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MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES

**BRAZIL'S CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD SECURITY:
MILITARY-DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS THROUGH PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

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ABSTRACT

Brazilian participation in peacekeeping operations increased during the post-Cold War era. Brazilian foreign policy has actively targeted the United Nations in order to focus global attention on the nation and to demonstrate to the world the country's potential influence in matters of international concern. It is generally felt that the United Nations and other global institutions are important forums in which to showcase the integration of diplomatic and military capacities.

For the military this focus represents useful, authentic experiences for Brazil's troops, thus improving their training while projecting internationally their members' professional skills and values.

For the diplomatic corps, this emphasis reinforces the need for a peaceful United Nations and supports its credentials as an active player in the processes of international decision-making. The end result of this fuller participation would be the realization of a long-sought goal: the obtaining of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

The following paper is intent on discussing these two major premises, supported by intensive research in important print media, books and magazines, which specialize in this specific area of concern, and in the examination of very specific websites.

KEY WORDS: peacekeeping operations; power projection; foreign policy.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Brazil's real dimension in the international arena has to be recognized because of its economic stabilization, its territorial area, the extent of its coast and air space, a 160-million people market, and the consolidation of the country's democracy – all of which make clear our peaceful projection beyond Latin America and provide us with the credentials to be an active participant in the world's decision-making process... The armed forces have a vital role in preserving our territorial integrity and supporting efforts to maintain public order, as well as in complementary missions, such as honoring Brazilian commitments to peacekeeping operations or – as observers as friendly countries – becoming vectors of my foreign policy.

President Fernando Henrique Cardoso¹

The end of the last century was the era that witnessed astounding events for mankind as a whole. The Berlin Wall fell on 9 November 1989, and soon after that, the collapse of Soviet Union's bloc created an immediate consequence: the end of East-West confrontation, the end of the so called Cold War era.

The post-Cold War period has been characterized by the redefinition of the international order, the resurgence of democracy and the geopolitics of economic blocs. As a result, the globalization phenomenon, the intensification of processes of transnational integration and the increase of national fragmentation induced a relevant change in the concepts of national policies-foreign and defense, facing it in regional and international spheres.²


As a negative consequence, the new world order favored the reappearance of latent tensions and new crises exploded, mainly intra-state. Ethnic groups aspired to more autonomy, independence or larger representations in the exercise of central power, such as occurred in the African continent, in the Balkan region, in Central Europe and in the former Soviet Union. Some

¹ Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Statement of the President of Brazil on the Ceremony honoring General Officers (Brasilia, DF, April 25, 1995), [document on-line], available on https://www.planalto.gov.br/publi_04/COLECAO/POLEXT16.HTM; Internet, accessed 22 January 2005

² Paulo Fagundes Vizentini, *The New Global Order: International Relations in the 20th Century* (master's thesis, University of Franca, 2000), 3-8.

of those crises reached levels of such a gravity that they forced the United Nations to intervene in order to preserve international peace and security.³

Figure 1 – Areas of Conflicts



Source:

Conflicts around the World; available from [http:// www.didyouknow.cd/story/conflicts.htm](http://www.didyouknow.cd/story/conflicts.htm); Internet; accessed 21 April 2005.

In this context, the new relevance of the United Nations was clearly evident with an extraordinary growth in the number and size of peace operations – especially peacekeeping missions - which have been providing opportunities for Latin American countries to strengthen relations within the region as well as to guide their policies towards a more international focus.⁴

The multipolarity of today's strategic environment is likely to continue at least into the next two decades. Regional powers are emerging in the global arena. Today's driving forces move both developed and developing nation-states into the international community, in order to project national power, and, thus, to achieve national interests. Latin America is no exception.

³ Duane Bratt, "Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations," in *The UN, Peace and Force*, in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.3, No.4, Winter 1996. Edited by Michael Pugh (Great Britain: Frank Cass&Co. Ltd, 1997), 64.

⁴ Angela Kuane, "Other New and Emerging Peacekeepers," in *Challengers for New Peacekeepers*

The region has increased the globalized nature of security, seen the emergence of multilateralism and international cooperation one result of which involves several countries' foreign and defense policies.⁵

Brazil is a complex country: it has a vast area which includes territory equatorial, tropical and subtropical, a terrestrial border that touches almost every other South American nation, enormous potential in natural resources, an extensive coastline which touches both a powerful economic zone and continental platform on major shipping lanes and a population of over 170 000 000 souls – many of whom are descendents of former African slaves. These unique features confer on Brazil enormous geo-strategic depth which makes the setting of foreign and domestic defense strategies very complex.⁶

According to the International Agenda of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazilian diplomacy is based on the principles of regional integration and international cooperation, which include several issues, from the protection of human rights to maintenance of peace.⁷ The support for an international peace and security system is expressed in Brazilian participation in the United Nations peace operations, which play a vital role in embedding the image of the country as a potentially significant actor in international affairs and reinforces the view that multilateral forums should be the target of the policy of international insertion as a means of projecting of Brazil's national power.

So, what is national power?

⁵ Jennifer N. Ross, "The Changing Role of the Military in Latin America", [document on-line]; available from http://www.focal.ca/pdf/Latam_military.pdf; Internet, accessed 22 February 2005.

⁶ Carlos M. Mattos, *Geopolitics and Modernity* (Rio de Janeiro: Army's Library, 2002), 67.

⁷ Department of Foreign Relations, *The International Agenda* (Brasilia, DF: Foreign Affairs Centre, 2002), 45.

The Superior War College (ESG) defines national power as “the capacity that the State has to integrate all people and resources available - which constitute the nation acting in accordance with national desires, in order to reach and sustain its national objectives.”⁸

The United States Department of Defence also defines it as “ the art and science of developing and using the political, economic and psychological powers of a nation-state, together with its armed forces during peace or war, to serve national objectives.”⁹ According to Frederick Hartmann “ national power is the strength or capacity that a sovereign nation-state can use to achieve its national interests.”¹⁰ For this paper, national power will be defined as “ the empowerment that it gives a country’s politicians or statesmen to fulfill their country’s national interests.”¹¹

In fact, national power has a lengthy list of its components. David Jablonsky suggested that eight elements are components of national power, all of them under headings of natural and social determinants.¹² From Meira Mattos' perspective, the national power is also composed of natural and social determinants.¹³ In addition, Jack Plano and Roy Olton advocate that some elements of national power are natural factors not ordinarily subject to human control or alteration, while others are variables that depend on human impulses, organization, and

⁸ The elements of the national power are grouped under headings, as follow: political, economic, military, social and technological. Ministry of Defense, Superior War College, *Doctrine Fundaments* (Rio de Janeiro: Army’s Library, 1998), 50.

⁹ Joint Chief of Staff, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, JSC Joint Pub 1-02 (Washington: GPO, March 23, 1994), 255.

¹⁰ Frederick H. Hartmann, *Realtions of Nations*, 6th ed., (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1983), 41.

¹¹ Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th ed., (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1985), 117.

¹² David Jablonsky, “National Power”, *Parameters* 27 No.1 (Spring 1997), 38.

¹³ Carlos M. Mattos, *Geopolitics and Modernity* (Rio de Janeiro: Army’s Library, 2002), 88.

capacities.¹⁴ In summary, academics reached agreement that elements of national power must include geography, natural resources, population, economy, government and military forces – along with other elements which are not specifically listed above as they do not enter into this discussion directly.

No one single element is likely to be the decisive factor in a country's search for national power so the various elements involved in the struggle must interrelate effectively in order for a government to achieve the desired outcomes and express effectively the nation's interests.

Economic power, including international trade, financial markets, tariff agreements and other specific economic policies must be integrated with the technological means to develop and apply scientific knowledge, the diplomatic skills needed to manage effective foreign relations and the employment of military forces in useful alliances and in the management of situations requiring international cooperation.¹⁵ Hence the importance to Brazil of its intentions to participate in peacekeeping operations with the UN.

Military forces must be considered as important players in the search for national power. They have the potential for insertion into the global arena where they, in concert with the other major elements of national power, support outward-looking policies which bring nations to the attention of the world, and earn for it the respect of the global community.

Based on those concepts enumerated above, this paper is a strong attempt to demonstrate that, to further enhance its emergence as a middle-level power, and its expanding influence in the international community, Brazil must continue its efforts to integrate its diplomatic and military

¹⁴ Jack Plano and Roy Olton, "The Nature and Role of Foreign Policy", in *The International Relations Dictionary* (Oxford: Western Michigan University, 1998), 9-10.

¹⁵ David Jablonsky, "National Power"..., 38.

capacities to effectively project Brazil's national power. Peacekeeping operations are an essential component of this integrated effort.

This paper will first provide a brief look at the globalization phenomenon, its nature and the dynamics of Cold War period. Then, it will discuss the elements of national power as mentioned above – one by one, explaining importance of each for a middle-level power and demonstrating how Brazil has been displaying those capacities which enable it to be considered as a middle-level power in Latin America.

The chapter on the United Nations will focus on the political and institutional aspects of security, in particular the role of the UN after the end of Cold War. Then, this paper will discuss Brazilian participation in peace operations and also will explore the implications of the UN Security Council's enlargement for ensuring better Brazilian insertion into the international community.

Conceptually, this paper will demonstrate the relevance of the changing nature of Brazilian international affairs in response to the evolving international environment – more specifically, the recognition by the Brazilian political class of the need to redefine Brazil's Foreign Policy and set up the conditions necessary to establish a new National Defense policy.

Finally, in the chapter on military capacity, this paper will focus on one of the key elements driving the international relations of Brazil – the Brazilian Army as a vector of the foreign policy, to project its national power, and one specific strategy, so called power projection, to achieve more effectively in synergy with the diplomatic's effort, the assertion of Brazil' national power through peacekeeping operations.

CHAPTER 2

BRAZIL AS A MIDDLE-LEVEL POWER

The international system, formed according to patterns of the American unipolarity, has quite unstable characteristics. In a long-term period, either these patterns may lead to the consolidation of an American hegemony, or may deepen its multipolar characteristics, creating a world order similar to the XI Century's.
Helio Jaguaribe¹⁶

2.1 THE GLOBALIZATION PHENOMENON

What is globalization?

In accordance with David Held and Anthony MacGrew's views, globalization can be conceived as "a process (or set of processes), which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, expressed in transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power."¹⁷ In consequence, this contemporary phenomenon is associated with a transformation of state power as the roles and functions of states are re-articulated, reconstituted and re-embedded at the intersections of regional and global scenarios.

Many academics suggest that this was not just a phenomenon of the market place or financial transactions. It has also seen the spread of globally political paradigms, cultural patterns and social ideas. It has led to standardization of the world's security systems. This way, globalization had been affecting the sovereignty of nation states and many of the established

¹⁶ Helio Jaguaribe, quoted in the introduction in Paulo Fagundes Vizentini, "Brazil: a Southern Giant in the Construction of a Multipolar World System,"[document on-line]; available from <http://www.ilea.ufrgs.br>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2004.

¹⁷ David Held and Anthony MacGrew, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 324.

political, economic, social, and military structures. Globalization pushes out past national borders to the regions and the global domain.¹⁸

The impact of globalization is mediated significantly by a state's position in political, military and economic hierarchies; its domestic economic and political structures; the institutional patterns of national policies; and specific strategies in order to assert itself in that global society.¹⁹ In summary, this phenomenon signals that “the contemporary world is no longer a world of closed communities with mutually impenetrable ways of thought, self-sufficient economies and ideally sovereign states.”²⁰

Even after a long period of reform, Brazil still seems to be looking for its own project in the 21st Century. What would be Brazil's role in such a globalized context?

Since the beginning of the 90's, Brazil has searched for a more meaningful and satisfying alternative to its national development project and to further its relationship with the international community. The Brazilian elite has adopted neoliberal and macroeconomic policies, new defense and foreign policies, integrated military power as a rapid method for the country to be inserted in the global decision - making process, and, the consolidation of its regional position, as a significant force.

2.2 BRAZIL AND LATIN AMERICA

Which capacities would Brazil have to develop in order to emerge in this great international game as a middle-level power?

¹⁸ *Report on 56th Session of the United Nations General Assembly*, Second Committee, Panel on Globalization and the State (New York: UN, 2001), 3-4.

¹⁹ David Held and Anthony MacGrew, “Globalization,” [document on-line]; available from <http://www.polity.co.uk/globalcp.htm>; Internet; accessed 18 December 2004.

²⁰ O. O'Neil, “Transnational Justice,” in David Held ed., *Political Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 282.

Brazil is large and diverse country with over 8.5 million square kilometers and over 170 million people. That large territory offers enormous natural resources; in great geographical variety, with immense economic potential. Its population of Amerindian, European, African and Asian origin, succeeds in combining unity with diversity. Brazilian people also enjoy a unique, original identity and culture, speak the same language – Portuguese- and reflect the intermarriage of many races. Despite areas of poverty, this population is espousing modernity and is over 80% urban.²¹

Brazil is a state with enormous potential, and in Latin America is seen as one of the region's powers in international terms. As noted by Lincoln Gordon:

*Brazil is the world's... ninth in total economic output. It accounts for more than one-third of Latin America's total population and production. Its economy in 1998 outranked that of all but the United States, Japan, China, and the four leading countries of Europe. Among America's export destinations in the western Hemisphere, it is surpassed only by Canada and Mexico. In recent years, it has also been major destination for portfolio investments.*²²

By the late twentieth century, Brazil had some of the traditional aspects of a middle-level power, and the potential for leadership in Latin America. But, what is middle-level power leadership?

