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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
CSC 31 / CCEM 31

EXERCISE / EXERCICE NEW HORIZONS

Individual Research Project

**THE JOINT SUPPORT SHIP A HARBINGER OF THE REVOLUTION IN
MILITARY AFFAIRS FOR CANADIAN FORCES' JOINTNESS OBJECTIVE
AND A FORCE MULTIPLIER OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY'S
HUMAN SECURITY AGENDA**

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Abstract

The CF's intention to create a rapidly deployable force is déjà vu. In 1963 the MND, Paul Hellyer, sought to transform the CF into a triphibious force. Hellyer's plan was rejected by cabinet for its unaffordability and inconsonance to Foreign Policy. To achieve its force transformation, the CF has now embarked upon the RMA path. Concurrently, Foreign Affairs have identified the Human Security Agenda (HSA) as a high priority. Hellyer's era suggest that a viable CF transformation needs to be affordable and consistent to Foreign Policy. Thus, the CF must bear in mind the HSA in the pursuit of a new force restructuration. The JSS is one such transformation, where initial requirements have considered jointness needs of Land and SOF Sealift, a key element of the CF RMA doctrinal change. The JSS will become a harbinger of the CF RMA jointness objective, and a force multiplier of the HSA.

IT'S NOT ENOUGH THAT WE DO OUR BEST; SOMETIMES WE HAVE TO DO WHAT'S REQUIRED.

SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has been the subject of numerous books and articles. Its definition varies from one author to the other, but the consensus seems to indicate that an RMA has three pillars, namely doctrine, technology and organisation. An RMA occurs when changes to either doctrine, technology or organisation cause significant transformations to modify the dynamic of how warfare is conducted by armed forces. Military operations over the last century have shown that technology has consistently been a catalyst of changes in the conduct warfare. Though technology appears to have been at the forefront of the changes, it is the transformations that ensued in doctrine and organisation, which made it a true revolution.

The Joint Support Ship (JSS) project will deliver the first major capital acquisition that embraces true services jointness, an objective of the Canadian Forces (CF) doctrinal transformation. It may very well become the model by which future acquisition of a jointness nature will be measured by. What makes the JSS a catalyst, capable of generating that type of doctrinal transformation for the CF, is predicated on the fact that it will be the first project to deliver a capability for all services where they effectively can work in a jointness fashion while conducting sealift operations for the Land or Special Operations Forces or providing Afloat Support to Forces Ashore. The JSS will feature three key capabilities, that of Support to Naval Task Group, Strategic Sealift capable of jetty independent offloading (potentially a welldeck, identical to that found on amphibious ships), and Afloat Support to Forces Deployed Ashore. This will go a long way in charting the course for all CF services to develop a new jointness vision, which

could eventually lead to joint operations, and possibly engender radical organisational transformations. As suggested by Mitchell, “[a]most certainly, the JSS will be a catalyst for the CF in improving joint relations among the services.”¹

Concurrent to the CF’ RMA, the Department of Foreign Affairs has redirected its focus on issues such as the Human Security Agenda (HSA). Canada’s influence abroad can be made through numerous means ranging from diplomatic, economic to military. The CF have long recognised their ability to assist Foreign Affairs with the HSA, but also understand that new resources would be necessary for that contribution to be more effective, relevant and attributable to Canada.

It is argued that JSS will significantly move the CF jointness objective of its RMA, in addition to providing a meaningful capability in support of the Canadian Foreign Policy’s HSA. Thus, JSS will be the harbinger of the RMA for the CF’ jointness objective, directly capable of supporting the Canadian Foreign Policy’s HSA.

Before describing the type of capability the CF require to support their government, the need for both Foreign and Defence Policies to work in consonance will be discussed through the lenses of Hellyer’s era. Armed with the lessons learnt from that era, a general description of the RMA and how it applies to the CF will follow. Finally, the contribution of the JSS as it pertains to the CF’s RMA objectives of deployability, restructuration and jointness will be articulated.

¹ Paul T. Mitchell, “Joint Support Ship.” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute; Vol. 130 Issue 3 (Mar 04): 66.

