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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
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EXERCISE / EXERCICE NEW HORIZONS

**HOMELAND SECURITY –
A NATURAL FIT FOR THE LAND FORCE RESERVES**

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La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

ABSTRACT

A “made in Canada” solution to modern security threats is demanded by unique geographic, political and economic conditions. This solution must ensure the well being of Canadian citizens and satisfy legitimate security concerns of the United States.

Generating a proficient, integrated and responsive Canadian Homeland Defence and Security (HDS) capability is a key part of the security challenge this paper will address.

Key shortfalls in the national ability to respond to HDS events, in particular those involving large natural and man-made disasters are first identified. A brief introduction to the history of the Land Force Reserve (LFR) shows a long and successful involvement in HDS and leads to discussions on the current capabilities and shortfalls of the LFR in this area. Of particular note is that the LFR is a national entity with unmatched capabilities outside of the Regular Force. The LFR can already provide many of the consequence management (CM) capabilities necessary for HDS response including cooperating with and providing support to local first-response agencies. These discussions and subsequent recommendations to expand the LFR role and enhance its capabilities support that the LFR is capable of assuming a lead role in disaster response throughout Canada. With enhancements the LFR can assume this role without detracting from its military augmentation and mobilization roles.

The paper concludes that the LFR should be assigned the responsibility, and be organized, funded, trained and equipped to address a critical HDS shortfall by generating the organizational framework upon which a nationwide, Reserve Force led CM cooperative can be constructed. This is firmly in line with the Army’s objective of connecting with Canadians and the LFR would welcome this mandate.

Introduction

Officially an independent nation for over 138 years, it can be argued that Canada's apron strings to Europe were only truly cut as it withdrew its Cold War forces from Europe. Since that time Canada has had to make its own way in the world and face a broad array of threats not necessarily alone but certainly on its own terms. As Europeans adopt similar and cooperative approaches to security, Canada's unique geographic, political and economic conditions demand a "made in Canada" solution that must ensure the well being of Canadians and satisfy the legitimate security concerns of the United States. Domestic security presents a particular challenge given the asymmetric threat environment, the tempo of Canadian Forces operations, the state of the Regular and Reserve Land Forces, and the ad hoc nature of domestic disaster response. This paper will address a key part of the security challenge, that of generating a proficient, integrated and responsive Canadian Homeland Defence and Security (HDS) capability,¹ of which the Land Force Reserve (LFR) should lead key aspects.

The events of 11 September 2001 should have galvanized all Canadians into becoming more vigilant and capable of dealing with such events given Canada's inextricably tight social and economic proximity to the United States. However, the immediacy Canadians place on HDS fluctuates constantly as world events vie for attention and whether it is national health emergencies, natural disasters, or the potential for terrorist attacks, the Canadian national sense of urgency fades easily. This demonstrates that Canadians are confident in their nation's ability to mitigate the effects

¹ This paper will focus on the protection of Canada and the safety and security of Canadians *at home*. To facilitate the discussion activities associated with this aspect of national security will be captured using the general term *Homeland Defence and Security*. The use of this term is for discussion purposes only. No linkage with other concepts or organizations involved in the security of Canada or the United States is implied nor does the term include military sovereignty operations in defence of Canadian territory.

of significant events but, successes to date aside, this confidence belies the need for a far more coordinated and capable national response to natural or man-made disasters and law enforcement crises.

This paper will propose that the LFR should be assigned the responsibility, and be organised, funded and trained to address a critical HDS shortfall by generating the organizational framework upon which agencies responding to an HDS event can be properly integrated. The LFR should also be made responsible for developing the capability to support the efforts of deploying military and civilian response agencies. To support this proposal it will be demonstrated that this approach is consistent with current LFR roles, it is feasible and desirable, and that it is in line with the Army's objective of connecting with Canadians.² It will also be suggested that no other option is immediately obvious and the LFR would welcome this mandate. This proposal presumes two things. First, the Public Security and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) organization retains the lead for policy, planning and execution of non-military HDS tasks. Second, the LFR retains its core mobilization and augmentation roles as they are essential to both the nation's military security and to maintaining the capabilities the LFR requires for HDS tasks.

This paper begins by outlining the HDS threats to Canada and in general, describing the capabilities required to meet them. Discussion follows regarding essential levels of consequence management (CM) capabilities and shortcomings in existing national emergency response capabilities. The historical relevance of the Militia in HDS is then presented with a summary of the LFR's current characteristics and capabilities.

² Department of National Defence, "The Army Strategy - Advancing with Purpose, (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, May 2002), 17; available from <http://www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/resources.asp>; Internet; accessed 14 April 2005.

Observations on how the LFR is ideally suited and situated to respond to HDS situations is then supported by recommendations for enhancing the LFR so it can effectively assume a lead role in national CM. This paper concludes that greater LFR involvement will result in a more integrated, proficient and responsive national HDS response.