In a world increasingly characterized by growing interdependence, all countries now have global interests. In a world characterized by transnational security threats – global arming, mass migration, terrorism, and small arms proliferation – there is an increasing need for a multilateral approach. However, in this scenario, the number of countries, which could effectively confront the problems attached to global interdependence and multilateral cooperation are few. Thus,

²¹ Paulo Fagundes Vizentini, "Brazil: a Southern Giant in the Construction of a Multipolar World System,"[document on-line]; available from <http://www.ilea.ufrgs.br>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2004.

²² Lincoln Gordon, *Brazil's Second Chance; en Route Toward the First World* (Washington: Brookings Institutions Press, 2001), 1.

Barbara Ward commented, “ The superpowers are too vast, unwieldy, too locked in their own responsibilities. The great mass of new states is too poor and too shaky. It is the middle powers who occupy about the right position on the scale of influence.”²³

In this context, a state which is regarded as being ranked slightly below the level of the superpowers has sufficient weight within its own region to be considered a “regional power.”²⁴ In support of this view, Robert Cox suggested that middle-level powers are to be found in the middle rank of material capabilities, both military and economic, and that they seek to bolster international institutions for cooperative management.²⁵

Then, who qualifies for middle-level power leadership?

There is a fierce and as yet unresolved debate among academics and policy-makers on the criteria needed for states to qualify for middle-level power leadership. While it is accepted that middle-level powers generally are in the middle range of power capabilities, proponents of middle-level power leadership are unsure of how to assess these power capabilities.

In order to demonstrate that Brazil is an emergent middle-level power for leadership in Latin America, this paper focuses on proponents of middle-level power leadership who judge this issue using as criteria Gross National Product (GNP) as the best general indicator of national power. Wood argues that “GNP automatically captures aggregate economic power, wealth and/or population size, and to a substantial extent, military potential...” On the basis of using GNP as a criterion for identifying middle-level powers, Wood proposes a list of states, which

²³ Barbara Ward, “ The First International Nation,” in W. Kilbourne ed. *Canada: A Guide to the Peaceable Kingdom* (Toronto: MacMillan and Company, 1970), 46.

²⁴ Geoff R. Berridge, Allan Innes and Sir Brian Bonder, *A Dictionary of Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 172.

²⁵ Robert W Cox, “Middlepowermanship, Japan and the Future World Order,” in *International Journal No.44* (Autum, 1989), 826-827.

includes Italy, China, Canada, Brazil, Spain, India, Mexico, Argentina, South Africa, among others.²⁶

Does Brazil qualify as a middle-level power?

On the basis of its GNP, Brazil certainly qualifies for a middle-level power in Latin America. The economy is the key factor in this assessment. Brazil's transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy began in the 1940's, and was consolidated between 1965 and 1980, when a diversified and solid economic plan was implemented. Since then, Brazil is one of the top ten economies of the world by size, representing roughly half the GNP of the whole South America.²⁷

The deterioration of the international economic situation because of globalization problems, which occurred around 2004, did not reduce the Brazilian growth rate (average 3.5 to 4.0 %). Thus, Brazil is leading the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUL), which integrates the economies of Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Bolivia is an associated member. This institution is expanding its relations with several other countries in Latin America. Today, Brazil is extremely successful in its commercial relations with the European Union (EU), Pacific Basin countries and the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries.²⁸

Table 1 - Macroeconomic Data: A Comparative View

MACROECONOMIC DATA	BRAZIL	ARGENTINA	MEXICO	CANADA	SPAIN	INDIA	SOUTH AFRICA	JAPAN

²⁶ B. Wood, "The Middle Powers and the General Interests," in *Middle Powers and the International System No.1* (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1988), 17.

²⁷ Lincoln Gordon, *Brazil's Second Chance; en Route Toward the First World* (Washington: Brookings Institutions Press, 2001), 100.

²⁸ Paulo Fagundes Vizentini, "Brazil: a Southern Giant in the Construction of a Multipolar World System,"[document on-line]; available from <http://www.ilea.ufrgs.br>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2004.

Population (million)	176,029	37,812	103,400	32,207	40,077	1,045,845	43,647	126,974
GNP (US \$ bi)	1,34	391	920	923	828	2,66	412	3,55
GNP per capita (US\$)	7,400	10,200	9,000	29,400	20,700	2,540	9,400	28,000
GNP Growth (%)	1.9	-14.7	-0.3	3.4	2.0	4.3	2.6	-0.3
Exports (US\$ bi)	58,024	25,329	159,827	250,191	118.153	48,048	26,042	406,195
Imports (US\$ bi)	47,547	8,700	165,367	219,912	153,728	54,268	26,811	327,271
Trade balance (US\$ bi)	10,477	16,629	- 5.54	30,279	-35,575	-6.22	-0.769	78,924
External debts (US\$ bi)	226,362	136,709	158,290	1.9	n.a.	97,320	24,050	n.a.
Unemployment (%)	9.6	12.8	2.0	8.0	14.1	n.a.	23.3	5.0

Source: Colombo, John Robert. "The Canadian Global Almanac: a book of facts." Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 2004.

Despite the economic success, however, it is important to note that Brazil still has a chronically poor distribution of income, a fact which creates a great challenge for Brazilian decision-makers – the eradication of poverty.²⁹

Finally, Latin America provides a privileged space for the Brazilian economy and for hemispheric integration, starting with the strengthening of MERCOSUL, an essential condition for facing North America's growing pressure for the expansion of NAFTA. Despite this, Brazil is still the only relatively autonomous market in relation to the United States. The main target in Brazilian economic policy is hemispheric integration, and, therefore, the country plays a key role in fostering regional cooperation for Latin American development.

Does Brazil have the military capacity to support its position -as a middle-level power- and, therefore, to contribute to international insertions?

Brazil has created the largest military capacity in Latin America, and is included in the twenty largest armed forces of the world.³⁰ The Brazilian armed forces enjoy the highest

²⁹ Lincoln Gordon, *Brazil's Second Chance; en Route Toward the First World*, ...21 and 96.

³⁰ Sam Perlo-Freeman, "Survey of Military Expenditure in South America,"[document on-line]; available from http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/bgpapersmex_s_america_bg_03.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 November 2004.

confidence rating of any public institution in the country, as evidenced year after year in national polls.³¹ Notwithstanding its position as having the 15th largest defense budget in the world, Brazil is among those countries with one of the smallest defense budgets as a percentage of its GNP.³²

Table 2 - Defense Data: A National Budget and Manpower Comparison

MILITARY DATA	BRAZIL	ARGENTINA	MEXICO	CANADA	SPAIN	INDIA	SOUTH AFRICA	JAPAN
Mil expenditures (US \$ mi)	10,439	4,300	5,168	9,801	9,906	14,018	2,653	42,488
Mil expenditures - GNP (%)	2.1	1.3	0.9	1.1	1.2	2.4	1.7	1.0
Manpower- availability	52,100	9,900	19,755	8,417	10,482	293,677	11,924	29,179
Manpower- fit for service	34,799	8,042	27,374	7,176	8,336	172,153	7,247	25,189

Source: The World Factbook - 2004 / Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Notes: Manpower 1,000 men / males age 15-49

The table above shows that Brazil and India, according to the percentage of defense spending in the GNP, are the main military players amongst those countries. India and Brazil seem to have the largest index of military expenditures as a percentage of the GNP, also, both middle-level powers have the largest military capacity, in terms of manpower.


A recent study published by Military Power Review, analyzed factors such as military force, modernization programs, equipment, manpower, economic capacity, strategic projection and geopolitical power in South American countries. The final analysis shows the military power

³¹ The Brazilian Army, "The Army and the Brazilian society," Social Communication Centre [document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/04Maoami/CCOMSEX/indice.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

³² Sam Perlo-Freeman, "Survey of Military Expenditure in South America," [document on-line]; available from http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/bgpapersmex_s_america_bg_03.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 November 2004.

ranking in the region, classifying the countries in ranked order: Brazil, Peru, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador.³³

Table 3 - Military Power in South America: Ranking 2004



The Brazilian Armed Forces – composed of navy, army and air force- are permanent and regular national institutions based on discipline and hierarchy, under the Supreme Authority of the President of the Republic. When factors of National Defense policy were analysed, it was considered that Brazil’s National Defense Policy-1996 is primarily directed by the 1988 National Constitution, built around two central pillars: active diplomacy and conventional deterrence.³⁴

Among all objectives in the National Defense Policy (PDN) there are two that play a vital role in effectively projecting Brazil’s national power. The first one – to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security – envisages the construction of a complex system in which Brazil will play a strong role vis-à-vis the United Nations peace operations.

The second objective suggests Brazilian projection into the international community and, therefore, the increase of its influence in the international decision-making process. Both objectives have the purpose of achieving an effective balance of power and opening the way for new players in world diplomacy.³⁵

³³ Military Power Review, “The Military Power in South America: Ranking 2004,” [document on-line]; available from <http://www.militarypower.com.br>; Internet; accessed 25 February 2005.

³⁴ Brazil, Executive Office of the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, *National Constitution 1988* (Brasilia, DF: National Press, 1988), 82-83.

In this context, Brazil is leading the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), of which it has provided the largest contingent (1,200 troops). It is a relevant factor that was analyzed as a strategic projection. Obviously, this mission is playing a key role in accordance with National Defense Policy objectives and is reinforcing Brazil's credentials as an active player in the international decision-making process. Finally, Brazil also has a huge mobilization capability, a fact which provides for rapid deployment abroad (overseas) as well as it discourages any aggressive intent against its territorial integrity.

Does Brazil have the political will to be a middle-level leadership?

More important than having capacity – military and economic- is the question whether Brazil has the political will to take on the role of regional leader. The Brazilian position was reinforced by the collapse of Argentina's economy in December of 2001, and the election of a leader from the Labor Party, Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, on November of 2002.³⁶

Brazil's President Lula proposed an "active and affirmative" foreign policy, with an emphasis on promoting integration of South America – especially through MERCOSUL, putting in train affirmative trade and intensified bilateral partnerships- but also emphasizing those goals of a more general nature, such as closing the gap between rich and poor, promoting and protecting human rights, protecting the environment and building a better, more just – and peaceful world, based on international law and the principles of multilateralism.³⁷

This position was clearly demonstrated in two important events that occurred recently.

The first one occurred during the political crisis in Venezuela when Brazil proposed the establishment a "group of friends" in order to complement the efforts being made by the Secretary- General of the Organization of American States, Cesar Gaviria. Bearing in mind the supreme authority of democracy and the upholding of constitutional principles, and therefore the legitimacy of President Hugo Chavez's government, Brazil played a key role in the negotiations, as stated by the United States' Secretary of State, Colin Powell:

³⁵ Brazil, Executive Office of the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, *National Defense Policy 1996* (Brasilia, DF: National Press, 1996), 6.

³⁶ Paulo Fagundes Vizentini, "Brazil: a Southern Giant in the Construction of a Multipolar World System,"[document on-line]; available from <http://www.ilea.ufrgs.br>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2004.

³⁷ Celso Amorim, "Diplomacy and the Lula Government," lecture at the Rio Branco Institute, on April 10th 2003,"[document on-line]; available from <http://www.embbrazil.gov.br>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2005.

Brazil was engaged energetically and in a most constructive manner in support of democracy through its leadership of the Friends of Venezuela group in the Organization of America States, and through Brazil's bilateral efforts with Venezuela.³⁸

The second position was demonstrated during the crisis of Operation Iraq Freedom, in 2003. Brazil stood firmly by its view that Iraq should fully comply with its obligations, and that the work of the United Nations inspectors should be allowed to continue in order to ensure that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were totally eliminated. Brazil supported the protests against the use of force along with France, Germany and Russia. That position reinforced the principles of multilateralism and the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the provisions laid down in UN Charter, in which a peaceful solution should be sought and that the approval of the UN should be present in order for nations to take military action.³⁹

2.3 FINAL WORDS

In a relatively short period of time, Brazil has become an emerging political, economical and military power in the Western hemisphere. As the major player in Latin America Brazil is the only country (apart from the United States) that can persistently pursue a policy geared towards asserting its presence in the global scenario. Despite some difficulties, there are forces working with willpower, to achieve that global presence as envisaged in the recent past by the former decision-making elite:

³⁸ Colin Powell, "Brazil's Achievements and Robust Democracy," lecture at the American Chamber of Commerce, in Sao Paulo, Brazil, on October 5th 2004,"[document on-line]; available from <http://www.muambai.usconsulate.gov>; Internet; accessed 23 February 2005.

