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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
CSC 31 / CCEM 31

**MASTERS OF DEFENCE STUDIES**

**TRANSFORMATION FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES AND THE  
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE:  
ENABLED OR NOT**

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## ABSTRACT

The emerging security environment of the post-Cold War era has been marked with instability and uncertainty. The United States has solidified its position in the world as the sole superpower. Throughout the 1990s there was a trend to reduce military expenditures in order to address the economic challenges of the day. For Canada, recognizing the unipolar moment, this meant a strong focus on the debt and deficit reduction at the expense of all else. The 1994 Defence White Paper provided the Canadian Forces (CF) and the Department of National Defence (DND) with a new policy that reflected the changes in the international security environment, and it determined that while maintaining multi-purpose combat capable forces, the CF would receive less to do less. However, as the decade unfolded, it became clear that the military was being asked to do more with less. By the turn of the century, the increased operational tempo and years of downsizing and funding neglect had strained the CF to the breaking point. In response to the ever worsening situation, the CF and DND recognized the requirement to transform and produced the long term visioning document, *Shaping the Future of the DND and CF: A Strategy for 2020*, in order to set the context for change. With this mind, this paper provides an overview of the factors affecting the transformation of the Canadian military. It argues that the concept of transforming the CF and DND has failed to meet expectations as a result of the lack of a coherent and supported strategic planning process. In doing so, the essay examines the key transformational enablers that include government policy, strategic visioning, capability development and leadership and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the individual component. It concludes with recommendations on how to strengthen the enablers to support transformation. Finally, in view of the appointment of a new Chief of Defence Staff on 4 February 2005 and the release of the Defence policy statement on 19 April 2005, an epilogue has been included that provides a positive initial assessment on the way ahead for transformation.

## INTRODUCTION

There is no more delicate matter to take in hand, more dangerous to conduct, or more doubtful in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. For he who innovates will have for his enemies all those who are well off under the existing order of things and only lukewarm supporters in those who might be better off under the new.

Niccolo Machiavelli

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 officially marked the end of the Cold War and with it brought a new world order and great expectations that a more secure and peaceful international community would follow. Governments raced to reduce the exorbitant costs associated with maintaining contributions to the bi-polar Cold War version of global peace. More than a decade has passed since then and clearly the stable security environment that was widely hoped for never came to fruition. In fact, the near opposite situation has unfolded, as the period has been marked with great uncertainty, instability and strife. Ironically, so widespread was the perception that the threat would diminish after a period of transition that from the late 1980s through to the tragic events of 9/11 in 2001, global military expenditures declined by one-third.<sup>1</sup> The “new world order” has instead been characterized by a growing gap between the developed and under-developed world due to many factors, most notably those of overpopulation, economic disparity and corruption. The resultant conditions have, in some cases provided

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<sup>1</sup> Project on Defense Alternatives, “9/11 and the Meanings of Military Transformation,” <http://www.comw.org/pda/0302conetta.html>; Internet; accessed 13 March 2005.

the breeding grounds for pandemic disease, illegal migration, hopelessness, extremism and terrorism.<sup>2</sup>

In 1994, the government of Canada delivered a Defence White Paper that attempted to reflect the evolving reality of the new security environment. While the policy recognized the importance of maintaining multipurpose combat capable forces to protect Canada and Canadian interests abroad, it also alluded that the threat had been reduced sufficiently to allow for a significant downsizing and reduced funding envelop for defence. It stated that “to maximize the contributions of our armed forces, their traditional roles -protecting Canada, cooperating with the United States in the defence of North America, and participating in peacekeeping and other multilateral operations elsewhere in the world - should evolve in a way that is consistent with today's strategic and fiscal realities.”<sup>3</sup> Those critical of the document believe that the federal government seized the opportunity to cash in on the envisioned peace dividend. Under the leadership of the Liberal governments of the 1990s, the “soft power”<sup>4</sup> approach as a key component of Canadian Foreign policy served to ensure continued reductions in military personnel, equipment and infrastructure. The reduction in Canadian Forces personnel since the height of the Cold War has reached upwards of 50 percent.<sup>5</sup> Commencing during the

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<sup>2</sup> Canadian Institute of International Affairs, “Giving Greater Weight to Canadian Foreign Policy,” <http://www.ciiia.org/Vicfpd.pdf>; Internet; accessed 5 April 2005. The document was a submission to the Dialogue on Foreign Policy by the Canadian Institute for International Studies in May 2003.

<sup>3</sup> Department of National Defence, “1994 Defence White Paper,” [http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/51110\\_e.htm](http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/51110_e.htm); Internet; accessed 20 February 2005.

<sup>4</sup> Daryl Copeland, “The Axworthy Years: Canadian Foreign Policy in the Era of Diminished Capacity,” Chapter 8 from *Canada Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy*, (eds. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot, Toronto, ON: Oxford University press, 2001), 152.

<sup>5</sup> J.L. Granatstein, “A Friendly Agreement in Advance Canada-US Relations Past Present and Future,” *C.D. Howe Institute Commentary*, No.166 (June 2002) [commentary online]; available from [http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary\\_166.pdf](http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_166.pdf); Internet; accessed 28 February 2005.

Mulroney years, the number of authorized uniformed personnel dropped from 84 000 to its current ceiling of approximately 60 000.

As Defence Minister Bill Graham recently commented, the “increased volatility of the international security environment has also produced greater demands on the Canadian Forces... statistics are well known but also very telling: since the end of the Cold War, the number of operations in which our military has participated has tripled compared to the period between 1945 and 1989”.<sup>6</sup> The end result of the successive budget cuts which ran throughout most of the 1990s<sup>7</sup>, the personnel cuts, the lack of capital re-investment and the increased operations is that the ability of the Canadian Forces to deploy and sustain operations has been significantly hampered.

Canada has certainly not been anomalous in her struggle to find a viable solution to the evolving demands of the post Cold War world. The challenges of addressing regional instability, failed or failing states, terrorism, explosive population growth and changing global demographics, pandemic disease, wealth disparity, globalisation and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) have all been at the forefront of international policy development.

Within the defence analyst and academia communities, there has been no shortage of opinion on what should the defence mandate entail and how best to deliver it. In their book, *Campaigns for International Security*, Douglas Bland and Sean Maloney discuss

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<sup>6</sup> Department of National Defence, “Minister's Speech Speaking Notes for The Honourable Bill Graham, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence at The Royal Canadian Military Institute Conference; September 22, 2004,” [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=1456](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1456); Internet; accessed 14 March 2005.

<sup>7</sup> Douglas Ross, “Foreign Policy Challenges for Paul Martin,” *International Journal* 58, no.4 (Autumn 2003): 539; <http://www.jstor.org>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2005. Ross points out that in a period of twelve years the military was cut by some the 30 percent in real terms from \$15 billion to \$11 billion.

policy and force structure implications for Canada in the post Cold War new world order.<sup>8</sup>

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the factors affecting the transformation of the Canadian military. In doing so it argues that the concept of transforming the CF and DND has failed to meet expectations as a result of the lack of a coherent and supported strategic planning process. The essay is divided into three parts. In the first part the essay will support the thesis by first providing a background on the genesis of transformation in Canada and a review of its accepted definition by senior officials. Part two provides an examination of why transformation is required and context with regards to the immediacy of the requirement. The third section of the paper studies the strategic enablers for transformation and discusses the challenges that continue to stall transformational initiatives. After a summation and strategic assessment of the factors, an epilogue will focus on the emerging political and military leadership dynamic and examines perhaps the greatest potential for meaningful change in more than a generation.

## **GENESIS OF TRANSFORMATION**

The end of the Cold War not only signified the shift from a bi-polar to a uni-polar globalised security environment, but it also marked the academic genesis of the current RMA. Dr Elinor Sloan, of Carleton University's International Security Studies programme, describes it as:

... a major change in the nature of war-fare  
brought about by the innovative application

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<sup>8</sup> Douglas Bland and Sean M. Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 1-28.



of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organisational concepts, fundamentally alter the character and conduct of military operations.<sup>9</sup>

As can be determined from the definition provided, the current RMA encompasses a broad scope of considerations. The US has been leading the way in examining the evolving technologies and in developing new doctrine and concepts that maximize the potential of the technology and enhance battlespace advantage for their forces. With its origins in the late 1970s as part of the American “offset strategy” in using technological advantage to counter the advantage held by the Warsaw Pact on the European plains<sup>10</sup>, the current RMA really gained its momentum in the early Post Cold war years as the US attempted to solidify its place as the sole global superpower.<sup>11</sup>

For the CF and DND, the endstate effects of RMA will have a profound impact, particularly in the areas of force development and the desired ability to operate effectively across the full spectrum of conflict. Assessing the best way to incorporate and take advantage of the RMA has become an important force development issue for the Canadian Forces. Notwithstanding Bland and Maloney’s argument that the cost of participating in the RMA may be prohibitive in view of potential returns,<sup>12</sup> Dr. Elinor Sloan has stated, “The fact that there's an RMA out there doesn't mean you have to buy

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<sup>9</sup> Elinor Sloan, “DCI: Responding to the US-led Revolution in Military Affairs,” *NATO Review* [document online] available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2000/0001-02.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 March 2005.

<sup>10</sup> Elinor C. Sloan, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 25.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 28-29.

<sup>12</sup> Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns...*, 138-139.

into every aspect of it... So in order to respond effectively to the RMA, it's a matter of picking out those aspects that will get you the most bang for the buck and still allow you to operate with your allies.<sup>13</sup>

At the same time, it has been recognized that an appropriate balance must be achieved between current and future requirements, as well as between the quality and quantity of defence capabilities.

Vice Admiral (VAdm) Gary Garnett (Ret'd), the then Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) and a driving force behind the delivery of *Shaping the Future of Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020 (Strategy 2020)*,<sup>14</sup> recognized the importance of RMA for as an important component of the CF change agenda. Delivered by the defence team in 1999, *Strategy 2020* detailed “a strategic framework for Defence planning and decision making to help guide the institution well into the century.”<sup>15</sup> For senior leadership at the time, it was clear there existed a real requirement for change or “transformation” if they were to successfully address the complex and evolving issues facing the CF and DND as they entered the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In 2001, VAdm Garnett opined that “[o]ur current circumstances may not be quite as we wish, but the new technology and the ideas associated with this RMA cannot be and are not being ignored.”<sup>16</sup> By 2003, the emergent

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<sup>13</sup> House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* Thursday, March 2, 2000, 0900, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/committee/CommitteePublication.aspx?SourceId=53502>; Internet; accessed 29 March 2005.

<sup>14</sup> Department of National Defence, “Shaping the Future of Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020,” [document online]; available from [http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/strategy2k/intro\\_e.asp](http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/strategy2k/intro_e.asp); Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.

<sup>15</sup> Department of National Defence, *Strategy for 2020...*; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.

<sup>16</sup> Vice Admiral Gary Garnett, “The Canadian Forces and the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Time for Change,” *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no.1 (Spring 2001) [journal online]; available from [http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol2/no1/pdf/5-10\\_e.pdf](http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol2/no1/pdf/5-10_e.pdf) ; Internet; accessed 13 March 2005.

threat assessment, allied initiatives, and the issues of sustainability and force structure led the Chief of the Defence Staff to state “If there was ever a time for a progressive, transformative agenda, that time is now.”<sup>17</sup>

During his tenure as VCDS, he played an integral role in building consensus within the senior defence leadership, and helped guide the CF towards the development of joint capabilities. Initiatives at that time included the formation of the Joint Operations Group, the Joint Signals Group and the Directorate of Joint Force Development.<sup>18</sup>

VAdm Garnett was also a leading player in providing the institution with a coherent strategic planning process in the form of Capability Based Planning. Introduced conceptually in 2000 as *Strategic Capability Planning for the Canadian Forces*, the approach was approved by senior leadership within the CF and DND and the following year *Capability Based Planning for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces*<sup>19</sup> was produced and adopted as the accepted methodology for identifying and developing capability concepts. The acceptance of the methodology was important as it signified commitment of senior leadership of both the CF and DND to fundamentally change the way the institution developed capabilities. Indeed, coupled

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<sup>17</sup> Department of National Defence, “Chief of the defence Staff Annual Report 2002-2003 – A Time for Transformation,” [document on-line]; available from [http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/anrpt2003/highlights\\_e.asp](http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/anrpt2003/highlights_e.asp); Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.

<sup>18</sup> Garnett, *A Time for Change...*; Internet; accessed 13 March 2005.