PAUL HELLYER'S ERA REVISITED

A PESSIMIST SEES THE DIFFICULTY IN EVERY OPPORTUNITY; AN OPTIMIST SEES THE OPPORTUNITY IN EVERY DIFFICULTY.

SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL

The Land Forces' intention to create a light, lethal and rapidly deployable force is nothing new. Similar attempts were made as early as the mid-1960s when the then Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Paul Hellyer, wanted to bring the three services together. Haydon suggests that "perhaps there is something to learn from this particular piece of history that may help guide the latest attempt to develop a credible Canadian rapid reaction force."²

Dr. R.J. Sutherland, a well-respected defence scientist, performed the first study Hellyer commissioned to restructure the CF. In this study, he recommended a triphibious force.³ This force was to be composed of a mechanised brigade and 30 VSTOL tactical air wing embarked in two light aircraft carriers. For protection purpose, the carriers were to be escorted by anti-submarine and anti-aircraft defence ships.⁴ Thus, the report recommended a task force centred on Land Forces supported by Air and Maritime Forces, all embarked in naval vessels. Nowadays, the proposed structure and

² Peter Haydon, "Canadian Amphibious Capabilities: Been there, Done it, Got the T-shirt!," *Maritime Affairs* (Winter 2001): 14.

³ From the description of this task force, the word triphibious leads to confusion due to the implied amphibious connotation. By design, aircraft carriers are not capable of amphibious operations, but can support these. Therefore, the inference to amphibious may have more to do with the Air and Land assets being borne in naval platforms.

⁴ Haydon, *Canadian Amphibious Capabilities ...*, 15.

composition of the task force would be qualified as a jointness approach to Special Operations or Land Forces operations.

Hellyer rejected most of the studies that followed Sutherland's first report for not being aggressive enough in their approach to Forces Transformation. One must remember that at the time the Canadian Government was trying to make a significant contribution to NATO, readily identifiable to Canada, but yet without incurring defence budget increases. Hellyer's triphibious vision could have achieved that readily identifiable Canadian contribution, but at a significant cost.

Through high-level discussion with senior NATO officials, staff from External Affairs realised how critical the actual number of ASW platforms was during the Cold War. The introduction of two aircraft carriers in the triphibious vision, though capable of ASW operation, would have led to a net reduction of Canadian ASW platforms.

Therefore, the triphibious option was doomed for its unaffordability and inconsonant to Foreign Policy. Haydon notes that Hellyer's vision "failed because Cabinet would not support either the radical shift in policy or related costs, which were considerable."⁵

Transposing these lessons to today's context of Rapid-Reaction Forces (RRF) may reveal to be quite useful, especially in relation to the Canadian Foreign Policy and the JSS. Starting with the Foreign Policy perspective, the subject of HSA now occupies a prominent place in the new International policy statement.⁶ This issue is most important

⁵ Haydon, *Canadian Amphibious Capabilities ...*, 14.

⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World - DIPLOMACY*, <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/IPS/IPS-Diplomacy.pdf>; Internet; accessed 21 April 2005, (Ottawa: Canada, 2005), 14.

to Canadians, as it is more effective to tackle conflicts at the source and in their infancy rather than when they culminate to full arms confrontation. Supporting this view, Gimblett suggests “Canada is made more secure by seeing to the resolution of global problems at their source, before they can expand to threaten the Canadian heartland.”⁷ Given the need to affects conditions abroad, Canada has at least three departments, which can contribute to the shaping of the environment on foreign land, in support of the HSA, namely Foreign Affairs, International Development Agency and Defence. Rudd suggests that when “Clausewitz spoke of goals and means, he was referring to foreign policy objectives and the use of military force to achieve them.”⁸ To this end, the CF have a significant role to play and can bring to bear the necessary resources in support of the HSA.

The question then becomes what resources could the CF contribute? One such resource could very well be the JSS, with its Sealift⁹, Command and Control¹⁰, and

⁷ LCdr Richard Gimblett (Ret’d). 2002. *Combat Capability and the Canadian Forces: Where are We Now? (And in the Foreseeable Future)*, Paper presented at the annual seminar of the Conference of Defence Associations, 3.

