

Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the [Communications Policy of the Government of Canada](#), you can request alternate formats on the "[Contact Us](#)" page.

Information archivée dans le Web

Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n'a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s'appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada.

Conformément à la [Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada](#), vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « [Contactez-nous](#) ».

ABSTRACT

CANADA: A MIDDLE POWER ESCAPING HIBERNATION

Canada's influence in the world is in decline. It can no longer live off its international reputation. Its status of Middle Power duly earned after World War II was effectively lost in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War. At the time, Canada withdrew itself and collected its peace dividend with the repatriation of the Canadian Forces from Europe to Canada. For their part, Australia, Japan and the European Union wasted no time and repositioned themselves in the new security environment. Today, Canada must also redefine and re-establish its position within the international order. It needs to develop its own security strategy to defend its global interests and promote a proud national identity. Canadians' high education and technological savvy are excellent qualities to build an agile and lethal but small military force. Canada has to move forward and earn a renewed reputation as the Middle Power of the 21st century.

CANADA: A MIDDLE POWER ESCAPING HIBERNATION

Canadians forged their worldwide reputation as peacekeepers when they headed the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) during the Suez Crisis in 1956.¹ Leading up to the intervention, Canada took an unprecedented stand and refused to side with the UK and France, standing tall as a Middle Power.² After this display of impartiality, the United Nations (UN) consistently sought and obtained Canada's support and leadership in subsequent peacekeeping missions. Decades later, Canada's presence abroad started to fade when it announced the repatriation of its army brigade and air group from NATO military forces stationed in Germany in 1992.³ Resolute, NATO countries maintained their average per capita expenditure on defence to *\$589 in 1998 (* funds in \$US throughout) while Canadians slowly disarmed themselves with receding expenditure per capita barely reaching \$265.⁴ Slowly at first, but becoming increasingly evident, Canada's influence over the international agenda had begun to decline. Its stretched and limited military capability could no longer fulfil Canadian's commitments abroad and was forced into an operational pause that started in August 2004.⁵

¹ United Nations, "First United Nations Emergency Force," http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unef1backgr2.html; Internet; accessed 22 April 2005.

² David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power: A study in Foreign Policy and International Relations* (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons Canada Limited, 1983), 1. "Emerging as a middle power with medium strength after WWII, Canada acted as a skilled diplomat in the pursuit of the central purpose of steadily constructing a more durable and just international order to all."

³ J.L. Granatstein, *Who killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Phyllis Bruce Books and HarperFlamingoCanada, 2004), 137.

⁴ Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2003), 47.

⁵ Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "An Update of Security Problems in Search of Solutions, December 2004," http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep03nov04part2-e.htm#_ftn1; Internet; accessed 10 April 2005. "Canada remains mired third last

In defence of the Chrétien Government which had been in power since 1993, officials such as Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy had granted that although Canada was purposely decreasing its defence expenditures, it would nevertheless still be able to exercise its international influence by adopting a leadership role in the development of worldwide peaceful initiatives. Although Ottawa experienced some success with the 1997 Landmines Treaty and the International Criminal Court (ICC), it was unable to convince the United States (US) to embrace these initiatives. And again, on February 20, 2003,⁶ Canada's Prime Minister Chrétien failed to convince US President Bush to postpone the invasion of Iraq by two weeks. In exchange for this unattractive proposal, Canada promised its full commitment to mediate the endorsement of a UN resolution in support of the invasion, should Baghdad ignore the plea to allow full access to international weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspectors within its borders.⁷ Conforming to its original deadline, the US led coalition launched Operation IRAQUI FREEDOM on March 19, 2003. Reflecting back on Chrétien's proposal, Canada had probably lost its legitimacy to offer constructive solutions but more seriously Canadians had lost their influence to defend their global interests with the US.⁸

among the twenty-six member countries, ahead of only Luxembourg and Iceland (which has no armed forces)".

⁶ David Ljunggren, "Canada Says will Push Iraq Compromise Plan at UN," http://www.sesresearch.com/news/in_the_news/Reuters%20February%2020%202003.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 April 2005.

⁷ Nihal Kaneira, "Canada Peace Bid May be UN Deal Breaker," <http://www.aljazeera.info/Opinion%20editorials/2003%20Opinion%20Editorials/March%202003%20op%20eds/Aljazeera%20Opinion%20Editorials,%20March%208,%202003/Canada%20peace%20bid%20may%20be%20UN%20deal%20breaker,%20by%20Nihal%20Kaneira,%20aljazeera.info%20Opinion%20eds.htm>; Internet; accessed 16 April 2005.

⁸ Geoffrey Hayes, "Middle Power in the New World Order," *Behind the Headlines, Canadian Institute of International Affairs*. (Winter 1993-94): 11.

It is argued that Canada's ability to influence the international community is at risk of degrading further if the Government limits itself to a softer diplomatic strategy without also reinforcing its potential means to intervene at least to a level that enables Canada to fulfil its international objectives. As such, Canada needs to regain its credibility by restoring its middle power status if it hopes to ensure that Canada's opinion remains valued within the international community specifically when it possess stability expertise to contribute to the security challenges of the 21st century.