<sup>19</sup> Capability-Based Planning identifies the capabilities needed by the CF to deliver its mandate and then seeks to create them. To have a capability means to have the ability to act in a specific way in a specific situation. Military capability is generated when plans, people and equipment are combined to achieve government goals. Capability-based planning is the process to determine the right blend of plans, people, equipment and activity to optimize the capacity of the DND/CF to fill its assigned roles. See more available at: Department of National Defence Canada, “Capability Based Planning Overview,” [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/dp\\_m/cbp\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/dp_m/cbp_e.asp); Internet; accessed 14 March 2005.

with *Strategy 2020*, which detailed “Defence’s long term objectives and short term targets for the future,”<sup>20</sup> the introduction of Capability Based Planning was a significant transformational initiative that altered the doctrinal approach to force generation and force structure development.

Notwithstanding the well established direction for transformation or change, the repeated reference in the CDS Annual Reports starting with 2001-2002<sup>21</sup>, official definition of “Transformation” in the Canadian context was not agreed upon until the winter of 2003. After much deliberation, a decision was reached by the Joint Capability Requirement Board (JCRB) in February of that year to move forward with the following definition:

The Transformation is a process of strategic re-orientation in response to anticipated or tangible change to the security environment, designed to shape the nation's armed forces to ensure their continued effectiveness and relevance.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Department of National Defence, “Shaping the Future of Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020,” [document online]; available from [http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/strategy2k/intro\\_e.asp](http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/strategy2k/intro_e.asp); Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.

<sup>21</sup> Department of National Defence, “Chief of the Defence Staff Annual Report 2001-2002,” [document online]; available from [http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/00native/pdf/CDS-R\\_e.pdf](http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/00native/pdf/CDS-R_e.pdf); Internet; accessed 24 April 2005. The report discusses the process of transformation from the perspective that it will take “several years, and the journey will not be easy. It has already started with the vision provided in *Strategy 2020*, and it will be refined through a defence update. It will end with the CF of tomorrow.” It goes on to discuss Army transformation as an important initiative for the CF and DND, but does not define transformation.

<sup>22</sup> Joint Capability Requirement Board Meeting 02/03 Minutes 25 February 2003, 2. The mandate of the JCRB is to review proposals, challenge the issues and provide direction for the development of multi-purpose Canadian Forces (CF) capabilities including the Long Term Capital Plans and Future Capability Plans. For strategic projects, JCRB routinely develops a joint understanding of Concepts of Employment/Operations, debates and reaches consensus for Statements of Operational Requirement and resolves issues of project scope at the corporate level.

As a result of the exposure to the JCRB in February 2003, the transformation concept had gained significant visibility and proponents throughout the strategic planning staffs of NDHQ. The CDS Annual Report 2002-2003 entitled *A Time for Transformation*<sup>23</sup> captured the momentum provided the necessary focus and message from the CDS regarding the requirement to transform. The definition was further refined and presented in the Chief of the Defence Staff Annual Report 2003-2004 as follows:

The transformation process is evolutionary and has no definable end state. Transformation focuses on people, technology, ways of conducting operations and ways of thinking. It does not seek to re-structure the CF completely, or re-equip it, but rather to blend existing and emerging systems and structures to create greatly enhance capabilities relevant to future missions, roles and tasks.<sup>24</sup>

The report goes on to say that it is an “iterative and continuous process, and its success is easy to see only in hindsight.”<sup>25</sup> It is important to note that transformation is not about the “complete re-structuring or re-equipping of Canada’s military forces but will instead blend existing and emerging systems and structures to create greatly enhanced capabilities relevant to future missions, roles and tasks.”<sup>26</sup> In short, modernisation of the existing relevant CF capabilities is as important as the transformational component when

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<sup>23</sup> Department of National Defence, “Chief of Defence Staff Annual Report 2002-2003,” [document online]; available from [http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/00native/pdf/CDS-R2003\\_e.pdf](http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/00native/pdf/CDS-R2003_e.pdf); Internet; accessed 24 April 2005.

<sup>24</sup> Department of National Defence, “Chief of Defence Staff Annual Report 2003-2004,” [http://www.cds.forces.ca/pubs/anrpt2004/intro\\_e.asp](http://www.cds.forces.ca/pubs/anrpt2004/intro_e.asp); Internet; accessed 16 March 2005.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.; Internet; accessed 16 March 2005.

<sup>26</sup> Department of National Defence Canada, “Strategic Capability Investment Plan: Part 4 Transforming the Canadian Forces,” [http://www.cdcs.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ddm/scip/scipc04\\_e.asp](http://www.cdcs.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ddm/scip/scipc04_e.asp); Internet; accessed 26 March 2005.

considering future force structure. Accepting that this is the case, it then follows that transformation, refers to the process of delivering the product(s) of RMA to the extent desired, understanding that transformation will mean different things to different countries. With the Canadian defence context provided, the strategic issues driving the requirement for transformation will now be examined.

## REQUIREMENT TO TRANSFORM

“Rapidly changing technologies transform the way militaries do business and require that we react to such change in order to remain capable and relevant... transformation has been identified as one of the key corporate priorities for the Department and are in place to acquire and upgrade equipment that will contribute to both modernizing and transforming the CF.<sup>27</sup>

The organisational and doctrinal change initiatives that reflected the recognition for the requirement to change by senior defence leadership at the turn of this century marked the start of the transformational process for the CF and DND. The assessed threat, operational tempo, personnel and equipment cutbacks, and fiscal realities all played an important role in reaching the culminating point that recognized the need to change. For example, regarding the operational tempo of the CF (operational tempo being the ratio of time spent in deployed missions in relation to time in garrison) was quite high during the 1990s. For the period “from 1948 to 1989, the Canadian Forces were deployed on 25 operations. In the decade since 1989, they have been deployed sixty-five times.”<sup>28</sup> By 2003 it had become clear that if Canada was to maintain a viable and credible armed forces the question was no longer whether or not to transform but

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<sup>27</sup> Department of National Defence Canada, “Defence Planning and Management: Defence Plan Online,” [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/DPOnline/FY6/Forward\\_e.asp?SelectedDPMMenu=8](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/DPOnline/FY6/Forward_e.asp?SelectedDPMMenu=8); Internet; accessed 30 March 2005.

<sup>28</sup> General Maurice Baril, “Speech by Gen. Maurice Baril, CDS, to the Calgary Chamber of Commerce, 23 Nov 1999,” [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=455](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=455); Internet; accessed 24 April 2005.

rather “how best to achieve the required transformation.”<sup>29</sup> In examining the US model for, there are five reasons why transformation is a key element of their defence strategy: 1) the US cannot depend on defence spending disparity to ensure its military superiority in the future; 2) to deal with the growing asymmetric threat; 3) negate the possibility of adversaries leveraging advanced technologies and innovative concepts to strike at US vulnerabilities; 4) to align the military with the information revolution; and 5) cost of not transforming will impact on the relative peace, prosperity and stability of the new world order.<sup>30</sup> In December of 2001, President George W. Bush demonstrated his understanding of the importance and immediacy associated military transformation for the US when he commented: “The need for military transformation was clear before the conflict in Afghanistan, and before September 11<sup>th</sup> ... What’s different today is our sense of urgency....”<sup>31</sup> Whether one agrees with their stated reasons for transforming is unimportant. What is important for Canada is that our Allies, the US in particular, has recognized that the static threat environment and weapons buildup strategy of the Cold War is no longer an effective defence strategy to address the new security environment and that to remain relevant they must to transform.

In setting the stage for discussion on the requirement for transformation, there are several planning aspects that are considered vital to the senior leadership decision-

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<sup>29</sup> Department of National Defence Canada, “Chief the Defence Staff Annual Report 2002-20003,” [document online] available from [http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/anrpt2003/part2\\_e.asp](http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/anrpt2003/part2_e.asp); Internet; accessed 13 March 2005.

<sup>30</sup> US Department of Defence, “Transformation Planning Guidance April 2003,” <http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/docs/transformationplanningapr03.pdf>; Internet; accessed 28 March 2005.

<sup>31</sup> Office of Force Transformation US Department of Defense, “Military Transformation a Strategic Approach”, [http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library\\_files/document\\_297\\_MT\\_StrategyDoc1.pdf](http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_297_MT_StrategyDoc1.pdf); Internet; accessed 30 March 2005.



making process. Firstly, the desired balance between transformation and modernization of defence capabilities must be determined. For the purposes of this essay, modernisation is defined the process of up grading of existing capabilities. Whereas transformation focuses on focuses on people, technology, ways of conducting operations and ways of thinking, modernisation focuses primarily on equipment. This determination must be accompanied with a sound understanding of the cost implications of the mixture of transformation and modernisation with regards the capital investment and life cycle management of capabilities. Indeed, the recognition of the need for an appropriate mixture is reflected in the Departmental Report on Plans and Priorities 2004-2005 in which it is stated that “[t]he transformation and modernization of the CF is essential to ensuring that Defence continues to protect Canadians and Canadian interests at home and abroad....”<sup>32</sup>

Secondly, and arguably as important, is the determination of the appropriate capacity or level of capability to fulfill the ever-increasing demands placed on the CF and DND. The objective of this determination is to ensure that the requirement to deploy on operations, either at home or abroad, does not exceed the available capacity. The impact of this issue can be seen most recently in April 2004, when the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) stated “It is important to balance Canada’s international commitments with the need of the Canadian Forces to rest, train and prepare for future missions.”<sup>33</sup> At the time

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<sup>32</sup> Department of National Defence, “2004-2005 Report on Plans and Priorities Section II,” [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ddm/rpp/rpp04-05/sec2b\\_e.asp#2](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ddm/rpp/rpp04-05/sec2b_e.asp#2); Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

<sup>33</sup> Department of National Defence Canada “News Release Canadian Forces to Deploy for Roto 2 of Operation Athena NR-04.026 - April 14, 2004,” [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=1337](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1337); Internet; accessed 9 March 2005. General Henault’s comments were made regarding the deployment of 600 Canadian Troops to Afghanistan in support of ISAF and Operation ATHENA.

General Henault was referring to the requirement for an operational pause in order to provide an eighteen-month force regeneration period for the Army. In 2002, the Conference of Defence Associations produced *A Nation at Risk: The decline of the Canadian Forces* which confirmed the severity and scope of the issues facing the Canadian Forces. Their findings have revealed the evidence that “shows beyond doubt that a crisis exists in Canadian defence, and that the armed forces will unravel if funds are not provided....”<sup>34</sup> Both of these issues present immediate and significant challenges for the government and Defence, as there is no simple solution to the problem. VAdm Garnett demonstrated the importance of understanding this relationship when he commented: “In reality, the quality of investments we make is generally more important than the quantity we invest in the long term.”<sup>35</sup>

Having now discussed that in addition to modernisation, transformation is a key conceptual component in the development process of the future force structure and organization of the CF and DND, the fundamental question of what, specifically, is driving this requirement. The CDS Annual Report 2003-2003 stated there were four primary factors<sup>36</sup> that were driving transformation:

- 1) the acceleration of technological change, which involves greater focus in the areas of research and development, integration of new technologies and ensuring interoperability with key to remain relevant;

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<sup>34</sup> Conference of defence Associations *A Nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces*, Ottawa, September 2002, <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/pdf/nationatrisk.pdf>; Internet; accessed 13 March 2005.

<sup>35</sup> Vice Admiral Gary Garnett, “The Canadian Forces and the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Time for Change,” *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no.1 (Spring 2001) [journal online], available from [http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol2/no1/pdf/5-10\\_e.pdf](http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol2/no1/pdf/5-10_e.pdf); Internet; accessed 13 March 2005.

<sup>36</sup> Department of National Defence, “Chief of the Defence Staff Annual Report 2003-2004 – Transforming the Canadian Forces,” [http://www.cds.forces.ca/pubs/anrpt2004/part3-transforming\\_e.asp](http://www.cds.forces.ca/pubs/anrpt2004/part3-transforming_e.asp); Internet; accessed 16 March 2005.

- 2) transformation and innovation in equipment, which focuses on equipment and capability choices and the impact of those choices;
- 3) our enhanced role in domestic security, which called for a realignment of the defence establishment, from headquarters to doctrine, to best deal with increased role for defence in domestic security; and
- 4) new ways of adapting to the security environment, which addresses the need to work more closely with other government departments and agencies as well as non-government organisations in contributing to foreign policy objectives and submits the importance of adapting an “effects based operations”<sup>37</sup> approach in support of this aim.

While these driving factors have evolved somewhat since the 2002-2003 report, it is in light of them that the following three overarching reasons for transforming the CF and DND:

- 1) to provide a relevant and credible force contribution to our allies;
- 2) to address emerging threats and operational trends associated with the new security environment; and
- 3) to support evolving national and international security policies.

