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Deterrence: A Policy Option for Canada in the Post Cold War/ 9-11 World

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The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so must we think anew and act anew.[1]

Abraham Lincoln, 1862

Since the end of the Cold War, the international environment can best be characterized as a period of great change and upheaval. Where once we lived in a generally predictable, status quo, bi-polar world dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, today the world is rapidly changing, essentially uni-polar, with the United States the only remaining superpower. Multilateral agencies, most notably the United Nations, which once seemed able to maintain a level of influence and limited control over the actions of nations in a period dominated by proxy actors and great alliances, now find themselves challenged daily from all sides to effectively respond to a myriad of never-ending crisis. The global system is truly anarchical with self-interest the dominant trait.[2] Hyper-nationalism, religious fanaticism, trans-national criminal activity, intra-state wars, rising poverty, famine, global economic inequality, globally occurring diseases, global

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[1] Abraham Lincoln, *Second State of the Union Address*. http://wikisource.org/wiki/Abraham_Lincoln%27s_Second_State_of_the_Union_Address; Internet accessed 30 April 2004.

[2] This comes 28 years after Hedley Bull coined the term in *The Anarchical Society*. Bull argued that the international order was anarchical because there was no over-arching authority exercising control over states, but he postulated that there was order and in his view international law provided the framework, and the need for security and interaction the impetuous. I would argue that today the international order is more anarchical in terms of standard definitions of the word. The current period can be characterized as one of political confusion where the international system is ineffective.

terrorism and genocide are all contributors to what is now a very unstable world.[3]

Canada has not been immune to these challenges, but has been painfully slow recognizing their depth, their impact on the global community, and in taking effective action. "Canadian foreign policy has been stuck in a nostalgic time warp harking back to Canada's status as a middle power within the small club of Western, democratic, market-economy states".[4] As a result, Canada's ability to be an effective international player has declined. Over the past decade, and a direct result of American hegemony, many of the elements that once secured Canadian national influence and importance, arguably at a level greater than deserved, have become less relevant. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which provided excellent access to Europe and where Canada held the self-appointed roles of translator and facilitator between the European nations and the United States, is in a state of transformation and like all other victorious alliances, struggling to find relevance in a world it was not created for. Nor does the United Nations any longer provide a place of great influence for Canada. Member states now number 191 versus the 51 of fifty years ago when Canada first joined. No longer can Canada influence events within the UN as significantly as it could when Canadian foreign policy was in its self-defined 'Golden Age'.[5] And the effectiveness of the United Nations, the leading multilateral body, has been diluted as American hegemony has

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[3] Michael P.C. Carns, "Reopening the Deterrence Debate: Thinking about a Peaceful and Prosperous Tomorrow", Deterrence in the 21st Century, ed. Max G. Manwaring (Chippenham, Anthony Rowe Ltd, 2001), 7.

[4] Bill Dymond and Michael Hart, *The Potemkin Village of Canadian Foreign Policy*. On-line; http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/dec03/dymond.pdf; Internet accessed 29 April 2005

[5] Incredibly, this is how the Department of Foreign and International Trade refers to the period in their own history. That in itself raises questions about where DFAIT now considers itself to be. For more information see http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ciw-cdm/history/history-8-en.asp.

increased.

"Canada is a fading power because international power is primarily about resources, and we have failed to invest in our foreign policy capabilities".[6] In the fiscal sector, while the Canadian economy has been strong and is growing, economic influence has diminished when compared to the other leading economies. In an area that directly relates to influence, Canada ranks 12th in effective aid provided to other countries and has not met agreed upon levels.[7] Military spending is also poor, with the nation ranking 131st when taken as a percentage of GDP.[8] Those numbers are significant, but perhaps the most important reason for Canada's declining influence during this dynamic period has been a tepid and confusing foreign policy and the lack of a clear strategy designed to deal with the post Cold War/ 9-11 world.

