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Officer Professional Development – The Key to Army Transformation

By /par Maj R Barrett

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses officer professional development in the context of Army Transformation. It suggests that the leaders, necessarily drive the transformation of a professional military body. It demonstrates that historically, in the case of the Canadian Army, officer professional development has been the enabler for success in transformation. Moreover, the paper argues that the current officer professional development system was the principal means that transformed the Somalia-era army to the professional position of respect and competence that the army is afforded today. Finally, the paper asserts that the new strategic realities of the future security environment will make officer professional development even more critical to success. Success in Army Transformation will require leaders that can adapt to the increasingly asymmetric and ambiguous environment of the future. Officer professional development is the mechanism by which army leaders learn how to adapt.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION(1)

Army Professionalism(5)

CHAPTER ONE - HISTORICAL PRECEDENCE(9)

Professional Transformation 1 – WW I: The struggle towards Professionalism(9)

Professional Transformation 2 – WWII : Professionalism Revisited(14)

Professional Transformations 3 – Cold War: Evolution and Devolution of OPD(16)

CHAPTER TWO – CURRENT TRANSFORMATION.....(22)

An Emergent Threat Environment(22)

Impact of Somalia(22)

OPD Reform – Past is Prologue to Change(24)

Strategic Direction for Change(27)

Current OPD Model(31)

CHAPTER THREE – THE OPD IMPERATIVE FOR THE FUTURE..... (37)

Future Security Environment (37)

Military Ethos(39)

Education(41)

Training(45)

Experience(50)

CONCLUSION(52)

INTRODUCTION

Today it is generally accepted that the military officer is by definition a professional. That is, that the officer corps ranks with traditional professions such as law and medicine. This belief is certainly secure in the US and Britain. Further, despite public apathy for many things military, this view is arguably shared here in Canada – if perhaps a little less enthusiastically. This was not always the case. The struggle to transform the Canadian Army into a professional force dates back to confederation, at which time the Americans, French, Germans and British had realised the requirement to professionalise their armies and took the requisite steps to begin the journey. History has demonstrated that the Canadian Army did not transform continuously over time, but rather incrementally. Moreover, it transformed somewhat abruptly in accordance with governmental direction in concert with allied nations' expectations as a result of significant changes to the security environment. This was evidenced by four major transformations, linked explicitly to significant events: World War One (WW I), World War Two (WW II), the Cold War, and the abrupt end of the Cold War. .

The first professional transformation occurred during WW I, where the necessity of war would transform the Army from a politically appointed militia dominated organisation, with a miniscule regular force cadre, into professional regular army – essentially a tactical fighting corps, that would spearhead the British advance to victory during the final months of the war. Twenty years of neglect would leave that once proud army in disarray before the immediacy of war would once again require a dilapidated army to rise to the challenge. This time, WW II, would be the impetus to transform the Canadian Army into a professional force. The advent of the cold war served to combat the natural atrophy that would have

eventually occurred on demobilisation, as it had between the two world wars. Moreover, as a result of the Cold War, the peacetime Canadian Army transformed from the small regular force cadre system to a larger professional standing army.

The abrupt end of the Cold War brought with it great change. The end of a 50 year-old adversary and of NATO nations lined up with large conventional forces massed on the inter-German border. Governmental and Allied expectations were tempered by the so-called peace dividend as the Canadian Army downsized and withdrew from Europe. A new more volatile security environment emerged; one of failed states, non-state actors, and elaborate terrorist organisations. Traditional warfighting was replaced by operations other than war (OOTW) that occurred across the spectrum of conflict – a spectrum that could include simultaneous combat and non-combat operations. Clearly transformation was again required. Unfortunately, this did not occur until revelations of what went wrong on OP Deliverance in Somalia came to the fore. More than a decade later, the CF and Army have taken huge strides along the road to professional transformation. The current Army Strategy, *Advancing with Purpose*¹ outlines the roadmap for *Army Transformation* into the future with a view to proactively approaching the challenges of the future security environment.

All of the above transformations have been both process and purpose driven - addressing force structure, organisation, capabilities and professional development. Transformation, however, is not as much about process as it is about purpose; military transformation is no exception. Military transformation can not be achieved simply by reorganization, by purchasing new equipment or weapons systems, but rather it can only be truly achieved through professional development (PD);

¹ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose – The Army Strategy* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2002).

that is to say through education, training, experience and self-development.² As officers are the intellectual capital or professional head of the organization, officer professional development (OPD) will be examined. Accordingly, the key to achieving success in *Army Transformation* is officer professional development (OPD).

