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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
CSC 30 / CCEM 30

EXERCISE/EXERCICE

MASTER OF DEFENSE STUDIES

CAN NATO SURVIVE THE EUROPEAN UNION?

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ABSTRACT

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent demise of the Warsaw Pact many experts predicted that the NATO alliance would disappear in the absence of its traditional threat. However, instead of going into a steady decline NATO has begun transforming itself to face new global threats. Rather than disappearing, NATO has begun a period of expansion and transformation confirming and strengthening its relevancy and dominance in the world security arena. The essay examines NATO transformation and enlargement as well as exploring the difficulties that the European Union and the European Security Defense Initiative face. This paper will further consider the importance of NATO in dealing with the major powers of Russia and China as well as the recent dialogue with Mediterranean countries. The importance of US involvement will also be examined to highlight the differences between NATO and the EU. The essay will argue that despite the rise of the European Union and its accompanying European Defense and Security Initiative, NATO is and will remain the dominant alliance in the world.

“As an alliance we have never been stronger. We have never been more united. We have never been more resolved to move forward together.”¹ Paul D. Wolfowitz, Munich 2002

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Upon conclusion of the Second World War, Europe found itself divided by the ideological and political divisions of the democratic West and the communist East. Eastern Europe fell under the domination of the Soviet Union and NATO was formed in 1949 to keep the Soviets from expanding westward.² The NATO alliance was fashioned into a complex organization that joined member states politically, economically and militarily. Its integrated military organization helped to keep the Soviets at bay but also ensured that Germany became a more responsible member of the world community.³

The twelve founding members of NATO: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States committed themselves to come to each others defence in the event of military aggression against any one of them. This commitment was based on Western fears of Soviet expansionist ambitions and these fears were confirmed by the outbreak of the Korean War and communist expansion into French Indo China. As a result of the fear of Soviet expansionism and the spread of communism, NATO member states agreed to further harmonize their military structures in order to emphasize and guarantee their commitment to joint defence.⁴ This unification of North American and Western European defence demonstrated that the western world was committed to

¹ Janusz Onyszkiewicz, “The Central Issues for NATO,” available from <http://www.csm.org.pl/pl/files/The%20Central%20Issues%20for%20NATO.pdf>; Internet; accessed 26 January, 2004.

² NATO, “Understanding NATO,” available from <http://www.expandnato.org/undernato.html>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2004.

³ James Chace, “A Strategy to Unite Rather than Divide Europe,” in *“NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality,”* ed. Teld Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington D.C.: Cato Institute, 1998), 177.

⁴ NATO, “Understanding NATO,” available from <http://www.expandnato.org/undernato.html>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2004.

repelling any Soviet aggression whether it be through military or political means. As a result it also provided a framework for the prevention of any further rise of fanatical nationalism in Western Europe.⁵

NATO has served its purpose throughout the decades. The large deployment of American, Canadian and European troops on German soil helped to ensure political and military stability and discourage any thoughts of communist or nationalistic expansion. Furthermore, the creation of NATO helped set the conditions for the softening of tensions between former adversaries such as Greece and Turkey who joined the Alliance in 1952.⁶ In addition to providing stability and independence for member nations, NATO helped set the conditions for further European economic integration and cooperation. The commitment of Alliance members aided in ending the Cold War and allowed for the liberation of former Warsaw Pact countries who were then free to seek their own security alliances.⁷

Now that the Cold War is over, such an alliance would normally dissolve.⁸ In spite of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War peace, however, has not broken out throughout the world. In fact, the lack of a second superpower has perhaps led to more instability as regional conflicts have increased. Ethnic and religious tensions, previously controlled by authoritarian regimes, have erupted all over the world, led in part by the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has had to come to grips with the changing world situation and how to best provide for their security

⁵ NATO, "Understanding NATO," available from <http://www.expandnato.org/undernato.html>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2004.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ James Chace, *A Strategy to Unite Rather than Divide Europe...*, 177.

needs.⁹ The post Cold War world has led to immense challenges for the Alliance and questioned its relevancy in the 21st Century.

NATO is not in trouble. It is an organization that has survived with all its key institutions intact,...it has been asked to undertake an active role of unprecedented scale in organizing the Bosnian intervention; and many of its neighbours are clamouring to join it. If this is an organization in trouble, it would be interesting to hear how NATO's detractors would define success.¹⁰

The North Atlantic Treaty organization has been in existence for over fifty years and is often viewed as the most complete and effective alliance created. It was founded to deal with the threat of the spread of communism and the expansion of the Soviet Union. After the end of the Cold War, the need for the existence of the Alliance was called into question. More recently, NATO's survival has been faced with growing competition from the European Union and its associated European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI). The question remains as to whether NATO is still relevant given the changing world situation which involves the formation of different coalitions for different operations and the changing global economy created by the expansion of the EU and the entrance of China into the world economic market. Is NATO still relevant or will it be overtaken by a new European military alliance given the fact that its very reason (threat) for existence no longer exists? Is the most powerful military alliance in the world doomed to fall into oblivion or will it transform and continue to maintain its dominant place in the world?¹¹

⁹ NATO, "Understanding NATO," available from <http://www.expandnato.org/undernato.html>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2004.

¹⁰ Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium: The Battle for Consensus* (London: Brassey's, 1997), 116-117.

¹¹ Sharon Riggle, "The Relevance of NATO: A Discussion whose time has come," available from <http://www.cesd.org/natonotes/natorel.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 February, 2004.

Why, in fact, is the future of NATO important given that the very reason for its existence has passed into history? The future relevance of NATO is important to understand, because it will help determine the focus of security initiatives and actions for the foreseeable future. Understanding where NATO will fit into the global security arena is important for nations to comprehend because it will determine where they put their focus, priorities and financial commitments. The relationship between nations and their subsequent allocation of funds toward NATO is extremely important. If NATO is allowed to slide into oblivion then it is likely that the close ties between the transatlantic allies will also follow.

NATO was and is a military alliance to defend against military threats. For the first 40 years, this threat was based on the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO began to search for a new purpose and strategy. Unfortunately the events of September 11, 2001 helped to provide NATO with a new and unexpected focus. In November 2002, NATO's heads of state met in Prague to change the Alliance. The declarations emanating from the Prague Summit include a commitment to expand membership, missions and capability. The concept of defence has been replaced by the much broader construct of providing security for members of the Alliance. This has led to defining new missions based upon the new threats facing the world. These new missions range from containing terrorists and weapons of mass destruction to humanitarian relief.¹² While NATO has been looking to change itself, the EU has been looking to expand its role both economically and militarily. The ESDI is designed to provide the EU with the ability to employ an all European military force outside of the parameters of NATO. It would appear from this initiative that the EU and ESDI are in direct competition with NATO since many of the forces earmarked for NATO are also identified to be

¹² Harlan Ullman, "From Prague to Prague," available from <http://www.washingtontimes.com>; Internet; accessed 5 February, 2004.

used by the “EU Army”. The expansion of the EU into the security arena brings into question whether NATO is still relevant and/or will be replaced by a strong EU. Many would argue that this is a logical progression based on the fact that the great Soviet Bear no longer exists and therefore NATO has used up its usefulness. But is this more myth than reality? Europe itself has been divided over many defense and security issues over the years and NATO has provided the umbrella for focus and conflict resolution. Furthermore, NATO has transformed itself from its Cold War focus to a more all-encompassing one based on the current world situation. This paper will argue that despite the growing emergence of the European Union and its associated defence initiative, NATO is and will remain the most relevant and dominant alliance in the world. This thesis will be proved by examining the NATO's transformation, the problems of the EU and its associated defense initiative as well as looking how NATO plays an important role in maintaining relations with major powers such as Russia and China. An examination of the importance of US involvement in the Alliance as well as how NATO has proven to be a useful tool in keeping European fears of a resurgent Germany in check will also be explored. Finally, this paper will look at how NATO has proven itself in areas such as the Balkans and in its recent initiatives associated with its Mediterranean dialogue.

Though the original military intent for the formation of the Alliance has changed, the underlying fact that the members of NATO are bound by common traditions and goals has not.

Though the following words were spoken in 1984 by President Ronald Reagan, they are as relevant now as they were then and help form the basis of why NATO will maintain its relevance and dominance in the world;

“We are bound today by what bound us then – the same loyalties, traditions, beliefs. We were with you then, we are with you now. Your hopes are our hopes and your destiny our destiny.”¹³

Before examining why NATO will continue to be the dominant alliance in the world, let us first look at the European Union and explain why it will not be able to replace NATO.

EUROPEAN UNION

The European project-in all its internal and external manifestations-remains the primary focus of all European countries, whether EU members or not; and this is not likely to change for many years to come. The profound and extraordinarily rapid transformation of Europe over the past decade-including the liberalization and accompanying political and economic transformation of central and eastern Europe, and the stunning growth in European economic, monetary, political and security policy integration- has left the continent with a large and difficult agenda of consolidation and enlargement that will be the foremost concern of European governments for the remainder of the present decade.¹⁴

The European Union was an organization formed to unite the countries of Europe in order to ensure that they were so closely tied together that another war would be unthinkable.¹⁵ In this regard the EU is totally different from NATO in that the transatlantic alliance was formed purely as a security umbrella to combat the Soviet threat and not an internal European one. The EU was and is primarily about trade and economy though it has begun to transform itself and look outside these boundaries. The EU now concerns itself with subjects such as citizen’s rights, freedom of movement, travel and work, job creation, regional development, environmental protection and security and justice.¹⁶

¹³ Janusz Onyszkiewicz, “The Central Issues for NATO,” available from <http://www.csm.org.pl/pl/files/The%20Central%20Issues%20for%20NATO.pdf>, Internet; accessed 26 January, 2004.

¹⁴ Ivo H. Daalder, “Are the United States and Europe heading for divorce?” *International Affairs* 7:3 (July 2001), 557.

¹⁵ EU Newsweb, “European Union in the US,” available from <http://www.eurunion.org/profile/brief.htm>, Internet, accessed 25 May, 2004.

