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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES  
CANADIENNES

CSC 30 / CCEM 30

MASTERS OF DEFENCE STUDIES

Taking the Fight to the Enemy: Terrorism and the Case for a Canadian Forces  
Expeditionary Orientation

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29 April 2004

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## **Abstract**

This paper examines the role of the Canadian Forces (CF) after the events of September 11, 2001. It argues that while the threat of terrorism is real, the CF should not adopt a homeland defence orientation, but should instead maintain and even bolster its expeditionary capabilities. To arrive at this conclusion the paper examines the definition of expeditionary warfare, Canadian efforts to field such forces, the nature of the terrorist threat, the most effective domestic response to that threat, the requirement for an international expeditionary response, other pre-existing demands for expeditionary forces, the CF's current capacity to provide such forces and finally the changes needed to field an effective expeditionary force. The paper demonstrates that domestic security against a terrorist threat is best handled by other agencies, while the CF has important contributions to make to the international campaign against terror and to Canadian foreign policy goals that can only be achieved with expeditionary forces.

## **Introduction**

It has become a cliché to say that after 9/11 everything changed. It must be acknowledged, however, that the horrific terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001 have become the prism through which almost all security and foreign affairs issues affecting Canada, and indeed the entire world, must be viewed. As but one example, the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS) entitled its 2002 and 2003 annual strategic forecasts *Fortress North America* and *Foreign Policy Realignment in the Age of Terror*. Such a focus on terrorism is a key indication of its central place in security and foreign policy debates in Canada and highlights the question of whether the correct response to terror is domestic or international in nature. The answer to this question must be put into perspective, along with a discussion of the Canadian Forces' (CF) core competencies and other roles, to determine the force structure needed in the future. More than two years after 9/11 it is possible to view the impact of the attacks more dispassionately and with a new Liberal Government formed in 2003, the departments of Defence (DND) and Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) have begun work on new defence and foreign policy reviews. Now is clearly the time to examine the CF's missions and force structure to ensure that the CF is ready to defend Canada and to serve its foreign policy.

The defence review will not, of course, begin with a clean slate moving forward from 9/11. Prior perceptions of Canada's strategic situation need to be re-examined to determine their continued applicability. It has been almost a decade since the last foreign policy and defence reviews were undertaken; however, the goals identified at that time were fundamental enough that a significant change seems unlikely, despite the newly

recognized terrorist threat. Canada's 1995 foreign policy statement, *Canada in the World*, provided three foreign policy objectives: the promotion of prosperity and employment, the protection of Canadian security (within a stable global framework), and the projection of Canadian values and culture.<sup>1</sup> Likewise the last defence review, conducted in 1994, can be seen as an attempt to remain as general and flexible as possible. The core ideas permit a wide range of government action and it seems unlikely that the government will want to constrain themselves as a result of the new review. Concepts such as "the primary obligation of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces is to protect the country and its citizens from challenges to their security,"<sup>2</sup> and "the defence of Canada and Canadian interests and values is first and foremost a domestic concern,"<sup>3</sup> appear to be obvious and non-negotiable.

Since 9/11, however, there has been a blurring of the defence and security roles. The attacks that morning revealed significant vulnerabilities in our defences that all government departments were called upon to address. Many government departments have a role to play in homeland defence, including the RCMP, CSIS, Immigration, the Coast Guard, and the newly constituted department for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP). The CF also has a role to play in homeland defence as a review of the 1994 White Paper makes clear. As stated there, the CF's "primary obligation to protect the country" not surprisingly leads to calls for a greater focus on defence of the homeland. At the same time, however, the public perception of the CF has been based on

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<sup>1</sup> Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada in the World: Government Statement*, (Ottawa: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1995), 10-11.

<sup>2</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper on Defence*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1994), 2.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

its overseas efforts. As Allen Sens noted, "more than any other single activity, peacekeeping has come to define the political and operational role of the Canadian Forces."<sup>4</sup> Even before 9/11, this dichotomy was not really surprising, as the government of the day had foreseen the competing challenges of security and foreign policy roles when it drafted the 1994 White Paper. Its intention to maintain the CF's flexibility is clearly expressed in calls for "an effective, realistic and affordable policy, one that calls for multi-purpose, combat capable armed forces able to meet the challenges to Canada's security both at home and abroad."<sup>5</sup> Flexibility, of course, comes at a cost. Limited resources have made it difficult to fulfil both homeland defence and potential expeditionary missions and the government of Canada has long recognized this challenge, as it also made clear in the 1994 White Paper with its acknowledgement that "the challenge will be to design a defence program that delivers capable armed forces within the limits of our resources."<sup>6</sup>

The upcoming defence review must address this capability versus commitment problem by either increasing funding or focusing the CF's roles. Even before 9/11, the decreasing budgets of the 1990s made the challenge of fulfilling all of the CF's missions ever greater and essentially resulted in a decreasing ability to sustain overseas commitments as the CF was reduced in strength to below 60,000 members. Despite this, the current strategy of DND is to be capable of as many missions as possible in an attempt to remain relevant to the Canadian public: in effect to be all things to all people.

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<sup>4</sup> Allen Sens, "From Peacekeeping to Intervention: Expeditionary Capabilities and the Canadian Force Structure Debate," CCS Research Papers, accessed 23 September 2003; available from [www.ccs21.org/ccspapers/papers/Sens-peacekeeping\\_intervention.htm](http://www.ccs21.org/ccspapers/papers/Sens-peacekeeping_intervention.htm), 1.

<sup>5</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper on Defence*, 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, 13.

The government has held to the philosophy of the 1994 White Paper, which stated that "new equipment will be acquired only for the purposes considered essential to maintaining core capabilities of the Canadian Forces and will be suited to the widest range of defence roles."<sup>7</sup> The squeeze between decreased budgets and increased operational demands, both at home and abroad, is finally being acknowledged as the CF's *Capability Outlook 2002 - 2012* recognizes by admitting that "the current unmitigated demand for equipment re-capitalization over the next ten years is approximately \$30.6B. While not all demands have yet been validated, it is clear that projected supply will not satisfy all capability requirements."<sup>8</sup> In a letter to the Chief of Defence Staff, the Chief of the Land staff goes further warning that "within the framework of current policy expressed in the 1994 White Paper, and in line with the objectives articulated in Strategy 2020, all three services and several other key components of the Department are engaged in modernization projects that are collectively overwhelming the available funds for capital investment."<sup>9</sup>

The Government of Canada is clearly faced with difficult choices. 9/11 has forced it to recognize the threat of international terrorism at the same time that years of reduced funding for the CF are forcing re-capitalization decisions. As always, the funds available are not limitless and any funds committed must be acceptable to a public also concerned with other pressing social needs, such as the health care system, failing infrastructure and education. In reacting to the threat of terror, the Government must

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 41.

<sup>8</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence, *Capability Outlook 2002 -2012*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2002) 12.

<sup>9</sup> Lieutenant-General R.J. Hillier, *Strategic Capability Investment Plan - Land Effect*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 26 Jun 2003), 1.

decide what emphasis to place upon defensive versus offensive efforts, with the full understanding that the CF is also an important component of the Government's foreign policy. While considering the new emphasis on terror, the most effective methods of combating it, and the CF's traditional roles and competencies, the Government needs to review the force structure of the CF. What should the primary purpose of the CF be? Has 9/11 really altered Canada's strategic situation? Political statements designed to maintain the Government's flexibility and offend no voter will not provide the centralizing direction needed to structure a force capable of responding to Canada's defence needs within the realities of Canada's financial constraints. This paper will argue that the Canadian Government's upcoming defence review should conclude that the best response to the terrorist threat is complex and multi faceted. Domestic security concerns are ideally addressed by agencies other than the military, while the military itself has a key role to play in responding internationally to terror. Additionally, Canada's military will continue to be called upon to act internationally in a variety of missions that may be indirectly related to the campaign against terror. These conclusions should logically lead the Government to an expeditionary orientation for the CF that must not only be retained in order to fight terror but should be built upon.

In arriving at this conclusion, the Government's defence review should consider the definition of expeditionary warfare, Canadian efforts to field such forces, the nature of the terrorist threat, the most effective domestic response to that threat, the requirement for an international expeditionary response, other pre-existing demands for expeditionary forces, the CF's current capacity to provide that response and finally the changes needed to effectively provide such a response. To make the case for an expeditionary orientation



for the CF, therefore, this paper will first outline the use of modern expeditionary forces and review Canada's expeditionary efforts. To determine how the future force structure should be built to better achieve both domestic security and foreign policy goals, it will be necessary to define those characteristics of expeditionary forces that are desirable.

