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**JOINT ORGANIZATION**  
**A CANADIAN WAY AHEAD**

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## ABSTRACT

In the 1960s, Canada was a world leader in military organizational theory, one of the first to attempt the implementation of an integrated and unified force structure, a precursor to modern joint organizational theory. However, the past four decades have been a period of almost constant organizational change for the CF and have left it in an organizational state that, although functional, does not allow for the full implementation of modern joint doctrine. NDHQ in its present state is a combined civil / military headquarters operating at both the strategic and operational levels, with a unified staff that is fractured by the presence of strong and semi-independent service chiefs. This situation has led to blurred lines of responsibility for the core NDHQ processes of strategic direction, corporate management, force generation and force employment. The situation is especially confusing with the processes of force generation and force employment and, as such, it prevents the CF from truly applying joint operational principles where they will provide the most benefit at the operational and tactical levels. This paper describes how the CF arrived at this present situation, compares the CF's organization with that of the US and UK defence models, and proposes an organizational model that clarifies the responsibilities for NDHQ's core processes, and hence, improve both the CF's command and control structure, and its application of modern joint principles. The solution is to clearly separate the responsibility for force generation and force employment by placing the current service staffs under the direction of a deputy chief responsible for joint force generation, and to establish a single CF operational headquarters responsible for all CF force employment.

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*“If the United Kingdom were today a recently created State organizing her fighting forces, it is inconceivable that they would be separated into three services”*  
*Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein*

## **Introduction**

It is commonly accepted that a modern fighting force, in order to be effective, must be capable of operating in a joint environment. As Field Montgomery implied, effective jointness depends greatly on how a nation organises and employs its services. Although joint operations have been conducted throughout history, jointness as an operational and organizational concept is a relatively new development, based primarily on the promulgation of US Joint doctrine in the mid-1980s. Canada has embraced this philosophy from a modern doctrinal perspective but has yet to implement it fully at the organizational level.

This situation is somewhat confusing because Canada actually has a longer history of joint organizational development than most other western militaries. Based on the CF's history of unification and integration, Canada should have a well-developed sense of jointness. However, it is not the case. What went wrong with the development of jointness in Canada and how can it be put back on track?

Jointness in Canada has been driven by economic necessity, expediency, and the popular view that all new and modern programs and organizations must be called joint, more so than it has been by joint doctrine and principles. As a result, organizational change within the CF over the last four decades has left Canada with a defence organization that, although functional, allows for neither development of truly modern joint systems and training, nor the CF to effectively employ forces utilizing modern joint

doctrine and principles. In order for Canada to truly progress jointness beyond its current level, the Canadian Forces requires further organizational evolution.

A review of joint force development in Canada since the start of the unification debates, through integration and unification, through the changes in the 1970s, and through the modernization and downsizing of the 1980s and 1990s shows that the organizational change, although almost continuously and effectively modernizing the unified management of the CF and DND at the strategic level, has hindered the development of the CF's joint force generation and joint force employment capability. This hindrance is due to the fact that, although appropriate for the strategic situation at the time, unification unto itself was never intended to support joint development or joint employment of the individual services. As such, unification could be described as a bold step forward in unified, or perhaps even joint, strategic management but one that was perhaps taken a step too far, and thus impeded joint operational and tactical development. Organizational changes since unification show the CF has attempted to further develop jointness within a unified structure; however, it has fallen short of necessary changes to its operational employment mechanisms. A review of the CF's current organization highlights the fact that, from a joint perspective, responsibility for the current NDHQ core processes are not well distributed, and further organizational change, specifically within the areas of force generation and force employment, are required in order to be able to effectively apply modern joint principles within the CF.

Modern joint principles have been successfully applied within other military organizations and a comparison of allied joint force development suggests that international organizational lessons could be applied in Canada. Deference to the US

organizational model is particularly important, as the US has been the vanguard of modern joint force development since the mid 1980s. The US model demonstrates that the development of a unified strategic headquarters with an integral joint force generation focus, and a clearly separated joint force employment organization, is not only possible but also highly effective. Similarly, the development of joint doctrine in the UK demonstrates that clearly defining the responsibility between strategic direction and force generation, and operational force employment, has produced operational effectiveness gains. In particular, the development and employment of the Permanent Joint Headquarters, and its relationship with the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) provide an excellent roadmap for Canada to follow if the CF wishes to improve its joint capability.

Canada, for a short time, was a world leader in military organizational theory and one of the first western militaries that attempted to institutionalize jointness. However, for various reasons, the process has stalled and must be restarted if the CF is to remain a meaningful force. The national review of unification, and the international review of allied joint organizations suggest a way ahead for Canada. If the CF is to develop further as a modern, credible and effective joint force, its organizational structure must allow for the effective adoption and application of internationally recognized and proven joint principles and doctrine. The current organization of NDHQ does not allow for this because responsibility for the core processes within NDHQ are not clearly defined from a joint perspective. Most importantly, force generation must be jointly, as opposed to service, driven, and responsibility for force employment must be concentrated with a single joint commander for all operations. These two changes will allow for the effective application of modern joint doctrine within the CF and thus allow Canada to deploy truly

joint, interoperable forces, both at home and abroad. These changes are crucial if Canada wishes its military to remain relevant on the world stage in the years ahead.

### **Literature Review**

Integration, unification and jointness in Canada have a long and controversial history that has generated a large body of written work on the subject. Most controversial are the personal memoirs of some of the key participants in the integration / unification process. This work expresses the opinions of those who supported and opposed the process and provides unique personal insight into the arguments and debates of the time. Of particular note are the memoirs of two of the most active antagonists during the unification era – then Defence Minister Paul Hellyer and then Assistant Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jeffery Brock. Their memoirs not only establish the parameters of opinion during the debate but also provide a deeper understanding of both the civil and military sides of the arguments for and against unification.

Hellyer's book, *Damn The Torpedoes*, was written in 1990 and provides an extensive history of his political career with particular emphasis on his time as the Minister of National Defence from 1963 to 1968. The main thrust of Hellyer's discussion surrounding the unification debate is that it was done on the basis of cost reduction and high-level, strategic organizational efficiency, and not on the basis of political motivation. His book also provides a good background on the government's reasons and logic for assessing that it was in the best interest of the nation to unify the CF. The book also sheds some light on the intent of unification, especially through his definitions of exactly what was meant by the use of the words integration and unification. This clarification in meaning has nullified many of the more emotional and operational



effectiveness arguments that the opponents of unification have articulated over the last three decades. The book also clarifies several organizational misconceptions that have been falsely attributed to the unification process but were in fact changes that took place subsequently. These changes include the civil/military headquarters amalgamation, CF force structure reductions and drastic cutbacks in military expenditures. In summary, Mr. Hellyer's book provides a relatively unemotional review of unification from the perspective of a government insider, and as such, provides a good start point for understanding the basic tenants and reasons that the government undertook the process.

Admiral Brock's book, *The Thunder And The Sunshine*, on the other hand, is a more emotional discussion from the perspective of a critic who opposed unification. It is the second volume in his naval career memoirs and although it covers a wide range of time from the mid 1950s to the late 1960s, and reviews much of his career not directly related to unification, the book does provide extensive insight into the reasoning of many of those both within and outside the military who hotly opposed the unification process. Although much of the book appears to be written from an emotional perspective, Brock does raise many valid arguments against the unification process, including those related to morale, operational effectiveness and interoperability, and thus provides a good counterpoint to Hellyer's point of view.

More academic reviews of unification articulate many of the same issues discussed above but from a more reflective point of view and generally provide balance to the two extremes mentioned above. One in particular, Peter Haydon's *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crises*, provides a fascinating view of the political workings of government and presents an alternate view of some of the reasons that may have

prompted unification, namely a perceived lack of civilian control of the military. Vernon Kronenberg's *All Together Now*, although somewhat dated now, also provides an unemotional, academic review of both unification and the civil / military headquarters merge as it was perceived in the early 1970s. Douglas Bland has written extensively on the subject of Canadian defence policy, history and organization, and is generally regarded as a subject matter expert in these areas. His 1995 book, *Chiefs of Defence*, is an extensive review of Canadian defence relationships, particularly those between the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the Deputy Minister (DM) from the time of integration through to the mid 1990s.

There is also a great deal of bureaucratic documentation published on unification in the form of numerous study reports, government review commissions, policy reviews and commissioned contractor reports. Although all the reports contain a great deal of information and analysis, the common theme is one of efficiency review and recommendations for limited change based on mandated limitations, or what was perceived to be achievable at the time. Many of these reports have led to limited operational and organizational changes over the last 35 years and, as such, they provide a good review of how the CF has arrived at its current state, post unification. All these academic reviews and bureaucratic studies are useful in providing an external, unbiased counterpoint and balance to many of those who were more directly involved in the organizational changes of the last four decades. However, little is written on the application of modern joint process within the Canadian defence organization, a potential area of weakness.

A review of allied joint publications, doctrine and organizations discloses some potential weak areas in the Canadian system, and helps to identify potential solutions. Publications such as *Allied Joint Doctrine*, published by NATO, the entire US JP series of publications, and the UK JWP series of publications lay out a very similar philosophy and doctrine for joint operations. This similarity is not surprising as most modern, western joint doctrine originated within the US and was adopted by other nations. As such, it seems logical to start any review of allied jointness with a look at the defining policy and doctrine that has flowed from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1986. The imposition of jointness within the US military since 1986 has led to unprecedented change both within the US, and consequently with its allies. The sheer size and resources within the US military make the direct application of the US model to Canada difficult at best; however, well developed and thoroughly tested joint principals may well have some applicability to Canada if it can be shown that they will improve operational effectiveness. Related allied joint doctrine and development are also valid as they give an indication of how other, smaller, perhaps more directly comparable to Canada, militaries have interpreted and applied the US developed joint doctrine. Canada's historical linkages to the UK, and the subsequent similarities in our military organizations and cultures, make for a particularly interesting comparison in joint development. The UK process has produced a system that has maintained many of the advantages of single services and combined it with an effective system of joint operational employment of forces, the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), under the overall control and direction of the civilian government. In many ways the UK's organizational system is similar to

the Canadian concept of the DCDS group; however, the UK system offers several operational advantages that may be worthy of adoption in Canada.

