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REVOLUTIONARY ENDS THROUGH REVOLUTIONARY MEANS

Understanding Transformation from a Canadian Context

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ABSTRACT

There is widespread agreement in Canada that the Canadian Forces need to change in order to remain relevant in the 21st Century. Military transformation has been brought to the forefront of CF thinking and planning. However, there remains considerable ambiguity concerning what transformation actually entails and how it should best be achieved. Canada's history contains examples of transformation in a military context. These have equated to radical change, implemented by ministerial decree, within a short period of time. Bureaucratic politics and highly centralized civilian control of the military in Canada serve to explain much of this tendency.

This paper argues that the CF must pursue revolutionary change through a revolutionary approach. It amounts to seeking radical change in the CF in as short a time as practical using an approach that integrates other government departments and agencies far more than ever done in the past. This overall strategy, being consistent with historical precedent and tailored to the unique characteristics of how defence policy comes to be in Canada, offers the best opportunity for success at transformation.

INTRODUCTION

A half-generation has gone by since the end of the Cold War. During this period,

two factors have enlightened Canada's military of the need to *transform*

why – as they pertain to transformation) and have a concept of operations that explains *how* that mission will be achieved. Thus, like a military operation, it must be clear within the military, government and the wider society, what the CF is trying to achieve and how it plans to get there.

Military Change – The Academic Debate

The idea of military transformation, as a concept in its own right, is relatively new. It was first introduced in 1997 within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) *Quadrennial Defense Review*.[1] However, it was only following the events of September 11, 2001 that it assumed momentum in U.S. military circles and subsequently, many other militaries. Strong rhetoric by key U.S. authorities, namely Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, and a steady stream of related policy has propelled transformation into the forefront. Despite its popularity though, it has only begun to be studied in detail. That said, it nonetheless falls within the broader notion of military change – a subject that has been studied considerably.

There is a wide body of literature that examines, to some extent or another, the idea of change in a military context. Most authors speak specifically to military change

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[1] Richard O. Hundley, *Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: What can the history of revolutions in military affairs tell us about transforming the U.S. military?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), xxi.

or some other synonymous term (innovation, reform, modernization, revolution and, most recently, transformation) as their subject. Other authors have chosen civil-military relations as their area of examination and, in doing so offer arguments or conclusions pertaining to military change. This approach is particularly the case with studies that compare different nations and the success or failure of their civil-military relationships. Lastly, there is the field of literature that looks at organizational change in its modern context. These works are almost entirely devoted to the civilian business world with only the exception focussed on military organizations. Taken as a whole, the study of military change is inter-disciplinary in nature and thus, one has to study various subject areas to gain an appreciation of how military change has been examined in the academic realm. It is also important to note that different studies may have the same subject but approach it from distinct perspectives. So, for example, military innovation can be studied by focussing on the military as an organization, the nation and its relationship with its military or change as a process. The overall point to be made is that summarizing the actual debate is not a simple and straightforward task.

It is here, once again, that the notion of a mission (the who, what, where, when and why) and a concept of operations (the how) prove useful. Using this construct, it is possible to summarize the debate in a manner sufficient to allow the reader to gain an appreciation for the main arguments and conclusions as they relate to military change.

Consider the *who* part of the mission – that is to say, who carries out military change? The literature is grouped into three main categories. The first are those who focus on the importance of military leaders and thinkers in bringing about change. Some authors who have written about the concept of military transformation, such as Hans

Binnendijk and Richard O. Hundley, fall into this category.[2] While they recognize that there are other authorities outside the military who are likely to *influence* change, it is those within the organization that are key to its success or failure. Other writers argue that it is both those in the military and in government that are critical to implementing change. Geoffrey Parker is firmly in this school of thought.[3] Lastly, other academics take a much broader view of change and argue that, in addition to military leaders and political authorities, society in general, both domestic and international, plays a role in military change. Michael Howard is included in this group.[4] Thus, in regard to *who* is the driving force behind military change, the answer depends on whom you read. This observation is less of an issue when it comes to understanding *what* is meant by military change.

There are two broad poles in the debate on *what* military change constitutes. Change can be either evolutionary or revolutionary. Murray Davies describes evolutionary change as that change which is small and subtle in scope and pursued in a

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[2] See Hundley, *Past Revolutions, Future Transformations* and Hans Binnendijk, *Transforming America's Military*, ed. Hans Binnendijk (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002).

[3] See Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern* Military (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

[4] Michael Howard, "The Armed Forces as a Political Problem," in *Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Michael Howard, 9-24 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959), 12-13.

"gradual and ordered" manner.[5] Conversely, revolutionary change is "dramatic and

chaotic", often catching an organization by surprise.[6] Most writers, however, who study

military change are concerned with change that is far from that which could be

considered routine. Various words are used to describe the scope of such change: broad,

major, significant, radical, revolutionary. Rosen describes a *major innovation* as a

change in how a primary combat arm may fight or "the creation of a new combat arm."[7]

Bryon Greenwald defines *military modernization* as "an action that represents a new and

improved method or procedure for doing business and implies a clear break with the

practices of the past."[8] In nearly all cases, the debate on military change is concerned

with major or radical change rather than the routine.

Ignoring the *where* aspect of the mission, which is not pertinent in the context of

understanding military change, one is then led to consider *when* militaries change. In this

regard, the debate is far from absolute. Some writers, such as Greenwald suggest that

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[5] Murray Davies, *Commanding Change: War Winning Military Strategies for Organizational Change* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 15.

[6] Davies, *Commanding Change*, 15.

[7] Rosen, *Winning the Next War*, 7.

[8] Bryon E. Greenwald, *The Anatomy of Change: Why Armies Succeed or Fail at Transformation*, Land Warfare Paper No. 35 (Arlington, VA.: Association of the United States Army, Institute of Land Warfare, September 2000), 19.

there are times when military organizations are more likely to change than would

otherwise be the case. For example, just following a defeat or success on the battlefield

or, alternatively, just prior to an impending conflict.[9] Others, such as Geoffrey Parker are

far less specific. His analysis of how some European nations revolutionalized warfare in

the 16th and 17th centuries and then went on to dominate much of the world spans a

considerably long period in history.[10] Parker's focus is not on determining when

militaries changed but rather that they did or did not and the ensuing impacts that such

change brought. The point, as it pertains to *when* militaries change, is that it depends on

the military organization at hand. Davies notes that, given the same catalyst for change,

some militaries will change sooner than others.[11] This situation implies that there are

different reasons for change as well.

Perhaps the most intriguing question at hand is *why* do militaries change. In this

respect, the academic debate seems to focus on three separate explanations. Michael

Howard, in his book *Soldiers and Governments*, argues that military change is a product

of how societies balance their peacetime desires with their need for security.[12] In this

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[9] Greenwald, *The Anatomy of Change*, 14-15.

[10] See Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[11] Davies, *Commanding Change*, 30.

[12] Howard, "The Armed Forces as a Political Problem," 22-24.

case, there might exist an obvious need for a military to change, but if it was not deemed

to be of necessity by society at large, a military would be unlikely to or incapable of

change. In contrast to that explanation, the majority of authors on the subject,

particularly those who have written on military transformation specifically, argue that the

catalyst for military innovation is a major change in the nature of warfare. Binnendijk,

for example, defines military transformation as "the act of creating and harnessing a

revolution in military affairs."[13] Military organizations, because they desire victory over

defeat, will be driven to change if they envision a major change in the nature of warfare

or are capable of implementing their own. Still, there are other academics, such as

Rosen, who emphasize the international security environment in which militaries have to

fight as being the major reason for change.[14] Rosen is less concerned with the specific

capabilities or intentions of a potential adversary than with the structural environment, as

determined by politics, economics and technology, within which militaries will have to

fight. Generally speaking, these three explanations summarize *why* militaries change.

Summarizing *how* they choose to implement change is far less clear-cut.

In the debate on *how* to implement change within the military, no straightforward

camps exist. While it would be desirable to suggest that there are two or three main

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[13] Binnendijk, *Transforming America's Military*, xvii.

[14] Rosen, *Winning the Next War*, 75.

schools of thought on the matter, the reality is that there are no obvious paths to follow. Rosen emphasizes this fact in his own review of the debate: "…different organizations will handle innovation very differently."[15] Davies stresses this same point when he warns against one organization copying the change approach used by another.[16] Notwithstanding the lack of generic schools of thought, there is benefit to outlining some of the key factors that have been raised as being important when discussing *how* change can be implemented.

The first area to consider in this regard incorporates those organizational factors that serve to enable or facilitate change. First, there is relative agreement that some sort of system that affords the opportunity to experiment with and evaluate new operational concepts is important to bringing about change. Similarly, the ability to establish new promotion pathways for young officers advocating a new way of warfare is seen by many as critical to successful change.[17] Not only does this reward and protect key architects of change but it can also serve to extend the continuity amongst those implementing change – both necessary factors according to Greenwald.[18] Lastly, the establishment of a special

[15] Rosen, *Winning the Next War*, 5.

[16] Davies, *Commanding Change*, 125-126.

[17] Rosen, *Winning the Next War*, 251.

[18] Greenwald, *The Anatomy of Change*, 15-16.

branch or office to implement change could also be important, particularly when the change goes against the "deeply rooted cultural characteristics" of the organization and its services.[19] In addition to these structural considerations are intellectual ones that also help to bring about military change.

