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***THE CANADIAN MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE: A MORE RELEVANT
DEFENCE OPTION FOR CANADA IN THE 21ST CENTURY***

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ABSTRACT

This paper sets out by stating that the continued existence of the Canadian Forces (CF) as a relevant military force is at risk. Moreover, it contends that in order to become more relevant in the face of the 21st century threat environment, it must adopt a more expeditionary force structure incorporating the capabilities and principles of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Marine Air Ground Task Force. In order to convince the reader of the validity of this argument, the paper attempts to define the threat environment by delving into a range of issues including globalization, the environment and fundamentalism. This leads to a review of recent conflicts involving Western militaries and an asymmetric enemy with a view to drawing doctrinal lessons that are applicable to a proposed future force structure for the CF. Following an overview of the USMC and its capabilities, the paper not only describes the proposed force structure but also explains how it will provide a better capability to deal with the country's present and future security interests.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1 – THE CURRENT AND FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS	6
• A “Bifurcated World”	6
• Defining the Asymmetric Threat	13
CHAPTER 2 – THE EVOLUTION OF MILITARY FORCES IN THE FACE OF THE ASYMMETRIC THREAT	17
• Sierra Leone and Afghanistan – Taking the Fight to the Asymmetric Enemy	17
• The United States Marine Corps – The Optimal Conventional Force for the 21 st Century	25
• Special Operations Forces – An Asymmetric Answer to the 21 st Century Enemy	34
CHAPTER 3 – DEFINING THE REQUIRED DEFENCE CAPABILITIES FOR CANADA IN THE 21 ST CENTURY	40
• A Brief History of Previous Restructurings of the Canadian Forces	42
• The CF’s Mandate	46
• The Proposed Structure	54
CONCLUSION	61
BIBLIOGRAPHY	64

INTRODUCTION

Large-scale, conventional war – war as understood by today’s principal military powers – may indeed be at its last gasp; however, war itself, war as such, is alive and kicking and about to enter a new epoch.¹

Martin van Creveld wrote these words in 1991, which was a time marked by much discussion regarding the future prospects of a post-Cold War era. When the Berlin Wall “fell” in 1989, a feeling of euphoria spread throughout the world as people everywhere rejoiced in the fact that the Cold War was finally over. No longer would the threat of nuclear annihilation hang over everyone’s head. No longer would obscene amounts of money be spent feeding the seemingly insatiable machine that had become known as the military industrial complex.² Moneys could now be spent on improving the lives of citizens everywhere and it was believed that this increased prosperity would manifest itself in the form of a lasting peace, the likes of which had never been seen in the history of the world.

Unfortunately, much like the post-war optimism that swept over the world in 1919 following the “War to end all wars”, the euphoria of the early 1990s was eventually followed by a rude awakening as the world was plunged into an even more complex and potentially dangerous environment.³

¹ Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 2.

² Based on a search of the Wikipedia electronic encyclopaedia website, the definition of military-industrial complex in an American perspective was given as follows: “...usually refers to the combination of the U.S. armed forces, arms industry and associated political and commercial interests, which grew rapidly in scale and influence in the wake pf World War II, although it can also be used to describe any such relationship of industry and military. It is sometimes used to refer to the iron triangle which is argued to exist between weapons makers/military contractors, the Pentagon and the United States Congress.” For an excellent overview of the impact of capitalism with regards to modern warfare, see Peter Singer’s *Corporate Warriors: the Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*.

³ Peter Johnston and Dr. Michael Roi, “Future Security Environment 2025,” http://vcds.mil.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ord/fse2025/intro_e.asp; Internet; accessed 21 February 2005.

Looking back from the perspective of the 21st century, historians now view the Cold War era from a different perspective. All things being relative, the Cold War era was much more stable than the security environment of the 21st century. This stability was the result of the balance inherent in a bi-polar world; a world in which there were only two real players: the United States and the Soviet Union. With so few players, it was easy to identify and understand the enemy. Moreover, regional conflicts, with the exception of Vietnam and Afghanistan were generally kept under control and greatly minimized due to the fear of involvement of the two big players and potentially catastrophic escalation.

The demise of the Soviet Union left the United States alone to dominate in a uni-polar world. Although this in itself can conceivably bring a certain degree of stability, the reality has proven to be the exact opposite. With the fear of a third world war no longer looming on the horizon, conflicts have erupted throughout the world at an alarming rate.⁴ What's more, these conflicts are no longer being waged between nations over differing political ideologies, but rather between peoples within the *same* country in what has become widely known as intra-state warfare. What is particularly disturbing about these conflicts are the issues over which they are fought as well as the savagery that has characterized them. Intra-state wars are fought largely over religion and ethnicity. They are wars of hatred and they target all citizens of these countries, be they women, children, the elderly or any civilian for that matter.⁵

⁴ In his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Huntington states that “the collapse of communism having removed a common enemy of the West and Islam and left each the perceived threat of the other.” (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 211. This message is further reinforced in the executive summary of *Future Security Environment 2025* in which the authors state that “Conflict and international strife have been major features of the post-Cold War security environment and will likely be with us over the coming decades.”

⁵ Description of future conflict and the reasons behind these are prevalent in Kaplans's *The Coming Anarchy, Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War*. Pages 9, 11, 24, 49 and 50 are particularly noteworthy

Until the 11th of September 2001, these ugly little intra-state wars hardly appeared on the radar screen of the collective Western conscience. There were of course occasional news reports of atrocities being committed in the Balkans and Africa, but Westerners generally considered themselves impervious to these matters and therefore invested little thought or money to security issues. This, of course, changed on that fateful day in 2001 and Westerners have since scrambled to better understand the new dynamics at play in the ring of global security with a view to fixing the problem and also to better protecting themselves from future attacks.⁶

From a military perspective, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 9/11 attacks have had a profound impact on everything from force structures and equipment acquisition, to military law, to training for Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and combat in complex environments. Generally speaking, Western militaries have downsized tremendously since the end of the Cold War. These reductions have been coupled with an increased professionalization of militaries resulting with an almost complete disappearance of the massive conscript-based militaries of the Cold War.⁷

Like most other Western militaries, the Canadian Forces (CF) have struggled to keep up with the demands of the evolving threat environment of the 21st century. Until recently, because of the combination of continuous budget cuts and what can only be described as a leadership

⁶ This observation is largely anecdotal but one need only consider the impact of the attacks of 9/11 from a Canadian and American perspective and the changes in government in terms of homeland security and inter-agency cooperation that were precipitated by these events.

⁷ As an example, France ended conscription in 2001 and pundits agree that Germany will likely follow suit shortly. Also, according to an article accessed at www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-jun04/army_1-13.html, the US Army currently has 499 000 active duty personnel and 700 000 National guard and reserve troops, which amounts to approximately 1/3 less than the troops available in 1991. These facts, combined with the emergence of highly skilled Special Operations Forces throughout the world (as will be discussed in Chapter 2 of this paper) lead to the assertion made in this paragraph. Finally, the recently released defence portion of Canada's International Policy Statement also makes numerous references to the increased importance of SOF in a Canadian context.

void both at the political level and internally at the strategic levels of the Department of National Defence, the CF have had a particularly difficult time doing so.

Charles Darwin once stated the following regarding the importance of adaptability in terms of a species' ability to survive: "It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is the most adaptable to change." Given the evolving nature of the 21st century global security environment, the survival of the CF as a relevant military entity is at risk. By examining current international security trends, this paper will make the case that the key to continued CF relevance lies in its ability to become more expeditionary.⁸ In order to do so, the CF will have to adopt a force that, in general terms, incorporates the principles and capabilities of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).

In order to most effectively persuade the reader of the validity of the thesis statement, the paper has been broken down into three chapters. The first chapter focuses on the current and future global security environments. In it, the ideas of groundbreaking theorists such as Samuel Huntington, Robert Kaplan and Benjamin Barber are explored with a view to laying the contextual foundation upon which more specific military theories can be viewed and considered. The theory behind the expression "asymmetric threat" will then be covered providing important definitions as well as an interesting chronology of conflict and the development of asymmetric doctrine.

The second chapter focuses on recent conflicts involving enemies that have been deemed representative of the "asymmetric threat" as discussed in the previous chapter. The intent of this

⁸ In a graduate paper written in 1997 in which he conducted a cost comparison between the USMC and the CF, Craig Stone defined "expeditionary" by stating that the "ability to prepare and deploy into areas lacking logistic support capability is the reason the Marine Corps is described as an expeditionary force." J.C. Stone, "Value for

analysis is to draw important doctrinal lessons that are integrated into the proposed force structure. This chapter also includes an overview of the USMC's history as well as its capabilities and innovative doctrine. The concluding portion of this chapter includes an examination of the emerging role of Special Operations Forces (SOF). This important trend ties into the proposal put forward by this paper in that the contention will be made that the CF's new structure will have to include a robust and equally expeditionary SOF component in order for it to be best suited for the 21st century threat environment.

The focus of the third chapter will turn inwards to the CF and its mandate. This will be preceded by a brief historical overview of the unification of the CF in order to put discussions of future re-structuring and the pursuit of further integration of the CF into context. This will lead to the crux of the paper, which of course is the proposed adoption of a USMC-like force structure based on the MAGTF concept. The proposal will be presented in terms of general capabilities and structure concepts and will integrate issues regarding the security environment as well as doctrinal lessons from recent conflicts brought out in the previous two chapters.

CHAPTER 1 -

THE CURRENT AND FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS

Sierra Leone is a microcosm of what is occurring, albeit in a more tempered and gradual manner, throughout West Africa and much of the underdeveloped world: the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war.⁹

Money: A Cost Comparison Between The United States Marine Corps and The Canadian Forces/Department of National Defence," (term project, Economics of Defence Course War Studies 504, April 1997), 7.

⁹ Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy, Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War* (New York: Random House, 2000), 9.

A “BIFURCATED” WORLD¹⁰

In order to tackle the issue of the relevance of the Canadian Forces in terms of its current capabilities, it is critical to first delve into the complexities of the current and future global security environments. Of course, this overview of security issues will be relatively brief but will provide the reader with a basic understanding of some of the major sources of conflict in the world today. Specifically, the theories of Huntington, Barber, Stiglitz, Kaplan and others will be discussed and compared with a view to painting the security landscape that must drive the development of our own capabilities so that we may defeat the enemy, or at least militarily set the conditions for his defeat through a combination of diplomatic, economic and other means.

As mentioned in the introduction, the end of the Cold War created a sense of euphoria that was cut short when pundits came to the realization that the bi-polar environment that had been the reality of the international security environment for nearly 50 years had actually been the root of relative stability. This is not to suggest that the Cold War era was characterized strictly by peace and prosperity, but rather that it was, in relative terms, a somewhat predictable period of history. The superpowers had a game to play that manifested itself in occasional regional conflicts such as Korea, Vietnam, Central America, and Afghanistan. In retrospect however, the overwhelming threat of “mutual assured destruction” was an effective deterrent that generally had a limiting effect on the aforesaid conflicts.¹¹

¹⁰ “Bifurcated World” is a term coined by Kaplan that suggests that the world is becoming more and more divided into those countries that are able to manufacture goods in demand by other successful countries, and those countries that can’t keep up and that therefore eventually succumb to poverty and chaos.

¹¹ According to John Gaddis in his book *Strategies of Containment*, mutually assured destruction - or MAD as it became known during the Cold War - was actually a widely accepted military doctrine that acknowledged the ability for each side to annihilate the other many times over. In other words the common belief that “whoever shoots first, dies second” acted as an effective deterrent amongst the two superpowers.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall came a new wave of chaos and barbarity. Some of the conflicts were the result of long-standing ethnic or religious tensions, whilst others represented a manifestation of significant demographic and environmental stressors.¹² Regardless of the root cause of the various conflicts, the one common denominator among them was that they often coincided with the collapse of the state within which the conflict occurred. As a result, military conventions and international rule of law were ineffectual as soldiers and civilians mixed freely and slaughtered one another. The civil war in the former Yugoslavia is an excellent example of this.