In summary, although there has been much written on the subject of Canadian unification and organizational change, there is very little published material relating to the application of joint operational principles within the overall Canadian defence structure. On the other hand, there is a great deal of good information available on allied joint doctrine and organizations that is directly applicable to the Canadian situation. As such, a review and merging of both the CF's organizational history and the international application of joint principles should provide a clear way ahead for Canada.

#### **A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON JOINTNESS IN CANADA**

It could be argued that the seeds of unification extend back to World War I; however, the generally accepted start of the process was with the promulgation of the 1964 Defence White Paper and its somewhat innocuous statement that “[t]his is to be the first step toward a single unified service for Canada.”<sup>1</sup> The subsequent amendments to the National Defence Act (NDA) creating the position of the CDS and integrating the CF, and Bill C164, the unification act, generated a great deal of debate on the pros and cons of unification. These arguments, from both the perspective of Hellyer and his detractors, and the academic reviews that have followed, provide a diverse view of opinion on the unification process; however, on balance, it is assessed that unification was the right organizational move for Canada at the time.

The same conclusion can be drawn from a review of the processes that led to the establishment of the combined civil/military headquarters in 1970, as it was a timely

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<sup>1</sup>Department of National Defence, *The White Paper on Defence* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1964), 19.

modernization of the dated command and control relationships between the government and the military. The subsequent unification review reports commissioned during the 1970s attempted to reverse some of the military's perceived excesses of unification and started to move the CF back towards a group of semi-independent services under integrated command, with unified support services. This concept is important to note, as it was the first stage of the CF's organizational evolution towards what today would be internationally referred to as joint, as opposed to unified command, control and support.

In 1990, a series of domestic and international incidents, including the Oka Crises and the Gulf War, led to reorganization of the DCDS Group and establishment of the first permanent joint staff in Canada. The development of this joint operational command and control capability within the DCDS Group was a watershed event for jointness in Canada as it was the first time that recently developed allied joint doctrine was conscientiously applied to the CF's organizational structure. Similarly, the results of the MCCRT process in the mid 1990s had a profound effect on the current CF command and control structure as it not only managed the CF force structure downsizing mandated in the 1994 Defence White Paper, it also refined and clarified the core processes within NDHQ. These core processes of strategic direction, corporate management, force generation and force employment remain the cornerstone of CF / DND management, command and control, and as such, directly impact the CF's ability to incorporate further jointness into the system.

A more detailed historical review of each of these changes over the last four decades will show that, although the CF / DND organization has adapted to implement more modern management processes, it has failed to make organizational changes that

take into account modern joint doctrine. In particular, it will highlight the fact that the CF has failed to adapt fully to the modern strategic reality of the post cold war era and organize its forces to provide for distinctly separate joint force generation, and joint force employment capabilities.

### **Paul Hellyer's Vision**

Paul Hellyer's first experience with the military occurred during World War II and, although limited, formed a lasting impression. In general, his impressions consisted of "grown men indulged in silly games that squandered valuable time" while the army overseas was desperate for reinforcements, and the fact that there "was little effective cooperation between the services when each concentrated almost exclusively on its own interests."<sup>2</sup> Although this wartime memory may have been emotional, his impression of a lack of inter-service cooperation formed the basis of his opinion of the military when he entered politics. Hellyer was first elected to Parliament in 1949 at the young age of 26 and spent many years in the backbenches on both the government and opposition sides of the house. His education during the 1950s and early 1960s in the ways of government in general, and the intricacies of the defence department in particular, included stints as the parliamentary assistant to the Defence Minister, and time as both the Associate Minister of National Defence and the opposition Defence Critic, before being appointed as the National Defence Minister in 1963.<sup>3</sup> The interesting mix of political / defence debates during this period, including the cancellation of the Avro Arrow, the Bomarc Missile acquisition, changes in roles for the CF within NATO, and the Cuban Missile Crises,

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<sup>2</sup>Paul Hellyer, *Damn The Torpedoes* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1990), 4.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid*, 10-28.

further deepened Hellyer's early impressions of the Canadian military as an inefficient and uncoordinated organization.<sup>4</sup> Contrary to popular opinion that he was a young political novice, Hellyer was in fact a veteran politician who was well experienced in defence matters when he took over the defence portfolio in 1963.

Hellyer's basic impressions of the military were confirmed shortly after taking up his duties as Minister when he received a series of briefings that indicated that each service was preparing for a completely different type of war, and thus setting plans and priorities in different ways, often based primarily on new equipment desires. The result, according to Hellyer, was "policy by happenstance" and the "ultimate confirmation ... of inadequate coordination and joint planning at the strategic level"<sup>5</sup> As an economist, Hellyer appreciated the fact that budget pressures, and the small size of the Canadian military demanded organizational change. The lack of high-level coordination, combined with the many departmental inefficiencies detailed in the Glassco Commission Report, became the foundations upon which Hellyer's reorganization of the CF was based.

The changes laid out in the 1964 Defence White Paper, which proposed integrating the higher command functions of the three separate services by bringing each component under the command of a single Chief of Defence Staff, with one unified defence staff rather than a separate Naval Board, General Staff and Air Staff.<sup>6</sup> In theory, this structural reorganization would lead to greater coordination and centralized priority setting at the national headquarters, and the eventual reduction or elimination of the

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<sup>4</sup>Hellyer, *Damn The Torpedoes...*, 12-31.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid*, 33-34.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid*, 42.

duplication and triplication of support services at the lower levels. In principle, it would also force the individual services to harmonize their overall defence and procurement plans as they would each have to progress them through a single chain of command to the minister, and then the government. With little argument, this portion of the plan was generally accepted by the military as it was viewed by the services simply as an organizational headquarters change that would have little practical effect on the actual employment of their individual forces. As such, integration, per say, was not vigorously opposed and the reorganization bill progressed through parliament in a timely manner.

Bill C-90, to amend the National Defence Act and form a single integrated headquarters, was given Royal Assent on July 16, 1964, and the new headquarters stood up on 1 August, 1964.<sup>7</sup> The concept of an integrated headquarters was based on Hellyer's belief that there was lack of coordination at the top because the individual service chiefs had too much direct access to the minister and thus could directly push their own agendas, and sidetrack those of the other services.<sup>8</sup> His concept of a single strategic level command and control structure was not new and had been proposed by several theorists as far back as the World War I, and attempted in an aborted unification attempt in Canada in the mid 1920s.<sup>9</sup> In many respects, it was an insightful first step in the direction of joint command and control at the national strategic level, a concept that was well ahead of its time as many military leaders still struggled with joint command at the operational and tactical levels. However, history has now shown that this idea of

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<sup>7</sup>Hellyer, *Damn The Torpedoes...*, 85-86.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid*, 34.

<sup>9</sup>A good review of pre-1960 unification attempts is contained at the Department of National Defence website, *Canadian Military Heritage*, chapter 7; available from <http://www.cmhg.gc.ca>.



strategic joint command of individual services has taken root amongst most western militaries and has now become the norm due to its inherent efficiencies of command and control, and high level coordination. Unification into a single service, however, has remained a uniquely Canadian experiment.

The next step of Hellyer's vision, unification, proved far more controversial. The concept of unification was based on his belief that a single service, with a single logistics and administration structure, would be more efficient than one with three separate support structures. Moreover, common operational services such as intelligence could also be unified into single branches, thus effecting further potential efficiencies.<sup>10</sup> Throughout the unification process in 1966-1968, there was much debate about the "one service, one uniform"<sup>11</sup> concept, especially on the point of what unification actually meant as it was not defined in law. Although many argue that Hellyer's vision was aimed primarily at the rationalisation of the logistics and administration chains of the military, and hence the emotional debates surrounding uniforms and the viability of an army cook serving on board a naval ship, Hellyer's vision was in fact aimed at the cultural heart of the services. His goal was to create a military that saw service to the nation before loyalty to their individual services.<sup>12</sup> After much, mainly partisan inspired, debate, Bill C-243 passed into law in April 1967 and the three independent Canadian services ceased to exist.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>Hellyer, *Damn The Torpedoes...*, 111.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid*, 206.

<sup>12</sup>Douglas A. Bland, *Chiefs Of Defence* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute For Strategic Studies, 1995), 87-88.

<sup>13</sup>Hellyer, *Damn The Torpedoes...*, 205.

The proposed, and eventually final, organization of the new Canadian Forces under Bill C243 was also subject to much debate and changed numerous times between 1965 and 1970. In the end, the adoption of a functional framework proved to be the most workable as it gave the CDS a headquarters that was capable of controlling key common areas such as training, administration and policy; however, it allowed for the delegation of authority to individual operational commanders.<sup>14</sup> Although this organization left the now defunct services with a considerable amount of operational control of lower level operations, it achieved Hellyer's goal of centralized control, coordination and strategic planning.

### **The Opponents**

As implied above, much opposition to integration and unification existed, both inside and outside the military. The issue of integration was generally accepted by the individual services as it was seen primarily as an organizational change that did not fundamentally change the way they conducted their business, nor did it affect their individual units.<sup>15</sup> Public debate was also generally positive with numerous press reports mentioning the foresightedness of the policy.<sup>16</sup> Unification, on the other hand, created enormous debate. Much of the public debate was very emotional and centred on the loss of history and tradition that would result from unification. In a similar vein, as the opposition saw an opportunity to attack a weak minority Liberal government; much of the public political debate revolved around partisan politics rather than the true substance

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<sup>14</sup>Bland, *Chiefs Of Defence...*, 83-84.

<sup>15</sup>DND, *Canadian Military Heritage ...*, ch7, 3.

<sup>16</sup>Hellyer, *Damn The Torpedoes...*, 47-9.

of the issue.<sup>17</sup> Although the opposition from within the military was also emotional, it tended to focus on several key operational concerns. These centred on the issues of operational effectiveness, a loss of interoperability with allies and, concern over the services' loss of effective access to the minister.