This argument will be demonstrated first by discussing the decline of Canada's influence as it discreetly surrendered its Middle Power status in the post-Cold War. Secondly, during the same period, Canada's closest allies had adopted a responsible defence posture to protect their national interests and defend the international community's stability. A summary review of the various geopolitical situations of Australia, Japan, the European Union and the United States suggest that with its unique geographical isolation, Canada had even more freedom to act but was contented with less influence over the pursuit of its global and national interests. Finally, a confident Middle Power like Canada has the potential to assume a greater international role, one that seeks to significantly extend its security commitment in the promotion of well-founded Canadians values.

At the end of World War II, Canada's image was one of "a middle power with medium strength" upon which it built its credibility to voice its opinion and propose

options to solve international crisis.⁹ Canada's opinion mattered, because it was perceived as a regional power (a distinct concept from Middle Power¹⁰) with proportional strength in the commonly defined six elements of power which are: "economy, natural resources, political stability, military, population and territory."¹¹ Canada's interpretation of a Middle Power invited its involvement in international crisis during the 20th century. Since Middle Power is a vague expression with no "legal definition"¹², it has been inconsistently used to infer a nation's military strength, role, diplomacy and behaviour.

The term Middle Power resonates well in the defence environment if it is linked to the "military-security issue area"¹³ as it captures and narrows down a nation's military capacity to be medium and situated within a spectrum between Great Powers and Small Powers.¹⁴ While this description of Middle Power encapsulates several countries such as the "Netherlands, Argentina, Australia, Denmark, Poland, India, Brazil, Nigeria, Ukraine, Mexico, and Sweden", it does not distinctively differentiate Canada's international influence which is discussed further.¹⁵

⁹ Dewitt and Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power*. . . , 1. "Emerging as a middle power with medium strength after WWII, Canada acted as a skilled diplomat in the pursuit of the central purpose of steadily constructing a more durable and just international order to all."

¹⁰ Peter C. Dobell, "Canada's Search for New Roles," *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1972): 4. "Herman Kahn, lecturing at military audience in Ottawa in 1968, advanced that the world is divided into great, regional (distinct from Middle Power) and small powers."

¹¹ Joseph S. Nye, *"The American Colossus" from the Paradox of America Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Do Alone* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4.

¹² Hayes, Middle Power in the New World Order, 4.

¹³ Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993), 116.

¹⁴ Cooper, et al., *Relocating Middle Powers* . . . , 172.

Other proposed descriptions of the term ‘Middle Power’ used to capture the role, behaviour or type of diplomacy have been debated in the 20th century. In their book, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*, Cooper, Higgott and Nossal have emphasized the good behaviour of a Middle Power: “Their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of “good international citizenship” to guide their diplomacy”.¹⁶ Later, Nossal advanced that “first followship” is the best form of Middle Power diplomacy that is summarized as “a form of activity in which those actors loyally support the norms and rules of the international system and perform certain tasks to maintain and strengthen that system.”¹⁷ Nossal concedes that these types of behaviour and diplomacy to describe a Middle Power were mostly valid during the Cold War.¹⁸

Jennifer Welsh contracted by the Government of Canada to review the upcoming International Policy and introduce the “Canada-as-a-model-citizen concept in foreign policy”,¹⁹ rejects the restrictive notion of Middle Power to describe Canada’s behaviour, as “it doesn’t tell us much about what Canada wants to achieve through those means.”²⁰

¹⁵ C.P. David and S. Roussel, “Middle Power Blues: Canadian Policy and International Security After the Cold War,” *The American Review of Canadian Studies*. (1998): 134.

¹⁶ Cooper, et al., *Relocating Middle Powers* . . . , XXX.

¹⁷ Hayes, “Middle Power in the New World Order,” 12.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Alexandre Panetta, “PM Outsourced Source for National Unity,” <http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2005/02/04/pf-920837.html>: Internet; accessed 10 February 2005.

²⁰ Jennifer M. Welsh, “Canada in the 21st Century: Beyond Dominion and Middle Power,” *Behind the Headlines, Canadian Institute of International Affairs* (September 2004), 6.

This suggests that the definitions have become unduly prescriptive in describing the behaviour that a Middle Power ought to have. A simpler and more common definition should limit itself to David and Roussel's proposal: "A Middle Power is a state which has significant international and global interests and defends them by adopting a security and foreign policy style distinct from that of the Great Powers."²¹ With this definition of Middle Power, a nation still maintains its freedom to select policies that can best achieve its aim. It can also then support the "Canada-as-a-model-citizen concept". This definition of Middle Power is timeless and provides a common reference to discuss the best role, diplomacy or behaviour for a country like Canada that once had greater influence in the world and will be adopted throughout this paper.

With the end of the Cold War, Canada collected its peace dividend²² and sought to minimize its military forces but also its contribution in aid and diplomatic efforts directed at the stability of the international community. The repatriation of the Canadian Forces (CF) from Europe to Canada signalled that defence and security were "continentalized" or can best be illustrated as a form of isolationist limited to operate within North America.²³ The CF mobility was further restrained with the elimination of its strategic lift that fell as a casualty of previous budget cuts. This was the first time in

²¹ David and Roussel, "Middle Power Blues . . . , 135.

²² Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 165. "The first major reductions were announced in the April 1989 budget. This was the post-cold war 'peace dividend' budget, which reduced the defence budget by \$2.7 billions over five years, resulting in base closures and the cancellation of major equipment programs."