There is widespread agreement that a military organization must be able to see into the future and either, picture the next war or as Rosen argues, anticipate a change in the structural environment within which war will be fought.[20] This requirement can be considered as the starting point to the entire process of change. Hundley adds another intellectual capacity – a "receptive organizational climate" that encourages and supports debate.[21] This climate is important as it questions the status quo and introduces new ideas into the organization. Lastly, the capability to translate the intellectual debate into operational concepts is also fundamental as it enables experimentation and evaluation. In simple terms, these intellectual capabilities permit the organization to turn words into deeds, a necessity for change. The next grouping of factors to consider involves the leadership of the organization.

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[19] Paul K. Davis, "Integrating Transformation Programs," in *Transforming America's Military*, ed. Hans Binnendijk, 193-218 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), 201.

[20] Rosen, *Winning the Next War*, 75.

[21] Hundley, *Past Revolutions, Future Transformations*, 55.

Despite the wide spectrum of thought regarding *how* militaries change, if there was one universally accepted requirement it would somehow be related to leadership. Davies, who argues that change can be "commanded", stresses the pivotal role that leaders play in bringing about change in an organization.[22] Rosen is of similar mind when, speaking about innovation in the US submarine forces during World War II, states that "innovation depended entirely on the character of the commanders of individual units."[23] However, it is probably Harold Winton who best captures the necessity for leadership:

> … just as the danger, chance, uncertainty, and privation of combat demand a genius for war, so also the ambiguities and complexities of peacetime military change demand a genius for adaptation.[24]

Winton argues that this genius must be well versed in the military art to have acquired the "*coup d'oeil*" necessary to understand fully the nature and impact of war in the future as well as the courage and persuasive ability to see change through to its end.[25] Clearly, leadership is a central requirement is any approach to change.

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[22] Davies, *Commanding Change*, 75.

[23] Rosen, *Winning the Next War*, 253.

[24] Harold R. Winton, "On Military Change," in *The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities,1918-1941*, eds. Harold R. Winton and David R Mets, xi-xix, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), xv.

[25] Ibid., xvi.

The last theme to discuss refers to the length of time taken in which to implement change. There are some authors who argue that military change is a process that occurs over the long-term. Certainly those, such as Rosen and Hundley, who relate the importance of new promotion pathways to successful change, are implying that such change occurs over a lengthy period. Conversely though, there are others, such as Davies, who make a clear case that it can occur rather rapidly as well.[26] In terms of the timeframe for change, there is no simple answer.

It is therefore evident that, just as the concept of military change is complex, so too is the academic analysis concerning it. There is no quick and simple way to summarize the debate pertaining to military change. One can find some areas of agreement or common thought regarding specific aspects of the subject but in other areas there can be a wide spectrum separating arguments or conclusions on the same issue. Each military organization approaches change in a different way and no two paths followed are likely to be identical. With this in mind, how does one begin to consider the appropriate strategy for the CF to follow in its pursuit to transformation?

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[26] Davies, *Commanding Change*, 15-16.

Effecting Military Change in the CF

Current CF transformation policy provides a logical starting point. In the 2003-

2004 Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Annual Report, the former CDS provides the

following explanation regarding the nature of and approach to CF transformation:

> The transformation process is evolutionary and has no definable end state.
> Transformation focuses on people, technology, ways of conducting operations
> and ways of thinking. It does not seek to re-structure the CF completely, or re-
> equip it….[27]

This description clearly denotes a measured approach over the long-term with the intent

to bring about, gradually, some measure of change across the breath of the military

establishment in Canada. Accordingly, this method could be described as an

evolutionary strategy. Yet, the recent appointment of General R.J. Hillier as CDS casts

some doubt on whether evolutionary accurately reflects the desired approach.

The new CDS assumed his role with a mandate for change. Acting with the

support of the Minister of National Defence (MND) and, presumably, the Prime Minister

(PM), the CDS has articulated his new vision for the CF and has already taken action to

steer the CF in this new direction. In both his words and deeds, Hillier appears to be

focussed on implementing radical change in as short a time period as achievable. This

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[27] Canada, Department of National Defence, *Making Choices: Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 2003-2004*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2004), 3. Available online at: http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/reports_e.asp

view would represent a revolutionary strategy towards transformation. What still remains unclear though is which strategy is the most appropriate to pursue?

The answer to this question is that the CF requires a revolutionary strategy. Military change in the CF, from a historical perspective, has always been revolutionary. This change was radical in nature, imposed by civilian authorities and implemented within a relatively short period of time. The study of how defence policy is made in Canada explains the historical tendency and also provides the two key practicalities that must be understood in adopting a revolutionary approach to military change in Canada. First, policy is created in a milieu of bureaucratic politics and if the CF intends to implement wide sweeping change, it will need broad support across government. Second, civilian control over the military in Canada is the deciding factor in any defence policy decision. Together, these two realities, if not somehow accommodated, will challenge or, even prevent, the CF in its attempt to transform. Therefore, this paper makes the case for advocating a revolutionary strategy for CF transformation that accommodates these realities of defence policy in Canada. In essence, this amounts to implementing radical change, in a relatively short period of time, using an approach that integrates other government departments and agencies far more than ever done in the past.

Military transformation is a challenge of tremendous scope and complexity. The approach taken by the CF to achieve it must be appropriate to the nature of the goals desired and suited to the make-up of civil-military affairs in Canada. In order to be successful, the CF must adopt a strategy of transformation that seeks revolutionary change through a revolutionary approach.

CANADIAN FORCES HISTORICAL RECORD

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Rather, it has been relatively rare and is best characterized as radical and revolutionary in both its intent and approach.

The Changing Nature of Warfare – Catalyst for Change

The change brought about by William Frederick Borden, Canada's Minister of Militia from 1896 to 1911 was precipitated by a change in warfare. While the appalling state of the militia may have been the catalyst for Borden's initial changes, it was in fact the South African War that brought out his most significant and lasting reforms. The war had shown that "the concept of a nation-in-arms, or a citizen army, replaced the barrack formula for professional military training."[28] This realization radically reshaped defence thinking in Canada. Canada's contribution to the defence of the empire could be met by maintaining a small core of military professionals that could be called upon to train citizen soldiers when required.

Recognizing this state of affairs, Borden instituted the Militia Act of 1904 to bring Canadian soldiers under Canadian command and set up a Militia Council in order to bring a greater degree of civilian control over defence matters. He also dramatically altered the militia by creating a number of specialized service corps (medical,

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[28] Carmen Miller, "Sir Frederick William Borden and Military Reform, 1896-1911," in *Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century*, eds. B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock, 9-18 (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1993), 11.

engineering, ordnance, signals, pay, etc.). In fact, some suggest today that he "deserves much of the credit for the creation of the structure of a self-contained army."[29] It is somewhat ironic that nearly a half-century later Brooke Claxton faced the problem of integrating what amounted to three "self-contained" military services.

There is no doubt that Claxton's initial and drastic cutbacks were a direct response to the ending of the war and the domestic desire to introduce and expand social programs. Notwithstanding, the subsequent build up of Canada's military was a result of entirely new conflicts – the Cold War and Korea. Modern weaponry now included nuclear weapons and the means by which to deliver such weapons over long distances. In addition, the United Nations and creation of NATO brought about the ideas of collective security and defence commitments in support of international security. These developments made the nature of war in the future far more complex and caused Claxton to take action to make Canada's military more manageable, from a political viewpoint, and better structured to deal with the changes he was witnessing.

Claxton's response was to embark on wide sweeping change. He consolidated responsibility for DND in a single minister/deputy minister (DM) team, he reorganized

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[29] Miller, "Sir Frederick William Borden and Military Reform, 1896-1911," 11. It is worthy to note that it was Major-General E.T. Hutton, General Officer Commanding, who first developed this concept and suggested it to Borden. See Richard A. Preston, *Canada and 'Imperial Defense': A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defense Organization, 1867-1919* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967), 251.

both the Cabinet Defence Committee (CDC) and the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and created the position of Chairman of the COSC. The effect of these moves was to create a more "integrated structure in Ottawa, bringing the civilian policy-makers who set defence policy together with the military leaders who execute[d] it."[30] By the end of his time as MND, Claxton "… had given Canada's military an organizational direction and structure that, with few changes, would endure for almost two decades."[31] In effect, Claxton's actions were a response to the increasing complexity and collectiveness of warfare. By establishing a greater degree of civilian control over the military, he was in a position to better manage the increasing costs of maintaining military forces.

Where Claxton left off, Paul Hellyer began. His initial focus was to overcome the internal bureaucracy that was stifling the CF's ability to become cost effective. That said, he was poignantly aware that the "absence of a single commanding voice" was hampering and in cases, preventing, effective coordination and integration amongst the services.[32] Hellyer, in this regard, was convinced that the services were not keeping up

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[30] David Jay Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 162.

[31] Ibid., 174.

[32] Douglas Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947-1985* (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Company, 1987), 38.

with the changing nature of warfare as related to "combined operations".[33] Clearly ahead

of his time, Hellyer recognized that success on the battlefield of the future required the

separate military services to act in unison toward a common objective. In this light, he

set about to unify Canada's military.

The scope of Hellyer's reforms was immense in the context of Canada's relatively

small military. In instituting the position of CDS, he created a single authoritative

military advisor to government thereby curtailing the divergent power of the three service

chiefs. He unified the CF's command structure, gave it its own headquarters (CFHQ) and

organized it along functional rather than operational lines. He also returned the

formulation of defence policy back to the civilian authorities in government. In all,

"Hellyer had changed the fundamental nature of civil-military relations in Canada and not

merely the organization of the Canadian Forces."[34] It represented a complete

modernization of the bureaucracy and organization of defence in Canada.

