

Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the [Communications Policy of the Government of Canada](#), you can request alternate formats on the "[Contact Us](#)" page.

Information archivée dans le Web

Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n'a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s'appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada.

Conformément à la [Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada](#), vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « [Contactez-nous](#) ».

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

CSC 31/CCEM 31

EXERCISE/EXERCICE NEW HORIZON

SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY OF THE CANADIAN ARCTIC:

A CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY PERSPECTIVE

By Major Michel Ouellet

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

INTRODUCTION

The defence and security of a nation has traditionally been a high priority for governments throughout the world. Canada is no exception. Despite the fact that a significant proportion of the Canadian population reside in southern urban areas, the vast Canadian Arctic continues to be embraced by Canadians as an area of special interest. As a result of pronounced interest in the North by neighbouring countries, and rapid environmental changes, Canada finds itself in a fragile situation. Traditional thinking about the Canadian Arctic is fast being replaced by a more global assessment brought on by events such as global warming and others that are unfolding at a speed and pace often exceeding the ability of the government to appropriately react. This has resulted in Canada being placed in an unfamiliar situation, based on unpredictable circumstances. Timely and appropriate interventions are needed so that every effort can be made to preserve Canadian sovereignty and prevent further compromises to its security.

A priority for Canadian sovereignty, R.B. Byers explains his view of the relationship between security, foreign and defence policies:

“A Canadian security policy should constitute those political strategic objectives and instruments, which have been identified and established by the government as central to national security interests. Defence policy, as one aspect of security policy, should constitute those military activities and capabilities, which are utilized to promote national and international security from military-strategic perspectives. Security policy thus encompasses defence policy and includes those political instruments, which are employed to enhance the security interests of the state. In theory, security policy serves as a bridge between foreign and defence policy.”¹

¹ R.B. Byers. *Canadian Security and Defence: The Legacy and The Challenges*. London, Canada: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986, pg 5.

At the end of the Second World War, Canada was at the height of its relative power. It possessed the third largest military force in the Western world and a homeland spared by the ravages of war seen in Europe and Asia. Despite the extensive wartime achievements of Canadian military forces, the military component of Canadian political culture is not prominent and peacetime military establishments have remained modest. James Eayrs contends that since the Second World War, “the overriding justification for the military has had little to do with our national security as such and everything to do with underpinning our diplomatic and negotiating position.”² This belief has had an influential impact on the subsequent development of Canada’s post-war defence policies of which the Canadian Arctic, although not at the forefront, has an important part in Canadian security policy.

The focus of this paper will be to address the issue of increased accessibility in the Canadian arctic resulting from climate change and the consequential need for readiness to respond to any threat to our Northern borders as delineated in Canadian defence policy.

As a framework, this paper will first highlight the issue that threatens the security in the North. Next, the traditional Canadian response to the North will be explored followed by an assessment of the current situation. Proposed solutions will be identified that will assist Canada in effectively reacting to the Northern dilemma. Canada has gradually evolved over the decades on issues of security in the Canadian arctic, and a more aggressive approach towards the sovereignty and security of the North is essential.

² B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock. *Canada’s Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century*. Toronto, Canada: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993, pg. 147.

THE ISSUE

The Arctic is a maritime area centred on an ice-covered sea and surrounded by sparsely settled lands with immense natural resources. Some of the region's physical characteristics include its abundance of ocean and fish, and its natural resources in fresh water, crude oil, and diamonds. In addition, the Arctic is an area of low population, inhabited by Inuit and a few settlers from the South. Very little attention was paid to this isolated region of Canada. At the end of the 19th century however, interest grew amongst Canadians and the situation momentarily changed the attitude Canadians had toward the North. After the transfer of the Arctic islands to Canada in 1880, "the Canadian government gradually became interested in discovering the nature and extent of its arctic territory."³ A European explorer triggered a more heightened, and protective interest by the Canadian government in that "in 1898-1903 the Norwegian explorer Otto Sverdrup had mapped the area around Ellesmere Island, and claimed this area (and northern Greenland) for Norway."⁴ Consequently, access through the North, by a myriad of uninvited, unannounced countries, developed into a significant issue for Canada, in terms of national security policy.