³⁹ Celso Amorim, "Diplomacy and the Lula Government," lecture at the Rio Branco Institute, on April 10th 2003,"[document on-line]; available from <http://www.embrazil.gov.br>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2005.

We Brazilians possess all the conditions to aspire to a place among the world's great powers...our territory does not lack natural resources such as fertile soil, hydroelectric potential, and mineral wealth. We are still far from an intensive exploitation of our resources, many of them still undiscovered. Our freedom of maneuver is being proven, day-by-day, by our mastery of technology and science, applied to the strategy of national development.⁴⁰

Brazil has demonstrated specific capacities that enable it to be considered as a middle-level power in Latin America. Brazil has a large population, huge territory and resource base, but these are not enough. Brazil has status as a middle-level power because it is utilizing a vast array of available resources to develop a powerful economy and to further its integration – political and economic- with contiguous states.

On the other hand, a sizeable and modernized military capacity provides it with resources adequate to make itself a hemispheric power. The political reshuffle of the late 1990's appears to be based on the idea of preserving these factors in association with a new reformist vision: Brazil as a global player. The Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister Celso Amorim stated this vision:

The multilateral forums are certainly the best arenas where Brazil can exercise, on a global level, its competence in the defense of national interests... The play of alliances of a variable geometry, made possible by a world of indefinite polarities, strengthens our participation in these forums, where we can best develop our action potential in the formulation of rules and norms of conduct for the management of the globalization space in every field of interest to Brazil.⁴¹


Finally, Brazil has been acting as a middle-level power based on its diplomatic tenet: preventive diplomacy. The tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to regional and international crises, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in global disputes, and the tendency to embrace notions of “good citizenship” to guide its foreign policy indicate that Brazil has been building regional leadership through active participation and cooperation in multilateral

⁴⁰ Carlos M. Mattos, *Brazil: Geopolitics and Destiny* (Rio de Janeiro: Army's Library, 1975), 72.

⁴¹ Celso Amorim, “National Defense and Foreign Policy,” [document on-line]; available from http://www.brasil.gov.br/ac_def31.htm; Internet; accessed 25 January 2005.

institutions, such as the Common Market of the South, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations. Peacekeeping operations are an essential instrument to support its diplomacy.

Figure 2 – Brazil in Americas and MERCOSUL



MERCOSUL is a free-trade area with a common external tariff, and the world's second largest customs union after the European Union. Its member states - Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay - having a combined GDP more than US\$1 trillion and a total population of approximately 220 million, MERCOSUL's GDP per capita is around US\$4,000. The Brazilian economy accounts for 70% of MERCOSUL's total GDP, while Brazil's exports and imports to and from the other members constitute 15% of the country's international trade.

Source:
Brazil's

Embassy in London: MERCOSUL, available from <http://www.brazil.org.uk/>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2005.

CHAPTER 3

THE UNITED NATIONS: A WORLD PEACEFUL AND SECURE

To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom...And for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.

The United Nations Charter – Preamble ⁴²

3.1 THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

The creation of the United Nations (UN), in 1945, was based on a realistic model of international relations, in which the state is considered as a primary actor. The causes of conflict in those days often were based on confronting various national interests for territory, power and natural resources. The UN Charter's provisions were conceived to deal with international conflicts, and its Chapter 1- Purposes and Principles - states as one of the objectives to the UN, "to take effective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace..."⁴³ However, most recent conflicts, particularly after the end of Cold War, have been characterized as intra-

⁴² United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations* (New York: UN, 1946), 2.

⁴³ United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations...*, 3.

state, deeply rooted, and covering a wide range of causes, such as ethnic, religious, and social conditions.

The changing nature of these conflicts – from international to intra-state- marked two broad phases in the evolution of UN activities, especially peacekeeping operations. The first phase, so-called Cold War operations, was characterized by traditional peacekeeping operations which involved the employment of an international military contingent under UN auspices in order to control actual fighting while peacemaking negotiations took place. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) best exemplifies that traditional peacekeeping model.⁴⁴

The second phase termed post-Cold War operations, moved into what is now known as its “second generation”, and typically involved “the right to intervene”, often justified on humanitarian grounds, such as prevention of genocide, ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity. As a consequence of this change, the UN’s agenda for peace and security expanded rapidly. In the period 1945-1987, the UN undertook thirteen operations, but after 1988, more than thirty new operations have been created.⁴⁵

The decision by the Security Council in 1992 to commission the then Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, made him responsible for a stronger and more efficient mechanism within the UN for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping – all of them defined on *An Agenda For Peace*.⁴⁶ The document emphasized an optimistic and ambitious agenda for proactive and principled UN action and also declared the UN’s will and right to intervene in state

⁴⁴ Marrack Goulding, “Current Rapid Expansion Unsustainable Without Major Challenges” appendix in *Keeping the Peace in the Post-Cold War Era: Strengthening Multilateral Peacekeeping* (The Trilateral Commission, New York: UN, 1993), 91-101.

⁴⁵ Marrack Goulding, “Current Rapid Expansion Unsustainable Without ...”, 91-101.

⁴⁶ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping* (New York: UN, 1992), 2.

matters as never before: “ peacekeeping as the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, *hitherto* with the consent of all parties concerned.”⁴⁷

The changing nature of peace operations is not necessarily solely because the world has become much more violent, but because the dynamics of the UN Security Council have changed, in response to changes in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union- both Cold War superpowers.⁴⁸

In accordance with the UN Charter, the UN General Assembly – representing all member countries - may recommend actions regarding disputes. They must forward these recommendations to the UN Security Council, as the Security Council is the authorizing body for such actions. This is regardless of whether the action is to be taken under the Charter’s Chapter VI-Pacific Settlement of Disputes, or Chapter VII-Action with Respects to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression. Generally, mandates for traditional peacekeeping operations fall under Chapter VI, while Chapter VII authorizes more forceful coercion or enforcement action in the maintenance of international peace and security.⁴⁹

The Security Council is comprised of five permanent members – the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Russian Federation (former The Soviet Union), People’s Republic of China and France- and ten non-permanent members that are elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. Decisions of the Security Council on peacekeeping matters must

⁴⁷ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace...*, 2.

⁴⁸ *Ibid...*, 10.

⁴⁹ Nigel D. White, “The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues,” in *The UN, Peace and Force*, in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.3, No.4 (Winter 1996). Edited by Michael Pugh (London: Frank Cass&Co. Ltd, 1997), 49-51.

have the concurrence of nine of the fifteen members and, more specifically, the concurrence of the five permanent members.⁵⁰

During the Cold War period, the world was definitely bi-polar i.e. the United States versus the Soviet Union. Both superpowers were extremely averse to allowing the UN the ability to influence events in countries that they considered to be within their particular spheres of influence, and used their power of veto to preclude this. As a consequence, the United Nations was rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises because of the vetoes- 279 of them- cast in the Security Council, which were vivid expressions of the extreme divisions of that time period.⁵¹

Nevertheless, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union's bloc, and, therefore, the radical changes to the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, cooperation in the world system has increased but, at the same time, demands on the United Nations have surged. One indicator of the shifting balances of power is the increasing frequency of multilateral operations under control by the United Nations.⁵² The world system has seen the development of power vacuums left behind by the dissolution of bipolarity, and, now, regional powers can operate more freely within their areas of influence, in order to achieve more effective insertion into the international community through projection of their national power.

3.2 THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY-DIPLOMATIC CAPACITY IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS

⁵⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations...*, 11.

⁵¹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace ...*, 10.

⁵² Duane Bratt, "Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations," in *The UN, Peace and Force*, in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.3, No.4, Winter 1996. Edited by Michael Pugh (Great Britain: Frank Cass&Co. Ltd, 1997), 64.

After the end of the Cold War, the new relevance of the United Nations-as noted previously - was perceived in the context of the image of the country as a potentially significant player in international affairs. The view prevailed that multilateral forums should be a target of the foreign policy to achieve the desired international insertion. Having occupied a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council in 1993-1994, 1998-1999, 2004-2005 and having the current Presidency of the UN Security Council, Brazilian representatives have been taking active part in the debates on the reform of the United Nations system and in the

In 2003, during the complex process of peace operations in Iraq, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, appointed the Brazilian diplomat Sergio Vieira de Mello as his special representative to lead the United Nations support for humanitarian aid, reconstruction, refugee return, economic development, legal and judicial reform and civilian administration. Vieira de Mello, who also was UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva, had extensive experience in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in countries such as Bangladesh, Sudan, Cyprus, Mozambique, Peru and Lebanon. One of Vieira de Mello's previous positions was a representative for the secretary-general in Kosovo. He also served as transitional UN administrator in East Timor.⁵⁵

On August 19, 2003, Vieira de Mello died in the line of duty, after a truck bomb exploded in the UN mission Headquarters. In Collin Powell's words: "his loss is a terrible blow to the international community."⁵⁶ His diplomatic career – dedicated to help people in danger and in difficulty- is a motivation for future generation of diplomatic corps.

The support for a collective security system is expressed in the country's active participation in UN peace operations. It is both parts of the diplomatic tradition and of the process of interaction with changing international norms. As early as the 1940's the country took part in a UN mission to the Balkan region (UNSCOB). The Brazilian military has taken part in operations in the Middle East (the Suez Battalion 1956-1967), infantry battalions were incorporated into United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I in 1956) and on two occasions UNEF I was commanded by a Brazilian general. Brazil was also present in the UN mission in Congo (ONUC air support unit 1960-1964), in the UN mission in New Guinea (UNSF-1962), in

⁵⁵ International World CNN, "Special Report : Sergio Vieira de Mello", [document on-line], available on <https://www.cnn.com/international.htm>; Internet, accessed 21 April 2005.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

the UN mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP, 1964-1967) and, in the UN observation group in India and Pakistan (UNIPOM, 1965-1966).⁵⁷

As the “second generation” operations became more diversified and numerous – more peacekeeping operations have been established since 1989 than in the first 45 years of the UN’s history. As a direct result, after the 1990s, there has been a sharp increase in the participation of Brazil’s armed forces in multilateral operations, following similar a trend in the continent.⁵⁸

The country’s role in Angola has been particularly significant since 1991, Brazil having contributed both in the verification missions (UNAVEM I and II, 1991-1997) and the observer mission (MONUA, 1997). In Africa, Brazilian armed forces were also present in Mozambique (UNOMOZ, 1992-1995), Uganda, Rwanda (UNOMUR. 1993-1994, UNAMIR) and Liberia (UNOMIL). Since 2004, Brazil took part in the United Nations Mission in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBS) with a military presence in an adviser's capacity to General Secretary Special Representative Military function of ONU. Also, the Brazilian military has been taking part in the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNMYC).

The participation of Brazilian troops in UNOMOZ between 1992-1995 represented the first deployment of combat troops in a foreign country since the 1965 Organization of American States (OAS) intervention in the Dominican Republic. In Angola and Mozambique the country has been particularly active, partly due to linguistic and cultural activities. In addition, Brazil’s relations with Angola and Mozambique were characterized by important commonalities:

⁵⁷ The Brazilian Army, “The Army and the National History: Participation in Peace Operations,” [document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/04Maoami/missaopaz/indice.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

common language, common heritage and common historical connection.⁵⁹ Both missions were most important military participations in Africa.

Brazil was also present in Central America, verifying the electoral process in Nicaragua (ONUVEM, 1989), overlooking to see if the governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua were complying with the Esquipulas II Accords (ONUCA, 1990-1992), supervising the internal accords in El Salvador (ONUSAL, 1991-1995) and monitoring the human rights situation in Guatemala (MINUGUA, 1994).⁶⁰

In the Balkans, Brazil was part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR, 1992-1995), of the missions in Croatia (UNCRO, 1995-1996, UNMOP, 1996), and of the mission in Macedonian (UNPREDEP, 1995). In Asia, electoral observers were present in Cambodia (UNTAC), and Brazilian troops joined the mission in East Timor (UNAMET). Brazilian military police were sent to East Timor the country having promptly answered the Australian request for troops, though the size of the group did not accurately express the support for the mission given by Ambassador Gelson Fonseca, in the Security Council. The Brazilian contingent has, however, in its stay in East Timor, supported the effort of national reconstruction.

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With regard to the emphasis on promoting integration of South America, and, at the same time, building a better, more just and peaceful world, Brazil was also present in two important missions: one in Cyprus and the other in Haiti. The ongoing United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP, 1995) is the perfect example of regional cooperation between South

⁵⁹ The Brazilian Army, "The Army and the National History: Participation in Peace Operations," [document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/04Maoami/missaopaz/indice.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

American military forces. Since 1995, it has included two Brazilian militaries in a contingent lead by Argentina. In September 2003, the UN mission also included participants from other South America's countries, as Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia and Peru.⁶²

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004) has as its mandate to coordinate its efforts with the OAS and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The Mission has included 1,200 Brazilian troops – the largest manpower allotment ever sent on a mission, with Brazilian Army General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro as the Commander of the UN mission. Contributions from other Latin American countries included troops from Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, Paraguay and Uruguay – more than half of the mission's forces – making MINUSTAH the largest ever peacekeeping operation made-up mostly of the region's own personnel.⁶³

Besides the missions off shore, Brazil had taken part in peace operations in surrounded countries. The Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEPE) was created by the United States, Argentina, Chile and Brazil to verify ceasefire agreements in disputed areas following a border conflict that erupted between Ecuador and Peru in January 1995. This conflict saw large numbers of troops mobilized on both sides of the border. Dozens of casualties, created the threat of general war in the region.