Although much of the emotional debate, centred on the issues of “buttons and badges,” and the decommissioning of regiments, can be logically dismissed as only heartfelt resistance to a loss of customs and history, the arguments surrounding operational concerns deserve closer analysis.<sup>18</sup> The loss of operational effectiveness arguments centred on the services' perceived notion that soldiers, sailors and airmen would become interchangeable and thus the individual needs of the services could not be catered to.<sup>19</sup> Although the foundation for the argument is logical, and has proven to be partially true over the last 35 years, there was never an intent to create one generic serviceman as the actual cross-training of personnel was really only ever aimed at those trades and professions that had common functions within the three services.<sup>20</sup> Those trades that were deemed suitable for cross-training were primarily the support trades comprised of personnel such as pay clerks, supply technicians, cooks, doctors, lawyers and dentists. In general, each specialist's work was the same regardless of their environment and, as the theory goes, with minimal cross-training, they were employable

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<sup>17</sup>Both Hellyer and Brock refer to this issue in their books. Hellyer provides a good description of the politics involved, from an insider's perspective, in his chapters 8-12; while Brock, as an outsider, vividly describes his angst at the avoidance of the real issues by the parliamentary committees for the sake of politics in his chapters 15-20.

<sup>18</sup>Hellyer, *Damn The Torpedoes...*, 147, 101-5.

<sup>19</sup>Jeffery V. Brock, *The Thunder And The Sunshine* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1983), 210-211.

<sup>20</sup>Hellyer, *Damn The Torpedoes...*, 174-7.

anywhere. The resulting reduction, from three to one, in training establishments and support bases would justify the merger of each of the trades. However, the argument is a little too simple as it ignores the environmental employment reality that a cook in the field has to be a soldier first as he must be able to defend himself and fight beside the infantry. Similarly, a supply technician serving on board a ship must be a sailor first, as he must be able to fight fires and conduct seamanship as an integral part of the crew. As such, there are enough differences in each of the environments to require substantial environmental related training beyond the basic, trade related, training that is common to each support area. The issue of ranks created similar concerns.

If a single, unified personnel administration system was to be effective, each of the services' distinct rank structures needed to be rationalized. This rationalization involved more than mere name changes as each service assigned responsibility to junior NCOs, senior NCOs and officers differently. For example, in order to align ranks, the decision was made to make promotion to corporal automatic, based on time, as was the RCAF standard. This decision caused great difficulty for the Army and the Navy as this rank was considered to be a supervisory rank and required specific skills and experience. As a result of this decision, these supervisory duties were pushed up the rank structure, which demanded a greater number of senior NCOs and thus created an unbalanced rank structure. In hindsight, even Hellyer saw the rank rationalization issue as a major problem that would eventually lead to a distorted NCO / soldier ratio; however, he let it pass as a minor problem at the time.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Hellyer, *Damn The Torpedoes...*, 213-4.

Trade and rank structures aside, operational effectiveness, especially when operating with allies, remained the major concern of the service chiefs. This concern over interoperability with our allies was expressed in two aspects. First there was concern voiced over Canada's rapidly changing defence policy and organization, and whether or not the CF would still be able to fit into the NATO construct. Furthermore, concern was expressed that the force structure would not be able to integrate with allies in a time of war.<sup>22</sup> Although the issues of policy and structure, from the perspective of what the CF would be allowed and equipped to do, are valid, the added argument that the very organization of the CF would impair interoperability are fallacious as the very organization of a force does not determine its ability to undertake a mission, only its capability does. In this vein, although the government decides what the CF's participation policy will be, as is its right, and this could affect the military's ability to operate with allies from a capability perspective, the very organization of those forces would not, as long as it had the capability to participate. For example, if the government decided to equip the military with fighter jets, and decided to allow them to operate within a NATO construct, the fact that the pilot wears a green uniform instead of a light blue one, and is called major instead of squadron leader, has no impact on the operational effectiveness of the Canadian fighter jet capability provided to NATO. Although the opponents of unification argued organizational issues such as this on the basis of operational effectiveness, they were actually issues of a perceived loss of identity. Of interest, Kronenberg actually argued how this change in identity, away from the CF's British roots and toward a more distinct Canadian identity, actually resulted in an

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<sup>22</sup>Brock, *The Thunder And...*, 281-2.

increase in the CF's operational effectiveness in many areas of the world, as the CF was no longer considered British.<sup>23</sup> As such, identity issues argued by the opponents of unification on the basis of operational effectiveness can be logically dismissed; however, concerns over the chain of command need further review.

The final service concern expressed over the operational effectiveness impact of unification was one of loss of effective access to the minister. The services felt that for effective attention to be paid to the myriad of operational and technical details of each of the services, direct access to the minister was required.<sup>24</sup> This situation was, of course, exactly what Hellyer was trying to avoid by placing coordination and decision-making power in military hands, those of the CDS.<sup>25</sup> As will be seen, this principle of military command of military personal and operations remains a cornerstone of Canadian defence policy.

### **The 1970s and The Task Force On the Review Of Unification**

The 1970s saw two dramatic changes in defence organization in Canada. First was the combining of the Canadian Forces HQ (CFHQ) and the Deputy Minister's organization, into National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). Second was the review report on unification that re-confirmed some of the principles of unification, and recommended some changes. Amalgamation of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, two separate legal entities, fundamentally changed the nature and processes of control of the CF, and although it strengthened civilian control of the

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<sup>23</sup>Vernon J Kronenberg, *All Together Now* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973), 81-3.

<sup>24</sup>Bland, *Chiefs Of Defence...*, 72-6.

<sup>25</sup>Hellyer, *Damn The Torpedoes...*, 34-42.

military in general terms, the organization introduced the possibility of confusion in the purely military lines of control that are so essential to successful military operations.<sup>26</sup> The task force review in 1979 was tasked primarily with a review of unification; however, by the very nature of the other significant changes that had occurred since unification, the task force also reviewed some of the impacts of these changes as well.<sup>27</sup> The substance of the task force report supported unification; however, it made several recommendations that started the CF on the road away from total unification by attempting to clarify the command of operations issue. A more detailed review of the ramifications of these two organizational changes will demonstrate that although the strategic management and control of the CF / DND improved, operational control of the CF suffered.

Under the auspices of the Management Review Group (MRG), the Department of National Defence, the Deputy Minister's organization, and the CFHQ, the CDS's organization, were merged in 1972. Although the mandate for the MRG's work was to bring modern management practices to CFHQ, it has been postulated that the real reason for change was to remove important decision-making power from the CDS.<sup>28</sup> In hindsight, it is assessed that the real impetus for change was a desire by government to have a single leadership within DND that was more sensitive to political reality. This desire, although understandable, neglected the requirement for operational control.<sup>29</sup> The

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<sup>26</sup>Bland, *Chiefs Of Defence...*, 92-101.

<sup>27</sup>*Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces – Final Report*. G.M. Fyffe, Chairman. Ottawa: Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 1980, 2.

<sup>28</sup>Bland, *Chiefs Of Defence...*, 96.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid*, 97.

MRG report's recommendations were considered highly controversial and, as such, they were implemented, and NDHQ was formed, with little to no public consultation, as the report was not even made public until 1985.<sup>30</sup> As a result of this implementation process, the desirable public debate, and subsequent changes to the National Defence Act, that would legislate the actual responsibilities of the DM and CDS, were never made. As such, there was much confusion and manoeuvring between the two offices in an attempt to establish the respective relationships. The lack of clearly defined responsibilities resulted in much confusion throughout the 1970s and early 1980s with respect to the administration and control of the CF. This, in conjunction with the new Defence Management Committee, changes in the procurement process, and the resultant shift in expenditure controls from military to civilian bureaucratic hands, left the CDS with official command of the CF but without the resources necessary to effectively exercise or even influence that responsibility.<sup>31</sup> In essence, the concentration of real decision making power in the DM's office, those of resource allocation, policy and material management, left both the CDS and his field commanders in a weak position to conduct operations as they did not control the resources necessary to conduct operations.

Although the creation of NDHQ may have helped to place the strategic control of defence policy and administration into the political hands where it rightly belongs in a modern democratic military, it blurred the lines of the military command of military forces and, as such, negatively impacted the CDS's ability to maintain unity of command. The principle of unity of command requires that a commander have command over all of

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<sup>30</sup>Bland, *Chiefs Of Defence...*, 100.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid*, 100-101.



the personnel, material assets, logistics support, and other resources necessary to accomplish an assigned mission. This enduring principle of military command was being compromised in the early NDHQ organization because many of the resources required for the accomplishment of assigned CF missions were not under the direct command and control of the CDS. Increasing frustration over the situation led to field commanders assuming more responsibility for operations and, indirectly, to the reestablishment of Air Command in 1975. Although the relationship between the CDS and the DM began to stabilize over time, the constant personnel changes in both offices caused an almost constant flux in responsibilities between the two, and hence operational frustration continued. This constant level of high frustration directly led to a full-scale review of unification, the Fyffe report, which was released in 1979.

The Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces, and the Review Group on the Report of The Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces, hereafter referred to as the Fyffe Report and the Vance Report respectively, were released in 1979 and 1980 respectively. The Fyffe Commission was tasked by the Minister “to examine the merits and disadvantages of unification of the Canadian Forces and at the same time to provide comment on the unified command system.”<sup>32</sup> The aim of the Vance Report was “to examine and prepare an appreciation of the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces so that appropriate disposition of its recommendations [could] be achieved.”<sup>33</sup> The recommendations in the two reports, and the actions that followed, fundamentally changed the ways in which the CF was managed

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<sup>32</sup>*Task Force on Review of Unification...*, 1.

<sup>33</sup>*Review Group on The Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces*. J. E. Vance, Chairman. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1980, A-5.

post unification, primarily due to the inclusion of the Commanders of the Commands, the *de facto* service chiefs, being made members of the Defence Council. This action proved to be the first step that moved the CF away from unification, and the start of a process that led to the re-emergence of semi-autonomous environmental chiefs.