The last case to consider is that of Doug Young during the mid-1990s. While

change was undoubtedly occurring in the military on account of government cost cutting

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[33] Paul Hellyer, *Damm the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada's Armed Forces* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1990), 41. Note that Hellyer uses *combined operations* to refer to operations where two or more services work together under single command. In the present day context, this would be referred to *joint operations*.

[34] Douglas Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), 87.

measures, the transformation of the CF by the events of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia was more profound. This infamous operation clearly showed how the CF was ill-prepared for operations abroad and, in particular, the realities of peace-support missions in the post-Cold War era. The belief that forces highly trained for combat could simply downgrade their efforts to meet the needs of a peace-support mission was proven inadequate. Berel Rodal, in his study of the CF prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Somalia deployment argued that "[t]he validity of 'lesser case included' [could] no longer be assumed."[35] The CF had failed to keep up with the changing nature of warfare.

In response to the ensuing fallout of Somalia, Doug Young implemented change that was both radical and expansive. He introduced reforms related to discipline, leadership, ethics, professional development and education, rank structures, conditions of service, operations, planning, training, and military justice among other areas. The entire functioning and culture of the Canadian Forces was reworked. In many ways, it represented a return to the basics of military organization and a point from which to start anew.

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[35] Berel Rodal, *The Somalia Experience in Strategic Perspective: Implications for the Military in a Free and Democratic Society*, Study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997), 48.

In each case from Canada's history, military change came about, either principally or partly, on account of a change in the nature of warfare. While certainly other pressures contributed, it was what had been learned about warfare or was being anticipated that resulted in the most significant and enduring change. It is also evident that reforms to the military were radical and broad in scope. Clearly, these are not cases of evolutionary change. Lastly, the timeframe in which change was effected was relatively discreet in that it was associated with one minister's tenure rather than a string of ministers. In other words, the time required to implement radical change in the CF has been relatively short. How short can often depend on the external factors that influence military change.

Society and the Structural Environment – External Influences

Even though CF transformation in the past was connected to a change in the nature of warfare, the impetus was insufficient for implementing radical change. Such change is significantly influenced by societal pressures at home, as well as the changing makeup of the international environment within which nations exist. Both factors have the ability to force a minister (as well a military organization) to introduce change or to back away from doing so. In the Canadian experience, it has been the former that has been most prevalent.

Consider the period when Frederick Borden became Minister of the Militia. It was a time when Canadians were far from concerned about defence matters. The threat of an American invasion had subsided and British regular forces had mostly withdrawn from Canada, transferring the responsibility of defence to Canada. Domestically, it was a period of "[t]ranquility and [t]ransition" where "Canadians soon lost interest in the

apparatus of defence."[36] In contrast, the imperial scene was demanding more effort from

Canada as it pertained to the defence of the empire. This demand was apparent in the

lead up to Canada's participation in the South African War but also London's requests to

have Canada take over the responsibilities of the British garrisons in Halifax and

Esquimalt and contribute a military force for service in India.[37] Thus, Borden faced

competing pressures and had to attempt to balance the imperial want for more with the

domestic desire for less.

Claxton too was faced with a growing predicament – how to maintain military

effectiveness while slashing costs. David Bercuson describes the dilemma as such:

"Claxton's responsibility to King was clear and simple – consolidate and save money –

but his duty to the nation was to maintain a viable defence establishment."[38] At home,

domestic pressure was driving military change. Claxton had to cut Canada's massive

war-based military establishment in order to make money available to pay for social

programs.[39] Juxtaposed against this situation was a growing international demand for

Canadian defence commitments by the United Nations, NATO, the Korean War and the

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[36] C.P. Stacey, *The Military Problems of Canada: A Survey of Defence Policies and Strategic Conditions Past and Present* (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1940), 62.

[37] Miller, "Sir Frederick William Borden and Military Reform, 1896-1911," 14.

[38] Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 159.

[39] Ibid., 154.

defence of North America. Claxton was unable to solve the dilemma under Prime

Minister King who had introduced a post-war policy of isolationism and was unbending

in matters of foreign relations and defence.[40] It was not until the election of Louis St.

Laurent in 1949 that Claxton, with the support of a more internationally focussed PM,

was able to implement his plans. About a decade later, Paul Hellyer would build on

Claxton's accomplishments.

Paul Hellyer began his term as MND in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile crisis

when the actions of Canada's service commanders contributed to the downfall of the

Diefenbaker government.[41] The military had lost the trust of government and in

response, the Liberal government was intent on seeing a greater degree of control placed

on those in uniform. Furthermore, demands grew to produce economies in defence

spending, particularly in procurement but also in administering three separate services.

Internationally, Canada was witnessing NATO change significantly in support of its

strategy of "flexible response". This requirement not only contributed to the

government's overall challenges with respect to defence but exasperated Hellyer's

dismay with the services. While NATO was changing to be prepared for both

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[40] James Eayrs, *In Defence of* Canada, vol. 3, *Peacemaking and Deterrence* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 13.

[41] Desmond Morton, "The Political Skills of a Canadian Officer Corps," in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, eds. Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris (St. Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 369.

conventional *and* nuclear war, Canada was without a single strategy of its own. Each service was preparing for a different war. In Hellyer's words, "[T]he air force was anticipating a quick thermonuclear war, the army a protracted conventional one and the navy, a little bit of both.[42] These domestic and international factors added significant impetus to Hellyer's ability to force change upon the military.

A generation later, Doug Young faced similar circumstances. The domestic political climate facing Young as MND was one where the government's intent was to harness public spending and a spiralling deficit. It could also be argued that it was a period that sought to check DND, particularly in the aftermath of the Somalia Affair. Beyond the downsizing, rationalization, reorganization and cost cutting that typified the period, events in the world of military operations were changing dramatically. The Soviet threat had collapsed and Western militaries were without a real mission. The traditional concept of peacekeeping was changing and operational tempo was higher than it had ever been in the past. The structured international environment of the Cold War had dissipated. As in the past, pressures at home and abroad influenced a minister to embark upon implementing radical change in the CF.

In summary, both the domestic situation facing the government as well as the demands of the international arena were powerful influences on the minister of the day.

[42] Hellyer, *Damm the Torpedoes*, 33.

Whether it was in deciding to pursue radical change or in deciding how far to take such change, both these factors are driving forces. In fact, it is these two factors that will ultimately shape the timeframe within which revolutionary change is accomplished. Historical experience shows that it is only occasionally that a minister is provided the latitude necessary to institute wide sweeping change. Thus, when the opportunity presents itself, generally once or twice a generation, it must be seized and completed relatively quickly.

Civilian Authority and Leadership – The Driver of Change

Any effort to institute radical change in an organization requires strong leadership. In the case of military transformation in Canada, it has historically been the MND that has spearheaded the role of changing the military. While it would be naive to believe that senior military leaders had little to do with implementing change, it has been the experience in Canada that military change has more to do with ministerial decree than forward thinking military leaders. This theme is fundamental in Canadian defence matters, namely civilian control over the military.

Frederick Borden, a medical doctor and politician from Nova Scotia, had strong views on defence matters prior to taking office. This background not only made him knowledgeable on military issues but it also permitted him to use effectively authoritative

rule when required. Upon assuming office, he very quickly established his authority, firmly insisting that regular regiments concentrate on training the militia. This decision not only went against the recommendation of his General Officer Commanding (GOC), a British professional officer, but was also at odds with ten years of effort by the previous GOC to create a shadow regular army under the guise of Canada's militia.[43] Borden often ignored the advice of senior officers and when challenged, did not hesitate to dismiss some, as was the case with two of his GOCs, Hutten and Dundonald.

Having set the tone for change, Borden embarked on implementing more fundamental changes in a persistent and sometimes cunning manner. For example, Borden sold his idea of the Militia Council on the fact that he was merely bringing the British model to Canada. Yet, under closer examination, the council had the same façade but far less independent authority than its British counterpart. Evidently, as Stephen Harris points out, Borden could be politically cunning: "Borden had not followed the British precedent exactly, and he knew it."[44] Borden knew exactly what changes he wanted and imposed his will on military authorities – both Canadian and Imperial.

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[43] Stephen J. Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 32.

[44] Ibid., 73.

Brooke Claxton was also known for his views on defence prior to assuming the role of MND. Once he became minister, he was under no false pretences when it came to his ideas of change. Claxton admitted: "[t]here would be bitter and biased opposition to anything I did."[45] His approach to change was rational, focussed and systematic over time. He started with small reforms, such as co-locating all three service chiefs within one building and finished with far more encompassing ones. Claxton's appointment of Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes as Chairman of the CSOC was one of his "most important and most astute" decisions.[46] This move foreshadowed the eventual creation of the Chief of the Defence Staff under Paul Hellyer some years later. In the course of leading change, Claxton also questioned the advice of his military advisors and made clear that he would not tolerate public dissent from senior military circles:

> Brooke Claxton … emphatically warned the chiefs of staff that 'I am all for silent soldiers as well as sailors,' and he threatened to remove any officer who 'was not content to express his opinions in private.'[47]

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[45] Brooke Claxton, Claxton Memoirs, vol IV, Claxton Papers, National Archives of Canada, 831 quoted in Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 153.

[46] Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 224.

[47] Brooke Claxton, Claxton Memoirs, vol. 221, Claxton Papers, National Archives of Canada, quoted in Douglas L. Bland, *Who Decides What? Civil-Military Relations in Canada and the United States*, Canadian-American Public Policy, no. 41 (Orono, ME: The Canadian-American Center, February 2000), 26.