The Homeland Defence and Security Threat

The HDS threat to Canada is plainly stated in *Securing An Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*: The world is a dangerous place, even if the relative safety of life in Canada sometimes obscures just how dangerous it actually is. As recent events have highlighted, there is a wide range of threats facing Canada from pandemics to terrorism.³ The National Security Policy also identifies the three core Canadian national security interests as being: “protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad, ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to our allies, and, contributing to international security.”⁴ It continues by identifying eight specific “threats that can have a serious impact on the safety of Canadians and on the effective functioning of our society:” terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed and failing states, foreign espionage, natural disasters, critical infrastructure vulnerability, organized crime, and, pandemics.⁵

³ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, (Ottawa: PCO, April 2004), 6; available from http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/Publications/NatSecurnat/natsecurnat_e.pdf; Internet; accessed 7 April 2005.

⁴ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society...*, 5.

⁵ Ibid., 6-8.

Historically Canada regularly experiences significant natural or man-made disasters, and medical pandemics.⁶ For example: massive flooding (PQ 1996, MB 1950, 1997, BC 1948), paralysing ice storms (eastern Canada 1998) and snow storms (PEI 1982, ON/PQ 1999, PQ 1971), forest fires (BC 2003, SK/MB/ON 1998), tornadoes (Edmonton AB 1987, ON 1985), hurricanes (NS 1971, 1987, 2003), wide spread power grid outages (ON/PQ 2003, ON 1965, 1977)⁷, water contamination (Walkerton ON 2000), health pandemics (SARS Toronto ON 2003), airliner crashes (Gander NF 1985, Halifax NS 1998), satellite re-entry (with nuclear reactor⁸ NWT 1978). Events of this magnitude inevitably require the attention of multiple levels of government, requiring national resources to control and coordinate a response, and provide finances, manpower, equipment and material. Each was successfully responded to by a collection of agencies with varying levels of coordination and control however a lack of depth in response capabilities at all levels of government was apparent in each. For some time Canada has not experienced such a disastrous event in terms of a huge loss in life and property that the nation suffered long term social and economic effects. Realistically, the recurrence of past natural events and the occurrence of other disasters such as an earthquake or chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear (CBRN) event remains a distinct possibility.

Given this eye-opening inventory of inevitable and possibly catastrophic disasters, it is instinctive to search for a single responsible organization (with a coordinated grand plan) that will quickly mitigate the effects of these threats. To date Canada has coped

⁶ Environment Canada, "Top Weather Events of the 20th Century," http://www.msc-smc.ec.gc.ca/media/top10/century_e.html; Internet; accessed 10 April 2005.

⁷ Robin Rowland, CBC News Online, "Blackouts hit in 1965, 1977," 14 August 2003; available from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/poweroutage/blackout.html>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2005.

⁸ Canadian Space Agency, "Canadian Space Milestones," http://www.space.gc.ca/asc/eng/about/csm_complete.asp; Internet; accessed 10 April 2005.

using infrequently exercised procedures and links between the various levels of government and non-government agencies. As expected, the national responses have resembled those that are cobbled together during foreign disaster relief efforts, in the end effective, but often not as efficient or as timely as possible. The establishment of PSEPC as the nation's responsible central agency is evidence of improvement though.

PSEPC is responsible for developing an integrated security system capable of threat assessment, protection and prevention, CM, and evaluation and oversight to counter future HDS threats.⁹ PSEPC is establishing linkages with a broad array of public and private organizations. It is also pressing these organizations to enhance their core capabilities and align them with the government's six key security activities: intelligence, emergency planning and management, public health emergencies, transportation security, border security, and, international security.¹⁰ Historically LFR expertise and capabilities were invaluable during disasters and other significant events therefore the proposed LFR contribution to the PSEPC integrated security system will focus primarily on CM. This does not imply the LFR is unable to contribute in other areas of the system or in other security activities but rather these aspects require analysis beyond the scope of this paper.

Essential National Consequence Management Capabilities and Shortfalls

An awareness of the range of nationwide capabilities that are essential for effective disaster response is necessary to illustrate where the LFR might best assist in CM. Minimally, the following readiness and response capabilities are required: the means to control, plan and communicate in austere environments; infrastructure to assure

⁹ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society...*, 11.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

readiness; CM and specialist skills training; pools of specialized and general purpose equipment; readily available strategic and local transportation; sustainment and protection of responders and victims; first-response specialists (medical, firefighting, hazardous material, explosive ordnance disposal, etc.); and abundant skilled and unskilled labour, preferably familiar with basic CM.

