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EXERCISE/EXERCICE New Horizons

From CFSP to ESDP: Europe's increasing importance as an independent player in the international security system

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Abstract :

The European Union's Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was criticized for not adding to the international security system, sometimes even weakening traditional institutions like NATO. This paper will argue that ESDP strengthens international security and that through it, Europe's role as an independent actor will be further enhanced.

At the end of 2002, barely 2 ½ years after the Cologne summit's decision to implement a security and defence policy, Europe had the capabilities, bodies and mechanisms in place to conduct operations within the ESDP framework. Employed with a comprehensive security strategy as the European Security Strategy (ESS) "A Free Europe in a Better World", ESDP addresses root causes, and not the symptoms of threats to the international security, while providing a fast reaction capability to unexpected challenges. This makes ESDP a unique policy, the EU an independent global actor with regional focus, and it strengthens international security in total.

I. History of European Defence: A brief introduction

One country may support another's cause, but will never take it so seriously as it takes its own...It is traditional in European politics for states to make offensive and defensive pacts for mutual support- though not to the point of fully espousing one another's interests and quarrels.

Carl von Clausewitz¹

For centuries, the European continent was a region ravaged and torn by war, as vastly divergent cultures, languages and habits met in a comparatively small area. Finally in the twentieth century, Europe was the setting of the two largest wars that mankind had experienced, which laid the continent in ruins.

From the ruins, two organizations arose that in the coming decades guaranteed peace and stability in Western Europe: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union. NATO was mainly conceived as a common military defence system². It provided "immediate defence and security of its member countries"³. The European Union on the other hand transformed only slowly into its present structure. While its earlier predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded to implement a common European control over the heavy industry and thus as a means of arms control mainly over Germany, the development of the European Union never directly aimed towards the creation of a common European defence. In August of 1954⁴, the Pléven-Plan⁵ was not accepted

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 603.

² Belgium, NATO Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels: NATO, 2001), 29.

³ *Ibid.*,30.

⁴ Trevor C. Salmon & Alistair J.K. Shepherd, *Toward a European Army: Military Power in the Making?* (London, U.K. and Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 24-27.

⁵ René Pléven, at the time French Prime Minister. His plan called for the creation of a common European force under a collective European authority. It was aimed to keep Germany out of NATO and possible German military formations as small as possible, with all forces above brigade level being multinational.

by the French Parliament, and the EU⁶ remained only loosely committed to a common defence through the Western European Union (WEU), which in turn was closely linked to NATO⁷. The WEU article 5 guaranteed mutual defence, should a member be subject to attack.⁸ Due to its economic weight, the European Union steadily grew in power and influence, and subsequently became “an actor on the world stage in its own right, acting as a single unit”⁹. Throughout this process, during the times of the Cold War, NATO guaranteed West European security, and for the USA, it ensured its interests were protected in Europe

So long as Europe was threatened by Cold War nuclear holocaust, US hegemony reigned supreme, marred only by the occasional petulant whining of European nations, resentful of Washington’s superpower status but unable and unwilling to challenge it¹⁰.

With the east-west confrontation ending in the early 1990s, the Atlantic resolve gradually dissipated and the differences grew stronger. The European nations, contrary to US demands of burden sharing, sought to cut their military budgets in light of the vanishing communist threat. Europe only slowly embarked to strengthen its military capabilities, eventually realising that national power stems from political, economical and psychological powers, *together* with a military component provided

Michael Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation: Asset or threat to NATO?* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 2.

⁶ The term European Union or EU denominates the EC after the treaty of Maastricht. While historically incorrect to use the term for events earlier than 1992, it is meant to represent the EU and all of its later incorporated predecessors.

⁷ Trevor C. Salmon & Alistair J.K. Shepherd, *Toward a European Army: Military Power in the Making?* (London, U.K. and Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 25.

⁸ The WEU however had to rely on NATO to be effective, as it recognized “the undesirability of duplicating the Military Staffs of NATO, the Council and its agency will rely on the appropriate military Authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.” See: *Ibid.*, 26.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁰ Jolyon Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 2000), 12.

by armed forces¹¹. Contrary to US plans, the genie of European defence that the US had demanded to be released manifested itself not only within the US dominated NATO framework, but as a “European Security and Defence Policy” (ESDP) it set out to become an independent European asset, completing the array of means at the disposal of the European Union.

The European Union had always been regarded as a power mainly in the economic sector. Though heavily criticized for not adding to the international security system, sometimes even weakening traditional institutions like NATO, this paper will argue that the European Union’s ESDP indeed strengthens international security and that through it, Europe’s role as an independent actor will be further strengthened.

The paper will present an overview of the important European achievements in the evolutionary process of the creation of a common defence, beginning with the treaty of Maastricht. It then will present the differing points of view of the key actors involved in the process: France, Germany, Great Britain and the US. This will be followed by a discussion of the arguments answering the question whether ESDP is a unique and independent asset to international security. Finally, future implications arising through this process will be presented.

II. The evolution of ESDP

II.1 From Cooperation to CFSP

The established division of the areas of responsibility between the European Union and NATO remained nearly untouched until the early 1990s. Initiatives to implement a security and defence dimension into the EU existed but these ideas were

¹¹ David Jablonsky. “National Power.” *Parameters* (Spring 1997): 34.

largely unsuccessful.¹² To further the political integration of the EC, the “Davignon-report” was presented at the 1970 Luxemburg summit and the European Political Cooperation (EPC)¹³ was introduced. It was a first attempt to establish a loose foreign policy coordination. Only with the treaty of Maastricht of 1992 did the European framework change drastically. The treaty entered into force in 1993 and introduced a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on an inter-governmental basis as the second pillar of the EU¹⁴, aiming to assert the Union’s identity on the international scene. Article J.4 of title V stated

The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.¹⁵

The WEU (and NATO for those EU nations being members of the Alliance) thus was still the EU’s instrument of choice, should a military involvement become necessary.

