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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
CSC 31 / CCEM 31

EXERCISE NEW HORIZONS

MAKING THE MOST OF CANADA'S RESERVE FORCES IN THE POST 9-11
ENVIRONMENT

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La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

Canada's Reserves have a long history and are the founders of many of Canada's proudest military traditions. They are firmly at the centre of the national military consciousness since the reserves contributed an overwhelming preponderance of the forces for the Boer War, Two World Wars and the Korean War. Much has changed in the intervening half century since Canada's Reserves were the core of the fighting services. The world has changed from the multi-polar world through the first fifty years of the last century to the bi-polar world of the cold war that dominated the latter half of the last century. The end of the cold war precipitated a process of reaping the "peace dividend" and that, coupled with an enormous public debt, resulted in substantial cuts to the Canadian Forces. This new reality of reduction forced a review of the Canadian forces structure that resulted in the 1994 White Paper of Defence titled "Challenge and Commitment". As a result of the reductions and the emphasis on a "total Force" that the 1994 White Paper emphasised, a series of reviews of and changes to the reserve structure were started. These changes were implemented in various ways by the three services with varying degrees of success. A decade later this process is nowhere near complete and the seemingly endless reviews of what role the reserves are to play continues. The attack by Al Qaeda on the United States on 11 September 2001, and the post-cold war transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement by the Canadian Forces in a resource constrained era, has forced the regular forces into a joint transformation and if Canada is to fulfill its role as a significant player on the world stage, the reserves must do likewise. "Transformation focuses on people, technology, ways of conducting operations and ways of thinking. It does not seek to re-structure the CF completely, or re-equip it, but rather to blend existing and emerging systems and structures to create greatly enhanced

capabilities relevant to future missions, roles and tasks”¹. If Canada’s reserves are to remain relevant to Canada’s national security, they must radically transform to the new post cold war joint reality, or become an expensive, anachronistic luxury absorbing badly needed funding.

This paper will examine the current individual service stovepiped restructuring efforts of the reserves and early efforts at transformation that have had varying degrees of success. As a result of recent security threats, new policies have been implemented that are the drivers of the need for transformation and as a result there are new roles and responsibilities for the Canadian Forces and in particular the reserves. This paper will then examine what these new roles are as defined in the new National Security Policy, and how the reserves need to be jointly changed in order to satisfy the government’s direction. The reserves, as currently structured, meet the needs of the individual service’s visions, but each is structured differently in terms of their roles as augmentation forces, full time roles or as a mobilisation base. The reasons for this structure will be examined and a joint organisational vision proposed. In order to provide perspective on transformation of the reserves, examples from how other countries reserves are structured and what steps they have taken in restructuring will be examined. In the final section, this paper will then illustrate the need for job protection legislation to make Canada’s reserves truly effective in the post cold war world.

¹Department of National Defence, *Annual Report of the Chief of Defence Staff 2003-2004* (Ottawa: ADM (PA), 2004) 3.

This section of the paper will review what steps the three individual services have taken to restructure the reserves since the end of the cold war and the degrees of success that have been achieved. The three services, Navy, Air Force and Army have each taken their own individual approach to restructuring their reserve forces independent of each other. Of the three services, the Navy has transformed most dramatically, moving from a mobilisation force with extremely limited capabilities, to a viable coastal defence force exclusively manning 12 Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV) on a near full-time basis. As a result, the Naval Reserve is generally considered to be in good shape². The Air Reserve is the smallest reserve component of the services with an authorised paid ceiling of 1800 personnel. Air Reserves man two Squadrons of Griffon helicopters, contribute a number of pilots to CFB Trenton's transport squadrons and the remainder are augmentees to various squadrons and headquarters (consisting primarily of ex-regular force members). The Air Force was supposed to have instituted a Reserve Contingency Support Wing consisting of an airfield engineer squadron, a medical squadron, a rapid runway repair flight and an administrative flight; as of 1995 the two airfield engineering flights numbered only 26 personnel³. To date, little progress has been made on expanding these capabilities. The Army Reserve or Militia is the largest of the three (four including Communications Reserves) reserve components with a paid ceiling of 15000 personnel, recently increased to 18500 personnel. The Army reserve has also had the most challenges restructuring. The Army Reserve is currently structured on 14 area commands consisting of 133 Army Reserve units in 125 cities and towns across Canada. The Army reserves consist of infantry, armoured, artillery, combat engineer, and logistics

² *Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves*. The Right Honorable Brian Dickson, Chairman (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1995), 24.