The EU has looked to achieve these goals through its close economic ties and it is achieving some success. “The EU has delivered half a century of stability, peace and prosperity. It has helped to raise living standards, built a single Europe wide market, launched the single European currency and strengthened Europe’s voice in the world.”¹⁷ It has developed into one of the world’s largest trading partners and with its new European Security and Defense initiative it is attempting to transform itself into a major player in global security.

In fact there is a belief within the EU that it is the organization most suited to dealing with regional conflicts because of its broad base of operations. The EU feels that all conflicts require political and economic solutions combined with military and policing assets for post conflict resolution. It is the EU ability to use economic assets to help reconstruction and their civilian crisis management skills to quickly help restore civil governments that make the EU an ideal organization to deal with multi-faceted situations.¹⁸

This belief within the EU has led to an expansion of its economic base as it enlarges and expands into Eastern Europe. The EU is constantly looking to expand its sphere of influence and sees Eastern Europe as an ideal location to extend the benefits of its economic and political cooperation in order to help emerging democracies deal with their political problems.¹⁹

The EU has been somewhat successful in its attempt to transform itself into a more far reaching alliance. The 1990s saw a decade of substantial growth and transformation for the EU as more nations joined the European community and its integrated economic and monetary union. The EU venture into formulating a common foreign and security policy and a coordinated

¹⁶ EUROPA, “The European Union at a glance,” available from <http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/.htm>, Internet, accessed 25 May 2004.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy,” available from . <http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/.htm>, Internet, accessed 25 May 2004.

defense policy under the ESDI were designed to allow the EU the ability to act autonomously of NATO, and more importantly the US, whenever they felt the need arise. These initiatives have been somewhat successful as they have ensured that Europe has not slid back into renewed conflict but has in fact progressed towards a more peaceful environment.²⁰

The EU has, in fact, has attempted to respond to new and emerging threats to international peace and security. It remains committed to aiding the UN and countries emerging from conflict situations. The EU is dedicated to intervening early in crisis situations in order to minimize human suffering. Furthermore the EU has made a concerted effort to participate in humanitarian activities and preventive type operations designed to mitigate potential conflict. The EU is constantly seeking to share a greater responsibility which will further enable it to increase its political weight.²¹ However despite all of its attempts to increase its role in the globe it continues to take a back seat to NATO because of its own internal difficulties.

NATO is and will continue to be the strongest alliance based on difficulties the EU faces in overcoming itself. The EU framework for its European defence arrangements are based upon the Helsinki Declaration that outlines the fact that their security remains firmly entrenched in NATO while allowing Europe to take upon a greater responsibility for its own defence.²² It is based upon the fundamentals of mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency²³ and thus relies heavily on NATO and not wholly on itself. The creation of the EU military force

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ivo H. Daadler, *Are the United States...*,556.

²¹ European Union, "A Secure Europe in a Better World...", accessed 25 May 2004.

²² UK Ministry of Defence, "NATO, the WEU & OSCE," available from <http://www.moc.uk/aboutus/keyfacts/factfiles/nato.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 February, 2004.

was designed to strengthen NATO not to weaken it. This point was in fact emphasized by Norway who supports the concept that the EU force is a supplement designed to help NATO deal with the new security threats. Norway recognizes that the division of labour resulting from a strengthened European force will be a major advantage in providing security based upon the fact that they see security in the transatlantic area as indivisible.²⁴ The impetus for a strengthened European force was a direct result of the Kosovo air campaign which highlighted the significant shortfalls between US and European defence capabilities. The EU and NATO are a partnership designed to ensure that the crisis management activities of the two organizations are mutually reinforcing, while recognizing that the European Union and NATO are organizations of a different nature. The EU will become involved in circumstances where NATO does not want to be involved however, NATO is, and will remain, the cornerstone of European security.

The reality of the European Union is that it is full of internal strife and will therefore have difficulty mounting any serious challenge to NATO before it can overcome these issues. The US has always been a stabilizing factor in the European defence umbrella and remains the big brother who manages to keep things together. “Most smaller NATO and EU members, concerned about domination by one of the larger European member states, greatly prefer US leadership from afar to political elbowing from a neighbour.”²⁵ The Europeans (in particular France and Germany) have great aspirations of Europe returning to be a global security actor. However, there is a huge reluctance within the continent to yield to the leadership of any one or

²³ European Union, “European Union-NATO Declaration on ESDP,” available from http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/eng/eu/eu_nato_161202.htm; Internet; accessed 25 February, 2004.

²⁴ Jan Petersen, “New Security Threats and the Transformation of NATO,” available from <http://www.odin.dep.no/ud/norsk/akutel...171-090128/index-dok000-b-n-a.html>; Internet, accessed 2 February, 2004.

group of nation states.²⁶ Although the issue of balance of power has not been openly discussed since the end of the Cold War, it certainly remains in the back of some countries' minds. Countries such as the UK and Netherlands have traditionally used the NATO alliance to counterbalance the growing influence of Germany and France and will continue to use it to ensure that an over concentration of power and influence does not end up in those countries' hands.²⁷ The expansion of the EU beyond the present members of NATO has led to numerous difficulties highlighted in the institutional conflicts in the European Council, the European Commission and the European parliament, as well as significant tensions between the Commission and some EU members.²⁸ Furthermore, there are the historical conflicts between France, Great Britain, and Germany, as well as some smaller EU countries. There are also some forging alliances within the organization which are creating tension amongst members and of course there is the issue of the new members from the East and the baggage they bring with them from their years spent behind the Iron Curtain.²⁹ Finally there is the issue of neutrality that some member states such as Sweden and Ireland have traditionally held on to and could become an issue when trying to gain consensus amongst member states.³⁰

The expansion of NATO has also led to similar type problems being recognized within the Alliance. Many have identified NATO's military capabilities as declining and see them further dissipated by the new arrivals to the Alliance. It is believed that the new members have

²⁵ John Borawski and Thomas-Durell Young, *NATO After 2000: The Future of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 34.

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium...*, 122.

²⁸ Simon Serfaty, "NATO is Back; Where is the Alliance," available from <http://www.csis.org/europe.html>; Internet; accessed 2 February, 2004.

²⁹ Ibid.

brought large security burdens but few military resources.³¹ While this may be true to some degree NATO has managed to bring these new members rapidly on board and has seen the majority of them make significant contributions to international operations.

Within the EU there is the group of 3 (UK, France, Germany) who are seen as controlling most of the decisions within the organization. This exclusive “club” is one of the groups that many member nations are unwilling to cede leadership to even though they currently hold it by de-facto. The fact is that these three countries bring with them the same security issues that they faced within NATO and therefore they bring the same problems.³² France itself left the military side of the NATO alliance because it could not agree on many of the common defence themes and little has changed to believe that these issues have gone away. France is perhaps the key player in pushing for a stronger EU military alliance yet it remains unwilling to cede many of its

national interest issues

in order to pursue a “greater Europe.”³³ It will be very difficult for the EU to become dominant

and therefore reach its full potential if France remains reluctant to give up on some of its autonomous polices and capabilities. History would tell us that this is unlikely to happen. Even more so it is important to note that while France remains an ardent advocate for a EU dominant direction it has accepted and even embraced the continuing role of NATO in the twenty first

century.³⁴

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ R.L Russell, “NATO’s European Members: Partners or Dependents?” *Naval War College Review* 56:1 (2003), 31.

³² Steven Everts and Antonio Missiroli, “Beyond the Big Three,” *The International Herald Tribune*, 10 March 2004.

³³ Stanley L. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered...*, 210.

³⁴ Ibid.

NATO, unlike the EU, serves as a key tool in integrating the security policy of its members. It helps to reduce nationalistic tendencies and rivalries that might otherwise develop if not united. These policies are united through consultative organs, the force planning process and through the military structure that NATO provides. Consultation and joint planning are an every day common occurrence which help to subvert nations interests to those of the Alliance.³⁵ While one can argue that this function will soon be taken over by the EU and ESDI, it is a false hope. Traditional European rivalries are much better contained within the NATO alliance due to the fact that the North American presence helps to mitigate potential conflict that might arise. As Brandeis University's Robert Art has ably put it, "through its military presence, the US helps buffer, dampen, and thereby keeps within defined bounds the inevitable tensions that will continue to arise among the Western Europeans."³⁶ There is the fear, and justifiably so, that some members of the EU would try and wield an extraordinary influence over European security matters. NATO helps to prevent these destructive tendencies from arising among its members and instead promotes mutual confidence by frequent consultation which allows members to inform one another of their activities and intentions, and if necessary, to register their concerns and misapprehension.³⁷

Despite its attempts to the contrary, the lack of a coherent and coordinated security and defence policy for the European Union is a serious impediment if it is to become a competitor to NATO.³⁸ Europe has been unable to greatly influence global security because it lacks common

³⁵ John S. Duffield, "Why NATO Persists?," in "*NATO and the Changing World Order*," ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: University Press of America, 1996), 106-107.

³⁶ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*..., 51.

³⁷ John S. Duffield, "Why NATO Persists?...", 106-107.

themes and purposes. Disagreements between member nations and discrepancy on the ultimate purpose of the ESDI have stagnated the process and made it difficult to move ahead.

Furthermore, the relationship between the EU and the WEU and the problem of establishing mutual defense commitments involving neutral members of the EU such as Ireland, Sweden, Austria and Finland seriously complicates the establishment of a common policy. This lack of common policies and objectives will continue to hamper the EU's ability to be a major player in the global security arena.