¹² The **Fouchet talks**, a committee implemented to further ideas for a political union of the European community, failed in the early 1960s amongst other reasons because of defence. Mainly France wanted to adopt a common foreign policy and a common defence policy, positions that the other members were not yet willing to adopt. See: Trevor C. Salmon & Alistair J.K. Shepherd, *Toward a European Army: Military Power in the Making?* (London, U.K. and Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 28.

¹³ Activities of the European Union: Summaries of legislation: External Relations: “The common foreign and security policy: introduction”; available from <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r00001.htm>; internet, accessed 13 March 2005.

¹⁴ The pillars which are often referred to when talking about the EU are:
 - the Community dimension, comprising the arrangements set out in the EC, ECSC and Euratom Treaties, i.e. Union citizenship, Community policies, Economic and Monetary Union, etc. (first pillar);
 - the common foreign and security policy, which comes under Title V of the EU Treaty (second pillar);
 - police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which comes under Title VI of the EU Treaty (third pillar). See: “Pillars of the European Union”; available from <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000p.htm#p3>; internet; accessed 14 March 2005.

¹⁵ Treaty on European Union, available from <http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title5.html>; internet; accessed 14 March 2005.

II.2 From CFSP to ESDP

In 1997, the treaty of Amsterdam¹⁶ intended to render the CFSP more effective and to improve the EU's weight in international politics. As a result of the experiences gained through the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, measures were introduced to enable proactive actions to emerging crises and a better focus of effort. For the first time, the "Petersberg-tasks"¹⁷ of the WEU were mentioned to represent also the EU's scope of future operations. However, Great Britain was not yet willing to compromise the established NATO for an unsure endeavour such as a EU led security and defence policy.

The experiences of the Balkan led to the British-French summit of St-Malo on 4 December 1998 and marked a change in EU development, as it "advocated an "autonomous" political and military capacity for the EU".¹⁸ With the altered British position, the road was free for the German dual presidency of both EU and WEU to prepare the significant decisions taken at the Cologne summit in June of 1999. The summit marked the actual birth of the European Security and Defence Policy, as the European Governments "committed themselves for the first time unequivocally to a common defence policy"¹⁹. Both a military means for autonomous action, and procedures and bodies for decision-making would be established. Lastly, the functions

¹⁶Some other changes to the Maastricht treaty included provisions to establish common strategies, enhancing the decision making process and the introduction of the position of a High Representative for the CFSP. See:

"The Amsterdam Treaty: A Comprehensive Guide"; available from <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/a19000.htm> ; internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

¹⁷ The Petersberg tasks include: Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, crisis management and peacemaking.

¹⁸ Jolyon Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 2000), 26.

¹⁹ Peter van Ham, *Europe's new Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia* (Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall Center Papers No. 1), 9.

of the WEU would be incorporated into the EU up to the year 2000, whereby “the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose”²⁰

II.3 The Evolution of ESDP

The Helsinki-summit of 10 and 11 December 1999 formalized the Cologne summit decisions. New bodies were implemented, notably the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (MC), and the Military Staff (MS)²¹. Along with this, the member states pledged to commit military troops and capabilities defined in the European Headline Goal, also known as the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG)²², to conduct EU-led military operations, where NATO as a whole is not engaged.

The European Council meeting in Lisbon 23-24 March 2000 recognised the civil component in crisis management by deciding to establish a permanent committee for civilian crisis management. The summit of the European Council in Santa Maria da

²⁰ Presidency Conclusions Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999: *European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence*, in Jolyon Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?* (Paris: Institute for po

Feira 19-20 June 2000, formalized the EU's goals in the civil area by identifying the need for personnel such as judges, prosecutors and penal experts.²³

On 20 and 21 November 2000, a capabilities commitment conference was held at Brussels, where member states pledged forces to the EU to fulfill the requirements as set out in the HHG. Identified shortfalls were to be rectified by "upgrading existing assets, investment, development and coordination so as gradually to acquire or enhance the capabilities required for autonomous EU action."²⁴ Long-term planning and improvement of capabilities through a structured planning process could not be agreed upon, with France unable or unwilling to adopt the respective NATO procedures for defence planning.²⁵

The European Council of Nice 7-9 December 2000, consolidated the previous development of the ESDP, but failed to advance the matter. "The main changes were in relation to the WEU, developing the notion of enhanced cooperation and widening the use of majority voting."²⁶ To this end, the declaration stated that the EU would assume "the crisis-management functions of the WEU"²⁷. Nice put the functions and

bodies of ESDP into a treaty framework and thus firmly and permanently established the second pillar of the EU.

The European Council at Göteborg 15-16 June 2001, brought little changes to the military side of ESDP. Deputy Director of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs Peter Kanflo commented “The emphasis, as I said, has been primarily on civil issues and preventive operations, since it is here that we have made most progress.”²⁸ The EU foreign policy thus would be built on two pillars, one being conflict prevention and the other civil and military crisis management.

The events of 11 September 2001 had a great impact on the development of the ESDP. In a first step on 12 September 2001, the Council of the European Union condemned the attacks and called on the member states to take all necessary actions to maintain the highest level of security²⁹. In an extraordinary European Council meeting, the EU declared

Terrorism is a real challenge to the world and to Europe. The European Council has decided that the fight against terrorism will, more than ever, be a priority objective of the European Union.³⁰

The Union recognized the terrorist threat, immediate action was taken and the fight against terrorism would become a long-term strategic objective for the Union.