In 1984, Sarajevo hosted the winter Olympics. The event was a tremendous success and although the country was known to be run by an authoritarian communist regime, Yugoslavia was able to successfully portray itself as a progressive Eastern European country where citizens of Bosnian Muslim, Serb and Croat descent lived in relative harmony. Although the country had been on the path of separation since the death of Tito in 1980, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to provide the impetus for the republics to secede from the central Yugoslav communist regime. In 1991, Slovenia declared independence and within the following year, all former Yugoslav republics were embroiled in a bloody civil war that saw former neighbours committing unspeakable atrocities against one another.

The end of the Cold War coincided with the rise of another significant international socio-economic phenomenon known as globalization. According to Joseph Stiglitz in his book *Globalization and Discontents*, globalization is defined as “the removal of barriers to free trade

¹² Chapter 7 of Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt’s book *Ecoviolence: Link Among Environment, Population, and Security* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998) deals precisely with this issue.

and the closer integration of national economies.”¹³ Although such integration would appear on the surface as having a potentially unifying effect, many analysts have contended that the reverse is in fact true.

In his book *The Coming Anarchy*, Robert Kaplan refers to the growing domination of corporations on the international economic scene and their seemingly unchecked pursuit of profits at the expense of the world’s most vulnerable citizens. In order to put their relative power in a numerical context, Kaplan makes the point that corporations make up 51 of the top 100 economies in the world. Moreover, according to Kaplan, the top 200 corporations employ only .75% of the world’s workforce while accounting for an incredible 28% of the world’s economic activity.¹⁴ Finally, Kaplan sums up his concerns regarding globalization in the following passage:

Corporations are like the feudal domains that evolved into nation-states; they are nothing less than the vanguard of a new Darwinian organization of politics. Because they are in the forefront of real globalization while the overwhelming majority of the world’s inhabitants are still rooted in local terrain, corporations will be free for a few decades to leave behind the social and environmental wreckage they create – abruptly closing a factory here in order to open an unsafe facility with a cheaper work force there.¹⁵

What Kaplan and many other experts are saying about globalization is that it is creating a “bifurcated world” or in other words, a world of haves and have-nots. This is not to suggest that there hasn’t always existed a divide between the wealthy and the poor of the world. The point being made however, is that the divide is growing incessantly in that the “haves” are becoming wealthier than ever whilst the plight of the “have-nots” worsens by the day. Although supporters of globalization would lead you to believe that laissez-faire capitalism is in the best interest of all

¹³ Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), ix.

¹⁴ Kaplan 81.

¹⁵ Kaplan 81.

citizens of the world, the numbers suggest otherwise. Statistics consistently reveal that the accumulation of wealth is a zero-sum game in that the relative prosperity of Westerners appears to have come at the expense of sub-Saharan Africans, Latin Americans, and many Asians whose economic growth has slowed considerably since the 1970s.¹⁶ In Stiglitz' words, "the gap between the poor and the rich has been growing, and even the number in absolute poverty – living on less than a dollar a day – has increased."¹⁷

In addition to its obvious economic impact, globalization has also had a tremendous cultural impact. Benjamin Barber's provocative work entitled *Jihad vs. McWorld* deals in part with the issue of the proliferation of Western popular culture throughout the world and the resultant frictions that this "cultural imperialism" is seen to create. Barber defines McWorld as a "product of popular culture driven by expansionist commerce."¹⁸ Although "cultural imperialism" can be a difficult concept to quantify, Barber does make reference to numerous statistics that provide a very interesting picture regarding the degree of the spread of Western popular culture throughout the world. For example, according to Barber, McDonald's was the top revenue-grossing restaurant in Japan in 1992 and the movie Terminator 2 was the most popular movie in Malaysia for 1991.¹⁹

But what do these statistics mean? Barber and Samuel Huntington suggest that although American pop culture is certainly a profitable export, its overwhelming presence in foreign societies also creates intense feelings of anti-Americanism. In fact, in his work entitled *The*

¹⁶ This notion is attributable to Stiglitz who in turn cites statistics from the World Bank. These statistics are detailed in paragraph 2 of his notes on p. 259.

¹⁷ Stiglitz 24.

¹⁸ Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 17.

¹⁹ Barber 18, 307. According to Barber's corresponding note for the McDonald's statistic, nearly 4500 of its 15000 total restaurants are abroad, including 1000 in Japan alone.

Clash of Civilizations, Huntington makes the case that the divisive issue in the 21st century is cultural rather than economic. According to Huntington, the world can be divided into nine distinct civilizations and in the post-Cold War era “the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural identities.”²⁰

Of particular importance to the discussion on the present security environment from a Western perspective is the growing rift between the Western and Muslim worlds. In his work, Huntington dedicates much of his attention to this issue and summarizes the problem by listing what he considers to be the five key contributing factors. The first of these is the important population boom experienced throughout the Muslim world in recent years. This phenomenon has resulted in a growing number of “unemployed and otherwise disaffected young people” looking for some outlet for their frustrations. It is from these pools of desperate youths that recruiters from Islamic fundamentalist organizations such as Hamas and Al Qaeda populate their rank and file.²¹

According to Huntington, the second factor contributing to the split between Islam and the West is what he refers to as the “Islamic Resurgence.” This resurgence can be attributed to leaders within the Muslim community who have rallied the aforementioned desperate youths by pointing the finger of blame for the Islamic world’s difficulties at the corruption and imperialism of Western civilization.²² Add to this what Huntington refers to as the “West’s simultaneous efforts to universalize its values and institutions, to maintain its military and economic

²⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 28. Huntington’s nine civilizations are as follows: Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese.

²¹ Huntington 211.

superiority, and to intervene in conflicts in the Muslim world,” and the potential for a tremendous backlash begins to materialize.²³

Similar to Barber’s claim regarding the friction created by the perception of American cultural imperialism, Huntington makes the point that the increased contact between the West and Islam brought on by Globalization has increased resentment among those who see themselves as protectors of the faith. As Huntington sees it, the prevalence of Western culture throughout the Muslim world has Imams reeling to fend off the corrupting influence of widely popular American movies and music videos; in short, the greater the contact between the two civilizations, the greater the resentment. When young Muslims watch American movies and music videos, they are exposed to a caricature of Western civilization that makes them question their own circumstances. Why shouldn’t women be allowed to lead productive lives and why shouldn’t heads of state be democratically elected? These are specifically some of the issues Huntington is referring to when he states “interaction and intermingling also exacerbate differences over the rights of the members of one civilization in a country dominated by members of the other civilization.”²⁴

Finally, Huntington draws a link between this clash of Islam and the West with the end of the Cold War. In simple terms, Huntington states that Communism represented a common enemy to both Islam and the West and therefore allowed the two rivals to temporarily set their differences aside. When combined with the previous four factors, Huntington describes the conditions for a cultural “perfect storm” of sorts; one which has resulted in today’s scenario

²² See Ralph Peters’ common denominators of nationalism and fundamentalism: *Fighting for the Future* (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2001), 120.

²³ Huntington 211.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

where relations between the West and the Muslim world have reached depths of intolerance not seen for centuries.

And what of the consequences of “renewable resource scarcity,” and how will these manifest themselves?²⁵ According to Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt in their work entitled *Ecoviolence*, water and land degradation, deforestation, decline in fisheries, global warming and stratospheric ozone depletion will play an increasingly significant role as causes of conflict.²⁶ Although there exists more than enough fresh water in the world, the issue is one of availability and quality (in terms of cleanliness and suitability for human consumption). The truth of the matter is that many of the world’s developing countries face critical shortages of potable water. The same can be said for arable land, which, when combined with the aforementioned deforestation, decline in fisheries, global warming, and stratospheric ozone depletion, combine to paint a very grim picture indeed.

The effects of renewable resource scarcity go well beyond the borders of those countries directly affected. As Homer-Dixon and Blitt point out, environmental scarcity combined with the market failure, social friction and capital availability common in developing countries results in the five following social effects: “constrained agricultural productivity, constrained economic productivity, migration, social segmentation, and disruption of legitimate institutions.”²⁷ In other words, a sort of vicious cycle exists whereby the rural citizens of developing countries will continue to migrate to urban centres looking for a better life. This migration will mean more stress on already overstretched urban infrastructure and less people in the fields producing the goods necessary to sustain growing populations. Already, in many parts of the world, this

²⁵ Homer-Dixon 2.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

urbanization has resulted in the “chronic and diffuse subnational violence that is exceedingly difficult to control using conventional means, that undermines development, and that sometimes jeopardizes the security of neighboring countries.”²⁸

DEFINING THE ASYMMETRIC THREAT

War will not take place in the open field, if only because in many places around the world there no longer is an open field. Its normal *mise en scene* will be complex environments, either those provided by nature or else the even more complex ones created by man. It will be a war of listening devices and of car-bombs, of men killing each other at close quarters, and of women using their purses to carry explosives and the drugs to pay for them. It will be protracted, bloody, and horrible.²⁹

Martin van Creveld wrote these prescient words in 1991 and given what we’ve seen occurring on the streets of Mogadishu, Freetown and most recently in Baghdad, it would appear as though the writer had been viewing a crystal ball. What van Creveld is describing in this passage is the essence of asymmetric warfare. In the Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts’ work entitled “Future Force”, several experts provide their own interpretations of asymmetry and the asymmetric threat. Steven Metz describes asymmetry as “acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action.... It can entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations, time perspectives, or some combination of these...”³⁰

The concept of technologically inferior forces using asymmetric means to neutralize an opponent’s advantage is not new. One need only think of Alexander’s battles against the

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

²⁹ van Creveld 212.

venerable warlord Spitamenes in the mountains of Afghanistan to understand how old this concept really is. Spitamenes' tactics involved drawing Alexander's more numerous and more heavily armed forces from the open plains and into the mountains where he would spring ambushes and retreat before being decisively engaged. Some 2300 years later, the Mujahideen were using almost identical tactics against the Soviets.

As was previously mentioned, the end of the Cold War brought with it a sudden proliferation of small and brutal intra-state conflicts. Although the French and the Americans had run into an asymmetric enemy in French Indochina/Vietnam, it wasn't until the early to mid 1990s that Western militaries actually began to use the term "asymmetric threat."³¹ In order to shed some historical context, the Americans had recently led a highly successful conventional campaign against the Iraqis in Operation Desert Storm. Following this success however, came the humbling experience of Mogadishu in 1993, where members of the US Army's elite Rangers as well as Delta Force operators encountered stiff resistance at the hands of Somali paramilitary troops and civilians. The violence of the battle eventually led to the withdrawal of US forces from the war-torn country.³² It was arguably at this point that senior military planners began to appreciate the potential implications of asymmetric warfare and the threat it posed to symmetrically construed and conventionally structured forces.³³ In fact, in 1996, General

³⁰ Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, "Asymmetry and US military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts," *US Army War College*, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001, 5-6. Taken from DLSC's *Future Force* p.63.

³¹ See Elinor Sloan's *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002),109.

³² See Mark Bowden's *Black Hawk Down* (New York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 2000), which provides a detailed account of the battle in question as well as an interesting perspective on some of the political context surrounding the deployment.

³³ According to the USMC's manual *Small Wars* (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Development Command, 2004), the pivotal moment for the Marines as an institution came as a result of the 1983 suicide bombing in Beirut that took the lives of 241 US servicemen and women.