Secondly the paper will consider the true nature of international terrorism and the threat it poses to Canada. It is vital, given both the threat and the limited resources available to combat it, that the most effective methods and resources be dedicated both domestically and internationally. The third section of the paper will therefore, focus on the most effective means of ensuring domestic security. This review will indicate that the CF's role in combating terrorism is overwhelmingly international in nature and that its domestic role is one of last resort only. The fourth section of the paper will outline how the CF can be used internationally against the terrorist threat. The fifth section of the paper will discuss pre-existing demands on Canada for expeditionary forces. As the CF is such an important tool in Canada's foreign policy tool box, it is vital to comprehend how terror has altered the expectations of Canada's allies and the intentions of Canada's potential threats. Given an altered strategic situation, it will be equally important to review how the CF can also be used to attain Canada's foreign policy goals. In the sixth section of the paper a summary of the CF's current expeditionary capabilities will provide a starting point for designing a force structure that achieves those desirable characteristics, described earlier. Finally, a discussion of what the future structure should be capable of is required. It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss platforms or specific equipment for expeditionary forces. Such a discussion would naturally follow

the Government's acceptance of the need to focus the CF's force structure on expeditionary capabilities.

### **Modern Expeditionary Forces and Canadian Expeditionary History**

If the CF is to be capable of responding to terrorist threats and international crisis with timely deployments of expeditionary forces, just what is required? It is vital to come to a consensus concerning just what capabilities are needed in expeditionary forces before the force structure requirements of the CF can be defined. No organization in the World today exemplifies the term expeditionary better than the U.S. Marine Corps, so it is instructive to consider how the Marines view the idea of expeditionary. In addressing the Marine Corps' operational requirements for the 21st century to the U.S. Congress, Major General William A. Whitlow stated that,

The term 'expeditionary' refers to a menu of forces (air, ground and sea) that are forward or rapidly deployed to achieve a specific national security objective. These forces are trained and configured to respond to the full spectrum of military operations, from humanitarian assistance to small-scale contingencies through major theatre war. To be effective in these different and challenging operations, expeditionary warfare forces must be capable, mobile and extremely versatile.<sup>10</sup>

The keys to expeditionary capability are therefore capability, mobility, and versatility. Expeditionary forces must arrive in theatre capable of contributing to a coalition effort without becoming a burden on coalition resources for either logistics or protection. Clearly expeditionary forces also need the mobility to arrive in theatre in a timely manner, if they are to be relevant to the effort. And finally, given the current strategic situation, expeditionary forces need to have the versatility required to handle the full spectrum of

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<sup>10</sup> Major General William A. Whitlow, "Navy and Marine Corps Operational Requirements for the 21st Century," FDCH Congressional Testimony, 05/09/2002.

missions from Special Force interdiction of terrorists, to Peace Support Operations (PSOs), to full spectrum dominance warfare.

As this paper will discuss later, there is now considerable room to debate the CF's capability, mobility, and versatility. To what extent can the CF be considered an expeditionary force? In the past the Government has used the CF to gain influence over the course of international events. This has long been the CF's most important role and a review of the history of the CF demonstrates that expeditionary warfare is its legacy. In fact the two World Wars of the last century must be viewed as the most important examples of Canadian expeditionary warfare, and whenever important international events were unfolding the government of the day was forced to return to that tradition. Since the end of the Second World War, "successive Canadian governments [have] committed some 1000,000 CF personnel on 40 peacekeeping and intervention missions around the world."<sup>11</sup>

After the Second World War, a war weary Canada wasted no time in demobilizing and the remaining forces were tasked with homeland defence. In 1950 the Korean War, however, forced Canada to reconsider its need for expeditionary forces when the land force contribution required six months to train and deploy to theatre. During the 1950s, Canada armed forces were expanded in strength to 120,000 members and Canada took on many peacekeeping missions in places such as the Suez and Lebanon. J.L. Granatstein admonishes that "what Canadians failed to understand was that their peacekeeping was possible only because Canada's military had war-fighting capabilities-ships that could roam the seas, transport aircraft, army signallers, logisticians,

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<sup>11</sup> Sens, "From Peacekeeping to Intervention: Expeditionary Capabilities and the Canadian Force Structure Debate," 1.

infantry and armour who could operate anywhere, work with other national armies and do it all well."<sup>12</sup>

projected cost contributed to the decision not to deploy the Brigade.<sup>14</sup> The Canadian government could claim that the lack of a direct threat to Canada during the Gulf War had not justified a commitment of land forces, but it was clear that the CF was simply not prepared to respond to such a request.

9/11 and the "Coalition of the Willing's" attack on Afghanistan in 2001 could not be likewise reacted to with only air and maritime forces. The direct attack against the United States resulted in the commitment of ground forces to a war for the first time since Korea. In an interesting parallel to the Korean War, Canadian ships were dispatched immediately to the war on terror in South West Asia, but it took six months for the government to commit land forces. Clearly those forces were not actually ready for expeditionary operations when initially needed.

This short review of Canadian expeditionary history reveals that in times of relative peace Canada has allowed its expeditionary capability to erode and has therefore been unable to react quickly to crisis when they occur. The period following the end of the Cold War is a perfect example of such a period, during which Canada cashed in its peace dividend. Now when the threat of terror has emerged as an international problem Canada has only a limited capacity to react. While, as will be discussed below, the war on terror should not be viewed as a war in the classic sense it does call for an international expeditionary response that Canada must rebuild if it is to play a significant role in that response.

### **The Nature of International Terrorism**

Since 9/11 there has been considerable debate about the wisdom of U.S. President, George W. Bush's decision to declare a "War on Terrorism." This debate is

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

central to every country's efforts against terror as the language used in the international campaign will affect the courses of action selected. The Chinese philosopher, Sun Tzu, said that "victory is the main object of war. If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed."<sup>15</sup> The war on terror is not really a war in the traditional sense as the enemy is not a single organization, over which victory can be declared, and, therefore, the war will never actually end. Instead, terror should be viewed as a method rather than an enemy and as long as it remains practical, the use of terror is unlikely to ever end. In attempting to put terrorism in perspective, Pamala L. Griset and Sue Mahan write that "regardless of the number of victories won in the current 'war,' history teaches us that terrorism is endemic to the human condition and cannot be eliminated by diligent application of the 'right' strategies."<sup>16</sup> The war on terror does not, therefore, lend itself to military strategy or organizational culture. Clearly, a more complex analytical method is needed that recognizes the requirement for both long term security measures against any foe who utilizes the method of terror and short term military actions against specific terrorist foes designed to achieve tactical victories that will reduce the overall terrorist threat.

The fact that the War on Terror is really a campaign against a method, and not simply a war against a particular opponent, has led our allies to a "shift from a threat-based model, analyzing whom the adversary might be, to capability-based planning,

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<sup>15</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans Samuel B. Griffith, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 73.

<sup>16</sup> Pamala L. Griset and Sue Mahan, *Terrorism in Perspective*, (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications Inc., 2003), xiii.

which focuses more on how an adversary might fight."<sup>17</sup> Capability based planning can also be used to determine which agencies are best suited to accomplish specific tasks in the campaign against terror. While this model was developed to discuss how the U.S. should react to terror, it is applicable to all countries involved in the campaign. Each ally is faced with the same choices in countering the threat.

In attempting to understand which federal department of the US government is best suited to lead the campaign against terrorism, Ashton B. Carter believes that previous attempts to label the campaign as a war or to describe terrorism as crime or disaster have led to inappropriate organizational models. The campaign as a war concept results in the leadership of the Departments of Defense and State whose focus has traditionally been "over there" against foreign governments. While this model would prove useful for taking action against a specific terrorist organization, it does not lend itself to the establishment of long term security measures against the generic terrorist methods. Equally ill-suited is the concept of terror as crime, as it leads to a reactive policy against terrorist acts already committed instead of prevention of terrorist acts before they can harm the citizens of a country. Lastly, Carter explains that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was unable to make a convincing case for the view of terror as a disaster and was, therefore, unable to secure the required resources. Clearly policy makers were unhappy trusting the security of the state to an organization that was not prepared to counter the threat with force if required. Carter concludes that the best model for managing the overlapping jurisdictions of counterterrorism is the establishment of an architect for Homeland Security who would be responsible for

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<sup>17</sup> Rob de Wijk, "The Limits of Military Power," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Guilford, Connecticut:

identifying which agencies were best suited to assume each counterterrorism role.<sup>18</sup> This solution is equally applicable to Canada and is attractive because it coordinates the activities of military action, police enforcement, and disaster response while allowing each to focus on established areas of expertise. It does not require organizations to develop whole new areas of responsibility that would distract them from their core missions.