While clarity in foreign policy has never been a hallmark of the nation, the failure over the past 15 years to develop and enunciate a cohesive, effective strategy has been debilitating. Canada has tried out many different roles, all to varying degrees of success but few laudatory. Great supporter of the United States, champion of human security, staunch defender of multilateralism and the United Nations, moral voice for the world,

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6 The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, *Canada Now: Fading Power or Future Power?* Minutes of the National Foreign Policy Conference Toronto March 2003; On-line; http://www.ciia.org/proceedings/FPC2003.pdf; Internet accessed 30 April 2005

7 Center for Global Development, *Ranking the Rich;* On-line; http://www.cgdev.org/rankingtherich/aid.html; Internet accessed 29 April 2005. This analysis places Canada 12th in the list of nations on 'effective' aid programs. Effective notes that the aid is in programs that 100% benefit the receiver as opposed to directed back the contributor as debt payments or in some other form. While not the same as effective aid, recently released 2004 OECD statistics for Official Development Assistance (ODA) show Canada standing 9th of 22 nations. See http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Debt/USAid.asp?so=c#oda. Note that Canada stood 7th in 1996.

8 Geography IQ, *Rankings – Military Expenditures Percent of GDP*; On-line; http://www.geographyiq.com/ranking/ranking_Military_expenditures_Percent_Of_GDP_dall.htm; Internet accessed 29 April 2005.

leading advocate and practitioner of Soft Power, critic of American hegemony, critic of the United Nations, supporter of 'coalitions of the willing', critic of 'coalitions of the willing'; the list is lengthy. And although there have been brief moments of glory (the landmines treaty and the International Criminal Court stand above the others), national influence has continued to decline. The single theme and motivation that has united all of these various positions appears to have been 'if it can be done on the cheap'. If Canada wants to reverse the downward trend and avoid becoming irrelevant on the world stage, resources must be applied and a strategy for foreign affairs shaped that examines all ways and utilizes all available tools.

In the development of a new strategy for foreign affairs, Canada should give serious consideration to greater application of an old theory – deterrence. While not one of the major tools consciously in current use by Canada when operating at the international level, it is not unfamiliar. Canada has exercised deterrence many times in its history and officially relies upon it in at least one area today, counter-terrorism. As a member of NATO, Canada participated in Cold War deterrence policies, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. The NATO umbrella itself was an example of extended deterrence. However, as Canadian international influence has declined and as successive governments have reduced the resources that support foreign policy capabilities, deterrence has been dismissed, or worse yet ignored as an option and any ability to exercise credible deterrence has withered away.

This paper proposes that Canada should consciously exercise deterrence, composed of political, military, diplomatic and economic elements, as a tool of national policy, both independently and in concert with other nations, to protect national interests

and enhance national and international security. It will examine the concepts Canada is currently utilizing to advance national interests and exert influence internationally. It will advance options for using deterrence in the current global environment and it will show that deterrence is a realistic option for Canada if adequate resources are applied to support it.

Deterrence theory is currently undergoing a major period of renewed examination and re-invigoration. Ironically, the same event that triggered it signalled the decline of Canadian influence at the international level, the end of the Cold War. For the majority of the last century, deterrence was one of the cornerstones of superpower Cold War policy. Classic deterrence theory reached its zenith with the strategies of Assured Destruction, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and Flexible Response as embraced by the United States and the Soviet Union. Nuclear deterrence became the aspect of the concept that everyone knew and likely understood as the two great powers representing competing ideologies stood against each other. It dominated intellectual thinking and influenced popular culture and global politics from the early 1950s through to the end of the Cold War in 1989. And though it still lingers today and is quietly still at work in the silos and submarines of Russia and the United States, nuclear deterrence has receded from the public psyche as quickly as the USSR. Its job was believed done and although greatly debated, it appears clear that the practice of nuclear deterrence was successful and a major reason that total war was avoided between the two superpowers.[9]

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[9] Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 13.

Yet nuclear deterrence is only one application of a concept that has existed for thousands of years. Over 2000 years ago Sun Tzu advocated deterrence with the strategy of the sheathed sword; "to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill".[10] Though many definitions exist, essentially, "the essence of deterrence is that one party prevents another from doing something the first party does not want by threatening to harm the other party seriously if it does".[11] In the political arena, which is what is being discussed here, it is about prevention, influence and denial, versus punishment, which is the key element in criminal deterrence. The etymology goes back to the Latin *deter Ere*, meaning "to frighten", "to turn aside, discourage, or prevent from acting" or "to inhibit".[12] Deterrence may threaten the use of force, but if force is utilized, it generally means that deterrence has failed. The aim is to by some means prevent conflict, and generally for the deterer, peacefully preserve the status quo and/or achieve desired goals. Deterrence is about coercion and influencing the actions of another. In most cases in the modern era, deterrence is exercised to preserve national security.