The Fyffe report made recommendations in seven different categories: command and control, identity, support services, training, the personnel system, recruiting, and the reserves and cadets.<sup>34</sup> Although it generally supported the concept of unified command, it made strong arguments for reestablishment of the individual service chains of command on the basis of operational effectiveness.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, it acknowledged that the single service support concept envisioned under unification, especially the trade structures, personnel management and training requirements, was not working well and further recognition of the individual services' requirements was required.<sup>36</sup> The recommendations on unified trade ineffectiveness were made based on operational experience during 10 years of unification. This experience justified the conclusion as unified training, although adequate for centralized services, did not meet the requirements of the operational units and significant extra training was required to meet the environmental needs of the services. The report also acknowledged that individual service identity was important and thus recommended a return to distinct environmental uniforms.<sup>37</sup> It is interesting to note that, although the standardization of benefits and

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<sup>34</sup>*Task Force on Review of Unification...*, 38.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid*, 77.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid*, 61-70.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid*, 78-80.

administrative processes that resulted from unification were well supported, there was still a general feeling amongst the CF that they

environmental commanders.<sup>40</sup> Although no major organizational changes were recommended, Vance's support of Fyffe's recommendation for the attendance of the Commanders of the Commands to attend DMC, and his own recommendations for greater sensitization within NDHQ to the needs of the individual environments, and for greater environmental input in operational planning, became the first steps in the reestablishment of individual service staffs. Most of the other Fyffe Report recommendations, especially those that were viewed as attempting to reverse the original direction of unification, were either given limited support such as "formal recognition that more emphasis should be placed on the environmental capability of support service personnel," or they were not supported as they "were considered to be in conflict with the basic policy of unification."<sup>41</sup> In the final analysis, the end result of the two reports marked a significant step away from unification, however tempered by the Vance Report, and the start of the rise of the individual services' input into the agenda at NDHQ. Although never formally promulgated as policy, the return of the Conservative government in 1984 furthered this trend as it implemented many of the original Fyffe Report recommendations, such as the instigation of environmental training for the support services and the return of distinctive environmental uniforms.

### **The Gulf War and the J-Staff**

The Gulf War of 1990-91 represented another turning point in the operational command structure of the CF. Although many of the confusing relationships with respect to the division of mainly administrative responsibilities between the CDS and the DM

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<sup>40</sup>*Review Group on The Report of the Task Force on Unification...*, 8-13.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid*, 26, 50.

still existed, it was the issue of operational command and control of military forces that came to the forefront when the CF went to war for the first time since Korea. This was due to the fact that the process for the operational command of forces had not really been stressed at the national level since the Korean War and NDHQ had slowly evolved into a headquarters that was focused on administration and management rather than operational planning and war fighting.

Throughout the late 1980s, the power and influence of the individual services continued to grow within NDHQ.<sup>42</sup> However, it took several domestic and international crises to reveal fully the inadequacies of the national command and control structure. The planning for Haiti in 1988, the Oka crisis, and the Gulf War in 1990 revealed that the central staff was incapable of operational level planning without the input of the environmental staffs because NDHQ was manned with neither the personnel nor the tools required for the task. Furthermore, they demonstrated that neither NDHQ nor the Command Headquarters were capable of effectively commanding operations because their core processes were designed for administration and management, not operations. The lack of resources at NDHQ, the small size of the DCDS's operations division, and the fact that the Command Headquarters lacked the direct access to necessary political and policy direction, meant limited ability to command effectively from either the centre, or the Commands. Further complicating the issue, especially during the Gulf War, was the fact that each of the commanders who contributed forces to operations were struggling for control of their forces as they saw that they should command something, even to the point that ADM Mat, a civilian completely out of the chain of command,

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<sup>42</sup>See Bland, *Chiefs Of Defence...*, 188-208 for a good description of the shifting balances of power within NDHQ during this timeframe.

thought that he should have command of his logistics units deployed to the Gulf.<sup>43</sup> The lines of command quickly became so diffused early in the Gulf War that the principle of unity of command was completely lost and the CDS had to act quickly in order to restore it.

As the Gulf War escalated, the CDS soon found that the multiple reporting lines within the command and control organization became intolerable and he moved to establish a single task force commander in the Gulf Theatre that reported directly back to NDHQ for operational command and left each unit to report back to its parent command for administrative support.<sup>44</sup> This organization led to the growth of the DCDS joint staff, in concert with the concept of the CDS acting as the force employer (with day to day control by the DCDS) and the environmental commanders reduced to force generators. The split of responsibility between force generation and force employment had the effect of removing all non-operational commanders from the direct operational chain of command and thus ensured the unity of command over operations. The 1994 Defence White Paper embraced this conceptual split between force generation and force employment and directed further refinement of the CF's operational command and control structure.<sup>45</sup> This refinement took place during the MCCRT processes of the mid to late 1990s.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>Bland, *Chiefs Of Defence...*, 191-202.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid*, 200-202.

<sup>45</sup>Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994), chapter 7.

<sup>46</sup>Department of National Defence, *MCCRT Historical Report* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1997), chapter 5.

## **MCCRT and the Operational HQ Review**

Although primarily driven by the need to manage the downsizing of the CF mandated by the 1994 Defence White Paper, MCCRT was also tasked to develop structural options for a new and leaner command system for the CF. The team was stood up in 1995 with “a mandate to re-engineer the DND/CF command, control and resource management structure, with emphasis on NDHQ, command and operational headquarters restructuring and downsizing.”<sup>47</sup> Direction to the team included the maintenance of an integrated civil / military NDHQ, to emphasize operational capability, and to remove a level of headquarters by moving the environmental chiefs to Ottawa and eliminating the command headquarters.<sup>48</sup> Although the team was tasked to deliver options for reorganization, the directions given to the team effectively limited their options for reorganization. For example, the direction that the environmental chiefs were to move to Ottawa, effectively eliminated the option of establishing a headquarters organized on the basis of joint command and control principles, one without service chiefs. As the directed goal of the team was to provide for “the integration of the former NDHQ and the staffs of the three environmental commanders” with the capability of delivering the key processes of strategic direction, force generation, force employment and corporate management, the team had to propose a model that merged the conflicting requirement to accommodate the service chiefs within a unified headquarters. Due to these

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<sup>47</sup>DND, *MCCRT Historical Report...*, 1.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid*, 5-2, 5-3.

organizational constraints, the required compromises led to an organization that did not clearly separate the responsibility for the core processes.<sup>49</sup>

Admittedly, the course that the MCCRT followed to re-engineer the CF / DND management process was complicated by the concurrent need to downsize.<sup>50</sup> Consequently, numerous other compromises were also made in order to ease the process of change. However, the main requirement to change the organization in order to fulfill and execute the key NDHQ processes effectively was never fully met. For example, blurred lines of responsibility for the core processes of strategic direction and corporate management remained between the DM, the CDS, the DCDS and the VCDS. Additionally, in order to accommodate the demands of the environmental commanders' to maintain some degree of operational control of forces, despite being primarily force generators, force employment responsibilities were also blurred.<sup>51</sup> This blurring was in part due to the initial direction that the MCCRT received which mandated that the "environmental heads would not be more than one rank less than the CDS and not subordinate to the staff."<sup>52</sup> This imposed start point for the new NDHQ organization ensured that the services not only had direct access to the CDS, it also gave the services more organizational influence, and thus further reduced the ability to implement joint reforms. As a result, not only were the previous confusing relationships at the strategic level made more difficult, the introduction of the three environmental chiefs into the

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<sup>49</sup>DND, *MCCRT Historical Report...*, 6-3, 6-4.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid*, 13-1.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid*, 6-5, 6-6.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid*, 5-3.



NDHQ equation further complicated the operational command and control of forces issue.

In an attempt to resolve the issues surrounding force employment, the VCDS commissioned the Mason Project in 2000. The Project was commissioned by the VCDS “to re-evaluate the concept of a centralized operational level headquarters” that had originally been looked at during the MCCRT process but was dismissed as being too disruptive at the time for reasons related to the large scope of reorganization that was already occurring at the time.<sup>53</sup> The project not only reviewed the MCCRT work but also looked at the viability of several additional operational headquarters models in an attempt to devise a workable model that would improve the force employment process within NDHQ. After reviewing the many factors that impacted on the various operational headquarters models, the study concluded “that neither the centralized nor the current model [was] clearly superior to the other [as...] each [had] strong advantages and disadvantages.”<sup>54</sup> Although seemingly non-committal, this conclusion is considered logical as there are few, even simple, operations that could be supported by a single, clear option for command and control. The report did, however, make some clear observations with respect to the probable lack of internal acceptability of the central model, and the distinct advantage of a strong division of responsibility in the areas of force generation and force employment.<sup>55</sup> The acceptability observations centred on the need to “obtain the ‘buy in’ of the senior leadership” in order for any centralized headquarters plan to

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<sup>53</sup>Lynn Gordon Mason and Raymond Crabbe., *A Centralized Operational Level Headquarters, Report for the Department of National Defence* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2000), 1.

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid*, 54.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid*, 54-5.

succeed.<sup>56</sup> This observation seemed to be based on the expected level of resistance from the environmental chiefs at their loss of operational control that a single force employment headquarters option would cause. That being said, the authors expressed the view that a clear distinction between force generation and force employment would improve operational effectiveness and streamline the command of both domestic and international operations.<sup>57</sup> The improvements noted include clearer lines of command responsibility for operations and the avoidance of discontinuity when operations have to hand-over during the conduct of operations. As such, although the report makes no firm commitment to any particular operational headquarters model, it does provide some sound ideas for organizational change that could improve the CF's current command and control model.

The last four decades have represented almost constant organizational change for the CF. The implementation of integration and unification, followed by the merger of CFHQ with the DM's office into NDHQ, the subsequent moves away from unification, increasing operational tempos, and the downsizing experienced in the 1990s have left the CF with a less than fully effective operational command and control system. The post-Cold War pressures of contingency operations, joint force employment and downsizing, and the re-emergence of environmental staffs with significant decision influencing powers, have furthered this state of organizational confusion. Although many changes have been evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary, and generally improved strategic decision making and corporate management within the CF / DND, effective operational

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<sup>56</sup>Mason and Crabbe, *A Centralized Operational...*, 54.