The European Council of Laeken 14-15 December 2001, declared the EU to be capable of conducting limited crisis management operations as outlined in the Petersberg-tasks. Further arrangements with NATO and the enhancement of European

²⁸ The Swedish Presidency: European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). available from http://www.eu2001.se/static/eng/eusummit/about_esdp.asp ; internet; accessed 19 March 2005.

²⁹ Special meeting of the General Affairs Council, Brussels, 12 September 2001: Declaration by the European Union. In *From Nice to Laeken: European defence: core documents* ed. Maartje Rutten, 143-144 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2002), 144.

³⁰ Extraordinary European Council meeting, Brussels, 21 September 2001: Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001, in *From Nice to Laeken: European defence: core documents* ed. Maartje Rutten, 150-154 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2002), 150.

capabilities through the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) were determined to be necessary to gain a full capability: “The Union will be in a position to take on progressively more demanding operations, as the assets and capabilities at its disposal continue to develop.”³¹ Lastly, the council decided to implement a convention to prepare a constitution for the European Union, a task that carried well through 2003.³²

2002 was a year characterized by the consequences of the terrorist attacks of September 11. The situation in Afghanistan began to normalize, while relations between the EU and the US deteriorated with the new pre-emptive US security strategy, the policy of “coalitions of the willing” and the increasing tensions in Iraq. For ESDP, this meant a period of consolidation as well as development and deepening. “In the field of European security and defence, normalization and transformation, [...], marked the year that has recently ended.”³³ The General Affairs Council meeting in Brussels 13 May 2002, continued work where the Laeken summit had identified shortfalls: the development of military capabilities by emphasizing co-operation in the armament field stood in the foreground³⁴. The Seville summit 21-22 June 2002, was a landmark in the development of ESDP, as the fight against terrorism was included as a strategic mission for European defence³⁵. Other important decisions

³¹ European Council, Laeken, 14-15 December 2001: Presidency Conclusions, in *From Nice to Laeken: European defence: core documents* ed. Maartje Rutten, 110-140 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2002), 120.

³² *Ibid.*, 110-119.

³³ Jean-Yves Haine, Introduction, in *From Laeken to Copenhagen: European defence: core documents* ed. Jean-Yves Haine, 11-12 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2003), 11.

³⁴ General Affairs Council, Brussels, 13 May 2002: Military capabilities – Council Conclusions, in *From Laeken to Copenhagen: European defence: core documents* ed. Jean-Yves Haine, 57-59 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2003), 58.

³⁵ European Council, Seville, 21-22 June 2002: Presidency Conclusions, Annex V, in *From Laeken to Copenhagen: European defence: core documents* ed. Jean-Yves Haine, 272-274 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2003), 272.

were the member states' commitments of capabilities in the area of the rule of law³⁶. The year ended with the Copenhagen European Council 12-13 December, enlarging the Union to 25 member states and finalizing the "Berlin-plus" agreement³⁷. With the guaranteed EU access to NATO planning, logistics and intelligence for operations in which NATO is not involved finally in place, the EU had reached full functionality to act in crisis management operations.³⁸

At the end of 2002, barely 2 ½ years after deciding to implement a security and defence policy at the Cologne summit, Europe had the capabilities, bodies and mechanisms in place to conduct operations.

II.4 ESDP following the Iraq war

ESDP in the year 2003 was marked by a split of opinions in Europe over the Iraq war, and strained relations of some member states with the US. The operational capability the EU had achieved was put to use in four missions.³⁹

The crisis in Europe following the split over Iraq led to the "European Defence Meeting" of the heads of state of Germany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium. Opposing the Iraq war, these countries proposed a list of changes to enhance and develop ESDP to render it more independent from NATO and the US, and more capable. Especially the proposal of setting up an autonomous EU military

³⁶ Ibid., 82-84.

³⁷ European Council, Copenhagen, 12-13 December 2002: Presidency Conclusions, in *From Laeken to Copenhagen: European defence: core documents* ed. Jean-Yves Haine, 165-177 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2003), 165, 170-177.

³⁸ European Union-NATO Declaration on ESDP, Brussels, 16 December 2002: Remarks by Javier Solana, EU Representative for the CFSP, in *From Laeken to Copenhagen: European defence: core documents* ed. Jean-Yves Haine, 178-180 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2003), 179.

³⁹ EUPM, a police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU Military Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a follow-on mission to NATO Operation Allied Harmony, which was succeeded in December by an EU-police mission (Proxima) and Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, making use solely of EU assets with France acting as framework nation.

Headquarter at Tervuren became a central issue of discussion.⁴⁰ To counter proliferation - weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were the prime US argument for the Iraq war – the EU adopted a strategy specifically designed against this threat.⁴¹ Triggered by the dispute over the war in Iraq, the European Security Strategy (ESS) “A secure Europe in a better World” was adopted at the European Council of Brussels in December 2003, giving the EU a common guideline for strategic thinking on international security issues⁴². ESDP continued to evolve by resolving the conflict over the size and scope of the EU military staff⁴³ and through the decision to set up an armaments agency that should bundle and co-ordinate efforts in development, research, acquisition and armaments⁴⁴.

In 2004, significant developments related to ESDP were the creation of the European Defence Agency to improve cost-efficiency and focus European armaments

⁴⁰ European Defence Meeting, Brussels, 29 April 2003: Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of Germany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium on European Defence, in *From Copenhagen to Brussels: European defence: core documents* ed. Antonio Missiroli, 76-80 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2003), 77, 80.