³ *Ibid*, 39-40.

units. Signals Units come from the Communications Reserve and Medical Units from the Health Services Reserve. This structure is the rough equivalent of 7 Brigade groups in form but not numbers⁴. The Regular Army has been highly dependant on the Army reserve to make up numbers on its operational deployments. On some overseas deployments reserves made up from 20-40 percent of the strength of the deployed units⁵. Based on those figures, it would be easy to assume that the Army Reserve was structured to augment the Regular Force. While the reserves do augment the Regular Force, it is done piecemeal as opposed to formed units with the Army Reserve treated as a vital manpower pool by the Regular Army. Army Reserve units number from 4 -264 personnel (1995) but are structured as Regiments or portions of Regiments (Companies and Platoons) not based on the number of personnel to actually make up a combat capable unit, but as an administrative unit. In order to mobilise the reserves, numerous units would have to be cobbled together to make recognisable fighting formations without a substantial mobilization and recruiting intake. The Canadian forces Mobilisation Planning Framework⁶ is based on a four stage mobilization with stages 1 and 2 consisting primarily of Regular Force units augmented by some reserves as necessary. Stage 3 is a force expansion stage and is likened to an event like the Korean War requiring substantial reserve employment. Stage 4 involves a national mobilization. The current structure of the Army reserve shows that it is designed for a Stage 4 National

⁴ *Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves*. The Right Honorable Brian Dickson, Chairman (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1995) 26-30.

⁵ *In the Service of the Nation: Canada's citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century*, John A. Fraser, Chairman (Ottawa: National Defence Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change, 2000), 5-12.

⁶ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence Mobilization Framework*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1999) 3/8-6/8.

Mobilization like that of World War II⁷. The view of Brigadier General Kip Kirby (ret'd) and many other of Army Reservists is heavily focused on the mobilization piece consisting of formed units of up to Division and Corps size⁸. This focus on a Stage 4 mobilisation philosophy, while it must be planned for, should not be the focus or structure of the Army Reserve. The Army Strategy, supported by the Land Force Reserve Restructure Strategic Plan is attempting to move the Army Reserve to an organization more responsive to earlier stages of mobilization. This initiative is meeting considerable resistance from the Army Reservists themselves and overcoming this friction will be essential to a successful transformation of the Army Reserve.

As an incremental step, the Army has configured some Platoons within Reserve Units to Civil and Military Affairs (CIMIC) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) roles as specific total force reserve roles. The Navy Reserve has continued to transform with the creation of Harbour Defence Units, which were put to excellent use as Force Protection for the Navy in Esquimalt and Halifax shortly after the 9/11 attacks and are continuing this role on a full-time basis. The Navy Reserve continues its transformation in taking officers of the Naval Coordination and Guidance of Shipping (NCAGS, formerly NCS) officer occupation and is transforming them into Naval Intelligence Officers. These improvements to date are positive, but incremental. While most of the services have made some progress in restructuring their reserve elements, there remains

⁷ *Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves*. The Right Honorable Brian Dickson, Chairman (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1995) 16.

⁸ Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Past, Present and Future of the Militia*, ed. Jim Hanson and Peter Hammerschmidt (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998) 58-75.

considerable progress to be made before all of the reserve elements are capable of supporting Canada's National Security Agenda in the future.

This paper will now examine the need for transformation and why the changes made to date have been insufficient in light of the changes of the post cold war era. While threats to Canadian security are not new, the events of 11 September 2001 when Al Queda terrorists hijacked aircraft and crashed two of them into the World Trade Towers in New York City killing over 3000 people, including 25 Canadians, brought home the fact that Canadians are not immune from attack here at home in Canada. The Canadian Government responded by not only participating in the so called "War on Terrorism" by dispatching ships, aircraft and troops to Southwest Asia but published "Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy"⁹ in April 2004. New Foreign and Defence Policies are pending which will provide further guidance to the Armed Forces on what direction transformation and reinvestment are to take. If recent events are to be a guide, the Canadian Forces must not only look towards being deployed in far flung and dangerous places more often, but to have greater involvement at home in Canada. The building of an Integrated Security System that includes DND and the Canadian forces is underway. Clearly, the Canadian Forces will be part of the response, not necessarily as the lead agency, but in support of Other Government Departments (OGD). While it would be foolhardy to configure either the regular or reserve forces as a strictly civil defence force, it is necessary to examine the Canadian Forces military capabilities to ensure that they have the capacity to respond to both emergencies at home