In its classic form deterrence is a rational theory that is dependant upon three essential factors; communication, capability and credibility. The only way to inhibit or discourage the potential aggressor is to be able to communicate clearly to him what your limits are, when his actions are considered unacceptable and what will be the result of his ignoring or exceeding your limits.[13] As deterrence is about motivating another in a

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[10] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 77

[11] Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence Now* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1.

[12] Dictionary A-F, Cabrillo College, http://www.cabrillo.cc.ca.us/divisions/english/290/dict/af.html; Internet accessed 29 April 2005.

negative way (prevent someone from doing something by threat), it has elements of fear in it. In fact, its success is dependant upon his fear of your potential actions. Communication need not be verbal, but the message must be clear and unambiguous. Capability is the second essential factor. A nation must possess "the known ability to inflict damage that the opponent will view as unacceptable".[14] Generally, this capability will be resident in military power. However, economic or political power could also serve this purpose (economic sanctions to modify behaviour are an example). The final essential factor is credibility. It is the credibility of the nation, its will to act, and its responses to previous challenges that will determine if the threatened re-action is likely or not. It is generally from assessing a nation's credibility that the opponent will determine the risk associated with his considered course of action and the likelihood of an effective response. Without credibility it is likely that deterrence will fail. The opponent must believe that the threat is real; and that if pushed, the deterrer will shove back hard. Together, communication, capability and credibility make up the essential factors any policy of deterrence needs to be viable and successful.

Generally, in the post Cold War/ 9-11 world, deterrence exists and is practiced as one of four methodologies. As was noted earlier, nuclear deterrence is still an important and thriving area of Russian and American strategy. France, Britain, China and arguably Israel, each of whom possesses an independent nuclear capability, also embrace it.

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[13] Tang Mun Kwong, *The Roles of Diplomacy and Deterrence in the 21st Century*. Journal Of the Singapore Armed Forces. Vol 27 Issue 1, Jan-Mar 2001. Page 5; http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2001/Vol27_1/5.htm; Internet accessed 29 April 2005.

[14] General Andrew J Goodpaster, USA (Retd) and C. Richard Nelson and Seymour J Deitchman, *Deterrence: An Overview*, http://bob.nap.edu/html/pcw/Dt-1.htm; Internet accessed 29 April 2005.

not.[18] This form of deterrence has the potential to be unstable and less successful then the others, as the unsatisfied opponent is usually willing to accept greater risk in order to achieve his goals.[19] Each of these four types of deterrence has its value. However, for Canadians, conventional deterrence is the methodology that offers the greatest potential and that could be most easily incorporated into an effective foreign policy supporting national interests.

Canada has exercised deterrence as an element of its foreign policy in the past. Primarily this has been during the Cold War and primarily as a member of an alliance or international organization. The first occasion was immediately after the Second World War as the Soviet Union entrenched itself in Eastern Europe and the world developed the bi-polar nature that would exist for the next 40 years. The western powers, including Germany, developed a framework to provide western European countries security from the USSR. NATO was founded in 1949 and under the banner of collective defence, initially utilized conventional deterrence to keep the USSR in check. As a member nation, and the fifth largest military power at the end of the war, Canada fully participated in that policy.

As the nuclear capability of the United States grew in the early 1950's, conventional deterrence gave way to its nuclear brother. The policies of Assured Destruction and later, when the Soviets developed their own nuclear force, Mutual Assured Destruction, were implemented. Rather than rely solely upon conventional forces, American nuclear weapons became the backbone of extended deterrence as it was

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[18] Jeffery D. Berejikian, A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence, Journal of Peace Research Vol 39 No 2, 2002, http://www.arches.uga.edu/~jberejik/deterrence.pdf; Internet accessed 29 April 2005, 176

[19] *Ibid*., 177.

exercised within NATO. Canada continued to participate in these policies and support them, to the point of accepting nuclear weapons on Canadian soil and carrying them on Canadian military aircraft at home and in Europe from 1963 to 1984.[20] During the Cold War period, Canada practiced both nuclear and conventional deterrence as elements of its treaty obligations to NATO and in support of national interests (national and international security) and foreign policy.