⁴¹ Non Proliferation, Brussels, 10 June 2003: Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Non Proliferation, Brussels, 10 June 2003: Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in *From Copenhagen to Brussels: European defence: core documents* ed. Antonio Missiroli, 106-110, 110-118 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2003).

⁴² European Council, Brussels, 12 December 2003: European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a better World, in *From Copenhagen to Brussels: European defence: core documents* ed. Antonio Missiroli, 324-333 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2003).

⁴³ The compromise reached at the Brussels Council in December envisaged a permanent EU cell within SHAPE in case of operations under the Berlin Plus provisions, and a reinforced autonomous EU planning cell with 100 (formerly 30) staff as part of the EUMS in Brussels, which exceptionally may be augmented and then used as an operational planning facility. However, EU operations without recourse to NATO assets would normally be conducted using a framework nation headquarter (i.e. the British PJHQ, the French CPCO or the German EinsFükdo and augmenting it with staff of participating nations).

⁴⁴ Armaments Agency, Brussels, 4 September 2003: The Committee of Permanent Representatives, in *From Copenhagen to Brussels: European defence: core documents* ed. Antonio Missiroli, 208-210 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2003), 209.

efforts⁴⁵, the new Headline Goal 2010⁴⁶, which included the “Battle groups concept”, the developments related to the EU constitution- *inter alia* the introduction of permanent structured cooperation -⁴⁷, which now has to be ratified by the members, and lastly the ongoing operations, most notably operation Althea, with which the EU took over NATO’s mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

III. The positions of the key actors

France, Germany and Great Britain are politically and economically the most influential nations in the EU, while the US is NATO’s dominant nation. The four countries positions and views on ESDP and the role of the European Union shall be the subject of the following paragraphs.

III.1 France – thorn in the US’ side

The French foreign and defence policy has always laid strong emphasis on the ability to prosecute its interests – if the need so arises – on its own. The will to counterbalance any dominant power, and its worldwide commitments have led France to adopt this policy, widely known as “Gaullist”. The over-all stated aim is to create added stability through a balanced, multi-polar security system. By its very nature, this challenges the self-declared US role as leading nation.

The French concept of defence states 3 key areas of interest

- To defend France's vital interests, [...] notably, its people, its territory and the freedom to exercise its sovereignty. [...]

⁴⁵ European Defence Agency-Council Joint Action: Council Joint Action 2004/ 551/ CFSP on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, Brussels, 12 June 2004, in *EU Security and Defence: Core Documents 2004*, 175-197 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2004), 175.

⁴⁶ General Affairs and External Relations Council: Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, Brussels, 22 November 2004, in *EU Security and Defence: Core Documents 2004*, 268-316 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2004), 295-310.

⁴⁷ EU Constitutional Treaty, Rome, 29 October 2004, in *EU Security and Defence: Core Documents 2004*, 372-415 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2004), 403-404.

At the same time, France must also protect its strategic interests at the international level [...].

- To work for the development of the European enterprise and the stability of the European continent [...].
- To implement a comprehensive concept of defence which is not limited to military concerns [...]⁴⁸.

While the original Gaullist approach aimed at securing maximum independence for France, the changing security environment and Globalization have led to a more realistic view of French possibilities. The changing power in the EU, with France's role in the widened Union being increasingly marginalized, led to a "Europeanisation of French defence policy and planning"⁴⁹.

French President Jacques Chirac formulated in June 2001

Given its already wide range of economic, financial and humanitarian instruments, its acquisition of a military action capability is making Europe a fully-fledged political actor.... The way we see Defence Europe, it is in no way incompatible with NATO which remains the basis of Allied collective security. It strengthens NATO by reaffirming a partnership which will be all the stronger if better balanced.⁵⁰

The Gaullist approach remains, but it is now pursued from within the wider context of Europe, with clear French ambitions to play a leading role.

III.2 Germany – redefining its role amidst a world of changes

Prior to re-unification, German policy was dominated by its role in the Second World War. The inhibitions to German national power ensuing from this period resulted in a realist-oriented policy with regards to the limits of its influence.

⁴⁸ France in the World, Defence Policy: *The French Concept*, available from <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/france/gb/politiq/08.html> ; internet; accessed 22 April 2005.

⁴⁹ Jolyon Howorth, "France", in *The European Union and National Defence Policy*, ed. Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, 23-48 (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 24.

⁵⁰ Speech by M. Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, to the Institute for Higher Defence Studies Paris, 8 June 2001, in *From Nice to Laeken: European defence: core documents* ed. Maartje Rutten, 13-18 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2002), 16.

Solutions were sought in back-door diplomacy rather than through loud proclamations on the world stage. German interest was seen as closely linked to “European” interest, as the opening preamble of the German constitution demonstrates: “Inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have adopted this Basic Law”.⁵¹ Through close linkage with international organisations, mainly the EU and UN, and integration into the western security system through NATO and strong transatlantic ties to the US, Germany re-integrated into the world community. This required Germany to constantly balance its natural, European interests with those of the dominant transatlantic partner, the USA.

The changes of the early 90s presented new challenges, but also new opportunities to Germany. Having lived at the front line of the Cold War for decades, EU enlargement was a priority for German politics

Germany wants to avoid a situation whereby its eastern border is permanently the EU’s eastern border as well. At the same time, it must ensure that the region does not turn itself into Fortress Europe; rather it must retain its extracontinental connections (acquis Atlantique).⁵²

This on-going enlargement was commented a decade after reunification by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder: “Enlargement affords us vast opportunities, both in political and economic terms. Everyone in Europe will benefit, particularly we Germans”.⁵³ Germany clearly states where its prime interests lie: “Europe is our

⁵¹ Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, in the version promulgated on 23 May 1949 (first issue of the *Federal Law Gazette*, dated 23 May 1949), as amended up to and including 20 December 1993, available from <http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm#Preamble> ; internet; accessed 22 April 2005.