Charles Krulak, retired Commandant of the United States Marine Corps said the following about the nature of future warfare: "...is most likely not the son of Desert Storm; rather it will be the stepchild of Somalia and Chechnya."³⁴

In addition to Mogadishu, Western militaries were also coming to terms with the fact that notwithstanding the regional threats posed by China, North Korea, and arguably Iraq, an immediate and credible conventional threat to Western security no longer existed. Instead, the threat to Western interests appeared in the form of extremist Islamic organizations and the continuing disintegration of sub-Saharan states. Until the attacks of 11 September 2001 however, the threat remained a foreign problem and therefore did not prompt the re-structuring necessary in Western militaries and other governmental agencies to properly deal with the new threat in a domestic context. The result was of course self-evident and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 served as a brutal yet effective wake-up call to the entire Western world. The message was clear; the threat was now not only to "national interests" on foreign shores. The new enemy had struck at the symbolic heart of Western civilization thus forever shifting the paradigm of asymmetric warfare.

The correlation between failed states and the asymmetric threat that had been openly advocated by the likes of van Creveld et al. was finally acknowledged as the US-led "war on terrorism" pursued Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. From a military perspective, the implications were equally clear. Military forces would have to evolve and embrace a somewhat asymmetric approach of their own in order to attack the enemy where and when necessary to be most effective. In other words, the optimal military force would have to be responsive (in terms of both strategic and tactical mobility), flexible (in terms of adapting to a

³⁴ Robert Holzer, "Krulak Warns of Over-Reliance on Technology," *Defence News*, 7-13 October 1996, 4. Taken from Future Force p.62.

continuously shifting enemy scenario to which no template could ever be applied), and capable of delivering a decisive blow to the enemy in any environment necessary.

CHAPTER 2 –
THE EVOLUTION OF MILITARY FORCES IN THE FACE OF THE
ASYMMETRIC THREAT

Like a man who has been shot in the head but still manages to stagger forward a few paces, conventional war may be at its last gasp. As low-intensity conflict rises to dominance, much of what has passed for strategy during the last two centuries will be proven useless. The shift from conventional war to low-intensity conflict will cause many of today's weapons systems, including specifically those that are most powerful and most advanced, to be assigned to the scrap-heap. Very likely it also will put an end to large-scale military-technological research and development as we understand it today.³⁵

On October 23, 1983 the world turned upside down for the U.S. Marine Corps. The deaths of 241 sailors, soldiers, and Marines in a concrete slab building in Beirut, Lebanon at the hands of a suicide bomber marked the beginning of the end of an era – an era where the enemy was a Soviet motorized rifle regiment and where Marines stood guard duty without magazines inserted because the United States was not “at war.” In retrospect, the Beirut bombing was a seminal event, heavily influencing subsequent Marine Corps organization and culture and ushering in the kind of profound change that seldom takes place in large organizations without the stimulus of a significant emotional event.³⁶

**SIERRA LEONE & AFGHANISTAN – TAKING THE FIGHT TO THE ASYMMETRIC
ENEMY**

Although Mogadishu and Beirut certainly represent excellent examples of an asymmetric enemy imposing its will on technologically superior Western forces, it is important to note more

³⁵ van Creveld 205.

³⁶ *Small Wars* 1.

recent examples of the reverse occurring. Since the debacle of Mogadishu in 1993, two specific engagements/campaigns have taken place that are worthy of particular attention in that they highlight the progress made by Western militaries in their ability to adopt less conventional approaches in order to defeat the enemy at their own game. The first of these consisted of a non-combatant evacuation operation conducted by the British in Sierra Leone in 2000.

The British experience in Sierra Leone is important because it encompasses several themes that are critical to the aim of this paper. Firstly, the scenario involves a failed African state, non-state players, and national interests that have become threatened by these same belligerents. If the writings of Kaplan and other analysts already mentioned are to be acknowledged as sound, it is safe to presume that scenarios such as this one will be common in the future. It is therefore important that a recent military engagement involving an asymmetric enemy be examined closely so that appropriate doctrinal/structural lessons may be drawn from it. Secondly, with regards to the forces involved and their employment, the scenario is textbook in terms of its joint nature and the timeliness of its execution. Thirdly, the setting involves those obstacles that are most likely to be present in future scenarios including a country with little infrastructure and an objective area in the middle of an almost inaccessible African jungle (which in military parlance would be referred to as complex terrain).³⁷

In the early morning of 10 September 2000, three Royal Air Force Chinook helicopters escorted by two heavily armed Lynx helicopters flew “nap of the earth” along the Rokel Creek towards the objective area some 40 kilometres east of Freetown. The Chinooks were loaded with a mix of Special Air Service troopers and paratroopers from the 1st Battalion of the Parachute

³⁷ Regarding the likely physical environment for future conflict, van Creveld states the following: “War will not take place in the open field, if only because in many places around the world there no longer is an open field. Its normal *mise en scene* will be complex environments, either those provided by nature or else the even more complex ones created by man.” 212.

Regiment. Their mission was to rescue British nationals who had been taken hostage by a rebel group/criminal gang named the “West Side Boys”. Whether this group represented a legitimate and organized rebel faction with an equally legitimate political agenda rather than a purely criminal gang is more or less irrelevant. What is important however is that they embodied what van Creveld referred to as “warmaking organizations of a different type.”³⁸

After a week’s worth of rehearsals in England and Senegal, the team was set to go and the near flawless execution of the plan in the early morning of 10 September reflected both the excellent preparations as well as the level of professionalism of the soldiers and officers involved. As it turned out, the enemy were caught almost entirely off guard as the troopers carried out their assigned tasks. The hostages were all rescued, the gang leader “Brigadier” Kallay was captured along with another 17 members of the “West Side Boys”, and 25 others were killed. Eleven British troops received minor injuries, one was seriously wounded and one was killed as a result of his wounds received during the rescue.³⁹

Despite the casualties, the mission was universally acknowledged as an unmitigated success and is often cited as a prime example of the successful integration of SOF with conventional forces. This concept will be re-visited in the analysis of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and will also be dealt with as a separate issue later in this chapter. What other lessons can be drawn from this operation? First and foremost, Operation Barras clearly displayed the important role that strategic and tactical mobility played in ensuring that the plan could be executed in a non-permissive and complex environment, and all in a timely fashion. This point is critical to acknowledge and will be a recurring theme throughout the discussion of

³⁸ van Creveld 192.

future force structures. If the aim of future military forces is to be able to project force to presumably failing states, then the force must be able to deploy rapidly to the region via strategic lift – by sea or air – and then to deploy tactically to the actual objective either from a friendly neighbouring country or from adjoining littoral waters. Given the potential difficulty of securing a staging area from a neighbouring country at extremely short notice, the ability to project from an afloat forward-staging base (AFSB) suddenly becomes a critical element to an expeditionary force.⁴⁰

Beyond the issue of physical access to the area of operations, there is also the need for operational security, which is difficult to achieve in a foreign country if the mission is preceded with the establishment of a secure forward operating base. If the operation is staged from a ship located off the coast of the objective area, the assaulting force has the ability to launch an operation prior to the enemy ever knowing that a threat exists, which is presumably what happened in Sierra Leone.

The importance of a country being able to respond in a forceful and timely fashion, independent of any other country, in order to deal with an immediate crisis affecting national interests – be it citizens in a foreign country or an embassy under siege in a failing state for example – cannot be overstated. It is an issue that can affect a country far beyond tangible or rational terms. It is an issue that can strike deep at the heart of a nation. Beyond obviously ensuring the safe return of the hostages, James Kiras had this to say in his article entitled

³⁹ Michael Smith, Philip Sherwell, and David Blair, “Helicopters Pluck Hostages from Jungle with Precision: Team Practised for Week: Rescuers Knew Location of Guards and Weapons,” *National Post*, 11 September 2000, 1.

⁴⁰ In his book *The Lessons of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence, and Force Transformation* (Washington: The CSIS Press, 2002), 143, Anthony Cordesman states the following regarding AFSBs: “...the use of carriers as AFSBs [afloat forward-staging bases] represents an evolution in the role of the carrier in military operations and represents the military’s desire to increase U.S. power projection and strike capability across the globe, thereby complimenting attempts to create a new forward-deployed military deterrence against future enemies.”

Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, about the true intent of the British when they launched Operation Barras:

The rescue mission was intended to convey an unequivocal political message as valid today as it was during the punitive British expedition to Sierra Leone in 1899: an insult to British national pride would be wiped out, a wrong avenged, and an action would be taken to deter other groups from kidnapping British citizens.⁴¹

The context for the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan is widely known. 11 September 2001 will be forever remembered as a day of immense tragedy in American history. The response from the U.S. administration was swift once responsibility for the attacks was determined.

American special operations forces (SOF) entered Afghanistan in early November. Their initial goal was to assist the Northern Alliance in the defeat of the Taliban with a view to setting the conditions for the eventual eradication of al Qaeda, which had been using Afghanistan as a base of operations from which terrorist activities were planned and the foot soldiers trained. The highly skilled and adaptive SOF integrated themselves fully with the Northern Alliance soldiers. They wore indigenous clothing, grew their beards, and even turned in their usual modes of transportation for horses, which the Northern Alliance used, and which were better suited for the mountainous terrain. The modus operandi of the SOF consisted of pinpointing the Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates of all major Taliban weapons systems and troop locations and relaying these to aircraft circling overhead. These in turn would proceed to attack the enemy positions with precision guided munitions (PGMs) or conventional munitions if necessary. These aerial attacks then allowed the Northern Alliance troops to close with the enemy and provide the decisive blow, often doing so with numerically inferior forces as was the case at

⁴¹ James Kiras, "Terrorism and Irregular Warfare," in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, ed. John Baylis et al., 208-229 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 228.

Mazar-e-Sharif where 900 Northern Alliance troops under command of General Dostum defeated an enemy force of some 8500. This cooperation between SOF and Northern Alliance forces proved terribly effective and the Taliban, as a cohesive fighting force and ruling government, was defeated within a few short weeks.⁴²

Concurrent to the Northern Alliance campaign in the north of the country, SOF and Marines were establishing a forward operating base some 100 kilometres south of Kandahar. The base, codenamed “Rhino” was in fact a small sand runway established and maintained by a several dozen SOF troops. Marines immediately began flying in from carriers in the Indian Ocean on CH-53s as well as from Oman on C-130s and C-17s. As they landed, they were incorporated into the perimeter defensive scheme as well as offensive patrols aimed at cutting off retreating Taliban and al Qaeda operatives. The location for “Rhino” was deemed particularly important because it was situated along what was suspected to be the primary escape route for the enemy looking to flee the advancing Northern Alliance via the Arabian Sea. Within days, an entire 1000 man Marine Expeditionary Unit had been flown into Rhino and was conducting offensive operations with their light armoured vehicles (LAV).⁴³

How effective was this quick deployment of conventional and SOF troops in the middle of the Afghani desert? Lieutenant General (ret'd) DeLong, who was Deputy Commander of CENTCOM at the time, stated the following:

We had all the exits and all the major highways covered. We watched them with our Predators at night and our troops by day. This kind of warfare had to be done with fast-moving vehicles, without a lot of support. It had to be done at night in small groups. It was very high-risk. And it was exactly what Special Ops and Marines were best at. They performed outstandingly, constantly surprising and weakening the Taliban and al-Qeada

⁴² Micheal Delong and Noah Lukeman, *Inside CENTCOM: The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq* (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2004), 45-47.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 54.

forces. After a week of this, the enemy was so demoralized that Kandahar was ripe for surrender.⁴⁴

The success of the combined SOF and light conventional forces throughout Operation Enduring Freedom is universally acknowledged and the lessons from this conflict are viewed as important enough to transcend this single theatre of operations. Regarding the significance of the SOF contribution specifically, Norman Friedman was unequivocal when he claimed that they were in fact “essential to the war’s success.”⁴⁵ Anthony Cordesman, author of *The Lessons of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence, and Force Transformation*, was equally enthusiastic in his praise of the SOF contribution during Operation Enduring Freedom when he stated that Special Forces provided “a critical element of coalition warfare in training Afghan forces and in providing local intelligence.”⁴⁶

In attempting to glean lessons from a past conflict such as Operation Enduring Freedom, there exists a risk that a military may simply attempt to learn how to fight “yesterday’s war.” Again, the point must be made that the recurring theme throughout the vast majority of the works based on the present and future threat environment point precisely to scenarios like Operation Barras and Operation Enduring Freedom as likely scenarios for future deployments of Western militaries. On the relative importance of Operation Enduring Freedom as a teaching tool from which valuable doctrinal lessons may be drawn, Norman Friedman had this to say:

Afghanistan may be more typical in the future than we can imagine. It is entirely possible that we will usually find ourselves fighting wars like this, in which territory is *not* the object, and it may be that in such wars the concepts of network-centric warfare (in effect, of strike warfare on a large scale) will prove particularly apt.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Norman Friedman, *Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s New Way of War* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 221.