Supporting this determined approach was the ability to envision where the military needed to go in the future. Claxton personally developed the first makings of a post-war defence policy with his memorandum entitled "Observations on the Defence Needs of Canada" in February 1947.[48] He also drove and coordinated much of the reorganization and expansion of the military by himself. He worked very long hours and made use of a large personal staff to assist in this regard.[49] In all accounts, Claxton was the driving force behind military change. His determination and personal involvement were indicative of a MND who was intent on bringing about revolutionary change in a short period of time. Paul Hellyer, some years later, would demonstrate similar qualities as MND.

There can be little doubt that Paul Hellyer was a strong-willed MND and one who was not afraid to be at odds with senior military leaders. In fact, Martin van Creveld's portrayal of war as "two independent wills confronting each other…" is useful in describing Hellyer's attempt to unify Canada's military.[50] On assuming office, Hellyer, like others before him, established his ministerial authority immediately. He refused to approve any major proposals in the first month, cancelled the general-purpose frigate

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[48] Eayrs, *In Defence of* Canada, vol. 3, 91.

[49] Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 163

[50] Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), 266.

project and scrutinized key procurement projects. Once firmly in control, he subsequently set about instituting more fundamental changes in a systematic and determined manner. In fact, some argue that his willpower went too far, ultimately leading to a "complete breakdown in confidence and trust between the Minister and the senior officer corps…."[51] Undoubtedly, these senior officers were also at fault for creating such an environment. Regardless, the effect was that civilian control over the military was upheld and Hellyer pushed through Claxton's ideas of change.

Like Claxton, Hellyer also displayed a personal and direct approach to implementing change. He wrote the first draft of his White Paper by hand, particularly the section related to the major changes he envisaged.[52] Throughout his tenure, he maintained very close personal control over his reforms, to the point where he became the de-facto "centre of information."[53] Hellyer's ability to effect major change in little time came, however, at a cost. In the final months of Hellyer's tenure, senior officers described an environment of "mistrust, intrigue (sic), hostility, and confusion in DND and CFHQ."[54] Given this state of affairs, it would be difficult to suggest that Hellyer's

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[51] Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947-1985*, 50.

[52] Hellyer, *Damm the Torpedoes*, 34.

[53] Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947-1985*, 36.

[54] Ibid., 52.

overall approach to military change is a preferred one. However, given the inflexibility

of some senior officers and their disdain with civilian control of the military, it may have

been the only way.

While not much has been written to date on Young's time as MND, it is clear that

he assumed the portfolio with a mission to take charge of DND. Doug Young had a,

"…deserved reputation for ruthlessness in two previous departments."[55] Like others

before him, he made his authority known early by immediately firing the CDS and

freezing promotions. These actions quickly set the tone for both Young's style of

leadership and his approach to implementing change.

Young's first decision of substance and indeed, controversy, was to terminate the

Somalia Inquiry.[56] The inquiry had dragged on for two years, was a constant source of

criticism for the government and had still not offered any solutions to the troubles that

faced the CF. Not unlike Hellyer and Claxton, Young decided to address the issue

personally and conducted his proper review of problems in the CF, enlisting the support

of a handful of prominent authorities. After a mere three months, he provided a full

report to the Prime Minister outlining his plan to overhaul the CF and DND. The

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[55] Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo*, 4th ed., (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, Inc., 1999), 288.

[56] The term "Somalia Inquiry" will be used in place of the more formal "Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia".

recommendations were sweeping. They focussed on restoring the morale and confidence of the military and were intended to put an end to the bloodletting that had besieged the department. Young was clearly another MND at the forefront of bringing about change in the CF.

In each case, it is evident that transformation of the CF has been by ministerial decree rather than rational military planning. This approach reflects the primacy of civilian control over the armed forces in Canada. Generally speaking, ministers have followed a pattern whereby they quickly establish their authority and then set about implementing their plan of change using willpower to overcome opposition. In essence, ministers have only one chance to institute radical change and it is either seized or lost. Also evident in this analysis is that it has been the minister who has served as the intellectual force behind change rather than the military's leaders. Not surprisingly, this force has often been at odds with the thinking of senior military officers and as such, has also contributed to notion of change by decree.

The Canadian Governmental Arena – Allies and Adversaries

While the strong leadership of a minister has certainly been the driving factor in the implementation of radical military change, support or resistance that such an initiative may receive within government is also important. Key political authorities and agencies in Canada can have a considerable effect in promoting or tempering change. The influence that other government departments and the wider bureaucracy have is therefore an important factor that ministers have taken into account before embarking upon significant change initiatives. Borden was one such MND.

While Borden was faced with a general lack of public interest in defence matters, this apathy did not entirely extend to indifference on the part of politicians. The militia was a means to extend significant patronage, and politicians, Borden included, were keen to use it. However, beyond this shortsighted interest, there was a lack of governmental focus and alignment on defence issues. Despite Borden's efforts to place Canadian interests above imperial ones, the Laurier government would at times agree to British requests or offers without thoroughly understanding their implications from a Canadian context.[57] At other times, Borden's efforts to have Canada increase its imperial military co-operation (but not subordination) created significant opposition within his own party.[58] In fact, Laurier was against such action and as such, Borden did not enjoy any special measure of support from him. Accordingly, Borden had to choose his reform carefully and ensure that he had the necessary support from within government before attempting to implement it.

Claxton's strategy of transforming the military recognized the importance of integrating DND within the wider political and bureaucratic establishments. In this vein, Claxton had the COSC well supplemented with bureaucratic expertise. The Deputy Minister of Finance, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Secretary of

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[57] Miller, "Sir Frederick William Borden and Military Reform, 1896-1911," 14.

[58] Ibid., 15.

the Cabinet would often be present to provide much broader experience with regards to public affairs.[59] He also had his DM bring the Department of Finance directly into DND's budget process.[60] In the end, "[a] direct and friendly relationship was built up between the most important civilians in the government service and the service heads, forming a basis for understanding and co-operation."[61] This cooperative environment complemented Claxton's efforts to transform Canada's military.

Claxton also recognized the necessity of having allies in government when it came to his most significant, and costly, reforms. A former minister of health, Claxton had strong credibility amongst his cabinet peers. Unfortunately, this background did little for defence while Mackenzie King was PM. King was notoriously disinterested in matters of defence. It was only in 1950, under St Laurent, that Claxton managed to have his budget estimates approved without first being slashed by a Minister of Finance. This reversal of fortune attests to the importance of having the complete confidence of the Prime Minister as well as a strong and cooperative relationship with the ministers of external affairs (Pearson) and finance (Abbott).[62]

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[59] Eayrs, *In Defence of* Canada, vol. 3, 114.

[60] Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 169.

[61] Eayrs, *In Defence of* Canada, vol. 3, 114.

[62] Ibid., 25-26.

Hellyer too understood the importance of managing the governmental environment, particularly as it pertained to the support of the Prime Minister. Although Lester Pearson provided Hellyer the necessary backing, he was not particularly interested in the armed forces.[63] As such, Hellyer was cautious not to sour this relationship. Hellyer recalled his view of the matter: "I had been in politics long enough not to climb out on a long limb only to have the Prime Minister saw it off."[64] Hellyer also understood the bureaucratic milieu within which his efforts as minister would play out. He saw the bureaucracy as a tremendous hurdle on the route to change:

> … the massive inertia of the bureaucratic system may help to explain why it is easy for politicians to promise radical change, and then find it extremely difficult to deliver.[65]

He also understood that various departments had different perspectives of defence issues and took steps to mitigate their impact on his plans for the CF. For example, he established clear lines of demarcation with Paul Martin, the Minister of External Affairs, with respect to matters of foreign policy.[66] He also ensured that a representative from

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[63] Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947-1985*, 37.

[64] Paul Hellyer, Diary, February 12, 1964 quoted in Hellyer, *Damm the Torpedoes*, 43.

[65] Hellyer, *Damm the Torpedoes*, ix.

[66] Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947-1985*, 36.

external affairs was usually present for meetings of the Defence Council.[67] With a sound

understanding of his bureaucratic surroundings and an in-depth knowledge of how to

work within such an environment, Hellyer managed to change, radically, the CF in a very

short period of time.

The environment within which Young attempted to effect his radical change was

less of a concern than the ministers previously discussed. The reason was two-fold.

First, Young's changes were very much internal to DND. Although some reforms had

broader governmental impact, they were far from significant. The second reason is that

Young undoubtedly had the support of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and most likely,

cabinet. He was appointed MND with a strong mandate to reduce spending but also to

take necessary steps to put an end to the constant probing, revelations and media frenzies

that dogged the Chrétien government. As Jack Granatstein describes, it was a federal

environment in which DND had lost its credibility: "[w]eakened by the scandals arising

out of Somalia, the Canadian Forces had little clout."[68]

Governmental environment undoubtedly influences a minister's ability to effect

radical change. It is also unmistakable that the most important ally to have is the Prime

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[67] Hellyer, *Damm the Torpedoes*, 89.

[68] J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 410.

Minister. This observation is a reflection of how paramount the PM is in the Canadian

system of politics and government. That being said, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and

Finance are two other authorities that can substantially influence change in the CF.

Consequently, the ability to build relationships with these key actors and by extension,

their bureaucratic staffs, is a fundamental necessity to ensuring the success of any radical

change initiative within DND. Desmond Morton refers to the difficulty posed by this

environment when he wrote:

> Only a tough and lucky minister can find good options and propel them through a
> political system briefed by opposing factions. No wonder National Defence is a
> graveyard of ministerial reputations and its projects often fare badly.[69]

Canada's military has clearly undergone transformational change in the past.