### Relevancy and Credibility

The first requirement to be examined concerns that of the relevancy and credibility of the CF. From the onset of the commitment by senior defence leadership to transform, it has been widely supported that change is necessary to ensure that the CF remains a relevant and credible force contributor towards ensuring international peace

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<sup>37</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, “Joint Forces Command Glossary,” <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2005. Effects-Based Operations (EBO) are defined as a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or "effect" on the enemy, through the synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

and security. This acknowledgement is evident in the *Strategy 2020* vision where it is stated the goal to be recognized as “an innovative, relevant and knowledge based institution.”<sup>38</sup> More importantly, one of the eight long-term strategic objectives laid out in the document, calls for a force structure that is prepared to “generate advanced combat capabilities that target leading edge doctrine and technologies relevant to the battlespace of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.”<sup>39</sup>

VAdm Ron Buck, VCDS, aptly summarized the importance of ensuring relevancy when he commented:

To be relevant in the international community, and provide government with meaningful policy options to respond to threats effectively and credibly, we must ‘transform the Canadian Forces.’<sup>40</sup>

VAdm Buck’s perspective cannot be understated. Prior to becoming the VCDS, he served as the Chief of the Maritime Staff and as a coastal Formation Commander in Maritime Forces Pacific. From a naval perspective, his exposure to combined operations during this time would have been extensive. In particular, the HALIFAX Class frigates were being integrated with the US Carrier Battlegroups on a regular basis, the only country to ever do so. A 2003 report produced by the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute summarizes the perceived lack of Canadian influence:

This is not surprising given the erosion of the Canadian foreign policy assets since

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<sup>38</sup> Department of National Defence, “Shaping the Future of Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020,” [http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/strategy2k/intro\\_e.asp](http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/strategy2k/intro_e.asp); Internet; accessed 28 March 2005.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.; Internet; accessed 7 April 2005. The eight objectives in general terms, are as follows: Innovative Path, Decisive leaders, Modernise, Globally Deployable, Interoperable, Career of Choice, Strategic Partnerships and resource Stewardship.

<sup>40</sup> Vice-Admiral Ron Buck, “Thoughts from the New VCDS” Bravo Defence Vol 4 (Fall 2004): 5.

1993. The Canadian Forces have been greatly diminished...<sup>41</sup>

From an international perspective, transformation of global defence forces to meet the challenges of the new security environment has been a high priority. In 2003, responding to the changing force requirements in view of the emerging post Cold War security challenges and opportunities,<sup>42</sup> NATO adopted a streamlined command structure, which demonstrated the alliance's understanding of and commitment to transformation. The new structure "reflects the need for smaller more flexible and rapidly deployable forces."<sup>43</sup> With the formation of the Supreme Allied Command Transformation (SAC T), NATO announced to their membership and the international community at large that to remain relevant and effective, significant changes to NATO force structure were necessary. To facilitate this requirement, the overall number of commands has been reduced dramatically from 20 to 11, with all of them falling under the Allied Command Operations in SHAPE.<sup>44</sup> Lord Robertson, the then Secretary General of NATO, provided an excellent analogy describing the challenge associated with transformation when he stated "[w]e are having to replace a Cold War sumo wrestler with a 21st century fencer."<sup>45</sup> Recognising the importance of the Alliance's initiatives in addressing the transformation challenge and

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<sup>41</sup> Denis Stairs et al, "In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World" Canadian defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (October 2003) [document online]; available from <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/In%20The%20National%20Interest%20English.pdf>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.

<sup>42</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *NATO Transformed – NATO's Transformation*, (Brussels: Public Diplomacy Division, 2004), 3.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>45</sup> Lord Robertson "Innovating in an Uncertain World", Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson at the 9th Conference de Montreal 6 May 2003, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030506a.htm>; Internet; accessed 14 March 2005.

Canada's role within that challenge, Defence Minister David Pratt reiterated Canada's position less than a year later in the spring of 2004 when he stated: "Canada fully supports the transformation of the Alliance so that it will continue to be a key player in ensuring global security."<sup>46</sup> Most recently, Prime Minister Martin confirmed the current government support for NATO's transformational initiatives 's when he commented, "...if we don't do our part in agreed missions, and if we don't fulfil our commitments to NATO's transformation agenda, our Alliance will slowly weaken."<sup>47</sup>

A second pillar supporting the requirement to remain relevant and credible is the doctrinal approach of ensuring interoperability with our allies, in particular the US. This doctrine has been derived from the 1994 White Paper policy statement "Canada needs armed forces that are able to operate with the modern forces maintained by our allies... able to fight 'alongside the best, against the best'.<sup>48</sup> The concept was further supported in *Strategy 2020* where it is described as a critical attribute of the strategy and a requirement to "[s]trengthen our military relationship with the US military to ensure Canadian and US forces are inter-operable and capable of combined operations in key selected areas."<sup>49</sup>

As Danford Middlemiss and Dennis Stairs have recently argued in a study on interoperability in the Canadian context, "from the military point of view, the overarching

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<sup>46</sup> NATO News Release Minister of National Defence to Attend Informal Meeting of NATO Ministers in Germany NR-04.007 4 February 2004, [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=1302](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1302); Internet; accessed 14 March 2005.

<sup>47</sup> Prime Minister Paul Martin, "Statement by the Rt. Hon. Paul Martin Prime Minister of Canada at the NATO Summit February 22, 2005 Brussels, Belgium," <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=425> ; Internet; accessed 14 March 2005.

<sup>48</sup> Department of National Defence, "1994 White Paper on Defence," [http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/5115\\_e.htm](http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/5115_e.htm); Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.

<sup>49</sup> *Strategy 2020*...; Internet; accessed 20 March 2005.

objective is thus to make a militarily relevant and effective contribution to multinational security efforts at the maximum possible level of efficiency.”<sup>50</sup>

Given the information age based RMA currently underway, this issue of addressing interoperability is no small challenge. As Dr Sloan commented in a recent article, “US advancements in communications, data processing and precision-guided weapons are in the process of “completely eclipsing” those of its allies and casting into question their ability to function together.”<sup>51</sup> Although primarily referring to the NATO Alliance at large, it is clear that if the CF is to achieve and maintain interoperability with the US, it is imperative to remain aligned with concept development and technological advancements.

*“...a future force that is defined less by size  
and more by mobility and  
swiftness, one that is easier to deploy and  
sustain, one that relies more  
heavily on stealth, precision weaponry and  
information technologies.”*  
George W. Bush<sup>52</sup>

The issue of force projection and global mobility has become increasingly important in conducting operations since the end of the Cold War. Failed and failing states, regional conflict and humanitarian assistance operations around the globe have all demonstrated the growing need for strategic air and sea lift assets. The days of static pre-

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<sup>50</sup> Danford W. Middlemiss and Denis Stairs, “The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues,” Institute for Research on Public Policy, June 2002. p. 20, <http://www.irpp.org/fasttrak/index.htm>; Internet;

positioned forces in Western Europe have long since passed. Flexible and rapidly deployable forces have become the hallmark of relevancy with Allied nations. At the Prague Summit in 2002, NATO indicated that strategic mobility, in the form of sealift and airlift, is one of the key capability areas that require immediate attention and improvement. The Prague Capabilities Commitment was approved “as part of the continuing Alliance effort to improve and develop new military capabilities for modern warfare in a high threat environment.”<sup>53</sup> They have recognized that the significant shortfall of available assets to address the increasing need. The issue is further complicated considering NATO acceptance to play a role in global security outside of its traditional boundaries, as demonstrated with assumption of the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August of 2003. The decision was a reflection the commitment to the “transformation agenda and the Alliance's resolve to address the new security challenges of the 21st century.”<sup>54</sup>

Closer to home, while addressing the Canadian Defence Industries Association the US Ambassador Paul Cellucci confirmed the reality of the global strategic lift shortfall when he commented “[e]ven the U.S. military, with all its vast resources, does not have enough strategic lift capability.... It seems a bit ironic that some see further defense cooperation with the U.S. as a threat to Canadian sovereignty, but the need to rely on other countries to provide lift to deploy Canadian forces as perfectly acceptable.”<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> NATO, “Prague Summit Declaration – Prague Summit 21-22 November 2002,” NATO Press Release (2002) 127, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>; Internet; accessed 28 March 2005.

<sup>54</sup> NATO, “NATO to Assume Command of the International Security Assistance Force,” NATO Press Release (2003) 91, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2005.

<sup>55</sup> US Embassy Ottawa, “North American Security,” [http://www.usembassycanada.gov/content/content.asp?section=embconsul&document=cellucci\\_021402](http://www.usembassycanada.gov/content/content.asp?section=embconsul&document=cellucci_021402); Internet; accessed 8 April 2005. Ambassador Cellucci's Remarks Canadian Defence Industries Association CANSEC 2002 Dinner 14 February 2002, Ottawa.



Ambassador Cellucci's comments highlighted that the shortage of strategic lift is not relegated to medium powers of the Alliance - mobility is at a premium for everyone. His latter remarks certainly spoke to the growing US perception regarding the relevancy and credibility of the Canada's ability to deploy expeditionary forces.

The evolving approach to international security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century requires flexible forces capable of rapid deployment, and our key Allies have recognized the need to obtain sufficient assets to effectively support this requirement. Martin Shadwick, a professor of Canadian defence policy at York University, noted the importance of such a contribution and recommended "measures, both short- and longer-term, must be taken to enhance our strategic mobility."<sup>56</sup> Strategic mobility is the central component of this doctrinal approach and as such would serve the CF as a transformational capability enhancing joint operational capability and rapid deployment.

#### Threat

I don't think there's anything about the war that is in any way inhibiting transformation. I could make the case that there are aspects to what's taking place in the conflict, in the global war on terrorism, and the distinctively new threats we're facing, which is providing impetus to transformation. –  
Donald Rumsfeld<sup>57</sup>

A second major reason for transformation that has been alluded to in several instances thus far is to address the emerging threats and operational trends associated

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<sup>56</sup> Martin Shadwick, "The Strategic Mobility Conundrum," Canadian Military Journal 1, no.1(Spring 2000):81.

<sup>57</sup> Office of Force Transformation, "Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on DoD Transformation," <http://www.of.t.osd.mil>; Internet ; accessed 7 April 2005. Mr. Rumsfeld was responding to a question on the war in Iraq.

with the new security environment, as it has changed significantly over the past decade and a half. The emergence of asymmetric threat in the form of global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has had an enormous impact on the very nature of operations. This is not to say that conventional warfare does not continue to pose a threat to international peace and security. Regional hotspots including the North Korea nuclear crisis and the ever-volatile situation between India and Pakistan situation continue to percolate.<sup>58</sup> In addition, Iran's support of a nuclear program, position on terrorism towards the west and seeming unwillingness to support the regional stability have all contributed to a growing concern regarding hope for peace and security in the Middle East.<sup>59</sup> However, in terms of the immediacy of the requirement to transform the CF, it is the growing asymmetric threat and associated operations that poses the greatest challenge. This requirement is also readily visible on the domestic front. The tragic events of 9/11 have impacted Canadians perception of how susceptible we are to the terrorist threat and have increased the expectations south of the border regarding commitment to continental security and defence.

From a military perspective, the strategic and operational level analysts and planners have been focused on developing innovative and modern approaches to capability problem solving. For example, a central component of that is driving army transformation in Canada is the concept of the Three Block War. In essence the concept has the soldier conducting combat operations in Block One, nation building and stabilization operations in Block Two and providing humanitarian assistance and

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<sup>58</sup> Department of National Defence Canada, "Strategic Assessment 2004," (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2004), 67-68, 74.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 39-40.

peacekeeping operations in Block Three. By themselves, these operations do not pose significant change to doctrinal approach. However the reality today is that soldiers will be asked to conduct all three simultaneously in the complex battlespace of urban centers.<sup>60</sup> General Rick Hillier, speaking as the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) on his experiences as the commander of the multi-national ISAF during 2004, spoke of transformational requirements for the Army in the interim and for the Army of tomorrow. He indicated that most of the Army transformational initiatives thus far have focused on the combat requirements and that the CF leadership has not placed “sufficient intellectual energy, and resources, and work toward the other two blocks...”<sup>61</sup> Referring to the impact of such a transformational approach to land warfare, General Hillier expounded that it will “significantly alter how we structure, how we prepare, how we command, how we train, how we operate and how we sustain ourselves.”<sup>62</sup>

For the Navy, transformation to meet the evolving security environment has meant a rethinking of traditional boundaries associated with security and defence<sup>63</sup>. Central to the Navy’s vision of transformational capability is the introduction of the Joint Support Ship (JSS), an innovative conceptual approach to providing support to forces ashore. Approved conceptually for procurement, the JSS will serve two vital functions in support of the CF expeditionary capability. First it will satisfy the long overdue

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<sup>60</sup> Rick Hillier, “Experience is Shaping Army Transformation,” *Frontline Magazine* Issue 1(2005)[magazine online] available from [http://www.frontline-canada.com/pdfs/0201Hillier\\_CLS.pdf](http://www.frontline-canada.com/pdfs/0201Hillier_CLS.pdf); Internet; accessed 4 April 2005.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, Internet; accessed 4 April 2005.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, Internet; accessed 4 April 2005.