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid*, 47.

employment of forces has been compromised by a system that has blurred lines of command and an unclear division of responsibilities amongst the major players. The question of how the CF can change this situation and develop a new and workable operational level joint command and control system may best be answered by looking at our Allies.

### **JOINTNESS AMONGST ALLIES**

The organizational constructs of Canada's allies perhaps present some best practices, lessons learned or organizational principles that can be applied in the CF to enhance its operational command and control organization. Furthermore, the CF's own doctrine, driven by the 1994 White Paper, states "that [CF] doctrine, both joint and single-service, should be consistent to the maximum extent possible with the doctrine of our principal allies."<sup>58</sup> As such, the US military is worthy of first review as they have been both the vanguard of modern joint doctrine development since the mid 1980s, and they remain Canada's closest ally. Although there can be no real comparison between the Canadian and American militaries in terms of power and resource expenditures, the US development of the joint principles that have been copied throughout NATO and other western militaries still make the US military's organizational model an appropriate starting point. The United Kingdom also provides some organizational lessons to Canada because the UK Forces have adapted to many of the same changes over the last 15 years that Canada has, such as the end of the Cold War, an increase in the number of expeditionary operations conducted, and overall downsizing. In particular, the establishment and operation of the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) has clarified

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<sup>58</sup>Department of National Defence, A-AE-025-000/FP-001 *Canadian Forces Doctrine Development* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), i.

and rationalized the force generation / force employment process in the UK, and this evolution is directly applicable to solving similar problems in Canada.

### **The US Armed Forces**

Although the US Military has a long history of joint operations, the development of its modern joint doctrine and organization can be traced to the the Goldwater, Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, as this act established a single point of responsibility within the US military for joint doctrine development. The implication of this act and the legislative changes that followed were wide reaching since each of the US services were required to align their doctrine, force generation and force employment policies to follow the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This shift in orientation resulted in the establishment of a strategic level of control over the doctrine of the individual services and the consequent force generation priorities of those services.<sup>59</sup> As such, the individual services were required to respond to higher-level joint force priorities rather than trying to develop doctrine, training, and equipment that was solely designed to meet their individual services' needs. This principle of top-down joint force generation has direct applicability to Canada as it would modernize the force generation process within NDHQ by directing and controlling the process from a CF wide perspective rather than trying to respond to the wishes of the individual services.

The US model also provides similar examples of modern, joint principles in the areas of force employment. The US national command and control model is based on four distinct command elements: the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of

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<sup>59</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Story*, available from [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/joint\\_doctrine\\_story.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/joint_doctrine_story.htm).

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified Combatant Commanders.<sup>60</sup> The President is the Commander in Chief, nominally equivalent to the Governor General in Canada; however, the position is practically equivalent to the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The Secretary of Defense and his office can be equated to the Canadian Minister of Defence, the Deputy Minister, and their respective offices. Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff holds a similar position to the CDS, in that they are both the primary advisors to government on military matters, the organizations below them differ significantly. This is primarily due to the fact that in the US system the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their offices and organizations within the Pentagon, hold the primary responsibility of training and equipping forces, and planning and coordinating military operations at the strategic level but they are not responsible for the direct employment of military power. The employment of military force is directed from the Secretary directly to the Unified Combatant Commanders, with the advice of the Chairman.<sup>61</sup> This situation is a clear example of an organization that has the desired split in responsibility between force generation and force employment that was recommended in the Mason Project.<sup>62</sup> Although it is difficult to compare directly the Pentagon with NDHQ due to the differences in scale, the principle of splitting force generation and force employment is applicable as the aim of the split is to create clear lines of responsibility and reduce the possibility of potential command confusion with forces in the field, thus ensuring unity of

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<sup>60</sup>Department of Defense, *DoD 101*, available from [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101/dod101\\_for\\_2002.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101/dod101_for_2002.html).

<sup>61</sup>DoD, *DoD 101*..., np.

<sup>62</sup>Mason and Crabbe, *A Centralized Operational*..., 47.

command, the prime goal of any command and control structure, regardless of scale.<sup>63</sup> In the US organization, unity of command is ensured by having the Combatant Commanders in the field report directly to the National Command Authority, The President and Secretary, without having to go through the force generators within the Pentagon. In Canada, this relationship is not clear as the commanders in the field often report to their individual service commanders, the DCDS, or both, depending on the context of the operation.

Despite the difference in scale, the US organizational model does provide two examples of how the CF could apply joint principals to its own command and control model in an attempt to delineate the force generation / force employment processes and thus improve both the CF's joint force generation capability, and its operational command of forces. To accomplish this, the CF's organization must first change from a service driven requirements process to a CF driven joint requirements process. Secondly, clear lines of command must be established from the government, through the strategic headquarters and directly to the operational forces in the field, for all types of operations. A review of the UK defence organization will now show that an organization designed to meet these goals is not just applicable to the US, as it has also been achieved in smaller militaries.

### **The United Kingdom**

The origin of the UK defence organization goes back to the 16<sup>th</sup> century; however, the current Ministry of Defence (MOD) organization only dates back to 1971. The reorganization in 1971 was the end of a high level amalgamation of the MOD with

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<sup>63</sup>Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1996), 43.

the Admiralty, the War Office, the Air Ministry, the Ministry of Aviation and the Ministry of Aviation Supply.<sup>64</sup> In many ways this reorganization mirrored both Canadian integration / unification in the 1960s, and the strategic level unification of the CFHQ with the DM's office in 1972, with the major difference that the individual services in the UK remained separate entities. As such, the MOD, led by the Secretary for Defence, is the equivalent of the Canadian unified NDHQ model, led by the defence minister, and responsible primarily for the strategic direction and corporate management functions of defence while the service chiefs remained primarily responsible for force generation and non-operational force employment. Although individually responsible for force generation, each service is still responsible to the Joint Doctrine Concepts Centre (JDCC) for ensuring that all of its service's systems, doctrine and force development meet the requirements of the overall UK joint development plan.<sup>65</sup> As such, the individual services are responsive to central control to ensure the principles of jointness are applied throughout the UK military.

In the early 1990s, the MOD went through a further period of restructuring following the end of the Cold War. The lessons learned from the Falklands War and the Gulf War, and the uncertainty of deployments in the post cold war era, led the UK MOD to a conclusion that a Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) was required to command and control all UK forces on operations. The driving factor in reaching this conclusion was the ad-hoc, reactive and uncoordinated ways in which the individual services were

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<sup>64</sup>Ministry of Defence, *History of the MOD*, available from <http://www.mod.uk/aboutus/history/mod.htm>.

<sup>65</sup>Ministry of Defence, *Joint Doctrine Concept Centre - Overview*, available from <http://www.mod.uk/jdcc/oview.htm>.

planning and conducting operations.<sup>66</sup> In many ways, this situation again mirrors the Canadian experience with the establishment of the DCDS COS J3 group in the 1990s. The difference in this case is that the PJHQ was stood up as a separate organization with clear responsibility for the planning and coordination of all UK force employment issues, whereas the DCDS group has split operational responsibility with the service commanders for the planning and coordination of all operations, and only holds sole responsibility for the actual command of international operations, while the services retain sole responsibility for routine domestic operations. This split in Canadian responsibilities dilutes the principle of unity of command and thus has the potential to introduce confusion into the minds of both the operational and tactical commanders.

The UK model has greatly reduced this potential for confusion by clearly separating the force generation function from the force employment function. Although the UK service chiefs each sit as members of the Defence Management Board and retain an operational command authority over their services, each is now primarily responsible for generating and providing forces, at an agreed to readiness level, to the PJHQ for employment. In the same vein, the Chief of Joint Operations (the CO of the PJHQ) also sits on the Defence Management Board as an equal of the service chiefs; however, he is charged solely with the responsibility of running all military operations on behalf of the CDS and the Secretary of Defence, with the forces provided by the service chiefs.<sup>67</sup> As with the US example, the UK model demonstrates an overall organization for the

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<sup>66</sup>Ministry of Defence, *Permanent Joint Headquarters - History*, available from <http://www.northwood.mod.uk/org/organise.htm#History>.

<sup>67</sup>Ministry of Defence, *MOD Organization*, available from <http://www.mod.uk/aboutus/modorg/index.html>.



command of forces that creates the desired clear lines of operational command by separating the force employment and force generation responsibilities.

Although both the US and UK organizational models have evolved for different reasons and to meet different strategic aims, several key organizational elements have developed to the same end state, a good indication that they are sound organizational principles. First, both models incorporate a unified, or joint, military headquarters that is fully integrated with the civil portion of the headquarters, the Pentagon in the US, and MOD in the UK. These HQs are charged with the strategic level direction and control of the military and, although structured differently, are both clearly responsible for the processes of strategic direction, force generation and corporate management. Associated with, but separate from these headquarters, are separate operational command elements that are responsible directly to their national commanders for force employment, the Combatant Commanders in the US, and the PJHQ in the UK. Also, in each case, force generation is a top down, joint driven process; led in the US by the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in the UK by the JDCC. If these same organizational principles could be applied to the Canadian model, perhaps there would be both a clarification of the NDHQ lines of responsibility and a potential corresponding increase in the effective operational employment of the CF's forces.

### **A JOINT WAY AHEAD FOR CANADA**

NDHQ is currently operating as both a strategic and operational level headquarters responsible for the core processes of strategic direction, corporate management, force generation, and force employment. As demonstrated above, this mix of operational and strategic direction, especially within the areas of force generation and

force employment, has the potential to impact adversely the principle of unity of command in operations, especially joint operations. Furthermore, the current NDHQ organization does not allow for a joint driven, force generation process. To put the Canadian situation into context, jointness will first be defined within the Canadian unified system and then the core processes within NDHQ will be defined and assigned to an appropriate area of responsibility. When compared with the CF's Allies' models, it will become apparent that NDHQ is not well structured to support joint force generation or joint force employment. Based on this finding, an organizational solution will be proposed that will better distribute the institutional processes within NDHQ and thus better position the CF to apply joint principles to both the force generation and the force employment processes.