⁵² Alpo M. Rusi, “Europe’s Changing Security Role.” In *Europe’s New Security Challenges*, ed. Heinz Gärtner, Adrian Hyde-Price and Erich Reiter, 113-124 (London, U.K. and Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 117.

⁵³ Gerhard Schröder, Policy Statement on the outcome of the European Council in Nice by Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in the German Bundestag, 19 January 2001, available from

future and its deepening and enlargement will bring us progress which is in both our common and in our national interests".⁵⁴

With the European integration far advanced in the civil sector, being the largest export-nation world wide and finally fully sovereign, Germany naturally turned its interest to a further integration in the military field

More broadly, Germany's transition, in the operational employment of her forces, from the reluctance of the early 1990s to the acceptance of major contribution and responsibility in Kosovo, was one of the most positive advances of the decade in effective European capability.⁵⁵

However, the old balancing act between Europe and the transatlantic is still a principle of German politics, as it is necessitated by the global threats that today's nations face

Ladies and gentlemen, one thing is certain: We will only master the challenges of the 21st century if transatlantic relations, the close ties between Europe, Canada and the United States are - and remain - intact. Only then will we also achieve the major international objectives which our governments have set themselves.⁵⁶
Gerhard Schröder, February 2005

Germany has grown and matured as a fully sovereign state, taking on its responsibilities on a worldwide scale from within the European framework. Balancing

<http://www.bundesregierung.de/en/dokumente/-,10001.29285/Regierungserklaerung/dokument.htm> ; internet; accessed 22 April 2005.

⁵⁴ Gerhard Schröder, Policy Statement on the forthcoming European Council in Nice by Chancellor Schröder, 28 November 2000, available from <http://www.bundesregierung.de/en/dokumente/-,10001.25272/Rede/dokument.htm> ; internet; accessed 22 April 2005.

⁵⁵ Michael Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation: Asset or threat to NATO?* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 49.

⁵⁶ Gerhard Schröder, *Speech by Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder at the opening of the 41st Munich Conference on Security Policy delivered by Federal Minister Peter Struck*, 12 Februar 2005, available from <http://www.bundesregierung.de/en/dokumente/-,10001.787159/Rede/dokument.htm> ; internet; accessed 22. April 2005

national, European and transatlantic interests, not everyone seems to be comfortable with Germany's newly found voice and more independent behaviour.

III.3 United Kingdom

Traditionally, the UK has been the gatekeeper of American interests in Europe, slowing European integration where it believed the process to endanger the special relationship with the US. To minimize Britain to this role would, however, not render justice to British foreign policy. A strong international interest has always existed, and is still present as the leading nation of the British Commonwealth ensures to honour its traditional commitments. The British Defence White Paper of 2003 states

UK Policy Aims

2.1 The security and stability of Europe and the maintenance of the transatlantic relationship remain fundamental to our security and defence policy. More widely the UK has a range of global interests including economic well being based around trade, overseas and foreign investment, and the continuing free flow of natural resources. We have responsibilities for 13 overseas territories.⁵⁷

Despite the traditional British cautiousness in advancing European integration, it was the UK that repeatedly drove forward the development of ESDP. The French-British St. Malo declaration, which effectively initiated ESDP, and the British role in implementing some of the Tervuren suggestions, i.e. the establishment of a more independent EU-staff or the principle of structured cooperation, may serve as examples.

Under Tony Blair, Great Britain adopted an almost Gaullist point of view, in that a strengthened European defence capability

⁵⁷ Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, *Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper*, (Ministry of Defence: December 2003), 4, available from http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/publications/whitepaper2003/volume1.pdf; internet; accessed 22.April 2005.

[...] would not undermine the transatlantic relationship, but would, quite to the contrary, be an essential element that would keep the Atlantic Alliance relevant and the United States involved in the management of European security.⁵⁸

Britain seemed to have learned from the Kosovo experience that, standing alone, even a partner with a “special relationship” has little influence on the US.

Consequentially, the UK, as the potentially militarily strongest EU member, uses this strength to influence and shape ESDP and thus put its own military influence on the broader base of the EU.

Closer European integration is also necessitated by the fact that Great Britain views a comprehensive security approach, as it is advocated in the EU’s European Security Strategy, as best suited to cope with today’s modern threats. Clearly, the EU possesses a far greater capability in the non-military security aspects than Britain on its own

Whereas in the past it was possible to regard military force as a separate element in crisis resolution, it is now evident that the successful management of international security problems will require ever more integrated planning of military, diplomatic and economic instruments at both national and international levels.⁵⁹

While Great Britain still preserves the special relationship with the USA, it has moved closer to the European centre. Standing at the pivot-point of the transatlantic bridge and benefiting from ESDP, Britain’s role is more than ever to balance the US and EU relationship.

⁵⁸ Peter van Ham, *Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia* (Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall Center Papers No. 1), 6.

⁵⁹ Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, *Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper*, (Ministry of Defence: December 2003), Foreword by the Secretary of State for Defence the Right Honourable Geoff Hoon MP, 1., available from http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/publications/whitepaper2003/volume1.pdf; internet; accessed 22.April 2005.