The EU however, has made some headway in this regard, historical alliances have not allowed it to reach its full potential. The idea for a common security and foreign policy (CFSP) was embodied in the Single European Act, but execution of this Act has been gravely affected by institutional rivalry and state resistance, as shown in the European Union's inability to deal properly with the Yugoslavian crisis because of some member nations long standing support of parties to the conflict (i.e., German support for recognition of Croatia and Slovenia).³⁹

While many consider NATO's expansion to the East as a preceptor for the demise of the alliance, there are others who feel that in fact it is EU enlargement which may in fact be a much more divisive influence. NATO's ability to establish military cooperation with the Central and Eastern European nations has been quite successful and far easier to achieve than the political and economic aspects that the EU has tried to create. The facts are that it is far easier to agree on stability and security issues than it is on social, cultural and economic development. The EU is still trying to achieve agreement in these areas so is likely to not have made much progress in the area of security issues in particular when NATO is a proven commodity. Major gaps remain

³⁸ Michael Pugh, *European Contributions to Global Security in European Security*, ed. Wilfried von Bredow, Thomas Jager and Gerhard Kummel (New York: St Martin's Press, Inc., 1997), 201-202.

³⁹ Ibid.

between EU member nations with regards to economic development and these will take some time to sort out.⁴⁰

The EU's lack of a common security and foreign policy is best exemplified by its performance or lack thereof in the Balkans crises. While traditional alliances such as Germany-Croatia and France-Serbia have hampered the EU's decision making process in the Balkans, the Albanian situation of 1997 which threatened to destabilize southeastern Europe hammered the point home. The EU was unable to agree upon the organization for an intervention force under the WEU and instead settled on an ad hoc force under Italian command.⁴¹ The EU did not have the capacity or will to be able to force project power into the area even when faced with a rapidly deteriorating situation in their own backyard. Not only did the EU not have common agreement on when and where to deploy their forces but they also lack the ability to do so. The EU has consistently demonstrated that they do not have the combination of military resources and political will to take on operations such as the Implementation Force (IFOR) or Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, and the United States provided most of the key resources for the air war against Serbia over Kosovo.⁴²

Recent supporters of the EU point to the fact that the EU is now expanding to takeover the IFOR mission in Bosnia, however this is somewhat of a paper tiger. First of all, one must consider that troops have now been deployed in the former Yugoslavia for over 12 years and therefore have created a rather benign environment and secondly the

⁴⁰ Monica Wohlfeld, EU and NATO Enlargement and Stability in Central-Eastern Europe in *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement*, ed. Anton A. Bebler (Westport: Praegar Publishers, 1999), 146.

⁴¹ Stanley L. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered...*, 170-171.

⁴² Ibid.

EU may be taking over leadership but it is still relying heavily on NATO and US resources to maintain the peace. The US and Canada (both non-EU members) continue to be key elements of the peacekeeping force. The EU's record bemoans the fact that it does not have the military capacity required to maintain stability on the borders of EU-WEU member states, to say nothing of the capacity to project force beyond the Balkans. As Michael Brenner has written, The cumulative record of EU failure and NATO's recovery (in the Balkans) sharpened the issue of whether an ESDI built within NATO on the CJTF principle was satisfactory. For the European allies, the record could be read two ways: as making a compelling case for them to take more drastic measures to augment their military resources and the cement their union, or as providing telling evidence that the quest for an autonomous ESDI was futile. Few drew the first conclusion.⁴³

⁴³ Ibid.

European Union Forces

“A credible, independent European identity is a myth, whereas European declaratory aspirations for a robust defense identity “separable but not separate” from NATO remains just that.”⁴⁴

The EU has great aspirations of having an independent foreign and security policy yet it lacks the means to achieve it. Europe’s NATO allies have consistently cut their defense spending and thus find themselves in desperate need of certain commodities that they traditionally relied on the US to provide. As of the late 1990’s the WEU and subsequently the EU depended upon NATO to provide eighty percent of its logistic support. In the intervening years the EU has done little to remedy this issue and finds itself in dire need of long-range sea and airlift. Furthermore, the EU lacks large deck aircraft carriers, all weather aviation and missile defenses⁴⁵ and is not looking to address these issues in the foreseeable future. The involvement of the US (through NATO) remains essential in order for European nations to participate in global security deployments. The US continues to be the major provider of airlift, command and control, intelligence and logistics support (i.e., Poland in Iraq).⁴⁶ This heavy reliance on US capabilities also requires that the European allies must often follow the US lead when it comes to defence and security issues.

The EU is attempting to become a more capable international device, however it is unlikely to be able to overtake or even equal NATO anytime in the near future. There is certainly a case for a distinct European security organization, but most Europeans seem

⁴⁴ John Borawski and Thomas-Durell Young, *NATO After 2000...*, ix-x.

⁴⁵ Hall Gardner, *Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia, and the Future of NATO* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 34.

⁴⁶ Jeffrey W. Ray, *Operating Out of the Box: The New NATO and the Out of Area Challenge in New NATO, New Century*, ed. David G. Haglund (Kingston: Queen’s University Press, 2000), 228.

unwilling to make the commitment to make it happen. In the event of another military crisis in Europe or anywhere in the world for that matter, European nations would rely heavily on US and NATO assets to get them there, sustain them and provide them with the command and control and intelligence infrastructures. In the event of a small (humanitarian type) mission, it is likely that a single European nation, or a small group of countries, would take the lead and provide these essentials.⁴⁷ The recent French deployment to the Congo is a typical example of this type of mission where France took the lead and helped to support contributing nations on behalf of the United Nations. However, it remains clear that despite recent initiatives, there is little reason to believe that the EU is capable of leading or undertaking any large-scale mission without the support of the United States and subsequently NATO.⁴⁸ The reality is that despite rhetoric to the contrary, the European allies remain incapable of assuming any kind of independent military role. They remain closely tied to US capabilities in order to accomplish small-scale military deployments. Their lack of political and military integration, which inhibits the development of a common security policy, makes it extremely difficult for ESDI to work. Until the EU countries make a conscious effort to spend more money on defense capabilities they will remain subservient to US and NATO roles, policies and infrastructure⁴⁹ and are therefore not capable of making a stronger and more relevant EU.

⁴⁷ Phillip H. Gordon, *The Western European Union and NATO's Europeanization in NATO's Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance*, ed. Philip H. Gordon (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), 258.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 258.

⁴⁹ Jeffrey W. Ray, *Operating Out of the Box: The New NATO and the Out of Area Challenge ...*,

Further inhibiting the development of ESDI and a common security policy is the fact that many EU countries continue to maintain defense forces more suited for territorial defense than for out of area operations.⁵⁰ Currently, only the UK and France are capable of even a medium scale deployment (10,000 troops) while Germany is making some progress in the area. The three major players mentioned above are making some progress in the area of transformation but it remains limited in scope.⁵¹ While the EU acknowledges the need to develop its defense forces into more expeditionary type elements, they remain seemingly uninterested in making the financial commitments to take their forces to the next level. Until the EU has the ability to deploy, sustain, and protect themselves independent of US and NATO assets, its goal of being a major global security actor remains a pipe dream. Current EU plans talk of being able to deploy a strong reaction force of between 50,000 to 60,000 troops based upon major contributions from France, Germany, Italy and the UK, however the costs both financially and politically of doing this would be enormous. Member nations would likely have to increase their defense budgets by up to five percent, thus reversing the trend of the last decade that saw a consistent trimming of defense expenditures. Politically, member nations are dealing with aging populations who are more interested in spending money on social programs than on defense spending.⁵² EU members nations (in particular the ones entrenched in NATO) have the benefit of the protection that NATO provides and would have to make a hard sell to their citizens to convince them of the need for larger defense expenditures when NATO is perceived as being able to provide their security requirements for the foreseeable future. In an era of struggling economies and social

⁵⁰ Phillip H. Gordon, *The Western European Union and NATO's Europeanization...*, 263.

⁵¹ Jeffrey W. Ray, *Operating Out of the Box: The New NATO and the Out of Area Challenge ...*, 228.

welfare states it is not conceivable that EU countries will be able to spend the enormous amount of money required to achieve their lofting goals and subsequently are unlikely able to pose any kind of threat of replacing the NATO alliance. If in fact there is a will to try and achieve the ESDI and an independent EU military force “one can legitimately ask, this simple question: Where will the money be found?”⁵³

EUROPEAN SECURITY and DEFENSE INITIATIVE (ESDI)

“The basic fact is that when it comes to defence, Europe has the ambition but not the ability. France has made great strides to improve its capabilities, as have a few other European countries.

But overall progress is still too slow and frankly inadequate.”⁵⁴

Lord Robertson (former NATO Secretary General)

Despite the fact that the Helsinki summit of December 1999 set the conditions for the EU to establish a force (up to 60,000) capable of handling future security matters, such as what happened in the Balkans in the 1990s; it has been unable to achieve its headline goal of being able to sustain that force its target date of 2003.⁵⁵ This failure to meet this goal comes despite the fact that it was acceptable by all NATO allies, including the US, and was to be supported by NATO assets.⁵⁶ It clearly emphasizes the lack of European political will that is necessary in order to diminish dependence on American capabilities and thus make ESDI more than just a paper tiger. The Americans and all NATO have remained supportive of ESDI and see

⁵² Jeffrey W. Ray, *Operating Out of the Box: The New NATO and the Out of Area Challenge* ..., 228.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ NATO, “NATO and the New Security Challenges”: Speech by the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson 12 March, 2002, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020312a.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 October, 2003.

⁵⁵ NATO, *NATO Today: Building better security and stability for all...*, 6-7.

⁵⁶ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security...*, 211.

it as a means for Europeans to take a much more active role in taking responsibility for their own security however there remains an unwillingness to take the next step.

If the EU remains unwilling to spend more on its defence capabilities it will never be able to sustain a credible defence policy of its own.⁵⁷ It has been reliant on NATO for far too long and remains hesitant to move out from under its protective umbrella despite the fears that NATO would cease to exist or that the US returns to a policy of isolationism. The fact that the EU has not moved in this regard would lead an educated person to deduce that the EU itself believes NATO will continue to be relevant. Even more farfetched than the likelihood of EU members spending more on defence is the notion that the three principal European military powers (UK, France and Germany) would merge their military forces to create the core of a European Army.⁵⁸ Those who

support this initiative are convinced that it is the only way to create a common European foreign and security policy and may be right in this assumption, though given historical difference, this is not likely to ever happen.