Subsequent to a cease fire in 1995 brokered by the four guarantor nations of the 1942 Rio Protocol (United States, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil) the MOMEPE was placed in the disputed

⁶² The Brazilian Army, "The Army and the National History: Participation in Peace Operations," [document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/04Maoami/missaopaz/indice.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

⁶³ Ibid.

border area between Ecuador and Peru to observe and report infractions through diplomatic channels pending political negotiations. On October 26, 1998, Peru and Ecuador signed a comprehensive peace accord establishing the framework for ending a border dispute more than a century old. This led to formal demarcation of border regions on May 13, 1999. The peace agreement was approved by both nations and ratified without opposition by both nations' national legislatures.

This successful multinational effort has brought a lasting solution to a border dispute that threatened the futures of Ecuador and Peru, helping create the conditions and framework for peace, prosperity, and the continued development of democratic institutions within both the region and the hemisphere. Apart from the peace mission in Dominican Republic, that was the second time UN forces in Latin America served under the command of a Brazilian Army general.⁶⁴

As expressed in this paper, there has been a sharp increase in the development and deployment of Brazilian military forces in multilateral operations, in the last fifteen years. In this context, Brazil's active contribution to the construction of a peaceful and more secure world is stressed. This also sets a pattern for an efficient mechanism of insertion for a medium country in the global sphere, based on increasing its presence in the international decision-making process.

3.3 THE REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

In relation to the reform of the United Nations system, the Brazilian position has favored a discussion of procedures, rather than a change to the right of intervention of the organization.

⁶⁴ The Brazilian Army, "The Army and the National History: Participation in Peace Operations," [document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/04Maoami/missaopaz/indice.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

Hence, Brazilian diplomats were skeptical about some propositions presented in that 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*, particularly the view that the United Nations should exert a pacifying function, regardless of the positions of the territories involved.⁶⁵

On the other side, the relevance of the proposal for reforming the UN Security Council is that it stresses the composition of the organ express the current balance of power and its need for the means of dealing with the uncertainties of the 21st Century. The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, reported to the General Assembly, on September 2004:

The number and scope of the United Nations peace operations are approaching what may become their highest level ever, improving projects for conflict resolution but also stretching thin capacities of the system.⁶⁶

During the government of Itamar Franco (1992-1994), Brazil formally applied to become a permanent member of the Security Council and former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) maintained the same posture.⁶⁷ The 2002-2003 Iraq crisis opened a window of opportunity for the newly elected government of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003) to restate the Brazilian candidacy. Ambassador Celso Amorim at his investiture as Foreign Affairs Minister, on January 1st, 2003, stated:

The peaceful solution of controversy is one of the pillars of Brazilian diplomacy. After an approach that elicited so much hope, it's sad to see the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, the home of populations with which we have strong ties. We cannot by any means forgo peaceful means and dialogue lest we perpetuate the suffering of the

⁶⁵ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace...*, 10. In addition, Alexandre da Silva Pinto, "Brazil and UN Peace Operations: an Analysis of Power Projection," *National Defense Review No. 799* (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Army's Library, 2004), 8.

⁶⁶ United Nations, Secretary General. *Press Release SG/SM/2485* [document on-line]; available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/dev2485.doc.htm>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2005.

⁶⁷ Colonel A. Mangiavacchi, "Peace Missions: Power Projection and Foreign Policy" (Rio de Janeiro: Command and Staff General College Advanced Military Studies Course Paper, 2002), 15. In addition, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Statement of the President of Brazil on the Ceremony graduating at Rio Branco Institute (Brasilia, DF, 28 April 1995), [document on-line], available on https://www.planalto.gov.br/publi_04/COLECAO/POLEXT16.HTM; Internet, accessed 22 January 2005.

populations involved and set loose uncontrollable forces with a huge potential for destabilizing the region and the world. We must restore confidence in the United Nations. The UN Security Council is the only body legally qualified to authorize the use of force, an extreme resource to be used only when all other efforts and possibilities have been truly exhausted. But is equally important for the Council's credibility and its peace maintenance task that its resolutions be strictly observed. We will defend the expansion of the Security Council through the inclusion of developing countries as permanent members, so as to reinforce its legitimacy and representativeness.⁶⁸

The Brazilian argument has been that the composition of the Security Council should express changes seen in the international system, particularly the emergence of new powers in the developing world – so-called middle-level powers, such as Canada, India, South Africa and Brazil. A more representative Council would carry greater legitimacy and function more efficiently. Moreover, Brazil would be a strong candidate due to the country's diplomatic tradition as a mediator and as an active member of the United Nations – Brazil has acted as a non-permanent member of the Security Council nine separate occasions since the foundation of the United Nations in 1945.⁶⁹

In October 2004, Brazil along with Germany, Japan and India – the so-called G4 Group, launched a joint effort to attain permanent seats on the UN Security Council. The issue of expansion of the 15-member Security Council also came up as a part of overall the discussion of reforms. The UN ambassadors of G4 nations stressed the need to add new members both in permanent and non-permanent categories to make the Council more representative of the membership.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Celso Amorim, Speech his investiture as Foreign Affairs Minister, on January 1st, 2003 [document on-line]; available from http://www.mre.gov.br/ingles/politica_externa/discursos; Internet; accessed 10 February 2005.

⁶⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Brazil and the UN peace operations," [document on-line]; available from http://www.mre.gov.br/portugues/politica_externa/grupos/onu/participacao.asp Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

⁷⁰ That meeting with the UN Secretary-General was reported an article published by DW-World DE; [document on-line]; available from <http://www.dw-world.de>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.

Recently, in March 22, 2005, the UN Secretary- General, Kofi Annan proposed an ambitious reform plan, in which he stated his recommendations for the expansion of the Security Council: “ I urge member states to make the Security Council more broadly representative of the international community as a whole and the geopolitical realities of today, and to expand its membership to meet these goals...”⁷¹ Brazil, together with Japan, India and Germany, welcomed Annan’s report and his position has confirmed Brazilian desires for a more active part in the international community.

Finally, from the Brazilian diplomatic perspective, the strengthening of the Security Council means improvement of its working methods and an equitable expansion of its membership essentially meaning that developing countries should be included as permanent seats on the Security Council. The success or failure of Brazil is not just crucial for the Brazilian people. The acceptance of the new procedures of collective security will represent a special opportunity for developing countries in their role in the United Nations and also will create a more legitimate distribution of power in the global forum. Therefore, it will have important implications for Latin America as a whole.

3.4 STRENGTHENING REGIONALISM AND BUILDING NEW RELATIONS AMONG THE PEACEKEEPERS

The United Nations had been a target of Brazilian foreign policy for the achievement of international insertion, and, as consequence, the projection of its national power. The country desires to be a significant player in international affairs and holds the view that the United Nations and any other multilateral forums should be important ways to emphasize the integration efforts of military with diplomatic capacities.

⁷¹ United Nations, Secretary General. *Report of the Secretary-General SG/A/59/2005*; [document on-line]; available from <http://www.un.org/>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2005.

Some significant examples justify this assertion. First, the recent participation in peacekeeping operations in African countries, such as Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, and in East Timor, Asia, created conditions that strengthen the relations between Brazil and the African and Asian communities and, in July 1996, supported the Brazilian initiative for the founding of the Community of the Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), as a multilateral forum to cooperation, integration, and international insertion. The Community is composed of eight countries, Angola, Brazil, Cabo Verde, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal and San Tome and Principe. These states are located in four continents, embracing a surface area of more than ten million square kilometers, and with a population of almost two hundred million inhabitants.⁷²

In his lecture delivered at the Rio Branco Institute, on 10th April 2003, the Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister, Celso Amorim, highlighted the importance of these relations:

We wish to pursue a truly preferential policy in our relations with Africa, in consonance with wishes of many sectors of our society, particularly of those in the community who are Portuguese descendents...the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries, we are endeavoring to use our affinity and solidarity with each of the peoples of the member countries to give shape to projects.⁷³

The peacekeeping operations were, and still continue to be an essential component of these integrated efforts. In 2002, the Felino Exercise, second edition, was carried out in Brazil. The exercise was lead by Ministry of Defense and involved the training of small factions of troops with the goal of improving the performance of missions of humanitarian aid and

⁷² Andre Carneiro Moutinho de Carvalho, "The Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries: an Opportunity for Integration, Cooperation and International projection," *Scene International Review No.3* (Rio de Janeiro: Candido Mendes University Press, 2001), 63.

⁷³ Celso Amorim, lecture at the Rio Branco Institute, on April 10th, 2003 [document on-line]; available from http://www.mre.gov.br/ingles/politica_externa/discursos; Internet; accessed 10 February 2005.

maintenance of peace. The exercises involved the staff-members and troops of the all sections of the Community, mentioned above.⁷⁴

Recently, the Felino Exercise was carried out in Angola. The joint maneuvers required the participation of around 600 special troops from the various member countries. The objective was to achieve inter-operability among these countries' armed forces, as well as to create conditions to enhance military capabilities of the joint forces in the execution of peacekeeping missions around the world. In 2005, the Felino Exercise will take place in Cabo Verde.⁷⁵

Undoubtedly, the Brazilian priority is South America. The integration with the all members of the MERCOSUL has been expanding, in matters of peacekeeping operations – missions and exercises. Two specific peacekeeping operations were noted and characterized as integrated efforts, developed by the diplomatic corps and the military. Those missions are established in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The military capacity in synergy with diplomatic affairs had strengthened the Brazilian relations with Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay, and extended Brazil's influence in Latin America.

In the case of Argentina, the political plan has the aim of establishing efficient mechanisms through bilateral agreements, in matters of the United Nations peacekeeping efforts. In the period from 1997 to 2001, exercise known as Southern Cross Operation was developed to perform integrated operations and it required the use of troops from Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The exercise developed peacekeeping simulations, focusing on the goal of preparing these forces for United Nations missions.

⁷⁴ The Brazilian Army, "Operations and Training,"[document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/04Maoami/missaopaz/indice.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

Today, the peacekeeping training continues with the participation of all South American countries, except Guiana and Suriname, and including forces of the United States. It goes by the title Fuerzas Unidas (United Forces) and Cabanas Exercises. Civilian and military participants in both peacekeeping operations learn skills relevant to United Nations missions. The operations use scenarios in fictitious countries to simulate how armed forces, international organizations like the United Nations, non-governmental organizations (NGO) like the Red Cross, or other interested groups should interact in peace operations. The exercises' goal is to increase regional and multinational cooperation by conducting successful peacekeeping operations.⁷⁶

3.5 FINAL WORDS

The United Nations has done a great deal to stabilize zones of conflict, and in the last fifteen years or so also helped countries emerge from conflict by deploying peacekeeping forces. As a result, peacekeeping has become a major part of the UN's operations and a major component in the global peace and security system. Brazil's active support of most of those United Nations interventions in the international community, during the post-Cold War period clearly displays Brazil's support for this collective action.

This chapter demonstrated that the Brazilian participation in peacekeeping operations was and continues to be highly important and useful to military-diplomatic capacities in their integrated efforts to achieve Brazil's national interests. Peacekeeping operations constitute an effective instrument for Brazilian interest in the United Nations and its support for ambitions for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.


From the military perspective it represents an extremely useful experience for troops, while improving the training and elevating the morale of the personnel. At the same time, it

⁷⁶ Ibid.

projects the Brazilian Army's core values. Furthermore, the military has become a relevant factor, by making a great contribution toward the country's international insertion. From the diplomatic perspective, it proves useful for collaboration in the initiatives of UN, reinforces the image of Brazil as a peaceful nation and it verifies credentials that enable Brazil to participate actively in the global decision-making process in the post-Cold War era.

Finally, Brazil's international insertion through peacekeeping operations can be useful in developing mutual cooperation among South American nations, which have been attempting to strengthen regional relationships. Simultaneously, it reinforces Brazil's focused search for peaceful solutions and its preference for the use of a multilateral approach in dealing with thorny issues.

Figure 3 – Brazil and International Peace and Security



CHAPTER 4

BRAZIL AND THE PERSPECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL INSERTION

Diplomats begin with the premise of US power, especially within the hemisphere, a premise that calls for a no confrontation strategy. However, they stress multipolarity and the opportunities it affords for Brazil's international ascent.

Maria Regina Soares de Lima⁷⁷

4.1 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: RELEVANT BRAZILIAN CHANGES

In order to understand the Brazilian perspective toward international insertion and toward the United Nations in particular, it is necessary to explain the changes in the perceptions of new world order that occurred during the period under scrutiny – the post-Cold War era.