### **Unification and Jointness**

Although it could be said that Canada's adoption of both integration and unification was an early attempt at jointness, by definition, there are some fundamental differences between the two concepts. Whereas unification was the creation of a single service, jointness refers to situations where two or more services of the same nation operate together. Under the context of Bills C90 (integration) and C243 (unification), the primary purpose of unification was to amalgamate the three services into a single entity, primarily at the strategic level, and to provide for savings through the reduction of duplicate and triplicate support services.<sup>68</sup> Despite much rhetoric to the contrary, there was never any real intent to create a generic serviceman capable of serving in any of the three environments, except in some support trades. Moreover, especially at the strategic

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<sup>68</sup>Hellyer, *Damn The Torpedoes...*, 36-8.

level, the intent was for a unified force structure that was capable of coordinating national policies and plans, and indirectly commanding the functional commanders at the operational level. As each of the functional commanders was committed to a “strategy of commitments”, essentially single service tasks in support of, or in conjunction with, NATO or other allies, this construct worked well as there was no real need for each of Canada’s services to work together in a joint manner.<sup>69</sup> Although this organizational construct made sense and worked well at the time, especially at the strategic level where a high degree of coordination in policy and administration was required, by definition, it cannot be called joint in the modern sense.

Jointness is defined as “activities, operations, organizations, etc in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate.”<sup>70</sup> The key difference between this definition and unification is the fact that jointness requires the separate environmental forces to coordinate and cooperate at the operational and tactical levels in accomplishing a common mission or task, as opposed to the unified coordination of environmental forces conducting different missions. Joint doctrine implicitly acknowledges that the separate environmental services bring different and specialized capabilities to each operation. It also recognizes that if each service can contribute these capabilities effectively, the total joint effect is better than that obtained by each service acting independently.<sup>71</sup> Hence, because joint operations requires that operational and tactical level units work closely together, the degree of interoperability and inter-doctrinal

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<sup>69</sup>Bland, *Chiefs Of Defence...*, 84, 94.

<sup>70</sup>Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-000 Canadian Forces Operations (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000), GL-E-5.

<sup>71</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Story*, available from [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/joint\\_doctrine\\_story.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/joint_doctrine_story.htm).

understanding between the services must be at a much higher level than that required to control a unified force conducting independent environmental missions.

By highlighting this fundamental difference between unification and jointness, it becomes apparent that the principles of unification - high-level coordination - is particularly beneficial in executing the CF's institutional processes of strategic direction and corporate management, and to a limited degree, force generation. On the other hand, it is also apparent that jointness is the key enabler for the force employment process, which is normally conducted at the operational and tactical level, although it also has some applicability to the force generation process. The solution to creating a better operational command and control process would, therefore, appear to be finding an answer to the question of how to create a system that balances the requirements of both the principles of unification and jointness, against the core processes within NDHQ.

### **Where Is The CF Today?**

Although it defies modern definitional logic, the fact that Canada has two permanently established joint HQs and a host of joint doctrine, proves the CF is conducting joint operations (more than one service) within a unified structure (one service). As such, despite the legal statute that indicates that Canada only has one service, the CF has been reasonably successful at applying joint principles to the development of its modern doctrine, its training systems, and in the organization of its prime operational force employer, the DCDS group. However, complicating this development of jointness in a unified CF is the presence of three powerful environmental chiefs of staff who act as *de facto* heads of independent services with the right to report directly to the CDS and the DM. In this regard, the reestablishment of the service chiefs

within NDHQ in 1996 was perhaps one step too far back from unification as it confused both the force generation and the force employment processes within the unified headquarters.

Within the force generation process, the confusion can best be seen in the equipment acquisition process. From a joint perspective, capability requirements should be determined from a CF wide perspective and tasked down to the appropriate environmental staff to fulfill. However, NDHQ lacks a joint requirements office and, as a result, the service chiefs carry the weight of decision making and are free to promote their own service interests.<sup>72</sup> This situation results in a force generation process that is service driven rather than CF driven. Within the force employment process, similar service interests create confusion within the operational chain of command because the service chiefs normally have command of all of their forces for all force generation issues and for routine force employment issues such as training and domestic operations; however, the DCDS gains command of all environmental forces for all international and non-routine operations.<sup>73</sup> This split in responsibility not only creates two potential chains of command, a possible source of confusion unto itself, it also creates handover difficulties as responsibility changes during operations, especially when the service chiefs may be unwilling to give up all or part of their command responsibilities to the DCDS. Further, command is not normally fully transferred to the DCDS because the service chief will normally retain administrative command of transferred units for residual issues such as personnel support, specialized logistics support and discipline. As such, further

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<sup>72</sup>Bland, *Chiefs Of Defence...*, 123.

<sup>73</sup>DND, *Canadian Forces Operations...*, 1-7, 1-8.

confusion can be introduced into the chain of command and thus, the principle of unity of command can be further compromised. At this stage, it appears that the clear assignment of the core process within NDHQ, especially those of force generation and force employment, must first be made to single, appropriate OPIs, if the application of joint principles is to be successfully applied to improve the CF's command and control process.

### **Where Does The CF Need To Go?**

In order to re-establish clear lines of responsibility for each of the core processes of strategic direction, force generation, force employment, and corporate management, it is first necessary to establish what these processes are and then assign them to a principle OPI within the headquarters. Strategic direction is defined as “the process of transforming government direction and assigned resources into strategic direction for [DND] and the [CF], and defence policy for government.”<sup>74</sup> Corporate management is defined as “the process of establishing, administering and communicating financial, personnel, material, information and other departmental policies.”<sup>75</sup> Given that the CDS has the statute responsibility for the “command, control and administration of the [CF] and advises the Minister on all these matters - including military requirements, capabilities, options and the possible consequences of undertaking or failing to undertake various military activities,”<sup>76</sup> it would seem clear that both strategic direction and corporate management are the CDS's responsibility; however, the Deputy Minister (DM)

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<sup>74</sup>DND, *MCCRT Historical Report...*, 6-4.

<sup>75</sup>*Ibid*, 6-4.

<sup>76</sup>Department of National Defence, *About the CDS*, available from [http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/resp\\_e.asp](http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/resp_e.asp).

holds similar responsibility. Although the position of the DM is established within the National Defence Act, the Act does not clearly spell out his responsibilities. The DM's responsibilities, as with any other senior public servant, are more generally laid out in the Public Service Act, the Interpretations Act and the Financial Administration Act; however, within DND the Minister has further defined his responsibilities as:

... provid[ing] the Minister with the broadest possible expert support in all of the Minister's responsibilities, except for partisan political activities. This includes supporting the Minister in consulting and informing Parliament and the Canadian public on defence issues. To this end, the Deputy advises the Minister on policy issues as well as on management concerns, and manages the Department on behalf of the Minister. More specifically, the Deputy is responsible for [policy advice, internal departmental management and interdepartmental coordination].<sup>77</sup>

Although the responsibilities of the CDS and the DM appear to be in conflict, the Minister has clarified their relationship by assigning the DM the primary responsibility for “resources, policy and international defence relations,” and assigned the CDS the primary responsibility for the “command, control and administration of the [CF] and military strategy, plans and requirements.” In practice however, many of the issues “affecting Canada's defence activities are decided jointly by the [CDS and the DM].”<sup>78</sup> Within this understanding of unified decision-making, it would appear logical that the core processes of strategic direction and corporate management should remain the unified responsibility of the CDS and the DM, aided by the ADMs for policy, material, finance, HR, IM and PA, and the VCDS, as they are now.

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<sup>77</sup>Department of National Defence, *Organization and Accountability*, available from [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/authority/OA\\_e.htm](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/authority/OA_e.htm), III.

<sup>78</sup>*Ibid*, np.

Although this combined responsibility between the CDS and the DM for the effective functioning and management of the CF/DND may sound confusing, it is in fact the very heart of the delicate decision making-balance within the unified civil / military headquarters that is NDHQ, and has generally proved effective in the past, especially at the strategic level. In many ways, it also reflects the political and strategic makeup of our allies' headquarters in both the US Pentagon and the UK MOD. As such, no recommended changes for the disposition of the core processes of strategic direction and corporate management can be made at this time. However, the processes of force generation and force employment present different challenges.

Force Generation is defined as “the process of transforming strategic and corporate policy into forces for employment.”<sup>79</sup> It includes responsibility for recruiting, training, equipping and maintaining the readiness levels of forces assigned. As described in *Organization and Accountability*, in most cases, this responsibility clearly rests with the commander to whom the forces are assigned. In the norm, these commanders are the ECSs, although some forces are assigned to the DCDS, ADM Mat and others in small quantities. The area of confusion with respect to force generation arises with the requirement to equip the forces assigned as, in many cases, the capital costs and political sensitivity of equipping forces mandate the participation of ADM Mat, ADM Pol and the VCDS. Complicating the issue further is the fact that within the current organization there is no single point of responsibility for joint requirements definition with the authority to impose joint requirements on the services, as is the case in the US and UK. This situation means that major material acquisitions are generally driven from the

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<sup>79</sup>DND, *MCCRT Historical Report...*, 6-4.



bottom up by the ECSs, based on service needs, rather than being top down driven by a joint requirement. As a result of these two organizational issues, responsibility for force generation can neither be assigned to a single OPI, nor can it be directed and controlled with any degree of jointness. The force employment process also suffers from similar organizational issues.

Force employment is defined as “the process of exercising command and control of forces tasked to carry out operations in accordance with defence policy and strategic direction.”<sup>80</sup> As described earlier, command and control of the forces is vested with the CDS and as such, force employment is clearly a responsibility that emanates solely from the CDS. However, in today’s construct, the Minister has further delineated the lines of command beyond the CDS. Depending on the operation, the line of command may proceed to the DCDS for international operations, to an assigned task force commander for specifically assigned operations, to an area commander for domestic operations, or to an ECS for routine operations and training.<sup>81</sup> Although this arrangement has generally proven successful, it is not optimal for reasons of both efficiency and unity of command as there is potential for confusion in the cases when routine or domestic operations become too large or too sensitive quickly and command has to be assumed by NDHQ.<sup>82</sup> Whatever route the eventual line of command from the CDS flows, one point remains clear – force employment involves a purely military chain of command. Although the civilian offices of the DM, ADM Pol and others may become involved in the strategic

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<sup>80</sup>DND, *MCCRT Historical Report...*, 6-4.