Regarding the state of Canadian preparedness, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SSCNSD) was frank: “There are only two certainties. The first is that big, bad moments will come to Canada. The second, <their> investigations showed, is that Canadians are unprepared.”¹¹ The crux of the problem lies in the limited ability of civil agencies in all but a few Canadian locales to sustain CM activities beyond a short duration for even small-scale events. Health care, fire protection and policing organizations are sized to the communities they serve, they have limited surge capacity, and they face a nationwide shortage of trained professionals. Many areas outside of high-density population centres must still rely on volunteer firefighters and ambulance operators many of whom must travel great distances to respond. Considering this there are few options for developing regional capabilities suited to new threats such as a CBRN event. CBRN response presents a particular problem. It is unaffordable in all communities and, in spite of years of federal funding for training, results are limited.¹² On CBRN response, the SSCNSD heard complaints such as: “We do not know where

¹¹ Senate, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, Volume 1 (Ottawa: March 2004), 6; available from <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/3/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep03mar04vol1-e.pdf>; Internet; accessed 9 April 2005.

¹² Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, *Background: Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada* (Ottawa: Communications Group PSEPC, 13 February 2004), n.p.; available from http://www.psepc.gc.ca/publications/corporate/PSEPC-Background_e.asp; Internet; accessed 9 April 2005.

that training program went nor do we know when it is ever going to surface again, and we are concerned about that”¹³ from officials of even large municipalities. Not only did this testimony highlight the challenge of developing crucial nationwide CM capabilities it also revealed the weakness in the links between various levels of government. To further illustrate disconnects, testimony to the SSCNSD regarding a reported \$330 million national stockpile of emergency supplies indicated “many first-responders are clearly unaware that the caches even exist” and that emergency supply caches can be “outdated and unhelpful.”¹⁴ Furthermore, on the interagency coordination mechanisms professed by the federal government, the SSCNSD reported that:

These programs, networks, and systems sound impressive. And yet, not once in the Committee’s travels or in the responses to the open-ended questions about emergency preparedness in the Committee’s questionnaire did a municipal official choose to highlight or comment on any of them. This silence speaks volumes, and it leaves the Committee wondering just how effective they really are.¹⁵

If such disconnects exist between levels of government it is no wonder that the organizations one assumes will contribute notably to HDS also have major limitations. For example, agencies such as the Canadian Red Cross (CRC) are concerned principally with international disaster relief. Deployed, the CRCs capabilities are respectable:

“In the emergency relief phase, help can be provided in the form of search and rescue, first aid, basic medical care and the provision of basic relief items such as food, shelter and clothing. Red Cross programs also respond to the long-term needs of disaster victims by providing programs that may focus on reconstruction, rehabilitation and psycho-social support.”¹⁶

¹³ Senate, *National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines...*, 44.

¹⁴ Ibid., 24.

¹⁵ Ibid., 29.

¹⁶ Canadian Red Cross, “Disaster Response,” <http://www.redcross.ca/article.asp?id=005470&tid=036>; Internet; accessed 12 April 2005.

CRC specialist volunteers are trained as field assessment and coordination team members and assist in determining the needs of those in the disaster area. However, reliance on volunteers relegates the CRC to an auxiliary role in HDS.

Remarkably, the military is supposed to be the responder of last resort¹⁷ since disaster response is primarily a provincial responsibility and there is no guarantee that Regular Force units normally stationed in an area are not deployed elsewhere. The disaster response limitations of the military are also noteworthy. Military units are neither specifically trained nor equipped to deal with most of the natural and man-made events discussed earlier. Furthermore, except for operational level headquarters, Regular Force units normally do not maintain the levels of interoperability with local governments, first-response services and civilian organizations that would ensure efficient integration into time sensitive relief operations. Even the military's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART),¹⁸ tailored for international relief operations, is not suited to domestic response and is normally precluded from these operations.¹⁹ Nonetheless, due to its high profile of late the potential of a domestic DART response does warrant additional discussion.

While promising at first glance the high readiness DART headquarters personnel and equipment (radios, vehicles and shelters) are redundant in a domestic context.²⁰ First, the 180-plus personnel that top up the headquarters, comprise the main body, and

¹⁷ Senate, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines...*, 20.

¹⁸ Department of National Defence, "Disaster Assistance Response Team – DART," http://www.dnd.ca/site/operations/DART/index_e.asp; Internet; accessed 12 April 2005.

¹⁹ Department of National Defence, NDHQ 3301-0 (DCDS), "NDHQ Instruction DCDS 2/98 – Guidance for the Conduct of Domestic Operations" (Ottawa: NDHQ, 10 July 1998), 8; available from http://barker.cfc.dnd.ca/Admin/JCP/DCDSGuide/dcds298_e.html; Internet; accessed 26 April 2005.

²⁰ The author served as Deputy Commanding Officer (the senior full time position) of the DART from 2003-2004.

generate specialist capabilities are drawn from other units. Second, the four Land Force (LF) Area commands are each responsible for military assistance to civil authorities in their geographic area and they have larger numbers of the same radios, equipment, vehicles and shelters held by the DART. An exception is the Yukon, North West Territories and Nunavut region under Canadian Forces Northern Area (CFNA).²¹ CFNA does not command large LF units but since the DART requires substantial contract aircraft to move it has no distinct advantage over neighbouring LF Area units given an event in the Arctic. The SSCNSD expressed similar reservations but foresees a time when the DART is capable of domestic disaster response.²²

Having identified several key shortfalls in Canadian disaster response capabilities the question arises: how can they be overcome? Militia history will serve to demonstrate the LFR's historical relevance to CM and HDS and then, it will be illustrated that while limitations exist the LFR either already has or is developing the necessary capabilities to have a solid head start in national CM and disaster response.