An independent foreign policy has been developed in Brazil by Itamaraty, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which in general terms always was led by diplomats-with minimal interference from military advisers- and, almost always disapproved of coercive diplomacy and armed intervention within the hemisphere. It has focused on a peaceful strategy combined with an emphasis on disarmament and human rights, and based on a non-interventionist approach.⁷⁸

The military had a stronger influence in international affairs during the 1964-1985 period – a time of a military regime, when foreign policy was decided frequently within the National Security Council, and, therefore, was focused on national security, an ideological Eastern-Western confrontation marked by Cold War methods and stress on economic development. That foreign policy's main objective was to build up nuclear capabilities as a platform for insertion in the global arena, therefore, Brazil was reluctant to accept the idea of a Latin America nuclear-weapons free zone and did not sign the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty that supported this. Through

⁷⁷ Maria Regina Soares de Lima, "Brazil's Alternative Vision," published in *The America In Transition: The Contours of Regionalism* [document on-line]; available from <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/mace/mace07.html>; Internet; accessed 23 February 2005.

⁷⁸ Delano Teixeira Menezes, *The Military and the Diplomat* (Rio de Janeiro: Army's Library, 1997), 75.

1990-1993 Brazil agreed to mutual inspections with Argentina – based on the Declaration on The Common Nuclear Policy of Brazil and Argentina- and began winding down the nuclear program. In 1991, Brazil, Argentina and Chile also signed the Mendonza Accord banning biological and chemical weapons that might disturb regional security. Finally, in 1998, Brazil had joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as part of a strategy of international insertion designed to consolidate the Brazilian image as a good citizen.⁷⁹

A number of conditions affected the precepts of Brazilian foreign policy: the disintegration of the Soviet Union and consequentially the transformation from bipolarity to multipolarity in the international scene, the liberation provided by an economic model which caused the opening of Brazil's markets in the light of the presently-observed globalization phenomenon with its ascendancy of multinational corporations, and on a regional level, the democratization process which has changed both the domestic environment and the political system. All of these influences have caused ideological shifts toward greater integration, one example of which is MERCOSUL.⁸⁰

The confluence of these factors, both international and regional in scope, has acted to limit the influence of Brazil's military which has been displaced by Itamaraty as the dominant force in decision-making in regard to foreign policy. This includes the question of peacekeeping operations.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Delano Teixeira Menezes, *The Military and the Diplomat...*, 61-65. In addition, Etel Solingen, *Regional Order's at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 148-152.

⁸⁰ Paulo Fagundes Vizentini, *The New Global Order: International Relations in the 20th Century* (master's thesis, University of Franca, 2000), 3-8

⁸¹ Delano Teixeira Menezes, *The Military and the Diplomat...*, 81.

According to the perceptions of the decision-makers, the links between Brazil and the international community have been mostly based on the principles as stated in article 4 of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, established in 1988:

The international relations of the Federative Republic of Brazil are governed by the following principles:

- I. national independence;
- II. prevalence of human rights;
- III. self-determination of the people;
- IV. non-intervention;
- V. equality among the states;
- VI. defense of peace;
- VII. peaceful settlement of conflicts;
- VIII. repudiation of terrorism and racism;
- IX. cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind;
- X. granting of political asylum.⁸²

After a period of transition between a model that associated foreign policy and national security-economic development, a drive to reshape the country's foreign policy can be observed. The Brazilian decision-making elite, then pursued a foreign policy characterized by a strong drive towards global insertion in accordance with international norms and rules.

4.2 THE NEW FOREIGN POLICY: THE VIEW OF DECISION-MAKING ELITES

After the end of Cold War, Brazil adapted to the relevant changes that took place in the international system, accurately evaluating the constraints by the institutions created, bolstered or reformed during the 1990's. At the same time, a new identity and new interests of the state were generated, in order to assist the management of Brazil's international insertion. This change was clearly stated by former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso:

⁸² Brazil, Executive Office of the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, *National Constitution 1988* (Brasilia, DF: National Press, 1988), 82-83.

The new international order is so complex that it would be difficult for a country, no matter how powerful, to transform itself into an exclusive “pole of power”. What we see in this new order which still shows signs of change and uncertainty as to its direction, is the control of and need for shared power... We also see the emergence of decision-making groups, but with limited power, like the famous G-7, for example. But they cannot position themselves as a central committee for decisions at the international level because they lack a legitimate base... In South America, we live in one of the most demilitarized regions of the world and with limited threats to peace... Within this international picture, in which Brazil needs and will have an even more present voice on worldwide decisions, we, at the same time, are strengthening our peace policies in South America, keeping in mind that here we have – for historical and geographical reasons- a more immediate interaction with our neighbors, characterized by increased integration. We are integrating economically and culturally, and with a very positive military relationship.⁸³

This view highlighted the fact that Brazilian’s diplomatic and military capacities would be re-orientated, and pursue, a “strategy of insertion”, which would cover the acceptance of international regimes, growing participation in UN peace operations, wider participation in commercial multilateral negotiations and an emphasis on regional stability rather than subregional competition (i.e. MERCOSUL).⁸⁴

Successive administrations gradually have designed new foreign policy. Largely under the leadership of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was able to reshape its goals, internalizing new concepts and perceptions. The policy orientations and perspectives of the decision-making elite reflects themes pertinent to international peace and security, such as nuclear non-proliferation, regional and international relations, and collective security.⁸⁵

⁸³ Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Statement of the President of Brazil on the Ceremony graduating at Rio Branco Institute, in Brasilia, DF, on April 28, 1995, [document on-line], available on https://www.planalto.gov.br/publi_04/COLECAO/POLEXT16.HTM; Internet, accessed 22 January 2005

⁸⁴ Celso Amorim, “National Defense and Foreign Policy,” [document on-line]; available from http://www.brasil.gov.br/ac_def31.htm; Internet; accessed 25 January 2005.

⁸⁵ Luis Felipe Lampreia, “Foreign Policy is not Opportunism,” *Journal O Globo*, November 19, 1999.

A positive approach toward the United Nations as a guarantor of international security and as a global forum for cooperation on many issues has prevailed. It did not countenance changes to the basic principles of Brazilian international relations especially the non-interventionist approach to crises.

The importance of this particular precept may be observed during three separate sets of United Nations deliberations about military intervention in the 1990's. Brazil was reluctant to approve military intervention in Iraq in 1990, Haiti in 1994 and Kosovo in 1999.⁸⁶

The Brazilian decision not to send troops to Iraq in the Persian Gulf War was costly in terms of benefits in certain parts of the world despite the fact that Brazil had provided diplomatic and military support for collective security operations and viewed the conflict as a clear case of aggression and rupture of the peace by Iraq.

In the case of Haiti, in response to the Security Council's adoption for a Chapter VII resolution in connection with a Western Hemisphere country, Brazil strongly opposed in its discourse over the matter any interventionist measures, favoring an extension of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The Brazilian representative quoted Article 2 (b) from the Organization of American States' Charter (OAS), "...the Organization has an essential purpose, to promote and consolidate representative democracy with due respect for the principle of non-intervention."⁸⁷ This position against wider interventionism can be understood in terms of the protective attitude towards the flexible nature of the concept of sovereignty and the defense of universalistic principles, both stated in the National Constitution 1988.

How is the Brazilian Foreign Policy developing under President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, the former leader of the Labor Party? Is there any relevant change or more continuity?

⁸⁶ Colonel A. Mangiavacchi, "Peace Missions: Power Projection and Foreign Policy" (Rio de Janeiro: Command and Staff General College Advanced Military Studies Course Paper, 2002), 25.

⁸⁷ Colonel A. Mangiavacchi, "Peace Missions: Power Projection and Foreign Policy"... , 28.

In accordance with Alcides Costa Vaz, in his article published by University of Brasilia-International Relations Institute, the main priority of Brazil's present foreign policy is promotion of political stability, economic prosperity and integration in South America. President Lula is following what had been one of the most original diplomatic initiatives of the Cardoso plan of hemispheric leadership, albeit more aggressively, with the support of Latin American nations, such as Uruguay, Paraguay, Venezuela, Chile, Peru and Bolivia.⁸⁸

Nevertheless, unlike the early nineties, when regional integration was also a main driving force in Brazilian foreign policy (i.e. MERCOSUL), there is an explicit intention to highlight regional integration as an important feature of the country's development strategy, although this is not meant to preclude other possibilities for international strategic partnerships with obviously similar interests. In this sense, Brazil's diplomatic activities have tried to strengthen relations with countries whose concerns and perspectives are convergent upon common objectives. As an example, Brazil began negotiations with India, Germany and Japan that resulted in the formation of the G-4, in order to achieve permanent seats on the UN Security Council.⁸⁹

Otherwise, the actions led by Brazil at the last Ministerial Conferences of the World Trade Organization (Cancun, 2003) in making-up the Group of 20 (G-20) expressed the country's renewed willingness to play an active role in strengthening multilateralism and to present itself as a credible global player. Its determination to demand a permanent seat on the Security Council follows the same pattern. Finally, the Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister, Celso Amorim, in his

⁸⁸ Alcides Costa Vaz, "Brazilian Foreign Policy under Lula: Change or Continuity," *Dialogue on Globalization* [document on-line], available on <https://www.fes.de/globalization>; Internet, accessed 20 January 2005.

⁸⁹ Alcides Costa Vaz, "Brazilian Foreign Policy under Lula: Change or Continuity," *Dialogue on Globalization* [document on-line], available on <https://www.fes.de/globalization>; Internet, accessed 20 January 2005.

lecture delivered at the Rio Branco Institute, on 10th April 2003, highlighted current objectives that must be achieved through active diplomatic participation in international affairs:

President Lula's foreign policy is imbued with a humanism that causes simultaneously the instrument of national development and the protector of universal values...with an emphasis on promotion and integration of MERCOSUL and South America, and building a better, more just - and peaceful - world, based on international law and the principles of multilateralism.⁹⁰

To sum up, the role of Brazil should or could play in the international community is the main focus of the new Brazilian Foreign Policy, and, it was shaped by four major trends, which are fully endorsed by the militaries:

- a. the non-acceptation of flexibilization of the concept of sovereignty;
- b. the clear decision of striving to become one of the new permanent member of the United Nations Security Council on the occasion of its enlargement;
- c. the strong commitment of strengthening MERCOSUL as a way to cope with the challenges of integration in the globalized economy;
- d. the unconditional support of a multilateral approach, instead of, a unilateral approach.

4.3 THE DEFENSE POLICY: DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY HERITAGE

The National Defense Policy is not just a decision of the military body or the diplomatic corps, but of a diplomatic vision...that should be supported by a military structure capable of generating an efficient effect...The armed forces have broadened their functions, in accordance with today's opinion in Brazil...Their increased participation in UN peace operations is one of the most important facts of their modern operations.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Celso Amorim, Lecture at the Rio Branco Institute, on April 10th, 2003 [document on-line]; available from http://www.mre.gov.br/ingles/politica_externa/discursos; Internet; accessed 10 February 2005.

⁹¹ Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Statement of the President of Brazil to students of the Naval War College (EGN), Air Force and Army Command and Staff College (ECEME), in Rio de Janeiro, on November 23, 1996), [document on-line], available on https://www.planalto.gov.br/publi_04/COLECAO/POLEXT16.HTM; Internet, accessed 22 January 2005

The National Defense Policy (PDN), established in 1996, is the main innovation in the domain of diplomatic-military relations, which besides opening the way for the creation of a Ministry of Defense, serves a guide for structuring the military in a manner that is attuned to the country's foreign policy. Both are geared to building new prestige for Brazil in the international arena. Since both military and diplomatic spheres involve medium and long-term concepts and perceptions, the PDN linked diplomats, military and other agencies, in order to achieve unity in goals and methods.⁹²

As quoted above, the PDN essentially was based on Brazil's diplomatic and military heritage. In consequence, it has contributed to significant interaction in diplomatic-military relations. To this end, former president Cardoso stated that the armed forces and the political system must indicate that military questions are no longer solely the domain of military

- a. Brazil tries to preserve national and regional interests and does not condone threats of world conflict;
- b. the post-Cold War international framework is defined by a dissonance between the unipolar military power (the United States), and multipolar economic powers (particularly, Japan and Germany);
- c. Brazil is trying to develop its performance as “global trader” in order to achieve the position of global player.

Therefore, and most significantly for the purpose of this paper, the Brazilian foundations of power projection into the international community were incorporated as relevant objectives in the PDN: territorial and national integrity, defense of the state under a democratic rule of law, development of a national scientific and technological capability, maintenance of a regional and global strategic presence, the strengthening of MERCOSUL and consideration of the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and cooperation, and the development of great strategic regional and global associations- among others.⁹⁴

According to President Cardoso, analysis of the world scene should come from the diplomatic vision, but the military point-of view also plays a fundamental role. This is the essential idea from the PDN. During the establishment of the PDN, the former Foreign Affairs Minister Luis Felipe Lampreia, stated that Brazilian diplomacy “ defends and projects overseas the national interests...But it does not create interests, nor can it project that which does not

⁹⁴ Brazil, Executive Office of the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, *National Defense Policy 1996* (Brasilia, DF: National Press, 1988), 5-6.

exist...and the diplomacy of a country like Brazil operates necessarily from a diplomatic heritage.”⁹⁵

These concepts have been incorporated into the heart of the PDN. Generally speaking, it does not limit itself to regional areas and interests, but whenever and wherever possible tries to strengthen partnerships based on common interests. Clearly, such diplomatic actions should be limited only by Brazil’s available resources.