The next step then is to understand which organization should be responsible for each potential response to terrorism. In discussing the possible responses to international terrorism in his recent work, *Understanding Terrorism Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues*, Gus Martin provides a useful categorization.<sup>19</sup> In Martin's model responses can be divided into four categories: Use of Force; Operations other than war (repressive options); Operations other than war (conciliatory options); and legalistic options. Use of Force includes coercive covert operations; suppression campaigns; punitive strikes; and pre-emptive strikes and, in Martin's opinion, would naturally be conducted by military forces. Operations other than war: repressive options include covert operations; intelligence; enhanced security; and economic sanctions. Each of the options in this category could be accomplished with either military or non-military assets; however, Martin advises that non-military options "require the development of creative security measures and the use of new technologies." Operations other than war: conciliatory options include diplomacy; social reform; and concessionary options. In this category

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McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2003), 505.

<sup>18</sup> Ashton B. Carter, "The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism Understanding the New Security Environment*, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Guilford, Connecticut: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2003), 428-442.

<sup>19</sup> Gus Martin, *Understanding Terrorism Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues*, (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications Inc., 2003), 346-348.



military forces may have a supporting role to play in diplomacy and social reform; however other resources would be the main contributors to these efforts. Legalistic options include law enforcement and international law. Once again military forces might play a supporting role, but as they lack the specific legal and police investigative training, they would not ideally lead these efforts. Martin's model of terrorism response categories provides suggestions for what type of resource is best suited to each category of response. In general, the responses that must be conducted domestically are usually conducted by non-military resources, while those responses that must be conducted internationally are either led by or supported by military resources.<sup>20</sup>

While the war on terror should not be viewed as a war because it cannot be won, it may be possible to successfully execute a war against a particular terrorist threat such as al-Qaeda. The question is how best to fight that war? What emphasis should be placed on defensive or "homeland defensive" measures and what resources are most suited to that role? Equally, what emphasis should be placed on offensive actions and what strategies and resources are required? As stated above, this type of action is more suited to military organizations, because an end-state can be articulated that equates to victory. In attempting to identify a desired end-state for the United States and its allies in the War on Terror against al-Qaeda, Barry R. Posen admits that we "may never fully destroy al-Qaeda, or aligned organizations or new organizations that emulate them...[but

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

we] can aspire to reduce the terrorists to desperate groups of exhausted stragglers, with few resources and little hope of success."<sup>21</sup>

What follows is that the war on terror can never fully be won and requires a non-military organization to prevent attacks against the homeland. At the same time, individual campaigns against specific terrorist organizations can be won and should be the purview of the military. This situation must be analyzed in light of the threat that has emerged since 9/11 before the upcoming Canadian defence review can properly assess the required future force structure for the Canadian Forces. It is becoming increasingly clear that even if al-Qaeda is defeated the threat of terrorism is not going to disappear and Canada will need to be ready to respond to future threats. As Barry Posen observes, "this is a war of attrition, not a blitzkrieg."<sup>22</sup>

### **Domestic Responses to Terror**

To provide the most effective and efficient domestic response to terrorism it is essential to acknowledge the non-military nature of the campaign. Homeland defence against terror is principally a job for intelligence services, police forces and low-technology forces such as the Coast Guard. The reasons for this are two-fold: first, the terrorists or potential terrorists are probably already amongst us and second, it would be impossible to erect a physical barrier to effectively prevent them from entering the country.

In discussing the characteristics of large terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, John Thompson states that they use "diaspora, or immigrant communities, in Western nations

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<sup>21</sup> Barry R. Posen, "The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Guilford, Connecticut: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2003), 393.

for fundraising, recruitment and the generation of political support."<sup>23</sup> Should a terrorist organization decide to attack Canada they most likely already have a base of support here and may already have the actual operatives in the country. There will be no need to attempt to enter the country with forces that would require a military response to stop. The 9/11 attacks were a perfect example of the simplicity of their strategy, which owes its success to the openness of Western societies. The 19 perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks completed their initial training in Afghanistan years before the attack and then completed generating their force once they were safely inside the country and through any potential security barriers. They entered the United States legally months or even years before the attack. Once in America they planned their attack, undertook specialized training, in the form of civilian commercial pilot training, and acquired the very simple equipment needed. The critical vulnerabilities of their plan, that might have resulted in its being foiled, were the connections between their identities, any intelligence concerning past acquaintances, and any reports of odd behaviour, such as flight simulator training with no focus on take offs or landings. The only potential role for military action was the interception of the hijacked planes once they were en-route to their targets. That option, however, would have required that the fighter aircraft be airborne. Clearly it makes no sense for the government to keep combat air patrols of fighter aircraft airborne over all potential targets of terrorist attacks. The required higher levels of readiness would come at a prohibitive cost as modern air forces are equipped and trained to operate aircraft that far exceed the requirement of intercepting commercial aircraft.

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 393.

<sup>23</sup> John C. Thompson, "Serpents in the Garden: The Threat of Terrorism in Canada," in *Fortress North America? What 'Continental Security' Means for Canada*, eds. David Rudd and Nicholas Furneaux (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002), 8.

Because the actual attack of 9/11 was both planned and conducted in the United States, by members of an organization not acting on behalf of a sovereign state, it was clearly a criminal activity, and, therefore, one could argue that it should have been handled by the police. As Griset and Mahan point out, "non-state-sponsored terrorism committed against the citizens or holdings of a state generally is not a violation of international law but rather a violation of the domestic criminal laws of the victim state or the state where the terrorist act occurred."<sup>24</sup> As stated above, however, we are more interested in preventing this type of crime than in detecting and prosecuting it. It is clear, therefore, that the police will need access to sources of international intelligence and that there will be instances, such as the attack against Afghanistan, where military force will be needed to eliminate sources of terrorism. Additionally, police forces require special evidence gathering laws which will enable them to more effectively prevent terrorist acts rather than react to them. All that aside, the prevention of criminal terrorist activity inside a democratic country will remain the purview of the police force as it must be acknowledged that they have the necessary investigative skills that the military lacks.

Another important consideration is the fact that the police have a mandate to operate against criminal activity within Canada that the CF only enjoys in the exceptional circumstances of aid to the civil power. This limitation is a long standing protection of Canadian civil rights that should not and will not be relinquished lightly.

To be honest, the combination of police force and intelligence services are really the only viable option Canada has to act domestically to prevent terrorism. The immense

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<sup>24</sup> Griset and Mahan, *Terrorism in Perspective*, 280.

size of Canada and its coastline (at 202, 080 km, the World's longest<sup>25</sup>) make the idea of a physical barrier impossible. In discussing a "blueprint for Fortress North America," Stephane Roussel does not mention such a physical barrier, but instead foresees a "harmonization of policies." He identifies immigration, border management, customs, and law enforcement as "core areas" for harmonization, while defence is only viewed as a "peripheral" concern.<sup>26</sup> The difficulty of erecting physical security barriers was driven home once again with the March 11, 2004 bombing of the Madrid commuter trains. Terrorists succeeded in detonating ten separate improvised explosive devices, killing 200 commuters and injuring over 1500 more. When questioned the next day about the utility of surveillance systems to prevent such attacks, renowned security expert, Wesley Wark of the University of Toronto's Munk Centre said, "All of the best surveillance systems in the world...are not going to be foolproof. Your best hope of preventing such things is to know about the plans in advance, which is what intelligence agencies are supposed to do."<sup>27</sup>

### **Military Response to Terror**

Clearly forces in Canada should be prepared to react in the event of an emergency and in the case of specialized capabilities such as biological warfare, the military may be the only option. But in preventing the anticipated low-technology terrorist attacks being conducted around the world, the military will be neither the most effective nor the most

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<sup>25</sup> Canada, Natural Resources Canada, "The Atlas of Canada," accessed 16 March 2004, available at [www.atlas.gc.ca/site/english/facts/coastline.html](http://www.atlas.gc.ca/site/english/facts/coastline.html).

<sup>26</sup> Stephane Roussel, "The Blueprint for Fortress North America," in *Fortress North America? What 'Continental Security' Means for Canada*, eds. David Rudd and Nicholas Furneaux (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002), 13.