⁸ David L. Rudd, “Strategic Sealift and Airlift: The Neglected Dimension of Canadian Defence Policy,” (master’s thesis, Dalhousie University, 1995), 155.

⁹ It is important to point out that the JSS will be designed to carry equipment only. This explains the recent flurry of articles discussing the need for troop carrying platforms ranging from Landing Platform Dock ships to light Aircraft Carriers, as well as suggestions that the doctrine of moving troops by air and equipment by sea is now obsolete. That being said, this troop carrying capability could be the subject of another paper, and will not be discussed. Nonetheless, JSS will still be able to make a significant Canadian contribution to the Human Security Agenda, once the troops have arrived in the theatre of operation.

¹⁰ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Afloat Logistics and Sealift Capability Ships (ALSC) Concept of Employment Guidance* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000), 9. The inherent headquarters command and control support capability that JSS will be able to provide consist of: Accommodation, working space and facilities for Command, Control and Communication staff (notionally up to 75 personnel) to support a JTFHQ; and, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief – Command, Control and communication facilities to supplement or enhance the Disaster Assistance and Relief Team (DART) or the follow-on mission.

Afloat Support to Forces Ashore¹¹ capabilities. For humanitarian missions, the forces ashore could be a mix of military and civilian personnel. Cdr Aikens is a proponent of this jointness concept suggesting "...the Land Forces [need to] develop the capability to rapidly deploy a Battalion Group in ships ... to make contributions to international and human security."¹² Thus, JSS will have the capability to contribute to the HSA due to the jointness capabilities it will bring to the Land or Special Operations Forces.

The concept of supporting humanitarian missions, especially off of naval vessels, has its critics. Mitchell, for one, questions the wisdom of using JSS for such operation "using JSS as an NGO/PVO taxicab to international hotspots, may earn the plaudits of politicians, but will distract the Navy from its other duties."¹³ Counter to this argument, first, one must understand that it is Canada and not the CF who is procuring the vessel, and the Canadian Government, upon consultation with senior military officials, will decide on which resources to commit. Second, the CF have an important role to play in support of the HSA, which may entail the employment of major capital assets such as the JSS. Finally, there are many phases in a humanitarian operation, some of which may involve the participation of NGO/PVO personnel who could also be supported from the

¹¹ DND, Canadian ALSC ..., 9.

Support to Forces Ashore Capability inherent in the JSS will comprise of:

- Non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). Command, Control and Communication facilities in support of NEO activities;
- Limited support to operations of forces ashore with C3 facilities, Role Three medical / dental facilities, maritime and army tactical helicopter operations, and rest and recreation facilities;
- Capability to embark, transport, and operate army tactical helicopters; and,
- Capability to conduct cross-operations with cargo/transport helicopters

¹² Commander G. Aikens, "Beyond ALSC: We Need to Get Amphibious and Joint to Stay Relevant," Maritime Affairs (Winter 2001): 12.

¹³ Mitchell, Joint Support Ship, 66.

ship. Supporting that train of thought, during a recent workshop to discuss future capabilities required for the Canadian Navy beyond 2020, Gimblett reported “a determined commitment to deliver humanitarian assistance will require a rigorous application of many of the core capabilities across the spectrum of warfare.”¹⁴ Thus, to effectively support the HSA, the CF will need to deploy robust resources, which could span all the way to major capital assets, such as the JSS.

In summary, Hellyer’s era taught us that a viable CF transformation needs to be affordable and consistent with Foreign Policy. This triphibious option would now be qualified as a jointness approach to operations. This jointness in operation is gaining momentum, especially as it pertains to RRF in support of humanitarian operations. To this end, the Canadian Forces will need to deploy robust resources to effectively support humanitarian mission, such as a force multiplier like the JSS.

Now that the importance of the HSA has been established, and that JSS will bring key capabilities in support of this Foreign Affairs’ objective, the RMA in the CF will be examined next.

REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

IF WE DON’T TAKE CHANGE BY THE HAND, IT WILL ONE DAY SEIZE US BY THE THROAT.

SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL

¹⁴ LCdr Richard Gimblett, “A ‘Transformational’ Fleet for Canada in The 21st Century,” *Maritime Affairs* (Spring/Summer 2000): 43.

What is the Revolution in Military Affairs? Sloan suggests that there are varied and numerous definitions. For the purpose of the present paper, we will use the following definition:

An RMA is a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations.¹⁵

The CF have been actively engaged down the RMA path for close to a decade now. During his tenure as Minister of National Defence, The Honourable Art Eggleton argued that “exploring and understanding the RMA is vital if Canada is to meet its future defence objectives.”¹⁶ This led to the development of the strategic document for the CF, *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*, more commonly referred to as Strategy 2020. Strategy 2020 highlights several key objectives that will guide the future strategic direction of the CF:

jointness, ensuring [the] C[anadian] F[orces] are interoperable with the U.S. forces and capable of combined operations, and developing a force structure that is more rapidly deployable to crisis spots around the world (all of which figure as important elements of the RMA).¹⁷

This paradigm shift in the way militaries and services operate together, respectively in a combinedness and jointness fashion, falls within the realm of doctrinal changes. For the CF, doctrinal changes also include rapidly deployable and flexible Land

¹⁵ Benjamin S., Lambeth, "The Technology Revolution in Air Warfare," *Survival*, Vol. 39, No 1 (Spring 1997): 75.

¹⁶ Art Eggleton, “Creating the Canadian Forces of 2020,” Keynote address to the annual CDIA conference, Ottawa, 26 April 2000.

¹⁷ Elinor C. Sloan, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 125.

Forces, future use of unmanned aircraft and vehicles, and naval forces moving from blue-water to littoral warfare.¹⁸ Reflecting upon Strategy 2020's vision, Sloan re-emphasises some of the changes proposed to foster the RMA in the CF, "including targeting leading-edge technologies and doctrines, enhancing deployability, and strengthening interoperability."¹⁹ Thus, key objectives necessary to fulfil CF's doctrinal changes include the need for interoperability between services and militaries to enhance jointness and combinedness in operations, rapidly deployable and flexible forces, and develop the ability to restructure forces to conduct littoral warfare.

Following the introduction of Strategy 2020, a number of initiatives have been put in place to facilitate and promote transformation in the CF, such as Capability Based Planning, Strategic Capability Investment Program, and the annual reporting on Plans and Priorities in the different services.²⁰ This change of focus in the day to day planning of CF capability generation is already noticeable. The methodical approach taken to transform and modernise the CF is expressed in the 2004-2005 Report on Planning and Priorities. This report provides the focus on the capabilities necessary to meet Canada's

¹⁸ Sloan, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), executive summary accessed on the Internet on 19 April 2005 at http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/521_e.htm.

¹⁹ Sloan, *The Revolution in Military Affairs ...*, 125.

²⁰ Department of National Defence, 2004-2005 Report on Plans and Priorities (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000), 17. With transformation and modernization as guiding principles, Defence will ensure that the CF remains relevant and effective to meet the challenges of the future, both at home and abroad. By aligning our capabilities with our fiscal and security realities, we will improve our ability to defend Canada's national and international interests. The foundation for this longer-range vision is outlined in the Strategic Operating Concept, and the transformation and modernization processes will be informed by the international and defence policy reviews.

current and future defence and security needs. In support of these requirements, the following priorities have been established:

- Focus strategic planning efforts on the required capabilities;
- Enhance the capability to operate effectively in joint, interagency and multinational environments; and
- Actively shift resources and effort from lower to higher priority initiatives to accelerate the pace of transformation.²¹

Stemming from the September 11th events and the introduction of the new Canadian National Security Policy, a new component has been added to the interoperability requirement, that of interagency. It can be seen that planning efforts and resources will be redirected to initiatives of higher importance to enhance effective operation in joint, interagency and multinational environments.