The military reflection on the international situation, which was part of the background of the PDN and, therefore, also influenced its central theme, was characterized by a US hegemony without historical parallel in the global scenario. The former Minister of the Army, General Zenildo de Lucena, presented his point-of-view, and stated that the Army which the country needs must rise to its historic mission of “maintaining Brazil’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.”⁹⁶ From his perspective, the Brazilian Army should develop four lines of action, in order to support the diplomatic position, envisaged by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

First of all, it must keep its military units at an adequate functional level form throughout Brazilian territory, in order to sustain the presence of the military and to support its national strategy. Secondly, it has to establish a core of military troops – an embryo of the Army of the future- comprised of professional soldiers devoted to external defense, based on deterrence capabilities. Third, in a gradually way, it must transform military capacity to support all the functions of an immediate deployment force with troops ready for use in peacekeeping operations. Finally, the greatest possible number of troops must be deployed abroad as part of

⁹⁵ Luis Felipe Lampreia, Lecture “Brazilian Foreign Policy Execution,” at the Superior War College (ESG), in Rio de Janeiro, on July 3rd, 1996 [document on-line]; available from http://www.mre.gov.br/politica_externa/discursos; Internet; accessed 10 February 2005.

⁹⁶ Army General Zenildo de Lucena, “ The Brazilian Army Today,” *National Defense Review No.674* (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Army’s Library, 1994), 7-13.

peace operations, so they acquire professional training, the motivation for personal development and to observe the behaviors of other nations' peacekeepers.⁹⁷

As illustrated above, the military and diplomatic points-of-view are integrated in the National Defense Policy, which has connected both foreign affairs and defense perspectives, and has made important progress during the past ten years. Clearly, peacekeeping operations have been playing an essential part in this integration.

Despite the PDN having a generic context on the conceptual level, it also defines structures and factors of power at the international level, as well as objectives, strategic orientation, and guidelines for military readiness. In this new concept, the PDN focuses on military and diplomatic capacities as expressions of national sovereignty and dignity, and for that reason, its integrated efforts must be continued and expanded to achieve the national interests.⁹⁸

On the global scene, it is important to emphasize specific National Defense objectives: projecting Brazil into the international decision-making process, and contributing to the preservation of peace and security abroad. Thus, the PDN's central orientation is preventive and defensive, though the country will adopt offensive initiatives as part of this larger strategy. That is Brazil's strategy of preventive defense:

Values both diplomacy as a vital tool for solving conflicts and...a credible military structure capable of generating an efficient deterrence...and dissuading defensive posture based on the following major premises...close relations with neighboring countries and the international community.⁹⁹

In accordance with objectives and preventive-defensive strategy, the PDN highlights the guidelines of the policy points towards: contributing to the development of a law-based,

⁹⁷ Army General Zenildo de Lucena, "The Brazilian Army Today,"..., 7-13.

⁹⁸ Brazil, Executive Office of the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, *National Defense Policy 1996* (Brasilia, DF: National Press, 1988), 7-9.

⁹⁹ Brazil, Executive Office of the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil,...8.

equitable international order; participating in the principal decision-making and peace-negotiations processes; participating in peace forces; collaboration, integration and peacekeeping operations with Latin American States, military exchanges with friendly nations, among others.¹⁰⁰

How has the PDN influenced this new engagement in peace operations?

Once the defense policy had been established, doctrinal changes have conformed to a new engagement in peace operations since the end of the Cold War era. One of the objectives of the PDN is the participation of the country in the international decision-making process, stressing the relevance of Brazil's contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. Among the guidelines contained in the document, is the reference to Brazil's active contribution to "the construction of an international order based on the rule of law which should promote universal and regional peace and the sustainable development of humanity."¹⁰¹

However, the irresolute efforts of the military establishment and the government to increase the Brazilian participation in peace operations, particularly in the sphere of strategic planning and training, outlines reaction against a move towards the redefinition of the role of the military in the new democratic context. This indicates in practical terms, that peace operations are not yet seen as the principal theme of national defense issues. Apart from the acceptance of the fundamental role as guarantors of domestic safety, the Armed Forces are reluctant to redefine

¹⁰⁰ Ibid..., 9.

¹⁰¹ Ibid..., 9.

their role, in terms of an “Argentinian model”, that would put UN missions at the center of their objectives and strategies.¹⁰²

Once the decision to participate in a particular operation has been taken, the preparation of troops required for that specific operation begin. UN forces prefer troops trained for generic duties. The belief that the main role of military lies in its dissuasive capability and the maintenance of territorial sovereignty and integrity is widespread. Fortunately, this aspect has been changing, as this paper will explore in the next chapter.

At the same time, since the end of the Cold War, the changes in the scope and nature of peace operations have been met with considerable concern by Brazilian diplomats and by the military establishment, of particular concern is the move towards resolutions based on Chapter VII to the United Nations Charter. The Brazilian decision-making elite has traditionally supported the principles on which peace operations were based: the previous agreement of all parts involved, impartiality, and minimum use of force.¹⁰³

In contrast, the changes in the concept of intervention, as established by the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his report, *An Agenda for Peace*, in 1992, are seen with great concern.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, the country has not been supportive of the resolutions, which involve the UN in coercive interventions such as occurred in the cases of Kosovo (1999) and Somalia (1992-1995). Indeed, the strategic orientation included in the PDN stresses the search for pacific resolutions to disputes. The use of force would only be required as a means of self-defense. Brazil’s position

¹⁰² United States, Institute of Peace, *State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military’s Role in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile*, Publications Report, Chapter 3, October 1998, (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 9.

¹⁰³ United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations...*, 2.

¹⁰⁴ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace...*, 10.

has confirmed Michael Harbottle's point-of-view, in which he suggests the "use of force" being the way that the peacekeeper only uses his weapon for self-defense purposes in the event of his being attacked: "in all other instances he will use the 'weapon' of negotiation, reason and quite diplomacy..."¹⁰⁵

4.4 FINAL WORDS

This chapter emphasizes that the interaction between the National Defense Policy and Foreign Policy will generate intense developments in civil-military relations during the coming decade, in order to support Brazil's intention to climb to a higher level in its international commitments. The Brazilian position is characterized by its interest in activities geared to international peace and security and its predisposal to take part as an active player in the global decision-making process. In summary, the military and diplomats will have to continue their integrated efforts in order to create conditions which will lead Brazil to adopt higher strategic dimensions.

Despite its ongoing commitment of support for initiatives in international peace and security, the Brazilian government does not align itself automatically with all interventions of the United Nations. Its standard behavior is to evaluate the situation and compare it to the basic principles that are related to the tenets of article 4 of Brazil's Constitution of 1988, such as non-intervention, self-determination, and territorial integrity.¹⁰⁶

Based on this article, there are two central issues at stake with integrated efforts of the military-diplomatic capacities in matters of peacekeeping operations. The first one concerns the legal norms for deploying military forces. From official statements, it is clear that Brazil

¹⁰⁵ Michael Harbottle, *The Blue Berets* (London: Leo Cooper, 1975), 4. In addition, Brazil, Executive Office of the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, *National Defense Policy 1996* (Brasilia, DF: National Press, 1988), 8.

¹⁰⁶ Brazil, Executive Office of the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, *National Constitution 1998* (Brasilia, DF: National Press, 1988), 9.

considers present UN peace operation practices problematic, particularly the growing recourse to enforcement actions under Chapter VII to the United Nations Charter. Despite these restrictions, Brazil has affirmed that it is “working with a view to increasing substantially its participation in peacekeeping operations.”¹⁰⁷

For Brazil to participate in peacekeeping operations, one difficulty is the need to obtain parliamentary approval for troop deployment, a process that can be extenuated - up to a year. In addition, Angela Kuane suggests that it may explain why the latest deployments had been limited to the presence of military observers.¹⁰⁸ In response, efforts to streamline the approval process have been undertaken by the Armed Forces, supported by diplomatic service. Repeatedly, the National Congress has not worked efficiently in this area.

The second issue is Brazilian popular support. In the cases of East Timor (2000) and Haiti (2004), initially, public opinion was more concerned with domestic socio-economic problems and internal security than with the granting of full endorsement for the government to honour international commitments. Soon after the deployment of troops, both ministries – Defense and Foreign Affairs, promulgated a special information campaign which highlighted the relevance of Brazil’s contribution to international peace and security, showing cultural affinity, especially with East Timor, and humanitarian values. As a result, a poll that involved all segments of Brazilian society (politicians, teachers, academics, businessmen, students) granted an approval rating of a 73%.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Angela Kuane, “Other New and Emerging Peacekeepers,” in *Challenges For The New Peacekeepers*, SIPRI Research Report No.12. Edited by Trevor Findlay (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 115.

¹⁰⁸ Angela Kuane, “Other New and Emerging Peacekeepers,” ...,115

¹⁰⁹ The Brazilian Army, “The Army and the Peace Operations,” [document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/04Maoami/missaopaz/indice.htm>; Internet; accessed 14 November 2004. In addition, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Brazil and the International Agenda,” [document on-line]; available from http://www.mre.gov.br/portugues/politica_externa/agenda; Internet; accessed 14 November 2004.

Finally, substantial changes in Brazil's military-diplomatic relations occurred since the nation returned to civilian rule in 1985. The defense and foreign policies are the best example of this. Both policies have been developed through a frank and constructive national dialogue that recognizes the decision-making elite's responsibilities for political issues and the professional expertise of the military capacity in defense affairs. A fundamental step was done and it had established a national commitment to educate civilian professionals in strategic matters and the management of defense institutions, such as the Ministry of Defense. On the other hand, the end of any external menace from South American neighbours - Argentina was considered the greatest rival for most of the twentieth century - and the focus on the redefinition of new threats to the state (i.e. internal security) allowed for the military capacity to accept a new role in the post-Cold War environment: a vector of Brazil's regional integration and international insertion.

CHAPTER 5

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND POWER PROJECTION

In a democracy, a Defense Policy is not a problem for the military alone, it is also a problem for society and government. It is obvious that the Military is a very active part of that policy, but military policy and defense policy are two different things. The latter is subordinate to the country's definition of what it wants in the international arena. What are the security requirements that will enable Brazil to have an international presence within parameters mandated by its Constitution? Brazil has a Defense Policy, and this committee was established so we could have a strategic view of our objectives, and could attune our presence in the world knowing what our national interests are and how we are going to direct them.

*President Fernando Henrique Cardoso*¹¹⁰

5.1 DEFENSE UNDER CIVILIAN CONTROL

During the past two decades, the control of the defense of Latin America has moved decisively in favor of its civilians. Brazil is a successful example of this shift in the “balance of power.” The President of the Republic has legal control over his armed forces, and they honor that command. Generally speaking, Brazil’s military operates within the bounds of legal documents, especially the National Constitution 1988 and the National Defense Policy. Those laws have strengthened civilian-military relations on matters of defense.

Traditionally, the mission of the Armed Forces had been to defend the integrity of the Nation. The threats that affect the nation-state present an unknown set of circumstances and actions that demand, many times, answers that go beyond the use of military force. Thus, established systems of defense in terms of conventional war alone are not enough to neutralize varied non-orthodox threats, such as transnational terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla warfare and organized crime. As a consequence, the Brazilian Armed Forces have enlarged the sphere of their missions to include the guarantee of constitutional powers, the guarantee of the rule of law and the order, the assistance in the matter of National development and the provision of civilian defense. It also has to participate in international peacekeeping forces.¹¹¹

The National Defense Policy reflects Brazilian foreign policy, defining a new strategic posture means building a more reliable and responsible profile in the international community. Former President Cardoso’s administration clearly established a relevant innovation in the domain of military-diplomatic relations, which also led the way to the creation of the Ministry of Defense in 1999.

¹¹⁰ Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Statement of the President of Brazil on the Ceremony graduating at Superior War College, in Rio de Janeiro, RJ, on September 21, 1996, [document on-line], available on https://www.planalto.gov.br/publi_04/COLECAO/POLEXT16.HTM; Internet, accessed 22 January 2005

¹¹¹ Brazil, Executive Office of the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, *National Constitution* 1988 (Brasilia, DF: National Press, 1988), 82-83.

In this context of evolution, the Ministry of Defense was established to serve as a guide for preparing the military capacity in a manner that is aligned with the country's foreign policy. It also fulfills the integration of a "strategic vision of social, economic, military and diplomatic issues, which counts on the endorsement of the nation" – a concept supported wholeheartedly by the National Defense Policy, in order to build increased prestige for Brazil in the international arena.¹¹²

Based on this concept, the Ministry of Defense gives priority to the laying out of the strategic profile that Brazil desires to acquire in the global arena of the 21st Century. For that, the military capacity has been developing seminars, discussions, doctrines and technologies appropriate to the fulfilling of missions in internal and external arenas. For the purposes of this paper, only those points that are related to international insertion will be discussed.