⁹ Canada. Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Privy Council Office).

as well as the ability to deploy abroad¹⁰. Tasks that have been identified in the new National Security Policy include:

- co-ordinated Canada-U.S. military planning to support civil authorities in responding to potential terrorist attacks and national disasters within North America;
- a dedicated military CRBN unit to support first line responders in a domestic situation and to support deployed operations;
- providing additional domestic capacity when the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) when the unit is deployed overseas;
- infrastructure protection;
- an increase in Canadian Forces Reserves available for civil preparedness;
- increased intelligence collection and assessment capabilities;
- improvements to marine and aviation security;
- an armed forces that are flexible, responsive and combat-capable for a wide range operations, and that are able to work with our allies.

While many of these tasks overlap with civilian agencies, clearly the military transformation task to engage in all of them is significant and the reserves as indicated in the National Security Policy have an important part to play.

¹⁰ Canada. Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Privy Council Office), 23.

So far this paper has examined the post-Cold War transformation challenges the reserves face and partial successes attained thus far and the rationale for further transformation as a result of the new National Security Policy. The next section of this paper will indicate what vital changes that must occur in the reserves to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The stove piped approach that the three services are taking in much needed reform of the reserve forces are designed to meet their own single-service needs, not the joint needs of the new security environment. The Naval Reserve has been given dedicated, largely domestic coastal defence roles. The Air Reserve fulfills a strictly augmentee role with the exception of the two Air Reserve Griffon helicopter squadrons and the Army Reserve, while providing superb manpower support to the Regular Army for its deployed operations, is very much structured around an independent mobilization role for major conflict. These three individual approaches, while meeting some of the requirements of transformation, are significantly wide of the mark on others. The reserves as a disciplined manpower pool have provided sterling service to Canadians during national disasters from ice storms in Ontario and Quebec, Hurricane Juan in the Maritimes, floods in Manitoba and forest fires in British Columbia and Alberta.

While manpower is important, there are improvements to the reserve structure that can be made to provide additional specialist help, invaluable not only during natural disasters but to deployed operations as well. An increase in the number of Combat/Construction Engineers (and units) would significantly enhance the capacity to respond to community emergencies. Furthermore, Combat/Construction Engineers are

amongst the personnel most in demand for deployed operations. Many of the tasks that Combat/Construction Engineers provide have a vital and often a stand-alone role in peacekeeping/reconstruction missions. Depending on location and need, Naval Construction Troop and Airfield Engineering/Runway Repair Reserves could be combined into a common occupation architecture providing not only needed expertise in these areas, but flexibility in deployed support depending on the need. This would be taking a truly joint approach to a tri-service engineering problem. Furthermore locating these units in close proximity to trade schools, such as the British Columbia Institute of Technology that conduct the civil variants of this training, would provide not only a plentiful recruiting pool, but generate community interest and support. This integrated approach would meet the requirements of the National Security Policy in the areas of domestic backup to the DART, increase the capacity for civil preparedness and an increase in deployed capability overseas.

As terrorists and rogue states continue in their attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, the importance of a CRBN response at home and abroad is required. Canada has one nascent Regular Force CRBN unit located in Kingston, Ontario. Part of this unit's capabilities is the participation of medical personnel from Health Canada in response to a national crisis. Canada has just one unit and if it is deployed abroad, there is only a limited response available within Canada. While CRBN training is highly technical and highly specialized, having reserve units with elements of this capability nationwide would significantly enhance the national response to any CRBN emergency. CRBN is a joint task and could involve personnel from all of the reserve services.