Relevance of the Land Force Reserve to Homeland Defence and Security

The crucial role that the Militia has historically played in HDS strongly suggests it is appropriate to employ today's LFR in a similar fashion. Today's Militia or LFR consists of 133 units located in 125 communities, plus numerous detachments of the Canadian Rangers throughout the arctic.²³ The LF attained its stated objective of 15,500

²¹ There is still a lack of resolution regarding the type of event that might occur in the arctic territories that would benefit from a DART response. One such possibility is to have the DART's self sustaining headquarters, communications, logistics and medical unit provide the lead and core support for a larger, urgent "clean-up" type of operation.

²² Senate, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines...*, 22.

²³ Reserves 2000, "Canada's Neglected Defence Asset The Militia;" available from http://www.reserves2000.ca/neglected_asset.htm; Internet; accessed 12 April 2005.

LFR personnel in September 2002 knowing the importance of the LFR to its operations. This strength dropped significantly in the absence of necessary additional federal financial support. Supported by the recent federal budget, the LFR strength is expected to grow from around 14,500 to 17,000 in 2006,²⁴ and eventually to 18,500,²⁵ a figure deemed essential to future LF operations. Specific information on unit location and strength (albeit dated) can be found in the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (SCRR) report of 1995,²⁶ the Reserves 2000 web site,²⁷ and the Militia distribution map provided by the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) office.²⁸

As military historian T.C. Willet portrays in his historical “ethnography” *Canada’s Militia: A Heritage at Risk*²⁹ the role of the LFR has evolved throughout its history. Arguably the greatest change occurred in 1956 when, as Willet notes, “the Militia’s raison d’être; its main task would be to assist the civil power by providing mobile columns to deal with the aftermath of nuclear attacks on Canadian cities,

²⁴ House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*. Thursday April 22 2004, 15:55; available from <http://www.parl.gc.ca/infocomdoc/37/3/NDVA/Meetings/Evidence/ndvaev09-e.htm>; Internet; accessed 7 April 2005.

²⁵ Department of National Defence, *Government of Canada Policy Statement: Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR)* (Ottawa: DND, 6 October 2000), n.p.; available from http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/LF/Downloads/MND_e.rtf; Internet; accessed 9 April 2005.

²⁶ Department of National Defence, *The Report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves*, The Right Honourable Brian Dickson, Chairman. (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group – Publishing, 1995), n.p. ; available from <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/minister/eng/restructuring/e-toc.html>; Internet; accessed 7 April 2005.

²⁷ Reserves 2000, “Canada’s Army of the Future,” http://www.reserves2000.ca/militia_component_structure.htm; Internet; accessed 14 April 2005.

²⁸ Department of National Defence, “Militia Map;” available from http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/LF/English/9_3_4.asp Internet; accessed 10 April 2005.

²⁹ T.C. Willett, *Canada’s Militia: A Heritage at Risk*, 2nd ed. (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations, 1990) (1st ed. Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1987). As the work is described in the cover leaf introducing the author.

essentially a civil-defence [sic] role.”³⁰ This trend toward civil defence is propagated by the Militia’s sizeable response to virtually every natural disaster of note in Canada over the past century. In spite of searching for purpose through 1950s and 60s, and suffering disproportionately during an interminable budget squeeze in the 1980s and 90s, the importance of the LFR to national security at home has garnered much attention relatively recently. LFR skill sets and equipment, both readily adaptable to disaster response, are of particular interest. As published in the Minister’s Monitoring Committee Interim Report (1999) this attention combined with the significant public, government and military efforts resulted in recognition of the three distinct roles of the Reserves:

The Reserves have three fundamental roles within the Canadian Forces: to serve as the basis of national mobilization; to augment the Regular Force; and to act as the military's link to the community. These roles are not mutually exclusive. Maintaining a link to the community, for example, facilitates the ability of the Reserves to prepare for their ultimate purpose of national mobilization by recruiting, training and maintaining a level of operational readiness. Exposure to the military informs Canadians, which is a requirement for public support of the military.³¹

In his Policy Statement on Land Force Reserve Restructure the Minister of National Defence affirmed the LFR role in particular:

...the Army Reserves exist primarily to provide the framework for expansion should the need arise. This is the *raison d'être* of our Reserve Force, which is characterized by its role as a 'footprint' in communities across the country. Its significant social role of fostering the values of citizenship and public service is one which, as Canadians, we have come to cherish and must protect.³²

³⁰ T.C. Willett, *Canada's Militia...*, 76.