The Canadian government became quite concerned by this perceived intrusion and Canada therefore sent J.E. Bernier, a renowned arctic sea captain, on a government sponsored, scientific expedition to survey the territory in dispute.⁵ This initiative by the Government of Canada was intended to establish Canadian sovereignty in the North, and also

³ David Percy. "North of Sixty: The Postal History of the Canadian Northwest Territories." (The American Philatelist, September 1995. Pg 5.

⁴ Ibid, 5.

to demonstrate to the rest of the world, including our closest neighbours, that Canada, through its decisive presence in the region, has declared that the North will remain uncontested Canadian territory. Notwithstanding, the aforementioned difficulties of the North, another important issue of Canadian security remains accessibility by foreign countries through our Northern waters without prior authority by Canadian officials. To facilitate resolving this situation, a Canadian defence policy that is providing adequate support as part of the greater toolbox of the security interests of Canada, would be a major contribution in reducing, if not eliminating, breaches to Northern security.

BACKGROUND

Before 1945 and the end of the Second World War, the Canadian government displayed very little interest in the affairs of the North.⁶ In addition, the Arctic was not a concern for the majority of Canadians as it was an area of low density and held little interest for the general population. After the end of World War II, focus shifted rapidly as a heightened awareness of the necessity of security resulted from two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. With the evolution of the Cold War, the United States applied additional pressure on the Canadian government to augment involvement in the Arctic in the name of North American security through initiatives such as: “Distant Early Warning Radar Chain (Project Lincoln); Development of Arctic Air Strips; Loran station on Baffin Island;

⁵ Ibid, 5.

⁶ A.J. Phillips. “Rediscovering Canada’s Arctic.” (Ottawa, Ontario: The Ottawa Citizen, November 21, 1987). Pg.C2B00.

Radar Stations in the North eastern Arctic, and Commercial Air Routes Across the Arctic”⁷

In addition, there was also substantial collaboration with the local Inuit people to obtain access to the area in order to show a presence in the North and to preserve Canadian sovereignty. The Inuit supported Canada’s assertion of full and complete sovereignty over the Arctic region. ⁸ Mr. Clark, former minister of external affairs, stated:

“Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic is indivisible. It embraces land, sea and ice. It extends without interruption to the seaward facing coasts of the Arctic islands. These Islands are joined and not divided by the waters between them. They are bridged for most of the year by ice. Canada's Inuit people have used and occupied the ice as they have used and occupied the land.”⁹

As a result of the Cold War, Canada suddenly had a presence and a supported interest in the Arctic. Neighbouring countries that possessed somewhat different views of ownership of arctic water shared this heightened attention on the area. Despite the fact that the geography of the Arctic is characterized by both land and water, disputes surrounding ownership of the Arctic focused primarily on the water surrounding the North. As for the lands of the Canadian Arctic, Canada's title and sovereignty were not in question and have never been disputed. “Sovereignty over the waters between the islands of the archipelago, by

⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. “Draft Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs, Chapter VIII, Relations With The United States, Part 4, Defence Issues, Section H, Arctic Sovereignty.” (Ottawa, Ontario: January 21st, 1953). Pg 3-4.

⁸ Sheila Watt-Cloutier. “Inuit, Climate Change, Sovereignty, and Security in the Canadian Arctic”. (Ottawa, Ontario: Inuit Circumpolar Conference Canada, January 25, 2002). Pg 1-2. As expressed in September 1985 by Joe Clark, then Minister of External Affairs.

⁹ Ibid, 1-2.

contrast, is more complex, since historically the principle of freedom of the seas has meant that the jurisdiction of a state ends at its coast. The seas have been free and open to all.”¹⁰

There was a military and commercial interest to find a seaway in the North of Canada, through the Arctic Archipelago, and along the northern coast between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.¹¹ This area, and its accompanied disputes regarding ownership by Denmark, Russia and the US, drove the desire to access the so coveted Northwest Passage, and challenge Canada’s sovereignty.¹² This lengthy disaccord began more than 30 years ago when the US government prepared to send the first commercial ship, the USS Manhattan, to successfully transit the Northwest Passage without asking permission of the Canadian government stating that the Northwest Passage was an international waterway.¹³ In 1988, the United States and Canada addressed the question of arctic sovereignty, agreeing that US icebreakers could cross arctic waters, but only after approval on a case-by-case basis.¹⁴ This declaration by Canadian officials that waters of the North are under Canadian control remains disputed and countries that disagree are not only jeopardizing Canadian security and sovereignty by not adhering to Canadian transit regulations but they also continue to challenge Canada about ownership and free access.