²³ David G. Haglund, "The Comparative "Continentalization" of Security and Defence Policy in North America and Europe: Canada Multilateralism in a Unipolar World?" *Journal of Canadian Studies*, Volume 38, no.2 (Spring 2004): 12.

forty years that Canadians would no longer be operating from a preposition location with “ready-force” in Europe. The principal advantage of this withdrawal was to appease Canada’s “post-industrial society” which became focused on its own welfare over the widespread human suffering taking place in other part of the world.²⁴

As Canadians minimized their international expenditures, they also subdued their international pledge to make a difference in the world as they once did in the hype of the 1956 Suez Crisis.²⁵ Whereas before, Canada could provide aid to other nations because it had been investing a significant portion of its GDP on defence and security.²⁶ It also had more flexibility and could count on its own aircraft carrier, the HMCS Magnificent, to deploy its contingent. Canada’s impressive credibility as peacekeepers was reinforced by the display of a strong military presence abroad. For example in 1965, 1920 soldiers were deployed on peacekeeping missions with an additional military force of 22,815 personnel posted overseas.²⁷

Whereas today, Canada only spends 1.1 percent of its GDP on Defence.²⁸ The resources shortfall in the area of strategic lift puts the CF in a subordinate position unable to fulfil its commitment in a timely manner as it waits to receive a priority for

²⁴ Nye, “*The American Colossus*” from *the Paradox of America Power*. . . , 6.

²⁵ Dewitt and Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power*. . . , 21.

²⁶ Cohen, *While Canada Slept*. . . , 60. “In 1953, Canada spent 7.3 % of GDP on Defence.”

²⁷ *Ibid* , 71.

²⁸ CIA, “CIA World Factbook,” <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ca.html>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2005.

deployment abroad by the force providing the lift.²⁹ Even if Canada announced its participation on OP APOLLO in Afghanistan in November 2001, it would take almost ninety days before the Canadian Contingent had access to strategic lift.³⁰ Of the six ships that were sent to support the operations in Afghanistan, three had to come back for lack of support.³¹ In their 2002 Report, *To secure a Nation*, the Council for Canadian Security articulated their urgent concerns to the government, specifically:

. . . A loss of sovereignty over our national agenda; diminishing capacity to make policy choice; a loss of status within the international community; marginalization in NATO and NORAD as the European are looking inward for security and the US develops its National missile defence system; difficulty affording and sustaining the military and alliance commitment of the future.³²

Canada still benefits from a higher economic international profile, merely by maintaining the illusion of success through its participation on the “G-8 highest council of world affairs”.³³ At the same time it posted a reduced aid program to “its lowest level in thirty-seven years, in 2001, placing Canada third-last of the twenty-two donor

²⁹ Cohen, *While Canada Slept*. . . , 57. “It is the American resources that dictate when we are going to move and join the fight”.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 56. “Ottawa announced it would send troops to Afghanistan on November 14. A 1000 members of 3 PPCLI were put on 48 hrs NTM, but 2 days, 2 weeks, 2 months none had left, the Canadian troop did not begin arriving until February, almost ninety days later.”

³¹ *Ibid.*, 57.

³² *Ibid.*, 48.

³³ Derek H. Burney, “A Time for Courage and Conviction in Foreign Policy - February 2005,” <http://www.irpp.org/fr/po/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2005, 1.

countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development”.³⁴ Even today, it remains as low as \$ 1.6 billion (0.23 per cent of its GDP).³⁵ Reducing its military and aid program, the government chose to introduce a new strategy to influence other countries based on the currency of its soft power “to co-opt” other nations “rather than coerce them”.³⁶ Stressing Canadian prosperity, health, higher education, political and personal freedom, and openness to multiculturalism as its source of soft power,³⁷ Foreign Affairs Minister Axworthy could comfortably propose a Canadian international human security agenda:

The basic premise of that agenda has been that security concerns should be evaluated primarily on the basis of the well-being of people rather than the physical security of states.³⁸

With this agenda, Canada ventures to engage the International Community attempting to sell the merit of a high moral standard. Although some significant progress was made on military arms-controls policy, international landmines treaty, child-soldiers, NATO nuclear deterrence strategy, International Criminal Court,³⁹ it did not prevent independent observers to conclude that this affordable soft power program was first and foremost convenient for a government that sought to limit its international expenditures.

³⁴ Cohen, *While Canada Slept*. . . , 29.

³⁵ CIA, “CIA World Factbook,” <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ca.html>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2005.

³⁶ Nye, “*The American Colossus*” from *the Paradox of America Power*. . . , 8-9.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 11.

³⁸ Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, “Canada and the Use of Force – Reclaiming Human Security,” *International Journal Volume LIX*, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 249.

³⁹ Tom Keating, *Canada and the World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*. (2nd ed. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002), 206.