<sup>81</sup>DND, *Organization and Accountability...*, np.

<sup>82</sup>Mason and Crabbe, *A Centralized...*, 47.

level decisions of whether and how to employ forces, the actual command of those forces on employment remains a military matter commanded directly from the CDS to his commanders in the field.

A review of the basic descriptions above immediately reveals several key deductions. First, responsibility for strategic direction, corporate management and the significant, capital intensive and / or politically sensitive portions of the material side of force generation, are a shared responsibility of the civil / military link between the CDS and the DM. Secondly, force generation, outside of major capital and / or sensitive material acquisition projects, is mainly a military responsibility, primarily of the ECSs; however, the process needs to include a joint generation capability, and this capability needs to be top down driven based on joint operational requirements. Finally, force employment is clearly a military responsibility, primarily of the CDS and DCDS; however, the ECSs should retain those force employment responsibilities directly related to force generation, such as training and the sustainment of readiness levels. If the responsibility for the core processes were distributed in this manner, modern joint principles could more easily and directly be applied within the CF. Reassignment of the core processes would however, require some reorganization within NDHQ to be most effective. This reorganization involves placing the processes of strategic direction, corporate management and the material aspects of force generation into a unified, civil military strategic headquarters, the establishment of a joint force generation component within that headquarters, and the establishment of a separate, joint operational headquarters to deal with force employment. This organizational model is not revolutionary as it would closely mirror both the US Pentagon / Combat Commander

model, and the UK MOD-Whitehall / PJHQ model. A more detailed description of this proposal for Canada will now demonstrate the advantages that this model will bring to both jointness and operational effectiveness within the CF.

### **A Joint Operational Model For Canada**

Although some may argue that the split of NDHQ into two distinct parts would be another step away from unification, if it was conducted as described above, it would in fact move the CF back towards the principles of unification, and further evolve the CF's command and control process to better cope with the challenges of modern joint operations. From a unified joint force perspective, the proposal offers several advantages. It first allows for a significant portion of the senior staff, both military and civilian, to concentrate on the strategic direction, corporate management and the long-term development of the CF, within a unified headquarters, without the need to split their focus onto daily conduct of operations. As this unified effort at the top was one of the prime goals of unification from the start, this proposal would allow for application of modern management principles, as described in the MCCRT report, to the unification process. Further, within this portion of NDHQ, the inclusion of the ECSs under a chief responsible for joint force generation would allow for the creation of a top-down, jointly driven, force generation staff. This reorganization would also move NDHQ back towards unification by placing the service chiefs under the direction and control of a single joint requirements chief responsible for most aspects of force generation, and would therefore reduce the direct, and sometimes confusing, influence that the service chiefs have on the force generation process. This loss of influence would result because the services would have to respond to and develop equipment, doctrine and training that would be based on

CF wide requirements rather than those in the sole interests of the individual services. By placing all aspects of CF force generation, except for the capital and/or sensitive material acquisition projects, under joint control, the CF will be better able to focus on true joint requirements, as the US and the UK headquarters do, rather than trying to modify the individual services' preferred developments to meet CF joint requirements. Additionally, as a separate entity, the DCDS's force employment organization would allow for a single point of responsibility for the command of all operations, utilizing a truly independent joint staff organization. This organization would mirror both the US Combatant Commander model and the UK PJHQ model, thus allowing the CF to remove any confusion from the operational chain of command, and allow the CF to apply the principles of joint command as laid out in *Allied Joint Doctrine*. To meet these organizational goals, NDHQ and the current operational headquarters, could be evolved with minimal effort. Figure 1 represents a conceptual view of this proposed organization.




Figure 1 – Conceptual NDHQ / CFJHQ Split HQ

The aim of this model is to improve the CF's joint force generation and joint force employment capability, and as such, it is not intended to go into the detailed workings of the model but simply concentrate on the joint aspects of it, specifically the roles of the Deputy Chief Force Generation (DCFG), and the Deputy Chief Force Employment (DCFE). The model depicts an altered NDHQ on the right that is responsible for strategic direction, corporate management and force generation. The major change in the organization is the creation of the DCFG group, which is essentially an amalgamation of the three current environmental staffs, minus any operational force employment personnel, and the addition of the force generation staffs from the current DCDS organization. The model further depicts a new force employment model on the left, nominally called the Canadian Forces Joint Headquarters (CFJHQ). The DCFE group is essentially an amalgamation of the current DCDS organization, minus its force generation personnel, the Joint Operations Group (JOG), the Joint Support Group (JSG), and the addition of force employment staffs from each of the environments. Further descriptions, and advantages, of these new organizations are described below, along with examples of how they would improve both the force generation and force employment processes.

DCFG is organized as a top down driven joint force generation organization with the prime responsibility of establishing and filling the joint operational requirements of the CF. In other words, it has complete responsibility for the recruiting, training and equipping of the CF; however, it does so based on the joint force requirements of the CF as a whole, rather than the current model of environmentally driven needs. In the current model, equipment acquisitions and personnel structures are initiated by the individual

services based on individual service needs rather than the joint requirements of the CF at large. As described earlier, the services tend to drive the end capabilities that the CF obtains and has to employ rather than the CF obtaining what it really needs from a joint perspective. For example, the recent acquisition of modern tactical radios was initiated by each of the three services based on service needs. As a result, the TCCS radios obtained by the Army, the Sabre FM radios obtained by the Navy, and the tactical radios fitted in the Air Forces' observation helicopters are not fully compatible with each other. This was a major problem that was highlighted in the Operation Assistance (Winnipeg floods) Post Action Report. Further complicating the radio issue was the fact that the navigation standard utilized by the Army (grid reference), and that used by the Navy (latitude and longitude), are not compatible with each other, and neither service is cross trained in the other method. Although the problems were overcome by placing Army communicators in Navy boats and Air Force helicopters in order to provide joint connectivity, interoperable radios and common procedures would have been more effective.<sup>83</sup> Had the procurement of radios been conducted from a joint CF perspective, perhaps the CF could have procured a single radio to meet all of the services needs and allow for joint connectivity. Furthermore, had navigation methods been set by a joint training standard, cross training and translation would not have been necessary.

The current process is further complicated by the fact that NDHQ has to prioritise the services' needs against CF resources on a unified basis. In the proposed model, the CF would establish a capability requirement from a joint perspective and then task the appropriate service, or services, to develop and generate that capability based on the

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<sup>83</sup>Department of National Defence, *Operation Assistance Lessons Learned*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1998), np.

priority that the CF as a whole applies. The exception to this would be major capital projects where ADM Mat would manage the actual acquisition with the appropriate force generator(s) acting as the project director and the appropriate ADM Mat agency acting as the project manager. This situation would be similar to the process of the UK's Defence Procurement Agency, which has proven successful at managing the UK's larger and more complex procurement programs.<sup>84</sup> This new model allows for more focused equipment acquisition, ensures that all acquired material meets a joint capability requirement, and will also help ensure training standards are joint where appropriate.


Under this new model, the force generators would still retain command of all normally assigned forces and execute that command as required for administration and force generation training operations. For example, the Chief of Air Force Generation would retain command of all aircraft operations for training and maintenance of readiness levels, until command of those aircraft was transferred DCFE for employment in operations, for example, for NORAD standby, or overseas operations such as the Kosovo bombing campaign. Consequentially, the chiefs of force generation would remain the titular heads of their services, as the individual chiefs of staffs do now, and continue to act as the senior advisors to the CDS on environmental operations and other purely service related issues. Similar economies and effectiveness gains would also be realized within the force employment function; however, the reorganization required to form the new DCFE organization would be more far reaching.

*Allied Joint Doctrine* establishes the principles of command in joint operations and lays out a proven organization on which to base the new DCFE model. The size and

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<sup>84</sup>Ministry of Defence, *Defence Procurement - Corporate*, available at [http://www.mod.uk/dpa/corporate/about\\_organisation.htm](http://www.mod.uk/dpa/corporate/about_organisation.htm).

scope of CF operations does not require establishment of multiple operational level headquarters as is the case with the US Combatant Commander model, nor does it even require an organization as large as the PJHQ. However, the joint organizational principles on which these headquarters are based, still apply to the Canadian situation. As such, DCFE is organized on these joint principles to act as the single operational level headquarters for the CF, tasked with the command and control of all CF operations, on behalf of the CDS. In order to accomplish this mission, the DCFE headquarters is staffed with joint expertise capable of planning, controlling and executing both international and domestic operations. This model would follow the joint organizational command principles laid out in *Joint Allied Doctrine*, which is also the basis for the US Combatant Commanders headquarters, and the UK PJHQ. Following the general theme of this successful allied formula, the DCFE could meet his mandate with a hybrid staff composed of operational component commanders, a skeletal continental staff, and the capabilities of the JOG / JSG. Figure 2 depicts this staff organization.



**Figure 2 – Proposed CFJHQ Organization**



Under this model, DCFE is responsible for the command and control of all CF operations, except for those routine operations primarily executed for the purposes of force generation and maintenance of readiness levels. As such, operational control of any forces assigned to conduct any other operations would be passed from the force generator to DCFE, and command would then flow from the CDS to DCFE, through the component commanders and to the employed forces. The COS is the coordinator of the entire staff and does not enter the chain of command unless acting in the absence of the DCFE. In this construct, the COS's primary responsibility is the coordination of planning and operations between the skeleton J-Staff and the component commanders, and the smooth functioning of the operations centre.