The reality is that despite all the rhetoric and desires, the EU is incapable of projecting power in all possible spectrums of conflict. As stated earlier, the social costs of increasing defense capabilities remain unacceptable to most Europeans who fail to identify a credible threat to their national sovereignty. The lack of political cohesion on the European continent ensures that the EU is incapable of mounting any kind of security operation other than one that is minor in character.⁵⁹ The fact that NATO has been the

⁵⁷ Geoffrey L. Williams and Barkley J. Jones, *NATO and The Transatlantic Alliance in the 21st Century* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 105.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid 94-95.

organization which harnessed action in both the Balkans and Afghanistan is evidence that the EU remains transparent when it comes to security matters. Until the EU achieves some sort of federated status, it is unlikely to be able to achieve the political harmony needed to fully address ESDI and the CSFP goals. Unfortunately, for the EU even the concept of a federated status (political and economic union) has not been agreed upon and would not be conceivable to be implemented, if at all, before 2025.⁶⁰

By means of the Helsinki Summit, the European members of NATO were given approval to deal with European security matters through the WEU and the EU. However, despite this opportunity these European NATO members have been unable to coordinate their activities. Further complicating the development of a realistic EU military force is the fact that while NATO supports its development it has clearly made the statement that NATO that it will maintain military initiative under its control. NATO has maintained that it would have the “right of first refusal” if European nations felt the need to intervene in a conflict or in response to an emerging security threat. NATO would only acquiesce to an EU deployment if it felt that it was unable to respond within the appropriate timeline (unlikely given the formation of the NRF) or if it felt that it was not within its interest to be involved.⁶¹

Notwithstanding the European initiative, NATO still maintains the support of its member nations and is likely continue to do so because it has never let its members down.

NATO is and will remain the dominant alliance because it continues to enjoy the overwhelming support of its members, even those who wish to expand European influence.

German political leaders have maintained their commitment to NATO despite

⁶⁰ Ibid 94-95.

⁶¹ Ted G. Carpenter, NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Coherent Blueprint or Conceptual Muddle?, in *NATO Enters the 21st Century*, ed. Ted G. Carpenter (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 15-16.

the fear that unification would lead them to follow other avenues. Even France who is typically viewed as the most critical of all member nations has acknowledged its enduring value and the requirement to keep it together. It is not just the current ruling parties that support NATO but its value is recognized by domestic political organizations throughout member nations. NATO is clearly viewed as the institution which members and nonmembers look to ensure their security and way of life.⁶² Italy, a strong proponent of a stronger Europe and European Union, has publicly stated that Europe should not, and will never, go its own way. It remains supportive of the EU initiatives so that Europeans can better express and enforce its own views yet it maintains that Europe, and Italy's, security concerns must be closely linked with that of the US and Canada through the NATO alliance.⁶³

In spite of all the discussion and attempts at managing ESDI and the Helsinki Summit declarations, NATO remains the leading security organization in Europe, with no obvious challenger in sight.⁶⁴ Richard Kugler, a former analyst for the RAND Corporation, and a strong supporter of ESDI and the EU, emphasizes that while NATO is not the only security institution in Europe, it is critical to the vitality of these two organizations as they are too weak in the absence of a strong NATO.⁶⁵ There are even some who feel that it is NATO and not the EU and ESDI that represents the greatest hope for the development and the implementation of common security policies in Europe.⁶⁶

NATO TRANSFORMATION

Few observers or analysts, if any, would have predicted that, on its fiftieth anniversary, NATO would be the most important and vigorous defence organization in the world.⁶⁷

In order to fully understand why NATO is and will continue to be the dominant Alliance in the world, one needs to look no further than its legacy and its ongoing transformation. While NATO was created to deal with the Soviet Cold War threat, it is not doomed to extinction simply because that threat is gone. NATO has always been based on more than the external threat of the Soviets. It is a community of like-minded nations who share similar values that have allowed democracy, market economy and diplomatic cooperation to take place. While there are disagreements within member countries the governments of the Alliance want to keep it alive. In, fact one to the greatest boosts to transatlantic cohesion was the collective decision to declare the September 11th attacks as an assault on all its members.⁶⁸ NATO has proven itself as a guarantor of national security and is looked on to do so in the future. The concept of a European only security system is unproven and remains in its infancy and cannot be considered to be a replacement for NATO anytime in the near future.⁶⁹

No other alliance in history has re-created itself for times as different as the Cold War and today's challenge to construct a new Europe. From the beginning of the 1990's when NATO appeared to have outlived its value it has been reborn as an essential component of

⁶⁶ Charles Philip David, *The Future of NATO...*, 216-217.

⁶⁷ Charles Philippe David, "Will NATO live to Celebrate its 100th Birthday?," in *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia and European Security*, ed. Charles Philippe David and Jacques Levesque (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1999), 216-217.

⁶⁸ Sharon Riggle, "The Relevance of NATO: A Discussion whose time has come...", 1.

⁶⁹ Richard L. Kugler, "Is NATO Obsolete?," in "*NATO and the Changing World Order*," ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Universtiy Press of America, 1996), 80.

European security. The world community has watched as a Cold War defense alliance has transformed itself into a new security organization committed to taking on new challenges. Recent events in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Europe itself have confirmed the requirement for America's strategic engagement on the continent. The necessity for collective security and defense despite the absence of an obvious military threat has been reinforced on Alliance members. The cooperative effort that is needed today is firmly entrenched in the ideals of NATO and it has proven itself once again as the premier military alliance. NATO was and is the organization that binds its member nations together.⁷⁰

NATO has not stayed stagnant as the world situation has changed. NATO has and continues to transform itself to meet the new challenges. While the first fifty years of the Alliance saw little requirement for change, NATO kept its policy shifts to small and gradual adjustment. It adapted effectively during the integration of West Germany in the 1950s, the addition of Greece and Turkey in 1952, the withdrawal of France in the 1960s, the response to Soviet missile buildup in the 60s and 70s through to the ultimate demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.⁷¹ Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has fundamentally transformed itself to deal with many and varied security threats. NATO has broadened its horizons to include many eastern European nations and members of the Mediterranean community into aiding help maintain peace and security in Europe and throughout the globe.⁷²

Today the transatlantic cooperation is as vital as it has ever been. In the wake of September 11th, the transatlantic community faces new and deadly threats.

⁷⁰ Robert Hunter, "NATO at Fifty: Maximizing NATO: A Relevant Alliance Knows How to Reach," available from <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/1999.html>; Internet; accessed 25 February, 2004.

⁷¹ Marc Grossman, "21st Century NATO: New Capabilities, New Members, New Relationships," available from <http://www.usinfo.state.gov/journals/grossman.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 January, 2004.

⁷² NATO, "*NATO Today: Building better security and stability for all*," (Brussels: NATO Press, 2002), 3.

Threats that are transnational, that respect no border. Threats that cannot be defeated without international cooperation.⁷³ Lord Robertson

This rapidly changing security environment brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of ethnic tension and a growing Islamic fundamentalism has left NATO and the world community as a whole, struggling to keep up.⁷⁴ While the threat of general war in Europe has virtually disappeared, Alliance members and other countries in the Euro-Atlantic region face other risks and uncertainties, including ethnic conflict, the abuse of human rights, political instability and economic fragility. In addition, the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery is a matter of serious concern, and the spread of technology could result in the greater availability of sophisticated military capabilities to potential adversaries.⁷⁵ NATO has the means and resolve to deal with these new threats in the same manner it dealt with its former adversary. NATO is about a community of nations who have shown a historic commitment to deal with their security and there is no reason to believe that this will fundamentally change because of a rise of “European nationalism” based on the EU. NATO has persisted as the central and single most effective security organization in Europe and is far from being absorbed or replaced in importance by the European Union.⁷⁶

NATO is a proven commodity, something which is rare these days. It is not fading away nor has it outlived its usefulness. NATO’s structure and capability to adapt have been proven in its dealings in the Balkans (a topic for discussion further in this paper) and through actions in the

⁷³ NATO, “NATO and the New Security Challenges”: Speech by the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson 12 March, 2002, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020312a.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 October, 2003.

⁷⁴ Sharon Riggle, “The Relevance of NATO: A Discussion whose time has come...”, 1.

⁷⁵ NATO, *NATO Today: Building better security and stability for all...*, 4.

⁷⁶ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 27.

first Gulf War, Afghanistan, and most recently Iraq. The Gulf War demonstrated NATO's utility as a vehicle for coordinating policy and building consensus amongst Western nations,⁷⁷ furthermore it showed how security challenges outside of NATO's original mandate could be dealt with in a swift manner. Actions in the Gulf region and Afghanistan illustrate why NATO has survived so well after the Cold War – it works. The thought that another security organization could usurp NATO dominance is questionable given its performance over the past fifty plus years.

The Alliance has proven itself to be a useful and adaptable asset and one in which its members have spent a great deal of time and effort creating. As Robert McCalla has noted, the Allies “spent years learning how to work as a long term coalition through a sophisticated political and military structure... Developing new institutions or consultative frameworks entails start up costs; NATO's appeal is that these costs already have been paid.”⁷⁸ The current member states, and certainly all the aspirant members, continue to see the major benefits of membership and an insurance policy to provide defence of vital national interests at a lower cost through a collective security arrangement.⁷⁹

Enlargement

“The value of NATO can be seen by the fact that 10 years after the Cold War , nations are still seeking to join the Alliance, not to leave it.”⁸⁰ Powell

⁷⁷ James Chace, *A Strategy to Unite Rather than Divide Europe...*, 178.

⁷⁸ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security...*, 61-62.

⁷⁹ Sir Timothy Garden, “NATO, EU and Eastern Europe,” available from <http://www.tgarden.demon.co.uk/writings/articles/.html>; Internet; accessed 25 February, 2004.

⁸⁰ Marc Grossman, *21st Century NATO: New Capabilities, New Members, New Relationships...*, 6.