⁴⁶ Cordesman 150.

⁴⁷ Friedman 216.

Although Operations Enduring Freedom and Barras differ tremendously in terms of scope, duration, and enemy, there exist many similarities and therefore many common lessons may be drawn. The first of these is the importance of the integration of SOF with conventional forces in order to achieve a truly synergistic effect. Although this topic will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, the tremendous benefit of joint SOF/conventional operations was again reinforced, albeit on a much larger scale. As was the case with the British in Sierra Leone, the U.S.-led coalition specifically tailored task forces in order to achieve the optimal mix of capabilities. This “jointness” went beyond SOF and conventional Army/Marines to include USAF and Navy elements and even representatives from other governmental agencies including the CIA and the FBI. Moreover, it occurred at all levels from formation to sub-sub-unit. Such is the reality in 21st century warfare where the enemy is no longer a lawful combatant but rather criminal, and matters of jurisdiction often become very complex. As a result, flexibility and cooperation among the various agencies and military components becomes all the more critical.

The second lesson to be drawn from these operations is the critical role of strategic and tactical mobility, especially when operating in a non-permissive and particularly rugged or complex environment. It is this fact that allowed the forces in both operations to so effectively disrupt the enemy. The coalition forces in Afghanistan were so well equipped and trained for operations in complex terrain that the enemy had nowhere to hide. This was new to the enemy. Throughout its history, al Qaeda had cherished Afghanistan as a safe haven due to its largely inaccessible landscape. By attacking the enemy with actual SOF and conventional troops in places like Tora Bora and Shahi-Kowt Valley, the coalition was able to keep the enemy reeling and constantly on the defensive. When dealing with an asymmetric enemy, this is arguably the

closest one will ever get to achieving a decisive victory as Friedman alludes to in the following excerpt:

Success in the war against terrorism is unlikely to be complete, just as there can be no final victory in the war against crime or, almost certainly, against drugs. In each case, success is defined as holding the problem below some acceptable level, and that is not a bad definition.⁴⁸

***THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS – THE OPTIMAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY***

That a role which is suited to a country of our size and having regard to the financial burdens possible to be borne over a lengthy term, would be a tri-service force whose main objective was peacekeeping. I believe its organization should be very much like that of the United States Marine Corps which is a mobile force complete with all its ancillaries and able to meet what are commonly called brushfire situations.⁴⁹

Prior to delving into a historical overview of the USMC, it is important to first understand that Canada's interest in the Marines is by no means a new phenomenon as displayed in the 1963 quote from LGen Simonds. Throughout its history, the USMC has established a reputation as one of the world's finest conventional military forces. It is a lean military organization that is purposely built to project force to the world's most hostile environments. As such, it is a model of relative efficiency, and given today's security environment (as discussed in the previous chapter), it represents a model that is arguably more relevant than ever when considering future CF force structures.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Friedman 249.

⁴⁹ LGen Guy Simonds quoted in *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 14, Special Committee on Defence*, The Honourable M. Sauve, Chairman, 17 October 1963, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1963), 439.

⁵⁰ The issue of efficiency is an interesting one and is discussed in some detail in Craig Stone's work where he compares the cost-efficiency of the USMC vs. the CF. Although his paper ultimately proved to be inconclusive, it did provide some interesting figures regarding the USMC's ability to deliver an apparently formidable "bang for the buck" in terms of combat capability when compared to the CF.

Our mission did not change with the end of the Cold War era, so there is no need for other major changes in the Marine Corps specifically in response to the demise of the Soviet Union. Where we can assist this nation as the other services adjust to the post-Cold War period is to be this country's "risk-balance" force. We provide to the nation the ability to take a risk – in this case allowing the rest of the military services to draw down quickly while still having an organization that is ready to respond. We are the most ready when the nation is the least ready, and you don't want to reduce the only force that provides this nation the capability to react while at the same time assuming the risks associated with the rapid post-Cold War drawdown.⁵¹

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) was created in 1775 and therefore pre-dates its nation by some eight months.⁵² Modeled after Britain's Royal Marines, the role of the USMC was initially to provide a ship's Captain with a core of professional soldiers that could be used in a variety of capacities including the disciplining of unruly sailors, manning of heavy guns, boarding enemy ships and even conducting the occasional raid on enemy soil. The USMC's true expeditionary roots were not established however until the beginning of the 19th century, during which time British and American commercial shipping became more frequently subject to wanton attacks by the "Barbary pirates" operating in the Mediterranean from North African ports. After several years of paying ransoms for the safe return of its hijacked ships, the United States finally decided to react forcefully and sent several Marine-led expeditions to deter future similar attacks.⁵³

Following their successes in World War I where they developed the concept of Close Air Support (CAS), as well as the inter-war years that were marked by numerous counter-insurgency campaigns, the USMC found itself involved in some of the Pacific campaign's fiercest infantry battles. It was during this time that the USMC applied the visionary doctrine that it had been

⁵¹ General Krulak quoted in Tom Clancy, *Marine: A Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit* (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 1996), 32.

⁵² Clancy, *Marine...*, 3.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 4.

developing during the 1930s. This doctrine involved a truly joint approach to amphibious assaults that included innovative tactics such as dive-bombing, which was conceived to ensure precise delivery of aerial bombs in support of ground troops. This period also saw the development of technologies in the fields of specialized landing craft, communications equipment, and naval gunfire control equipment.⁵⁴

In Korea, the Marines once again distinguished themselves. Of particular significance was the stunning success of the landing at Inchon. Following this pivotal battle however, the Marines found themselves being somewhat misemployed as the Army's poor cousins for the remainder of the War. This prompted the development of new structural doctrine that would ensure that Marine formations would always deploy as a self-contained outfit, one that would no longer be dependent on the Air Force for CAS or the Army for logistical support. The result was the creation of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), which remains the force structure concept of the Marine Corps to this day. This concept of self-containment is important to the discussion of future Canadian Force structures because it is precisely this concept that allows the Marines to be as flexible and as responsive as they are, no matter the crisis:

For the Corps, the tendency of Presidents to “send the Marines” simply affirms their “first to fight” reputation, as well as the inherent flexibility of the MAGTF concept. Willingness to move first and fast, and being ready to do so, is part of the marine ethos – when you want something done right, give the job to the Corps!⁵⁵

Although the existence of the USMC came under attack during the Congressional defence reviews of the 1970s, things changed for the better with the election of President Reagan in 1980. Along with the increased funding, a marked increase in terrorist activity targeted at American interests prompted the Corps to create the Special Operations Capable Marine Expeditionary Unit or MEU (SOC). Unlike the other departments of the US military, the

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

Marines chose not to pursue a separate special operations branch within the Corps. Instead, and in very simplified terms, the concept involved rotating conventional Marine units through what can be described from a Canadian perspective as pre-deployment work-up training involving unconventional training scenarios. These scenarios essentially represented the delta of capabilities deemed lacking in conventional training in order to ensure that the units were equipped and trained to deal with a wide variety of contingencies including hostage rescues. Once the unit's standards were achieved and validated they were authorized for deployment. When distilled, what these MEU (SOC) units represented were MAGTFs of roughly 2000 personnel pre-positioned around the world and ready to deploy at very short notice. What makes the MEU (SOC) so appealing to senior leadership of the US military is that they can operate on their own, along the full spectrum of conflict, whenever and wherever they are needed. In other words, they are truly expeditionary in that they are self-contained, self-sustaining, and are both equipped and trained to deal with almost any international crisis requiring military action, be it combat or humanitarian assistance.⁵⁶ This of course is consistent with the following passage taken from the newly revised draft of "Small Wars":

The most relevant forces for future small wars must be prepared to respond on shorter timelines than in the past. As a very general rule, units should be roughly 80 to 90 percent task organized for the most likely missions in their area of responsibility. Then when the alert order is received, only fine-tailoring employing Modular Task Organization is required to address specialized requirements and fully optimize the force for the specific mission.⁵⁷

The structure of the MEU (SOC) is a reflection of this philosophy of high readiness and is based on the following elements:

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 210-214.

⁵⁷ Department of the Navy, *Small Wars* (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Development Command, 2004), 69.

- Command Element (CE) consisting of the formation's headquarters personnel including the command team (led by a Colonel) and the formation's communications experts;
- Ground Combat Element (GCE) consisting of an infantry battalion with a full complement of combat support assets including field artillery and air defence assets;
- Aviation Combat Element (ACE) consisting of fixed and rotary wing aircraft including AV-8B Harrier IIs, CH-53 Super Stallions, and AH-1 W Cobras;
- Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) consisting of a large sub-unit covering all necessary CSS functions for the formation including medical, supply, maintenance etc.⁵⁸

In addition to a new structural approach, the Marines also underwent some important doctrinal introspection over the past decade that has resulted in a significant shift in emphasis from providing a strictly conventional amphibious assault force that is engineered to establish a beachhead for follow-on forces, to a much more manoeuvrist doctrine. This new manoeuvrist emphasis is captured in the 1997 Marine Corps publication entitled *Ship-to-Objective Maneuver*, and as its title would suggest, the publication looks to promote the concept of force projection from an objective's littoral waters directly to the objective. What this implies in turn is bypassing well-prepared enemy defensive forces on the beaches in order to target the enemy's vulnerabilities.⁵⁹

In his book entitled *Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies*, Terry Pierce defines a disruptive innovation as that which improves "performance along a war fighting trajectory that

⁵⁸ Clancy, *Marine...*, 215-216.

⁵⁹ Department of the Navy, *Ship-to-Objective Maneuver* (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, July 25, 1997), 5-6.

traditionally has not been valued.”⁶⁰ He then goes on to cite the Blitzkrieg as an example due to its involvement of an important shift in the way that a combat arm fought, therefore forcing the enemy to react to a tactic that it had not envisioned.⁶¹ The doctrine of *Ship-to-Objective Maneuver* arguably represents another example of such a disruptive innovation. In fact, in his book *The Lessons of Afghanistan*, Anthony Cordesman implies that the U.S. military’s renewed interest in the capability to project force from littoral waters is so important that it has actually resulted in the development of a new role for the Navy’s aircraft carriers:

...the use of carriers as AFSBs [afloat forward-staging bases] represents an evolution in the role of the carrier in military operations and represents the military’s desire to increase U.S. power projection and strike capability across the globe, thereby complimenting attempts to create a new forward-deployed military deterrence against future enemies.”⁶²

Given then that this doctrinal innovation seems to be tailored to the 21st century environment and appears to be the focus of future force structures of our most important ally, it would be prudent to further analyse its meaning so that it may be considered in the context of future capabilities of the Canadian Forces.

According to the publication *Ship-to-Objective Maneuver*, the purpose for the development of this doctrine is that the U.S. Armed Forces still require “a force projection capability that will secure early and decisive advantages over their enemies.”⁶³ However, as previously mentioned, this new doctrine involves much more than simply “storming the beach” as Marines were seen doing in the Pacific Campaign of World War II. Instead, the essence of

⁶⁰ Terry C. Pierce, *Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies* (New York: Frank Cass, 2004), 1.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Cordesman 143.