To recommend policies to better the human living conditions might be initiatives that will have a lasting effect but it has no immediate value for combatants and non-combatants trapped in the middle of a conflict such as the former Yugoslavia or Kosovo.⁴⁰ The Chrétien government may have pursued high moral objectives to appease the different interest groups, but it did not seem to have the courage to govern and ask Canadians to do better. Canadians are becoming irrelevant in the security area and have been criticized as inappropriately showing “high moral standards from a safe distance.”⁴¹ In the new security environment where hard power has currency, Canadians must be prepared to do much more than they are doing today.⁴²

In his book, “*While Canada Slept*”, Cohen advanced that the joint effect of Canadian military power, its foreign aid, and diplomatic corps is “less effective than a generation ago”.⁴³ He also quotes John Manley for his brutal observation:

We have lived off our reputation, as donor, diplomat, and soldiers for years. No longer. The bill is coming due. Our development assistance, which should be giving us credibility in the Third World, as well as giving us standing in newly emerging nations, is too broad and too thin to yield real influence anymore; our spending, as measured by our peers, is simply an

⁴⁰ Tom Keating, *Canada and the World Order*. . . , 219. Speaking of Kosovo: “Soft power has its place but it can’t curb terrorism, civil strife or aggression.”

⁴¹ Robert Greenhill, “The Decline Of Canada’s Influence In The World — What Is To Be Done For It?” <http://www.irpp.org/ft/po/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2005, 36.

⁴² Cohen, *While Canada Slept*. . . , 198. “fight wars, keep the peace, help the world’s poor, and act as a moderator, a mediator, and an architect of international institutions”.

⁴³ *Ibid.* , 22.

embarrassment. Our armed forces cannot honour our commitments in war or in peace.⁴⁴

It is contended that Canada has faded as a Middle Power with insufficient military forces to fulfil its commitments which can not be counter balanced with the unattractiveness of its soft power. If Canada wants to be influential in the world, it must regenerate a strong combination of three sources of power – military, economic, and soft to support its global interests.⁴⁵ What is apparent is that sovereignty for nations with exposed territorial borders continues to be supported by significant military expenditures.⁴⁶ As will be seen later, Canada's region is relatively secure within the globe.

A cursory review of the geopolitical situation affecting Australia, Japan, European Union and US will provide some clues on the global reality afflicting these regions. These allies reinvested their peace dividend into their own regional stability also serving to improve the international stability. They have a sense of their national identity. They remained active in their foreign affairs program to protect their international credibility contrary to Canada. Each of their security postures has been adopted to match the constraints that are partly present and can be used to identify policy options for Canada.

Australia continues to be recognized as a Middle Power that possesses regional powers to defend its principal national interests within Southeast Asia. Australia and

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 197.

⁴⁵ Nye, "*The American Colossus*" from *the Paradox of America Power*. . . , 12.

⁴⁶ Cohen, *While Canada Slept*. . . , 26.

Canada share a similar past as former Dominions of UK with an extensive network of international relations. Australia's density is lower, with a population two-thirds the strength of Canada's.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, Australia spends 50 percent more annually on defence than Canada.⁴⁸ In the 1980s, to limit their vulnerability to the downfall of the US market, Australia along with Canada sought to diversify their source of trade within the international system.⁴⁹ Australia has a negotiated military cooperation with the US, in contrast to Canada who has taken the US collaboration for granted.

After the Soviet Union collapse, the strategic environment of Australia and the Asian-Pacific region became more complex with tensions rising between India and Pakistan, Japan, China, Taiwan, East-Timor and Indonesia.⁵⁰ To maintain its situational awareness, the Australian government adopted a new 'Whole-of-Nation' strategic approach that integrates the economic, politic and military elements in a clear set of policy statements on security matters.⁵¹ This concept appears to have been later borrowed by Canada and relabelled as '3D'.⁵² This joint effort through the Department of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Immigration and multicultural and Indigenous Affairs may have facilitated Australia's change of strategic defence framework from a

⁴⁷ CIA, "CIA World Factbook," <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/au.html>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2005. Australia's population is 20 million over a landmass of 7.7 million sq km.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Australia spends \$14,1 billion (2.8 % of its GDP).

⁴⁹ Cooper, et al., *Relocating Middle Powers* . . . , 136.

⁵⁰ Major N.H. Stanton, "Australia's Emergence as a Middle Power in the Asia-Pacific Region," (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course Master of Defence Studies, 2003), 53.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁵² Office of the Prime Minister, "A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (October 5, 2004)," <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/sft-ddt.asp>; Internet; accessed 16 April 2005.

continental posture called ‘Self-Reliance’ to ‘Forward Response’.⁵³ Later, with the frustrations surrounding the UN deliberations against the invasion of Iraq, Australia has proclaimed that it will invest its security efforts on supporting multilateral initiatives such as ‘coalitions of the willing’ and ‘partnerships with like-minded states’.⁵⁴ Australia is a determined Middle Power that has taken the necessary measures to defend its global and national interest.

Across the Pacific Ocean in Northeast Asia, Japan is no longer just an economic power but also is emerging as a strong regional military power. Along with Australia, it is exposed to increased security risks within the Asian-Pacific region. With 127 million citizens, Japan is four times the size of Canada’s population.⁵⁵ The Japanese have become characterized as pacifist but generously distributed \$7 billion in foreign aid.⁵⁶ As a result of the 1951 San Francisco Accord, a defeated Japan agreed to the basing rights of 110,000 US Forces soldiers to ensure its collective security and the protection of its immediate territory.⁵⁷ As part of the same Accord, the Japan Self Defence Forces (SDF) has been restricted to military expenditures not exceeding one percent of its GDP which

⁵³ Stanton, *Australia’s Emergence as a Middle Power* . . . , 69.