Colin Powell's comments above confirm the belief that the Alliance is strong and capable of maintaining its importance on the world scene. Faced with the necessity to ensure national security requirements nations, are clamouring to become members of NATO. The end of the Cold War has led to an increase in the number of member states, not a decrease. In fact, the Alliance will increase to 26 members before the end of 2004. These same nations could wait for, or look to the EU and its ideas for a greater European security organization, yet they turn to the one proven commodity that will ensure their security requirements for the foreseeable future. The new European democracies see NATO membership as attractive because it not only binds European nations together but it is the glue that more importantly ties the Euro Atlantic community together.⁸¹

NATO's continued success and chances of survival and longevity are greatly enhanced due to the fact that its successes are not just military in nature. Nations want to belong to NATO because it is the one remaining hegemonic camp and membership brings with it huge benefits in terms of continental stability and coordination of national security policies. Furthermore, NATO is attractive because it is a community of likeminded nations who practice collective consultation and decision-making thus encouraging democratic principles and rule of law.⁸² The continued attractiveness of NATO membership can only serve to further enhance security and secure the Alliance's relevance for years to come.

The enlargement process is also playing a key role in unifying a Europe that was divided for over 50 years. The addition of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic laid the foundation

⁸¹ Stanley L. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield publishers, Inc., 2003), 4.

⁸² Charles Philippe David, "Will NATO live to Celebrate its 100th Birthday?...", 217.

for an expansion that will unite all of Europe and North America in its effort to ensure a secure and stable global environment.⁸³ Enlargement will also widen the circle of democracies and expand the zone of stability and security through the Baltics and the Balkans. The embracing of these countries reaffirms the NATO principles of strength and vitality and a confirmation that NATO is viewed as the leading security organization.⁸⁴ NATO's enlargement has also allowed for a closer interchange between NATO and Russia as the Alliance spreads East. While many feel that this expansion could be a destabilizing issue, because Russia will feel threatened on its borders, this may be overstated. Russia has become closer entwined with NATO members and in fact works in close concert with NATO forces in the Balkans and has recently offered intelligence assets to aid in NATO operations in Afghanistan.

NATO has not been disbanded because many champions of the alliance believe that it, much more than the EU can be useful in dealing with regional conflicts such as have taken place in the Balkans and Afghanistan. These challenges required a response that goes well beyond military and security tools confirming that NATO is still the key player in the international security field.⁸⁵ Construction of a functioning military organization is not one which happens overnight and involves years of negotiations and teething problems in its formation. NATO is an organization which exists and has proven itself capable even where organizations such as the United Nations have failed. The European Union is still in its infancy

⁸³ Phillip H. Gordon, "A Changing NATO After September 11," available from <http://www.usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/gordon.html>; Internet; accessed 2 February, 2004.

⁸⁴ Janusz Onyszkiewicz, "The Central Issues for NATO," available from <http://www.csm.org.pl/pl/files/The%20Central%20Issues%20for%20NATO.pdf>; Internet; accessed 26 January, 2004.

⁸⁵ NATO, "NATO and the New Security Challenges": Speech by the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson 12 March, 2002, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020312a.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 October, 2003.

and though it has boasted about its future potential as an alliance it has not yet demonstrated that it can challenge NATO in the security arena.

NATO Response Force (NRF)

Operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan have accelerated thinking that NATO's military relevancy lies, not in the ability to provide heavy land forces or tactical fighter planes in defence of NATO territory, but rather in the ability to act quickly to stabilize distant situations which, left unattended, could break out into a larger conflict.⁸⁶ Due in part to a US initiative, NATO members agreed at the Prague Summit to form a new NATO Response Force (NRF) designed to project Alliance power to anywhere in the globe in a very short time frame. The NRF is founded on the principles that the world situation has changed so significantly that the Alliance cannot rely on its traditional force generation process to provide troops in a timely enough manner in order to deal with potential flare ups. The NRF will consist of a designated force designed to deploy for up to 6 months and will be a key vehicle for focusing and improving Alliance military requirements as well as being a key link in promoting the declarations of the Prague Summit.

The formation of the NRF is a key ingredient in pushing forth the transformation of NATO⁸⁷ and will ensure its relevancy and dominance for many years to come. The NRF will be made up of 21,000 troops equipped with high tech weapons and defences against NBCD and will be deployable within 7-30 days. It will consist of a technologically advanced, flexible,

⁸⁶ Stephen J. Mariano and Brendan Wilson, "Strategic Insight: NATO Response Force: Political Deftness, Economic Efficiency, Military Power," available from <http://www.opccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/apr03/europe.asp>; Internet; accessed 21 October, 2003.

⁸⁷ NATO, "The NATO Response Force: At the Center of NATO Transformation," available from <http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html>; Internet, accessed 27 March, 2004.

deployable, interoperable and sustainable force, including land, sea and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed. It will serve two distinct but mutually reinforcing purposes. First, the NRF will provide NATO with a highly capable, high readiness force ready to operate in all spectrums of war. Secondly, it will provide the forum for the transformation of NATO military capabilities as it looks to improve to meet the new security challenges.⁸⁸ NRF roles will be varied, but will range from show of force type operations designed to deter aggression to the ability to conduct war fighting against belligerent forces. The NRF will be a strong enough force that it will be able to take the fight to the enemy while setting the conditions for stronger follow on forces to prepare and deploy.⁸⁹

The NRF, unlike the EU's Rapid Reaction Force, will be focused on conducting combat operations and therefore will not compete with EU designated forces. The fact that the NRF, unlike EU forces, is designed to conduct combat operations leaves it as the only Alliance capable of projecting power into a hostile environment and therefore demonstrates its relevance and dominance in the world. Currently, EU missions and tasks revolve around the conduct of peacekeeping type operations rather than war fighting and this is unlikely to change because of the lack of agreement within the EU with regards to how their forces could or should be deployed.⁹⁰

NATO has the possibility of experiencing similar type problems particularly if the EU member nations attempt to vote as a single unified body.⁹¹ The reality that NATO

⁸⁸ NATO, "*NATO After Prague: New Members, New Capabilities, New Relations*," (Brussels: NATO Press, 2002), 4.

⁸⁹ Annalisa Monaco, "NATO shake up command structure and prepares for global role," available from <http://www.isis-europe.org/global>; Internet; accessed 12 November, 2003.

⁹⁰ Annalisa Monaco, "NATO Response Force: The tool for NATO's global outreach?," available from <http://www.isis-europe.org/nrf%20global>; Internet; accessed 12 November, 2003.

has never developed a mechanism for conducting foreign policy or crisis management has not limited its ability to make decisions as the Secretary General has been able to negotiate with other governments on behalf of the NAC.⁹² Neither of these issues has resulted in a lack of agreement on force deployment (NATO was not originally envisioned for Iraq). The EU itself acknowledges that NATO, through the NRF, is the only security organization capable of organizing and conducting far ranging military operations.⁹³

Under the NRF, NATO will be able to continue the stellar work it started in dealing with regional and ethnic conflict. NATO's long standing command and control structure and joint staffing and training will ensure that any NATO led operation will succeed in its mission.⁹⁴ NATO's success in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and more recently Afghanistan can only be improved upon given the overwhelming support that member states have given to the NRF.

The establishment of the NRF ensures that NATO will continue to be unencumbered by the growing emergence of the EU based upon the fact that the EU will not possess the ability to force project into the full spectrum of operations. A well organized, trained and properly equipped NRF will give NATO a significant response capability in an area where European Union efforts fall short - war fighting capability.⁹⁵

US INVOLVEMENT

⁹¹ Robert E. Hunter, *"The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor,?"* Rand Corporation, 2002), 74.

⁹² Ibid, 83-84.

⁹³ US Department of State, "Launching NATO's Transformation at Prague": Speech by the US Ambassador to NATO, R. Nicholas Burns, 30 October, 2002, available from <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/14907.htm>; Internet; accessed 2 February, 2004.

⁹⁴ Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "Statement on the Future of NATO" before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services 27 March 2003.

⁹⁵ Stephen J. Mariano and Brendan Wilson, "Strategic Insight: NATO Response Force: Political Deftness, Economic Efficiency, Military Power," available from <http://www.opccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/apr03/europe.asp>; Internet; accessed 21 October, 2003.

Having the US involved in NATO is both a blessing and a curse. For every benefit that the Americans provide to the alliance, and thus make it more relevant, they also hamper European independence and decision making abilities. The recent expansion of NATO from 19 to 26 countries is but one example of how the Americans have influenced the Alliance to their benefit. The eastward expansion has added seven nations, all of whom are supportive of the US actions in Iraq⁹⁶ and this has caused some internal Alliance problems. This type of extra support for US actions can have severe implications for the Alliance as traditional members such as France and Germany may feel bullied by US tactics.

The US involvement in NATO has also made life extremely difficult for European policy makers as it appears that the US and NATO are going in different directions when it comes to dealing with the emerging international order and resulting security environment. Europe is looking to its consolidation and enlargement while the US is focusing on Asia and homeland security. Further, the US remains preoccupied with the war on terrorism while Europe continues to focus on issues of globalization (ie poverty and the environment).⁹⁷

A heavy reliance on US military capabilities has also further exacerbated US dominance of the Alliance and the US has been slow to respond to European concerns about the sharing of US high technology in the defense field.⁹⁸ This continued imbalance means that most major decisions require US approval and capabilities to facilitate NATO decisions.

Despite the difficulties NATO faces with US involvement, it is still one of the most compelling reasons why the EU will not challenge NATO in the security and defense arena. The

⁹⁶ Washington Post, "7 Former Communist Countries Join NATO," available from <http://www.washington...yn/articles/.htm>, Internet, accessed 30 March, 2004.

⁹⁷ Ivo H. Daadler, "Are the United States...553.

⁹⁸ Robert E. Hunter, "*The European Security and Defense Policy*"..., 82.

fact that the US is involved in NATO and not the EU has significant ramifications. US involvement in NATO is significant for three reasons as follows: it plays the role of financier, stabilizer and is a key component of US Grand Strategy. The Americans have been the single largest contributor to European security through their financial support to the Alliance. Basically, the US is footing the bill for European security and has for the past fifty or so years. In 1996 alone the US spent \$269 billion on defense or 60 percent more than all other NATO members combined (their total \$167 billion). Of the US outlay, an estimated \$100 billion a year goes directly or indirectly for the security and stability of West Europe⁹⁹ and thus European security is dependent upon US contributions.