⁶³ Department of the Navy, *Ship-to-Objective Maneuver...*, 2.

ship-to-objective maneuver involves “thrusting combat units ashore in their fighting formations, to a decisive place, and in sufficient strength to ensure mission accomplishment.”⁶⁴

This more manoeuvrist approach to Marine tactics ensures that the Marines will be less predictable and much more surgical in their application of force. This also means that the Marines will be able to provide a more timely armed response, which is clearly paramount when dealing with a highly mobile asymmetric enemy capable of packing up and leaving upon the first hint of intervention. The ability to effectively execute a ship-to-objective manoeuvre doctrine is dependent on seven key capabilities, as described in the following table:

<u>Capability</u>	<u>Description</u>
Mobility	This capability involves for the most part the platforms necessary for both surface and vertical assault from the littoral waters (also referred to as the Littoral Penetration Area by the USMC) including the landing craft air cushion (LCAC), the vertical take-off and landing aircraft (VTOL), and the advanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV).
Command and Control	With centralized planning and decentralized execution as themes common to any manoeuvrist doctrine, excellent situational awareness is critical at all levels so that the right people are receiving the necessary information at the right time. More specifically, commanders must be able to reinforce success in a timely fashion as well as assist those forces encountering difficulties in the execution of the plan.
Intelligence	More than ever, the importance of a “reconnaissance pull” philosophy is emphasized in the ship-to-objective manoeuvre doctrine. As a result,

⁶⁴ Department of the Navy, *Ship-to-Objective Maneuver...*, 6.

	technologies able to provide the necessary fidelity of intelligence required at the tactical level will be sought.
Fires	Must be available in all weather and around the clock, and must be accurate even at long ranges. In order to address this capability, the USMC has ensured that much redundancy is in place at the tactical level; hence the availability of CAS fighter-bombers, attack helicopters, field artillery, mortars, and naval gunfire/surface-to-surface missiles that can all provide support to commanders of surface and vertical assault elements.
Information Operations	Are critical in ensuring that the assaulting forces achieve the necessary surprise and deception called for in ship-to-objective manoeuvre.
Sea-based logistics	As is the case with the previously stated capabilities, the ability for the Marine Corps to sustain itself from the sea is not a new requirement. However, ship-to-objective manoeuvre requires a much more flexible and responsive approach to sustainment. Having to support elements manoeuvring at much greater distances and at much higher speeds through hostile territory adds another dimension to the complexities of sustainment, which is why mastery of this piece is critical to the success of this new doctrine.
Organization, Doctrine, and Training and Education	Of course, in order for this doctrine to be effectively executed, the Department of the Navy must be prepared to undergo some fundamental changes including organizational, doctrinal, as well as training and educational. Moreover, ship-to-objective manoeuvre also

	represents a philosophical shift in that it requires constant evolution and flexibility in order to effectively deal with a constantly evolving enemy. ⁶⁵
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One could argue that when analysed individually, these capabilities clearly do not represent revolutionary doctrinal thinking. Although this may be an accurate observation, the point being made in describing the ship-to-objective manoeuvre doctrine is that it captures the true meaning of joint warfare at the tactical level. It is not the individual parts but rather the sum of these parts that makes this doctrine so important. In fact, the point could be made that this doctrine represents the essence of the USMC in that it delivers a synergistic effect that is the key to the success of any expeditionary force, given the logistical constraints of an expeditionary campaign. This is why the USMC should be looked upon from a Canadian perspective as a shining example of how the CF could achieve greater cohesion, unity of effort, and most importantly, a greater relevance in the face of the 21st century threat environment. Prior to turning the focus of this paper inward towards the CF and its mandate, it is important to provide a brief overview of one other significant development that was mentioned in the descriptions of Operations Barras and Enduring Freedom. The issue is the emerging role of SOF in Western militaries everywhere and the highly effective combination of SOF and conventional forces in the fight against the asymmetric enemy.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES – AN ASYMMETRIC ANSWER TO THE 21ST CENTURY ENEMY

The aim in this portion of the paper is not to go over once again the specific accomplishments of SOF in recent operations, but rather to discuss from a macro perspective the evolving role of SOF in Western militaries in order to draw ideas that may be applicable to discussions of future CF capabilities and structures in the following Chapter of this paper. SOF is the topic of choice amongst military academics everywhere - one need only pick up a recent copy of the Canadian Military Journal wherein no less than four articles can be found dealing with this very topic – and the interest is natural as we collectively struggle as a profession to deal with the asymmetric threat.⁶⁶ In the previously mentioned issue of the Canadian Military Journal is an article written by Colonel Bernd Horn in which he summarizes the reasons for the emergence of SOF in the following excerpt:

The tragic terrorist attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City on 11 September 2001 transformed the perception of SOF and represented the culmination of their acceptance as a core element of any modern military force. Faced with an elusive foe that relies on dispersion, complex terrain, and asymmetric tactics, political and military decision-makers recognized that only a flexible, adaptive and agile response would suffice. SOF, with its organizational flexibility, rapid mobility, and its underlying strength of exceptionally well trained personnel, answered the call yet again.⁶⁷

As Horn alludes to in his article, SOF has become the weapon of choice for Western governments in their fight against terrorism. That being said, the point will be made that the optimal employment of SOF should include a complimentary conventional element. Despite certain exceptions, successful SOF operations in recent years have generally consisted of joint

⁶⁵ Department of the Navy, *Ship-to-Objective Maneuver...*, 19-22. It should be noted that although the headings of each category were taken from the text as cited, the accompanying text was paraphrased from the original source.

⁶⁶The specific edition being referred to is *Canadian Military Journal* 5, no. 3 (Autumn 2004). In this edition, there are four articles relating to SOF. They are: “When Cultures Collide: The Conventional Military/SOF Chasm” by Colonel Bernd Horn; “Special Operations Forces: Ready, Relevant and Precise” by Lieutenant-Colonel Jamie Hammond; “Canadian Special Operations Forces: A Blueprint for the Future” by Major Brister; and “Who Has Seen the Wind? An Historical Overview of Canadian Special Operations” by Dr. Sean Maloney.

⁶⁷ Bernd Horn, “When Cultures Collide: The Conventional Military / SOF Chasm,” *Canadian Military Journal* 5, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 6.

efforts with conventional land forces providing essential support to the specific SOF task. This trend was touched upon in the recounting of Operations Barras and Enduring Freedom and was again mentioned by General Tommy Franks in a statement made before the House of Armed Services Committee of the United States House of Representatives as a key lesson learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom.⁶⁸ Although SOF is not mentioned per se in the thesis of this paper, its inclusion in any relevant force structure proposal is essential. It is therefore important to discuss the issue in general terms so that it may be integrated into the proposal in a manner that will ensure its optimal employment, which in turn will ultimately contribute to the enhanced security of Canada.

In his article “Special Operations Forces: Relevant, Ready and Precise” Lieutenant-Colonel Jamie Hammond states that the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq represented watershed campaigns in that SOF actually played leading roles with conventional forces supporting the former.⁶⁹ Although this assertion might be debated in the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the same cannot be said for its predecessor Enduring Freedom which was characterized from the outset by an unconventional approach to dealing with the enemy.⁷⁰ The critical piece

⁶⁸ Micheal DeLong and Noah Lukeman, *Inside CENTCOM: The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq* (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2004), 144. The statement made by General Tommy Franks before the House Armed Services Committee of the United States House of Representatives on 10 July 2003 was included as Appendix A to the above-cited book. The following excerpt captures the point regarding the significance of the SOF working jointly with conventional forces as made by General Franks: “Our forces were able to achieve their operational objectives by integrating ground maneuver, special operations, precision lethal fires and non-lethal effects. We saw for the first time integration of forces rather than deconfliction of forces. This integration enabled conventional (air, ground, and sea) forces to leverage SOF capabilities to deal effectively with asymmetric threats and enable precision targeting simultaneously in the same battle space. Likewise, Special Operators were able to use conventional forces to enhance and enable special missions. Operational fires spearheaded our ground maneuver, as our forces sustained the momentum of the offense while defeating enemy formations in open, complex, and urban terrain.”

⁶⁹ Jamie Hammond, “Special Operations Forces: Ready, Relevant and Precise,” *Canadian Military Journal* 5, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 18.

⁷⁰ The title “Operation Enduring Freedom” refers to the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan that began on 7 October 2001. “Operation Iraqi Freedom” refers to the campaign that began on 19 March 2003. For an

preceding these campaigns that arguably set the conditions for SOF to take the lead was the passage of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defence Organization Act by the American Congress. This amendment directed that the Department of Defence create a separate four-star joint command under which all American SOF would be grouped. This eventually led to the creation in 1987 of what is known today as the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).⁷¹

The creation of USSOCOM was significant in the development of SOF capabilities worldwide. In one fell swoop, the US SOF community was granted equal status among military components. The implications of this move were numerous and significant. Most importantly, the creation of USSOCOM ensured that SOF would, in the future, be considered a full-fledged component of any US Joint Task Force, including one created in the context of combined or coalition operations.

Although SOF have been a fixture in the British and Australian armies for many years, the commitment of these troops to extended deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom has resulted in both countries re-visiting their respective SOF structures. The British solution to the requirement for increased SOF capability has been the presumed creation of an additional SAS squadron as well as the creation of a new Reconnaissance and Surveillance Regiment.⁷² The Australians have gone much further and have

interesting insider's perspective of both campaigns, see LGen (ret'd) DeLong's previously cited book *Inside Centcom*.

⁷¹ Hammond 19. See also Tom Clancy and Carl Stiner, *Shadow Warriors* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2002) for multiple references to the context and impact of the Nunn-Cohen amendment to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defence Organization Act.

⁷² See Sean Rayment's two articles: "SAS creates a new squadron to counter threat from al-Qa'eda," *The Telegraph*, 7 March 2004; available from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/03/07/wbin107.xml>; Internet; accessed 31 March

in fact mimicked the Americans by creating their very own Special Operations Command. In addition to the Australian Special Air Service Regiment, the newly formed command created in 2003, consists of a converted infantry unit (into a commando regiment) as well as an assortment of other special operations components.⁷³

Although many differences exist between American, British and Australian SOF structures, there are also some important similarities that are indeed indicative of universally acknowledged capability requirements in the fight against the asymmetric threat. Hammond effectively captures these similarities in a list of “observations on SOF”. For the purposes of this paper, his key observations are paraphrased as follows:

- “SOF have truly become the fourth component.” Hammond is referring here to the equal status of the SOF community among the other existing military components. In simple terms, SOF is a reality in almost every conceivable military intervention today and in the future. Therefore, the point is made that a country can ill-afford not to contribute a SOF element to a coalition joint task force if it wants to stay current of military actions being undertaken covertly. Without such a contribution, a country risks being kept on the periphery of the sensitive decision-making related to an operation and therefore loses clout.
- “SOF are in demand today and for the future.... SOF are precise, lethal and discriminate.... when used appropriately, SOF create military, diplomatic and political successes out of all proportion to their numbers.” This point has been made

2005; and “Britain forms new special forces unit to fight al-Qa’eda.” *The Telegraph*, 25 July 2004; available from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/07/25/nrsr25.xml>; Internet; accessed 31 March 2005.

⁷³ See “Defence response to a terrorist incident within Australia;” available from <http://www.defence.gov.au/terrorism/>; Internet; accessed 31 March 2005.

from the outset of the paper and is merely reinforced by Hammond in his observations. The importance of SOF in any future military structure is a given for the foreseeable future.