From a holistic RMA approach, Sloan has identified seven areas where the CF are moving ahead to meet future defence objectives: “precision munitions; battlespace awareness; joint/combinedness; interoperability; rapid deployability of ground forces; unmanned combat; and, littoral warfare.”²² A cursory review of the JSS design capabilities indicates that it will be able to contribute to five of these areas, namely battlespace awareness, jointness and combinedness, interoperability, rapid deployability of ground forces equipment, and littoral warfare in a benign environment. Mitchell supports this assessment, where “the JSS will be the first major capital project that will conform directly to several of the objectives outlined in [Strategy 2020].”²³

²¹ DND, 2004-2005 Report on Plans and Priorities, 16-17.

²² Sloan, *The Revolution in Military Affairs ...*, 126-137.

²³ Mitchell, Joint Support Ship, 64-65.

In summary, key objectives necessary to fulfil CF' doctrinal changes include: the need for interoperability between services, interagencies and militaries to enhance jointness and combinedness in operations, the need for rapidly deployable and flexible forces, and the requirement to perform littoral operations. By design, the JSS will bring capabilities to support several of those key objectives. These three objectives will be examined next.

CANADIAN FORCES TRANSFORMATION

WE SHALL NOT FAIL OR FALTER, WE SHALL NOT WEAKEN OR TIRE... GIVE US THE TOOLS AND WE WILL FINISH THE JOB.
SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL

RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE FORCES

Starting with the requirement for rapidly deployable and flexible forces, this objective covers the need to enhance the combat preparedness, global deployability and sustainability of the Naval, Air, Special Operations and Land Forces.²⁴ Strategy 2020 proposes a radical shift to the strategic mobility of the Land Forces focusing it to rapid deployability. It also specifies the need for flexible Forces, which combined with the requirement for rapid deployability leads to the need for RRF. This topic will be covered in the restructuration section.

It is worth noting that the Canadian Navy has consistently been able to deploy first and arrive quickly to a theatre of operation, thus suggesting that Land Forces could

²⁴ Department of National Defence, *Shaping the Future of the CF: A Strategy for 2020* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1999), 10.

take advantage of this situation. Therefore, a possible scenario for the deployment of this RRF would be for it to have the ability to be deployable by sea.

When it comes to the movement of a large force contingency, the CF have long recognised the need for strategic lift as part of the rapid deployability requirement of all services. By their nature, Naval and Air assets are intrinsically deployable, but Naval platforms have the added ability to self-sustain for several months and their staying power is predicated on the availability of resupply ships while on station. Conversely, the Land Force requires a significant combination of strategic Air- and Sealift as to rapidly and globally deploy in any significant capacity. Thus, strategic lift (the mean) becomes an essential part of the force structure in order to be able to rapidly deploy the Land Force (to the means) to their operational area, to fulfil its mission (to the end). It is following this logical deduction that Rudd coined the phrase “the means to the means to the end” when referring to strategic lift.²⁵ Neither Sealift, nor airlift does exist in the CF arsenal at the present time, a situation that will be partially rectified upon the introduction of the JSS, with its equipment Sealift capability the size of a Vanguard Group.

That being said, Strategic lift is only worth pursuing if the Land Forces can deploy in sufficient number, and with the proper equipment, to make a significant Canadian contribution abroad. The Land Forces restructuring will be discussed in the next section. For its part, the JSS will only address the deployability of the Land or Special Operations Forces equipment, thus suggesting the obvious need for additional projects to fill the void for troops transportation.

²⁵ Rudd, *Strategic Sealift and Airlift ...*, 155.

Nonetheless, each JSS will have the capability to carry a CJTFHQ of up to 75 staff and be able to temporarily accommodate an additional 210 members. If needed, this provides the option to deploy a small contingent of troops and equipment in a benign environment, and reduce the footprint ashore. Furthermore, there could be instances when the Canadian Government cannot or may not want to commit its Forces immediately, and a naval platform offers that flexibility. As Gimblett suggested “sea-basing offers the advantages that transit times can be extended as desired, and that a secure rear area is immediately available.”²⁶

In summary, a viable scenario for the deployment of this RRF would be for it to have the ability to be moved by sea. Naval platforms offer benefits to strategic lift, a situation that should not escape the attention of other services. In addition, a ship provides the option to the Government of poising off a coast until the situation warrants intervention. The JSS will be able to address part of the rapid deployability needs of the Land or Special Operations Forces, with its equipment Sealift capability. Finally, the need for Strategic lift is only worth pursuing if the Land Forces can make a significant Canadian contribution abroad, thus bringing us to the issue of Forces Restructuration.