This disproportionate sharing of European security costs does not appear, at least from the European side, to change anytime soon. The Europeans have continued to slash their defense budgets and have shown no inclination to change this trend in order to pursue their “European security goals.” This inequitable share of financial burden has resulted in an imbalance in the military capabilities that are able to be employed by the Alliance.¹⁰⁰ While there have been some recent initiatives to purchase new aircraft by EU members, the US remains the only Alliance member capable of providing strategic airlift. Other capability gaps were evidenced during the Kosovo air campaign when US forces were used in over 80 percent of all bombing sorties because the European allies had not invested in all weather capable aircraft.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Michael G. Roskin, “NATO: The Strange Alliance Getting Stranger,” *Parameters*, (Summer 1998): 32.

¹⁰⁰ NATO, *NATO Today: Building better security and stability for all...*, 5.

¹⁰¹ Jeffrey W. Ray, *Operating Out of the Box: The New NATO and the Out of Area Challenge...*, 223.

Until the Europeans are able to close this and other gaps the hope for a viable and reliable European force remains a pipe dream. These themes are reinforced by former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson who was quoted as saying:

“There is no other means than NATO to ensure that European defense strengthens our collective capacity. And there is no other organization which can provide stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and prevent the danger of re-nationalizing defense in Europe.¹⁰² For all Europe’s rhetoric, and an annual investment of over \$140 billion [\$140 million] by NATO’s European members, we still need US help to move, command and provision a major operation.¹⁰³

The US has also become the key stabilizing factor within Europe. The US dominance of the European security arena has ensured that no new, or old for that matter, great power has risen. US involvement has ensured that a “re-nationalization” of European security affairs has not taken place thus leading to a more stabilized continent where neighbours are not concerned about the intentions of each other. Furthermore, US involvement has helped to quell instability on the fringes of Europe (i.e., Balkans) thus ensuring that these peripheral conflicts have not spread into Central and Western Europe. Without heavy US involvement there is the possibility that Europe could digress into old-world power politics games which would have a huge destabilizing factor on the continent.¹⁰⁴ NATO is therefore essential to a continued peaceful and secure Europe because it is the organization that binds and controls potential adversarial intentions. The EU clearly does not have this ability because it lacks the stabilizing force that NATO provides.

¹⁰² Lord Robertson, “NATO’s Future,” available from <http://www.usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0302/ijpe/pj71robertson.htm>; Internet; accessed on 2 February, 2004.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Christopher Layne, “US Hegemony and the Perpetuation of NATO”, in *NATO Enters the 21st Century*, ed. Ted G. Carpenter (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 73.

The involvement of the US in NATO and subsequently European security is essential to US Grand Strategy concerns and therefore it is unlikely that the US would be willing to witness the decline of the organization. NATO helps to provide stability on the continent and thus minimizes any potential European rivalries. NATO also provides the security umbrella under which economic prosperity is allowed to flourish thus allowing for expansion of market economies and subsequently US power. Finally, NATO is the one organization, which ensures the dominance of US power in Europe's as it is used as a means of forestalling any European challenge to US hegemonic power throughout the continent.¹⁰⁵

The stabilizing effect of American involvement in NATO and its military contributions has greatly aided the effectiveness of the Alliance. The US led; NATO initiative in the Balkans is evidence of the importance of the Americans in the Alliance and is an excellent example of NATO relevance and effectiveness when faced with global challenges.

BALKANS

NATO is the dominant alliance in the world based upon its performance in the Balkans. The Bosnia experience has shown how important the Alliance is on the world stage. The unity and solidarity the Alliance possesses when it comes to managing security issues is unparalleled in history and no rival appears on the horizon. NATO took over in Bosnia when it became evident that the United Nations was incapable of halting or even controlling the ongoing conflict. This success was based upon NATO's ability to plan, deploy and run a complicated mission – something the EU was not capable of doing.¹⁰⁶ While some would argue that the mission in

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Javier Solana, NATO beyond Enlargement in *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement*, ed. Anton A. Bebler (Westport: Praegar Publishers, 1999), 7.

Bosnia is not a success because NATO forces are still there, this is an unfair comment given that NATO intervention stopped the conflict. NATO's ability to end hostilities cannot be diminished

because of

the ongoing political difficulties associated with the former adversaries coming to an agreeable solution for the future of their new-found nationhood.

IFOR and its successor, SFOR, have been major feats of military planning and skill and have demonstrated in the most vivid way possible the practical benefits of cooperation within the

Alliance. Furthermore, both IFOR and SFOR also have a much wider significance. By incorporating a sizable Russian contribution, they have shown how NATO and Russia can work together.¹⁰⁷

Perhaps NATO's greatest challenge in the last sixty years was its ability to prosecute the war in Kosovo. The requirement for consensus amongst member nations led to an extremely cumbersome decision making process.¹⁰⁸ In fact there are those who would argue that the entire

war was initiated, fought and ended with no formal agreement among the allies. Apparently there was little or no agreement on objectives, strategy or limits of actions.¹⁰⁹ Conflict arose over the bombing of cities in Serbia, the province of Kosovo and northern Serbia itself.¹¹⁰

Despite months of preparation NATO's civilian leaders were not prepared to decide on options for ensuring victory.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ R.L. Russell, "NATO's European Members...38.

¹⁰⁹ Richard K. Betts, "Compromised Command: Inside NATO's First War," *Foreign Affairs* 78:4 (July/August 1999), 127.

¹¹⁰ Ibid 130.

¹¹¹ Ibid 131.

In spite of these factors, NATO's relevance was demonstrated by its resolve in the Kosovo campaign. The Alliance commitment to end the conflict in Kosovo by force if necessary is a prime example of its dominance. Faced with a determined Serbian force, NATO remained resolute in its obligation to end the genocide that was taking place. The Alliance proved itself capable of deploying air, land and sea forces in combination to bring about a cessation of hostilities in their former Yugoslav province. The overwhelming air campaign followed by the occupation of the province by NATO led land forces demonstrated once again that there is no rival to its dominance in the world. The alliance provided the muscle in both Bosnia and Kosovo so that more than a dozen other international bodies could help rebuild the economy, establish the institutions of self government and civil society, and supervise elections.¹¹²

The Balkan conflicts could and should be viewed as regional in nature, and therefore ultimately the responsibility of the European countries to resolve, however, the reality is that Europe lacks the capability and political resolve to intervene by themselves. The size and scope of operations in the Balkans is far beyond the ability of the EU as they lack the resources and command and control ability to conduct them.¹¹³ In fact Europe, in particular, France and Germany, were divided on how to resolve the Balkans crisis. France and Germany were supportive of different belligerents in the conflict and could thus not reach consensus on what needed to be done. Even if there had been European consensus on what to do in the Balkans the European countries, without US support, did not possess the ability to intervene.¹¹⁴

¹¹² Strobe Talbott, "Repair Work Required," available from http://www.brookings...articles/talbott/2002novdec_fa.htm; Internet, accessed 9 February, 2004.

¹¹³ NATO, *NATO Today: Building better security and stability for all...*, 6.

¹¹⁴ Alan Tonelson, NATO Burden-Sharing Promises, Promises, in *NATO Enters the 21st Century*, ed. Ted G. Carpenter (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 46.

The EU recently has taken over operations in Macedonia (a small theater), and have visions of taking over operations in Bosnia. While it appears that the plan for the handover in Bosnia will take place, it really is more a case of smoke and mirrors. The reality in Bosnia is that although the EU may takeover in principle, the reality is that it is not EU forces who will continue to conduct peace and security operations. The Bosnia mission will continue to be run with major troop contributions from the United States and Canada, neither of whom are members of the EU. There will not be a true test of EU ability to run a military operation until it can plan, deploy and run it separated from the NATO infrastructure.

GERMANY

Following the Second World War, Germany was divided into East and West Germany based upon two different ideological governments and alliances. This division of the German people continued until the end of the Cold War and the accompanying disintegration of the Eastern bloc. The collapse of the Iron Curtain and the Warsaw Pact presented the opportunity for the reunification of Germany; however, this brought with it the fear of the rise of nationalism that had been so prevalent in the nation prior to its split. Because of this fear the US felt it imperative to ensure that a reunified Germany remained anchored in NATO. This would ensure that Germany would not develop its own independent foreign and/or security policy and would also ensure that it did not develop its own nuclear weapons. The re-unification of Germany was dependent upon the “Two Plus Four” process that ensured that Germany would not enter into a separate agreement with the Soviet Union and would ensure a more secure Europe. NATO was thus used as a security-enhancing device as it allayed both US and European concerns of Germany’s return to Great Power status.¹¹⁵

NATO has proven to be an excellent tool in keeping European concerns

minimized. NATO, much more than the European Union, is best suited to constrain German unilateralism and the lingering fear of Germany gaining too much economic and military power.¹¹⁶ Countries that had been previously wronged by Germany have been concerned that the potential exists for a renewed supremacy interest that one-day might pose a problem for themselves and other European nations. Stability in Europe is reliant on the fact that there are no great powers on the continent since it had been those powers which had led to conflict. It is important that a strong institution exists (NATO) to maintain the checks and balances critical to this stability and reducing the fears amongst the nations of Europe. There can be no debate that NATO remains the leading institutional vehicle for performing this essential function of reassurance.¹¹⁷ There may be the belief that the EU will provide the best avenue for this function, however, the EU is proving to be an organization controlled primarily in the capitals of France, Germany and the United Kingdom and thus cannot be viewed as a potential insurance policy in controlling any potential German resurgence. Potential power plays in Europe have and continue to be mitigated by NATO and its strong trans-Atlantic influence.

Further aiding in confidence building is the continued US military presence in Europe, which assures alliance members that they have nothing to fear from one another.