- “It takes years to create SOF structures and to develop SOF personnel.” Beyond the obvious reality stated by Hammond here is that true interoperability between SOF and conventional forces cannot be created overnight either. It is a standard that must be worked towards and maintained constantly through cross-pollination of personnel and training.
- “To be most effective, they [SOF] must be established within coherent and ready standing formations, with all the tools necessary to function.” This point relates directly to the previous one and speaks to the importance of co-location of these assets so that the cohesion necessary for seamless transition to combat operations can be achieved.
- “Counter-terrorist forces should not be used to conduct overt unconventional warfare. [Likewise] Direct action units like Rangers are not suited for discriminate engagements or ‘hearts and minds’ tasks.” The point here is that not all SOF are created equally and that a variety of SOF capabilities is important which once again points to the requirement of a Ranger-like organization in the Canadian Forces. This will be covered in more detail in the next chapter.⁷⁴

SOF clearly have an important role to play in future military structures of leading Western powers, including Canada’s. Recommendations on specific SOF capabilities that must be included in a future CF structure will be discussed in the next chapter. However, aside from

⁷⁴ Observations paraphrased unless otherwise indicated by quotation marks from Hammond 26-27.

the emerging role of SOF in the 21st century security environment, the key lesson to be taken from the various experts is that SOF should not ever be looked upon as a defence panacea but rather “they should be considered as an adjunct to conventional forces.”⁷⁵ Given these two somewhat conflicting messages then, the key is to develop a proposal that encompasses the essential qualities of a SOF approach to defence but from a macro perspective; one that consists of a well-rounded SOF capability as well as a conventional force that is built on the tenets of true joint interoperability; one that can project to the world’s trouble spots - as well as across the breadth of our country - either independently or in a coalition in a timely fashion.

CHAPTER 3 –

DEFINING THE REQUIRED DEFENCE CAPABILITIES FOR CANADA IN THE 21ST CENTURY

On the one hand, the Canadian Army is conceived of in markedly traditional ways: the Army is organized and outfitted – and supported by other CF elements – as a force that is designed primarily to defend Canada from external attack. On the other hand, the political leadership in Cabinet persistently use the Army for a range of foreign policy purposes, ignoring the fact that the Army itself is not organized as a “foreign policy army,” and not supported by the other elements of the CF.⁷⁶

As Kim Nossal so effectively points out in the above-cited passage from his article ‘The Army as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy: Implications for the “Army of Tomorrow,”’ there exists a fundamental problem with the present structure of the Army, and by extension, the

⁷⁵Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05.1 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations* (19 December 2001); available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05_1.pdf; Internet; accessed 31 March 2005, ix. For added clarity, the full sentence from which the quote was taken consisted of the following: “SOF should not be construed to be a substitute for conventional forces; rather, they should be considered as an adjunct to conventional forces.”

⁷⁶ Kim Nossal, “Chapter 2 – The Army as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy: Implications for the “Army of Tomorrow,” in *Towards the Brave New World: Canada’s Army in the 21st Century*, ed. by Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn and Peter Gizewski, 23-32 (Kingston: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2003), 23.

CF as a whole. In simple terms, the CF has failed to evolve and is therefore still structured to combat yesterday's enemy. It is built along the conventional long-standing institutional lines of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Although this structure has certainly served Allied militaries well, it no longer provides the responsiveness and flexibility required of a 21st century military. Times have changed and so has the threat as we have seen in the preceding pages of this paper. It is therefore important that the CF keep up with these changes and consider adopting a radically different structures that will permit it to regain a place of relevance in the defence of Canada and its interests.

As previously stated in the introduction, this chapter represents the crux of the argument. It is in this chapter that the theories of the new global security environment discussed in Chapter 1 and recent military trends applied in the fight against the asymmetric enemy covered in Chapter 2 will be meshed in order to provide the ingredients for a new CF force structure proposal. For the purposes of this paper, the proposal will be limited in detail to general capabilities and structural concepts. Also, given that the new defence policy has not been published by the government, Canada's National Security Policy as stated in last year's document "Securing an Open Society" will serve as the basis from which the CF's current mandate will be discussed.⁷⁷

A BRIEF HISTORY OF PREVIOUS RESTRUCTINGS OF THE CANADIAN FORCES

⁷⁷ On 20 April 2005, the Canadian government released its new International Policy Statement entitled "A Role of Pride and Influence in the World." This date of release was within one week of submission for this paper and therefore could only be mentioned in passing in this note and in the conclusion. Luckily, many of the points contained in the Statement are in fact consistent with those in this paper. This is no mere coincidence of course as this paper has cited numerous government documents as well as recent public announcements made by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence.

Attempts at “unification” of Canada’s three military services can be traced as far back as 1920, when then Chief of the Army General Staff, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie first argued for a single defence ministry.⁷⁸ However, it was Mackenzie King’s post-war minister of national defence Bruce Claxton who first made significant progress in the pursuit of unification of Canada’s three military services. When Mackenzie King appointed Claxton to the position, he instructed the minister “to bring about the utmost possible degree of unification and coordination” to the country’s department of national defence and its three services.⁷⁹

Despite much institutional resistance to change, Claxton was successful on two significant fronts. The first was the ratification of the National Defence Act, which superseded the acts governing the individual services. The next important milestone was the creation of the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in 1951, which unified and centralized the department’s civilian staff under a deputy minister who was made responsible for “administering the financial affairs of the department and regulating civil servants.”⁸⁰

Some ten years after the creation of NDHQ, the Conservatives were in power with John Diefenbaker at the helm of the government. These were times marked by an increased awareness of social issues accompanied by a significant increase in government spending on social programs. In order to fund these programs, the government looked for cost-saving measures and thus formed the Royal Commission on Government Organization (otherwise known as the Glassco Commission). In terms of its examination of the Department of National Defence, the aim was of the Commission was stated as follows:

⁷⁸ Douglas Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Forces* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), 31.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 64.

The object of this study is not to examine Canadian defence policy, but to appraise the role of the Department of National Defence in the formulation and application of policy and the suitability of its present organization in these roles. Attention is therefore focussed on the headquarters organization and on the broad aspects of administration.⁸¹

Among its many findings, the Commission found that despite the introduction of a chairman of the Chiefs of Staff at the beginning of the Korean War, little had changed in terms of improved inter-service cohesion.⁸² Moreover, it found that the system of the Chiefs of Staff Committee permitted “procrastination” and that “the absence of a single commanding voice may spell the difference between success or failure in any matter of joint concern to the three Services.”⁸³ Therefore, the Commission recommended that “additional powers of co-ordination be invested in the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.”⁸⁴

In 1963, the Liberals returned to power due in part to Diefenbaker’s perceived mishandling of the Cuban Missile Crisis.⁸⁵ Pearson believed that the Canadian Military was at fault for Diefenbaker’s downfall and appointed a young political star to take the helm. The Liberals also faced the same fiscal constraints and were therefore equally keen to cut the fat from its departments - including national defence. Immediately upon appointment, Paul Hellyer set out to make his mark, and he was certainly effective in this regard. In keeping with the Prime Minister’s wish to establish a better control over the military, Bill C-90 was ratified in 1964, thus amending the National Defence Act to rid the military of its service chiefs while imposing a

⁸¹ Royal Commission on Government Organization, *Volume 4: Special Areas of Administration* (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer, 1963), 64.

⁸² Jon B. McLin, *Canada’s Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1967), 198.

⁸³ Royal Commission..., 70.

⁸⁴ McLin 198.

⁸⁵ Bland, *Chiefs of Defence...*, 67.

single Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).⁸⁶ The bill also mandated the creation of a Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ), which was intended to serve as Canada's strategic military headquarters and not to directly command subordinate formations in any way. However, because Hellyer insisted on transferring all of the legal authority of the service chiefs to the newly minted CDS, he inadvertently made the new position a command one for all intents and purposes.⁸⁷ Furthermore, as Bland points out in the following excerpt, this oversight set the conditions for the inevitable unification of the Canadian military:

In effect, the creation of the office of chief of the defence staff solved unintentionally a problem that Glassco and others had dismissed and made the unified command of the Canadian Forces a *fait accompli*.⁸⁸

When neither the creation of CFHQ or the position of the CDS had much effect on the ballooning costs of defence, the decision was made to pursue unification of the three services. Bill C-243 was ratified in 1966 and the rest, as they say, is history.

The aim of this very brief historical overview was not to provide a detailed analysis of the unification of the CF. Rather, the aim was to provide some historical context so that proposals of radically unified future force structures be considered objectively. Although unification may have failed in its execution, the point must be made that many military experts consider the concept to have been sound. Bland makes the point very plainly that in his mind, Hellyer's unification of the Canadian Forces was working until Trudeau's Minister of Defence Donald McDonald dismantled CFHQ and stripped the CDS of much of his authority in 1972. In the following passage, Bland expresses what he believes to be the essence of unification.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 76.

The assumption is that a strong navy, or army, or air force is *a priori* good and essential for national defence. Prior to 1964 the service chiefs based their plans and estimates on this assumption without regard for the needs of the other services and assumed as well that their rivals would do the same. Happily for service commanders, then and now, this assumption fit perfectly with their own interests, which were to advance their own services. Special interests were turned effortlessly into duty....When, however, one is required to consider national defence as a unified concept and the greater good, then it is possible to argue that building a strong air force when the nation faces a considerable seaborne threat might actually harm national defence.⁸⁹

Bland's point is supported by McLin's observation of the lack of cohesion that existed in the Department of National Defence at the time of the release of the 1964 White Paper:

The principal sufferer from this lack of co-ordination and control was the Army, which was less capable than the other services of finding and executing a self-contained, independent role. In particular, it was ill-suited for service except in an international, integrated structure because the preference of the other services – especially the Air Force – for other roles deprived it of the support, reconnaissance and transport it needed to operate as a national contingent. Canadian forces, for example, in both UNEF and ONUC were dependent upon U.S. air transport for their effectiveness; the RCAF, meanwhile, took a nuclear strike role of doubtful utility and even more doubtful appropriateness for Canada.⁹⁰

What is so ironic about this comment written in 1967 is that little has changed in thirty years.⁹¹

It is precisely this notion of ridding the Canadian Forces of the petty inter-service rivalries that have plagued the department for as long as one can remember that is critical to the survival of the CF, and more importantly, the security of Canada and its interests. With that in mind, let us now consider the mission with which the CF is today mandated.

THE CF'S MANDATE

⁸⁹ Bland, *Chiefs...*, 16.

⁹⁰ McLin 195.

⁹¹ This observation is based on the author's own professional experience as the Operations Officer for the 3 PPCLI Battle Group that deployed to Kandahar Afghanistan in 2002 as part of Canada's contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom. Although the Battle Group was generally praised for the quality of the work accomplished as members of Task Force Rakkasan, the fact remains that it had to be entirely transported into theatre by USAF strategic lift. Also, once in theatre, the Battle Group found itself almost entirely dependent on US Army medium lift aviation for the purpose of tactical mobility. It should be noted that neither of these capabilities currently exists in the CF.

As previously mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the most recent defence policy dates back to the 1994 White Paper. After eleven years of neglect, the government once again appears to be actively engaged in the development of a relevant and effective Canadian Forces that will be equipped and structured to defend Canada and its interests in the face of the 21st century threat environment. As this paper is being written, so too is the new national defence policy. What is considered by many as an important indication of a more sophisticated approach to the design of the defence policy is the fact that it is being written in conjunction with the new foreign affairs policy. Given the security environment and the required 3D (diplomacy, development, and defence) approach to international crises, the idea of subordinating, and more importantly integrating the national defence policy to the foreign affairs policy makes perfect sense.⁹²

As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the most recent national security policy entitled *Securing an Open Society* will be used as the primary reference when discussing the CF's current mandate. But aside from this reference, recent public statements made by the minister Bill Graham clearly indicate the will of the government to project a Canadian presence on the international stage and to provide the CF with the means to do so. In a recent speech marking the formal change of command of the CDS, the minister stated the following:

In today's world, Canada's security is directly tied to international events and crises. Events in far-off places like Afghanistan and Sri Lanka affect us profoundly. As the Prime Minister has emphasized, Canadians want their country to play a meaningful role in making the world a safer place. And, now more than ever, the unique capabilities, skills and expertise of the Canadian Forces are needed to further the cause of global peace and security. The Canadian

⁹² For an excellent overview of the 3D approach and its implications in terms of achieving greater cohesion between the departments in question, see "Remarks by LGen Evraire (ret'd), Chairman of CDA to Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 25 November 2004;" available from http://www.cda-cdai.ca/presentations/chairmans_remarks_FAIT_sub_committee.htm; Internet; accessed 18 April 2005.