<sup>63</sup> Kelly Williams, “The Future of Canada’s Naval Capabilities,” *Bravo Defence* Vol 4, (Fall 2004), 13. Captain (N) Williams is the Director of Maritime Strategy for the Chief of the Maritime Staff in Ottawa.

requirement for a replacement the ageing replenishment ships HMCS PROTECTEUR and HMCS PRESERVER. Second it will provide “the ability to host command and control facilities and logistic support for the complete spectrum of maritime operations as well as a limited joint operations...combine these with embarked reinforced light infantry or perhaps elements of Joint Task Force 2”<sup>64</sup> and you begin have a sense of the joint effects potential that this concept will deliver.<sup>65</sup>

The Chief of the Air Staff, Lieutenant General (LGen) Ken Pennie realizes that there are significant challenges ahead for the Air Force. He states that they need to transform from a “primarily static, platform-based organisation into an expeditionary, networked enabled capability-based and results-focused “Aerospace Force”.”<sup>66</sup> Focus on air expeditionary force units, mobility, increased interoperability with the US, joint operating capability and the leveraging of advanced technology are all aspects of the transformational vision of the Air Force.<sup>67</sup>

Consideration must be given not only to the evolving threat environment that has expanded the traditional spectrum of conflict to include an asymmetric component, but also the nature of that asymmetric threat. The current RMA has provided militaries the opportunity to move to an information age based network approach to warfare. These same exploitable opportunities are available to the terrorists groups, rogue states, drug cartels, organized crime syndicates and non-state actors that form the essence of this non-

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>66</sup> Ken Pennie, “Transforming Canada’s Air Force: A Vision for Future Effectiveness,” *Bravo Defence* Vol 4 (Fall 2004), 7.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 7.

conventional threat.<sup>68</sup> Funding through illicit means provides advantage for these smaller less complex threats to leverage and apply advanced technologies in support of their cause much quicker than most, if not all, military institutions.

Indeed the threat has changed; although conventional threat still exists and will continue to exist into the foreseeable future, the evolving challenges of modern warfare dictate the requirement to transform the CF. Future conflicts will continue to be expeditionary in nature for the most part and will require the commitment of alliance and coalition forces in a joint and combined environment. The conduct of these operations, however, will depend on the ability of the allied community balance their contribution between flexibility, rapid deployability and sustainability of force packages. The extent to which this can be accomplished will indicate the level of success of in adapting to the emergent threat environment and changing operational trends.

#### National and International policy

The final major reason for the transformation of the CF and DND proposed in this essay is the requirement to support evolving national and international security policies. Having discussed the impact of the threat environment on transformation operations, the focus of this premise surrounds how the senior leadership of the defence team the responds to both the direction of the National Security Policy as it is refined, as well as the International and Defence Policy Reviews that are still ongoing. In establishing a strategy to meet the challenge of these policy directives, senior leadership will demand a close examination and reconsideration of current and planned CF capabilities. With the

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<sup>68</sup> Department of National Defence, "Strategic Assessment 2004," (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2004), 17.

establishment of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) and the delivery of the National Security Policy,<sup>69</sup> homeland defence and security of our own borders has become much more important. What will this mean for the CF? There are demands for increased intelligence and surveillance capability that will be part of an integrated security system.<sup>70</sup> What role will the CF be required to play and what capabilities will be necessary. In addition, the orientation of personnel, research and development, infrastructure, concepts, doctrine, information management and equipment (encapsulated as PRICIE in the Capability Based Planning lexicon) have not yet adjusted to the challenges of the new world order and will require alignment to ensure a holistic approach to delivering capabilities.<sup>71</sup> The impact of this activity will provide a significant challenge for leaders and their force development staffs at both the strategic and operational levels.

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<sup>69</sup> Privy Council Office, Canada, “Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy,” (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004),vii-x..

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 9-20.

<sup>71</sup> Department of National Defence, “Capability Based Planning for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces,” [document online]; available from [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/dp\\_m/cbp\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/dp_m/cbp_e.asp);\_Internet; accessed 16 March 2005. Add more.

## TRANSFORMATION ENABLERS

Having now defined and determined the genesis of transformation in the Canadian context and confirmed the requirement for the CF and DND to adjust to the evolving security environment, this essay will shift focus to an examination of the key enablers that are essential in the effective delivery of defence transformation. These enablers are derived from two primary sources: government policy, in the form of direction and commitment, and defence institution, in terms of strategic visioning, capability development process, and leadership. Through examination of activities, initiatives and decisions since the delivery of *Strategy 2020* in 1999, this essay will probe the effectiveness of these areas in supporting defence transformation.

### Government Policy

Central to the delivery of a strategy to support government objectives is the provision of clear and unambiguous government policy, including both direction and commitment, regarding the role, missions and commitment to support the achievement of the policy goals. By their very nature, militaries exist as an extension of government policy, in particular foreign policy, and as such, the policy that guides their activities must be well understood. Bland and Maloney observed that since the 1960s, national defence policies have not been well integrated with other government policies. In fact, they argue that defence policy has been more of an afterthought that has been dealt with on the periphery. Furthermore, they propose that in the new world order, development of

national defence policy must be considered from within the overall government priorities governments from the onset.<sup>72</sup>

The 1994 White Paper remains the official defence policy statement. Criticism of the scope and meaningfulness of the policy have been well documented.<sup>73</sup> At the time there was significant support to reduce the ambitious policy statement from the 1987 White Paper tabled by the Mulroney government during the Reagan led defence spending spree of the 1980s. The delivery of the 1994 White Paper was considerably different in focus than its predecessor.<sup>74</sup> Reflective of the emerging security environment in the early post Cold War era, the policy statement continued with the downsizing of military capability and the withdraw Canadian Forces from pre-deployed positions in Europe.<sup>75</sup> Although the military and pro defence supporters won the battle to maintain flexible combat capable forces, the policy did not provide “adequate funding to support it.”<sup>76</sup> As a result of the funding constraints that were discussed in the White Paper, the understanding was that the CF would be asked to do less.<sup>77</sup> Critics argue that the policy was hollow in its direction and commitment to our allies and more importantly the CF and DND. In the 2002 CDA study *A Nation at Risk*, the nature of Armed Forces discusses the unlimited liability of members of the CF in the face of danger. It stipulates

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<sup>72</sup> Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns...*, 191.

<sup>73</sup> Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns...*, 129-131.

<sup>74</sup> Department of National Defence, “1994 Defence White Paper,” [document on-line]; available from [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/94wpaper/six\\_e.html](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/94wpaper/six_e.html); Internet; accessed 14 March 2005.

<sup>75</sup>“Department of National Defence, “1994 White Paper on Defence,” [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/94wpaper/six\\_e.html](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/94wpaper/six_e.html); Internet; accessed 14 March 2005.

<sup>76</sup> Conference of Defence Associations, “Does Canada need A New White Paper?” <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/library/newwhitepaper.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

<sup>77</sup> Department of National Defence, *White Paper...*; Internet; accessed 14 March 2005.



that in response the government must match this commitment by the CF with unlimited responsibility to ensure that the CF members are capable of achieving their mission at as low a risk as possible.<sup>78</sup>

The 1994 White Paper signified the beginning of a period of defence cuts (Table 1) that lasted until 1998-1999. It took a further five years to show an increase in planned spending from the 1994 decision to cut proposed increased budget allocations and reduce spending. In 1996, Lloyd Axworthy was appointed Minister of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT),<sup>79</sup> and he focused his efforts on the development of the “Human Security Agenda”, which had its origins in the 1994 White Paper and responded to the *Canada in the World* policy direction of promoting Canadian culture and values. The agenda was based on strong elements of “soft power”<sup>80</sup> which supported a policy approach that assumed the primary focus to be on the non-coercive tools of policy such as diplomacy, values, attraction, economy and moral suasion.

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<sup>78</sup> Conference of Defence Associations, “A Nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces”, <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/pdf/nationatrisk.pdf>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

<sup>79</sup>DFAIT was split into two departments in 2003: Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) and International Trade Canada (ITCan).

<sup>80</sup> Copeland, *The Axworthy Years...*, 155-156. Joseph Nye, an American political theorist is widely recognized as the originator of the concept of soft power, which focuses outcomes on attraction and not coercive manipulation. However, Nye never imagined soft power as a substitute for or alternative to the harder variety, but instead as a useful and effective complement.

Table 1.1

1994	10.2%	10.2%
1995	10.2%	10.2%
1996	10.2%	10.2%
1997	10.2%	10.2%
1998	10.2%	10.2%
1999	10.2%	10.2%
2000	10.2%	10.2%
2001	10.2%	10.2%
2002	10.2%	10.2%
2003	10.2%	10.2%
2004	10.2%	10.2%

Source: DND RPP 2003-2004

For Defence, this meant continued under funding in support of federal deficit reduction. The impact of the government's position on defence policy and commitment to that policy during the majority of the 1990s was twofold. First, the policy supported "arbitrary cuts to defence capabilities" which obviously limited Canada's ability to react...<sup>81</sup> Second, and most critical, was the impact of the lack to investment in future capabilities for the CF, as a result of the requirement to manage the day to day business and operations. Denis Stairs charges that degradation of military capabilities is indeed due in large part to the retrenchment that resulted from the federal program review of the 1990s,<sup>82</sup> of which defence was hit especially hard.

<sup>81</sup> Bland and Maloney, Campaigns..., 135.

<sup>82</sup> Denis Stairs, "Challenges and Opportunities for Canadian Foreign Policy in the Martin Era," *International Journal* 59, no.4 (Autumn 2003), 499.

In light of the defence policy interpretation and priorities of the government throughout the 1990s, at the turn of the century the CF found itself overworked, as a result of the operational tempo, lack of sufficient funding, operations sustainment challenges, and equipment degradation from years of capital investment neglect. Ironically, the government policy that should serve as the cornerstone for transformation had proven to be a great disabler for defense. It was at this point that *Strategy 2020* was produced and delivered in June 1999 as a defence team product to bridge the gap between current policy and the future.<sup>83</sup> If the government wasn't going to provide a clear interpretation of the policy, then the defence establishment would..

*Strategy 2020* alludes to the importance of a well developed strategy to support defence policy and states the importance of this relationship in the following terms: "In preparing for the future, it is essential that we seamlessly link our defence policy to our strategy and force planning, the capital equipment program, performance measurement and the accountability framework."<sup>84</sup> A fair statement to say the least, but if a defence policy (and the associated direction and commitment) is no longer deemed reflective of the threat environment and does not effectively support the capability to deliver the stated policy goals,<sup>85</sup> then it follows that one may question the validity of the policy.

Critics of the 1994 White Paper viewed the policy as a minimalist approach to meeting our international and Alliance obligations and it was soon after questioned

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<sup>83</sup> Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns...*, 139.

<sup>84</sup> Department of National Defence, *Shaping the Future of Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020* (Ottawa: Canada) [document online], available from [http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/strategy2k/intro\\_e.asp](http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/strategy2k/intro_e.asp); Internet; accessed 11 March 2005.

<sup>85</sup> Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns...*, 137.

whether the amount of operations demanded of the CF to conduct could be maintained.<sup>86</sup> Since the delivery of *Strategy 2020* there have been several efforts in terms of defence policy updates and reviews that were largely conducted as cost saving exercises and fact-finding missions on the critical issue of operational readiness facing the CF as a result of years of neglect. It has been suggested that the problem is now at the point that an infusion of more money won't make a difference, as it will take 10-15 years to recover from years of neglect and that the next few governments will have to deal with the collapse of vital military capabilities as the result of years of neglect.<sup>87</sup>

With this in mind, it is difficult to imagine the senior leadership attempting to play 'catch-up' regarding force the modernization and transformation of the CF through a series of relatively small incremental increases to the defence budget since 1998-1999. During an address to the CDA Annual Seminar in 2003, General Henault acknowledged this when he noted that the Defence funding increase in the budget that had recently been announced, would meet the CF minimum requirements, and in particular that it would "help to move us from a position of survivability to one of sustainability.... While the additional funding will go towards helping to meet the sustainability gap, we will have to make difficult choices in order to ensure that we proceed deliberately forward on the path of transformation."<sup>88</sup> The significance of the general's comments were noted by Dr.