³¹ House of Commons, Ministers Monitoring Committee Interim Report July 1999 as quoted in: Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs, *In Service of the Nation: Canada's Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century*. “The Reserve Restructure Process: Chronology of Events,” John A. Fraser, Chairman (Ottawa: 19 May 2000), n.p.; available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/Fraser/english/restructure_e.htm; Internet; accessed 14 April 2005.

³² Department of National Defence, “Government of Canada Policy Statement: Land Force Reserve Restructure...”, n.p.

The references to community ties have since been interpreted to include a broader civil defence role. The LFRR Strategic Plan makes specific mention of the LFR's responsibility to "Provide locally available military resources for civil emergencies and civil assistance tasks,"³³ and the SSCNSD provided greater role definition in its recommendations for: "expanding the role of the Militia to be a civil defence force capable of quickly aiding local authorities in the event of a national emergency; and involving the Militia in emergency planning and training in conjunction with municipalities across the country."³⁴ It is appropriate to conclude this section on the relevance of the LFR to HDS by illustrating what Canadian's expect. The SSCNSD report, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines*, provides a prime example:

Take the Vancouver area. Although the reserve land forces stationed in the area do not officially have a first-response role, municipal officials reportedly believe that they will provide emergency assistance. Lieutenant-Colonel Blair McGregor, Commander of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, told the Committee during its visit to Vancouver that "People in the local area – be they informed or not – look to these establishments as a source of immediate disaster relief. Currently we have contingency plans, but little else. We do not train for that and are not funded for it... There is a bit of a disconnect between what the public expects and what we can provide. This is a significant problem. Should there be a major calamity in this area, we would be looked upon as not being up to the task."

Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Travis, the Deputy Chief of Staff for the 39 Canadian Brigade Group, echoed this in saying "I think... expectations do exceed what we are capable of doing. One of their top priorities is domestic operations. They expect us to be there in case of emergency."³⁵

³³ Department of National Defence, *Land Force Reserve Restructure Strategic Plan*. (Ottawa: DND, March 2001), 2-A-1; available from http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lf/Downloads/Strat_Plan.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 April 2005.

³⁴ Senate, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines...*, 21.

³⁵ Senate, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines...*, 45.

This section provided a brief outline of the historical relevance of the LFR to HDS, suggested a trend toward more involvement of the LFR in a civil defence role and touched on the expectations of the government and the public. The current capabilities and shortfalls of today's LFR in relation to CM will now be discussed.

Land Force Reserves Current Capabilities and Shortfalls

With over 14,500 LF Reservists established in 125 communities arguably the greatest strengths of the LFR are its nationwide presence, manpower, community ties and numerous formal and informal links with local government and first-response agencies.

Having an effective number of Reservists in sufficient locations is crucial to greater LFR involvement in HDS response but unit establishments are growing and shortfalls are being addressed through proactive recruiting. To ensure that HDS capabilities are uniform nationwide and to satisfy the LFR's mobilization and augmentation roles, balancing the personnel establishment and occupation mix among units will be necessary. Undoubtedly the LFR's most notable limitation is that it is composed primarily of part time personnel and that specific conditions apply where there is a risk of injury during domestic operations.³⁶ Further compounding the problem, in the author's experience 5-10% of Reservists may also hold key civilian positions essential to HDS response i.e. police, firefighting or medical. The impact of these shortcomings is better understood by reiterating that volunteer first-responders still reliably serve a significant part of rural Canada. Second, delegation of approval levels to grant the necessary short-term Class C contracts to Reservists was demonstrated during Y2K

³⁶ Department of National Defence, "NDHQ Instruction DCDS 2/98...", 16.

standby operations. Third, significant training and experience benefits result from the dual hatting of key personnel between the Reserves and civilian first-response organizations. Risk of an absence in either position is a planning matter. Due to the part time nature of most Reservists additional dedicated personnel will be required to assure the most efficient and effective unit response.

The nationwide LFR presence offers a degree of standardization that could be invaluable in coordinating national HDS capabilities. The LFR's inherent command and control and communication structure also goes beyond the local community giving LFR units access to higher-level support and national level resources. Many LFR units also have radio assets and trained operators that enable them to coordinate their response to local events and integrate with other attending units or formations. Enhanced radio capabilities and communications links to civilian agencies are important and some degree of integration with Land Force Communications Reserve units may be required to facilitate this.

LFR commanders and staff are familiar with military planning, including logistics and communications requirements, and can apply these skills to potential and actual HDS tasks. Contingency planning for disaster operations is a complex and iterative process that also requires a high degree of integration into the community. Reservists who bring first hand knowledge of civil defence planning and community first-responder operations from their civilian life often facilitate this integration. Among the many skilled LF Reservists are drivers, communicators, medical assistants, supply technicians, mechanics, cooks, and, predominantly, combat arms personnel (read armed security). Reservists are typically trained in first aid and undergo familiarization exercises on casualty evacuation,

ground search and rescue and limited fire fighting. The LFR also employs personnel in a wide array of medical occupations in a few LF Area based medical units. While the national shortage of medical professionals has also impacted LFR units, the potential exists over the long term for an enhanced LFR medical response capability. Regarding Reserve-unique skills, the LFRR Phase 2 will see units specialize in a variety of HDS relevant military occupation fields. Remarkably the preponderance of this capability will reside in the LFR, not in the Regular Force. More on these enhancements will follow.