⁵⁴ Department of National Defence, *Strategic Assessment 2003* (Ottawa, 2003), 74.

⁵⁵ CIA, “CIA World Factbook,” <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ja.html>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2005.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Yutaka Kawashima, *Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty-First Century* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 26.

is approximately the same self-imposed ratio as the unmilitary Canadians.⁵⁸ Meanwhile a portion of the Japanese population is becoming more critical of the US unilateral attitude toward the larger global initiatives such as the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court and Operation IRAQUI FREEDOM.⁵⁹ They are also growing disgruntled with their current security posture, as it is perceived to be a shield from which the US can project its global power in the Asian-Pacific region.⁶⁰ Concurrently, these proud Japanese people see their role expanding to internationalism in the new security framework and began with the authorization to deploy 850 SDF personnel to assist with the post war reconstruction in South Iraq and Kuwait.⁶¹ Although it lacks operational experience and a joint force doctrine, the SDF is a highly modernized armed force with the capability to extend its range by sea to the Indian Ocean⁶² and by air with AWACS and strategic tankers for in-flight refuelling.⁶³

Across the Atlantic Ocean, the European Union region continues to have an influence in Canadian internal politics since it has been a traditional source of immigration to Canada. The European Union is constituted of 25 countries comprised of

⁵⁸ CIA, "CIA World Factbook," <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ja.html>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2005. Total Japanese budget is \$ 42.3 billion while Canada's budget is \$ 9.8 billion..

⁵⁹ Kawashima, *Japanese Foreign Policy*. . . , 52.

⁶⁰ Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions* (Boulder London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 148.

⁶¹ Department of National Defence, *Strategic Assessment 2004*, 80.

⁶² Kawashima, *Japanese Foreign Policy*. . . , 42.

⁶³ Hughes, *Japan Security Agenda*. . . , 148.

a total population of 460 million persons (fifteen times larger than Canada).⁶⁴ Formed as a regional economic union, it is an economic giant of the same magnitude as the US.⁶⁵ Several member states are simultaneously part of NATO and the EU; nonetheless, the EU has evolved to develop its own mutual defence policy under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to guide its response to meet an eventual non-NATO threat.⁶⁶ Like most Western countries, it is facing the threats of: “Terrorism, the proliferation of weapon of mass destruction and organized crime associated with failed states”.⁶⁷ The EU can defend itself with approximately 1.5 million soldiers in the Continental Europe, however only 10 percent can deploy on combat missions abroad.⁶⁸ Moreover similar to Canada, it has significant shortfalls in “strategic lift, intelligence and precision guided missile”, but seems to be poised to overcome these deficiencies.⁶⁹ The US unilateral action during IRAQUI FREEDOM may have added some strain to the EU unity; however, at the same time it has ignited a renewed incentive to develop an operational framework for the EU to react outside of NATO’s purview.⁷⁰ To obtain a consensus with the larger size of its membership, the EU may find itself constrained to internationalist mission that aim to stabilize through a multilateral approach rather than an energetic and

⁶⁴ CIA, “CIA World Factbook,” <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ee.html>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2005.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Its GDP is \$11 trillion.

⁶⁶ Robert M. Cutler and Alexander Von Lingen, “The European Parliament and the European Union Security and Defence Policy,” *European Security Volume* 12, no 2 (Summer 2003): 6.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 17. “Secure Europe in a Better World” June 2003.

⁶⁸ Rob De Wijk, “The Reform of ESDP and EU-NATO Cooperation,” *The International Spectator*, Volume 39, no. 1 (January-March 2004): 3.

⁶⁹ Cutler and Lingen. “The European Parliament . . . , 13.

⁷⁰ De Wijk, The Reform of ESDP and EU-NATO Cooperation, 1.

crushing military response imposed by short timelines.⁷¹ Due to its past, Canadian public opinion may side with the EU internationalism but the difference will be their freedom to chose their own approach, bilateralism, multilateralism or internationalism.

To the South, the United States, the most powerful country in the world, is Canada's closest neighbour. It possesses an abundant reserve of all three essential sources of power – economic, military and soft power to influence the global agenda. It has a population of 293 million persons (10 times larger than Canada).⁷² Its economic aid, as a donor, approaches Japan with \$ 6.9 billion.⁷³ It spends 3.3 percent of its GDP on military expenditures which is 3,700 percent more than Canada.⁷⁴ The US has the capability and the will to defend its global and national interest through several bilateral and multilateral arrangements or unilaterally if needed.⁷⁵ Nonetheless, its power is not limitless; if it had to defend itself against too many threats simultaneously it would be forced to address them with the support of its permanent alliances (Japan, Korea, NATO) or through the formation of a coalition.⁷⁶ It has decisively demonstrated that it will not hesitate to use military means if its vital interests are threatened.⁷⁷ The US has often behaved in a manner to benefit others as well as itself, but if its interest grows to become too narrow

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁷² CIA, "CIA World Factbook," <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2005.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, US Defence expenditures are \$371 billion compare to \$9.8 billion annually for Canada.