<sup>27</sup> Jeff Gray, "High-tech meets low-tech to defend transit systems," *Globe and Mail*, 12 March 2004, A14.

efficient option. Indeed, the military should be viewed as the last option for defence, because the immense expense of training and equipping a force for war is not required for simple security operations to counter unsophisticated, although deadly, attacks. Some will argue that terrorism represents the most significant threat facing Canada today, and that, therefore, the CF should be structured to meet that threat, within the domestic context. This outlook ignores the other important missions that a prosperous country's military can take on and wastes a valuable national asset. As DND noted itself in its 2002 Strategic Assessment, "severely constrained resources would suggest that a domestic focus might be more feasible, but today's strategic environment suggests that Canada has significant interests in the continuously erupting global crises that are predicted to unfold for many years into the future."<sup>28</sup>

One of the most obvious interests that Canada will want the CF to address is directly confronting terrorist organizations before they can attack. In the War on Terror it is preferable to take the offensive to ensure that military conflict occurs as far from the Canadian homeland as possible. Clearly, unlike domestic reactions to terrorism, international responses can only be effectively provided by the military. As Griset and Mahan note, "no international criminal code exists nor is there an international police force capable of combating terrorism or an international court with jurisdiction over all acts of terrorism."<sup>29</sup> International cooperation is required to interdict trans-national terrorists before they can relocate to the targets, but when international cooperation is

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<sup>28</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence, *Eyes Forward Strategic Assessment 2002*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2002).

<sup>29</sup> Griset and Mahan, *Terrorism in Perspective*, 279.

neither possible nor practical, military forces may be the only option for this type of mission.

In discussing the limits of military power and possible responses to international terrorism, Rob de Wijk recommends the following options in pursuing an international war on terrorism:

1. A military strategy of control in failed states that terrorists use as sanctuaries using SOF, supported by specialized forces and airpower,
2. A strategy of coercive diplomacy against unfriendly regimes that support terrorists, and if necessary their removal from power,
3. The use of HUMINT to infiltrate terrorist networks and then the destruction of those networks from within, and
4. A campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Islamic people.<sup>30</sup>

All of de Wijk's options could involve the use of expeditionary forces ranging from small special force units for control missions to medium sized forces in PSOs in support of the hearts and minds campaign, to full spectrum warfare, if required to remove an unfriendly regime. To provide the Canadian Government the flexibility to respond appropriately to international terrorism, the CF should be capable of performing all four types of missions.

Since 9/11, missions undertaken to disrupt terrorist organizations, using Special Forces, have become the counterterrorist method of choice. Rensselaer Lee and Raphael Perl write that "most experts agree that the most effective way to fight terrorism is to gather as much intelligence as possible; disrupt terrorist plans and infrastructures before they act; and organize multinational cooperation against terrorists and countries that

support them."<sup>31</sup> Disrupting terrorist plans and infrastructures in a foreign country that may be only nominally ruled by law means using military force to kill terrorists and destroy their camps and equipment. While these types of operations may be described by some as state approved assassinations and have previously been shunned by many Western governments, legal experts such as Daniel B. Pickard now believe that "it is possible to make a good faith argument that, under certain circumstances, assassination of terrorists may be permissible as a form of self-defense."<sup>32</sup> These types of operation have traditionally been very rare; Michele Malvesti notes that "among the more than 2,400 Anti-US incidents [of international terrorism] over a 16-year period [1983 -1998], the US has applied military force in response to only three."<sup>33</sup> While this type of pre-emptive operation is rare it is not a new phenomenon, as Ronald Bee illustrates with his example of the "Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in June 1981."<sup>34</sup> This type of pre-emptive action against terrorism is necessary, because as Bee points out, "deterrence does not work well for terrorists that are dedicated to taking their own lives along with those they murder."<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> de Wijk, "The Limits of Military Power," 517.

<sup>31</sup> Rensselaer Lee and Raphael Perl, "Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 25 February 2002), 4.

<sup>32</sup> Daniel B. Pickard, "Legalizing Assassination? Terrorism, the Central Intelligence Agency, and International Law," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism Understanding the New Security Environment*



It will serve little purpose to kill terrorists and destroy their infrastructures, if the very act of doing this results in greater numbers of terrorist recruits. Many commentators insist that, while not condoning terror as a method, the West must address the root causes of terrorism. As de Wijk notes, "a significant component of the new war...is the campaign to win the support of the populace of the opponent."<sup>36</sup> A key pre-requisite to improving the lives of those susceptible to terrorist recruiting is security. This has long been the goal of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) that have become the basis for the CF's positive reputation in Canada. While PSOs, with their capacity to reduce the threat of terrorism worldwide, have become more relevant to Canadian security than ever before, they are also becoming increasingly more risky. As DND notes in its *Capability Outlook 2002 -2012*, "in a strategic environment progressively influenced by asymmetric threats, traditionally benign UN chapter 6 missions may now transform into higher intensity conflicts in short order."<sup>37</sup>

Higher intensity conflicts are also increasingly relevant to counterterrorism efforts, as Western countries have vowed to deny sanctuary to terrorists operating within the borders of rogue regimes. The overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan eliminated al-Qaeda's principle training bases and put the terrorist organization on the defensive. Additionally it proved to be the source of vast amounts of intelligence which permits the prosecution of the campaign against al-Qaeda all over the World.

"The new terrorism is a strategic or international challenge, requiring international cooperation between intelligence services and armed forces."<sup>38</sup> In responding to

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<sup>36</sup> de Wijk, "The Limits of Military Power," 513.

<sup>37</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence, *Capability Outlook 2002 -2012*, 13.

international terrorism it is clear that only militaries are capable of taking direct action taken against terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda, anywhere in the world, ensuring the stability of failing or troubled states, authorized in chapters six and seven of the United Nations Charter, and eliminating rogue states that harbour terrorists, such as Afghanistan.

Direct actions taken against terrorist organizations require precise strike capabilities due to the small size and mobility of the targets. Currently these strikes are undertaken by strategic bombing, either cruise missile or fighter aircraft delivered, or Special Forces. Peace Support Operations undertaken to create or re-enforce the conditions needed for stability, on the other hand, require significant numbers of highly trained and well equipped troops as the potential for these operations to become hazardous has greatly increased since 9/11. Finally, actions taken against rogue states require the full range of military capability to enable full spectrum dominance warfare.

What all three types of action have in common is the requirement for expeditionary forces. Whether disrupting terrorist networks before they can take action, establishing security to ensure the success of a hearts and minds campaign, or working as part of a coalition to deny terrorists the sanctuary of a rogue regime it is necessary to have a force that can act quickly anywhere in the world. Even before 9/11 commentators were suggesting that "in part to counter asymmetric threats, the U.S. army is seeking to create a more flexible expeditionary force that fills the gap between powerful heavy forces and rapidly deployable light forces."<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> de Wijk, "The Limits of Military Power," 506.

<sup>39</sup> Peters, *Club Dues? The Relevance of Canadian Army Expeditionary Forces* 51.

## **Pre-existing Demands for Expeditionary Forces**

The attacks of 9/11 have forced Canada to both debate the most effective and efficient responses to terrorism and to re-examine its strategic situation. As is clear from the discussion above the war on terror is best fought with a complex array of resources that includes military actions taken abroad. In this context then did 9/11 fundamentally alter Canada's strategic situation and the correct mission and force structure for the CF? Ronald J. Bee argues that "September 11, 2001 has thus far served as a defining moment and organizing principle of American foreign policy under George W. Bush."<sup>40</sup> Given that the attacks have commenced a chain of events that include the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq, against the wishes of traditional NATO allies, France and Germany, it is hard to argue with him. In trying to understand how this defining moment for America affected Canada and the other countries of the World, Lenard Cohen observed that "terrorism, already an important facet of the international political landscape, seemed to have become the central organizing principle of international relations."<sup>41</sup> This precept makes intuitive sense, as many of the nations of the World, including Canada, consider the United States to be their most important strategic and economic partner and would, therefore, be forced to consider terrorism as required by that relationship.

In examining Canadian foreign policy after 9/11, Kim Nossal makes the initially surprising assertion that "what is remarkable about the events of September 11 is how

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<sup>40</sup> Bee, "Watershed and Continuity: US Foreign Policy After 9/11," 35.