III.4 USA – the unilateral hegemon

While US foreign policy repeatedly underwent periods of relative isolationism, US interest in Europe never dwindled. This interest was based on two factors: a strong and united Western Europe was needed as an ally against communism, and the nations of a strong and united Western Europe would not wage war amongst each other, with “the need for the United States thus, once again, to “sort out” European Problems”⁶⁰. Based on these – in the very end contradictory motivations (one being isolationist, the other not), the US supported the European integration.

A strengthening of the “European Pillar” in defence was welcomed by the US as well – “burden sharing” had been demanded by the US of their Europeans allies for decades⁶¹. This however was thought to better be done within NATO, where the US dominated and could better make use of European capabilities. Consequentially, the European quest for a defence outside of NATO was seen with irritation and suspicion, especially towards “Gaullist” France.

Even under the more European oriented Clinton administration, Secretary of State Albright formulated

As Europeans look at the best way to organize their foreign and security policy cooperation, the key is to make sure that any institutional change is consistent with basic principles that have served the Atlantic partnership well for 50 years. This means avoiding what I would call the Three Ds: decoupling, duplication, and discrimination.⁶²

⁶⁰ Robert E. Hunter, *The European Security and Defence Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor?* (Santa Monica, Arlington, Pittsburgh: RAND National Defence Research Institute, 2002), 8.

⁶¹ Michael Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation: Asset or threat to NATO?* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 5.

⁶² Madeleine K. Albright, US Secretary of State „The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future“, *Financial Times*, 7 December 1998 in *From St-Malo to Nice: European defence: core documents*, ed. Maartje Rutten, 10-12 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2001), 11.

The Bush administration adopted an increasingly unilateralist approach, called by the U.S. national security strategy “a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests”⁶³.

This “distinctly American internationalism” was more critical about the increasing European independence in the security sector, and the rhetoric of President George W. Bush became more direct: “My nation welcomes the consolidation of European Unity, and all the stability it brings. We welcome a greater role for the EU in European security, properly integrated with NATO”.⁶⁴

In the end, Washington will welcome all developments from which it can benefit, and which do not challenge its role of global leadership. ESDP thus will remain a critical issue for the US.

IV. ESDP - Value added to international security?

The European Union is changing fundamentally, as it no longer looks inwards and concentrates on economical development, but puts its traditional first pillar in the broader context of world politics and globalization, and of protection of its democratic values such as individual rights and rule of law, while simultaneously growing to 27 members. This effort to assure security through a coordinated effort across all three pillars requires greater coordination in order to achieve the desired synergetic effects. The new European constitution, which after ratification will come into effect 2009, symbolizes the effort to tie the three pillars more closely together by combining the individual European treaties into one single document. In the following, some of the

⁶³ United States, The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America: I. Overview of America's International Strategy*, (The White House: September 2002) available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>; internet; accessed 22 April 2005.

⁶⁴ Remarks by President Bush at Warsaw University, 15 June 2001, in *From Nice to Laeken: European defence: core documents* ed. Maartje Rutten, 24-29 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2002), 26.

challenges connected to ESDP arising from this fundamental change will be debated. As ESDP is becoming increasingly complex, only a small selection of issues will be discussed.

IV.1 Implications of the enlargement process for ESDP

The European Union, with Bulgaria's and Romania's accession scheduled for 2007, will comprise 27 members. Through enlargement, the EU has reached a stage of development where not only the decision-making process becomes a matter of concern, but also the geographical dimension of the territory has implications for ESDP.

In the 1950s and 60s, ceding national responsibilities to supranational organisations was only acceptable by granting veto-rights to the Union's members. The growing Union however faced increasing problems with this principle. Additionally, the latest enlargement included countries from a much wider cultural background and development stage. Consequentially, consensus will be even harder to reach. Realising this problem, the draft constitution proposed new voting mechanisms. A reduced number of areas for which the nations have a veto right, and changed majority voting principles were introduced. While the proposed draft constitution would have increased the decision-making capability greatly, it was not acceptable to some countries. The final version, though improving the Nice treaty provisions, was not as ambitious as the draft version⁶⁵. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder commented

The constitution greatly expands the area of application of majority voting. We in Germany would have liked to have seen Europe go

⁶⁵ Janis A. Emmanouilidis, *Historically Unique, Unfinished in Detail- An Evaluation of the Constitution*, (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation, 2004/03), available from http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/spotlight/Reformspotlight_03-04_en.pdf; internet; accessed 24 April 2005, 12.

even further on this question, for example with regard to foreign policy, but also with regard to tax policy - in particular direct taxes. This met, however, with the resistance of individual member states and could not be pushed forward. [...] With regard to the core institutional questions, we have found solutions to ensure the ability of Europe to act - which is synonymous with its ability to make decisions.⁶⁶

To compensate for these shortfalls especially in the field of foreign policy, the European Security Strategy (ESS) provides a guideline for decision-making. Some progress was achieved, but it is obvious that further changes to the voting mechanisms will have to be made.

The geographical dimension of the enlargement process most directly influences ESDP, in that specific capabilities are required in order to provide for coercive military power wherever and whenever needed. The geographical radius of operations clearly has increased, with the European Union extending from Portugal and Ireland to the Black Sea Shores, and from Finland to Cyprus and Malta. Moreover, the ESS calls for a strategy that strengthens the EU's neighbouring countries, in order to extend the zone of security around Europe: "Even in an era of globalization, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed"⁶⁷. The strategy specifically mentions the EU's interest in stability in Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, the Southern Caucasus, the Arab/Israeli conflict, and the entire Mediterranean area with regards to the EU framework of the Barcelona Process. To satisfy the ensuing demands, capabilities mainly in the field of

⁶⁶ Gerhard Schröder, *Policy Statement by Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in the German Bundestag regarding the agreement reached by the heads of state and government of the European Union on a European constitution, Berlin, Friday, 2 July 2004*, available from <http://www.bundesregierung.de/en/dokumente/-,10001.679760/Regierungserklaerung/dokument.htm> ; internet; accessed 23 April 2005.