Forces are a tangible expression of our nation's values and beliefs. Wherever they go, they are remarkable ambassadors for Canada and Canadians.⁹³

Securing an Open Society actually marks Canada's "first-ever comprehensive statement of our National Security Policy" and is thus telling in its very existence.⁹⁴ In fact, the document's preface – which is signed by the Prime Minister – outlines its aim by stating that it "articulates core national security interests and proposes a framework for addressing threats to Canadians" and "puts us on a long-term path to enhancing the security of our country."⁹⁵ Although this "path" does not consist exclusively of a military one, the expectations of Canada's military are clearly delineated in the pages of the text.

In Chapter 1 of "*Securing an Open Society*," the nation's core national security interests are summarized as the following three:

- Protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad;
- Ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and
- Contributing to international security.

"Protecting Canada" can further be broken down into three sub-components. The first consists of physically protecting what is dear to Canadians including key institutions and Canadians themselves.⁹⁶ Arguably, this responsibility lies within the realm of law enforcement, although the military certainly must be able to assist in the event of crises beyond the scope of other governmental agencies. Such was the case when the CF responded to the Manitoba floods

⁹³ Department of National Defence, "Speaking notes for The Honourable Bill Graham, P.C., M.P., Minister of National Defence for the CDS Change of Command Ceremony, 4 February 2005;" available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1586; Internet; accessed 31 March 2005.

⁹⁴ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004), iii.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, ii-iii.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

of 1997 and the ice storm that crippled much of eastern Ontario and Quebec in 1998 to name but a few. Although domestic security is not the focus of this paper, it is important to note that the issue of achieving a more expeditionary posture for the CF is as important in the domestic context as it is in the international one. Short of creating a territorial force numbering in the hundreds of thousands so as to be able to provide a timely response to potential crises throughout our vast country, the key once again lies in the creation of an expeditionary force. The ability to deploy strategically and to operate in a crisis environment without infrastructure is the same whether one is referring to Sierra Leone or a hypothetical earthquake-stricken British Columbia.

The second sub-component consists of defending against threats to Canadian sovereignty.⁹⁷ Although not solely the responsibility of the CF, this is clearly what Canadians expect from their military. The reality of our geographic isolation and proximity to the US however has allowed Canada to assume certain risks, which it has. Given the size of the CF, it is clear that Canadians have not been overly concerned with maintaining a constant surveillance over our vast coastlines.⁹⁸ The events of 9/11 have changed the perspectives of Canadians and their government, and border-control issues are now considered as critical elements in the fight against terrorism (this point ties in directly to the second core national security interest).⁹⁹

The third and final sub-component of this first core national security interest involves protecting Canadian nationals working abroad as well as the Canadian international presence in

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ For a detailed picture on Canada's defence spending relative to other NATO members, as well as the decline in defence spending since the end of the Cold war, see "Historical and Comparative Overview of Canadian Defence Spending;" available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/cds_report/english/anxc_e.htm; Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

⁹⁹ For an overview of this issue and an indication of the problems that continue to plague the Canadian government, see Adrian Humphrey's "American 'patience running out' over border: Congressman says 'spend some money'," *National Post*, 12 April 2005; available from <http://www.canada.com/components/printstory4.aspx?id=531af6da-8101-4d16>; Internet; accessed 12 April 2005.

broader terms including embassies and their staff.¹⁰⁰ Of the three core national security interests and their numerous sub-components, this specific task demands those capabilities inherent in the sort of expeditionary force being proposed in this paper. One need only imagine the impact on Canada's collective national pride if the country were unable to respond in a forceful manner in the event that one of our embassies were to come under attack in a far-away country thrown into sudden anarchy. The requirement to respond to such a crisis goes well beyond simply saving those threatened persons (which many would argue is reason enough). The requirement to respond to such a crisis is a question of protecting our sovereignty, our identity, and our pride as a nation. The British were able to flex their sovereign muscle in Sierra Leone during Op Barras. Canada should be able to do the same the next time that Canadian nationals find themselves in need of being rescued from a desperate situation.

As previously mentioned, the second core national security interest consists of ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to our allies. This national security interest speaks directly to those issues arising from the events of 11 September 2001 and is therefore aimed primarily at ensuring that terrorist cells cannot use Canada's relatively open border to the US as a prime avenue of approach to their ultimate target. Of the three core national security interests, this one falls for the most part outside the realm of the CF and is more of a concern to the law enforcement community as well as the country's security and intelligence service (CSIS).¹⁰¹

Conversely, the third and final core national security interest, contributing to international security, falls squarely on the lap of the CF, although the Department of Foreign Affairs

¹⁰⁰ Privy Council Office, *Securing...*, 5.

¹⁰¹ See the "CSIS Mandate," available from http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/backgrnd/back1_e.html; Internet; accessed 18 April 2005.

obviously plays a major role in the accomplishment of this task as well.¹⁰² In the description of this national security interest, the important link is established between the world's failing states and terrorist organizations in that these generally provide ideal safe havens for the latter. What Canada should be able to contribute in these cases is a military force capable of operating in the context of a failed state as described in previous chapters. This force must also be robust enough to potentially re-establish order in a chaotic environment and to do so independently. This question of independence – which, when translated in the context of force structure discussions is referred to as “self-contained” – is what provides the government the opportunity to send forces to a trouble spot in a timely manner, whilst the remainder of the international community debates the issues. Finally, it can be safely assumed that the demand for Canadian military involvement in international crises is likely to continue unabated for the foreseeable future.¹⁰³

Having considered Canada's national security interests, it is important to now consider the threats to these interests. Although the general themes of the international security environment were discussed in a fair amount of detail in the first chapter of this paper, the aim now is to highlight the specific threats to Canada in order to set the stage for follow-on discussions regarding an optimal defence structure to best deal with these.

Referring once again to *Securing an Open Society*, the Canadian government has pledged to counter threats to the nation's security and has placed the following three agendas at the top of its list of priorities:

- Countering international terrorism;

¹⁰² See “Canada's International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Diplomacy;” available from <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/IPS/IPS-Diplomacy.pdf>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2005.

¹⁰³ See Peter Johnston and Dr. Michael Roi, “Future Security Environment 2025;” available from http://vcds.mil.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ord/fse2025/intro_e.asp; Internet; accessed 21 February 2005.

- Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and
- Assisting failed and failing states and diffusing intra- and interstate conflicts.¹⁰⁴

Prior to 9/11, terrorism was no more than a fleeting concern for most Canadians. Times have obviously changed and so have perceptions. In response to this threat, the Canadian government committed a relatively significant military force in 2001 and 2002 to Operation Enduring Freedom, including a Battle Group and SOF elements to combat al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁵ The government also pledged additional spending in the 2001 federal budget in order to enhance JTF 2's capabilities.¹⁰⁶

As previously mentioned, it has become an accepted reality among pundits of the asymmetric enemy that the idea of a clearly definable military end-state or a decisive victory is no longer achievable. Instead, constant disruption of the enemy, such that he cannot regain his footing long enough to mount an offensive of his own is probably the best that can be hoped for. The following excerpt from FSE 2025 effectively displays the growing acceptance of the tactic of disruption against the terrorist enemy, which is best achieved by attacking him at his home base.

As the focus shifts to distant lands that offer sanctuary to terrorists, either tacitly or because they are unable to exert control over their territories, the United States will seek allies who are prepared to join them in eliminating these bases of operations. Terrorist and transnational criminals will likely continue to exploit the lawlessness of failed or collapsing states. In the future, Canadians may find that they will be frequently asked to intervene in the failing regions of the developing world where terrorists and criminals cohabit and increasingly cooperate.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Privy Council Office, *Securing...*, 48-49.

¹⁰⁵ See "The Canadian Forces Contribution to the International Campaign against Terrorism," available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=490; Internet; accessed 21 April 2005.

¹⁰⁶ See Chapter 5 of 2001 Federal Budget entitled "Enhancing Security for Canadians;" available from <http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget01/booklets/bksece.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 April 2005.

¹⁰⁷ FSE 2025 para 46

Of course, at the risk of endlessly repeating the ‘expeditionary mantra’, the implications of pursuing a disruptive doctrine in order to deal with the asymmetric threat are rather obvious. From a force structure perspective, an optimal military must be expeditionary enough to be able to deploy at short notice to the furthest reaches of the globe in order to truly be capable of disrupting the asymmetric enemy.

The prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a very complex issue that has taken on for the most part a diplomatic dimension. The exception to this has been the creation of a dedicated nuclear, biological, and chemical response team, which has the capacity to assist in domestic as well as internationally deployed operations.

Assisting failed and failing states as well as defusing intra- and interstate conflicts may very well be multi-departmental task, but due to the nature of the work being done as well as the environment within which it must be executed, the CF tends to play a significant role. The reasons for Canada’s involvement in these circumstances range from self-preservation - as was outlined in the earlier paragraph dealing with the fight against terrorism – to a sense of moral obligation based on our country’s relative wealth and influence.

Given Canada’s reputation as a world leader in peacekeeping operations, some might contend that the CF’s structure is in fact well suited to deal with the realities of the 21st century threat environment. Upon closer scrutiny however, this view does not hold up to the facts as presented by CF insiders and numerous experts from outside of the military chain of command. The reality is that while recent Canadian military deployments on peace support operations have met with a fair degree of success, the CF’s present structure has been identified time and time again as inefficient and largely irrelevant in the post cold-war era.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, the successes of

¹⁰⁸ In his book *Canada Without Armed Forces* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 118, Bland states the following: “The fundamentals of Canada’s national defence policy are not sound.

Canadian military deployments can be largely attributed to the quality of the officers and non-commissioned members of the CF who have continued to excel by doing more with less as a result of recent budget cuts combined with increased operational tempo.¹⁰⁹

THE PROPOSED STRUCTURE

But additional troops alone will not guarantee future success. We must also be prepared to look at how the Canadian Forces are organized and how they function. This is why, as part of our review, we are examining the command structure of the Canadian Forces. This is why we are working to ensure a more unified and integrated approach to operations. And it is why we are determined to enhance our partnerships with other government departments and agencies, and strengthen our ability to work with our international partners and allies. Our new vision for the Canadian Forces – which we will be putting in place shortly – will lead to a fundamental restructuring of our military in the months and years to come. It will also ensure that the Canadian Forces will be able to play a more significant, leadership role in the world.¹¹⁰

Minister Graham's themes of a unified and integrated approach, as well as improving our ability to work with allies, and finally of the CF playing a more important leadership role are all integral to the CF structure being proposed in this paper. As the structure is described, the above-mentioned themes will be referred to in order to hopefully link the new proposal to the minister's above-mentioned goals.

The thesis of this paper stated that the evolving nature of the 21st century global security environment meant that the survival of the CF as a relevant military entity is at risk and that the key to its future survival is to adopt a more expeditionary structure akin to the USMC MAGTF

Military capabilities are eroding quickly from age, use, and obsolescence, among other factors. The effect of this decay, now obvious in the Canadian Forces, will soon become as obvious in foreign policy and may have a serious negative influence on Canada's ability to protect its national sovereignty."

¹⁰⁹ For an excellent graph displaying the increased operational tempo of CF personnel since 1980, see p.7 of the Defence Chapter of the newly released International Policy Statement.