The second area where Canada has exercised a form of deterrence, although untraditional, is as a member supporting the actions and resolutions of the United Nations. In the early years of the United Nations, Canada was a particularly strong participant in these efforts. One of the stronger military powers and amongst the leaders in economic power, Canada was often at the forefront of action. The establishment of peacekeeping forces provided Canada an opportunity to expand its influence in roles that the nation had the capability and credibility to effectively perform. Communication came under the auspices of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and with it the factors for effective deterrence were established. The Suez, the Golan Heights and Cyprus, were all areas that Canada could execute deterrence credibly and did so in support of the United Nations. This form of deterrence is untraditional or not in the classic style because it involves the insertion of a capability to deter between two independent actors. Peacekeeping is about deterring the original actors from continuing the conflict against each other. It is a secondary form of deterrence utilized in many cases where classic deterrence between the original actors has failed.

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[20] Duane Bratt, *Canada's Nuclear Schizophrenia*, http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=ma02bratt; Internet accessed 29 April 2005. For additional information on nuclear weapons in Canada, see Dr. John M. Clearwater, *Canadian Nuclear Weapons* (Toronto, Dundurn Press, 1998).

The final area where Canada has participated in deterrence has been within coalitions. The first Gulf War is the best example of this. Although a UNSCR authorized the action, it was the coalition established under the leadership of the United States that deployed to the Middle East, and through the exercise of conventional deterrence, threatened Iraq with violence if any further expansionist activity was undertaken. The coalition then attempted to coerce Iraq into relinquishing Kuwait without further hostilities. While some would not recognize the elements of deterrence in this action and would argue that deterrence had failed once Iraq invaded Kuwait, the actions of the coalition were a deterrent and fit within the escalation ladder of coerciveness.[21] It may be more limited then the classic variants seen during the Cold War, but all of the factors were present as was the intent to exercise deterrence on the part of the coalition. It is clear that Canada has exercised deterrence as an element of foreign policy in the past and taking the Gulf War into account, as recently as 1991. However, things have changed since then.

Over the past 14 years Canadian foreign policy has lost its direction, relinquished its sword and retreated into the world of soft power. Participation in the first Gulf War, insignificant as it was, can be viewed as a last gasp, undertaken more for political expediency then to protect and advance national interests.[22] Under the direction of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, Canadian foreign policy slid further away from its traditional

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[21] Paul K. Davis and Brian M. Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism (Santa Monica, RAND, 2002), xii.

[22] The Canadian government was led by Brian Mulroney, who had developed a close, personal relationship with President George HW Bush. Based upon that and the close ties the counties has forged over the course of the Mulroney administration (NAFTA), it is unlikely that Canada was in any position not to be seen as supporting the United States.

activism supported by 'harder' power, towards soft power. Soft power gained attention shortly after being introduced by Joseph Nye in the late 1980's. A distinctly American concept for the exercise of American foreign policy, soft or co-optive power, was one end of a spectrum of 'behavioural power'.[23] It is "the ability to achieve desired outcomes because others want what you want".[24] The counterbalance was command or hard power.[25] Nye was looking at how to obtain desired outcomes, the use of power and the resources required. Soft power quickly gained notoriety, but was misunderstood by many, and by some it was believed to be an alternative to hard power. This is consistent with what occurred within the Canadian government and Foreign Affairs in the 1990's.

When Chrétien came to power in the early 1990's, he initiated a foreign policy review, as has every Prime Minister before him upon taking office. Released in 1995, *Canada in the World* established the path that has been followed since that time. In part the result of being strangled by massive national debt and in part influenced by true liberalism, it avoided defining national interests and establishing a cohesive foreign policy and instead, surprisingly, made Canadian values the central theme. In doing so, the door to confusion was opened and the decline in national influence on the international stage picked up momentum. An effective foreign policy has "a clearly articulated set of interests and values which allow us to ration resources and capabilities effectively and the policies that result from these hard choices address the challenges we

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[23] Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead (New York, Basic Books Inc., 1990), 267.

[24] Reesha Namasivayam, Soft Power at the United Nations; A Compatible Marriage between Canada and the Security Council; http://www.cda-cdai.ca/pdf/namasivayampaper.pdf; Internet accessed 29 April 2005, 4.

[25] Nye, *Bound to Lead*, 267.

face".[26] *Canada in the World* had none of that.