While the areas of infrastructure protection, marine and aviation security are largely civilian policing functions, there is the protection of DND's own infrastructure to be concerned about. In the days after 9-11, elements of the services responded largely by activating their Base Defence Forces to provide additional security. These Base Defence Forces were designed for short-term employment only and their long-term employment in infrastructure protection resulted in a negative impact on support and school personnel until, in the Navy's case, the Naval Reserve Harbour Defence Units were activated to provide not only Base and Dockyard security but waterborne security as well. A Navy is based on extremely expensive ships and the irreplaceable loss of just one caused the Navy out of the three services to take the most proactive steps in augmenting base security, a lesson perhaps fresher in the Navy's mind due to the USS Cole incident in Yemen where a suicide bomber had caused significant damage to this Destroyer and killed 16 of her sailors. Of the three services, the Navy is the only one to have dedicated force protection elements in the form of Harbour Defence Units. The original mandate was the seaborne defence of civilian harbours but they proved to be extremely useful in the aftermath of 9-11 in protecting Naval Bases. In Halifax, the Harbour Defence Unit was augmented by Army Reservists on the shore based perimeter resulting in a joint security force. Security of bases is a joint task. While the Navy rightly has waterborne security concerns, the Air Force and the Army both have landward security concerns that have not been adequately addressed. Security in the civilian sense is a policing concern so shouldn't it also be a military policing concern? In fact, the Military Police are the lead agency for infrastructure protection within DND. Abroad, the Military Police

provide threat assessments and advice on the security of airfields, ports and bases prior to and during deployments to those places. Currently, deployed Military Police are taken from bases around the country, leaving bases short of personnel and straining the Military Police forces at home. Here is another joint role that is ideal for the reserves. Instead of/in addition to having personnel who are trained for other duties tied up doing security, additional Military Police units with Marine, Aviation and Army subspecialties should do the job. Furthermore, one of the types of personnel highly in demand for peacekeeping is civilian and military policemen. Since Military Police units need not be large nor equipment intensive, they are ideal for basing in smaller communities where the population does not support a larger reserve formation.

This leaves increased Intelligence collection and assessment as a task directed by the National Security Policy. The Intelligence occupation is by definition a joint occupation serving all three services both deployed and at home. The Navy has identified a need for Naval Intelligence Officers in the Naval Reserve and the Army Reserve has created its first CIMIC and PSYOPS personnel. These are excellent transformational steps in the right direction and go some way to addressing these individual services needs but where's the jointness? There is a constant barrage of messages asking for interested personnel to deploy as Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Officers to the places where the Forces are conducting peacekeeping/peace enforcement. There is demand for Intelligence Officers and Non Commissioned personnel that have been filled by Reserve as well as Regular Force personnel who are not trained in Intelligence although they receive a considerable pre-deployment training package. The

creation of a Reserve Intelligence Branch would go a considerable way towards alleviating these shortages and demands on other over tasked occupations. This branch could serve the needs of all three services by having sub-specializations as required for environment specific tasks (NCAGS, PSYOPS) but there would be a common core training that could allow for significant cross environmental employment as the situation demands. Taking advantage of Canada's considerable ethnic mix in the larger cities and perhaps the linguistics departments of universities would significantly enhance Canada's ability to assess sources both part-time in peace and full-time in a crisis. It was necessary for all rotations of the Naval Task Groups during Operation Apollo to borrow Farsi and Urdu linguists from the United States Navy in order to provide translation during the numerous small boat interceptions that were a large part of Canada's mission in the Gulf of Oman.

The previous paragraphs of this paper provide recommendations for changing the stovepiped roles of the three services to the joint approach demanded by the new National Security Policy. While these are important joint elements of a transformed reserve they do not provide for guidance on how to get from here to there. The first thing that is needed is a joint vision for the reserves. The current single service vision has resulted in three very different types of reserve organizations. The Naval Reserve has specific full time and Reserve exclusive tasks and only a limited augmentation role, the Air Reserve has an almost exclusively augmentation role with the exception of the two Griffon Helicopter Squadrons and the Army Reserve which has a significant ad hoc augmentation role and is primarily focused on mobilization in crisis. There are historically good

reasons as to why the various services have organized themselves this way, but it leaves no room at all for jointness. While augmentation (either in the form of specific roles or as a manpower pool) has its place, neither the Air Reserve nor the Army Reserve have specific augmentation roles exclusive to the reserve although both services have taken their first tentative steps in that direction with Airfield Engineering Squadrons and CIMIC and PSYOPS personnel.