¹⁰ Donald M. McRae. “Arctic Sovereignty: Loss by Dereliction?” CARC – Northern Perspectives (Volume 22, Number 4, Winter 1994-95). Pg 1.

¹¹ The Columbia Electronic Encyclopaedia, 6th ed. Northwest Passage, (US: Columbia University Press, 2004), www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0836035.html, site visited on 2 Feb 05.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Nathan Vanderklippe. “Arctic called tempting terror target.” Montreal, Quebec: The Gazette, Sep 19, 2004. Pg.A7.

¹⁴ Donald Pharand. *The Northwest Passage Arctic Straits*. Boston, USA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984. Pg 45-47.

There are inherent difficulties in successfully making this Northern water claim to the rest of the world. In fact, it has become a futile argument and may never receive international support. Access however, of the Northwest Passage, not only in the defence of Canada, but also to protect the vast environment, could be scrutinized by Canada through the utilization of the Canadian Forces in its Defence policy. Appropriate monitoring and control of Canada's waterways would play a key role in the application of Canada's national security policy.

CURRENT SITUATION

Government

As consistently outlined throughout the years in the form of Canada's White Paper, a serious commitment is underway to design an appropriate and adequate defence program for both the short-term and the long-term needs of Canada. The government of Canada, through many criticisms about the sovereignty of the North, is aware of the deficiencies in relation to Canada's security and the protection of its Northern waters.

Recently, Canada has developed a great deal of concern on the subject of environmental issues, and more specifically global warming. Global warming, and resulting ecologic changes caused by melting of the ice of the North passageways, would facilitate a much easier access through this route, which is highly coveted by surrounding Canadian neighbours, and create a potential highway between the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans. The case for developing a "transit management regime" has been strengthened over the past

decade.¹⁵ Renewed interest and the resulting emphasis placed on the environment has encouraged the government of Canada to become more aware, and to show a greater interest in the North with relation to sovereignty and security of the Canadian Arctic.

Politically, the North has always been a lower priority for the decision-makers in Canada. “In 1970, Pierre Trudeau put economic growth and social justice ahead of peace and security. By 1985 Brian Mulroney made national unity and sovereignty his main themes. In 1995, Jean Chretien put prosperity first, then security.”¹⁶

Conversely, under the present government, a recognition of the importance of safeguarding Canada’s sovereignty has been brought to the forefront as a result of a proposal by Prime Minister Martin in April 2004, that outlined its first national security policy affirming Canada’s sovereignty and independence and assuring its security in a world shaken by instability and terror.¹⁷ Canada has subsequently decided to take the lead on this vital security issue. Failure to take action in order to ensure that activities both on and below the Arctic waters are monitored and controlled, could lead to serious problems by Canada over its sovereignty and security over the Arctic.¹⁸ Ottawa will have to be cognisant of its sovereignty, practical and firm to endorse its interests even with friends.¹⁹

¹⁵ Douglas M Johnston. “The Northwest Passage Revisited.” (New York: Ocean Development and International Law, Apr 2002, Vol.33, Iss.2). Pg 145

¹⁶ Paul Martin. “Defining Canada’s Role In The World”. (Toronto, Ontario: Toronto Star, 30 October 2004). Pg.H.06.

¹⁷ Ibid, H.06.

¹⁸ McRae, Pg 2.

¹⁹ Martin, H.06.

Undoubtedly, Canadian agencies such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Canadian Coast Guard could be fundamental resources when it comes to protecting Canada's Arctic sovereignty. Collaboration and coordination between the organizations must take place to make certain that the North is monitored, controlled, and appropriate resources allocated where required for these initiatives. The Canadian Forces can, therefore, be an integral provider in assuring Arctic sovereignty and security.

The most important attributes of the Canadian Forces that give them the ability to execute this essential role are not only the highly developed command, control and organizational structures but also the rapid mobility and the broad range of skills and specialities available to them.²⁰ They are also capable of responding to requests for aid to civil power, providing peacetime surveillance and control, securing borders against illegal activities, fisheries protection, environmental surveillance, disaster relief and search and rescue.²¹ Many of these attributes would be an asset to security of the North. Some of these include:

Surveillance

Military surveillance is required for the protection of Canada and Canadian interests, but it is also an essential contribution to North American defence and, in the broadest context, to the security of the North Atlantic region.²² Canada also has a national

²⁰ Canada. *1994 Defence White Paper*, Ottawa: DND, 1994. Pg.18.