The first point suggests bringing up to date the conceptual base of the national strategic view of world reality and the need for developing an understanding of the National Defense Policy.¹¹³

What is that civilians do not know, and for how long have they not known this?

Obviously, Brazilian political leaders have had considerable success at integrating and subordinating their military to civilian control, but they have done so without a fundamental knowledge of defense affairs. Such knowledge prepares politicians to ask questions pertaining to national interests, national objectives, priorities, threats, strategies, implementation, budgeting, doctrine, and education. According to Samuel Huntington, the author of *The Soldier and the State: Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, the requisite knowledge of defense is fundamental in this complex interaction.¹¹⁴

The monopoly that the armed forces exerted for long time (1964-1985) on matters of National Defense hindered the formation of a "culture of defense" in areas that should have had direct impact on the matter: in such places as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Congress. As a negative consequence, the politicians' ability to contribute new ideas was compromised. As well interest in defense affairs also was suppressed in the academic centers, universities and the mass media.¹¹⁵ In response, the Ministry of Defense has been developing some activities to strengthen civilian-military relations. It is actively disseminating fundamental knowledge about defense matters.

Initially, the Ministry of Defense led a revision of Brazil's military strategy with the purpose of redefining the military structure that the country requires in order to be well positioned in the international decision-making process. Secondly, in 2003, the Ministry of Defense promoted the update of the National Defense Policy in order to stimulate debate amongst the civilian population. As well it proposed an elaboration of the White Paper on Defense. As part of this process, the Ministry of Defense

¹¹² Delano Teixeira Menezes, *The Military and the Diplomat...*, 114-115.

¹¹³ Ministry of Defense, "Brazil and National Defense," [document on-line]; available from <http://www.defesa.gov.br>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

¹¹⁴ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 451.

¹¹⁵ Delano Teixeira Menezes, *The Military and the Diplomat...*, 61-65.

promoted a seminar, *Brazil and UN Peace Operations*, in Brasilia-DF, on November 2004, which involved the participation of members of the Armed Forces, academic centers and the diplomatic service.¹¹⁶

Finally, an excellent initiative from the federal government, sponsored by the Ministry of Defense, allowed journalists to travel in Brazilian Air Force planes, in order to visit the Brazilian contingents in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and in East Timor (UNAMET).

These opportunities enabled the national media to take part in peacekeeping operations as well as to have contact with the local population in both countries. The reports transmitted by the national media met with a very positive reaction from Brazilian society. As a result of this effort better integration was achieved among the Itamaraty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the Armed Forces and the national media.¹¹⁷

The second point focuses the consolidation of Brazil's role as promoting regional and hemispheric integration in defense matters, as well as expanding its influence in international forums, in order to enhance Brazil's position in the maintenance of international peace and security.¹¹⁸

Hemispheric integration continues to be a top priority in Brazilian foreign policy. In

support of its importance and the idea of cooperation in defense matters, the former Minister of Defense, Geraldo Quintao, stated:

The Ministry of Defense, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has furthered the dialogue with Argentina and Chile in the field of political strategy. Brazil has just finished establishing important mechanisms of bilateral cooperation in defense matters with these countries.¹¹⁹

In the context of hemispheric integration, Brazilian troops have participated in several UN peacekeeping missions together with troops from Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, such as those in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Furthermore, the Conferences of Ministers of Defense of the Americas, and the bilateral defense group meetings with

¹¹⁶ Ministry of Defense, "Brazil and National Defense," [document on-line]; available from <http://www.defesa.gov/enternet/sitios/internet/eacademico/index.php.br>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ministry of Defense, "Brazil and National Defense," [document on-line]; available from <http://www.defesa.gov/enternet/sitios/index.php.br>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004

¹¹⁹ Geraldo Quintao, "Defense, Diplomacy and the Brazilian Strategic Scene", lecture of the Minister of Defense at the Rio Branco Institute, in Brasilia, DF, on August 28, 2000, [document on-line], available on <https://www.defesa.gov.br/enternet/sitios/discursos.php>; Internet, accessed 22 January 2005.

Argentina and the United States, have led to the establishment of peacekeeping operations, particularly in the United Forces Exercises (Fuerzas Unidas), Cabanas and Southern Cross operations.¹²⁰

In the international arena, the meeting of the Ministers of Defense of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) and the Brazilian Technical-Military Cooperation Plan with the nations belonging to CPLP, through the Felino Exercises, reinforced Brazil's role in the international sphere. During the Guinea-Bissau crisis in October of 2004, Brazil, through its UN representation, actively participated in the discussions between the UN Security Council and the CPLP, so that the international community could support political and economic stability in Guinea Bissau.¹²¹

In order to support the operations in which Brazil participates and defends its national interests, the Itamaraty and the Armed Forces have worked together to increase Brazil's presence in different peacekeeping activities, especially in key posts, such as in the Department of Operations of the United Nations (DKPO) in New York. In 1998, Brazil was the fifth largest contributor of personnel, contributing seven army officers, and ranking behind the United States (11), France (10), Italy (9), and the United Kingdom (8).¹²²

Recently, an initiative of the Ministry of Defense, the President of the Republic adopted Provisional Amendment No.187 that gives authorization to Brazilian military personnel to receive remuneration from international organizations in which it participates or cooperates, making it possible to occupy important positions and also allow an expanded number of military troops as contributions to UN operations.¹²³

5.2 FORCE PROJECTION: THE BRAZILIAN ARMY AS A DIPLOMATIC VECTOR

¹²⁰ The Brazilian Army, "Operations and Training,"[document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/04Maoami/missaopaz/indice.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

¹²¹ The Brazilian Army, "Operations and Training,"[document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/04Maoami/missaopaz/indice.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

¹²² The Brazilian Army, "The Army and the National History: Participation in Peace Operations," [document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/04Maoami/missaopaz/indice.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004

¹²³ The Brazilian Army, "Army's News,"[document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/05Notici/Informex/2004/Infor018.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 March 2005.

The Army's Strategic Conception (SIPLEX -4) conceptualizes military strategies for adoption in the case of the need for the use of military force, these being dissuasion, power projection, offensive, independent action, alliance, and defense. These strategies are based on the Army's missions, under the National Constitution of 1988, to support Brazil's position in the international community and to honor its international commitments in multilateral forums.¹²⁴

For a long time, due to the political situation in the Southern Cone - a specific area in South America that embraces Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay - dissuasion and offensive strategies were priorities, and there was extensive military planning involving the deployment of troops in order to defend state sovereignty. The end of the rivalry between Brazil and Argentina and the establishment of MERCOSUL allowed Brazil to be part of a wider strategy of insertion that stressed its position as a medium-level power, and consequently moved the country towards more involvement and cooperation in Latin America.

Today, the power projection strategy has become an important contribution to international insertion, a major goal of Brazilian Foreign Policy. The Superior War College (ESG) defines power projection "as the process by which a nation can improve, by peaceful ways, its influence in the international decision-making system by employing the interrelated elements of its national power."¹²⁵

The Temporary Instructions (IP 124 – 1) STRATEGY – Edition 1993 – also defines power projection strategy as "military participation beyond its borders in situations that favor the increasing back-up of a country in the global sphere, for its own initiative or in the scope of international organisms, for maintenance or re-establishment of the international peace and security."¹²⁶ The American doctrine, on the other hand, states that power projection is "the capacity of applying all or part of the national power, in the varied fields, in response to crises to make contributions for dissuasion and to guarantee regional stability."¹²⁷ Based on this doctrine, the United States Army - as part of a joint or combined task force - contributes to this strategy

¹²⁴ The Brazilian Army, *The Army's Strategic Conception – SIPLEX 4* (Brasilia: Army's Library, 2000), 3-4.

¹²⁵ Ministry of Defense, Superior War College, *Doctrine Fundaments* (Rio de Janeiro: Army's Library, 1998), 62.

¹²⁶ The Brazilian Army, *The Temporary Instructions (IP-124-1) STRATEGY* (Brasilia: Army's Library, 1993), 8-12.

¹²⁷ Department of Defense, *Field Manual FM 3-0 Operations*, Department of the Army (Washington: June, 2001), 3-12.

through force projection. This is the ability for rapid alert, mobilization and deployment needed effectively to conduct operations wherever required in the international community.

Both definitions stress the role played by the military forces in this context. Primarily, the focus of the US Army doctrine is most appropriate for intervention through combat.

For the Brazilian Army, however, whose mission excludes any action or intervention in others' sovereign territory, force projection operations represent peaceful ways to exert influence in the international decision-making process, usually through peacekeeping operations. This requires an integrated effort involving diplomatic capacity to effectively project national power and achieve its national interests. Force projection is a complex process in which each capacity must influence the other, with the balance of cooperation being unspecified. It verifies, thus, that there are numerous challenges to overcome. By means of arduous training and coherent doctrine, the Brazilian Army will attempt to successfully face these challenges, standing out as an important vector of the Brazilian view of power projection into the international community through the conduct of effective peace operations.

These operations are based on the Charter of the United Nations, their purpose being to “keep the peace and the international security.”¹²⁸ According to the characteristics of operations that will be developed under the mandate of the Security Council, peace operations can be classified in specific modalities, these being preventive measures (i.e. preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping) and as repressive measures (i.e. peace enforcement).¹²⁹

Brazil, according to its Constitution, must not take part in operations classified as repressive measures. The only exception would be if there were to be a modification of the National Constitution 1988, an action which is highly unlikely. Brazil has, however, taken part in several peacekeeping missions as mentioned in Chapter 3. The

¹²⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *Charter of the United Nations...*, 3.

¹²⁹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping* (New York: UN, 1992), 10.

main missions for which the Brazilian Army should be ready, according to its Strategic Conception and based on the Power Projection, throughout the military capacity as a vector are:

- a. participation in international missions aimed at peace, pacification or maintenance;
- b. military assistance to neighboring nations aimed at contributing to regional security;
- c. participation in allied international forces aimed at containing regional violence.¹³⁰

In terms of international relations, with regard to Brazil, there is no defined military policy defined by the political capacity. The bridging of this gap by the armed forces has begun, and in terms of the army itself, the current Army Commander in his Command's Guidance 2003 indicated the priorities for military strategy in the coming decades.¹³¹

This document defines three terms for the Forces: today (short-term), tomorrow (medium-term), and the future (long-term). In the short-term, the document, aligned with National Defense Policy and the National Constitution 1988, recommends the needed operational preparation in order to contribute to peacekeeping missions. Army Commander General Francisco de Albuquerque, directs the General Army Staff in terms of the role the Brazilian Army should play in the international arena. The military leader maintains its role to be the following:

To act to establish and maintain representatives of the Brazilian Army and/or Armed Forces together with UN agencies those plans and supervise peace and humanitarian operations. The preparation for peacekeeping missions must be emphasized, for the participation of Army officers in command and vital functions in these missions is important.¹³²

In the medium term, the Brazilian military expect an increase in the capability to convince and dissuade. Therefore, in dealing with the long term, the Army Commander establishes new criteria for the force's preparation, advocating the need to increase military capability, in a progressive transition from the strategy of dissuasion to one of power projection. In his Guidance, Army Commander General

¹³⁰The Brazilian Army, *The Army's Strategic Conception – SIPLEX 4* (Brasilia: Army's Library, 2000), 3-4.

¹³¹ The Brazilian Army, "Operations and Training,"[document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/04Maoami/missaopaz/indice.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

¹³² Army General Francisco de Albuquerque, Brazilian Army Commander, "Commands' Guidance 2003"[document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2004.

Francisco de Albuquerque, also directs the General Army Staff in terms of the strategies of top priority:

The power projection is done throughout the participation in peacekeeping operations, whenever possible in accordance with national interest, and in conjunction with exercises and interchanges. The purpose would be to increase mutual confidence within Latin America and to project an image of Brazil as cooperative, efficient and trustworthy, in order to contribute to the maintenance of Latin America as a peaceful area. In this strategy we include both human and material resources in turn to create a strong force in the regional and intercontinental arena, while still maintaining Brazil's national interests.
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Based on this Command's Guidance, the Brazilian Army has as one of its aims the participation in peacekeeping missions for the undeniable benefits that it will bring for the institution and for the nation, and leading to the international insertion of Brazil. Moreover, such participation strengthens the Brazilian presence in the terms of international forums, such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States, honoring Brazilian commitment to worldwide security and peace.

So, how is the military capacity readied, organized, trained, and deployed to meet these commitments?

5.3 ENHANCING THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY OF THE ARMY

As explained in the Chapter 4, the military and diplomatic points-of-view are integrated in the National Defense Policy, which connects both foreign affairs and defense perspectives. During the debates concerning the establishment of this defense policy, in the period 1994-1995, the former Minister of the Army, General Zenildo de Lucena, developed some activities to support the diplomatic position envisaged by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luiz Felipe Lampreia.