<sup>41</sup> Lenard J. Cohen, "The World "Reordered?": The Impact of September 11th on International Politics," in *Foreign Policy Realignment in the Age of Terror*, eds. Lenard Cohen, Brian Job, and Alexander Moens, (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003), 3.

little realignment or reorientation there was in Canadian policy in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks."<sup>42</sup> In the wake of the attacks the Canadian public expressed genuine support for the US and the Canadian Government contributed forces to the War on Terror. Neither the public nor the government, however, could be convinced of the necessity of invading Iraq, despite President Bush's attempts to connect the invasion to the war on terror and the importance of Canada's relationship with the U.S. It seems that Doug Bland is correct when he states that "Canada is secured by geography and the United States (whether we like it or not) and most Canadians believe that is so. For the most part, Canadian leaders can volunteer (or avoid) any defence mission that seems appropriate at the time and they are as free to select for Canada almost any military capability they think appropriate and public sentiment seems to confirm this notion."<sup>43</sup> To date, 9/11 and the events of the last two years have done nothing to change this perception.

What then is Canada's strategic reality? After the end of the Cold War but before 9/11, Canada faced no imminent threat to its security, and, therefore, foreign policy and expeditionary force deployments focused on then Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy's human security agenda. Interestingly this agenda fully supports de Wijk's recommendation to embark on a campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Islamic people in order to reduce the number of potential terrorist recruits. The 1994 White Paper on Defence stated that "at present there is no immediate direct military threat to

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<sup>42</sup> Kim Richard Nossal, "Canadian Foreign Policy After 9/11: Realignment, Reorientation or Reinforcement?" in *Foreign Policy Realignment in the Age of Terror*, eds. Lenard Cohen, Brian Job, and Alexander Moens, ( Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003), 21.

<sup>43</sup> Doug Bland, "Funding Canada's Future Defence Policy," *CCS Research Papers*, accessed 15 March 2004; available from [www.ccs21.org](http://www.ccs21.org).

Canada and today's conflicts are far from Canada's shores."<sup>44</sup> While terrorism has altered that reality, as discussed above, within Canada counterterrorism is primarily a mission for the intelligence and police forces. The military's counterterrorism mission, therefore, is primarily over seas. This assessment matches the CF's own assessment of the Canadian public's expectations as it noted "the premium placed on maintenance of a rapid reaction capability to support preventative diplomacy."<sup>45</sup>

In designing a Strategic Capability Plan to achieve the goals of the White Paper, DND intended to develop "a joint expeditionary force structure for the Canadian Forces."<sup>46</sup> Of course, as previously stated, the concurrent desire to reap a "peace dividend" made the achievement of that goal practically impossible, but nonetheless it has never officially ceased to be the goal of the CF.

As Colonel David Read points out Canada is not alone in its desire to field expeditionary forces. He notes, however, that "[European members of NATO] are still caught in a national security paradigm based on territorial defence, and have only recently begun to accept the need to project power."<sup>47</sup> Again like Canada, our allies have been hampered by budgetary constraints, for "with over 50 divisions in NATO Europe, only a handful can be projected abroad."<sup>48</sup> Some portion of this limited expeditionary capability can be attributed to the use of conscripts in some European armies; however, it

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<sup>44</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper on Defence*, 12.

<sup>45</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence, *Capability Outlook 2002 -2012*, 13.

<sup>46</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2001), 72.

<sup>47</sup> Colonel David W. Read, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: NATO's Need for a Niche Capability Strategy," *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 3 (Autumn 2000), 17.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid*, 18.

still reveals that few countries are able to back up their foreign policy goals with hard power. Even the powerful U.S. Army is being forced to consider how it can become more expeditionary and thereby remain relevant to U.S. foreign policy, because as James Davis of Washington University notes "if they don't change the Marine Corps will eat their lunch."<sup>49</sup> Clearly, some observers believe that even the U.S. army cannot deploy fast enough to remain relevant to future expeditionary requirements.

As seen above, expeditionary forces have a three-fold mission in the war on terror: the disruption of terrorist organizations; PSOs in pursuit of international stability; and the elimination of rogue regimes that harbour terrorists. But as we have also observed, Canada was intent on developing expeditionary forces prior to 9/11. The question is to what end were these forces intended and are they still relevant to Canada with or without the terrorist threat?

The motivation for using Canada's military in foreign operations is a very emotional subject. The military has become deeply tied to the Canadian public's view of its country's place in the World. The fundamental argument is, should we commit our forces to international operations because it is the right thing to do or because it is in our national self-interest? This debate is of consequence because the cost of a modern expeditionary force requires a considerable demonstration of national will, and, therefore, a consensus on the rationale for such a force is essential. The Government's unwillingness to date to engage in this debate is perhaps one of the reasons that, despite the stated intention to develop an expeditionary force, little concrete progress has been made. Interestingly, it is possible to link the two separate goals for an expeditionary

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<sup>49</sup> Harry Levins, "What's Old is New Again: Expeditionary Forces," *St Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 02, 2003.

force (doing the right thing and serving the national self-interest) such that most Canadians could agree on the worth of such a force.

Even if Canada desires to take action internationally for altruistic reasons, in many instances it will find that it does not have sufficient resources to accomplish the mission alone. "Since the end of the Second World War, Canada has pursued a national strategy of selective engagement through multinational institutions, which feature membership in alliances."<sup>50</sup> As a middle power Canada desires a multi-polar world and relies upon a multi-lateral approach to advance its political and security agenda. Canada's eagerness to belong to as many international organizations as possible (UN, NATO, OAS, APEC, etc) is a clear indication of this strategy. The U.S. also belongs to each of these organizations and each provides an additional opportunity for Canada and like-minded countries to influence the policies of the U.S. The strategy is an obvious one for any country faced with the necessity of close ties and a shared border with the world's single super power. And so, paradoxically, even if Canada wishes to act internationally to do the right thing that act may serve to gain the influence required to advance such an altruistic agenda. Clearly that same influence could be used to advance the national self-interest.

Another important link between altruistic and self-interested agendas is their ultimate effect on the world. The ultimate goal of the altruistic agenda is the betterment of the lives of the world's less fortunate citizens. That betterment is contingent upon a more secure environment for them to pursue their own agendas and coincidentally stability is an important goal of the national self-interest agenda. A clear example of the crossover of altruism and self-interest exists with Canada's support for international law. Most

Canadians inherently believe that Canada should work to ensure that every person is treated fairly in accordance with the law. At the same time a worldwide respect for the conventions of international law is essential to the stability of the world both inside and outside of Canada. As a country of immigrants, including 579,600 Muslims,<sup>51</sup> Canada would benefit from the perception that justice meted out to suspected terrorists was fair and based on international law. Without a significant contribution to the war on terror, however, Canada will have no say in the form that the justice takes. Equally, a worldwide respect for the legitimacy and efficacy of international law would serve Canada and Canadian citizens working abroad.

Despite the overlap with an altruistic agenda, many observers of Canada's foreign policy, such as Allen Sens, believe that "self interest has formed the basis for Canada's commitment to overseas contingencies."<sup>52</sup> Canada benefits from stability and the current world order, and it is clearly in our interests, therefore, to make efforts to maintain it. Efforts in this regard are easier to justify as the Canadian effort itself contributes to the end goal of stability. On the other hand when the desired self interest is not directly related to the effort the way international stability is, then it is significantly more difficult to justify the use of the CF. Many observers will argue that military efforts can provide seemingly unrelated influence. Colonel William Peters, for example, warns that without the influence derived from military contributions "some have suggested...the possibility of American withdrawal of support for Canadian membership in the G-8, which would

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<sup>50</sup> Peters, *Club Dues? The Relevance of Canadian Army Expeditionary Forces*, 1.

<sup>51</sup> Canada, Statistics Canada, "2001 Census: Analysis Series Religions in Canada," accessed 15 March 2004, available at [www.statscan.ca](http://www.statscan.ca).

<sup>52</sup> Sens, "From Peacekeeping to Intervention: Expeditionary Capabilities and the Canadian Force Structure Debate," 1.



have a strong negative impact on Canada's reputation and self image and would probably cause significant political fallout."<sup>53</sup> And Sean Maloney contends that the contribution of ships and aircraft, but not land forces to the coalition effort in the Gulf War "made Canada look cautious and minimalist" and led to a loss of prestige.<sup>54</sup> Others observers will counter that there is no proof that military operations provide such influence. Joel Sokolsky, for example, believes that "arguments that Canada must send forces, particularly combat forces, abroad because it is dependent upon trade have no validity."<sup>55</sup>

Ultimately, however, Canada's desire for influence can be realized through the projection of power, for despite the fact that the effect of Canada's military contributions on its influence is hard to measure, there is little debate concerning what our allies expect of us. Clearly if we were to meet those expectations (discussed in greater detail below), our influence would be enhanced even if there remains disagreement concerning just what that influence could be used to achieve. Allies are expecting commitment, capability and a willingness to share risk.