In order to develop this joint vision of the reserves the question that must be asked and answered is what do we want the reserves to do? This will dictate what organisational approach is taken. Three possible approaches are:

- specific roles assigned to the reserves that are performed on a full time basis with the reserve units acting as force generators of part-time personnel much like the Naval Reserve;
- use the reserves primarily as an augmentation force with units acting as force generators to provide personnel to Regular Force units much like the Air Reserve; and
- use the reserves as a mobilization force, where augmented by increased recruiting, they would form organized combat capable units that would operate alongside their Regular Force counterparts on an equal basis much as the Army Reserve is structured today.

These are not 'either or choices' since the situations that Canada may face as a nation will require elements of all three approaches. The reserves as a whole should be formed along the following lines: full time reserve forces with specific skills and tasks that are always in demand such as the Coastal Defence, Security, Intelligence (including CIMIC/PSYOPS), and Air Reserve Squadrons. The primary focus of the reserve structure should be along the lines of an augmentation focus where the reserves would provide two types of augmentation. Individual personnel to Regular Force units from closely affiliated reserve units as opposed to the current piecemeal approach currently employed by the Army and Air Reserves and formed units as required in the case of a major emergency or operation. This could range across the spectrum of conflict from an entire Intelligence Unit, Harbour Defence Unit, MP Platoon, or Infantry Company for operations such as Op Apollo to larger formations such as the provision of an entire Infantry Company/Battalion, Combat/Construction Engineer Regiments to form a battle group with Regular Force units should a larger scale operation such as the Korean War require that scale of contribution. In the unlikely event of a nationwide mobilization being required, the Reserve units still form the core of the mobilization base. The Army Reserve, with its large formations, is currently organized along a national mobilization model consisting of a large number of regiments all of which combine to amount to approximately 7 Brigades organizationally but don't actually reflect that in actual unit or personnel numbers. While preserving Regimental traditions and history are important, they should not hinder progress towards a capable, fully integrated Regular and Reserve Army. Ideally, the Army Reserve formations should be able to plug into task tailored battlegroups in accordance with modern Army doctrine. A Reserve Infantry Unit

consisting of 150 personnel should be a Company to a Battalion which should then be part of an affiliated Regular Force Regiment. This would permit synergies in training, a meshing of Regimental traditions and be a community base for Regular Force units much like the Navy names ships and the Air Force Squadrons after cities in order to develop closer ties with the community. X Company of the 4th Battalion the Royal Canadian Regiment based in X City in Ontario would provide useful community ties for Regular Force Regiments deployed abroad and would allow a better affiliation between the Regular Force and the Reserves. The size of a reformed Army Reserve should be dictated by the number of combined total force battle groups required to fight a major conflict such as Korea, specialist ‘reserve role only’ units and the number of personnel required to provide a training base for national mobilization. “Any change or reform within the Army reserve is difficult and demands consideration of many factors. Constant awareness of such considerations is a challenge when faced with major reform pressures but must be assured if the trust of all stakeholders is to be maintained and genuine progress is to be achieved”¹¹. This significant challenge cannot be understated since there has been an “active campaign waged by some Honorary Colonels against Total Force and the policy of using the militia for Regular Force augmentation”¹².

This section of this paper will examine models for transforming the reserves based on the successful examples from other countries whose efforts at reform have been completed since the end of the cold war. During the cold war, most European NATO nations possessed enormous reserve forces usually numbering several times that of their

¹¹ Land Force Reserve Restructure Strategic Plan pg 2-2

¹² *Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves*. The Right Honorable Brian Dickson, Chairman (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1995) 16.

regular force counterparts. The end of the cold war saw a massive demobilization and shrinking of reserve and regular forces across Europe. One reason that the many European countries had such large reserve forces was due to conscription with an obligatory period of reserve service following the period of conscription. This made sense during cold war. NATO transformation itself calls for a new emphasis on expeditionary forces where most of the European nations had concerned themselves with defence on their own soil against a Soviet threat. Canada is not alone in needing to restructure its reserve forces. The German Armed Forces have undergone massive reductions since the end of the cold war. The German Army has taken the approach of split regular/reserve formations with the exception of their rapid reaction forces. In a German Mechanised Brigade there is one regular force armoured battalion and one infantry battalion. There is also a reserve armoured battalion and infantry battalion. The Combat Service Support formations are likewise mixed. In the German Air Force and Navy, reservists fulfill specialist fields in logistics and security amongst other support tasks¹³. The United Kingdom was unique in that it did not have a conscript based force during the latter parts of the cold war. The Royal Navy Reserve (RNR) was significantly reduced after the end of the cold war. The RNRs former role of manning Minor War Vessels (MWV) has all but disappeared and while the RNR still fulfills some specialist functions, its primary role is the augmentation of the Regular Navy. The RNR provides personnel in Amphibious Warfare, Seamen, Mine Warfare, Computer and Information Services Engineering, Communications, Electronic Warfare, Information Operations, Information Specialization, Intelligence, Submarine Operations, Logistics, Chaplaincy,