This strong American presence and influence, particularly as translated through NATO, is viewed by most European nations as providing an important ingredient in the stability of European states. Germany's neighbours do not see it as a threat, because both Germany and it

¹¹⁵ Christopher Layne, *US Hegemony and the Perpetuation of NATO...*, 68-69.

¹¹⁶ Geoffrey L. Williams and Barkley J. Jones, *NATO and The Transatlantic Alliance in the 21st Century...*, 48.

¹¹⁷ John S. Duffield, *Why NATO Persists?...*, 106-107.

neighbours feel more comfortable with Germany's role in Europe through the integrated framework of NATO alliance.¹¹⁸

RELATIONSHIPS

One of the huge benefits that NATO provides is its venue for developing relations with countries outside of the Alliance. Because of its importance and position as the dominant alliance in the world, it is able to both pursue relations and be approached by countries seeking to increase both national and global security. It is important to note that NATO's relationship with these countries is much different from that of the EU in that its focus has been on the military and security sphere, as opposed to the EU concentration on economic relations. This next section will demonstrate how NATO's current dominance will help maintain its future relevance through the relations it has created outside of the Alliance. In order to do this we will briefly examine the effects of NATO relations with Partnership for Peace countries, Russia, China and what is known as the Mediterranean Dialogue.

Partnership For Peace

An excellent example of NATO's continued importance and relevance is its Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme that was established in 1994. Since its inception, over 30 countries have participated in PFP and this has led to ten new countries joining the Alliance. This programme established the consultative process through which participants could voice their concerns when faced with real or perceived threats to their territorial integrity, national security or political independence. It has proven to be remarkably successful as evidence by the number of countries involved as well as by those applying for NATO membership.¹¹⁹

The PFP Programme has greatly aided in providing enhanced security for Europe

¹¹⁸ Stanley L. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered...*, 8-9.

because of the principles it is based upon. Countries wishing to participate in this programme were encouraged to make commitments to help preserve democratic societies and maintain the principles of international law. Furthermore, countries joining PFP were compelled to refrain from the use or threat of use of force against other states and must respect internationally recognized borders.¹²⁰ The PFP programme has also contributed significantly to crisis management, humanitarian aid and peace support operations.¹²¹ By making these commitments countries have demonstrated a willingness to improve global security and have demonstrated the importance of NATO by their willingness to abide by the principles of the Programme. If NATO was not relevant or was about to be replaced by a new European initiative, it is unlikely that so many countries would be willing to participate so actively in PFP.

This important part of NATO transformation has helped to strengthen security and stability by encouraging former adversaries to take part in dialogue, military exercises and other confidence building matters. It has achieved and has continued to achieve its aims by enhancing security in Europe by strengthening political and military ties between Central and Eastern Europe and the NATO alliance. The PFP also encourages the restructuring of participants armed forces into proper members of democratic societies. This programme has reaped significant rewards evidenced by the numerous participatory countries who have recently joined the NATO alliance. Its importance in developing new relationships has helped encourage cooperation amongst militaries as well as contributing to closer relations between the countries participating

¹¹⁹ NATO, *NATO Today: Building better security and stability for all...*, 14.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ UK Ministry of Defence, "NATO, the WEU & OSCE," available from <http://www.moc.uk/aboutus/keyfacts/factfiles/nato.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 February, 2004.

in peace-keeping forces such as the Stabilization force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Kosovo Force (KFOR).¹²²

Russia

One of key security concerns for Europe after the end of the Cold War was the status of Russia and how it would adapt to the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union itself. Russia, though less so than the former Soviet Union, was still viewed as a potential threat to NATO and subsequently European security. Because of this fact, NATO saw the necessity of finding a way to deal with the future of Russia and its relations with its former adversaries. Western countries were especially concerned because Russia has never been able to successfully democratize and its ability to do so in the near future is virtually nonexistent,¹²³ therefore the potential for instability and conflict continued to exist. Given that European security is dependent on the ability of Russia to contribute to stability and not take away from it, Russia needed to be encouraged to develop trade and defense type relations in order to guarantee that it pursues its foreign policy in a confident and peaceful manner. Furthermore, it was imperative that Russia maintained tight control over both its conventional and nuclear forces.¹²⁴

NATO has played a key role in helping to bring this about. One of the most significant breakthroughs in recent European history was the NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed in May 1997 by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the Allied leaders. Arising from the Alliance's conviction that NATO and Russia have a responsibility to cooperate on security issues, this act constituted a key instrument for closer collaboration between Russia and Europe. This forum

¹²² NATO, "Understanding NATO," available from <http://www.expandnato.org/undernato.html>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2004.

¹²³ David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security..., 83.

ensures that Russia's concerns will be heard and acted upon helping to ensure greater security for all of Europe.¹²⁵ The Permanent Joint Council (PJC) (now NATO-Russia council) oversees NATO-Russian cooperative activity in a number of fields, including military, peacekeeping, defense related environmental and scientific issues, civil emergency preparedness and disaster relief and defense conversion.¹²⁶

The basis for Russian co-operation with NATO was NATO's position as the dominant alliance in the world and the one most likely to maintain its relevance for the foreseeable future. Russia identified a requirement to be involved with NATO, rather than the EU, because NATO had proven its usefulness and effectiveness over the past six decades.

Further to Russian involvement with NATO a similar type (to the PJC) forum was also established to engage the Ukraine on a more formal bilateral basis. The establishment of both the NATO/ Russia Permanent Joint Council and the NATO-Ukraine Commission have helped to ensure regular consultation between the member countries on security matters.¹²⁷

Since September 11, 2001 Russia and NATO have consulted regularly on the new security environment. In order to face the new security challenges based upon the terrorist threat and the potential for the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons Russia and NATO have exchanged views between senior level terrorism experts. This is an important milestone in achieving long-term security for the region and for emphasizing the importance of the NATO alliance in the world.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Javier Solana, *NATO beyond Enlargement in The Challenge of NATO Enlargement...*, 6.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ NATO, "Understanding NATO," available from <http://www.expandnato.org/undernato.html>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2004.

¹²⁸ NATO, *NATO Today: Building better security and stability for all...*, 23.

Not only does NATO encourage dialogue with Russia in the security sphere, it also serves a perhaps much more important role as confidence builder amongst European states. A strong NATO stands as a beacon that many former Warsaw Pact members can look to. Many of these countries see NATO membership as a means of guaranteeing that they will not fall under the Russian sphere of influence and as an insurance policy against any future Russian resurgence. While most European governments hope that the process of European unification will lead to more intensive security and defense cooperation among European states they continue to see the transatlantic link as essential to security in and around Europe.

China

While NATO involvement with Russia can be understood based upon historical interface, the emerging relations with China can be attributed to the changing world situation that has forced NATO out of its traditional operating area. Critics of the Alliance have long prophesied about its impending doom however, NATO continues to demonstrate its flexibility, relevance and dominance as it expands beyond its customary borders. The massive presence of US, and now NATO, troops in Central Asia has caused a significant shift in the military and power equation in the region and has prompted Beijing to approach NATO for a “strategic dialogue” on common threats and an understanding of its role.¹²⁹ Furthermore, NATO planners have had to deal with China and its concerns given that four NATO partners – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia-are already on China’s borders.¹³⁰ Chinese strategists are concerned about NATO’s eastward expansion and the possibility of closer ties with Russia. China has always

¹²⁹ Ninan Koshy, “NATO’s Transformation and Asia,” available from http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2002/0212nato_body.html; Internet; accessed 17 January, 2004.

been concerned with its northern neighbour and would see a NATO with Russia as a member state as a regional de-stabilizer.

The rise of China and its potential to become a regional hegemonic force¹³¹ is also a situation that will have to be dealt with sooner rather than later and NATO is well suited to do just that. The fact that the US is a member of NATO and not the EU is a simple reminder of which organization wields world power and which does not. It is NATO that the Chinese government has turned to, to discuss the future prospects of Russian involvement in NATO and western activities in Central Asian nations such as Afghanistan. The fact that China has been in contact with NATO over security and defense issues is a clear indication of NATO's status on the world scene. Though the EU may try to spread its wings it cannot and will not possess the power or influence personified in the trans-Atlantic Alliance.

Mediterranean Dialogue

NATO will remain the most relevant security organization because it continues to expand its horizons beyond the borders of the European continent. While the EU remains Europe focused, NATO has identified the need to reach beyond its current mandate based upon the changing global security environment. NATO's AFSOUTH Headquarters has recently identified the requirement to reach into the previously, by NATO, untouched region of the Middle East. More specifically, AFSOUTH has identified three areas which could affect NATO members or require NATO involvement in the event of conflict. The areas identified by AFSOUTH were the

¹³⁰ Strobe Talbott, "Repair Work Required," available from http://www.brookings...articles/talbott/2002novdec_fa.htm; Internet; accessed 9 February, 2004.

¹³¹ John Woodworth, "NATO's Prospects," in *"NATO and the Changing World Order,"* ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Universtiy Press of America, 1996), 202.

Maghreb (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia), the Levant, and the Transcaucasus region.¹³²

In the last eight years, NATO has begun to establish connections with six Arab countries through this Mediterranean dialogue. NATO is currently in discussions with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia each on a bilateral basis though the possibility for multilateral meetings exists. These dialogues relate to NATO's policies and their relation to their Mediterranean partners.¹³³ Much like the Partnership for Peace programme, the Mediterranean Dialogue has encouraged participants to be involved in interchanges of information in the field of science, civil emergency planning, arms control, peacekeeping, environmental protection and European security cooperation. This intercourse has allowed for training opportunities at NATO schools and has greatly aided in regional stability.¹³⁴ The cooperation gained in this programme, particularly on the military level, has provided for Dialogue countries to observe both NATO and PFP exercises as well as participating in seminars and Headquarter visits.¹³⁵ Furthermore, three members (Egypt, Jordan and Morocco) of this dialogue have participated in NATO led missions in the Balkans, thus further encouraging cooperation and promoting international stability.