²¹ Ibid, 18.

²² L. Douglas Bland. *Canada's National Defence, Volume I Defence Policy*. Kingston ,Ontario: School of Policy Studies, 1997, pg.145.

requirement for certain surveillance activities to provide information on events of importance occurring on land, at sea and in Canadian airspace.²³

Assistance to the Civil Authorities

The general surveillance of Canadian airspace and waters required for national security also permits enhanced support to other government departments. Initial consultations with the civil departments responsible by legislation for the protection of various specific interests, have already indicated several areas where a greater contribution by the Armed forces is necessary.²⁴

Control

In addition to the requirements for surveillance, a military capability for control is required as an adjunct to the other measures necessary for the protection of Canada and Canadian interests.²⁵ This should include an ability to enforce these measures should laws not be respected.

Sovereignty is a vital attribute of a nation-state. For Canada, sovereignty means ensuring that, within its area of jurisdiction, Canadian law is respected and enforced.²⁶ Until now, every elected government in Canada has attempted to bring this to fruition. Canada

²³ Ibid, 145.

²⁴ Ibid, 147.

²⁵ Ibid, 148.

²⁶ 1994 defence White Paper. Pg.15.

should never find itself in a position where, as a consequence of past decisions, the defence of its national territory has become the responsibilities of others.²⁷

The Gap

Despite the advances that Canada has made in relation to the priorities of Northern security and sovereignty, there remains many significant issues that inhibit realization of optimal safeguards.

Associated capabilities

The history of Canadian defence policy as it pertains to the Arctic security can be seen as pressure provided from the Americans and more particularly during the Cold War. On several occasions, Canadian authorities have requested that transit through Canadian Arctic waters be reported for appropriate surveillance and control. Canada's objective is not to restrict Arctic waters to other countries; it does however insist that transit through Canadian waters be made with Canada's consent and subject to the controls and other measures required for Canada's sovereignty and security and for the preservation of the environment in the Arctic.²⁸ This affirmation is critical to Canadian sovereignty and security, but the current involvement of the Canadian Forces is rather limited considering the task at hand. As pointed out by Col Pettis, Commander of Canadian Forces North Area, "right up front, we have a significant weakness in our ability to survey because right now our surveillance is largely dependent on human beings and that is not a terribly efficient way to

²⁷ Ibid, 15.

conduct surveillance in the space age.”²⁹ “Canadian Forces Northern Area is alarmed at the emerging reduced commitment to demonstrating sovereignty over, and ensuring the security of the Canadian Arctic.”³⁰

Although Canada has some capabilities to monitor the North, some of these capabilities have extended beyond their life expectancy and do not provide adequate reporting on adverse situations. The North Warning system is almost 20 years old, long-range maritime patrol aircraft are aging and seldom used for northern patrols, the Coast Guard’s icebreakers are aging and require replacement, and there is limited satellite capability for northern surveillance.³¹

Reaction Force

According to Col Pettis, more ground troops are required in order to adequately respond to incidents in the north. “We have some limited parachute capability but to expect us to drop 100 people into a remote area of the north without any significant way of sustaining them isn't realistic.”³² Moreover, as detailed by Col Pettis the Canadian Navy is

²⁸ Joe Clark. “The Canada-United States Arctic Cooperation Agreement.” Don Mills, ON: CanWest News: Jan 13, 1988. Pg.1.

²⁹ Adrian Humphreys. “Canada’s troops to reclaim Arctic.” Don Mills, ON: National Post: Mar 25, 2004. Pg. A 1.

³⁰ David Pugliese. “Canada not protecting the Arctic, reports warn: dwindling military presence in the North could allow other nations to move in and take over, documents say.” Vancouver, BC: The Vancouver Sun: Dec 7, 2000. Pg A 4.

³¹ Rob Huebert. “The Shipping News Part II: How Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty Is On Thin Ice”. Toronto, Canada: International Journal, Summer 2003. Vol. 58, Iss.3. Pg. 7.