For purposes of economy, the skeleton J-Staff is envisioned as a basic continental staff system manned only to the level required to maintain the day-to-day support to ongoing operations and missions, similar to the construct of the current J3 International and J3 Continental desk officers. They also form the core of the planning staff for contingency operations, augmented as required by the JOG / JSG, and the staffs of the component commanders. In many ways this staff would operate in the same fashion as the current Joint Staff Action Team (JSAT) within NDHQ.<sup>85</sup> However, the major difference, and advantage, in this case is that the augmentation staff would be members of a dedicated operational joint staff, and not members of the matrix and environmental staffs. This separation ensures that the primary interests of the staff as a whole are in the best interests of the operation, as they would not be subject to potential conflicts of

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<sup>85</sup>Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-500/FP-000 CF Operational Planning Process (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2002), 5-1, 5-5.

interest with the goals and interests of their parent organizations, as is now potentially the case with the JSAT process.<sup>86</sup>

The organization of the component commanders follows classic joint doctrine, as laid out in *Allied Joint Doctrine*, in that each commander has a permanent staff organized to plan and support operations subject to the joint commander's intent and direction.<sup>87</sup>

change to the DCDS's current process of conducting international operations today; however, it would be a major change to the current process of conducting domestic operations. Central command of domestic operations is considered to be in the best interest of the CF for one simple reason - it simplifies national force employment to a single process that has proven to be successful and therefore reduces the risk of confusion in the chain of command as to who is in charge of what at any given time. Along this same line, there have been numerous occasions such as royal visits, fighting forest fires, fisheries patrols and the G8 Summit where the size and / or sensitivity of a purely domestic operation became so large that the DCDS had to assume command anyway in order to bring the necessary resources to bear, and to ensure a sufficient degree of national oversight. Control of all domestic operations from the early planning stages through to completion would ensure that any degree of command confusion is minimized. For example, Operation Assistance (Winnipeg Floods) started out as a low level request from the Manitoba Government to the Commander of Land Forces Western Area (LFWA) for limited manpower and transportation assistance. Within 10 days, the size of the operation had not only grown in scale to the point that national level resources were required but the whole situation had also become politically sensitive due to the level of national media coverage. As a result, NDHQ became involved in various aspects of the operation and at times relieved LFWA of some of its command responsibilities.<sup>88</sup> The resulting multiple chains of command created confusion between LFWA, the Army Commander, the other ECSs, the JSAT and the DCDS group as to who was responsible for what. As there was no clear chain of command for all issues, the principle of unity of

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<sup>88</sup>DND, *Operation Assistance Lessons...*, np.

command was not maintained. Had the DCDS group had control of this operation from the start, many of the command and control issues raised in the post action report would have been nullified or avoided all together.

If the CFJHQ is to become the sole operational headquarters in the CF, it must be asked of what will happen to the current operational headquarters. Under this proposal, forces available for employment by the CFJHQ could be reduced to seven tactical level headquarters and their subordinate units, under the same basic construct as they currently exist. They are the Army's four area headquarters, the Navy's two fleet headquarters and the Air Forces' 1 Can RHQ. Although it could be argued that these seven HQs have some operational level responsibilities, especially in their roles as liaison offices with provincial governments, their responsibility for action does not generally occur at the level that "link[s] tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives..." and as such, by definition, the majority of their tasks are actually carried out at the tactical level.<sup>89</sup> Therefore, these headquarters should be restructured to become primarily force generation headquarters, responsible to their environmental commanders, and the primary force providers to CFJHQ for employment. These headquarters would also provide the basis for the establishment of tactical level joint task force headquarters if the JOG was either unavailable, or unsuitable for a particular mission.

This proposal would make the current operational headquarters of MARLANT, MARPAC and 1 CAD redundant. It is therefore proposed that these headquarters could be closed and the personnel dispersed as follows. Those personnel assigned force generation responsibilities would be used to augment the DCFG organization or

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<sup>89</sup>DND, *CF Operations...*, 1-5.

reassigned to force employment responsibilities at the CFJHQ. Those with force employment responsibilities would either augment the tactical level headquarters or be reassigned to the CFJHQ. In any case, the total amount of force generation and force employment activity would not change significantly as the work is simply being conducted in a different, in this case joint, location.<sup>90</sup>

With respect to the geographic location of the CFJHQ, there are some definite advantages of having the CFJHQ collocated with NDHQ, but it also raises some concerns. Co-location has the benefit of being close to the strategic direction organizations and the political decision makers. This is an advantage from an operational planning perspective, and a briefing to senior leaders perspective. There is also the advantage of sharing services such as a command centre and other administrative support. However, collocation brings with it the danger that the strategic level can easily lose focus and attempt to over control tactical operations. This issue presents a danger as the close availability of detailed operational and tactical level information brings with it the natural tendency of leaders to focus on the immediacy of operations at the tactical level and hence lose focus on the bigger picture. Although it is recognized that some modern operations conducted at the tactical level can have almost immediate impact at the strategic level, it is important that senior leaders resist the attempt to exert too much control over tactical operations.<sup>91</sup> The further danger of co-location is the issue of hidden agendas from the matrix organizations creeping into the joint operational planning

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<sup>90</sup>See Mason and Crabbe, *A Centralized...*, for a full discussion of the force generation / force employment workarounds that would be required by this merger of HQs. As the Mason Report was primarily aimed at gaining economies in manning, there is no discussion of the joint benefits of a single operational HQ; however, the workarounds and manning levels discussed remain germane.

<sup>91</sup>Ministry of Defence, JWP 0-01 *British Defence Doctrine* (Shrivenham: UK MOD, 2001), 1-3, 1-4.

process, as was discussed earlier regarding the JSAT. Physical displacement of the CFJHQ away from NDHQ will help prevent this natural desire for leaders to become intimately involved in the details of day-to-day planning and minute-to-minute operations. Furthermore, modern information technology and good information management techniques make distance less of a hindrance to good information flow, both up and down the chain. It is, therefore, recommended that the proposed CFJHQ be located physically separate from NDHQ but that it remain in the national capital region to facilitate easy consultation, visits and briefings as required.

The split of NDHQ into two entities – a strategic, unified, civil military headquarters responsible for the processes of strategic direction, corporate management and force generation, and a separate CFJHQ, solely responsible for CF wide force employment - allows for clearly delineated lines of responsibility for the core NDHQ processes, and for clearly defined lines of operational command and control in a joint environment. Furthermore, amalgamation of the current environmental chiefs structure into a top down, joint CF wide, requirements driven force generation organization will allow for a more unified approach to joint force generation. As such, the CFJHQ should be the sole operational level headquarters with MARLANT, MARPAC and 1 CAD being closed and their resources redistributed to the tactical level headquarters, the CFJHQ, or the DCFG. As demonstrated, this split NDHQ / CFHQ organization will allow for a clear split in the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operational responsibilities in accordance with the CFs own joint doctrine.<sup>92</sup> Further, it will allow for the smooth

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<sup>92</sup>DND, *CF Operations...*, 1-4, 1-5.

application of recognized joint command and control principles in accordance with allied joint doctrine.<sup>93</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The last four decades of organizational change within the CF have left it in a state that, although functioning, does not allow for the effective application of modern joint operational principles, nor does it allow for the most effective operational command and control of its forces. The current CF model was based on an operational construct during the period of unification that saw the CF's individual services being employed as part of a larger NATO or allied force, and as such, was based on a principle of unified, high level control of individual services, and therefore did not need the application of joint principles. The system worked well as each service essentially continued to operate as a separate entity under the overall control of NDHQ. However, today's world requires the CF to respond to different threats in modern manners, namely joint operations. In order to remain effective, the CF must evolve its organizational structure again.

To evolve to today's threats and challenges, the CF must be able to respond, either alone or with our allies, in a joint manner, utilizing modern joint principles, doctrine, training and equipment. To meet this goal, the responsibility for the core NDHQ processes of strategic direction, corporate management, force generation and force employment must first be clearly assigned within both the CF's overall organization, and its command and control structures. This in turn will allow for more effective application of joint principles and doctrine within the CF. To meet this realignment of core processes, further evolution of the CF's headquarters organizations is

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<sup>93</sup>NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine...*, chapitre 0 la

required. The split of the current NDHQ into two parts, NDHQ, the new strategic headquarters, and CFJHQ, the new operational headquarters, will best meet this evolutionary aim.

The new NDHQ, as a unified strategic headquarters, can remain functionally the same organization as it is now, and should retain responsibility for strategic direction, corporate management and force generation. However, of concern with the present organization is the lack of a joint force generation focus and capability due to the influence of the service chiefs. This can be rectified by placing the service chiefs within an organization that is responsible for establishing CF wide capability requirements, from a joint perspective, and developing those requirements based on a CF wide joint priority. This will create a top down driven organization with a joint perspective, rather than a bottom up focused organization with the individual services driving both the requirements and the priority. This model would not only mirror the practice of the US Pentagon and the UK MOD, it would also allow the CF to better respond to a changing future with a more focused joint perspective.

The ability to employ the CF's forces in a modern joint manner also requires some organizational evolution. The current force employment model, although reasonably joint within the DCDS organization, leaves several operational areas open to confusion and presents several opportunities to weaken the principle of unity of command. These areas are separate command methods for domestic and international operations, dual chains of command from both force generators and force employers to forces in the field, and a joint planning process within NDHQ that has the potential of inserting matrix and environmental priorities into the process. All these areas of potential



confusion and inefficiency could be reduced and / or eliminated with the establishment of a single Canadian operational level headquarters responsible for the planning and conduct of all CF operations. This model again mirrors those of our allies, and incorporates modern joint doctrine within its organization. As this HQ would be manned with a permanent joint planning staff, a permanent joint operations centre, and a permanently established series of component commanders, the staff would be capable of providing the sole source of operational level guidance to all CF operations. As such, it would simplify the CF's command and control processes to a single method, eliminate dual reporting, and focus joint operational planning to a single organization.

Modern threats demand that the CF evolve to meet them. This evolution includes the requirement to change the CF's organization in order to allow for the most effective application of modern joint doctrine to all of its processes. The separation of NDHQ into a strategic command and management headquarters, and a joint operational headquarters will best meet this requirement.

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