paper's assertions about Canada needing to cooperate more with the US are addressed, and this *rapprochement* might assist in garnering continued US support for NATO and multilateralism. In fact, the US and North American security both figure *very* prominently throughout the policy statement. This leads to the bad news, for NATO at least: the US and North American security both figure *very* prominently throughout the policy statement, thus reaffirming Claxton's first two 'laws' of Canadian defence policy. I suppose it simply a reflection of reality—while Canadians may enjoy dual Martian-Venusian citizenship, we live on Mars.[188]

Finally, given the paltry attention it devotes to NATO, the policy statement more than supports the theme I have tried to maintain throughout the dissertation: Canada's relationship with NATO has been, and continues to be, erratic. This sends mixed signals to both the US and our European allies, and further erodes the already tenuous foothold Canada has in NATO affairs. If one can find solace in this policy statement vis-à-vis Canada's relationship with NATO, it is in its stated belief that the organization is still relevant and capable of taking on a more global role. However, given its 'fortress North America' theme and the elevated status of Canada-US relations, the policy statement can hardly be characterized as a ringing endorsement of the alliance or trans-Atlanticism.

Then again, it is only a policy *statement*—a statement of intent, couched in ambiguous, non-committal political rhetoric that would make Arnold Wolfers proud; this to ensure there will always be an 'out' for the policymakers.[189] And with the current Liberal minority government wheezing its last breath

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[187]Moens, "Canada and Europe…," 6.

[188]Kagan, 2.

[189] See Arnold Wolfers, "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (December 1952), 494. Arnold Wolfers has gained considerable notoriety on the Canadian Forces Command

and on the verge of a death rattle, it appears an 'out' is exactly what they will get, although probably not the kind they had in mind. It remains to be seen whether this statement will survive in the coming months and, even if it does, whether sufficient resources will be applied to bring it to fruition, particularly with respect to the five-year defence plan. In the end, one wonders whether NATO will even notice, since Canada's oscillatory approach to the great alliance is something to which it has surely grown accustomed. It is my sincere hope that continued public debate on Canadian defence and security issues will reverse this trend and revitalize Canada's commitment to the great, trans-Atlantic alliance.

Toronto, April 2005

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and Staff College course, where students are cruelly introduced to international affairs by having to interpret this article in their first written assignment. Invariably, albeit not without considerable consternation, students come to appreciate his immense contribution to the fields of political science and international relations.

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