³² Humphreys, A 1.

not able to meet the requirements of northern surveillance. "Our navy is not ice capable."³³ Canada's current response to any adverse incidents in the North demonstrates a limited capability to react to emergencies. This, in turn, threatens the sovereignty of Canada and augments security concerns.

As an interim measure, and one that certainly does not address all aspects of the issue, foot patrols have been established using resources from the Inuit Canadian Rangers. This

The question is therefore, what can the Canadian Forces do to protect its sovereignty and contribute to the national security of the North? Historically, political decisions against sufficiently funding Canada's Forces have resulted in a military that is unable to respond adequately in the Arctic.³⁶ From a military perspective, the Canadian Forces must continue to be aware of its responsibilities and ensure that planning initiatives are in place. According to Col Pettis, "we like to plan and we'd like to be ready for it in the future. We're looking at whatever could go wrong. Concerns range from the threat of terrorists to environmental disasters."³⁷ We must therefore, incorporate a military presence in the North into future government policy despite its limited resources and resultant capabilities.

Canada is doing its utmost to protect Canadians and its Arctic sovereignty. "The enhanced northern security and sovereignty efforts encompass both low-tech manpower and cutting-edge science, ranging from patrols by soldiers driving snowmobiles and carrying rifles, to an intensive satellite surveillance system that is able to monitor the Arctic from space."³⁸ Presently, there is a definite aspiration to improve the security situation in the

³⁶ James H Taylor. "Canadian foreign policy and national interests." (Toronto: Behind The Headlines, Apr-Jun 1999, Vol.56, Iss.3), pg.6.

³⁷ Editorial. "Military considers security, sovereignty issues northern pipeline." Canadian Press Newswire. Toronto: May 15, 2001. Pg1.

³⁸ Adrian Humphreys. "Canada's troops to reclaim Arctic." Don Mills, ON: National Post: Mar 25, 2004. Pg. A 1. Enhanced security such as: 1. The approval of Project Polar Epsilon, a satellite system piggy backing on a new commercial space program, designed to provide surveillance of the north, which encompasses 40% of Canada's land mass, to be operational by 2008. 2. The flying of unmanned aerial vehicles this summer over Baffin Island to test their abilities in the extreme conditions of the north.. 3. The start in August of Exercise Narwhal, the first large-scale war game held in the Arctic involving army, navy and air force units from the south.4. A series of enhanced sovereignty patrols by regular Canadian Forces soldiers and Canadian Rangers, a military unit made up mostly of Inuit, that will see soldiers snowmobiling across almost all of the Arctic archipelago that Canada claims. 5. The planning of a last-resort option of building permanent high- frequency surface-wave radar installations to monitor both ends of the Northwest Passage for unauthorized ship activity,

North. This has not only resulted from greater support by the Canadian government but also a heightened sense of awareness by Canadians in general. "More important than anything else is our ability as a nation to do surveillance in the north, our consequent ability to detect and analyze what we detect if there is something of an anomaly and then our ability to respond in whatever fashion is deemed necessary or appropriate."³⁹

Canada's security and sovereignty is at risk. In order to address some of these security issues sound solutions must be established that would create an alternative to current measures.

SOLUTIONS

"Canadian sovereignty over the lands and waters of the Canadian Arctic is the essence of Canada as a nation. The defence of Arctic sovereignty is therefore crucial to Canada's defence policy."⁴⁰ An analogy can be made between the issues surrounding Canada's north and a household security system. A home must be protected with every means possible and supported by an effective response mechanism or procedure to deal with adverse events such as intruders. For Canadian sovereignty and security of the North, Canada must have a similar stance. Re-thinking Northern policies, a transit monitoring or surveillance system and a rapid reaction force that is on-site to counter suspicious activities or concerns are key initiatives that should be considered to ensure Northern security.

both civilian and military. These powerful detectors penetrate out 200 nautical miles to the edge of Canada's territorial waters.

³⁹ Ibid, A 1.

⁴⁰McRae, Pg 1.