FORCES RESTRUCTURATION

Hellyer’s era showed that the Forces capability requirements need to take into consideration Foreign Policies, to reflect the type of impact Canada wishes to have on the international scene. To this effect, the emergence of the HSA as the next major issue of

²⁶ Gimblett, *Combat Capability and the Canadian Forces ...*, 5-6.

the Canadian Foreign Policy was discussed. Thus, the restructuring of the CF must take into consideration the HSA in order to contribute to the Canadian Foreign Policy.

The HSA presupposes that Canada intends to make an impact abroad, and that military assistance may be required at short notice. This implies that the CF need a rapidly deployable and flexible force. Since the Navy has consistently shown the ability to deploy first to a theatre of operation, it would be logical to restructure some elements of the Land Force into a seagoing RRF. It is not suggested that the entire CF should restructure into a Marine Corp like service, but rather that the RRF being developed by the Land Force should be capable of performing amphibious like operations from a ship. This concept of littoral operation is supported by the proposed CF Strategic Operating concept in that:

The ability to operate effectively in the land-sea interface will be crucial for future armed forces. Thus the CF must be capable of operating in the challenging littoral battlespace – jointly and as an element of a coalition force. This will be the ultimate manifestation of Canadian joint capability at the far end of the joint spectrum and a key force development objective for the CF. This joint capability will be required both internationally and similarly for force projection into remote Canadian littorals.²⁷

This is quite a tall order for CF' services. They presently lack the knowledge and experience to perform joint operations, let alone in a demanding environment such as that of a littoral. Hence, it is suggested that the new RRF should be structured as an element capable of performing amphibious like operations, but from a jointness perspective, with the support of Air and Naval Forces.

²⁷ Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Strategic Operating Concept - Draft 4.4 for CDS review (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2004), 27.

This then begs the question of the type of capability the RRF will require, and the force transformation necessary on the part of the Navy and Air Force to support that change. The Air Force transformation requirement could be the subject of an entirely new paper and will not be discussed here. The Naval support requirements, to this Land Force transformation, seem to indicate that the present structure of the Canadian Navy needs to be refocused to also support amphibious like operations. Some of the requirement could entail the need for large amphibious ships, outfitting the present fleet with the necessary armament for Naval Fire Support (NFS), whilst maintaining a balanced fleet. As suggested by Haydon, large amphibious ships “would provide an important part of the necessary fleet balance and flexibility needed to meet the mandate of Strategy 2020.”²⁸ Leadmark argues the necessity to enhance NFS to influence events ashore.²⁹ Gimblett goes even further by suggesting that:

Canadian naval forces operating in the littoral could expect to participate in mid-intensity hostilities and will require: global deployability; across-the-beach delivery; self-defence; C4ISR, area air defence; green water underwater warfare; operational sustainment; naval fire [support]; and, in-theatre airlift.³⁰

Furthermore, the requirement to escort the amphibious task group becomes obvious when considering that the ship(s) becomes a high value asset. This reinforces the need for the Navy to maintain a balanced fleet, whilst developing the amphibious capability as an

²⁸ Haydon, *Canadian Amphibious Capabilities ...*, 18.

²⁹ Department of National Defence, *Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2001), 160. Naval fire support is defined as fire provided by naval gun, missile and electronic-warfare systems against targets ashore in support of a unit or units on land. This competency component will allow for the protection of forces deploying ashore until they are able to establish sufficient defensive capabilities to protect themselves, or for the preparation of the operating area prior to the insertion of the land forces if required.

³⁰ Gimblett, *A ‘Transformational’ Fleet for Canada in The 21st Century*, 44.

integral part of its arsenal. Cdr Aikens has suggested that the Navy “needs to get into the amphibious business, which would imply jointness with the Army, if it wants to stay relevant.”³¹ Therefore, the Navy needs to develop these capabilities if it wishes to become more relevant to Land Force operations.