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<sup>86</sup> House of Commons Canada, "Facing our Responsibilities: The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces," Report of the Standing Committee on National defence and Veterans Affairs, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2002), 14-15.

<sup>87</sup> Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns...*, 197.

<sup>88</sup> Conference of Defence Associations, "Sovereignty, Defence and Global Security Defending Canada's Interests in the 21st Century, CDA Institute 19th Annual Seminar CDA 65<sup>th</sup> Annual General Meeting 2003," <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/seminars/2003/gimblet.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2005. General Ray Henault's comments refer to the Federal Budget 2003 that had added a most welcome (even if barely sufficient) \$800 million to the base funding of the Department of National Defence, as well

Richard Gimblett, the facilitator of the Conference, in that from his perspective, it was the first time a senior uniformed officer made reference to the issue.<sup>89</sup> There have, however, been recent indications within the Liberal governments that defence policy and commitment may be assuming higher priority. Academic and public support for the reinvigoration of the military has steadily grown since the turn of the century. Studies released by the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) in 2001, which focused on strained operational readiness of the CF, and by the Council of Canadian Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, which examined the issue of equipment degradation and relevance, both called for the immediate infusion of funding to relieve the strain.<sup>90</sup>

In June 2003, the liberal government under the leadership of Bill Graham as Minister of Foreign Affairs introduced a new concept in international relations as part of the International Policy Review that is currently ongoing. Referred to as the “3 D” concept, it focuses on an “integrated approach in which diplomacy, defence capability and development assistance work together in advancing Canadian goals.”<sup>91</sup> A fourth pillar that focuses on Trade has since been added to the approach. The 3 “D” plus “T” concept has become a central component of international policy focus, so much so that the most recent Speech from the Throne in October 2004 referred to the importance of this relationship in the following context, “...[j]ust as Canada’s domestic and international policies must work in concert, so too must our defence, diplomacy,

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as an immediate \$200 million contingency infusion to sustain on-going operations in the War Against Terrorism.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.; Internet; accessed 30 March 2005.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 14-15.

<sup>91</sup> Foreign Affairs Canada, “A Dialogue on Foreign Policy: Report to Canadians,” <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/participate/dialoguereport-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 8 April 2005.

development and trade efforts work in concert.”<sup>92</sup> It was also confirmed that this approach would form an essential component of the soon to be released International Policy Statement.

The focal point of the approach to policy is the inference that the way business is conducted in support of international policy is changing. By elevating the importance of defence policy, it is proposed the government has acknowledged the requirement for change. From this, and a recent speech by Minister Graham in which he commented “the Prime Minister informed me that, for the first time in many years, the Defence portfolio would be front and centre in the Government's agenda.”<sup>93</sup> Perhaps the concerns of Bland and Maloney regarding the supporting stature of defence policy may be about to change. During his speech at CFB Gagetown in the spring of 2004, the Prime Minister confirmed the government’s commitment to transform the military when he commented “[m]erely modernizing Canada’s armed forces on old models will not suffice. ... our investments must focus on transforming our Forces to ensure they are capable, useable, deployable, sustainable and interoperable.”<sup>94</sup> This recognition of importance and commitment to alignment of policy by the government is admirable and cause for hope. However, rhetoric is cheap and given the track record of Canadian governments over the past generation regarding defence policy and commitment, it is suggested that the jury is still

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<sup>92</sup> Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, “Speech from the Throne to open the First Session of the Thirty-Eighth Parliament of Canada October 5, 2004” [http://pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/sft\\_e.pdf](http://pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/sft_e.pdf); Internet; accessed 10 April 2005.

<sup>93</sup> Department of National Defence Canada, “Ingredients for Transforming National Defence: Leadership, Money and Ideas,” [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=1631](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1631); Internet; accessed 28 March 2005. Speaking Notes for The Honourable Bill Graham, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence for a conference on Transforming National Defence Administration Sponsored by Queen's University and the Institute for Research on Public Policy in Ottawa, ON on April 6, 2005.

<sup>94</sup> Office of the Prime Minister, “Address by Prime Minister Paul Martin at CFB Gagetown, New Brunswick,” <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=172>; Internet; accessed 28 March 2005.

out. Although the envisioned aim of transformation is to become more effective and efficient in delivering the defence mandate, the initial investment cost will not be cheap. In the words of Minister Graham at a recent defence related conference, “ ‘transformation’ is driven by technology and this, in turn, is expensive.”<sup>95</sup> Whether the statement is true or not in the Canadian context is less important than the perception that exists in the government.

In September 2002, a year after the events of 9/11, President Bush delivered the much-anticipated National Security Strategy. The document has helped provide the context for not only defense policy but, it serves as the capstone document to which all national interest policy development may evolve.<sup>96</sup> Of particular interest is Chapter IX, which discusses the requirement for all of the US national security institutions to transform in order to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>97</sup> For Canada, our response came in the form of the National Security Policy (NSP)<sup>98</sup>, delivered by the newly created Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), in April of last year marked a significant milestone in the development of a grand strategy capturing Canadian national interests. Unfortunately, the document does not provide the level of detail necessary with regards to the inter-departmental relationships and transformational

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<sup>95</sup> Department of National Defence Canada, “Ingredients for Transforming National Defence: Leadership, Money and Ideas,” [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=163](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=163); Internet; accessed 10 April 2005. From the speech of the Honourable Bill Graham, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence for a conference on Transforming National Defence Administration Sponsored by Queen's University and the Institute for Research on Public Policy held in Ottawa on 6 April 2005.

<sup>96</sup> The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>; Internet; accessed 29 March 2005.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>98</sup> Privy Council Office of Canada, “Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy,” (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004).

requirements within the government that are necessary to support the NSP goals. Of particular concern from a defence perspective and indicative of how the government views the defence establishment, is that in Chapter 2: Building an Integrated Security System of the NSP, the security system model presented, Defence is not identified as an integral component of the architecture.<sup>99</sup>

As the key enabler for transformation, government policy must provide clear and unambiguous guidance on which to base the defence vision and the strategy required to support that vision. In turn, that guidance must be anchored in an overall policy framework that supports the goals and objectives of national security that reflect the challenges of the new world order. In the context of defence planning, “without some clear idea as to what to transform into, there can be no planning for the process of transformation itself.”<sup>100</sup> Finally, without an integrated approach to policy development in support of those national security objectives and which considers input from all government departments, any defence policy statement that is delivered will fail to provide the necessary synergistic context for transformation. Although defence is but a component of the national security structure, to ensure success in the new world order the entire national security architecture must be adapted, fully integrated and robust.

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<sup>99</sup> Privy Council Office of Canada, “Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy,” (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004), 9-10.

<sup>100</sup> Paul Mitchell, “A Transformation Agenda for the Canadian Forces: Full Spectrum Influence,” *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no.4 (Winter 2003-2004) [journal online]; available from [http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol4/no4/transformation\\_e.asp](http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol4/no4/transformation_e.asp); Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.



## Defence Institution

The second grouping of transformational enablers that will be examined is internal to the defence institution and contains the components of strategic visioning, capability development process, and leadership. The first two of these enablers, along with the resource prioritization, business planning process, performance measurement and in-year management activities form a framework designed to provide a cohesive and measurable approach to defence activities, and is known as the Defence Planning and Management (DP&M) framework.<sup>101</sup> Leadership, the last of these transformation enablers, is a critical element towards ensuring the effective functioning of the DP & M components. In addition, it is the job of leadership to ensure the appropriate focus is provided in support of transformational initiatives.

Within the DP&M framework, there are three planning horizons utilised that categorise the focus and timeframe that is applicable for the activities of the period. Horizon 1 is a short term focus of 1-4 years on maintaining or enhancing current capabilities, whereas Horizon 2 is a medium term focus of 5-15 years on replacing or enhancing current capabilities and Horizon 3 provides a much longer term view of 10-30 years and is primarily focused on acquiring new capabilities.<sup>102</sup> Together, these three horizons provide strategic planning staffs the ability “to be focused on the most appropriate aspects of a [force planning] problem.”<sup>103</sup> In terms of transformation, to

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<sup>101</sup> Department of National Defence Canada, “Defence Planning and Management,” [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/intro\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/intro_e.asp); Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.; Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

<sup>103</sup> Department of National Defence Canada, “Defence Planning Guidance 2001: Chapter 2 – Strategic Direction,” [document on-line]; available from [http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dfppc/dpg/dpg2000/chap2\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dfppc/dpg/dpg2000/chap2_e.asp); Internet; accessed 30 March 2005. The introduction of the Force Planning Horizons first appeared in Defence Planning Guidance documents in 2000. This coincided with

develop a long-term strategy that will achieve the vision it is necessary to have a sound understanding of the relationship between these horizons, the activities that are focused on within the individual timeframes and the impact of decisions taken regarding force development. Remember, the purpose of transformation is to “create greatly enhance capabilities relevant to future missions, roles and tasks.”<sup>104</sup> With the context of transformation and capability development now established, the first defence institution enabler to be examined is that of the strategic visioning process.

The strategic visioning process involves a number of interrelated activities that includes the “ analysis of military trends, formulation of alternative futures and the selection of a benchmark future security environment.”<sup>105</sup> The two primary products that result from this process are the strategic vision statement and the strategy in support of that vision. A third element that supports the visioning process is concept development and analysis. Although the vision and strategy affect all planning horizons, the foundation of both is anchored in Horizon 3 with a long-term focus of acquiring new capabilities. *Strategy 2020* was developed to provide the institutional interpretation of government policy and the roadmap on how to deliver it. The importance of a coherent vision that easily “links policy to activities through strategy”<sup>106</sup> is vital in providing defence with a clear understanding of expectation and commitment.

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the delivery of *Strategy 2020* in June 1999, and the conceptual document *Strategic Capability Planning for the CF* (SCP), delivered in June 2000, which set out a new, capability-based, approach to force development. For more information on the SCP see [http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/strat/foreword\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/strat/foreword_e.asp).

<sup>104</sup> Department of National Defence, “Chief of Defence Staff Annual Report 2003-2004,” [http://www.cds.forces.ca/pubs/anrpt2004/intro\\_e.asp](http://www.cds.forces.ca/pubs/anrpt2004/intro_e.asp); Internet; accessed 16 March 2005.

<sup>105</sup> Leonard Kerzner, *An Introduction to Capability Based Planning, Research Note*

<sup>106</sup> Department of National Defence, *Strategy 2020...*; Internet; accessed 8 April 2005.

The Defence Team will generate, employ and sustain high-quality, combat-capable, inter-operable and rapidly deployable task-tailored forces. We will exploit leading-edge doctrine and technologies to accomplish our domestic and international roles in the battlespace of the 21st century and be recognized, both at home and abroad, as an innovative, relevant knowledge-based institution. With transformational leadership and coherent management, we will build upon our proud heritage in pursuit of clear strategic objectives.<sup>107</sup>

The above vision statement from *Strategy 2020* provided planners with a fresh, albeit somewhat predictable in view of allied efforts<sup>108</sup> developed at the same time, approach to solving the challenges of the force development process for the CF and DND. As Bland and Maloney observed, while the document introduces nothing especially novel, it did provide the necessary baseline context for defence staffs at all levels to develop their plans.<sup>109</sup> The problem is that, although the document has served the Defence team well for the short term in focusing efforts on the way ahead, it did not go far enough towards identifying plan on “how” to deliver the endstate sought for 2020.

With the policy basis derived from the 1994 White Paper, *Strategy 2020* examined the changing global security environment, and analyzed key issues facing

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid.; Internet; accessed 8 April 2005. The vision statement introduces Section II of *Strategy 2020* entitled From Strategy to Results. The vision provides the base for anchoring the principle domains of defence, the associated long-term strategic objectives and the five years Targets that will support progression and measurement of success.

<sup>108</sup> Work on Joint Vision 2010 and the follow on document Joint Vision 2020 was ongoing during this period. Although the scope and detail of the vision differs significantly from *Strategy 2020*, the key descriptive verbiage is quite similar in many aspects. For more information see Joint Vision 2010 available at <http://www.dtic.mil/jv2010/jv2010.pdf>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2005, and Joint Vision 2020 available at <http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2005.