Re-evaluation of Northern Policies

The Canadian government must be conscious of the importance of this particular aspect of Northern Defence. One important limitation that impedes any improvement in improving Northern policies is the Canadian government's refusal to invest money into Canadian security in the North. Re-evaluation of historical defence cuts and priorities must be at the forefront of discussions because the shift of interest to Northern security has justified the addition of resources to this portfolio. "If enough commercial shipping passes through the Northwest Passage without Canadian approval, our claim to sovereignty will plunge to the depths of the Beauport Sea. The environmental and economic consequences could be costly."⁴¹

A paradigm shift in Canadian attitude towards the Canadian Arctic must occur as we begin to experience the North as a vital region of the future encompassing vast economic and environmental opportunities. Timeliness is crucial and pressure must be placed on policy-makers "urging Canada to develop a northern dimension to its foreign policy."⁴² The longer Canada waits, the more critical national security threats become as other countries use Canadian waters and the Northern passage as a gateway without prior consultation with Canadian authorities. A more robust plan of action is required and as noted by Pharand, "along with national security in the North, the government should aim to broaden international cooperation on fishing, pollution control and scientific development among the

⁴¹ Editorial (opinion). "Sinking of the Polar 8." Edmonton, AB: Edmonton Journal: Feb 22, 1990. Pg.A14.

⁴² Watt-Cloutier. Pg 1.

five countries which share the Arctic basin.”⁴³ Despite the requirements for intense planning and a commitment of resources, the status quo is not a favourable solution and policies developed to ensure Arctic sovereignty are not only necessary, but must be tough enough in order to preserve this vital region of Canada.

Transit Management

A formalized monitoring and control device should be implemented in the North to ensure proper surveillance of foreign vessels travelling through the North. This system must have inherent to it a system that would notify Canadian authorities of the use of the Northern Passage to ensure adequate control of Canadian waters. Canada must aggressively invest in surveillance capability, and an understanding and level of compliance by all other nations using Canadian waters must be agreed upon and respected. “Our sovereignty in the Arctic cannot be complete if we remain dependent on allies for knowledge of possible hostile activities in our waters under our ice, and for preventing such activities.”⁴⁴ Canada must have the means to respond to situations independently of other countries. It must have the control capability to act like a sovereign country: defending itself and its interests.

⁴³ Donald Pharand. “Canada doing well on Arctic Sovereignty: Expert say”. Ottawa, ON: The Ottawa Citizen: Dec 12, 1985. Pg.C19. Donald Pharand told the committee, which is studying Canada’s international relations, that moves to delineate Canadian territorial waters, a decision to build a Class 8 icebreaker and plans for increased military presence in the North have shown the world that Canada has full sovereignty over all the waters of the Arctic archipelago.

Reaction force

After the Second World War, as Canada began to posture much of its military forces in support of American-led NATO multilateral alliance, bilateral security relations with the United States in North America became increasingly imperative and cooperative.⁴⁵ Canada gained surveillance over its own territory and the opportunity to participate in the initial deliberations at NORAD Headquarters, in the event of warning and/or attack.⁴⁶

The task of defending North America has been, and will continue to be, a shared function with the US. Given the disparities between the US and Canada with regard to available resources, Canada still has to maintain an acceptable and adequate contribution to preserve its sovereignty. The likely chance of intrusions against North America through the North would also support the idea that the primary emphasis should continue to be placed on sufficient defence mechanism. As a result of this, and the extremely high costs involved in providing a credible security system, Canadian Defence policy, through the Canadian forces, should continue to be directed toward a more serious involvement in the protection of its territory and particularly, the North.

On the other hand, investments from the Canadian Forces must be through augmentation of personnels (Inuit Rangers and/or military units), aircrafts (Search and Rescue and patrols), ships/ice-breakers (control and reaction force), submarines (control and

⁴⁴ Terrence Wills. "White paper will spark a likely debate on defence." (Montreal, QC: The Gazette, Jun 1, 1987. Pg.A1.

⁴⁵ Bland, 150.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 151.

reaction force) and detection devices covering the entire North. Canada must take action now to protect the Arctic. If not, Canada risks security compromises or exploitation of its resources by foreign countries.