First, the Brazilian Army established the embryo of the army of the future-which is comprised of professional soldiers devoted to external defense, based on deterrence capabilities and the readiness to execute rapid deployment for peacekeeping operations. Fundamentally, the

¹³³ Ibid.

greatest possible number of troops – peacekeepers and military observers - would be deployed abroad as part of peace operations, so they could acquire professional training and the motivation for personnel development.¹³⁴ During the period from 1994 to 1996, the Brazilian military took part in a several missions, such as ONUMOZ (Mozambique), ONUSAL (El Salvador), UNAVEM I-II –II (Angola), UNAMIR (Liberia), UNOMUR (Rwanda), UNPREDEP (Macedonian), UNPROFOR (ex-Yugoslavia), and UNFICYP (Cyprus), as mentioned before.

In this context, the 19th Infantry Motorized Battalion (19th BIMtz) was assigned, under control of the Command of Land Operations (COTER), as a peacekeeping battalion. Since then, the unit has been prepared to face conditions close to the realities peculiar to peacekeeping operations. The specific training consisted of preparatory instruction, such as fluency in foreign languages – English and Spanish, seminars about the Law of the Armed Conflict, lectures with the International Committee of Red Cross (CVIV) and multilateral peacekeeping exercises.¹³⁵

At the same time, Canada and the Netherlands then set up an informal group called the “Friends of Rapid Deployment” (FORD), which had as its objective the promotion of the idea of a UN rapid deployment brigade established by various powers. By the autumn of 1996, FORD had expanded to include twenty-six members. Brazil was one of those.¹³⁶ Clearly, peacekeeping operations have been playing an essential component in the military and diplomatic efforts of Brazil’s international insertion.

Since 1996, the Brazilian peacekeeping battalion has been participating in a several international exercises focusing on peacekeeping operations, such as Southern Cross Operations

¹³⁴ Army General Zenildo de Lucena, “The Brazilian Army Today,” ..., 7-13.

¹³⁵ The Brazilian Army, “Operations and Training,” [document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/04Maoami/missaopaz/indice.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

¹³⁶ Ronald M. Behringer, “Middle Level Power Leadership on Humah Security,” paper presented in *the Canadian Political Science Association* (Florida: University of Florida, US, 2003), 8.

(Argentina-1996, Brazil-1997 and Argentina-1998), Cabanas Operations (Argentina-2001), United Forces Exercises (Fuerzas Unidas, Paraguay-1998, Ecuador-2001 and Argentina-2003). Moreover, the 19th Infantry Motorized Battalion had rapidly deployed for United Nations missions on three separate occasions. In 2000, the battalion's troops were deployed to the United Nations Transitory Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and in 2002, the troops were deployed for the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET). In both instances, the personnel deployed were reduced (only 135 troops), but the successes of those missions were highlighted by the excellent technician-professional qualifications of the Brazilian troops performing in those peacekeeping operations.¹³⁷

The most recent deployment was to Haiti. The United Nations Mission of Stabilization in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been lead by Brazil. It commands 6,000 troops, including 1,200 Brazilian troops, in a UN multinational force which moved into Haiti after the violent overthrow of former President Jean Bertrand Aristide in 2003. The situation of "Lead Nation" conferred on Brazil enhanced status recognized in the context of the international community, at the same time that it assigned great responsibility to Brazilian forces for supporting and nurturing the process of peace and reconstruction of the failed country. Participation in Haiti has placed Brazil in 14th position in the ranking of military contributions to UN operations, as reported by the United Nations in February 2005.¹³⁸

¹³⁷ The Brazilian Army, "Operations and Training,"[document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/04Maoami/missaopaz/indice.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

In MINUSTAH, Brazilian military capacity was deployed into the area of operations in less than forty-five days after the United Nations Security Council Resolution No.1542, of 30 April 2004 was signed.¹³⁹

In June 15, 2004, a Brazilian Naval Task Force of four ships arrived in Port-au-Prince transporting 161 troops who joined MINUSTAH. It also transported 143 vehicles including armored personnel carriers, trucks, a number of containers and tons of supplies. Brazilians blue helmets joined the forty-nine staff officers and 192 soldiers and marines already on the ground. Also, in June 20, 800 additional troops arrived by air transport, concluding the Brazilian Brigade, the so-called Haiti Brigade. The Transfer of operational responsibility between the Multinational Interim Force and the UN peacekeepers took place on 25 June, 2004.¹⁴⁰

The Haiti Brigade has been touted as the best reference in leading that UN mission, as stated by the United States' Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld: "Brazilians can be proud of the leadership that Brazil is demonstrating in the region and across the globe."¹⁴¹ Since the first moment, the operational mission was carried out with excellence, and the military troops have been demonstrating enthusiastic, professional knowledge and high morale.

In response to this operational necessity, the Army's Strategic Conception (SIPLEX -4) in its "The Army's Transformation Project -2005," describes the creation of the peacekeeping brigade. This brigade is located in Rio de Janeiro and two infantry battalions, protective light armored vehicles and logistic support services compose it. The Peacekeeping Brigade, so-called

¹³⁹ Ibid. In addition, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, "Press Release", [document on-line]; available from <http://www.un.org/News/press/docs/2005.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2005.

¹⁴⁰ The Brazilian Army, "Operations and Training," [document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/04Maoami/missaopaz/indice.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

¹⁴¹ Donald Rumsfeld, "Brazil and MINUSTAH," an interview published by World News Designers Magazine, [document on-line]; available from <http://www.world.news.designerz.com>; Internet; accessed 26 March 2005.

9th Infantry Motorized Brigade must also concentrate all material resources that are necessary to carry out peace missions (the pre-packed equipment), in order to facilitate rapid deployment. The brigade would be supported by strategic air-and-sea lifts from the Brazilian Air Force and the Brazilian Navy. It means that the Brazilian Army has overarching strategic mission requirements: improved interoperability with other members of armed forces and, simultaneously, increased operational reach to rapidly respond to humanitarian crises in the global arena.¹⁴²

5.4 FINAL WORDS

In 1998, the Ministry of Defense was created to strengthen interaction between the military and civilian authorities. In the past years, the Ministry of Defense has been giving priority to the laying out of the strategic profile that Brazil desires to achieve as a global player in the international decision-making process, in accordance with Brazilian foreign policy. Furthermore, the military capacity has been developing seminars, discussions, review doctrines, plans for bi-lateral and multilateral cooperation, and the implementation of new military structures, which should deal successfully with all potential challenges facing it.

The capability of force projection represents a peaceful way to influence the international decision-making process, usually through peacekeeping operations. Why does Brazil participate in peacekeeping operations?

From Brazil's perspective, peacekeeping operations represent an incentive for the armed forces themselves: forces involved in peacekeeping receive valuable overseas experience during peacetime, and their contact with other military forces is an important catalyst for their becoming more professional.

Also, peacekeeping participation has even been a cogent argument for permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council due to an integrated effort by Brazilian diplomatic-military capacities to demonstrate both the necessary force projection capabilities for

¹⁴² The Brazilian Army, *The Army's Strategic Conception – SIPLEX 4* (Brasilia: Army's Library, 2000), 12. In addition, The Brazilian Army, "Army's News," [document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/05Notici/Informex/2005/Infor001.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 February 2005.

an active role in collective peace and security systems and a strong commitment to the mission statements of the United Nations with certain reservations.

Moreover, the Brazilian Army has shown growing interest in rapid deployment and has responded accordingly – force projection capability, albeit within the constraints imposed by the resources, as well as by the relatively tight budget set by the Brazilian government. The Brazilian Army has already pursued further specialization in rapid deployment to multilateral peacekeeping operations, based on Brazil's expertise and capabilities as demonstrated in Angola, Mozambique, East Timor, and more recently in Haiti.¹⁴³

For that, Brazilian soldiers, sailors, airmen integrated with the members of the Diplomatic Corps must continue their efforts to promote Brazil's hemispheric cooperation and international insertion, as well as preserve the current gains made in supporting democratization and peaceful presence in failed states. This paper suggests that over time their efforts will bring about collective security advancing stability and establishing an environment free from violence, violation against human rights and genocides for future generations. Peacekeeping operations, as an essential component of its foreign policy, are a good reason for investment in future defense buildup - focus on power projection - which should allocate a budget that realistically meets the Brazilian military needs and also Brazil's national interests while allowing increased funding for the solution of domestic problems like the eradication of poverty and the protection of the environment.

¹⁴³ The Brazilian Army, "Operations and Training," [document on-line]; available from <http://www.exercito.gov.br/04Maoami/missaopaz/indice.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The insertion of our troops in multinational forces of peacekeeping, under the aegis of multilateral organisms, strengthens Brazil's image as a nation committed to the peaceful solution of conflicts throughout negotiation and in accordance with our National Constitution. Moreover, this action reinforces Brazilian honoring of commitments to peace, security, cooperation and hemispheric stabilization.

Gen Francisco Roberto de Albuquerque¹⁴⁴

The post-Cold War period has been characterized by the redefinition of the international order, the resurgence of democracy and the geopolitics of economic blocs. As a result, new middle-level powers are emerging in the global arena, striving to assert their national capacities involving the political, the economical, the technological and the military, looking for more integration and cooperation within the international community.

Brazil's capacities as a political, economic, and military leader within Latin America, make it a pivotal state. It is arguably the leading force – not in charge but certainly a strong and much respected leadership example- in the subregion (South America) for several reasons. First, it geographically dominates South America as the largest country in area – it is more than twice as large as the second largest country, Argentina. Second, Brazil is ranked in the 12th largest economy in the world, far outpacing Argentina (ranked 25th), and just behind NAFTA member Mexico (ranked 10th). Third, Brazil is a leading force within the Common Market of the South – or MERCOSUL. It sees itself as a subregional hegemony in pursuit of future continental hegemony through an expanded economic bloc. Fourth, it also leads Latin America demographically, with over 170 million people, thus making it the fifth largest country in the world.

¹⁴⁴ Army General Francisco Roberto de Albuquerque, Brazilian Army Commander, "The Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti," interview published by [Defesa@Net](http://www.defesenet.com.br) Review [document on-line]; available from <http://www.defesenet.com.br/haiti>; Internet; accessed 23 March 2005.

Fifth, Brazil possesses the largest active duty military force in Latin America – second within Americas behind the United States – with almost 300,000 personnel in service. Brazil's military has been transformed from a strictly conventional force into a versatile one that has garnered much peacekeeping experience over the last decade, thus gaining even more respect from other military groups in the region. Those activities have been developing in strict accordance with Brazilian diplomacy's principles: regional integration and international cooperation. Besides, Brazilian peacekeepers have been projecting the unconditional support for an international peace and security system, in which the United Nations must play a vital role.

In this context, most of its peacekeeping efforts have been concentrated in the former Portuguese colonies such as Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, in Africa, and most recently, in East Timor, in Asia. As a result of that, Brazil's has launched the diplomatic initiative for establishing the Community of the Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) - as a multilateral forum for cooperation, integration, and international projection, which is composed of Angola, Brazil, Cabo Verde, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal and San Tome and Principe.

This paper has demonstrated that one Brazilian diplomatic priority involves nations in the Southern Cone of South America (especially Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay). The integration with the all members of the MERCOSUL has been expanded elsewhere in matters of peacekeeping activities, missions and exercises. Both the missions established in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and in Haiti (MINUSTAH), were noted and characterized as integrated efforts, which have been developed by diplomatic-military cooperation. Also close to home, Brazil was instrumental – along with Argentina, Chile and the United States – in the very successful

peacekeeping operation that was established to oversee the cease-fire agreement that ended a brief 1995 border conflict between Peru and Ecuador.

In the period from 1997 to 2001, several peacekeeping exercises, such as Cabanas and Southern Cross Operations, have been achieving better integration among troops from Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay. Actually, peace force training continues with the participation of almost all South American countries and the United States under the name Fuerzas Unidas (United Forces). These peacekeeping exercises focused on the goal of preparing forces for United Nations missions and provide unique opportunities for military-to-military interaction, enhanced interoperability, and invaluable training for both partner nations and Brazil. Of course, the most important aim: they are building good hemispheric cooperation and promoting transparency, understanding, trust, and a sharing of democratic values.

This paper has elicited many detailed facts to support Brazil's position as a global player in the international arena. Most people in North America know little about Brazil's interests, and its determination to be re-positioned in this new world order. A permanent seat on the UN Security Council should be one reward for the middle-level power leadership that Brazil has demonstrated in Latin America. This Brazilian ambition is fostered in order for Brazil to achieve greater international recognition for what it has done although Brazil must continue to strive for improve economic conditions and efforts to integrate diplomatic-military objectives.

Finally, the integration efforts to develop cooperation between diplomatic and military capacities provide for the sharing of information, ideas, interests and concerns. Evidently, the Brazilian Armed Forces have a primary duty to protect the territorial integrity, the safety and rights of Brazilians citizens. However, the peacekeeping operations will remain an essential component to strengthen integration, promote cooperation, expand influence and build a better

and more peaceful world. This is the most astute way to address the challenges of the 21st Century.

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Brazilian Army

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