⁷⁵ Department of National Defence, *Strategic Assessment 2003*, 17.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ De Wijk, *The Reform of ESDP and EU-NATO Cooperation*, 4.

and ‘bully’ its way around, as it has been perceived during IRAQUI FREEDOM, it risks promoting the creation of independent resentful coalitions that can operate with its own agenda.⁷⁸ The US does not possess the monopoly on the usage of soft power as was demonstrated by its inability to prevent the endorsement of the Ottawa Landmine Treaty and the ICC.⁷⁹

To the North and within its borders, Canada is responsible for its own security and must continue to do whatever is necessary to defend its sovereignty but also to prevent becoming a base for threats to its allies.⁸⁰ It is a daunting task for a population of 32 million people to protect a landmass of 10 million square kilometres.⁸¹ Now that the Soviet threat is neutralized, Canadians naively accept their comfortable safety and openly engage in multilateral dialogues free of inter-state warfare, unnoticeably losing their sense of national identity. Canadians have become complacent as they envision a promising future through the globalization of societies and their economic interdependence thereby minimizing the preventive security role of the state.⁸² Canada’s geographical isolation helps in reinforcing this perception. Canada must never forget to be prepared as a non-pacifist nation. It proved it in the past when a large share of its

⁷⁸ Nye, “*The American Colossus*” from *the Paradox of America Power*. . . , 15.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁸⁰ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy* (Ottawa, 2004), 5.

⁸¹ CIA, “CIA World Factbook,” <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ca.html>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2005.

⁸² Department of National Defence, *Strategic Assessment 2003*, 15.

citizen fought during World War I and World War II with respectively 7.5 percent and 10 percent of its population.⁸³

Canada is not exempted of the global threats discussed earlier which could originate from outside of its borders.⁸⁴ It is therefore paramount that stringent security posture no different than its allies be adopted by Canada to protect its way of life. The recommendations of the April 2004 National Security Policy titled: “Securing an Open Society”, provide a start point to implement domestic measures that would be well complemented with the ability to intervene outside of its borders.⁸⁵ Urgent investments are required for this role as the Chrétien government permitted successive budget reduction on defence and security to the point where it had to take an operational pause.⁸⁶ Canada has the ability to generate power for its own regional protection but also with the intent to defend its national interest abroad.⁸⁷ Canada may have a smaller recruiting pool, but the highly educated and technological savvy of Canadians can be turned into an advantageous military edge. That strength concentrated into a smaller force has the potential to generate more agile and lethal forces that could match the performance of elements of other modern forces such as Japan or the US.⁸⁸

⁸³ Cohen, *While Canada Slept*. . . , 40. 600,000 soldiers for WWI and 1,100,00 for WWII.

⁸⁴ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society* . . . , 6.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994), 15.

⁸⁷ Dobell, *Canada’s Search for New Roles*, 4.

⁸⁸ Elinor C. Sloan. *Revolution in Military Affairs*. p. 141.

Canadians need to regain their credibility with the US as a priority since it is a matter of national interest. Canada depends heavily on the bilateral arrangement between the two countries both for trade and security. Access to the enormous US market through a common undefended border is essential for Canadians to maintain their living standard. Deplorably, the carefree and unmilitary image portrayed by Canadians has an undesirable side effect. It creates doubt as to their ability to prevent the onset of major crisis and to protect its open society. This irresponsibility at home implies that someone else, plausibly the US, needs to be prepared to intervene. Canadians were wrongfully blamed for their carelessness and probable role in the event leading to 9/11 or the August 2003 electrical outage in the US Northeast region and in Ontario.⁸⁹

A crucial acknowledgement was made when the government issued its National Security intentions, which provided a framework where for the first time the activities of several departments were integrated into a policy to enhance homeland security.⁹⁰ The obvious benefit was to confirm that Canada is serious about its own protection but also that it values its economic and security relationships with the US.⁹¹ To minimize its ‘troop to task’, Canada needs to pursue fiercely the integration of its capability within a CANUS continental security system. The Ballistic Missile Defence Program was worth

⁸⁹ PBS Online News Hour, “Power outage,” http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/fedagencies/july-dec03/blackouts_08-14.html; Internet; accessed 15 April 2005.

⁹⁰ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society* . . .

⁹¹ Office of the Prime Minister, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* (October 5, 2004). <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/sft-ddt.asp>. Internet accessed March 2005.

consideration in this endeavour.⁹² The ensuing relief in security forces could then be applied to defend national interests in other region of interest. Whether the national interests in other region converge or diverge becomes a matter of national prerogative.

Canada is ready to renew its international engagement by assuming a greater role in the world.⁹³ It must first identify its global and national interest abroad and how it will achieve them. The balance of international power is shifting with the emergence of regional powers throughout several continents except Africa. In North America, Canada has occasionally needed its military power for domestic operations but doesn't have a dedicated and permanent requirement. Therefore operating in Africa could be a consideration if Canada judged it to be in the pursuit of its global and national interest, within the realm of a Middle Power. It would do more than provide judicious advice to countries that desperately need assistance.

The 1994 White Paper envisioned that Canadian contribution to international peace and stability was better achieved through multilateral efforts.⁹⁴ The concept of collective defence has been to increase Canadian contribution in UN, and multilateral operations.⁹⁵ NATO used to be a multilateral security institution of choice, but its future is at stake after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Canada may be a country that needed

⁹² CBC News Online, "Introduction: Indepth Ballistic Missile Defence," http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/us_missiledefence/; Internet; accessed 16 April 2005.