The government of Canada is mindful of this situation and recent budget allocations over the next five years (2005-2010) have demonstrated that amplified security issues of Canada are a priority for Defence. The reality that Canada is making an effort to put more emphasis to the North even though it has limited response capability are very important first steps and absolutely overdue.⁴⁷ Canada is on the right track to recovery, but it cannot let its guard down, as diligence and control are required at all times. In fact, the Americans could be challenging Canada again in the near future; if not already. As outlined by an editorial in the Ottawa Citizen:

“The Bush government intends to proceed with developing a national missile defence program with or without our participation. This could involve American submarines being stationed under the Arctic ice cap in Canadian waters.”⁴⁸

This clearly depicts the necessity for Canadian Forces personnel to patrol the Arctic in order to ensure that adequate and appropriate surveillance and control measures are instituted. If not, there is a risk that Canada’s security and sovereignty may be in jeopardy. “Northern development is not a joint responsibility; it is a Canadian responsibility which

⁴⁷ Humphreys. Pg. A 1. Dr. Rob Huebert, an Arctic and maritime law specialist with the Centre of Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, lauded the attention.

⁴⁸ Editorial. “Our throne Speech.” Ottawa, On : The Ottawa Citizen: Jan 29, 2001. Pg A 13.

cannot be allowed to go by default or left to others to carry out.”⁴⁹. Canada should vigorously demonstrate to the world that the Northwest Passage is Canadian, and will remain part of Canada.⁵⁰ Canada must therefore be proactive when it comes to preserving its sovereignty in the North. “If Canada wants to strengthen its position, it must continue to expand its presence in the Arctic.”⁵¹ In fact, “as resource development sweeps across Canada's North, new fears are emerging that terrorists could see the Arctic as the soft underbelly of the continent.”⁵² Furthermore, due to the easy access of the North, other similar possibilities exist for probable criminal activities. “It is only a matter of time before organized crime starts to use the Arctic as a back door into Canada.”⁵³ The reality is that Canada’s North is unprotected to intruders. “Canada’s unguarded back door, the Arctic, offers easy access for unwanted guests, terrorists and criminals.”⁵⁴ Canada is an immense territory and if the North is left unattended without appropriate surveillance and response mechanism in which the Canadian forces could be of great help, it may become a hiding ground for unsolicited or illegal activities.

⁴⁹ Department of foreign Affairs and International Trade. “Arctic Sovereignty and Northern Development.” (Ottawa, Ontario: Memorandum from Secretary, Advisory Committee on Northern Development to Advisory Committee on Northern Development), Chapter V, Part 2, Volume 20 – 508, May 28th, 1954. Pg 3.

⁵⁰ The Gazette. Montreal, QC: Editorial: Mar 25, 1987. Pg. B2

⁵¹ Alison Appelbe. “Canada revives claim of arctic sovereignty”. (Montreal, Quebec: The Gazette), Aug 27, 2002. Pg.A 16.

⁵² Nathan Vanderklippe. “Arctic could be target for terrorism.” (Victoria, BC: Times – colonist), Sept 19, 2004. Pg.A3. Comments from Rob Huebert, associate director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies.

⁵³ Ibid, Pg.A3. Comments from retired Col. Pierre LeBlanc, who spoke at a conference on sovereignty and security in the Canadian Arctic.

⁵⁴ Kate Jamet. “Arctic vulnerable to Crime: Expert: Police, Army Have Little Presence.” (Calgary, Alberta: Calgary Herald), Jan 26, 2002. Pg. A13.

CONCLUSION

The defence and security of Canada, as a result of global warming and resultant melting of ice in the Canadian arctic, has become a national priority. Canadians have become more aware of the risks that this melting has caused throughout the access routes of the Northwest Passage. Historic beliefs and Canadian reaction to these issues were not only somewhat indifferent, but also were not supported by adequate resources. Despite Canada's claims to the Northwest Passage, most countries either do not accept this stance or refuse to comply with regulations of surveillance for transit.

There is a trend towards improvement in the way the Canadian Government is becoming implicated in this issue. There is also a lack of resources and supporting control mechanism to counter it. By re-evaluating Northern policies, instituting a transit monitoring or surveillance system and incorporating a rapid reaction force that is on-site to counter suspicious activities or concerns Canada would be placed in a better position to respond to threats through an increased presence in its Northern waters.