<sup>109</sup> Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns...*, 139.

defence, while considering the impact of the RMA for Canada.<sup>110</sup> All of which were prudent measures to take in developing a long-term strategy and institutional approach to defence management. However, there are several reasons that have led some people to question the value of *Strategy 2020*. First, as already mentioned, the document was produced within the CF and DND, but it was not signed by the MND, and as such was not approved by the government as a valid interpretation of defence policy. Secondly, the Stakeholder Analysis referred to in the document was very corporate focused, with many statements of the obvious. For example, public opinion was considered in broad terms through previous polls conducted on what Canadians believe Canada has to offer the world. However, it then goes on to relate that “in many ways, [the people of Canada] look to the CF as a symbol of the positive contribution that we [the people of Canada] can make.”<sup>111</sup> Thirdly, is the issue of commitment to funding, which relates to the lack government approval. As Bland and Maloney pointed out, the “major defect...in the statement was the absence of any predictable funding forecast above the unworkable budget already in place.”<sup>112</sup> Having noted the weaknesses of the document, it must be noted that CF and DND leadership realized that the strategic visioning process was iterative and that *Strategy 2020* would necessarily require revision as the new security environment unfolded.<sup>113</sup> What this has meant from a transformational perspective is

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<sup>110</sup> Department of National Defence Canada, “Shaping the Future of Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020”[document online]; available from [http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/strategy2k/intro\\_e.asp](http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/strategy2k/intro_e.asp); Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.

<sup>111</sup> Department of National Defence, *Strategy 2020*...; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.

<sup>112</sup> Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns*..., 139.

<sup>113</sup> Department of National Defence, *Strategy 2020*...; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005. Specifically, *Strategy 2020* stated that it would be updated periodically, as it serves as a bridge from policy to the future.

that the institutional strategy that should be leading the transformation of the CF and DND is perceived as having fallen short of the target. It was for these reasons that work within the VCDS staff was commenced in 2003 to develop *Strategy 2025*.<sup>114</sup>

Whereas Strategy 2020 was produced in relative isolation within NDHQ strategic staffs, the direction for the development of Strategy 2025 was significantly different. It was to include an external scan and input process from academia, political and public fora, and reflect the mounting challenges facing the CF and DND. With an external scan conducted and the structure of the document all but approved, *Strategy 2025* was “put on hold” in the spring of 2004, awaiting the direction from the international and defence policy reviews.<sup>115</sup> Given the timeframe and stated commitment by the government under Prime Minister Martin to deliver this direction it was the prudent thing to do. Certainly, with much of the research and analysis completed, the strategic staff was well positioned to align *Strategy 2025* with an updated defence policy statement.<sup>116</sup> In essence, with its well focused mandate supported by a clear defence policy statement, Strategy 2025 will be able to provide the long-term vision and transformational roadmap to deliver the capabilities towards the achievement of the stated the policy goals.

The strategic visioning process involves a complex relationship between policy, strategic visioning and concepts. Although each of these components is distinct in its

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
As such, it follows that as policy or the security environment changes, the requirement to align the long term strategic objectives and short term targets. For more, see specifically the following sections: Forward, Introduction and From Strategy to Results.

<sup>114</sup> *Strategy 2025* remains the working title of the follow document to *Strategy 2020*, once completed and approved, the final selection of the title may be different.

<sup>115</sup> Dr Michael Roi, telephone interview with Directorate of Defence Analysis staff analyst and team member for development of *Strategy 2025*, 21 April 2005.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

own right, there exists an interdependency that is necessary to function as a whole.<sup>117</sup> The relationship, in broad terms is described in Figure 1. Just as the development of a vision, strategy and concepts are guided by policy, the policy, in turn, is informed by the capstone<sup>118</sup> or strategic operating concept by “reflecting the professional military assessment of the defence requirements needed to continue to meet policy directives in the future.”<sup>119</sup> This military assessment of defence requirements is found in the form of a high level CF operating concept.



**Figure 1.1 – Taxonomy of Concepts**

Source: *Strategic Operating Concept Draft Version 4.4 21 May 2004*<sup>120</sup>

<sup>117</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

<sup>118</sup> Capstone concept is defined as the overarching, primary concept.

<sup>119</sup> Department of National Defence, “Strategic Operating Concept Draft Version 4.4 21 May 2004,” [document on-line]; available from [http://www.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/home\\_e.asp](http://www.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/home_e.asp); Internet; accessed 30 March 2005.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 5. Produced in 2004, the Future Security Environment is a CF and DND document that provides context for military planners of what the future may entail. As developed it is not a specific vision of the future, it analyzes geopolitical, economic, social, military, environmental and health trends to develop an

In 2002, the first attempt of providing such a high level-operating concept was produced in the form of the CF Concept of Employment.<sup>121</sup> The Concept of Employment was designed to describe “how” capability would be delivered or employed in support of the strategic objectives and goals, focusing primarily on the Horizon Two timeframe of 5-15 Years. It was recognized at the time that having a sound understanding of the CF might be employed, either at home or abroad, was a fundamental component in effective capability development.<sup>122</sup> At the center of the concept was the notion of Tactical Self Sufficient Units or TSSUs. These individual units would represent the building blocks of force contributions to either domestic or international operations. Complex in nature and varied in definition and construct within the individual services, these units would contain a wide range of tactical capabilities that would, by design be supported by capabilities at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.<sup>123</sup> That is to say, these units would be comprised of task tailored capabilities to meet the mission requirements. Although the deployment of military packages that were adjusted to meet mission requirements was not unheard of, the TSSU approach to deployment packages was transformational in that it sought to formalize doctrine regarding force generation.

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understanding of how the security environment over the next two decades may unfold. For more see Department of National Defence, “Future Security Environment,” [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ord/fse2025/abs\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ord/fse2025/abs_e.asp); Internet; accessed 18 March 2005.

<sup>121</sup> Department of National Defence, “Capability Based Planning for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces,” [document on-line]; available from [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/cbpManual\\_e.pdf](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/cbpManual_e.pdf); Internet; accessed 15 March 2005. For more details on the CF Concept of Employment see Chapter 3, 12-18.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.; Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

Transformational as it may have been, the concept has a significant shortfall in that it has struggled to gain acceptance in the force development community. Closer analysis reveals that there are two primary reasons why this is so. Firstly, defining the TSSUs from a service perspective has vested interests regarding force structure and the authors of the concept have recognized that “[d]etermining the proper balance between capabilities within TSSUs, and between TSSUs optimized for maritime, aerospace and land environments, is a fundamental challenge for CF force planners.”<sup>124</sup> As Bland and Maloney have indicated, the bottom-up process of force development, in the context of a strong service organisational construct, tends to “stimulate exaggerated demands on the governments, reinforce organisational rigidities in the defence establishment... and inhibits the development and functioning of a probing, analytical policy process.”<sup>125</sup> Secondly, as the highest level operating concept for the CF and as a key contributor to the both the policy formulation and strategic visioning process, the concept deserves the widest circulation and recognition as such. In reality, it was delivered as a mere chapter in the primer on Capability Based Planning for the DND and the CF. Add to this the fact that the document was not signed off by the CDS, but by the VCDS and the Director General of Strategic Planning (DGSP), and it is not difficult to see why the concept was never seriously considered as more than conceptual insight as opposed to guidance or direction to force planners.

In the spring of 2003, under direction of the VCDS, the strategic planning staffs began work on the next iteration of a CF wide high-level operating concept. With the

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<sup>124</sup> Department of National Defence, *Capability Based Planning...*; Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

<sup>125</sup> Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns...*, 43.



events of 9/11 more clearly understood in terms of long term impact on military operations, and the US well advanced on the development of operating concepts to address the new threat environment,<sup>126</sup> the CF was well positioned to leverage the work of the CF Concept of Employment, as well as the significant US DoD efforts in the area of concept development. The aim of the Strategic Operating Concept (SOC)<sup>127</sup> was to become the capstone document to provide “an overarching conceptual framework for designing the CF of the future.”<sup>128</sup> In 2002, when discussing the imperative for transformation, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz demonstrated his understanding of the importance of strategic concept development when he stated “New operational concepts—the end-to-end stream of activities that define how force elements, systems, organizations, and tactics combine to accomplish military tasks—are critical to the transformation process.”<sup>129</sup>

There are two central themes that permeate the *SOC Draft 4.4*. Firstly, the notion of Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) was introduced as the framework in which the CF will conduct future operations.<sup>130</sup> Transformational from a Canadian

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<sup>126</sup> Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), “Future Warfare,” <http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/index.html>; Internet; accessed 28 March 2005. This webpage lists US DoD official and developmental concept initiatives.

<sup>127</sup> Department of National Defence, *Strategic Operating Concept...*; Internet; accessed 30 March 2005.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.; Internet; accessed 30 March 2005.

<sup>129</sup> Air War College US Air Force, “Prepared Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing On Military Transformation,” <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/transformation-wolfowitz-9apr02.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 April 2005.

<sup>130</sup> Department of National Defence, *Strategic Operating Concept...*; Internet; accessed 30 March 2005. The SOC describes the JIMP concept as follows: Joint, involving both military and support organizations; Interagency, involving other government departments, non-government, and commercial organizations; Multinational, involves one or more Allies or international coalition partners; and Public which involving public opinion and reaction, both domestically and internationally. This includes recognizing the influence of the media.

perspective, the JIMP concept considers the impact of the movement towards jointness that had begun in the late 1990s, the interagency approach supported by government as part of the '3D + T' approach to international policy, to requirement to operate multinationally as part of a coalition in accordance with stated defence policy, and the public component of modern warfare reflecting the importance of domestic and international public opinion as well as the CNN effect.<sup>131</sup>

The other, and arguably more important, strategic product that the *SOC Draft 4.4* introduced was the CF hierarchy of concepts, with the SOC providing the overarching guidance for the development of subordinate operational concepts, including integrating, functional and environmental. Of particular note is that during the document's development, the contentious issue of where Joint and Environmental operating concepts were seen to live within the hierarchy provided much discussion among senior military leadership.<sup>132</sup> While the *SOC Draft 4.4* has made significant progress in defining how the CF will conduct operations in the future, it too has been put on hold until the impact of the International and Defence Policy statements are known and given that context, will be able to best inform the policy development and strategic visioning processes.

### **Capability Development**

Once the vision and strategy have been delivered and are supported by a strong conceptual framework, there must be means of delivering the desired endstate. The force

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<sup>131</sup> Ibid.; Internet; accessed 30 March 2005.

<sup>132</sup> The SOC was presented to the Joint Capabilities Requirement Board on several occasions from the fall of 2003 to the spring of 2004. The primary issue of contention from senior leadership surrounded the question of primacy between joint and environmental operating concepts. The essence of the debate supports the position of Bland and Maloney on the strong service notion and the battle for funding. For more see Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns...*, 43., and Records of Discussion/Decision for JCRB meetings 01 / 04 & 08 /04.

development process provides the necessary framework to accomplish this. Military capabilities degrade, technology improves and doctrine changes. To ensure relevancy into well into the future, militaries must have a coherent long term planning process that addresses the anticipated threat environment and develops the plan to deliver an effective adaptable force and organisation. The challenge for strategic planning staffs has always been to do so with the added constraints of an ever-evolving security environment, consideration of legacy equipment and systems, and fiscal reality.<sup>133</sup> There have been many different long-term planning approaches used over the years to varying degrees of success, but the approach that Canada and key allies<sup>134</sup> have moved towards a hybrid of scenario based and capability based frameworks.<sup>135</sup> The post Cold War “The dramatic changes in the strategic environment that came at the end of the Cold War spurred western militaries around the world to abandon threat-based force planning....”<sup>136</sup> For Canada, the adoption of Capability Based Planning (CBP) occurred in 2002.

Defined as “planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day circumstances and challenges,”<sup>137</sup> the process starts with an analytical

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<sup>133</sup> Leonard Kerzner, “An Introduction to Capability Based Planning” *DOR (Joint) Research Note RN 2004/09* (Ottawa: Operational Research Division, September 2004), 4. Mr. Kerzner refers only to the fiscal reality as a constraint, but it is the authors assessment the security environment and political implications of maintaining existing systems present equally challenging constraints.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, 1. In addition to Canada, various aspects of Capability Based Planning have been adopted by Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>136</sup> Department of National Defence, “Strategic Capability Planning for the Canadian Forces,” [document on-line] available from: [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/strat/chap3\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/strat/chap3_e.asp); Internet; accessed 17 March 2005.