In order to prove this assertion, precedence will be established. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that first, despite external initiating factors, OPD was the recipe for success in all previous transformations. Consequently, lack of a credible OPD system was a recipe for failure. Secondly, it will be established that the current OPD system is responsible for the remarkable transformation that occurred since Somalia. Finally, it will be demonstrated that now, more than ever, given the unique demands of the future security environment, OPD will be the critical factor in achieving *Army Transformation*. The above three arguments in support of the papers thesis will be presented in chronologically organized chapters.

In Chapter One it will be demonstrated that during WWI PD, developed through the very expediency of war, enabled successful transformation. The emergent OPD system was initiated based on harsh experiential-based learning which then drove requisite education and training in pursuit of an institutionalized PD system. In way of contrast, during WWII a poor OPD system resulted in a protracted and sluggish professional transformation. During the Cold War, it will be demonstrated that the Canadian Army NATO experience served as a surrogate for actual protracted war. Moreover the NATO commitment focussed the OPD, enabling the army to attain and maintain an acceptable level of professionalism. Conversely, the professional transformation disintegrated when the OPD system was eroded as a result of unification and governmental neglect.

² Department of National Defence, *Report of the Officer Development Review Board*, Vol II (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1995), 6. To be referred to hereafter as the *Rowley Report*.

Chapter Two of the paper will examine the professional transformation that occurred as a result of Somalia. Revelations of what went wrong in Somalia were presented in two major reports.³ Moreover, OPD recommendations, based on the aforementioned reports and a 1969 benchmark report known as the *Rowley Report*⁴ were implemented, and a comprehensive OPD was put in place. This current OPD system will be described in detail, as it is asserted that this OPD system is responsible for the remarkable professional transformation that exists currently. In summarising the strategic context of the Army Strategy, CLS posits that Army leaders must inculcate military ethos and receive appropriate training and education that reflects the new strategic reality.⁵ This new strategic reality is perhaps best described by Dr Steven Metz as the ‘strategic battlespace,’ an increasingly complex and ambiguous environment where the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war are blurred and technological changes continue at a revolutionary rate.⁶ Accordingly, in Chapter Three, it will be asserted that professional transformation in such an environment must rely more than ever on the OPD system to produce a dynamic officer corps that is educated, trained ethically and cognitively in such a manner so they can adapt to the aforementioned environment and guide the army in its pursuit to be strategically relevant and tactically decisive. Where applicable, recommendations will be made for optimizing the OPD system in order to best achieve *Army Transformation*. Before, the argument can be joined it will be necessary to define professionalism in the military context.

1. Army Professionalism

The term professional is one that is oft used in a less than precise manner. For the purpose of this paper the term shall be precisely defined. Although the definitions to describe the requisite

³ Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia*, (Ottawa, 30 June 1997), and *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, (Ottawa, 25 March 1997).

⁴ Department of National Defence, *Report of the Officer Development Board*, Volumes I, II and III, (Ottawa: DND Canada, March 1969).

⁵ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose...*, 12.

criteria or attributes of a profession have changed with time, there are certain tenets that appear to be universal. Moreover, regardless of the academic discipline - history, philosophy, sociology or political science - these tenets are generally complementary. Political Scientist Sam Sarkesian cites the four characteristics of professionalism as organisational structure, special knowledge and education, self-regulation and, a calling or commitment.⁷ Sociologist Wilbert Moore suggests that the professional practices a full-time occupation distinguished by organisation, education, service orientation and autonomy.⁸ Morris Janowitz, in his classic *The Professional Soldier*, cites that the professional offers a specialized skill, acquired through prolonged training. Moreover, that the professional group has a sense of collective identity with associated standards of performance and a body of ethics.⁹ Canadian military historians have traditionally subscribed to Samuel P Huntington's hallmarks of military professionalism - Expertise, Corporateness and Responsibility.¹⁰ Indeed, Huntington's three hallmarks form the basis of the definitions in the Canadian Army's corner stone publication *Canada's Army*.¹¹ Canada's newest publication *Duty with Honour – The profession of Arms in Canada*, codifies the attributes of military professionalism using Huntington's model while explicitly including Sarkesian and Janowitz' final tenet as the military ethos.¹² Therefore, for the purpose of this paper military professionalism will be defined in terms of expertise, corporateness, responsibility and military ethos.

⁶ Steven Metz, "Future Geo-political Context in whicj10.02 0 0 10.02 326.005s, 6

Expertise is generally defined as specialised skill or knowledge learned through study and practise, and capable of being tested according to measurable standards.¹³ Expertise then can be displayed in terms of a primary function. For the military this function can be described as the orderly application of forces in the resolution of a social problem, or simply as the management of violence.¹⁴ This expertise however must carry over in peacetime as well. Expertise demands that there is a continuous study of doctrine, weapons, technology and leadership with a view to being prepared for any future conflict and having the ability to exercise professional judgement.¹⁵ Today more than ever, expertise demands also the study of broader issues such as strategy, geo-political motivations, national and international law as they relate to the Law of Armed Conflict.¹⁶ Expertise is acquired through professional development - formal education, self study and training, as well as practical experience.