Having discussed specialist skills it is important to consider the collective capabilities of regionally based LFR support units. Unbeknownst to many, LFR units generate a significant portion of Regular LF logistical and medical support. LFR Field Ambulances, Service Battalions (supply, transport, maintenance, food services) and Field Engineer Squadrons in each of the LF Areas also have the potential to deploy as formed units or sub-units. This provides an indispensable, equipment intensive cornerstone capability for an effective HDS response. Deployed, the capabilities of support unit are essential to tending to the victims of an event and to supporting response efforts.

Due to cost and the LFR's augmentation role, equipment holdings are normally limited in LFR units. Units have vehicles and equipment that in many cases would aid in a limited initial response to a disaster however the lack of sufficient, immediately available equipment is considered the LFR's second notable limitation. Without the necessary numbers of vehicles, tools, and equipment to support the units' field operations LFR capabilities will be severely degraded. Equipment shortfalls could be addressed in two ways, either the military must procure and manage (or contract source) increased

stores of equipment and material appropriate for an LFR response or, some other agency must augment the LFR's limited military equipment.

Assuming HDS funding continues, and given the organization, people, skill sets and equipment, the remaining piece of the HDS capability puzzle is training. The LFR constantly conducts training to enhance individual military skills and unit collective capabilities and can develop new planning skills, technical skills and deployment procedures to meet the challenge. Reservists undergo selection and basic training thereby demonstrating that they are suitable for training for fairly complex tasks requiring teamwork under strenuous circumstances. Should standard HDS capabilities be assigned (and funded) as objectives for the LFR units there is a broad range of disaster response training available in North America and abroad which units need only integrate into their training plan. As alluded to earlier, there is also great potential for sharing trainers, courseware and facilities between the LFR units and community first-responders involved in HDS readiness preparations.

LFR capabilities relevant to HDS are growing. The SCRR of 1995 established a starting point for rebuilding LFR capabilities within the budgetary and operational constraints at that time. The LFRR Strategic Plan was developed with broad consultation and it provided previously undeveloped detail on the mobilization process, the absence of which had effectively retarded LFR development for years. The Strategic Plan continues to serve as the roadmap for LFR development and the chronology of this development can be found on the DND website.³⁷ Among the LFRR Phase 2 objectives is the development of new specialist capabilities for LF operations within several designated

³⁷ House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs, *In Service of the Nation: Canada's Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century*. "The Reserve Restructure Process: Chronology of Events"...n.p.

units.³⁸ Most specialties are equally applicable to HDS operations including: civil-military co-operation (CIMIC), public affairs, geomatics support, CBRN response, command support and community-based contingency planning. LFRR Phase 2 also mandates that combat service support and military police capabilities be reviewed. It also directs that connections with post-secondary educational institutions be developed which makes a great deal of sense considering the amount of trade and specialist training yet to be developed and delivered nationally to the LFR.

Of all the new LFR capabilities, the most critical may be CBRN response. It is essential for military operations and its absence is also considered a significant vulnerability in the current Canadian HDS threat environment.^{39,40} Should the LFR assume greater HDS responsibilities, the military CBRN capability would be a valuable carry-over. On the re-rolling of the Militia in favour of civil defence in 1956, Willet remarked that it was “believed <to be> disastrous for the Militia’s image and morale”⁴¹ but we can hardly consider this true today. Taking on a CBRN specialist role today is a significant step forward both in the development of essential war-fighting skills, and in responding to the terrorist threat at home and abroad.

In summary, the CM capabilities essential to HDS response in the future include planning, control and communication means, appropriate infrastructure; training; equipment; transportation; sustainment; protection; first-responder specialists, and,

³⁸ Department of National Defence, *Land Force Reserve Restructure Master Implementation Plan Phase 2*, (Ottawa: DND, 18 November 2003), 9-11; available from http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/Land_Force/English/9_3_2_1.asp; Internet; accessed 9 April 2005.

³⁹ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society...*, 7.

⁴⁰ Senate, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines...*, 7.

⁴¹ Department of National Defence, *Land Force Reserve Restructure Master Implementation Plan Phase 2...*, 76.

skilled and unskilled labour. Pending a mandate and financial resources, the LFR remains well positioned to address many of the CM shortfalls and can already generate each of the above capabilities at a level that can contribute significantly to an effective HDS response. It is apparent that the LFR, while not an immediate 100% solution, is well suited to assume the responsibility for generating an organizational framework suited to the integration of an array of CM response agencies. Recommendations as to how the LFR might be developed and utilized in the CM aspect of the HDS role follow.