¹¹⁰ Department of National Defence, "Speaking Notes for the Honourable Bill

concept. The previously cited definition of an “expeditionary” capability as provided by Craig Stone was the “ability to prepare and deploy into areas lacking logistic support capability.”¹¹¹ That being the case, what is being proposed for the CF is a structure that will provide the government of Canada a military force that can “deploy into areas lacking logistic support” more effectively than the structure that presently exists. Of course, the expeditionary requirement is consistent with the previously mentioned mandate of assisting failing states and disrupting an asymmetric enemy, which requires “the capacity to move operationally and tactically in areas with little infrastructure and support...”¹¹²

In Chapter 2 of this paper, the USMC structure was discussed in a fair amount of detail. Specifically, and of most relevance to the proposed force structure, were the concepts of the MAGTF and the MEU (SOC). Simply put, the MAGTF consists of the complete integration of air and land components of the Marine Corps such that an MEU, or a unit level organization based on an infantry battalion, has its own organic tactical air organization including fixed and rotary-wing aircraft able to provide both CAS and tactical mobility. The significance of the special operations capable or (SOC) designation was also explained in Chapter 2 and refers to the recognized status of a MEU having successfully completed a prescribed and validated series of individual and collective training objectives related to the execution of special operations-like tasks.¹¹³

Graham, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence at the Annual Conference of the McGill Institute for the Study of Canada, 18 February 2005;” available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1609; Internet; accessed 31 March 2005.

¹¹¹ Stone 7.

¹¹² Peter Johnston and Dr. Michael Roi, “Future Security Environment 2025...”, paragraph 85.

¹¹³ See Clancy, *Marine...*, 210-214.

What is proposed for the CF is that it adopt the MAGTF force structure concept by creating its own MEUs using existing land and air assets. Within the land force, permanent battle groups would have to be formed based on infantry units with a complement of light armoured and indirect fire assets. From the air perspective, the CF-18 would provide the same close air support capability provided by the USMC F-18s. The missing link however would be the tactical lift piece, which would be sorely lacking with the existing Griffon platform. That being said, the procurement of medium-lift helicopters being discussed by the CF chain-of-command would certainly solve that problem.¹¹⁴

What the MEU construct provides is a deployable organization that covers the entire spectrum of combat functions, which in turn allows it to be employed either independently or as a very meaningful contribution to a coalition. This ability to cover the full gamut of functions is what is also referred to as “self-contained.” When a contribution is self-contained, it is able to deploy without requiring assistance for air or sealift, sustainment, or any other essential combat function such as tactical mobility. This was clearly the problem with Canada’s SOF and conventional land contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom, whereby forces had to be deployed via US strategic airlift and tactical mobility was provided by US rotary-wing assets in theatre.¹¹⁵ It is arguably the characteristic of self-containment inherent in a more expeditionary force structure that would indeed answer the minister’s expressed aims of strengthening “our ability to work with our international partners” as well as ensuring that the “Canadian Forces will be able to play a more significant, leadership role in the world.”

¹¹⁴ As it turns out, the newly released “International Policy Statement” contains numerous references to the requirement for the Air Force to obtain “medium-to heavy-lift helicopters to support land operations.”

¹¹⁵ See FN 94.

The most difficult and arguably the most important part of the adoption of a MAGTF structure in the CF would be the actual integration of the Air and Land components. In a document submitted by RAND to the US Secretary of Defense, in which the consulting firm provided observations on the conduct of military operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the following points were made regarding the integration of air and land forces:

The Iraq operation demonstrated the increasing interdependence of air and ground forces.... Fixed wing aviation should be better integrated with ground forces by increasing the realism and frequency of joint training... Attack helicopters should have close support as their primary mission.¹¹⁶

Unlike the US Army, the USMC has already achieved this level of integration. The remainder of the US military is now learning the same lessons learned by the Marines on the battlefields of France some 90 years ago. The key to the success of the USMC is that all Marines share a common heritage and ethos. A Marine F-18 aviator has undergone infantry training and therefore can relate to the platoon commander calling for CAS. Although the concept of unification of the Canadian services may have failed in many ways in the past, a renewed attempt at integration by adopting permanent joint units is paramount if the CF is to evolve and remain effective.

The maritime piece in this equation is somewhat more complex, but the co-existence of the USMC and the US Department of the Navy could be used as a model, albeit with some important adjustments for the CF. Firstly and most importantly, the Canadian MAGTF organizations would not be subordinate to the Maritime component. The proposed Canadian structure would be a truly joint one with air, land and maritime forces working under a unified chain of command. The primary difference of this proposal from the status quo within the CF is

¹¹⁶ A copy of a report submitted by the President of RAND to Secretary Rumsfeld was circulated through informal CF network as interesting professional reading. Upon reviewing said document, the points regarding the integration of air and land components were deemed especially appropriate to this paper and thus included.

that the individual components (or the remnants of the old services as we know them today) would have to disappear. Instead, chains of command would be streamlined so that these permanent joint units could answer directly to a central operational authority, similar to that which currently exists with the DCDS.

The ability to effectively conduct expeditionary operations from an objective area's littoral waters would clearly require an AFSB capable platform. The U.S. made San Antonio Class ship has been unofficially mentioned as a potential option being considered by senior military planners and would certainly meet the capability requirements.¹¹⁷

One of the implications of this renewed integration is that in order to become truly expeditionary, these forces would have to be physically co-located and ready to deploy at a moment's notice. This would logically lead to the creation of joint "super-bases" on each coast whereby all assets could remain at a high level of readiness for immediate sea and/or strategic airlift. This co-location would also ensure the maximum degree of cohesion amongst these newly formed joint units, as it would allow for constant training and other cohesion building activities.

Another implication of adopting a more expeditionary force structure is that it would have to come at the expense of other important capabilities such as a broad spectrum of aerospace capabilities or a "blue-water" maritime capability. The truth of the matter however is that many conventional military capabilities have already been stricken from the CF's inventory and the CF has already in fact adopted a niche approach to defence. The effect of adopting this proposed structure would simply lend some much needed cohesion and purpose to the already

¹¹⁷ This option was mentioned in an article written by Stephen Thorne, "Military Planners Ponder Leasing Ships," *CNEWS*, 27 February 2005; available from <http://I:\MDS\CANOE%20--%20Canada%20Military%20planners%>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2005.

very limited military force, and would be perfectly consistent with the 1994 White Paper which included the following passage:

A Country of Canada's size and means cannot, and should not attempt, to cover the entire military spectrum, but the CF must be able to make a genuine contribution to a variety of domestic and international objectives. While the maintenance of specialized skills and capabilities are essential, the decision to retain combat-capable forces should not be taken to mean that Canada must possess every component of military capability.¹¹⁸

As for the SOF portion of this proposed structure, the backbone of any future CF force structure already exists in the highly touted JTF 2, which represents Canada's tier 1 SOF capability.¹¹⁹ What is presently missing in this equation however is the highly trained conventional or quasi-SOF component found among most Allied force structures. In the Australian context, this capability has been filled by the newly re-rolled 4 RAR (Commando). This light infantry unit was specially equipped and trained to conduct domestic counter-terrorism tasks, and work jointly with the country's SAS as a "quick reaction force, or in an outer cordon role during the deployment of national SOF assets."¹²⁰ In the US context, this role is filled by the Army Rangers who, in general terms, fulfill a similar mandate.

For the purposes of this paper, a variation of Brister's "hypothetical Canadian SOF niche capability" is being proposed. In keeping with the Australian and US models, a tier 1 SOF core would be supported by a special operations capable or tier 3 SOF unit filling the same role of 4 RAR (Commando) for all intents and purposes. Where this proposal differs from Brister's is the size of the tier 3 organization. In this case, it is proposed that the organization be composed of the three existing light infantry battalions who would simply rotate through the high readiness

¹¹⁸ Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1994), 13.

¹¹⁹ Bernard J. Brister, "Canadian Special Operations Forces: A Blueprint for the Future." *Canadian Military Journal* 5, no.3 (Autumn 2004): 31.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 33.

SOF support task on an annual basis. This would provide the units with the necessary time to regenerate and conduct the individual and collective training necessary to achieve the necessary level of readiness required to support JTF 2.

The requirements for self-containment apply arguably even more to the SOF component than the remainder of the CF for obvious reasons of responsiveness. For the SOF component to be truly effective and relevant in today's environment, it would need not only the necessary complement of tier 3 forces, but also the necessary strategic airlift and tactical mobility provided by medium or heavy-lift helicopters.

The purpose of this proposed structure is to hopefully provide a more focused and efficient structure that will meet the demands of the 21st century security environment. The MEUs built on the USMC MAGTF concept, combined with capable maritime and SOF components not only represent a viable option to all of Canada's national security interests, but also provides the capabilities that will achieve a more "unified and integrated approach." Although unification may have missed the mark earlier, this proposal will see the sound concept of unification taken to its logical conclusion. This structure will also provide the government with the option of either contributing in a truly meaningful way to coalition operations or taking on a leadership role and acting independently if necessary. Finally, the impact of this proposal will be positive from both a domestic and external threat perspective as it will allow the CF to become much more responsive and effective at its destination, whether that might be northern Quebec or the killing fields of the Great lakes region of Central Africa.

CONCLUSION

Enhancing Canada's security means that we have to invest more in our military as part of defending ourselves at home, in North America and in the world. We have to earn our way in the world. But ours will never be the biggest military force, so it must be smart, strategic and focused.¹²¹

This excerpt from last October's Speech from the Throne marked an important event for members of the CF. With these words, the Commander-in-Chief injected much optimism in CF members when she indicated that Canada was no longer going to take its security for granted and that, in the future, the country would in fact earn its "way in the world." It is therefore hoped that this paper will provide a new perspective that will help ensure that the CF becomes smarter, more strategic and better focused than it has in recent years. That being said, the aim of this paper has been to demonstrate that not only must the CF become more expeditionary in order to remain relevant and effective in today's global security environment, but that it must specifically adopt a force structure that incorporates the capabilities and principles of the USMC MAGTF doctrine.

In the opening chapter, the dynamics of today's security environment were discussed in order to understand the security context prior to delving into the proposed structure. In doing so, the inter-connected issues of globalization, environmental stressors, nationalism, and fundamentalism were all discussed. When combined, these factors point towards a fluid and highly volatile security environment from which a Western nation will have increased difficulty insulating itself. This "fluid" threat was referred to in this paper as the asymmetric threat, and the point was made that it is precisely this threat that should be addressed in the design of any modern military force.

Considering doctrinal themes gleaned from recent successful conflicts involving Western militaries and an asymmetric enemy was deemed an important step in building the case for the

¹²¹ See the "Speech From the Throne, October 2004;" available from <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/sft-ddt.asp>;

proposed force structure. Based on Operations Barras, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, the issues of strategic lift and tactical mobility, self-containment, the ability to operate in the context of failed states, and finally greater interoperability and synergy among the various components at the lowest possible tactical levels all surfaced as critical ingredients to success against an asymmetric threat. Moreover, as was the case in Iraq, this synergy proved equally devastating against a conventional enemy.

Given the important role of the USMC in these military Operations - and in the case of Operation Barras, British paratroopers used in a marine-like role – an overview of its history, current doctrine and capabilities was provided in order to establish a level of understanding of the proposal being made for the CF, as well as provide some historical legitimacy and context to the MAGTF concept.

The military phenomenon that is the recent rise to prominence of SOF in all Western militaries was also deemed worthy of mention. From this analysis, several important themes were identified including the importance of improved interoperability between a nation's SOF and conventional components.

The proposed force structure represents an attempt to incorporate all of the above-mentioned factors and provide the government of Canada a set of defence capabilities that will allow it to not only better protect Canada and its national interests, but also to deliver on its promises of taking a more active leadership role in the world as stated by the Prime Minister in his forward to the recently released International Policy Statement:

That is why as Canadians we must be active beyond our borders to protect and promote our values and our interests--security in the face of terrorism and the increasing threat of nuclear proliferation, and our trading relationships with the United States, Mexico and throughout the world. We must advance the concerns of people who seek freedom, stability, democracy and above all, a better life. And while we value multilateralism and know the great good that

international cooperation can achieve, we must ultimately be committed to playing a lead role in specific initiatives and, on occasion, to resolving to go it alone. We have the means to help, and so we will. We must.¹²²

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¹²² Prime Minister Paul Martin's Forward to "Canada's International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World; Overview;" available from <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-overview2-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2005.

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