Now, how can this RRF, capable of amphibious like operations, support the HSA? In first instance, the choice of a naval platform to deploy that force makes for a very effective capability. This is based on the fact that close to 70 percent of the world population lives within 250 km from the littoral, and present NFS can reach up to 1000 km inland. This concept of littoral operation is not entirely foreign to the Canadian Navy. During the Korean War, the Canadian Navy performed NFS by way of gunning down trains and railways, which gained them the nickname of train busters. Moreover, most of the resources needed to conduct modern warfare are just as necessary to support humanitarian missions. Finally, the Canadian Navy does not have to make any significant changes to its fleet composition to support the Land Force transformation. Gimblett indicates that “most of the humanitarian assistance role is achievable with the present fleet mix, with the missing capabilities being generated by MHP and JSS projects.”³² Therefore, the most significant change for the Navy will be doctrinal, where the JSS Class will lead the way with a shift of focus from blue- to green-water operations. JSS will also be designed with a Sealift capability that will feature jetty independent operation, which opens to the possibility of amphibious like operation. It is

³¹ Aikens, *Beyond ALSC ...*, 12.

³² Gimblett, *A ‘Transformational’ Fleet for Canada in The 21st Century*, 44.

obvious that sufficient time and new procedures will be required before any such operation can be performed. Notwithstanding the lack of doctrine, JSS will provide the maiden capability to allow the development of such a concept of operation, which initially may be done in a jointness fashion but eventually leading to full joint operations. As advanced by Mitchell, the JSS “may mark the transition of the Navy from a blue-water, destroyer-based fleet to a globally [and rapidly] deployable ‘green-water’ [coastal or littoral waters] fleet with a more land-support-oriented mission.”³³ This has all the making of a transformation for the Canadian Navy.

In summary, jointness in operations rather than joint operations may be a more appropriate course of action for the CF restructuring. This restructuring shall take into consideration the HSA for the CF to harmonise capabilities to Canadian Foreign Policy. The new RRF should be structured as an element capable of performing amphibious like operations. To support this concept, and become more relevant to Land and Special Operations Forces, the Canadian Navy will have to shift focus from blue- to green-water operations. JSS will greatly facilitate in that matter, by providing the catalyst to allow the development of such a doctrine, which at first may be done in a jointness fashion and eventually evolve to full joint operations.

JOINTNESS AND COMBINEDNESS

The Canadian Navy and Air Force have a long history of jointness in maritime operations, which was consolidated through the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) role, and

³³ Mitchell, Joint Support Ship, 64

where the use of helicopter for ASW has been a force multiplier. Similarly, the Canadian Air Force and Army have also worked in a jointness fashion for a considerable amount of time, especially in the area of tachel, light airlift and ISR support. The next logical step to close this triangle will be for the Land and Special Operations Forces to proceed to work in a jointness fashion with the Navy. But more revolutionary would be for all CF services to operate in a jointness manner. This jointness approach could very well lead to future joint operations by the CF. Thus, the present jointness approach may be the necessary intermediate step, which will lead to CF joint operations.

The fact that most recent RMA have stemmed from the introduction of new technology, does not prevent an RMA from occurring as a result of dramatic doctrinal transformation. This may be the case with the introduction of the JSS. The Navy has taken the lead to define the requirement for an Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment replacement, which for the Navy includes its maritime Air component, and sought input from the Army as far as Strategic Sealift requirement. The discussions resulted in a new Class of Ships able to perform Underway Support to Naval Task, equipment Sealift capable of jetty independent offloading, and facilities necessary for Afloat Support to Forces Deployed Ashore. The last two capabilities are a proof that the Navy is developing the capability to support Land and Special Operations Forces in a jointness fashion. This paradigm shift, on the part of the Navy, makes the JSS concept that much more forward thinking and transformational.