⁶⁷ A Secure Europe in a better World, Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003: Report by Javier Solana, High Representative for CFSP on the Security Strategy of the EU, in *From Copenhagen to Brussels: European defence: core documents* ed. Antonio Missiroli, 160-169 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2003), 163.

communications, strategic transport, sustainability and command and control have to be enhanced. While these were areas of concern already previously, the greater geographical area has intensified the challenges. The EU has reacted by following a new Headline Goal 2010 and implementing the “Battle Group Concept”, along with a “Global Approach on Deployability”⁶⁸.

IV.2 ESDP – strengthening European military capabilities?

A key issue in the development of ESDP has always been the question of lacking European military capabilities. Not only did the US criticize Europe for not investing enough in military hardware, ”Washington seems to have almost given up on EU defence and is ready to accept whatever increased capabilities the EU can muster”⁶⁹, but also that ESDP procurement weakens NATO

The creation of the European Defense Agency is sending ripples across the Atlantic and raising questions about Europe diverting resources away from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Trans-Atlantic tensions over European commitments to NATO have caused some leading U.S. officials in the alliance notably U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns to question whether a heightened focus on EU capabilities will further sap resources that could benefit the alliance.⁷⁰

Although these allegations are repeatedly voiced, ESDP structures the European Forces in a way that a true increase in capabilities will result. This is done by two different approaches: the ECAP as a permanently established process coordinates capabilities on a supranational level between nations. As a result, redundant

⁶⁸ General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussels, 22 November 2004: Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, in *EU Security and Defence: Core Documents 2004*, 268-316 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2004), 295-310.

⁶⁹ Dr. Fraser Cameron and Dr. Antje Herrberg *What Security Capabilities for the EU?* (EastWest Institute, The European Policy Centre, 10.03.2003), 3; available from <http://www.iewu.org/pdf/Capabilities.pdf> ; internet; accessed 22 April 2005.

⁷⁰ Roxana Tiron, European Defence Agency Raising Hackles, in U.S. *National Defense*, August 2004, pp. 29-32; available from http://www.uspolicy.be/issues/europeandefense/europeandefense_nonusgjournals.asp ; internet; accessed 22 April 2005.

capabilities will be minimized, and smaller nations can concentrate on niche capabilities as opposed to ineffectively investing across the entire width of the military. The other approach is a coordinated spending of money through the European Armaments Agency, which bundles European efforts to achieve greater cost-efficiency. At the same time, the ECAP process regularly reviews the strategic situation and demands new capabilities, should a demand arise. An example is the battle group concept of the new “Headline Goal 2010”, which calls for rapidly deployable, independent units of 1500 soldiers as a means of quick reaction.

This coordinated effort does not, however, cover only purely European demands at the supranational level. Much rather, it also takes NATO demands and capability shortfalls into account, thus also strengthening NATO efforts. Javier Solana pointed out

“The consequences of the new NATO DCI initiative must be fully taken into account. We all have only one set of budgets. ECAP and the new DCI are not per se mutually reinforcing. We must therefore assure the credibility of the European effort on capabilities, in view of the Prague summit, as a guarantee of the mutual reinforcement of two initiatives. They are close, but not similar.”⁷¹

IV.3 ESDP to what avail?

Beginning in 2003, ESDP became operational with a total of four missions. Two of these were police missions, while one was a military mission using NATO assets, the other a military mission conducted only with EU assets⁷². In 2004, the EU again conducted several missions, taking over SFOR from NATO and a jurisdictional

⁷¹ Informal meeting of EU defence Ministers, Rethymnon (Greece), 4-5 October 2002: Summary of the intervention of Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP: ECAP and the improvement of European military capabilities, in *From Laeken to Copenhagen: European defence: core documents* ed. Jean-Yves Haine, 132-133 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2003), 133.

⁷²Dov Lynch and Antonio Missiroli, *ESDP Operations* (Institute for Security Studies of European Union). Available from <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/09-dvl-am.pdf>; internet; accessed 22 April 2005.

mission in the context of the third pillar of the EU. Through ESDP, the European Union has emerged as an actor of its own.

Europe is criticized for building this capability at the expense of weakening other security organisations and of duplicating existing structures. However, the principle of the “same set of forces” is widely recognized: “There is only one set of forces in Europe”⁷³. Europe has not changed its troop strengths significantly as a function of ESDP, it has tried to improve the quality of the troops by adding capabilities and thus increasing the percentage of expeditionary and deployable units. It follows that in terms of availability and capability, NATO could not have been weakened by the European effort. But is the effort worthwhile, if only a re-labelling of already present troops was undertaken, or is there a unique European approach to the employment of military force? Is ESDP only a toolbox for Europeans to arbitrarily choose from, or does it follow a concept, a policy, a strategy that lends a deeper meaning and added value to ESDP and international security in total?

While the USA, and to a lesser degree NATO, view crisis management and global security primarily as a function of military power, the EU takes a much broader approach. As Javier Solana stated, ESDP was more than the creation of a rapid reaction force: “Military means will always be the last resort for solving a crisis. ESDP is also about the Union having access to other tools which most of the time might be better suited to maintaining or providing security than military force”.⁷⁴

⁷³ Lord George Robertson, NATO Secretary General, *Berlin Plus, NATO and the EU*, Grandes Conférences Catholiques, Brussels, October 22, 2003, available from http://www.paginedidifesa.it/2003/natosg_031022.html ; internet; accessed 20 April 2005.