<sup>137</sup> Paul K Davis, *Analytic Architecture for Capabilities Based Planning, Mission Systems Analysis and Transformation* (Arlington: RAND, 2002), xi.

scan of the security environment and other factors affecting the future Canadian Forces.<sup>138</sup> Once completed, the CBP methodology uses a series of enablers to support the analytical activities that then determine the capabilities required given the stated constraints. These primary tools include a set of five capability programs<sup>139</sup> that form the basic building blocks of CBP, the Canadian Joint Task List that provides a set of potential generic tasks to be conducted, which are organized along the lines of the capability programs, and a set of Force Planning Scenarios that cover the provide a set of circumstances or situations in which the CF be employed.<sup>140</sup>

CBP utilises a holistic approach to capability development and, in doing so, considered all components of the capability to be delivered including personnel, research and development, infrastructure and organization, concepts and doctrine, information management and equipment.<sup>141</sup> These components, known collectively as PRICIE, form the anchor to which all capability must be analysed, with each of the capability containing all of the components at varying levels of weighted importance.<sup>142</sup>

Based on government policy and direction the process is supportive of the strategic ends that will achieve the policy goals, and is supported by a capability

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<sup>138</sup> Department of National Defence, *Capability Based Planning*..., 3; Internet; accessed 14 March 2005.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 20; Internet; accessed 14 March 2005. The five capability programs are Command and Control, Conduct Operations, Sustain, Force Generation, and Corporate Policy and Strategy.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., 3-5,19-21; Internet; accessed 14 March 2005.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., 24-27; Internet; accessed 14 March 2005.. Capability-based planning is the process to determine the right blend of plans, people, equipment and activity to optimize the capacity of the DND/CF to fill its assigned roles. For a comparison of Canadian, US

development governance structure. Through an examination of the policy directives, senior leadership of the CF and DND, in the form of the Joint Capabilities Requirement Board (JCRB),<sup>143</sup> determine the capability goals that are desired in each of the capability programs (Figure X<sup>144</sup>) that support the potential tasks of the CJTL, and reflect the type of CF operations represented in the Force Planning Scenarios.<sup>145</sup> The Joint Capability Assessment Teams (JCATs), each assigned to a capability area, then analyse current and projected capabilities, the results of which determine the capability gap or shortfall. This gap in turn is assessed by the JCRB against all other gaps within the matrix, and through advice by the JCATs decisions are reached on how best to address the capability shortfalls in terms of the type of capability desired and priority in which individual capabilities are to be developed. The end product of this process is the Strategic

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<sup>143</sup> Department of National Defence, "Terms of Reference: Joint Capability Requirement Board," [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/commit/jcrb\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/commit/jcrb_e.asp); Internet; accessed 14 March 2005. Define JCRB The mandate of JCRB is to review proposals, challenge the issues and provide direction for the development of multi-purpose CF capabilities including the Long Term Capital Plans and Future Capability Plans. For strategic projects, JCRB routinely develops a joint understanding of Concepts of Employment/Operations, debates and reaches consensus for Statements of Operational Requirement and resolves issues of project scope at the corporate level. The Board is chaired normally by the VCDS and is attended by all Level 1 members of the CF and DND. DM/CDS co-chair JCRB when strategic corporate program decisions are required. The Capability Development Working Group (CDWG) supports the JCRB. The CDWG will co-ordinate DND/CF capability-based planning and review force development initiatives with a view to ensuring their alignment and coherence. The CDWG also provides oversight and guidance to the JCATs. See more on CDWG at [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/commit/cdwg\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/commit/cdwg_e.asp); Internet; accessed 14 March 2005.

<sup>144</sup> Department of National Defence, *Capability Based Planning...*, 22; Internet; accessed 14 March 2005. The H,M,L designations represent the relative High Medium or Low capability desired. This determination by senior leadership reflects the application of constraints against the planning process. Once the gap has been determined through analysis, the individual capability areas are assigned a colour of green, yellow or red dependant on the capability assessment - green being sufficient capability and red being serious deficiency. See more in Chapter 4

<sup>145</sup> Department of National Defence, "Descriptions: Departmental Force Planning Scenarios," [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/scen/intro\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/scen/intro_e.asp); Internet; accessed 10 April 2005. Force Planning Scenarios Force Planning Scenarios cover the entire spectrum of conflict from domestic peace operations through to high intensity conflict/collective defence. There is a total of 11 Scenarios in all and as a result of the tragic events of 9/11 and emergent asymmetric threat, four new variants have been added to reflect the evolving security environment. They include Chemical weapon, Radiological Weapon, Failed State and Cyber Attack.

Capability Investment Plan (SCIP)... a plan that sets out “the departmental high-level plan for investment in defence capabilities for the next fifteen years.”<sup>146</sup> It is the transformation planning guidance for the CF. Currently focused primarily on equipment, or the “E” of PRICIE, the aim is for this document to rapidly evolve to include holistic capability investment plans that cover all capability components.

The introduction of Capability Based Planning has provided both opportunities and challenges for the CF and DND. The opportunities presented involve the transformational approach to capability development, in a resource constrained environment, that provides linkage and alignment of the planning activities in all three planning horizons and establishes a holistic capability approach that “focuses on people, technology, ways of conducting operations and ways of thinking.”<sup>147</sup> As Kerzner also points out, “capabilities language forces a transformation in the way capabilities are developed and analysed.”<sup>148</sup> The challenge, on the other hand, is that by virtue of the analysis activities and broad scope, the CBP methodology is not “the most time efficient way of doing long term planning.”<sup>149</sup> Furthermore, the establishment and assessment the desired capability goals adds significantly to the complexity of the process.<sup>150</sup> In other words, the CBP methodology, by itself, is not a panacea for effective capability development. To be an effective enabler for transformation, the process requires

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<sup>146</sup> Department of National Defence, “Strategic Capability Investment Plan: Part 2 – Aim, Scope and Outline,” [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ddm/scip/scipc02\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ddm/scip/scipc02_e.asp); Internet; accessed 30 March 2005.

<sup>147</sup> Department of National Defence, “Chief of Defence Staff Annual Report 2003-2004,” [http://www.cds.forces.ca/pubs/anrpt2004/intro\\_e.asp](http://www.cds.forces.ca/pubs/anrpt2004/intro_e.asp); Internet; accessed 16 March 2005.

<sup>148</sup> Kerzner, *Introduction to Capability Based Planning*..., 51.

<sup>149</sup> Kerzner, *Introduction to Capability Based Planning*..., 49.

<sup>150</sup> Kerzner, *Introduction to Capability Based Planning*..., 49.

commitment of resources, of both long-term capital investment and dedicated trained personnel. From a resource perspective, an examination of the past six years reveals questionable commitment to funding for capital acquisition. To demonstrate, Table 2 details the impact of commitment to funding on the long-term capital plan for equipment. The important trend to note is that of the decreasing percentage of actual re-capitalisation as part of the overall Defence Services Program (DSP).

Figures in \$000	FY 99/00	FY 00/01	FY 01/02	FY 02/03	FY 3/4
1. '99 Capital Equipment Allocation Plan	1,566,000	1,740,000	1,844,000	1,825,000	1,825,000
2. Actual Capital Equipment Expenditures	1,338,000	1,314,000	1,319,000	1,311,000	1,229,000
3. '99 Planned Recap as % of Defence Services Program	14.91%	15.54%	16.08%	15.47%	15.08%
4. '99 - '03 Actual Recap as % of Defence Services Program	12.74%	11.73%	11.50%	11.11%	10.16%

Table 2 – Source DFPPC <sup>151</sup>

Note - Un-delivered Program '99-'03 – approximately 2.3B

The trend is in opposition with the stated direction to increase funding to the capital program to 23% of the DSP. <sup>152</sup> As a result of the claw back on capital funding during that period, almost \$2.3 billion of planned program was not delivered to the CF. <sup>153</sup>

<sup>151</sup> Information except from slide presentation by DFPPC planning staff to the DGSP in May 2004.

<sup>152</sup> Department of National Defence, *Strategy 2020...*, 6; Internet; accessed 30 March 2005.

<sup>153</sup> Information except from slide presentation by DFPPC planning staff to the DGSP in May 2004.

The capability methodology must be institutionalized and maintained by the CF and DND. Currently, only two of the five capability program JCATs are set-up and operating. While the Command and Control JCAT has been functioning for several years now, and has effectively contributed to identification of capability gaps and solutions, the Sustain JCAT is still in its infancy having had its Terms of Reference and initial guidance approved by JCRB in June 2004.<sup>154</sup> A shortfall of the governance structure for CBP is that the availability of trained dedicated personnel to conduct the gap analysis and determine capability solutions in response to the gap. Secondly, although the associated tools have been introduced, and revision has been conducted on the Force Planning Scenarios,<sup>155</sup> all of the associated elements of the CBP require review and revision. In the end, until such time as personnel requirements are addressed and the process tools are refined and reflective of the current security environment, the institutionalization of the methodology will not be complete. In fact, the CF must institutionalise procedures to ensure timely appreciation of significant changes in the strategic environment and to react accordingly.<sup>156</sup>

In summary, the Capability Development Process allows senior leadership to develop a 10-15 year (Horizon 2) Strategic Investment Plan for the CF and DND, by linking the strategic visioning process and supporting concepts (Horizon 3 – where we want to be and how to get there) with business planning and management process (Horizon 1 – where we are now), by balancing the demands of today with the

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<sup>154</sup> Minutes from JCRB Meeting 08/04, 08 June 2004.

<sup>155</sup> Minutes from JCRB Meeting 10/04, 18 August 2004.

<sup>156</sup> Department of National Defence Canada, “Capability Outlook 2002-2012,” [document on-line]; available from [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/CAPABILITY\\_OUTLOOK\\_E.pdf](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/CAPABILITY_OUTLOOK_E.pdf); Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.



requirements of the future through a resource prioritisation process (constraints: funding, security environment, etc... ). In view of the today's fiscal reality and the management challenges facing senior leadership, the dilemma for the CF and DND is how to strike the balance of the funding for current operational requirements against the long term capital investment requirements.

## Leadership

Leadership is the art of influencing others to do willingly what is required in order to achieve an aim or goal<sup>157</sup>

General J.A. Dextraze

The definition of leadership by General Dextraze is enduring. The ability to influence is key to successful leadership. In times of significant change or transformation, that requirement is even more important as a result of the accompanying uncertainty. The importance of transformational leaders in the change process cannot be understated as they “act as change agents who initiate and implement new directions within organisations.”<sup>158</sup> The CDS Annual Report 2002-2003 reflected this understanding when it stated “[t]o enable transformation, the CF must embrace transformational thinking and leadership....”<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> J.A. Dextraze, “The Art of Leadership”, *Canadian Armed Forces Personnel Newsletter*, June 1973, 3. General Dextraze defined leadership while serving as the Chief of the Defence Staff for the Canadian Armed Forces in 1973.

<sup>158</sup> Peter G. Northhouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice* (Thousand Oak: Sage Publications Inc., 2001), 45.

<sup>159</sup> Department of National Defence, “Chief of Defence Staff Annual Report 2002-2003,”[document online]; available from [http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/00native/pdf/CDS-R2003\\_e.pdf](http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/00native/pdf/CDS-R2003_e.pdf); Internet; accessed 24 April 2005.

Culture refers to how things are done within an organization or society; it defines the tacit rules that influence actions in a wide variety of situations... To support the goals of transformation, the values and beliefs that define military culture will have to emphasize innovation and entrepreneurship within the bounds of the military's chain-of-command environment, and will recognize the importance of flexibility in managing personnel. Leaders will have a particularly important role in communicating....<sup>160</sup>

It was with transformation in mind that, in February 2003, the MND stood up an advisory committee to examine the administration practices of the CF and DND in the hopes of identifying administrative efficiencies.<sup>161</sup> After six months the committee tabled their report to the minister with a series of 49 recommendations for improvement. It is interesting to note the one of the first things that the committee stated was that implementing the recommendations were necessary if efficiencies were to be gained, and that they held a “firm view that, despite success in some areas, Defence has an inconsistent track record in implementing strategic-level change.”<sup>162</sup> Not a complimentary remark for an institution in the process of transformation. The committee also recognized the immaturity of the governance structure supporting the capability development process and recommended to “transforming governance structures, placing corporate decision-making and issue management in the hands of a core group of senior

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<sup>160</sup> Beth Asch and James R. Hosek, Looking to the Future “What Does Transformation Mean for Military Manpower” and Personnel Policy?” [http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\\_papers/2005/RAND\\_OP108.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2005/RAND_OP108.pdf); Internet; accessed 4 March 2005.