The introduction of this values based foreign policy did not provide for the allocation of resources, which are necessary for establishing power and influence. Instead of a foreign policy based upon national interests being a ways to a means, the values based policy advanced by *Canada and the World* became both the ways and the means, with national interests addressed only nominally. The policy stated "Canadian values, and their projection abroad, are key to the achievement of prosperity within Canada and to the protection of global security".[27] The policy said very little about hard power instead focusing on human security as a key to global stability. Some of the problems with the policy were that none of the values were uniquely Canadian and though laudable (respect for human rights, democracy, an international system ruled by law, sustainable development, support of culture and education), that made it difficult to advance and protect real national interests. In addition, without closely linked political, economic and military resources, there was little capability for Canadian values to be effectively advanced at the international level, which was the key point of *Canada and the World*. As was noted earlier, international power and influence is primarily about those resources and the capability they provide.[28]

Lloyd Axworthy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the late 1990s became the leading advocate of Canadian soft power. He passionately argued that "a soft power

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[26] Michael Ignatieff, *Peace Order and Good Government: A Foreign Policy Agenda for Canada*; http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/skelton/lecture-2004-en.asp; Internet accessed 29 April 2005, 1.

[27] Canada, *Canada and the World*; Part V, Projecting Canadian Values and Culture; http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/chap5-en.asp; Internet accessed 29 April 2005.

[28] The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, *Canada Now: Fading Power or Future Power?*

approach was deemed optimum for Canada, given its traditional foreign policy strengths as a diplomatic middle power with strong capabilities in terms of building consensus and cultivating coalitions".[29] It is clear from his tenure that he believed that Canada could exert influence internationally through the use of soft power. In many ways this was naïve as it ignored the arguments of intellectuals (including Nye), who explained, "the entire notion of soft power was predicated upon the use of at least threat of 'hard' or military power to back it up".[30]

Axworthy and the Canadian government consistently dismissed any arguments about the resources and capabilities required for the exercise of power. Military expenditures were consistently cut, the diplomatic core and overseas Foreign Affairs representation reduced and as noted at the outset, foreign aid goals were not met. One critic labelled Canada's efforts as "Foreign Policy for Wimps".[31] Yet another claimed that Canada was a country without a foreign policy and was relegating itself to the sidelines.[32] Perhaps the most eloquent criticism of Canadian soft power came from Michael Ignatieff, who stated "Soft power is not a substitute for the harder varieties. We will not have influence unless we have power, and we will not have power unless we maintain capabilities. We cannot have the capabilities we need – and these range from a strong diplomatic service, an effective intelligence service, and a combat capable counter-terrorist and peace enforcement force – unless we invest significantly greater

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[29] Namasivayam, *Soft Power at the United Nations*, 6.

[30] *Ibid*., 9.

[31] Kim Nossal, "Foreign Policy for Wimps", *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 April 1998, section A19.

[32] Andrew Coyne, "Canada on the Sidelines", *The National Post*, 26 February 2003; http://andrewcoyne.com/columns/NationalPost/2003/20030226.html; Internet accessed 29 April 2005.

resources from our national budget. We will not be powerful and will not have influence, therefore, unless we have political leadership that is unafraid to challenge the Canadian electoral preference for being nice on the cheap".[33]

Canada needs a foreign policy that supports its national interests and is capable of defending and enhancing them in the post Cold War/ 9-11 world. Soft power as practiced by Canada has devalued Canadian influence in the world because it is not suited to the international challenges faced today. It is a concept that appears positive but in reality is an empty shell when practiced in isolation. "Soft power by itself provides no leverage".[34] And without leverage it is very difficult to influence serious international actors and deal with serious issues. In 1999, as the issue of UN weapons inspectors in Iraq and sanctions was once again heating up, Canada tried to find a middle path between opposing nations in the Security Council.[35] Canada was able to get the Security Council to pass a resolution that set up panels to assess the issues and their impact. While initially this appears to be a success, it was not. China and Russia abstained from the vote, the panels were never set up, the Council remained divided over the issues and "Canada was even accused of working to lower the standard of Iraqi compliance".[36] Soft power was not suited for that type of problem.

There were other events over the past 10 years where Canada realized soft power

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[33] Michael Ignatieff, *Peace Order and Good Government*, 3.