After the Cold War, American foreign policy observers stated that America's allies needed to contribute more to defending shared vital interests.<sup>56</sup> As previously discussed, many allies paid lip service to that expectation, but after 9/11 influence with the United States will be dependent upon efforts made in the war on terror. Griset and

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<sup>53</sup> Peters, *Club Dues? The Relevance of Canadian Army Expeditionary Forces*, 57.

<sup>54</sup> Sean Maloney, "Missed Opportunity: Operation BROADSWORD, 4 Brigade and the Gulf War, 1990-1991," *Canadian Military History* 4, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 45.

<sup>55</sup> Joel J. Sokolsky, "Caught between "Pulpit Diplomacy" and the "Bully Pulpit": The Canadian Forces and the Second American Century," paper presented to the VCDS Symposium: Creating the Canadian Forces for 2020, Government Conference Centre, Ottawa, 26 April 2000, 9.

<sup>56</sup> David Gomport and Richard Kugler, "Free Rider Redux: NATO Needs to Project Power and Europe Can Help," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 1995), 9.

Mahan believe that "more than ever before the U.S. government's counterterrorism policy is seen as an integral part of its foreign affairs policy."<sup>57</sup> Clearly the U.S. values commitment, and the sustainability of that commitment is key. When Canada extracted its ground commitment in the Afghanistan campaign against the Taliban after just six months, U.S. disappointment was palpable.

Equally important to commitment is capability. Surely, allies are not interested in wasting valuable resources to supply and protect the contributions of allies who do not add value to the mission. Long term observers of Canadian foreign policy Louis Nastro and Kim Nossal have argued that there is a commitment-capability gap created by a lack of effective military forces that has negatively influenced Canada's ability to advance its foreign policy agenda.<sup>58</sup>

Finally, the most important factor in determining the value of a contribution, and, therefore, the influence that can be derived from it, is the level of risk that a country is willing to accept. General Lewis MacKenzie opines that "the credit earned and received on international military operations is directly proportional to the potential risk involved."<sup>59</sup> Even when they do not state so for political reasons, allies measure force contributions to determine if each ally is appropriately sharing in the burden of collective security.

Ultimately, Canada must find a balance between working for a multi-polar world and being an influential ally. Robert Kagan clearly represents the resentment of the

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<sup>57</sup> Griset and Mahan, *Terrorism in Perspective*, 277.

<sup>58</sup> Louis Nastro and Kim Richard Nossal, "The Commitment-Capability Gap: Implications for Canadian Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (Autumn 1997), 19 - 22.

<sup>59</sup> Lewis MacKenzie, "No to Niche Roles for our Military," *National Post*, October 2, 2003.

World's only superpower by articulating the sense that America's allies are free riders, who at the same time are attacking their ride.

Those [countries] contributing to the growing chorus of anti-hegemony and multi-polarity are playing a dangerous game. The problem is not merely that some of these nations are giving themselves a 'free ride' on the back of American power, benefitting from the international order that American hegemony undergirds, while at the same time puncturing little holes in it for short term advantage. The more serious danger is that this behaviour is already eroding the sum total of power that can be applied to protecting the international order altogether.<sup>60</sup>

Just as it is true that allies know what they expect from their strategic partners, it is equally true that they know what they do not appreciate. Despite platitudes to the contrary, allies are not interested in strategically meaningless substitutions for contributions. They also do not value the pursuit of roles that involve reduced risks. And most of all, allies believe that moralizing and trying to set the international agenda without an appropriate contribution is unacceptable. These generalizations apply to all allies and are simply based upon human nature which dictates that no one appreciates continuously being asked to shoulder more than their own fair burden.

In gaining influence with the U.S., Canada's geographic location is less important than it was during the Cold War. Colonel Peters notes that "the threat to North America has declined significantly since the end of the Cold War. The reduced threat of air and missile attack from the former Soviet Union, while a positive development for Canadian Security, has also reduced the geostrategic significance of Canadian territory as well as the value of continental defence as a component of Canada's contribution to Western

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<sup>60</sup> Robert Kagan, "If Not U.S. Hegemony, Then What?" *Washington Post*, 23 June 1998, A17.

security."<sup>61</sup> Access to Canadian territory, therefore, is no longer a resource that Canada can trade for influence in lieu of appropriate military contributions.

Like access to Canadian territory, during the Cold War Canada used its status as a middle power to take on roles that the U.S. could not. In attempting to establish peace in many strategic areas of the World U.S. presence would have been viewed as counterproductive, as it would have prompted Soviet attempts to maintain the global strategic balance. Since the end of the Cold War, "key roles previously played by middle powers in the bipolar world, such as mediation, are less important because of the increased capacity of great powers to undertake such activities alone, no longer needing smaller nations as go betweens."<sup>62</sup>

Perhaps the contribution least appreciated by allies is the tendency to moralize and set the international agenda without providing hard assets to achieve that agenda. During the 1990s, Foreign Minister Axworthy articulated the "human security" agenda which he believed could be achieved through the use of Canadian "soft power." As Sokolsky points out, "What Americans do not like about the Axworthy doctrine, is not its 'human security' agenda, it is that the Canadian Foreign Minister is presuming to set that agenda for the international community, including the United States."<sup>63</sup> The truth was that contrary to the rhetoric proclaiming the purpose of the U.S. military was to fight wars "what characterized the 1990's was the extent to which America intervened militarily on what can only be described as human security agenda."<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Peters, *Club Dues? The Relevance of Canadian Army Expeditionary Forces*, 55.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid*, 48.

<sup>63</sup> Sokolsky, "Caught between "Pulpit Diplomacy" and the "Bully Pulpit": The Canadian Forces and the Second American Century," 2.

We can see now that prior to 9/11 Canada desired an expeditionary capability in an attempt to play a larger role in the World. Whether one believes that this goal was motivated by altruism or self-interest depends upon how one views the proper motivation of nations. Ultimately, however, the debate concerning motivation has little bearing on the type of contribution that will provide influence with our allies. There is no turning away from seeking influence, as the process of globalization simply will not permit isolationism.<sup>65</sup> Canada is left to decide between accepting the world as it is and the decisions of others or attempting to use its resources to fashion a world more to our liking. What sort of contribution will best serve Canada in seeking the influence it needs?

Expeditionary forces were clearly the answer that Canada came to at the end of the Cold War. The keys to gaining influence were seen to be rapid reaction, flexibility and an ability to operate throughout the full spectrum of war. In reviewing the trends in the defence policies of NATO nations, Peters opines that "perhaps the most significant of the trends will be the higher force structure priority on power projection in the form of rapid reaction forces."<sup>66</sup> Being able to get there first matters, whether a force is searching for terrorists before they can escape or establishing peace before rebel forces can mobilize. As important as speed, is flexibility. The increased tendency of the United States to form ad hoc "coalitions of the willing" to achieve foreign policy goals will require Canada to have expeditionary forces capable of a wide variety of missions in the

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>65</sup> Jean-Marie Guchemmo, "The Impact of Globalization on Strategy," *Survival*, no. 4 (Winter 1998-99), 12.

<sup>66</sup> Peters, *Club Dues? The Relevance of Canadian Army Expeditionary Forces*, 63.

air, on land, and at sea, if it hopes to have the flexibility to choose which coalitions to join. As Sens has noted the nature of PSOs has changed, and "if Canada wishes to derive the political benefits of involvement in PSOs in support of Canada's interests, selective engagement or the provisions of niche contributions will not secure those benefits. Canada must be able to contribute to the full spectrum of conflict management efforts, if it is to reap the political benefits of being a serious player in PSOs."<sup>67</sup> Canada must be prepared to accept its full share of the risk, if it hopes to exercise influence. In seeking to gain influence through the deployment of forces, a country must be careful not to tailor its force structure to achieve the most economical contribution possible by accepting a niche role. As Rear Admiral Richard Hill warns, "if a medium power emphasizes its alliance commitment to the extent of saying its forces are a 'contribution' and that only, it is very likely to get a force structure that is not suited to its national needs."<sup>68</sup>

Whether Canada is motivated by Axworthy's human security agenda or self-interest and great power politics, a greater commitment to international causes is called for. "Canadian governments have generally chosen to engage themselves in international affairs because that has been seen as the best way to further Canadian interests."<sup>69</sup> Now, as at the end of the Cold War, expeditionary forces provide the Government with choice with respect to which missions to be involved with and they provide the greatest potential for influence.