More important though, in each case, the change has been revolutionary in its intent and

approach. The intent has been to change Canada's military on account of a change in the

nature of warfare. However, no matter how rational and necessary such change was, it

was heavily influenced by the pressures and demands of Canadian society as well as the

structure of the international arena within which militaries operate. History has also

demonstrated that the Canadian experience is that military change has been the purview

of strong and enlightened ministers of national defence rather than forward thinking

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[69] Desmond Morton, *Report to the Prime Minister: A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence by Desmond Morton McGill Institute for the Study of Canada* (Ottawa: n.p., March 25, 1997), 1.

military professionals. These ministers have also been particularly adept at understanding the difficulty of implementing radical change within the broader governmental milieu and have taken measures to maximize their success. In this regard, the support of the PM is of prime concern as is some level of consensus among key cabinet minister colleagues.

DEFENCE POLICY IN CANADA

Understanding how defence policy is created in Canada can be a difficult and confusing affair. It is a process that is often ambiguous, tightly controlled, and undoubtedly complex. Two broad factors serve to explain this state of affairs. The first factor refers to the nature of bureaucratic politics, as it exists in Canada. Prior to even becoming policy, defence thinking and planning are debated and significantly influenced by the competing interests and perspectives that exist within a milieu of bureaucratic politics. Given this environment, it is necessary that widespread support or consensus be established within the bureaucratic milieu if policy proposals are made with any substantial success. The second factor concerns the civil-military relations construct that exists in Canada. Canada puts great emphasis on the notion of civilian control over the military. The creation of defence policy, does not occur at the hands of senior military leaders but rather, is tightly controlled by the political authorities of the day. Despite this level of control though, politicians in Canada are generally preoccupied with matters of more domestic concern and as such, defence policy is rarely accorded any lasting attention. Together, bureaucratic politics and civilian control of the military can be viewed as two interlocking mazes. In order to be successful in transforming the CF, each maze must be expertly navigated and even then, one may only exit if the appropriate permission has been granted.

Maze One – Bureaucratic Politics

An understanding of defence policy formulation in Canada requires an appreciation of the interplay between the various actors involved in formulating it. The

study conducted by Allison and Zelikow regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis and the

actions taken by the U.S. government in response to it, is required reading in the fields of

organizational behaviour and policy making in government.[70] In trying to understand

how governments come to decisions on specific matters, Allison and Zelikow base their

various conceptual models on the premise that "… alternative conceptual lenses lead one

to see, emphasize, and worry about quite different aspects of events . . .."[71] In other

words, defence policy in Canada is different depending on who you are as an actor and

the perspectives you bring to the bargaining table.

It is no secret that, in Canada, the making of defence policy is a product of many

hands. Even within the military establishment itself, policy-making is a responsibility

shared between DND bureaucrats and professional CF military officers. Bland and

Maloney refer to this state of affairs when they observe that defence policy in Canada is

"found more often than it is made."[72] The theory that explains this situation resides in

the *Governmental Politics* model introduced by Allison and Zelikow. In this framework,

decisions on policy are a ". . . resultant of bargaining games among players in the

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[70] Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Second Edition (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999).

[71] Ibid., x.

[72] Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 58.

national government."[73] Each player has views and interests that stem from their

personal, organizational and national perspectives and these are pursued to greater or

lesser extent depending on the power and bargaining skill each player holds.

Allison and Zelikow present some key propositions from their model that help

understand how decisions are made or to predict future behaviour. The first is that

government action on an issue does not necessarily imply that the action taken was, in

fact, the intent of the government. This realization is important when it comes to

changing an organization. While the intent may be to change radically the CF, the action

taken may be significantly less so, given that such action results from the interests of

many players within the government. The second is that ". . .where one stands is

influenced, most often influenced strongly, by where one sits."[74] This statement explains

why each of the three services in the CF have their own visions and plans for

transformation yet the CF itself, lacks one. Lastly, there is the recognition that how each

player plays the bargaining game depends on the issue and with whom they are playing:

> In policy-making, then, the issue looking *down* is options: how to preserve my
> leeway until time clarifies certain uncertainties. The issue looking *sideways* is
> commitment: how to get others committed to my coalition. The issue looking

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[73] Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 6.

[74] Ibid., 307.

upward is confidence: how to give the boss confidence to do what must be done.[75]

This insight is important to the issue of transformation as it can explain why a government may be hesitant or even unwilling to implement radical military change. First, military change is inherently uncertain. It is predicated on a change in the nature of warfare, which one might also argue, is always changing. Additionally, it is heavily influenced by domestic society and the international environment, neither of which is within the government's ability to control. With this in mind, if the complexity of war is considered, it is not surprising that authorities or bureaucrats outside the military might be wary to offer their (unqualified) support to a proposal for transforming the military. Thus, it is left to military professionals alone, to somehow convince the political authorities that they have it right. Suffice to say, this task is by no means simple.

Kim Richard Nossal's 1995 examination of defence policy making in Canada makes many of the same observations that Allison and Zelikow do, but from a purely Canadian perspective. Nossal introduces his *Bureaucratic Politics* model and notes that governments may tout defence policy as being rational but it is rarely the case:

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[75] Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 308.

> The bureaucratic politics approach sees policy-making and policy implementation as essentially messy processes, and certainly rarely as cleanly rational as the classical means/ends definition would have it.[76]

Nossal too sees policy-making as a game that has players of varying power and influence compete with each other and where policy is created that may not reflect the perspectives and interests that the primary actor(s) had in mind at the beginning of the game.[77] Despite the similarities with Allison and Zelikow, Nossal's look into the future of defence policy in Canada is particularly relevant as it relates to transformation. In this regard he notes that with the end of the Cold War, the idea of rationality in Canadian defence policy will become even less likely.[78] This prediction serves to foreshadow the challenge at hand of transforming the CF. Transformation implies a rational approach to change. Radical change of wide sweeping scope, if indeed rational, certainly cannot be undertaken haphazardly. However, recognizing how decisions on defence policy come together, it is highly unlikely that such a large step in defence policy formulation that transformation implies, could be readily digested within the bureaucratic milieu. Instead,

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[76] Kim Richard Nossal, "Rationality and Non-Rationality in Canadian Defence Policy," in *Canada's International Security Policy*, David B. Dewitt & David Leyton-Brown, eds. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, Ltd., 1995), 354.

[77] Ibid., 355.

[78] Ibid., 361.

it is more likely that the government would seek a more cautious, iterative (evolutionary) approach that it could consider more easily.

Overall, the *governmental politics* model provides the CF with the background knowledge necessary to understand the environment of defence policy-making and to be more effective at working within it. First, the CF's plan to transform cannot only focus on its internal needs. It must also concentrate on the interests and needs of the broader government community. Second, the CF must be capable of minimizing the F pt(zint)]TJ-0.2706 Tw 18.94

… a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within society.[79]

How these forces actually interact with each other is ultimately a function of how governments choose to balance the demands of both forces. In this regard, the objective, as Huntington suggests, is to "maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other social values.[80] Thus, nations must have a means by which to balance the wants (or needs) of the military against the wants (or needs) of society. This process is explained by the concept of civilian control over the military.

Huntington emphasizes that the aim of civilian control is the "minimizing of military power."[81] Objective civilian control, which Huntington would suggest suits nations that have officer corps that are professional, minimizes military power by maximizing the professionalism of the military. In this context, a professional military willingly accepts subordination to the state. Thus far, this theory might support the Canadian case. Canada's military does indeed have a professional officer corps and the organization is a subordinate instrument of the government. However, Huntington also argues that this concept of civilian control ultimately leads to a balance of power between

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[79] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), 2.

[80] Ibid., 2.

[81] Ibid., 84.

the military and civilian groups within society and a politically neutral control of the military.[82] In this respect, Huntington's predominantly American-focussed analysis breaks with the reality of the Canadian situation. In Canada, power is not shared with the military but retained by civilian authorities. In fact, in Canada, the institutional structure that governs matters of defence is tightly controlled by the highest levels of political authority. As such, defence policy is very much a reflection of the relatively short-term interests of the government of the day and does not afford the military much recourse if it does not agree with those interests or seeks a longer-term commitment.

Given the level of responsibility that such a level of control implies, Canadian political authorities, one could assume, would be committed defence policy makers. This assumption would be only partly true. While politicians have been active in matters of defence, this activity pales when compared to the focus and effort they afford to more domestically-oriented issues. The reasons are varied but revolve around two historic assumptions, according to Douglas Bland: "there are no threats, and if there were any, no strategy invented by Canadians could redress them." [83] Such assumptions still exist in the minds of Canadians, even in the post-September 11 world. In a poll conducted in

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[82] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 84.

[83] Douglas Bland, "Everything Military Officers Need to Know About Defence Policy-Making in Canada," in *Advance or Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21st Century*, eds. David Rudd, Jim Hanson & Jessica Blitt, 15-29 (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000), 16.

2005, a majority of Canadians considered international terrorism as one of the top threats to Canada, but they did not associate it with an attack on Canadian soil.[84] On the whole, politicians in Canada are doing what they are meant to do – represent the interests of ordinary Canadians. In that same poll, respondents placed spending on defence second to last in order of governmental priorities.[85] The impact that this Canadian perception has on transforming the CF is significant. It is extremely difficult to convince Canadians and their political representatives that the nation should devote considerable resources and effort to transforming the military when almost every other issue is of more importance in the minds of everyday citizens.