¹³ Sjouke De Jong, *Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No. 6, NATO's Reserve Forces* (London: Brassey's, 1992) 35-38.

Medical and NCAGS¹⁴. The Royal Air Force Reserves consist of ex-Regular Force personnel who continue to work in their previous occupations. New recruits can work in the RAF Regiment that defends RAF bases from ground and air attack. The remainder of the occupations are in logistics/support trades¹⁵. The British Territorial Army (TA) was restructured after the end of the cold war, losing some 14 percent of its strength. Not all arms and services were reduced; of note the Royal Engineers increased by 16 percent, Royal Corps of Signals by 20 percent and the Intelligence Corps by 40 percent¹⁶. This is indicative of the increased need for these specialties in the current security environment. The final example to be examined is that of our neighbour, the United States. With its large population, the US has significant reserve capabilities across every specialty and combat arm imaginable in a manner that cannot be fully emulated by Canada, with its smaller population as a whole and lower population density. The US Army Reserve's lead mission statement is illustrative of their focus: "Enabling the Army to do more with fewer resources, by providing a flexible, well trained, complementary force that can expand and contract to meet the specific needs and challenges of each new mission"¹⁷. The US Army Reserve is structured such that only 1 percent is combat troops (infantry, attack aviation) whereas 18 percent are Combat Support (Signal, CRBN, Military Police, Engineer, Intelligence, PSYOPS, Medium Helicopter Support) , 27 percent are Mobilization Base Expansion (Training Divisions, Garrisons, Schools, Hospitals, Depot Support, Port Operations) and fully 54 percent are Combat Service Support (Medical,

¹⁴ Stephen Howarth, *The Royal Navy's Reserves in War and Peace, 1903-2003* (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2003) 164-171.

¹⁵ RAFreserves.com, "Job Opportunities",

http://www.rafreserves.com/how_to_join/Job_Opportunities.htm; Internet; accessed 7 March 2005.

¹⁶ Sjouke De Jong, *Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No. 6, NATO's Reserve Forces* (London: Brassey's, 1992) 95-96.

¹⁷ United States Army Reserve "Mission Statement", <http://www4.army.mil/USAR/mission/statement.php> ; Internet; accessed 7 March 2005.

Finance, Supply, Transport, JAG, POL, Logistics, Administration, CIMIC, Fixed Wing Aviation)¹⁸. While these numbers appear highly skewed in favour of support to the Combat elements of the US Army, these same elements would support active National Guard Units which consists of a balanced mix of Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support units¹⁹. Notwithstanding, the US Army Reserves are very much structured on providing the support enablers to the Regular Army. The United States Air Force Reserve is likewise focused on support possessing no less than 26 airlift/air refuelling wings and only 4 fighter wings²⁰. The US Navy Reserve uses ex regular force personnel to augment occupations when required and uses a more limited but still broad pool of occupations for recruits with no prior experience. These personnel are integrated with the regular force and man a number of “reserve frigates” with mixed regular force and reserve crews. The United Kingdom and the United States have had recent experience deploying significant numbers of reservists in support of operation “Iraqi Freedom”. In fact, the majority of support forces in theatre belong to the US Army Reserve. All of these countries have good examples of their Reserves filling specialist roles on both a full time and part time basis. Their success should be a template for transforming Canada’s reserves in a model that works for Canada. Transformation of Canada’s Reserves is vital task and as Canada’s former Chief of Defence Staff, General

¹⁸ United States Army Reserve “Mission Statement”, <http://www4.army.mil/USAR/capabilities/skills.php> ; Internet; accessed 7 March 2005.

¹⁹ The Army National Guard “About Us”, http://www.arng.army.mil/about_us/organization/force_structure.asp ; Internet; accessed 7 March 2005.