Timely and appropriate interventions are required to ensure so that Canadian sovereignty and security are preserved.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Appelbe Alison. "Canada revives claim of arctic sovereignty". (Montreal, Quebec: The Gazette), Aug 27, 2002.
- Baglolle Joel. "Northern Thaw Raises Defence Concerns – A Canadian Waterway Free of Ice May Bring Commerce and Foes." New York, NY: Wall Street Journal - Eastern Edition, Dec 20, 2000.
- Bland L. Douglas. *Canada's National Defence, Volume I Defence Policy*. Kingston, Ontario: School of Policy Studies, 1997.
- Byers R.B. *Canadian Security and Defence: The Legacy and The Challenges*. London, Canada: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986.
- Clark Joe. "The Canada-United States Arctic Cooperation Agreement." Don Mills, ON: CanWest News: Jan 13, 1988.
- Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. "Draft Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs, Chapter VIII, Relations With The United States, Part 4, Defence Issues, Section H, Arctic Sovereignty." Ottawa, Ontario: January 21st, 1953.
- Department of foreign Affairs and International Trade. "Arctic Sovereignty and Northern Development." Ottawa, Ontario: Memorandum from Secretary, Advisory Committee on Northern Development to Advisory Committee on Northern Development, Chapter V, Part 2, Volume 20 – 508, May 28th, 1954.
- Editorial. "Our throne Speech." Ottawa, On : The Ottawa Citizen: Jan 29, 2001.
- Editorial (opinion). "Sinking of the Polar 8." Edmonton, AB: Edmonton Journal: Feb 22, 1990.
- Editorial. "Military considers security, sovereignty issues northern pipeline." Canadian Press Newswire. Toronto: May 15, 2001.
- Hannaford Nigel. "True North Not Only Unguarded but Also Unwatched." Calgary, AB: Calgary Herald: Sep 5, 2000.
- Huebert Rob. "The Shipping News Part II: How Canada's Arctic Sovereignty Is On Thin Ice". Toronto, Canada: International Journal, Summer 2003. Vol. 58, Iss.3.
- Humphreys Adrian "Canada's troops to reclaim Arctic." Don Mills , ON: National Post: Mar 25, 2004.
- Hunt B.D. and Haycock R.G. *Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century*. Toronto, Canada: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993.
- Jamet Kate. "Arctic vulnerable to Crime: Expert: Police, Army Have Little Presence." Calgary, Alberta: Calgary Herald, Jan 26, 2002.

- Johnston Douglas M. "The Northwest Passage Revisited." New York, US: New York: Ocean Development and International Law, Apr 2002, Vol.33, Iss.2.
- Martin Paul. "Defining Canada's Role In The World". Toronto, Ontario: Toronto Star, 30 October 2004.
- McRae Donald M. "Arctic Sovereignty: Loss by Dereliction? CARC – Northern Perspectives", Volume 22, Number 4, Winter 1994-95.
- National Defence 1994 Defence White Paper.
- Percey David. "North of Sixty: The Postal History of the Canadian Northwest Territories." The American Philatelist, September 1995.
- Pharand Donald. *The Northwest Passage Arctic Straits*. Boston, USA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984.
- Pharand Donald. "Canada doing well on Arctic Sovereignty: Expert". Ottawa, ON: The Ottawa Citizen: Dec 12, 1985.
- Phillips R.A.J.. "Rediscovering Canada's Arctic." Ottawa, Ontario: The Ottawa Citizen, November 21, 1987.
- Pugliese David. Canada not protecting the Arctic, reports warn: dwindling military presence in the North could allow other nations to move in and take over, documents say." Vancouver, BC: The Vancouver Sun: Dec 7, 2000.
- Taylor James H. "Canadian foreign policy and national interests." Toronto: Behind The Headlines, Apr-Jun 1999, Vol.56, Iss.3.
- The Columbia Electronic Encyclopaedia, 6th ed. Northwest Passage, US: Columbia University Press, 2004, www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0836035.html, site visited on 2 Feb 05.
- The Gazette. Montreal, QC: Editorial: Mar 25, 1987.
- Vanderklippe Nathan. "Arctic called tempting terror target." Montreal, Quebec: The Gazette, Sep 19, 2004.
- Vanderklippe Nathan. "Arctic could be target for terrorism." Victoria, BC: Times – colonist, Sept 19, 2004.
- Watt-Cloutier Sheila. "Inuit, Climate Change, Sovereignty, and Security in the Canadian Arctic". Ottawa, Ontario: Inuit Circumpolar Conference Canada, January 25, 2002.
- Wills Terrence. "White paper will spark a likely debate on defence." Montreal, QC: The Gazette, Jun 1, 1987.