The approach taken by Canadian governments, over the past several decades, regarding matters of international security has also compounded the problem of formulating Canadian defence policy. Since the early days of the Cold War, creation of NATO and NORAD and the rise in United Nations peacekeeping missions, Canada has opted for a strategy of commitments based upon our responsibilities in support of these organizations. During this period, national security was not the ultimate aim. Rather, the focus of the government was "underpinning our diplomatic and negotiating position vis-

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[84] Sarah Noble, "Talking to Canadians About Defence: Giving to Whom you Trust," in *Understanding the Crisis in Canadian Security and Defence*, 9-18 (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, March 2005), 10.

[85] Ibid., 10.

à-vis international organizations and other countries."[86] While this aim is worthy, it should not equate to the raison d'être of the CF. Consequently, this out-sourcing of defence strategy has left Canadian political institutions with a weak history of defence policy formulation. Douglas Bland argues that "the problem of discovering a strategic rationale for Canada lies in Canada and in a history that encourages Canadians to look to others for strategic authority and guidance."[87] Ultimately, lack of corporate knowledge and experience has an adverse effect on the ability to craft unique defence policy, such as that relating to transformation, reflective of true Canadian security interests.

In view of this general preoccupation with matters that are not defence related and the strategy of commitments, a fundamental dichotomy has developed when it comes to defence policy-making in Canada. In other words, Canadian politicians have a common disinterest in all things defence related while at the same time, when they do choose to show some interest, it is often resented by the same military officers who demand political leadership and direction.[88] The consequences are twofold. First, this disinterest leads to little political oversight of defence policy unless it relates to the national budget.

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[86] James Eayrs, "Military Policy and Middle Power: The Canadian Experience," in *Canada's Role as a Middle Power*, Contemporary Affairs no. 35, ed. J. King Gordon, 67-85 (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966), 70.

[87] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 260.

[88] Bland, *Who Decides What?*, 33-35.

In effect, Canada's defence policy has been determined by budgets rather than strategy.[89] While this preoccupation reflects civilian control and serves to ensure scarce resources are appropriately apportioned over all the nation's priorities, it does nothing to generate interest in discussing the more fundamental issues of defence policy related to transformation. Second, the dichotomy has led to an impression that the only defence policy that is good for Canada is what complements the military aspirations of the officer corps. These aspirations, however, are often at odds with the true interests of the state.[90] In the final analysis, military officers and civilian bureaucrats in DND draft defence policy that is viewed as suspect while those who are in a position to provide a measure of clarity regarding national interests are kept from doing so by the low priority assigned to security issues in Canada. Given this state of affairs, it is doubtful that the government would sanction an effort to transform the CF to any significant extent unless there was some national security crisis compelling it (where the government has no doubt in the necessity of the military's demands) or some compelling argument that military transformation was in the day-to-day interests of ordinary Canadians (where the government would have some reason to become interested).

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[89] Ibid., 34.

[90] Ibid., 35.

What remains, in the end, is a somewhat ambiguous situation. Bland and Maloney purport that the true state of affairs in defence planning is uncertainty and as a result, military officers and defence administrators have resorted to a process termed "hedging". They suggest that the "dynamic elements" of defence policy are beyond rational and effective control and as such, the management of defence policy assumes a character of randomness that results in incremental decision-making.[91] The implication of hedging on transformation is straightforward. Given that the military does not and cannot effectively control defence policy in Canada, it will choose to follow an approach to change that is iterative and evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Any comprehensive and rational plan supporting transformation will, by necessity, have to be "watered down" as the military attempts to attract the interest of politicians in manageable and acceptable "bite sized chunks".

Defence policy in Canada is formed by a neither straightforward nor predictable process. The environment of bureaucratic politics forces defence planners to be aware of the need to achieve consensus across government for policy to be created. Accordingly, they must think beyond the purely military requirements and relate the benefits of transformation to a wider government community with differing perspectives and interests. This objective will require one common CF voice rather than three service ones

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[91] Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 49.

and necessitates an effort to communicate the national (vice military) requirement for

transformation across government. Concurrently, political authorities must be made to

see that transformation is not only in the interest of Canadians but it is a matter of

priority. Achieving solid consensus across the federal bureaucratic milieu will strongly

support this endeavour but it is not sufficient to permit transformation. The temptation to

thin out or dilute defence transformation policy must be avoided. Otherwise, the attempt

to gain support will in fact be for some measure of evolutionary rather than

transformational change. This would result in coming full circle to where the situation,

as described by Douglas Bland, rests today: "[p]olitical leaders direct and manage

defence policy sporadically from crisis to crisis and issue to issue, free from the fetters of

any national strategy."[92]

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[92] Bland, "Everything Military Officers Need to Know About Defence Policy-Making in Canada," 16.

TRANSFORMING THE CANADIAN FORCES

Ask anyone in NDHQ about transformation and each will give a different definition. There is widespread agreement, both within the CF and outside it, that the CF has to transform. What is lacking, though, is a common understanding of what transformation entails and an appreciation for how it will be achieved. In military parlance, the CF has not fully comprehended or developed its mission for transformation and it therefore lacks a concept for achieving it. In order to overcome this state of affairs, the CF must pay particular attention to its past experiences with change and the system that governs the creation of defence policy in Canada.

What is the Mission?

The first step in planning any military operation is to develop a comprehensive understanding of what the mission is really all about. This requirement means understanding some basic parameters. In the context of transformation, it requires answers to the following questions. Why do we need to change? What sort of change do we want? When does it need to be done? Who is going to do it? Once these questions have been addressed, the CF will have a common understanding of transformation and be in a position to work in unity towards achieving it.

There is ample evidence to support transforming the CF. First, consider the change in the nature of warfare over the past decade. Peacekeeping operations, for which the CF has had long experience, have completely given way to peace-support or peace-making operations. The adversary in conflict is no longer likely to be a foreign state but rather, non-state actors, terrorists, fundamentalists, ethnic groups, or other similarly

difficult to distinguish entities. The War on Terrorism has brought together the notions

of domestic and international security but as blurred the difference between law

enforcement and military operations. Lastly, there is the most recent rise in insurgency

operations where low-tech human ingenuity and willpower can potentially defeat high-

tech militaries. There can be no doubt that warfare has changed significantly since the

end of the Cold War. If the CF is going to remain effective in future war, it too must

change.

There are also indicators that Canadian society will strongly influence the call for

CF transformation. First, the

conflict resolution in the world.[94] Lastly, there is the effect that changing demographics will have on the government's ability to choose, selectively, when and where Canada's military may intervene. Denis Stairs notes that "[t]he injunction to 'Do Something!' in response to cataclysm abroad…" will be hard for a government to sweep aside.[95] In fact, the call for and displeasure with the Canadian response to the December 2004 tsunami is a case in point where societal demand cannot be ignored. Given these factors, Canadians will exert increasing pressure to see the problems with the CF resolved.

Finally, the international environment will also be a strong influence on the transformation of the CF. The interconnectedness that exists in today's world will increase and make conflict, no matter where it may exist on the globe, an issue to Canada. While the degree of Canadian interest in the issue may vary from slight to significant, the government will be increasingly compelled by the international community to decide consciously for or against Canadian involvement. The use of "coalitions of the willing" is a new phenomenon that also has the potential to draw Canada to decision. The expanding use of NATO in a world context is another. Canada's advocacy of an international *Responsibility to Protect* duty (or liability) is a

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[94] Noble, "Talking to Canadians About Defence: Giving to Whom you Trust," 11.

[95] Denis Stairs, "Challenges and Opportunities for Canadian Foreign Policy in the Paul Martin Era," *International Journal* 59, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 488.

further one. In each case, Canada will find itself faced with making decisions on military

intervention of some size or sort more often than has been the case in the past. This

international influence, coupled with domestic societal pressure and the changing nature

of warfare, make CF transformation imperative if the military is to remain an effective

instrument of the state and Canada a credible nation in the world. But what does

transformation entail?

In assessing what sort of change is required, the choices are few – evolutionary or

revolutionary. Recalling the rationale supporting the call for change, it is hard to argue

that anything less than revolutionary change would be adequate. The South African

National Defence Force (SANDF), recognized the challenge it faced after the fall of

apartheid and clearly distinguished transformation from the more ongoing and routine

evolutionary change:

> Transformation is therefore not tampering with obsolete structures and outdated ideas or about fixing what is beyond repair, it is a drastic and complete change.[96]

An examination of the challenges facing the CF today suggests that the same holds true

for transforming Canada's military. For example, the increasing demand for Canada to

partake in international conflict resolution will require a more expeditionary focus for the

CF. This requirement will entail making forces more rapidly deployable as well as more

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[96] South Africa, Chief Director Foreign Relations SANDF, *Transformation Briefing Package No. 3* (n.p.: n.p., November 1997), 2, quoted in Davies, *Commanding Change*, 104-105.

sustainable. The former requires first, that the CF overhaul its readiness constructs and make forces available for use within a more acceptable period than three to six months.[97] It also requires a significant capability to deploy forces in terms of lift. There is no argument that the CF is critically lacking in this regard. Even if such lift was available, particularly strategic airlift, much of the force structure is based on "massed, heavy and ponderous forces" which are too bulky and heavy to lift rapidly.[98] In terms of sustaining forces overseas, the challenges are equally difficult. They not only encompass having more capable and efficient logistical support mechanisms but also the adequate availability of trained personnel to permit multiple rotations, and capabilities that are more suited to deployed operations. This example is but one of many daunting challenges facing the CF. Overcoming it and the others will require revolutionary change that breaks with the past and truly adapts the CF for the 21st Century.