Recommendations on Developing and Utilizing the Land Force Reserve in HDS

The Federal Government has already taken specific measures to address the immensity of the homeland security challenge. As detailed in *Securing an Open Society*, one of the measures is to authorize “an increase in Canadian Forces Reserves available for civil preparedness, including a capacity to deal with natural disasters and local emergencies.”⁴² This direction will necessitate the development of LFR capabilities specifically tailored to the HDS role, not just applying their growing range of peacekeeping and war fighting skills i.e. CIMIC, CBRN, etc., to civil defence tasks. This is consistent with specific recommendations made by the SSCNSD:

“the Canadian Forces Militia be equipped and trained for emergency preparedness operations,” and,

“the Office of Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) include the Canadian Forces Militia in the national inventory of emergency preparedness resources, and that first-responders receive details on the Militia’s assets and capabilities.”⁴³

⁴² Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society...*, 24.

⁴³ Senate, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada’s Fragile Front Lines...*, 45.

Notwithstanding this positive direction, a myriad of details must be worked out before fielding any tangible increase in HDS response capability. The Chief of the Land Staff and the Minister of National Defence have made it clear that LFR personnel are essential to operations at home and abroad therefore their use for HDS must be balanced with augmenting LF operations.^{44, 45}

Further to the recommendations in the referenced SSCNSD and SCONDVA reports, should the LFR assume a lead role in HDS, a number of other initiatives would enhance its success. First, the LFR would benefit from a separate command and staff structure issuing from at least as high as the Chief of the Land Staff. While this dramatic step has the appearance of turning back the clock, it would enable the LFR to assume responsibility for disaster response, and perhaps other HDS tasks, from the Regular Force Area commanders. It would also enhance the Reserve Brigade Group structure essential to its mobilization role, an initiative long desired by the LFR. Assuming that the authorities devolved to the LFR are not overly constrictive, the command structure would enable the Regular Force to focus on military operations and rely on the LFR for HDS liaison and contingency planning. It would also facilitate direct liaison between LFR units, headquarters staff and non-military/community HDS agencies on a broader range of issues. This proposal also has the potential to enhance the control and accountability for HDS finances, material and readiness. Additionally, there is potential for the LF

⁴⁴ Major-General Marc Caron, Acting Chief of the Land Staff Address to The Conference of Defence Associations (Ottawa: 26 February 2004) ; available from http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/6_2_3.asp; Internet; accessed 14 April 2005.

⁴⁵ Department of National Defence, "Government of Canada Policy Statement: Land Force Reserve Restructure...", n.p.

managed readiness program to work better for the Reserves and their augmentation role under this structure.

A second key recommendation is to establish units in numerous other communities to provide more effective and responsive coverage, create a greater number of links to smaller communities, enhance recruiting and perhaps extend or enhance the national emergency communications network. This would increase LFR's ability to provide a nationwide HDS capability and it would be most welcome to the LFR after years of disbanding units. It is suggested that to enhance LFR coverage, small sub-units be established (i.e. 50 person) with contracted support. These sub-units, led by two Regular Force personnel each (not Reserve Support Staff), might resemble the successful Airfield Engineering Flights (AEF) established in BC, NS and NF in the 1990's and report to a similar community based headquarters cadre.⁴⁶ Not only have the AEFs provided the Air Force with a significant number of augmentees for operations and training, they have pooled their resources to deploy as a sub-unit overseas. As an added benefit, at least 10% of the AEF Reservists continue to join the Regular Force annually and the units have experienced only temporary challenges in recruiting up to their authorized strength. Managed properly, any increase in the LFR footprint will benefit the Regular Force by expanding its recruiting pool and, as demonstrated in the AEFs, capture a large number of trained personnel wishing to transition from the Regular Force and return to their home communities.

A third recommendation is that a formal, nationwide training cooperative be established between LFR units, civilian disaster relief organizations and community first-

⁴⁶ The author served as Commanding Officer of 14 Airfield Engineering Squadron from 1998-2001. 14 AES is a Reserve-heavy (read 10-90) unit of approximately 150 personnel working from unit facilities in three communities in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland.

response agencies. Given their established infrastructure, LFR units could lead a training cooperative in which the various organizations can cross train, share skill sets and reduce skill fade. By broadening the type of training and exercises to include interesting disaster relief skills LFR units could enhance training and increase recruiting. Reservists would also have the opportunity to develop skills in a variety of non-traditional specialities that would contribute to their military functions. In addition to these specialities, greater HDS responsibilities may make it feasible to develop of some specialist trades rarely recruited in the LFR i.e. power generation and distribution, water purification, construction and survey, and plumbing and heating. This training cooperative could also plan and supervise combined civilian-military disaster response exercises, including CBRN event simulations. Logically the lead in CBRN immediate response in Canada might be adopted by the LFR given that civilian training in CBRN remains a critical weakness. This would not only provide an essential regional CBRN capability but it would also broaden LF capabilities for combat operations.