⁷⁴ Javier Solana, High Representative for CFSP, „Where Does the EU Stand on Common Foreign and Security Policy?” In *From St-Malo to Nice: European defence: core documents*, ed. Maartje Rutten, 151-157 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies European Union, 2001), 154.

This view of adding to and increasing international security by taking a distinct approach to today's challenges is reflected in the European Security Strategy. It has been referred to as a comprehensive security strategy, looking at the various elements that determine the international environment and that may be the underlying causes of security threats, and mitigating these threats by attacking the causes⁷⁵. Even when taking preventive action, this does not necessarily imply military means, since these often prove to be inappropriate against the cause, but are directed only against the symptom. German Chancellor Schröder recently stated “ One thing is certain: we can only successfully master the new challenges if we tackle their root causes - and we must do so together, in a comprehensive manner and with a view to prevention.”⁷⁶

The European approach may be compared to joint, effects based targeting: It is not important who does what, but that the effect – security - is achieved by looking at all the means at one's disposal. As Sven Biscop writes

This range of policies covers all three pillars of the EU; it includes *inter alia* external trade, development cooperation, international environmental policy, international police, justice and intelligence cooperation, immigration policy, foreign policy and politico-military measures. The overall objective of this range of policies, which functions as an integrating mechanism, is the promotion of the core global public goods.⁷⁷

In this way, the European Strategy is preventive and pro-active in nature, and this while honouring the principles of the UN. In contrast, the US strategy, even when

⁷⁵ Sven Biscop, *The European Security Strategy – Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security?* (Brussels: Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB), 2004), 39.

⁷⁶ Gerhard Schröder, *Speech by Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder at the opening of the 41st Munich Conference on Security Policy delivered by Federal Minister Peter Struck*, 12 Februar 2005. Available from <http://www.bundesregierung.de/en/dokumente/-,10001.787159/Rede/dokument.htm> ; internet; accessed 22. April 2005.

⁷⁷ Sven Biscop, *The European Security Strategy – Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security?* (Brussels: Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB), 2004), 39.

being used pre-emptively, is reactive to underlying causes and developments.

Moreover, its pre-emptive use is ground to extensive legal debates.

Answering the question of ESDP's avail, it is the missing link to persuasively implement Europe's comprehensive security strategy. It underpins soft with hard power and renders possible EU engagements more credible and less susceptible to security threats. Finally, it gives Europe an option for short notice intervention, in cases where a preventive strategy fails, or an entry capability to set the grounds for implementing its long-term strategies.

V. Conclusion

Regarding the term "European Union," in 1975 the European Court of Justice observed that "it is not clear what the expression imports". Over twenty-five years later, the same might be said of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The voyage to ESDP is a "journey to an unknown destination."⁷⁸

ESDP is a story of success. Less than 3 years after deciding to embark on the "journey to an unknown destination", the EU has created an independent military capability to undermine and harden its already impressive "soft" power in the economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian field. This journey could not have been done from within NATO, as NATO does not necessarily share the same interests as the EU. More importantly, NATO is mainly a collective defence Alliance and lacks the close coordination with other means of national power, as they are present within the EU. Strengthening European capabilities within NATO would not have resulted in the synergistic effect that the EU framework is able to create, with the view to preventively address the root causes, and not the symptoms of the present global threats. Moreover, the EU actively acknowledges the primacy of international law and

⁷⁸ Trevor C. Salmon & Alistair J.K. Shepherd, *Toward a European Army: Military Power in the Making?* (London, U.K. and Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 201.

the principles of the charter of the UN, thus ESDP serves to strengthen the entire international security system.

Not all is good, however. Many issues remain unresolved, a few of which were discussed in this paper. The relations towards NATO need further improvement. Military budgets remain a matter of concern. Many solutions found are imperfect, as they present a compromise. Ceding national power to an international organisation is not easy, especially for those countries, which have only found true independence less than 15 years ago.

Yet the EU has demonstrated time and again its capability to change, to adapt, and to improve. The Pléven-Plan to create common defence, not acceptable in the 1950s, is about to be realised. The Fouchét-talks initiative to implement a common policy, not acceptable in the '60s, has already been realised with the CFSP. A common currency was not acceptable in the 1970s, and today the Euro is a reality.

Presently, ESDP is at an intermediate stage of its development. It works, it strengthens Europe and international security, the EU member states benefit from it, but it has not yet reached its full functionality. True improvement will come with a true integration of all the members' forces. Eventually, the Tervuren suggestions should be realised, and Europe should create, as the Maastricht treaty envisions, a common defence. When this is established, unnecessary redundancies between nations will be avoided, budgets will be used most cost efficiently, the EU members will not be able to wage war out of uniquely national interests, as they do not have an independently functioning military any more, and the EU will act as a single, strong, political unity.

While a weakening of NATO not necessarily occurs - EU and its individual NATO member states emphasize the importance of NATO - this process will significantly reduce US influence, as the US would have to convince the entire EU, and not single, small member states to join the US' preferred "coalitions of the willing". This seems to be the real reason behind US opposition to ESDP, not the possible weakening of NATO, which would not be in European interest in any case. While ESDP's growing into a common defence may be seen as utopian, the EU has time and again surprised: the journey is not yet over.

ESDP is a new asset to international security. Employed with a comprehensive security policy as the ESS, it addresses causes, not symptoms, while providing a fast reaction capability to unexpected challenges. This makes ESDP unique, the EU an independent global actor with regional focus, and it strengthens international security in total.

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