²⁰ Air Force Reserve Command “Air Force Reserve Command Numbered Air Forces and subordinate units”, <http://www.afrc.af.mil/Units.htm> ; Internet: accessed 7 March 2005.

Henault stated “if we were to remain relevant, we needed to accelerate our efforts and make difficult choices. Those choices are now more urgent than ever”²¹.

While transforming Canada’s reserves is a priority task, the reserves will never be able to make a fully effective contribution to the defence of Canada without job protection legislation. Repeated recommendations have been made by Canadian politicians that this job protection legislation is essential for the reserves; “In the Commission’s view, the purpose of job protection legislation is twofold. First, it would send a message to all employers in Canada, regardless of their size, that reserve service is valued by Canadians as a whole and is a national interest worth enhancing” and “The second and most important purpose of job protection legislation is to make it possible for working Canadians to become members of the reserves”²². Additionally, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs recommended that “The National Defence Act be amended as quickly as possible to provide job protection to Reservists called-up for duty during major emergencies”²³. The absence of job protection legislation was apparent during Operation Friction. When Canada deployed a Field Hospital, it was necessary to strip the regular force of the majority of its medical staff “Not a single Reservist surgeon or anaesthetist volunteered to go to the gulf. They all

²¹ Department of National Defence, *Annual Report of the Chief of Defence Staff 2003-2004* (Ottawa: ADM (PA), 2004) 2.

²² *Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves*. The Right Honorable Brian Dickson, Chairman (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1995) 68.

²³ Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, *Facing our Responsibilities, The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces*, David Pratt, M.P., Chair (May 2002); <http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/1/NDVA/Studies/Reports/ndvarp04-e.htm> ; Internet; accessed 23 February 2005.

had large practices requiring their presence”²⁴. If Canada is to have a reserve with specific missions and a regular force that is dependent on the reserves being there when needed in order to accomplish their mission, it is only right that those who voluntarily leave their place of employment to contribute, be protected.

The time has come for a joint vision of Canada’s reserves. As the regular force faces significant transformation, significant transformation of the reserve is necessary as well. Canada’s reserves have a long tradition of rising to the occasion in time of national need and this will continue, but a thorough assessment of what Canada needs from its reserves and how they are structured to provide it is desperately needed. Stubbornly holding on to traditional structures and irrelevant capabilities for unlikely eventualities while ignoring the likely ones will leave the reserves ill-equipped to provide the right kind of support when it is needed. While the regular force rapidly builds increasingly joint, deployable force structures, a fully integrated reserve force is the only way Canada will be able to bring sufficient numbers of the correct resources to bear in an increasingly dangerous world in a resource constrained environment. The National Security Policy provided the first strategic direction and the forthcoming Foreign and Defence Policy reviews will no doubt provide more detailed direction for the Canadian Forces. The way ahead is clear; the reserves will increasingly bring specialist capabilities on a full and part-time basis to support ongoing regular force deployments. The reserves must be restructured and equipped to perform these roles in addition to the augmentation role not only as formed units, but as individual personnel and as Combat Casualty replacements.

²⁴ Major Jean H. Morin and Lieutenant-Commander Richard Gimblett, *The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf, Operation Friction 1990-1991* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997) 217.

The reserves must also serve as a national mobilization base should a major world conflict occur, however, their peacetime structure should reflect their primary specialization tasks and their augmentation roles. Furthermore, the structure of the reserves should be reviewed to ensure that sufficient Combat Support and Combat Service Support are provided to both the Regular Force formations when deployed, and to Reserve Forces when mobilized and deployed as part of an integrated, joint regular/reserve force. Transformation has been slow in coming to Canada and to Canada's reserves in particular. Other countries make far better use of their reserve resources by having transformed them radically after the end of the cold war and Canada must do the same. Other countries have successfully integrated their regular and reserve forces better than Canada has and there are lessons to be drawn from them. Of note, many of these countries support their reserves with job protection legislation. If Canada is to have reserve forces that are capable of deployment either globally in support of Canada's foreign policy, or domestically during national crisis, reserves jobs must be protected. In an era of constrained resources and living in a dangerous world, if Canada's reserves do not transform jointly, in concert with their regular force counterparts, they will become an increasingly irrelevant and costly anachronism.

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