⁹³ Office of the Prime Minister. "A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (October 5, 2004)," <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/sft-ddt.asp>; Internet; accessed 16 April 2005.

⁹⁴ Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 27.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 49.

NATO more than others and was glad to have the former Canadian CDS, General Henault named as chairman of the NATO military committee (the only other Canadian to hold this position was Admiral Robert Falls in 1980-83).⁹⁶ If NATO transformation is unsuccessful, Canada will need to investigate on other multilateral options. The selection of a mission has political ramification in Canada and consideration must be taken to address the different ethnic groups.⁹⁷ But sadly this doesn't mean to refuse most missions or to be satisfied like the Chrétien government tendencies with Canadians remaining a contributor not a leader of missions using its "multi-purpose, combat-capable forces". This stand-by approach only produces a marginal influence on the conduct of an operation. The size of the force made available by Canada would also be proportional to the national influence over a mission.

Multilateral missions contain pitfalls for smaller contributors. In a US led mission, Canada will likely obtain strategic lift support to go abroad, but it needs to conform to the US prioritize schedule.⁹⁸ The same situation prevails when a political coalition has been formed. The larger coalition leader has the ability to modify the conduct of the operation to suit its own preference with little consideration for the smaller

⁹⁶ CTV.ca, "Canada's Gen. Ray Henault Named to Key NATO Post," http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1100694511241_254?s_name=&no_ads; Internet; accessed 16 April 2005.

⁹⁷ Cooper, et al., *Relocating Middle Powers* . . . , 134.

⁹⁸ Cohen, *While Canada Slept* . . . , 57.

contributor, like Canada.⁹⁹ If Canada considers enhancing its influence abroad it needs to “build capacity in itself and in other members of the international community”.¹⁰⁰

A possible option is for a Middle Power like Canada to seek “an active leadership role in building a coalition” that will conduct stability operations.¹⁰¹ With their experience, Canadians could confidently assume a leading role in a multilateral organization (Suez, Bosnia, Eritrea, Haiti, Afghanistan). They have their military expertise to offer, but also they will likely be reinforced by Canada’s new commitment for effectiveness with an integration of its policies that includes Defence, Diplomacy, Development and Trade (3D).¹⁰² This additional support from diplomats and aid workers is a new dimension that recognizes that however essential a military force can be, it will not be sufficient by itself to bring a lasting peace in an area of operation.¹⁰³

Joint operations within the military and also the development of an effective interface with non-state actors and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) is a requirement in the new security environment.¹⁰⁴ NGO’s have often led governments and should be recognized for their growing capabilities in the globalization of the world.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁹ Cooper, et al., *Relocating Middle Powers* . . . , 118.

¹⁰⁰ Welsh, “Canada in the 21st Century . . .”, 11.

¹⁰¹ Cooper, et al., *Relocating Middle Powers* . . . , 117.

¹⁰² Office of the Prime Minister, “A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (October 5, 2004),” <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/sft-ddt.asp>; Internet; accessed 16 April 2005.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Hayes, “Middle Power in the New World Order,” 11.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

The leadership and soft power of the NGOs will increasingly become important if the current economic and social trends continue.¹⁰⁶ NGOs are not alone, Canadians also have a “commitment to pluralism and human rights”, and they can make a difference to ease the suffering that is caused by the conflicts of the 21st century.¹⁰⁷ The government need to put in place strategies to engage Canadians so that they feel personally involved and become committed to a promising future within a Canada that has influence out of proportion to its relative size.¹⁰⁸ The politicians have the most crucial role; they have to govern and remind Canadians that their heritage is not one of a neutral or pacifist nation.¹⁰⁹

Conclusion

To date, Canada’s influence is in decline and has been at an accelerated pace since the 1990’s. It had already lost its Middle Power status when it advocated that its soft power was of sufficient calibre to have a global influence as ‘an actor on the world stage’. But by all accounts, soft power used alone is a losing strategy. To restore its credibility, Canada will need to be seen to do a lot more by proceeding with direct intervention and provide assistance to ‘nations in duress’. Canada must decide on taking its own direction and recover its Middle Power status amongst the other regional powers.

¹⁰⁶ Nye, “*The American Colossus*” from *the Paradox of America Power*. . . , 12.

¹⁰⁷ Office of the Prime Minister, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*. . .

¹⁰⁸ Desmond Morton, *Canada and War: A Military and Political History* (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981), 2.

¹⁰⁹ Cohen, *While Canada Slept*. . . , 60.

Australia has decided to remain active internationally with a bilateral arrangement with the US for collective defence in the Asian-Pacific area. It has extended its region of interest to the Indian Ocean. Its foreign strategy is amenable to decisive multilateral initiatives that operate under the framework of a “coalition of the willing.” In the same region, Japan is responsible for its own self-protection also with a bilateral arrangement with the US. Its public opinion shows signs that it wants Japan to become more engaged in internationalism through multilateral organization like the UN. For its part, the EU is currently addressing its security challenges through NATO, however it is slowly building up its own permanent multilateral organization for the conduct of independent security operations. The tendency of diverse EU will be towards internationalism as it offers a better chance to obtain a consensus in the selection of critical stability operations. All these nations have adopted their unique security posture to reposition themselves.