To ensure the CF is ready for the 21st Century, the time for change is now. In fact, the CDS in 2002 noted that the CF was at a crossroads and that the status quo was

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[97] Canada, Department of National Defence, *Defence Plan Online*, [document on-line]; available from http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/DPOnline/ReadinessSustainment_e.asp; Internet; accessed 20 April 2005.

[98] Canada, Department of National Defence, *A Time for Transformation: Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 2002-2003* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2003), III. [document on-line]; available from: http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/reports_e.asp; Internet; accessed 20 April 2005.

no longer acceptable.[99] The following year, he stated that the issue was not whether the CF should transform but how.[100] A year later, he emphasized that choices would need to be made to prepare the CF for transformation.[101] Clearly, the senior leadership of the CF recognizes and accepts that the time for transformation has arrived. This situation is of course an important point in the context of military change. Bryon Greenwald reminds us that often, "military organizations neither perceive the nature of the change [in warfare] nor accept the need to change despite ample evidence to the contrary."[102] In fact, CF authorities are likely aware that the CF is now lagging other countries, such as Australia, Norway, the Netherlands, and Germany in transformation. Lagging or not, there are also other good reasons to begin transformation straight away.

Bearing in mind the historical analysis of military change in Canada, some important observations are apparent when it comes to implementing revolutionary military change. The first was that it occurred at the purview of strong and enlightened MNDs. Considering the situation today, one could argue that, for the first time since

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[99] Canada, Department of National Defence, *At a Crossroads: Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 2001-2002*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2002), 19. [document on-line]; available from: http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/reports_e.asp; Internet; accessed 20 April 2005.

[100] Canada, Department of National Defence, *A Time for Transformation*, II.

[101] Canada, Department of National Defence, *Making Choices*, 5.

[102] Greenwald, *The Anatomy of Change*, 3.

Doug Young, the department has such a minister. This argument is predominantly based on the MND's former background as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, historically one of the top cabinet portfolios in Canada. Furthermore, this background provides the minister with a much broader appreciation for the governmental milieu and a better likelihood of having allies around the cabinet table. Lastly, and most important to success, is having the support of the PM. In this regard, it would appear that Prime Minister Martin has an international agenda that he would genuinely like to implement. As such, he is likely to be supportive of a MND who is well versed in international affairs himself and leads a department that plays an increasingly crucial role in this respect. In summary, the timing could hardly be better to embark upon revolutionary change.[103]

Given that the timing appears to be ideal for change, it only seems reasonable that the CF should want to accomplish as much as possible while such favourable conditions exist. Again, the historical experience supports such a statement. In all the cases studied, revolutionary change was implemented within a relatively short period of time – usually within one term in a minister's overall tenure as MND. Furthermore, the nature of

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[103] This paper does not attempt to factor into its analysis the fact that the current government in Canada is a minority one. This issue is of course a consideration that can affect, significantly, federal policy-making at large and thus defence policy is not immune from it. However, it should also be noted that military change is not necessarily impossible in such a climate as attested by Hellyer's success within Pearson's minority governments.

civilian control of the military in Canada does not favour military change initiatives when new governments are elected in Canada. Given that defence policy is very much a reflection of the relatively short-term interests of the government-of-the-day and is tightly controlled by the highest levels of political authority, namely the PM, incoming governments are not likely to bring an opponent's initiative to fruition unless it is in their overall interest to do so. So then, whether it is intuition, historical precedent or political astuteness, the indicators point to seeking revolutionary change in as short a time as possible.

Ministers of National Defence have historically been the actors to drive revolutionary change in the CF. This pattern stems, principally, from Canada's rigid construct of civilian control but it also has had much to do with the inability of the CF to recognize when change was required. Thus, while history appears to place the CF at a disadvantage in terms of bringing about its own transformation, this case is not entirely true today. In fact, it is obviously beneficial to achieving success if both military officers and political authorities agree on the need for change. However, recognizing that both agree on the matter, who should lead the effort?

The academic literature surrounding military change does not offer a definitive answer on who should lead change. Some believe that it is the leadership of the military that must do it while others believe that, due to the culture and inertia of military organizations, it is civilian authorities that must be at the helm. Another way of viewing this lack of agreement is that, perhaps, there is, no right or wrong way. In the case of the CF, it should, at least, attempt to be the driver of its own change. There are two very good reasons to support this suggestion. First, military organizations react better to

change when it is brought about from within. This fact has much to do with the professional nature of the organization and the perception that only properly trained and well-experienced senior military officers have the knowledge and skill to reform the military appropriately. In this regard, one can recall Winton's analogy that military change requires a "genius" who possesses a "peacetime equivalent of *coup d'oeil*."[104] Second, the effectiveness of the organization is more likely to be better if it is the architect of its own change. It is basic human nature that people prefer to be involved in actions that will significantly affect their lives. One might consider this proposition as ideal and therefore unrealistic but to do so would ignore the principal fact that makes it suitable for the case of CF transformation. Namely, there already exists widespread recognition and acceptance, from senior leaders down to the junior ranks, that significant change in the CF is required. Clearly though, this does not constitute a *carte blanche* for the military to be unrealistic with its reform.

Whereas there may be little agreement on who leads military change, there is general consensus that both the government and society at large are substantial shapers of change. Thus, the military's plan for transformation must be capable of accommodating the relatively short-term perspectives that the government-of-the-day has on defence. In the current context, it means providing the government the flexibility to meet a larger

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[104] Winton, "On Military Change," xv.

requirement for security at home, which includes defence of North America, while at the same time, an ability to provide Canada the means to make a relevant and credible contribution abroad. One could argue that there is nothing new to this challenge, that this has always been the requirement in Canada. This argument would be short-sighted. In fact, the civilian authorities have told the CF what they want – which of course is a necessary precursor to transformation. It means that the plan for transforming the CF needs to show a greater emphasis on and capability for continental security and that the CF need not determine its force structure based on our international commitments but rather the ability to act in a manner that is more cohesively Canadian and capable of making a difference. This reading is probably accurate of what the average Canadian envisions the CF's role to be. Taxpayers will also welcome the restraint on military ambition that is implied within this policy direction. Overall, there is an opportunity that could be viewed as a defining moment for the CF. It has what it routinely calls for – political direction. Now it must act appropriately to satisfy it.

In summary, this analysis of transformation, using the context of a mission, provides a detailed and common understanding of what transformation entails. The rationale that the CF needs to transform is abundantly sound. The nature of warfare has changed considerably in the past decade and the CF has failed to keep pace. Furthermore, demands at home and the changing structure of the international environment will add further pressure for change. In considering what needs to be done, there can be little argument that revolutionary change is required. The change must be broad – affecting ideas, organizational and force structure, training, capabilities and mindsets. There must be a clear disruption of the status quo and a new direction and

focus provided. In looking at the current situation in the CF and in Canada, one can certainly say that both the time and timing for transformation is right. Finally, the ball appears to be in the military's court as it pertains to leading transformation. The CF should endeavour to learn from its past and ensure that in planning transformation, the needs of the military are suitably reflective of the desires of the government. Failing in this regard would constitute a failure to appreciate the nature of civilian control of the military in Canada and severely jeopardize achieving success in transforming the CF.

The Concept of Operations – Joint and Integrated

Now that a common understanding of the parameters of transformation has been developed, the selection of an appropriate approach to pursuing it is possible. Just as it has been argued that the CF is in need of revolutionary change, it also true that it needs a revolutionary approach to achieving such change. First, it must break with its past tendencies and provide a plan that reflects one military arm of government rather than three separate ones. This requirement is more than mere semantics in the drafting of a policy document. Rather, it resides in how such policy is conceived and the ideas, concepts and capabilities that it represents. It is advocated, therefore, that a special staff be stood up to achieve this unity of perspective and oversee the implementation of transformation. Second, the CF must adopt an approach that integrates the transformation of the CF with the interests and requirements of other government departments and agencies. Not only is such an approach evident in the changing nature of warfare (joint, combined and integrated operations) but it is also ideally suited to the Canadian milieu of bureaucratic politics and the current government's desire to pursue *horizontalism* in policy-making. Guiding transformation in a joint and integrated manner

has the best likelihood of success given the history of the CF and the nature of

government in Canada.

In any military operation, there can only be one mission – a mission to which all

arms of the military contribute in a synchronized and unified manner. While this

statement is not the military doctrinal definition of *joint*, it encapsulates the main idea of

"jointness" in operations. The same idea holds true with respect to pursuing the

"mission" of military change. Yet, when one considers current CF transformation policy,

this idea does not appear to be widely understood. At present, each of the three services

has a dedicated vision/plan for their particular transformation.[105] The CF, as the

overriding institution, has none. In speaking of the CF as an institution, one should be

reminded of the words Colonel Maurice Pope wrote in 1937 when he examined how

Canada should organize its function of national defence:

> From the standpoint of the Government, the problem of national defence has
> always been fundamentally a single one, incapable of complete division in terms
> of the fighting Services.[106]

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[105] The Navy's strategy for transformation is embedded within *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*. The Army has recently promulgated *Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy* and the Air Force has released *Security Above All: Transforming Canada's Air Force*. [All documents on-line]; available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/home_e.asp ; Internet; accessed 20 April 2005.

[106] Douglas L. Bland, ed., *Canada's National Defence: Volume 2 – Defence Organization* (Kingston: Queen's University School of Policy Studies, 1998), 9.

One is also reminded of the efforts of first, Claxton, to reduce the overlap and redundancy across the services and then Hellyer, to integrate and unify them such that they would speak with one voice and act with one motive. Given the state of current affairs, the strong service mentality remains prevalent within the CF and will prove to be a disservice to any attempt to transform.