Since the events of September 11, 2001, this group has taken on even more relevance. Consultations between NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries have occurred much more frequently and have actually led to what is commonly known as the "19+1" (soon to be 26+1) format with the North Atlantic Council.¹³⁶ This extremely valuable exchange of information

¹³² Jeffrey W. Ray, *Operating Out of the Box: The New NATO and the Out of Area Challenge...*, 226.

¹³³ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security...*, 75.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ NATO, *NATO Today: Building better security and stability for all...*, 26.

with regards to combating global terrorism is yet another example of the relevance and importance of the NATO alliance as it shows how non-member nations view its significance.

This Mediterranean Dialogue is a vital component of NATO's continuing transformation and continued relevance as the major security player. This organization is clearly the first of many steps NATO will take to foster cooperation amongst members of the Arab world.

Additionally, it helps to encourage the concepts of democratic principles and acceptable international behavior¹³⁷ and allows for the non-democratic members of the Dialogue to see how militaries operate within democratic societies. The mere fact these countries have entered into discussions with NATO is clear evidence of NATO's continued relevance on the global scene.

CONCLUSION

The EU needs to exercise restraint and provide clarity in its rhetoric about what ESDP is and what it is not, especially in dealing with the US. It is especially important that those members of the EU that most care about preserving the vitality and cohesion of the transatlantic relationship, as well as NATO's primacy, ensure that "autonomy" for EU decision and action under ESDP not become the central focus of the European pillar.' A parallel risk is that some member of the US Congress will read into excessive ESDP rhetoric more of a challenge to NATO's primacy and to US influence on the European continent than any European leader really intends., thus deepening suspicion to no good effect.¹³⁸

The EU and NATO need to work together to provide global stability by maintaining solid, and sustained military and political dialogue. Cooperation and understanding between the ESDI and NATO is essential for the evolution of both these organizations and should be done in concert rather than in opposition.¹³⁹ There needs to be a continuing, broad strategic dialogue

¹³⁶ Ibid 27.

¹³⁷ Strobe Talbott, "Repair Work Required," available from http://www.brookings...articles/talbott/2002novdec_fa.htm: Internet, accessed 9 February, 2004.

¹³⁸ Robert E. Hunter, *"The European Security and Defense Policy..."* 156.

¹³⁹ Robert E. Hunter, *"The European Security and Defense Policy..."* 154.

within NATO about the purposes of military capabilities and defense spending. It is important for NATO's future and for the EU's development of foreign policy and defense.¹⁴⁰

The NATO alliance is simply too important to let slip into irrelevance. The ties that link North America and Europe have been forged over two world wars and one cold war. It simply is irreplaceable. The combination of the US, Canada and the European Union is a formidable force that can help provide peace and stability throughout the globe.¹⁴¹

Furthermore, it is the link that keeps the United States occupied in European and world affairs. This link ensures that the US remains engaged on the European continent and therefore it is in the best interest of both the US and the world. History has certainly taught us this lesson when one revisits how the lack of American involvement in international affairs helped contribute to two world wars.¹⁴²

The continued dominance of NATO will also help to focus both European and North American defense expenditures and will ensure that they are mutually supporting. NATO's relevance has provided the framework for security cooperation for the past sixty years and should continue for the foreseeable future. Cooperation within NATO will allow its partners to contribute specific capabilities to the Alliance allowing for maximum benefit to all parties. In an age of shrinking defence budgets this will be critical in the battle for peace and stability throughout the globe.

Since its inception in 1949, NATO has been the most relevant security organization in the world. It has survived numerous internal and external changes and challenges and has always

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 157.

¹⁴¹ European Union. "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy," available from . <http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/htm>, Internet, accessed 25 May 2004.

emerged from them as a stronger alliance. The end of the Cold War and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union has led many to question the future relevance of NATO and its position on the world scene. While these purveyors of doom have predicted its demise, NATO has gone about the process of transforming itself into a security organization that is capable of dealing with the new global security threats. While this transformation is not complete, NATO has certainly taken the steps necessary to maintain its relevancy and dominance. This ongoing process of adaptation and adjustment is aimed to allow the Alliance to the new security challenges such as those posed by the rise of fundamentalism and its associated terrorist threat as well as the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

¹⁴² Brian Finlay and Michael O'Hanlon, "NATO's Underachieving Middle Powers: From Burdenshedding to Burdensharing." In Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Lekha Sriram, Eds. *Managing Armed Conflict in the 21st Century*, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 147.

NATO's transformation has involved an expansion to twenty-six members and a restructuring of its force composition to include the NATO Response Force. These two initiatives are beacons pointing to the continued vibrancy and relevance of the organization. The recent addition of seven new members is a clear sign that the Alliance is considered the key security organization to have membership in. Despite the fact that the European Union is attempting to expand its security umbrella, it is evident that the nations of the world view NATO membership as much more important. The recent development and implementation of the NRF is also a clear indicator of NATO's relevance. Because of the NRF and other defence initiatives, NATO has remained the only organization capable of deploying anywhere in the world to conduct war fighting activities. NATO has ensured its importance by implementing important adjustments that have allowed it to engage in operations outside of its normal operating area as evidenced by its actions in the Balkans and more recently in Afghanistan .

Further ensuring NATO's dominance and relevancy are the difficulties faced by the European Union and its associated European Security and Defense Initiative. The EU is rife with problems based upon historical and new conflicts. EU members have failed to agree on a common foreign and security policy and this severely hampers their ability to create a unified security force. Reluctance to increase defense expenditures has ensured that the EU remains reliant on NATO for many critical force capabilities such as all weather capable aircraft, command and control functions as well as logistic support. Until they overcome these deficiencies they will not be capable of taking on any major type of operations therefore limiting their relevance on the world scene. From a pure military point of view, ESDI has not been able to separate itself from US supremacy due to a lack of political will. The EU's Rapid Reaction force has been challenged by the NATO Response force and has left Europeans having to choose

between a NATO based war fighting capable force or an all European peacekeeping one. In reality, it is impossible to combine these two concepts because of the EU lack of resources.

The EU also faces difficulty with division of its members in regards to national caveats and support of the NATO alliance. Most NATO nations within the EU identify their security requirements with the one proven security organization that has existed for over fifty years. Countries such as France have remained reticent in submitting their foreign policy goals to the EU and thus the organization suffers as a result. Internally, EU nations remained concerned with regard to the resurgence of a European Great Power and are therefore loath to becoming fully entwined in the organization. Many see the United States and NATO as the major stabilizing force on the continent and maintain that tight links between the Euro-Atlantic community must remain.

NATO's relevance and dominance is also based upon the many unique functions that it conducts on the international scene. NATO has long been the common bond that European nations have identified with in ensuring their security concerns. These concerns have not always been based solely on external threats but also on internal ones. NATO has kept the ongoing Turkish-Greek disagreement under wraps ensuring that war has not re-erupted over the island of Cyprus and it has guaranteed that Germany has remained a responsible member of the world community- a serious concern of many European nations in light of its re-unification. The Alliance has also been the major focus point for security co-operation with Russia and China and has recently reached out to numerous Mediterranean countries. The Partnership for Peace programme has tied NATO with many Central and Eastern Europeans encouraging them to develop democratic societies and enabled them to become accountable members of world society. This unique programme has increased security throughout Europe as it has led to many

participatory nations joining the NATO alliance. NATO's importance in the global community has paved the way and subsequently encouraged dialogue with non-Alliance members. This has occurred because other countries and organizations see the value of cooperation with the Alliance and want to better understand the benefits and inner workings of NATO. This point is reflected in China's recent attempts to forge closer ties with NATO as a result of the new security threat and by default reinforces the relevancy of the Alliance.

NATO is the most relevant and dominant alliance in the world simply because the United States is a member of it. Due to the absence of another world superpower, the US has guaranteed freedom of action on the globe. US financial and logistic contributions to the Alliance ensure that it is capable of performing its security role in the world. The US commitment to NATO ensures that the European nations have a stabilizing force that minimizes disagreement between member nations. The American roles of financier and stabilizer are critical to European security and have not and cannot be replaced by the European Union. Finally the US sees NATO has a key component of its Grand Strategy and therefore is not likely to sit by and allow the Alliance to become irrelevant.

The concept of common defense remains NATO's reason for being and it ensures its relevance for today and the future. Despite pressure from other organizations "only NATO can provide the core of democratic security in Europe by sustaining the vital transatlantic bridge between the United States and Europe."¹⁴³ In spite of all of the changes in the world and NATO, the Alliance will continue to hold to the principle that security can only be maintained by likeminded nations working together based upon common values and interests. NATO maintains that Europe and North America are a unique community whose security arrangements

¹⁴³ John Borawski and Thomas-Durell Young, *NATO After 2000...*, 106-107.

cannot be separated by the Atlantic Ocean. This fundamental principle ensures that it, and not the European Union, will continue to be the framework for security cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area.¹⁴⁴

NATO is not irrelevant nor will it be allowed to venture in that direction. There simply are too many benefits that the Alliance provides and too many roles it fulfills. Perhaps this is best summed up in the words of Richard L. Kugler who underlines the importance of NATO and

why it will and must remain:

“If NATO unravels,...Europe may unravel with it. Potential aggressors would be given a broader license to engage in roguish conduct. Equally worrisome, NATO’s own members might fall victim to re-nationalization. They might return to their old ways and start competing with each other. Renewed security competition among Germany, France, and Britain is one possibility. If so, the EU could also start un-raveling, thereby administering a double shock to Europe’s stability.

Beyond this, the collapse of NATO could result in the United States not only losing its most important source of influence in Europe but also disengaging from Europe itself.”¹⁴⁵

Despite the emergence of the European Union NATO is and will remain the most relevant and dominant alliance in the world.

¹⁴⁴ NATO, “Understanding NATO,” available from <http://www.expandnato.org/undernato.html>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2004.

¹⁴⁵ Richard L. Kugler, “Will Enlargement Succeed?,” in *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia and European Security*. ed. Charles Philippe David and Jacques Levesque (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1999), 56.

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