<sup>161</sup> Department of National Defence, “Report to the Minister of National Defence by the Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency,” vi [report on-line]; available from [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Focus/AE/AEReportFull\\_e.pdf](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Focus/AE/AEReportFull_e.pdf); Internet; accessed 26 March 2005.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.; Internet; accessed 26 March 2005.

managers whose responsibilities are pan-departmental.”<sup>163</sup> With a wealth of corporate experience on the Committee<sup>164</sup> regarding transformation was the establishment of a ‘change agent’ or ‘chief of transformation’ that would report directly to the MND but work closely with the CDS and the Deputy Minister.<sup>165</sup> The principal role of this ‘change agent’ would be to ensure “the transformation of strategic-level management in Defence, and play a critical role in, enabling and supporting the broader transformation of Canada’s military capabilities.”<sup>166</sup>

Although many of the recommendations of the advisory committee were adopted, the recommendation of a change agent has not, to date, been implemented. The revision of the governance structure is underway and currently falls within the responsibility of the Director General of Strategic Change. Ironically, this had already been recognised by the VCDS staff as an issue, as noted in the Capability Outlook in 2002,<sup>167</sup> the comment was made that “the CF must also be capable of undertaking rapid organisational

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<sup>163</sup> Department of National Defence, “Report to the Minister of National Defence by the Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency,” ix [report on-line]; available from [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Focus/AE/AEReportFull\\_e.pdf](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Focus/AE/AEReportFull_e.pdf); Internet; accessed 26 March 2005.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.; Internet; accessed 26 March 2005. The Committee was composed of four experts with experience in private and public sector administration, management, and restructuring.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.; Internet; accessed 26 March 2005.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.; Internet; accessed 26 March 2005.

<sup>167</sup> Department of National Defence, “Capability Outlook 2002-2012,” [document on-line]; available from [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/CAPABILITY\\_OUTLOOK\\_E.pdf](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/CAPABILITY_OUTLOOK_E.pdf); Internet; accessed 15 March 2005. The 2002-2012 Capability Outlook provides context to defence planning activities. It examines projected capability gaps and strategic trends, by capability area, and identifies priorities to harmonise strategic planning and future force development over the mid term.

and conceptual transformation. The current CF structure, with its bureaucratic and hierarchical levels of command, leads to slow, sometimes ineffective change.<sup>168</sup>

### **Strengthening the Enablers**

Having now discussed the key strategic planning components, the paper will now examine a current initiative design to strengthen these transformation enablers. In November 2003, a less than two years after the formal introduction of Capability Based Planning for the DND and CF, the VCDS directed a team of staff members to examine the core planning processes of the DP &M framework to with the intent of revising the framework to better meet the needs of the various planning staffs.<sup>169</sup> The challenges of the framework components is that while individual components are generally recognised and understood, there is a lack of understanding across the planning staffs of how the overall planning framework functions.<sup>170</sup>

The Harmonisation Initiative Team (HIT) is mandated to determine the “how best to realign the various components of the planning regime.”<sup>171</sup> Specifically, since the key tools of Capability Based Planning were developed individually, it was found that

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<sup>168</sup> Department of National Defence, “Capability Outlook 2002-2012,” [document on-line]; available from [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/CAPABILITY\\_OUTLOOK\\_E.pdf](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/CAPABILITY_OUTLOOK_E.pdf); Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

<sup>169</sup> Evan Perrakis, “Draft Concept Paper on Defence Planning and Management Framework Harmonisation - 28 February 2005,” telephone conversation with the author 16 April 2005. Mr Perrakis is a member of the Directorate General of Strategic Planning Staff in NDHQ. He has been with the Harmonisation initiative since its inception in November 2003 and is currently the Harmonisation Team leader on behalf of the VCDS.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 1-5.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., 1-10.

significant work was required to align the key elements of the process.<sup>172</sup> Also, as expected, the governance structure, in terms of span of control and top down guidance function for capability development issues were weak link. The establishment and refinement of the framework and fundamental principles of the capability development process is an essential part of enabling the transformation of the CF and DND.

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<sup>172</sup> Ibid.,2-14 – 2-21.

## Summation

To hear the word bandied about, transformation is the solution to everything that ails the CF. It surely has a progressive ring. But watch out lest it join the fine traditions of unification and jointness as the latest excuse for accomplishing nothing<sup>173</sup>

The world has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. Amidst great hopes for global peace and security in the new unipolar moment, nations around the world were quickly confronted with growing regional instability, intrastate conflict of failed and failing states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the rise of asymmetric threat. Canada was confronted with difficult choices regarding maintenance of the Cold War level of military capability and forward basing in the face of economic challenges. The 1994 White Paper on Defence provided somewhat more clarity on the emerging security environment, reduced military funding and international commitment, and stated that the CF would do less.<sup>174</sup> The government proceeded adopt a more soft power and human security focus to international affairs.<sup>175</sup> As such, throughout most of the 1990s, the CF funding was significantly reduced and the effective combat capability of the CF began to erode. At the same time increased operational tempo and personnel reductions put even more strain on the ability of the CF to sustain operations. By the turn of the century, the CF and DND began a revitalisation of the CF from within. With the

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<sup>173</sup> Council for Canadian Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, "Transformation" – What's the Point?, , <http://www.ccs21.org/>; Internet; accessed 5 April 2005. Article by Nic Boisvert

<sup>174</sup> Department of national Defence Canada, "The 1994 White Paper on Defence", [document on-line]; available from [http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/5115\\_e.htm](http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/5115_e.htm); Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

<sup>175</sup> Daryl Copeland, "The Axworthy Years: Canadian Foreign Policy in the Era of Diminished Capacity," Chapter 8 from *Canada Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy*, (eds. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot, Toronto, ON: Oxford University press, 2001), 152.

technological advancements that marked the transition from the Industrial Age to the Information Age, and the evolving approach to modern warfare, the stage was set for Canada to leverage allied efforts, re-align capabilities to meet the challenges of the new security environment particularly and begin the journey on the road to transformation.

This paper has successfully argued that the transformation of the CF and DND that was introduced with *Strategy 2020* has failed to meet expectations as a result of the lack of a coherent and supported strategic planning process. In doing so, the essay provided context for the genesis of transformation as it is related to the current RMA and the associated technologies and conceptual shifts concerning modern warfare, and then provided the definition of transformation in the Canadian context.

Through an analysis of the requirements for transformation, it was revealed that for our Allies, in particular the US, the continued static threat approach to strategic planning was no longer effective. It was recognised that transformation is not about wholesale change of the CF; an appropriate balance between transformation and modernization was necessary in terms of affordability and continuity. It was also argued that the appropriate level of capability to support policy objectives must be defined and supported. The essay then related the requirement to transform to three primary themes: relevancy – in terms of contributing to Allied initiatives, ensuring interoperability and mobility; to address the emergent asymmetric threat; and to align with the evolving national and international security policies.

The main section of the essay examined the key transformation enablers through an analysis of government policy, the strategic planning components of the defence institution and strategic leadership. It was determined that government policy must

provide both the direction and the commitment to defence and also confirmed the requirement of a defence policy that is reflective of the security environment. The essay then went on to examine the strategic planning components in terms of the visioning process, concepts and capability development as they related to policy and to transformation. Strengths and shortfalls were identified within each of the enablers, as well as their assessed impact on transformation. The importance of a strategic operating concept that helps inform policy development Notwithstanding the sound transformational capability framework that has been established there is a high level of complexity involved in the mechanics of the development process that has yet to be mastered. The influence of strategic leadership and the importance of its role was then discussed and determined to be a critical factor in supporting the progress of the transformation initiatives.

Although the framework and procedures of the strategic planning process are sound, there is still much work left to do. The revitalization of Capability Based Planning and the introduction of a hierarchy of operating concepts to support the visioning and policy development processes will add more coherency to the overall process. In the end, to ensure the expedient and effective transformation of the CF, the alignment and harmonization of the key enablers is vital to ensure the if transformation



## EPILOGUE

With our review of Canada's defence policy and our commitment to provide additional funding to the Canadian Forces in the months to come, the Government has placed Defence at the forefront of its agenda. I cannot think of another time, in recent decades, when there has been more support for our military and our men and women in uniform.

Defence Minister Bill Graham<sup>176</sup>

In a ceremony on the 4<sup>th</sup> of February 2005, General Rick Hillier assumed the position of the Chief of the Defence Staff Prime Minister Martin's support for the new CDS was clearly in his indicated in his congratulatory remarks when he stated "Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier brings strong leadership and unparalleled experience to his new position.... His service record demonstrates a broad breadth of achievement at home and abroad making him the ideal person to lead the Canadian Forces as they transform for the future."<sup>177</sup> As a strong proponent of the government's 3 D international policy approach<sup>178</sup>, General Hillier is well suited to execute the government's policy objectives.

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<sup>176</sup> Minister's Speech Speaking Notes for The Honourable Bill Graham, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence at the Annual Conference of the McGill Institute for the Study of Canada February 18, 2005 Montreal, Québec [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view\\_news\\_e.asp?id=1609](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1609); Internet; accessed 19 March 2005.

<sup>177</sup> Office of the Prime Minister, "Prime Minister announces new Chief of the Defence Staff", <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=388>; Internet; accessed 8 April 2005. PMO news release 14 January 2005, Ottawa, ON.

<sup>178</sup> Rick Hillier, "Experience is Shaping Army Transformation," Frontline Magazine Issue 1(2005)[magazine online] available from [http://www.frontline-canada.com/pdfs/0201Hillier\\_CLS.pdf](http://www.frontline-canada.com/pdfs/0201Hillier_CLS.pdf); Internet; accessed 4 April 2005.

There is an excitement in NDHQ that has not been seen in the recent past. The timing of several events has raised expectations amongst the staffs concerning the CF and the defence portfolio. First the high profile support for defence since the election of the in June 2004. Second, the appointment of Minister Graham, with his experience in foreign affairs has been interpreted as a strong message of committed support for defence, third the appointment of General Hillier as CDS, a dynamic leader by all accounts, and fourth, the delivery of the International and Defence Policy Statements on the 19 April 2005.<sup>179</sup>

In establishing an initial assessment as to whether the hype surrounding the current situation with defence is well placed, a closer examination of recent and ongoing activity is warranted. To support the assessment a cross check against the transformation enablers will be conducted.

- 1) Government Policy – the long awaited defence policy statement was delivered on 19 April 2005; initial assessment indicates that, as a minimum, it reflects the new and foreseeable security environment;
- 2) Strategic Vision - 10 March CDS delivered new vision for the CF. Very operationally focussed, the vision calls for the transformation of the CF to an integrated organisation;<sup>180</sup>
- 3) Strategy – 19 April 2005 Defence Policy Statement is released. Strategic planning staff have since commenced meetings to progress on the work and alignment of Strategy 2025;<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> International and Defence Policy statements available from <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/homepage-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2005.

<sup>180</sup> General Rick Hillier, CDS Planning Guidance - CDS Action Teams,” 10 March 2005.

- 4) Concepts – Directorate of Defence Analysis staff has been directed to leverage the baseline work of the Strategic operating Concept Draft 4.4 and re-align the document in view of the CF Vision and Defence Policy Statement,<sup>182</sup>
- 5) Capability Development – 10 March 2005 CDS directed the formation of four action teams to initiate the CF Transformation Planning process. CDS Action Team 4 - Institutional Alignment is directed to “ensure the Department aligns its strategic processes and elements to effectively support the domestic and international components of the new defence policy and the Canadian Forces (CF) vision.”<sup>183</sup>
- 6) Leadership – regarding the sixth and final transformational enabler examined by this paper, preliminary indications are positive based on the initiative and direction provided thus far. As Northouse points out, leadership not only involves influence, but has to do with “directing a group of individuals toward accomplishing some task or end.”<sup>184</sup> There is little question that General Hillier has accomplished this with his staff.

The question that remains is whether the momentum that has been created can be sustained. An initial assessment of the ongoing strategic level activity sufficient

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<sup>181</sup> Dr. Michael Roi, telephone conversation Strategy 2025 team member, 19 April 2005.

<sup>182</sup> Cdr Ian Wood, telephone conversation with Team Lead for development of CF Integrated Operating Concept, 10 April 2005.

<sup>183</sup> General Rick Hillier, CDS Planning Guidance - CDS Action Teams,” 10 March 2005.

<sup>184</sup> Peter Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc., 2002), 3.

provides reason to believe the sought after transformation agenda may come to fruition earlier than expected.

Gen Hillier's leadership and experience will be invaluable as we continue this process to transform the Canadian Forces to meet the security challenges Canada faces. I have every confidence in his ability to shape and implement the CF transformation.<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>185</sup> Department of National Defence Canada, "CF Field Hospital display wins "most innovative" at medicine forum," Maple Leaf Vol 8, no.3 19 January 2005, Vol. 8 No. 3 [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/community/MapleLeaf/html\\_files/html\\_view\\_e.asp?page=vol8-03p1-3](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/community/MapleLeaf/html_files/html_view_e.asp?page=vol8-03p1-3); Internet; accessed 10 April 2005. Interview with the Hon Bill Graham, Minister of National Defence

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