The fourth recommendation is to maximize the impact of funding where possible by pooling equipment with non-military agencies much along the lines of the training cooperative recommended earlier. The cost of HDS related equipment is significant. For example, among the PSEPC budget allocations in 2001 two were very relevant to the LFR: “improve critical infrastructure protection, emergency preparedness and response and expand anti-terrorism capacity for the military (\$1.6 billion);” and, “increase chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) preparedness, including funding for equipment and training for first-responders (\$500 million).”⁴⁷ To ensure the units

⁴⁷ Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, *Backgrounder: Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada...*,n.p.

could support themselves while responding to HDS events LFR equipment establishments would still have to be increased. However the equipment needed for victims and to support other agencies, such as shelters, water purification units, power generating equipment, etc., could be commonly procured, stored and maintained using pooled budget resources. This would create another lead role opportunity for the LFR and, pending contributed funding, could substantiate a further increase in key support occupations within the LFR units. Large pools of equipment and material suited to disaster response may not be necessary in all locations. Regional pools similar to that maintained by the DART may be all that is required, a solution that might negate the requirement to enhance the DART for domestic operations.

Certainly the Canadian Forces should not fund this ambitious initiative on its own. The military share of the HDS capability including an increase in Reserve personnel, the upgrade of LFR equipment to meet the needs of LF operations, and specialist training is for the most part already earmarked in the LFRR project. The funding and authority for Reservist contracts and contingency funding readily accessible to local LFR commanders are essential to the success of this proposal.

The need for local contingency funds was previously noted by the SCRR in 1995:

In addition, we believe that the Canadian Forces' interest in enhancing the reserves' profile in the community is such that it warrants the creation of a special emergency fund that local reserve unit commanders could draw on when necessary in order to respond to local emergencies. A relatively modest amount (for example, \$1 million) would provide flexibility to reserve units across the land in assisting civilian authorities in often highly visible crises.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Department of National Defence, *The Report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves...*, 22

The LFR's involvement in HDS may necessitate nationwide budgetary control for LFR operations including a devolved operating budget managed by a "LFR Comptroller." If adopted this mechanism might also be used to provide a key national HDS service by using it to assist in HDS financial and materiel accountability.

By assigning the LFR a lead role in key aspects of HDS such as CM and by implementing the above recommendations the LFR can assist in providing PSEPC a much needed nationwide HDS coordination and response capability. Undoubtedly, this capability will enable the Government to better execute its six key security activities, those being: intelligence, emergency planning and management, public health emergencies, transportation security, border security, and international security.

Conclusion

In the preceding discussion it was shown that there are key capability shortfalls in national disaster response and that the core capabilities required can be satisfied in great part by the LFR in cooperation with local first-response agencies. The LFR is a national entity with capabilities unmatched by any outside of the Regular Force and the recommendations presented would enhance the role of the LFR enabling it to effectively lead natural and man-made disaster response and better assist in other HDS events throughout Canada. This evolution will require the LFR be given the authority to reorganize and work directly with all levels of government as well as the financial means to enhance capabilities beyond LFRR objectives. Enhanced legislation or regulations may also be required to protect Reservists who are required to assist in an emergency.

In conclusion the LFR should be assigned the responsibility, and be organized, funded, trained and equipped to address a critical HDS shortfall by generating the

organizational framework upon which a nationwide, Reserve Force led CM cooperative can be constructed. Furthermore, the LFR should also be made responsible for developing the capability to support the efforts of deploying military and civilian response agencies. The LFR can assume this lead role without detracting from its military augmentation and mobilization roles and in fact its capacity to satisfy these roles would be enhanced. This proposal is feasible and desirable, and, perhaps more importantly, there is no other immediately viable option. The LFR would welcome this mandate and it is firmly in line with the Army's objective of connecting with Canadians.

What remains to be seen is how this proposal will be accepted in the military and in government. Adjusting the LFR role has always been a sensitive and complex issue but the need get past this and move ahead on the LFR's involvement in Homeland Defence is underscored by the words of military historian Major General J.C.J. Fuller: "Adherence to dogma has destroyed more armies and cost more battles than anything in war."⁴⁹ Thus far, the progressive efforts of the LFRR have overcome the historical competition between the Regular and Reserve components of the LF and the new defence policy will undoubtedly renew momentum in the pursuit of sound HDS capabilities. That being said, the LFRR initiatives need to be broadened further to achieve this proposal. New asymmetric threats to Canada require new ways of doing business and the LFR is capable of contributing a far more to Homeland Defence and Security.

⁴⁹ J.F.C. Fuller, As quoted in *The CADRE Digest of Air Power Opinions and Thoughts*. Compiled by Lt Col Charles M. Westenhoff. (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, October 1990), 9; available from <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milquote.doc>; Internet; accessed 9 April 2005.

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Personal Interview

To assist in the preparation of this paper a personal interview was conducted with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret'd) John A. Selkirk, Executive Director, Reserves 2000 in Kingston, ON, on 14 March 2005.