Clearly, the notion that strong services make for a strong CF is part of the ingrained military culture of the CF. On paper, it is very easy to suggest that the CF needs to shed such thinking but in reality, it is a very hard thing to do. It is even harder when one considers the argument within this paper that transformation must occur over a relatively short timeframe. Many scholars of military change have argued that overcoming such organizational impediments requires a long-term approach. It affords young members of the military the time to move up the promotion ladder and eventually bring new thinking into the senior leadership of the organization. This approach, however, is not suited in a construct of civilian control that is heavily guided by the short-term interests of a governing political party. Thus, the CF is seemingly faced with a situation where it is doomed to base much of its approach on hope.

One useful measure to assist in overcoming the situation with military culture is to establish a special staff to oversee transformation. Many, at first glance, might argue

that this suggestion is merely an organizational reengineering initiative that provides a façade of change but does not produce any substantial results. However, some academics in the field of military change note that this option is viable. Paul Davis argues that military change must match the organization's culture "or else extraordinary measures to overcome resistance" will be required.[107] He uses the example of how the U.S. Navy introduced a special branch in order to manage the introduction of their nuclear submarine capability. Murray Davies is of similar mind. He notes that one of the reasons why the SANDF was successful at transformation was "the establishment of a special staff within the SANDF to manage the process."[108] There are several good reasons to support this move in the CF.

The establishment of a special staff would, first, remove the responsibility for planning transformation from those DND offices that are tasked with managing routine strategic change. It clearly establishes the delineation between what will be demanded of transformation and the sort of change that is required on a steady-state basis. It will also keep planners from having to think with two different mindsets. Next, it provides the organization a specific "locale" into which in can place innovative thinkers and talented leaders. This pool of designated expertise is one way of overcoming the inability to wait

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[107] Davis, "Integrating Transformation Programs," 205.

[108] Davies, *Commanding Change*, 108.

for junior personnel to rise to the top through normal promotion. Also, these personnel, having been specifically selected to lead the effort of transformation, will undoubtedly be more motivated than those routine strategic planners who have had the task of planning transformation added to their other responsibilities. Third, it provides the CF with a means to produce one single perspective of transformation. While it is not realistic to think that each planner will magically lose their service *backgrounds*, the opportunity to work as a select group on making the CF a truly effective organization for the 21st Century may eliminate the existence of service *bias*. Lastly, and most important for the revolutionary approach being advocated, this special staff creates a focal point within the organization with which other governmental departments and agencies can work. This construct will facilitate the ability of DND and the CF to approach transformation in a manner that is integrated with the wider government.

In the short time since September 2001, the nature of warfare has changed dramatically. Most relevant to the topic of integration has been the convergence of international and domestic security as well as the blurring between military action and law enforcement, particularly in the context of the War on Terror. In light of these developments, militaries are having to work far more closely and in many instances, in company with, civilian governmental or international agencies in order to effect their missions. There is also the case of intra-state conflict resolution. In the past decade, with operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and now Iraq, there is a much clearer appreciation for the broad range of capabilities, military and civilian, that are required to resolve conflict within a state. In view of these realities, it is only logical that a government should want to see all its available instruments of security working together toward a

common aim of national (or international) security. Integrated is to governments what joint is to militaries.

Recognizing the growing need to be integrated in military operations, it would be myopic for the CF to seek to transform itself without ensuring that such change suits the other government departments and agencies with which the CF will have to operate in the future. Undeniably, this need represents a far more complex and challenging task than remaining self-centered and focussed on the mere military component of transformation. There is also far greater risk that the whole process goes nowhere on account of the difficulty in getting a disparate group of organizations to agree on something. However, with the greater challenge and risk comes the potential for greater reward. The CF has an opportunity to make its transformation not about itself but about Canada as a whole. This proposition may sound somewhat prophetic but it is not meant to be. It simply represents the intention to find a solution to transforming the CF that not only strengthens the military for the future but also the other arms of government and consequentially, the nation as a whole.

The adoption of an integrated approach to transformation will benefit the CF's ability to conduct integrated operations in the future. Given that the CF is already working at integrating aspects of its operations with those of other government departments, for example in the realm of maritime security, it is only sensible that transformation planning should take this reality into account from the outset. An integrated approach will also benefit the process of defence policy formulation in Canada. The CF, in working with other government departments and agencies, will be in a far better position to establish trust and gain influence within the federal bureaucracy.

These two elements are keys to success in a milieu of bureaucratic politics and the CF has historically been very poor at maintaining such credibility. Douglas Bland refers to this record when he writes that, "[t]he officer corps is treated as a liability [by politicians] and this attitude is reflected in the behaviour of public servants outside DND."[109] Lastly, the government benefits from an integrated approach because it not only delivers what government has been asking for since 1937 – a single perspective on national defence but goes beyond this to provide a truly complete one as well. Ignoring that this approach is exactly what the current government is seeking when it speaks of *horizontalism*, it is also something that political authorities can sell to their constituents. It reflects a government that is making the maximum effective use of the tools available to safeguard the security of Canadians. Speaking at a level more in tune with the concerns of everyday Canadians – it maximizes the military's bang for their taxpayer buck.

The Canadian Forces, faced with the challenge of instituting revolutionary change in order to remain effective and relevant in the coming decades, needs to adopt an equally revolutionary approach to implementing transformation. First, the organization must finally begin to think and act as a single entity. This approach requires overcoming long-established and dominant service cultures. In order to achieve this feat in a relatively

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[109] Bland, "Everything Military Officers Need to Know About Defence Policy-Making in Canada," 22.

short period of time a special staff should be created to oversee transformation. This staff of specifically selected individuals will also facilitate integrating CF transformation with other government departments and agencies. This integration not only reflects developments in the nature of warfare but is also ideally suited to the system of bureaucratic politics that exists in Canada and within which defence policy is created.

Transforming the Canadian Forces is not going to be a simple undertaking. Neither is going to war. It is a common event that, military planners, when directed to conduct a military operation, first study what they have been asked to do. This *mission analysis* is a fundamentally important point from which to start planning as it provides clarity on the parameters (who, what, where, when and why) of the mission. Furthermore, it leads directly to developing a *concept of operations* which provides the initial intent and broad means by which the mission will be achieved. In the context of transformation, the mission facing the CF is to implement revolutionary change in a relatively short timeframe in order to remain relevant in the 21st Century. The concept by which to achieve this mission is through a joint and integrated approach that will have the CF speak with one voice and work collaboratively with other government departments and agencies so as to maximize the benefit of transformation vis-à-vis Canadian national security. Simply put, revolutionary ends must be sought through revolutionary means.

CONCLUSION

Transformation, in the context of military organizations, refers to a process of bringing about military change. This change is notably significant in its scope and effect on the organization and is normally brought to light on account of a change in the nature of warfare. That said, there are factors that are external to the purely military realm that can and most often do influence such change. The pressures and demands of national society as well as the changing international environment can serve to heavily constrain change or make it impossible to ignore. Beyond these general observations, there is very little agreement in the academic community on the remaining aspects to military change. There is no ideal timeframe in which to implement change. There is no single individual or group that is ideally suited to lead such change. And, there is certainly no ideal method or approach in which to follow to achieve change. In the end, the answer to these questions depends on the organization in question.

The Canadian Forces are in need of change and transformation is a stated priority of CF leaders. However, the CF has a poor record when it comes to bringing about its own change. While history confirms that the CF has undergone transformation in the past, it has been on account of ministerial decree more than military desire. Ministers were the drivers of change as it was they who recognized why it was required, how the nation and world was influencing it and the best means to implement it in the Canadian system of government. This system is one where defence policy is created in a milieu of bureaucratic politics and strong civilian control over the military. Accordingly, the key to creating defence policy is to have broad consensus across government.

If the CF wishes to learn from its past, work within the political environment that exists in Canada, and remain relevant in the 21st Century, it needs to pursue revolutionary change in a revolutionary manner. This change must happen as quickly as possible and can in fact be led by military authorities if they adopt a joint and integrated approach to transformation. It means speaking with one voice rather than three and working in consort with other arms of government in order to make transformation more a matter of *national* than *military* necessity.

There is of course no guarantee that revolutionary change through a revolutionary approach will be successful. As it has already been determined, there is no ideal way to bring about military change. Furthermore, the factors that shape and influence change are beyond any measure of control by militaries, governments or the international community. Change, however, is an inevitable force, like the weather and tides are to a ship. Mariners, though, have come to understand their environment and can determine how such forces will affect the ship and consequently take action to use these forces to their advantage. Militaries must learn to face the forces of change in a similar manner.

An understanding of military change and the political system within which it occurs, from a Canadian context, is vitally important. This background serves as the foundation on which to develop a common understanding of what CF transformation should entail and the most practical means by which to pursue it. The strength in this analysis is two-fold. First, it studies transformation from a Canadian point of view. Even a cursory review of the academic debate on military change shows that each military organization is unique in its own characteristics and in the external factors through which it can be influenced. As such, this step should be viewed as absolutely necessary in any

analysis of CF transformation. Second, it approaches this analysis from first principles.
By doing so, it provides a common, academically sound and Canadian-specific
understanding of the parameters of transformation, which leads to a logical approach that
will work with the forces of change, rather than against them.

However, as sound as this approach may be in theory, predicting the future and
reacting to the forces of change in the real world is inherently imperfect. There can be no
certainty that what is expected to occur or planned to take place will happen in the
manner or at the time anticipated. Additionally, the analysis in this paper remains at a
relatively high, some might say, strategic level. Clearly, this approach is of n 1Ciints id

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