[34] Allan Gotlieb, "Canada Must Return to its Golden Age of Diplomacy", *The National Post*, 10 September 2003; http://www.canada.com/national/features/foreignfields/story.html?id=a27b6d11-1cdd-412c-bcce-abec995e6e19; Internet accessed 29 April 2005.

[35] Namasivayam, *Soft Power at the United Nations*, 16.

[36] *Ibid.*

would not work when strong action was most needed. In some of those cases, Canada temporarily abandoned its self-praised policy to remain an engaged actor. Nuclear weapon testing by India and Pakistan, the intervention in Kosovo, NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, and the invasion of Afghanistan were all hard power issues; issues that required capability and credibility to resolve, not just "the stern voice of the daughter of God".[37] Canada wielded very little influence on these issues because there was no Canadian capability and almost no influence. This was very apparent in the weeks leading up to the invasion of Iraq in early 2003, when once again Canadian representatives at the United Nations worked to find some middle ground, the so-called Canadian Option, between Security Council members (the United States supported by Britain opposing France and Germany). However, without influence or credibility, no one accepted what was in reality a logical alternative to the polarized positions of the two groups. By the time the invasion of Iraq occurred, the nation could only follow other more important nations that led and was but a very small voice well to the back. Having reached a very low level with respect to the nation's ability to exert influence internationally, new ways must be found to improve on the current situation and permit Canada to more effectively conduct foreign affairs.

Canada's new International Policy Statement, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, takes direct aim at ensuring that Canada is capable and prepared to handle the challenges of the post Cold War/ 9-11 world. Its harder edge indicates a shift in policy and a willingness to invigorate and utilize all of the elements that promote national

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[37] Margaret MacMillan, "A New Foreign Policy? Not Necessarily", *The National Post*, 11 September 2003; http://www.canada.com/national/features/foreignfields/story.html?id=02a48b96-77fd-4215-9fef-192bd3f23492; Internet accessed 29 April 2005.

power.[38] By increasing capability across the spectrum, Canada puts itself in a position to effectively utilize deterrence as a tool to protect national interests and preserve national security. By marrying hard power with soft power, leverage will be gained and with it will ultimately come greater influence. The policy statement shows a clear understanding of that concept. But why use deterrence? Simply stated, it is a concept that is well suited for the current environment with its many challenges. It is security focussed, it is flexible enough to adapt to different situations, and when considered in the conventional context, it has the ability to respond at different levels.

Clearly, if Canada is to practice deterrence it will primarily be conventional deterrence. It will involve economic, political, diplomatic and military power. Action on the part of the nation will range from co-opting an opponent, through to deterrence by threat, right up to enhancing future deterrence by taking significant action now. That spectrum reflects the 'Ladder of Escalation' detailed by Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins in their RAND Study on deterrence.[39] At the lowest level of the spectrum, influence will be exercised and the aim will be to deter undesired actions by co-opting the opponent. That can be achieved through diplomatic means; offering support on some other matter, or economic means; using aid, trade or cash to obtain the desired goal; deterrence of the undesired action. As one slides along the scale, the greater the potential danger or undesirable action, the greater the likelihood that the higher ends of the spectrum will be used and military force required to effectively deter the opponent. Accepting that

national and international security is globally amongst the highest priorities today, it is likely that any threats to security will be dealt with swiftly and at very highest force levels. The recent actions in Afghanistan and Iraq support that.

Already it can be seen that in order to effectively practice conventional deterrence, a sound economy, effective foreign ministry and a strong, combat capable military will be required. They are required not only because they permit flexibility with respect to options and provide an ability to execute deterrence at different levels, but also because they are the capability that was defined as one of the essential factors for effective deterrence. Additionally, possessing a strong and effective capability in those areas will halt the decline in national influence experienced over the past 15 years and addressed by Prime Minister Martin in the new policy statement.[40] Current promises to increase foreign aid and re-vitalize the Canadian Forces with new equipment, new personnel and a new structure are aimed at reversing the decline and establishing a new level of international power for Canada.

Possession of strong capabilites, unspoken threats per se, just by their existence will deter many opponents from taking action. That is the first stage in deterring terrorism, an area of prime interest and a major threat to national security and global stability. The question of deterring terrorism is greatly debated. Opponents argue that terrorists cannot be deterred because they are not rational actors. Lawrence Freedman, as well as others, do not agree with that viewpoint.[41] In the majority of cases there is something of value to the terrorist that can be threatened, leaving them vulnerable to

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[40] Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement*, 2.