Of all services, the Navy definitely has the lead in the area of interoperability, one of the means necessary to achieve effective jointness and combinedness. From a combinedness perspective, the fact of the matter is that Canadian Naval warships are

capable of full integration with a USN Carrier Battle Group, or lead a Task Group in a US led coalition, thus testimony of its extensive interoperability. The issue than become one where CF need to develop the capabilities to enhance interoperability amongst services, thus leading to increased jointness. Consequently, the CF can draw upon the Navy's experience in the development of this interoperability for jointness operations. Again, JSS will allow the advancement of this jointness objective by the sheer fact that it will promote operational jointness through its Sealift and Afloat Support to Forces Ashore capabilities. Furthermore, it will be possible to use JSS as a testbed during the developmental phase of the interoperational capability. Hence, from the Navy's perspective, its main focus regarding the CF' RMA resides in the area of the interoperability requirement for the jointness approach to operations with the Land and Special Operation Forces, and the ability to properly support RRF in a benign area along a belligerent's littoral. Therefore, JSS, like other new projects aimed at providing all services the ability to perform operations in a jointness and combinedness manner, will be a stepping stone towards the achievement of the CF' RMA, more specifically a harbinger of the jointness objective.

In summary, the present jointness approach to operations may be the necessary intermediate step for the CF to eventually achieve fully joint operations. . The Navy's paradigm shift in doctrine will make it more relevant to jointness operations, thus making the JSS concept that much more forward thinking and transformational. Drawing upon the Navy's interoperability experience in a combinedness context, JSS will undoubtedly become the harbinger of the jointness objective of the CF' RMA.

CONCLUSION

HISTORY WILL BE KIND TO ME FOR I INTEND TO WRITE IT.

SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL

Hellyer's era has taught us that in order for a Forces Transformation to be achievable, it has to be affordable by the nation, achievable and sustainable by the services, and, last but not least, it must be in consonance with Foreign Policy. In today's context, the CF would qualify Sutherland's triphibious option as a jointness approach to Land or Special Operations Forces missions. This view of jointness in operation has received a lot of attention in open literature over the recent past, especially as it pertains to a RRF in support of humanitarian operations. To achieve this goal, the CF will need to deploy robust resources to effectively support the HSA, such as the JSS.

To support this CF Transformation, some key objectives necessary to fulfil its doctrinal changes have been identified. These include the need for interoperability between services, interagencies and militaries to enhance jointness and combinedness in operations, the need for rapidly deployable and flexible forces, and the need to restructure forces for littoral operations. By design, the JSS will bring capabilities to support several of these key objectives.

A viable scenario for the deployment of the RRF would be for it to be able to perform amphibious like operations. Naval platforms can provide great benefits to Strategic lift. In addition to being a most effective mean of transportation, a ship provides the option to the Government of poisoning off a coast until the situation warrants intervention. The JSS will be able to address part of rapid deployability needs of the

Land and Special Operations Forces, with its equipment Sealift capability. We are reminded of the fact that the need for Strategic lift is only worth pursuing if the Forces can make a significant Canadian contribution abroad.

A review of all the main operations since the end of the Second World War indicates that jointness in operations rather than joint operations may be a more appropriate course of action for the CF restructuration. This restructuration must take into consideration the HSA in order to contribute to the Canadian Foreign Policy, and by extension provide the Canadian Government with the necessary capability to make a significant and noticeably Canadian contribution on the international stage. Hence, the new RRF should be structured as an element capable of performing amphibious like operations. To support this concept, and become more relevant to Land and Special Operations Forces, the Canadian Navy will have to shift focus from blue- to green-water operations. JSS will greatly facilitate this matter, by providing the initial capability for doctrinal development, which at first may be done in a jointness fashion and eventually evolve to full joint operations.

The present jointness approach to operations may be the necessary intermediate step for the CF to eventually achieve fully joint operations. . The Navy's paradigm shift in doctrine will make it more relevant to the Land and Special Operations Forces for jointness operations, thus making the JSS concept that much more forward thinking and transformational.

Drawing upon the Navy's interoperability experience in a combinedness context, and refocus onto littoral operations, JSS will undoubtedly become the harbinger of the jointness objective of the CF' RMA, and a force multiplier for HSA missions.

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