It is time for Canada to escape hibernation and reclaim its place within the international order. Canada has lived off its residual influence for too long. It has to fulfil its sovereignty obligation and promote its national identity. In the short term, to protect its high living conditions, it needs to gain credibility with the US. Then, resume its own international leadership activities with the purpose of defending its global and national interests. The Middle power status needs to be earned day by day. How Canada sees itself in tomorrow’s world needs to be prominently articulated and pursued.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Bland, Douglas L. and Sean M. Maloney. *Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *1994 Defence White Paper*. Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Strategic Assessment 2003*. Ottawa, 2003.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Strategic Assessment 2004*. Ottawa, 2004.
- Canada. Privy Council Office. *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*. Ottawa, 2004.
- Cohen, Andrew. *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2003.
- Cooper, Andrew F., Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal. *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993.
- Dewitt, David B. and John J. Kirton. *Canada as a Principal Power: A study in Foreign Policy and International Relations*. Toronto: John Wiley & Sons Canada Limited, 1983.
- Granatstein, J.L. *Who killed the Canadian Military?* Toronto: Phyllis Bruce Books and HarperFlamingoCanada, 2004.
- Hughes, Christopher W. *Japan Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions*. Boulder London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.
- Kawashima, Yutaka. *Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty-First Century*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
- Keating, Tom. *Canada and the World Order: The Multilaterist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*. 2nd ed. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Morton, Desmond. *Canada and War: A Military and Political History*. Toronto: Butterworths, 1981.
- Nye, Joseph S. *"The American Colossus" from the Paradox of America Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Do Alone*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Sloan, Elinor C. "Canada and the RMA." *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002, 123-142.

Stanton, Major N.H. "Australia's Emergence as a Middle Power in the Asia-Pacific Region." Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course Master of Defence Studies, 2003.

Periodicals

Brunnée, Jutta and Stephen J. Toope. "Canada and the Use of Force – Reclaiming Human Security." *International Journal Volume LIX*, no. 2 (Spring 2004).

Cutler, Robert M. and Alexander Von Lingen. "The European Parliament and the European Union Security and Defence Policy." *European Security Volume 12*, no 2 (Summer 2003).

David, C.P. and S. Roussel. "Middle Power Blues: Canadian Policy and International Security After the Cold War." *The American Review of Canadian Studies*. (1998).

De Wijk, Rob. "The Reform of ESDP and EU-NATO Cooperation." *The International Spectator, Volume 39*, no. 1 (January-March 2004).

Dobell, Peter C. "Canada's Search for New Roles." *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972.

Hayes, Geoffrey. "Middle Power in the New World Order." *Behind the Headlines, Canadian Institute of International Affairs*. (Winter 1993-94).

Haglund, David G. "The Comparative "Continentalization" of Security and Defence Policy in North America and Europe: Canada Multilateralism in a Unipolar World?" *Journal of Canadian Studies, Volume 38*, no.2 (Spring 2004).

Welsh, Jennifer M. "Canada in the 21st Century: Beyond Dominion and Middle Power." *Behind the Headlines, Canadian Institute of International Affairs*. (September 2004).

Electronic Sources

Burney, Derek H. "A Time for Courage and Conviction in Foreign Policy - February 2005." <http://www.irpp.org/fr/po/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2005.

CBC News Online. "Introduction: Indepth Ballistic Missile Defence." http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/us_missiledefence/; Internet; accessed 16 April 2005.

- CIA. "CIA World Factbook." <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>; Internet; accessed 10 April 2005.
- CTV.ca. "Canada's Gen. Ray Henault Named to Key NATO Post." http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1100694511241_254?s_name=&no_ads; Internet; accessed 16 April 2005.
- Greenhill, Robert. "The Decline Of Canada's Influence In The World — What Is To Be Done For It?" <http://www.irpp.org/fr/po/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2005.
- Kaneira, Nihal. "Canada Peace Bid May be UN Deal Breaker." <http://www.aljazeera.info/Opinion%20editorials/2003%20Opinion%20Editorials/March%202003%20op%20eds/Aljazeera%20Opinion%20Editorials,%20March%2008,%202003/Canada%20peace%20bid%20may%20be%20UN%20deal%20breaker,%20by%20Nihl%20Kaneira,%20aljazeera.info%20Opion%20eds.htm>; Internet; accessed 16 April 2005.
- Ljunggren, David. "Canada Says will Push Iraq Compromise Plan at UN." http://www.sesresearch.com/news/in_the_news/Reuters%20February%2020%202003.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 April 2005.
- Panetta, Alexandre. "PM Outsourced Source for National Unity." <http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2005/02/04/pf-920837.html>; Internet; accessed 10 February 2005.
- PBS Online News Hour. "Power outage." http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/fedagencies/july-dec03/blackouts_08-14.html; Internet; accessed 15 April 2005.
- Office of the Prime Minister. "A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (October 5, 2004)." <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/sft-ddt.asp>; Internet; accessed 16 April 2005.
- Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. "An Update of Security Problems in Search of Solutions, December 2004." http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep03nov04part2-e.htm#_ftn1; Internet; accessed 10 April 2005.
- United Nations. "First United Nations Emergency Force." http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unef1backgr2.html; Internet; accessed 22 April 2005.