[41] Freedman, *Deterrence*, 124. See also Davis and Jenkins, *Deterrence and Influence* and Daniel S. Gressing, *Deterrence in the 21st Century*.

deterrence. For example, threatening the ability of terrorists to conduct a successful operation. Strong security forces, complete and fully exercised procedures and effective intelligence forces all pose a threat to terrorist activity. If national capabilities are such that they pose an unnacceptable risk to the terrorist, and attach greater risk to the success of an operation, the likelihood is good that the terrorist will turn away from that course of action. Their mission success is the key element and terrorist leaders are known to be risk adverse.[42] Strong capabilities, leveraged through conventional deterrence can deter some terrorism.

Conventional deterrence also has applicability when dealing with states that support terrorist activities, states that are threats to international security and global stability and at a lower level, states that provide a haven for illegal activity such as drugs. In the first case, persuasion, exercised by political and diplomatic power, is one likely option. The opponent has to clearly understand that any support of terrorist activity is unacceptable and a line not to be crossed. For states that threaten security and stability, for example through the exportation of arms, similar tactics could be used. In the final example, economic power, and perhaps military power would be effective. A good example is the American effort against criminal activity in Central America.

In some cases it would be appropriate for Canada to exercise deterrence in a multilateral setting, through alliances or as part of coalitions. As already discussed, this has been a choice many times in the past. However, since the end of the Cold War, Canada's ability to make significant contributions, especially military forces, has been limited. With increased capability, the nation could be a greater partner within these

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[42] Davis and Jenkins, *Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism,* xii.

arrangements. In fact, as capability increases over future years, Canada should be encouraging multilateral security management as it compliments and reflects the objectives of the new international policy. It supports the national commitment to multilateralism and provides the best option for securing both national and international security. Deterrence exercised collectively through a multilateral organization would multiply the individual capabilites of each individual nation. In many ways that was the promise of NATO. It has often been the dream of the United Nations.

Deterrence as a tool of national policy is a realistic option for Canada as long as there exists commitment to increase capabilites, and the national will exists to make hard decisions. Without that kind of a commitment, two of the essential factors for effective deterrence would not exist. The recently released policy statement is positive for Canada in that it advocates measures that will increase capability and also makes a commitment to improve all elements of Canadian power. Increasing capability alone will begin to improve Canada's position with respect to international influence. The small changes in how economic power is to be applied (the re-focusing of aid to fewer countries to increase effectiveness) will complement the improvement in military capability, and in time will enable the exercise of power. It will not take great numbers to improve the current situation and put Canada in a position to be able to effectively practice deterrence. It only requires enough that the deterrent threat be credible.

This paper has advocated that Canada should conciously exercise deterrence as a tool of national policy. The main reason for advancing the proposal is that deterrence would provide another option which could be used to enhance and preserve Canadian national interests and security. Currently, Canada is a nation with very little influence

and no international power. The policies and concepts followed since the end of the Cold War have not been successful and have hastened the nation's declining influence. Soft power exercised alone, the primary policy employed by Canada at the international level, has proven itself to be poorly suited to the post Cold War/ 9-11 environment. Elements of hard power are also required by any nation that intends to try and influence international behaviour. An ability to operate along the spectrum from hard power to soft power utilizing political, diplomatic, economic and military elements as required would also permit the nation to effectively exercise deterrence.

This paper has also shown that Canada has a history that includes successfully practicing deterrence. It examined the essential factors for the effective exercise of deterrence; communication, capability and credibility, and has shown how they contribute. It also showed how capability and credibility enhance influence. Nuclear deterrence, the dominant strategy of the Cold War, is not an option for Canada. However, conventional deterrence, which "requires an integrated course of action utilizing all elements of national power" is well suited for the nation.[43] It is robust, adaptable and can be effective on numerous levels. With a credible capability and national will, conventional deterrence could be utilized to protect national interests and enhance Canadian and international security, independantly or within a multilateral system. Canada's new International Policy Statement indicates that a greater national capability using the elements of power, and a will to wield that power is at hand. With that capability delivered, deterrence is a viable and credible foreign policy option for Canada.

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[43] Menk, *Conventional Deterrence*, 2.

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