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<sup>67</sup> Sens, "From Peacekeeping to Intervention: Expeditionary Capabilities and the Canadian Force Structure Debate," 3.

<sup>68</sup> Fred W. Crickard, *In a Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity*, (Montreal, PQ: McGill-Queens University Press, 1996), 59.

<sup>69</sup> Peters, *Club Dues? The Relevance of Canadian Army Expeditionary Forces*, 75.

## Canada's Current Expeditionary Capability

Before moving from why an expeditionary force is needed to what sort of force is specifically needed, it is useful to examine the current Canadian expeditionary capability. The 1994 White Paper on defence provides for expeditionary capabilities through the Vanguard and Main Contingency Force (MCF) units of each element of the Canadian Forces. The White Paper commits the CF to the ability to provide Vanguard units within three weeks and to be capable of sustaining them indefinitely in a low-threat environment. MCF units are to be available within three months but there is no stated sustainability commitment to keep.

The Army's Vanguard unit is a battle group, "usually a force of roughly 1000...based on either an infantry battalion or an armoured regiment, with at least a squadron or a company from the other arm."<sup>70</sup> The Army's MCF consists of the Sabre Brigade, a robust formation that consists of over 8000 troops, including a full mechanized infantry brigade, an additional infantry battalion group, accompanying tactical aviation, and a joint headquarters. As Joseph Jockel points out, the Sabre Brigade is not, however, intended for high-level operations (those operations where "the full range of modern weaponry may be used and military activities are conducted continuously") and has never actually been deployed. Additionally, he makes it clear that the Sabre Brigade is not sustainable as the army could not support three rotations of the brigade.<sup>71</sup> The truth that the Sabre Brigade is not actually a viable option for the Canadian Government to offer as a contribution to a multi-national force has led to the practice of contributing only the

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<sup>70</sup> Joseph T. Jockel, *The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power*, (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1999), 57.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, 44-48.

Vanguard component (battle groups), as was recently done in Bosnia and Kosovo. This practice has significantly limited the range of missions the Canadian Army can participate in as "the U.S. military has quietly let its allies and potential allies know that it would not want to accept contributions smaller than a brigade into a combat land force under its operational command."<sup>72</sup> Despite this limitation, the army has continued to make contributions to international stability through the deployment of battle groups, often to more than one mission concurrently. This has clearly stretched the Army's ability to regenerate its forces to the breaking point and Sens warns that "despite a stated commitment to the capacity to deploy and sustain indefinitely a force of 4000 personnel, Canada's expeditionary capability for formed ground force units is dangerously thin."<sup>73</sup>

The Navy's Vanguard units are a Halifax class frigate on each coast. While the White Paper also commits the CF to maintain a ship in NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL), it is usually the case that this contribution is double tasked as the Vanguard unit. This practice necessitated the removal of HMCS HALIFAX from SNFL after 9/11 to provide the naval Vanguard component to Operation APOLLO, the CF's contribution to the war on terror. The MCF is a task group which nominally consists of a destroyer, two frigates (one of those frigates is the Vanguard unit from the coast where the MCF task group is based) and an AOR (Replenishment ship). The task group would normally be supported by at least three sea king helicopters and might include a submarine and associated Maritime Patrol Aircraft support. In 1999, Jockel correctly identified the AOR as the limiting factor on sustainability and during Operation

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid, 57-58.

<sup>73</sup> Sens, "From Peacekeeping to Intervention: Expeditionary Capabilities and the Canadian Force Structure Debate," 3.



APOLLO only the first two rotations included a full task group.<sup>74</sup> This may surprise some observers, however, as stated above the CF is not mandated to sustain MCF units for any specific period. Another potential problem with the naval MCF units is the limited number and age of the IROQUOIS class, area air defence and command and control destroyers. The navy was not able to sustain one in theatre throughout the two year duration of Operation APOLLO and therefore during those times the Canadian Task Group was forced to rely upon U.S. Navy units for area air defence. During those periods the value of the Canadian contribution was clearly reduced as allies were forced to divert resources to provide force protection.

The air force's Vanguard units are a squadron of CF-18 fighter aircraft and a flight of C-130 Hercules transport aircraft. If a greater contribution is required, the MCF, as planned in Operation SCEPTRE, consists of two squadrons of CF-18s (36 aircraft) and two flights of C-130s (8 aircraft). Once again, the forces are not intended for high-level operations and the plan is unsustainable past the first rotation as 36 CF-18s "would require over half the operational fighter squadrons [in the Canadian Air Force.]"<sup>75</sup>

### **Required Expeditionary Enhancements**

If the keys to expeditionary capability are capability, mobility, and versatility, as stated by Major General Whitlow, it is obvious that there are serious gaps in Canada's current expeditionary capability. Canada's inability to sustain anything more than Vanguard forces speaks to a lack of capability, the three months required to deploy the MCF (a target which has never even been tested for the Army and Air Force MCFs)

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<sup>74</sup> Jockel, *The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power*, 85.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, 110.

speaks to the lack of mobility, and the stated intention not to use our forces in high-level intensity operations speaks to the lack versatility.

The question that naturally follows is what type of forces with what capabilities should Canada develop to achieve its goal of a joint expeditionary force structure? It is clear that our allies expect us to be capable of contributing all over the World, wherever they themselves are engaged. In 1999, before 9/11, the U.S. Ambassador to Canada made it clear just what America expected out of its continental ally in terms of defence capability. "As partners in North American defense and peacekeeping elsewhere in the world, we both need high quality, well-equipped, professional defense forces capable of undertaking all appropriate defense tasks separately, jointly, and in coalition with our allies. At the one end of the spectrum, we need to be ready to cooperate in operations like Desert Storm, and at the other end we must be able to answer the call for peacekeepers."<sup>76</sup> While he mentioned the defence of North America, the entire spectrum of conflict envisaged (peacekeeping to Operation Desert Storm) required expeditionary forces. To match our allies expectations, the CF requires strategic lift, the ability to operate in the littoral areas, and a joint operations concept that ensures tactical relevance. These three key enhancements would result in a truly expeditionary force which would provide the government with significant options for contributing to the campaign against international terror and for serving foreign policy goals.

Sens sums up the need for expeditionary forces by stating that "in a general sense, the force structure implications of peacekeeping and intervention missions are self-evident. By geographic necessity, the Canadian government's commitment to

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<sup>76</sup> Gordon Griffin, "The Challenges of Shared Security," remarks to the Canadian Club of Montreal, 11 Jan. 1999, 5.

peacekeeping or intervention operations requires military forces with expeditionary capabilities."<sup>77</sup> And so it would seem that expeditionary capability should begin with the ability to actually get the country's forces to the theatre of operations. Sokolsky, on the other hand, argues that it does not make sense to spend money on air or sea lift; if a crisis requires rapid deployment "Canada will simply have to say that it cannot get there quickly with its Vanguard and MCF [Main Contingency Force] units, but that, given time, it can mount and deploy a useful contribution."<sup>78</sup> The key hole in his argument, however, is "given time." Time, of course, counts. It counts in terms of mission accomplishment, and it counts in terms of the influence gained with allies. Relying on allied strategic lift means that CF forces will not arrive in the first wave, and that they will be a burden on our allies' lift capability. This is sure to lessen Canadian influence and detract from any claim to a role in the leadership of an operation or to a seat at any decision making table.

Peter Haydon believes that "the strategy of together, jointly from the sea is a reality and if Canada wants to be part of the decision-making process, then that sort of commitment will be expected."<sup>79</sup> While appearing to agree, by stating that "the CF needs to fundamentally transform into a force capable of operating from littoral areas and focused on land effects,"<sup>80</sup> the CLS argues that "the reality of the emerging security

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<sup>77</sup> Sens, "From Peacekeeping to Intervention: Expeditionary Capabilities and the Canadian Force Structure Debate," 4.

<sup>78</sup> Sokolsky, "Caught between "Pulpit Diplomacy" and the "Bully Pulpit": The Canadian Forces and the Second American Century," 14.

<sup>79</sup> Peter Haydon, "What Naval Capabilities Does Canada Need?" *Maritime Affairs*, accessed 29 April 2004, available from : [www.naval.ca/article/haydon/whatsnavalcapabilitiesdoescanadaneed\\_by peterhaydon.htm](http://www.naval.ca/article/haydon/whatsnavalcapabilitiesdoescanadaneed_by peterhaydon.htm).

<sup>80</sup> Lieutenant-General R.J. Hillier, *Strategic Capability Investment Plan - Land Effect*, 4.

environment suggests that it is unlikely that the CF will be called upon to fight in 'blue skies' or 'blue water', and the overall value to our country of equipping to do so would be minimal compared to the impact of providing precision land effects."<sup>81</sup> The inconsistency with the CLS's argument is that while it is true that future conflicts are more likely to occur in the littoral areas, force protection in far flung littoral areas will require the same capabilities for air superiority and sea control that operations in blue skies and blue waters required.

In fact, littoral waters require all of the capabilities of "blue" waters and offer the additional risks of closer proximately to shore launched missiles and aircraft, more congested surface picture to confuse the tactical situation, more challenging water conditions for anti-submarine warfare, and shallower waters that are conducive to mining operations. At the international forum on future naval forces, held in Copenhagen in April 2003, "[Danish Rear Admiral Kurt Birger Jensen] stated that the primary role of Western Navies has changed from open-ocean operations (blue water) to that of gaining access into and subsequently operating from within the littorals. He said that the primary role of smaller Western Navies had changed from territorial defence operations in their own regional littorals to global, international operations."<sup>82</sup> In assessing the future strategic environment, the CLS acknowledges this but deduces that future regional conflicts will be "characterized by American-lead coalition supremacy of maritime, air and space environments...will demand a capable CF that is strategically relevant and credible...[and] will require joint and interagency capabilities."<sup>83</sup> Unless Canada wants to

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid, 4.

<sup>82</sup> Joel Wieldman, "Future Naval Forces - Littoral to Expeditionary," *Naval Forces* (3/2003), 128.

rely exclusively upon its allies for force protection that joint capability will need to include "blue water" and "blue sky" capabilities that are enhanced to be effective in the littorals.

And so just as with strategic lift, a true expeditionary capability and the influence that comes with it, requires an ability to operate from the littorals. To a large extent it is the role of navies and air forces to provide lift and fire support to land forces. It, therefore, follows that if Canada were to adopt of plan of focusing on land effects, delivered only from land forces that Canada's contribution to a multinational coalition operation would be viewed as fulfilling a niche role. Peter Haydon worries that "the bottom line is that I have yet to see anything that convinces me that the [Canadian] Army is serious in restructuring itself in a way that it can provide a force compatible with the rapid response capabilities being assembled by the Americans, British, Dutch, Spanish, etc."<sup>84</sup>

Operating from the littorals is perhaps the most complex military operation that can be conducted as it involves air, land, and maritime forces working closely together in a constrained theatre of operations. At present there is no politically approved joint operations plan for the Canadian Forces. A decision on just how Canadian units should operate within a multi-national force is fundamental to future force structure decisions. Currently, "Joint", in the Canadian context, means that Canadian units will integrate within the appropriate multi-national component commander's organization.

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<sup>83</sup> Lieutenant-General R.J. Hillier, *Strategic Capability Investment Plan - Land Effect*, 3-4.

<sup>84</sup> Peter Haydon, "What Naval Capabilities Does Canada Need?" *Maritime Affairs*, accessed 29 April 2004, available from : [www.naval.ca/article/haydon/whatnavalcapabilitiesdoescanadaneed\\_by peterhaydon.htm](http://www.naval.ca/article/haydon/whatnavalcapabilitiesdoescanadaneed_by peterhaydon.htm).

Operationally, these units will not be supported by other Canadian units, simply because we have chosen not to invest in the required equipment, doctrine and training. However, Forces that require less support, either logistically or for combat, are easier for the coalition leader to accept and, therefore, are likely to be assigned more important tasks, requiring autonomy of action. Grouping all Canadian Forces under a single Canadian operational commander could result in a greater command role and increased influence over the conduct of the operation. On the one hand, the navy's ability to deploy its Task Group on Op Apollo and that Commander's subsequent appointment as Commander Task Force 151 is a clear example of how concentrated contributions can achieve better results. On the other hand, providing forces that integrate into the corresponding component commander is analogous to our colonial history of providing contributions to the imperial forces. In fact, our practice of establishing a National Command Element to retain Operational Command of all Canadian Forces in a multinational coalition force is our bureaucratic answer to the problem of ensuring that Canadian troops will not be sacrificed by foreign commanders.

Doug Bland recommends that in attempting to open a defence budget debate, a defence review should "centre the argument around the capabilities planning notion of defence management, but avoid basing any recommendations on achieving a 'multi-purpose combat capability' simply because the term is indefinable."<sup>85</sup> That debate needs to be opened around an expeditionary capability which is based upon strategic lift, the ability to operate in the littorals and a joint operating concept if the CF is to be truly expeditionary.

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<sup>85</sup> Doug Bland, "Funding Canada's Future Defence Policy," *CCS Research Papers*, accessed 15 March 2004; available from [www.ccs21.org](http://www.ccs21.org).

## **Conclusion**

Having reviewed the true nature of terrorism and the potential of expeditionary forces to address both that threat and Canada's other, pre-existing foreign policy objectives, it is clear that 9/11 has offered us an opportunity to open such a defence budget debate centred around capabilities. For every challenge can also be viewed as an opportunity, and this debate is Canada's opportunity to ensure that its forces are structured in a way that will ensure their relevance to Canadians, their security and their country's place in the World. The essential question that must be answered in determining what force structure the CF requires is should the CF be focused on homeland defence or expeditionary warfare? Some will argue that it's not a matter of choosing but rather one of balance. Governing, however, is about choosing and Canada's government needs to choose a priority for the CF or risk diluting its efforts to the point of irrelevance.

This paper has argued that the government should choose an expeditionary orientation for the CF to permit it to contribute meaningfully to the campaign against terrorism and to fully serve Canada's foreign policy goals. For all of the reasons stated above, this is the role most appropriate for the CF, given Canada's current strategic reality.

It is important to note that such a strategy will not come cheaply. As discussed above, to become truly expeditionary, the CF requires strategic lift, the ability to operate in the littorals and a joint operations concept. It is pointless to argue on the one hand that Canada can arrive late to the fight, using someone else's lift and that on the other hand the goal is an expeditionary force. The value of an expeditionary force is the influence

gained from an ability to contribute meaningfully in a timely manner. Strategic lift is really the starting point for discussions about expeditionary forces. The next capability in line for discussion is the ability to operate from the littorals. This is the future of expeditionary warfare and to play a meaningful role in the operation Canada will need the capability to operate there. Just as with strategic lift, Canada needs to provide a measure of its own force protection in this area, if it is not to be viewed as a free rider. Finally, Canada requires a joint operations concept. Strategic lift and operations in the littorals are true joint operations that require supporting fires to ensure force protection and effectiveness. Such a truly joint capability would provide a Canadian operational commander with a critical mass of forces and capabilities that would entitle Canada to a much greater say in any operation.

The acceptance of the assertion that the CF should have an expeditionary orientation will lead to a debate that promises to transform the CF. A Canadian expeditionary force holds the potential to be lighter, faster and more lethal. The requirement to be fully joint offers the promise of remaking the culture of the entire CF into an elite, combat-capable organization. With the CF's relatively small size, every unit will need to be able to contribute to a joint expeditionary effort. Capabilities that do not contribute to that mission will need to be rationalized to focus the limited resources available.

There are those who will argue that the Canadian public does not want such a force. Don Murton, however, has concluded in his study that fighting wars is seen as a priority role for the CF, while activities such as preventing drug smuggling or illegal



immigration are priorities for fewer Canadians.<sup>86</sup> An expeditionary force, as described above, would permit the CF to contribute to international security by fighting in wars as directed by the government, anywhere in the world. It is clear that this is the sort of military force Canadians need to fulfil the roles that Canadians want it to.

Ultimately, both before and after 9/11, what Canada desires from its military is security and influence. Again, both before and after the attacks of that morning, security is best achieved through international cooperation, collective defence and allowing the appropriate agency to take the lead in every circumstance. In the case of homeland defence against terrorism that agency will be other than DND. Influence gained from military operations, on the other hand is best achieved by arriving early, possessing capability, and demonstrating commitment through sustaining the operation as long as it is needed: in short, by deploying expeditionary forces. In conducting the defence review, the Canadian Government should come to this conclusion and clearly state that the requirement to field expeditionary forces will be the driving factor in determining Canadian Force Structure.

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<sup>86</sup> Don Murton, "Defending the Canadian Public," *Canadian Military Journal*, (Autumn 2003), 31.

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