Corporateness refers to the feeling of exclusivity. Although military members are part of Canadian society, reflected by shared common values, its members identify themselves as a group separate from the rest of society.¹⁷ In the military this arises from prolonged and continued training and from socialisation into a sub-culture. Accordingly, the member believes that only other members are competent to judge others within the profession. As a result the military has its own education and training system with control over the content, its own regulations, culture, dress, hierarchy and power to govern promotions.¹⁸

¹³ Jack .L Granatstein, *On Canadian Army Heritage*, The LGen G.G. Simonds Lectures, Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, Kingston, 1998, 1/7.

¹⁴ Sir John Hackett, *The Profession of Arms*, (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1983), 103.

¹⁵ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour...*, 17.

¹⁶ Ibid, 17/18.

¹⁷ Department of National Defence, *Summary of Duty with Honour – The profession of Arms in Canada*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), 7.

¹⁸ Granatstein, *On Canadian Army Heritage...*, 2/7.

Responsibility refers to the professional relationship with the client, which is the state. Thus, the professional serves first not his own self-interest, but the interest of his clients. Given the military's unique responsibility of exercising lethal force on behalf of the state, responsibility is perhaps the most important attribute of military professionalism. The military professional must at all times be subservient to the government while the government in turn should provide the *quid pro quo* of sensible policies that ensure national security. Specifically, in the Canadian context, members have the collective responsibility to Canada and her interests in a manner accountable to the government and people of the nation.¹⁹ Suffice to say, co-operation with, and trust in the government must be an inherent trait of the military professional.

Finally, the military profession must have a code of ethical conduct, a military ethos that intertwines with the aforementioned three attributes and inextricably links the professional soldier to the society in which he serves. Canadian Military ethos reflects core Canadian values, beliefs and expectations which establish the framework for professional conduct.²⁰

¹⁹ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour...*, 14.
²⁰ Ibid, 25.

CHAPTER ONE – HISTORICAL PRECEDENCE

2.

3. **WW I – The Struggle toward Professionalism**

In the years leading up to The First World War the British Army was in the midst of a doctrinal transformation. This transformation essentially consisted of a change from ‘close order’ infantry tactics to ‘open order’ tactics. Close order tactics involved the execution of frontal attacks by masses of infantrymen assembled in lines or waves while open order deployments saw small tactical sub-units manoeuvre on the battlefield using fire and movement, essentially a decentralization of infantry tactics.²¹ Also, the British were steadfast practitioners of restrictive control - a decidedly rigid and inflexible command system that is predicated on the blind obedience of all ranks to superiors and regulations. This system, the so-called ‘cult of the rank’ existed whereby it was accepted that an officer of

²¹ John. A. English. *A Perspective On Infantry*, (New York: Praeger, 1981) 1.

any rank was intrinsically more knowledgeable than any officer of a more junior rank.²² As Martin Samuels points out this system produced subordinate commanders that were employed “primarily as postmen passively transmitting orders from above, rather than as dynamic figures making their own decisions, based on the local situation.”²³

As the First World War drew near the British Army issued the keynote manual: *Infantry Training 1914*. In it, the role of the machine-gun was clearly articulated. The machine-gun was to be viewed as a weapon of opportunity only. Essentially, the awesome potential of rapid-fire weapons and machine guns with increased range, lethality and rates of fire were largely marginalized. The doctrine manual stressed individual soldier marksmanship and placed the emphasis on the dominance of the battalion and its commander in the assault. In the final analysis the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) went to war utilizing forty year old tactics and doctrine; as a result unsupported massed infantry was expected to defeat indirect artillery fire, machine gun fire and barbed wire. This doctrine combined with the BEF strategy of the wearing out battle and decisive assault created the bankrupt doctrinal milieu that awaited the CEF as it waded into the First World War.

The first two years of the war witnessed the ill-trained Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) learn harsh lessons through the immediacy of war. The CEF arrived in England on 14 October 1914, by this time the war in France and Belgium was grinding to a stalemate. The Canadians would spend 123 days on the Salisbury Plain organising and training in the most rudimentary manner in order to prepare for fighting in France.²⁴ 1915 would turn out to be a year of bitter lessons learned. The 2nd Battle of Ypres, the Canadians first large scale test in battle can perhaps be best described as a mix of courage, chaos and confusion. Not surprisingly, 1st Division faired rather poorly overall. However, the Canadians would learn and internalize battlefield lessons. Here we see how experiential-based

²² M. Samuels, *Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918*, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 58.

²³ M. Samuels, *Doctrine and Dogma*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 137.

²⁴ D. Morton. *A Military History of Canada*. (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1990) 25.

learning creates an informal PD feedback system. These lessons were validated during subsequent operations at Festubert, St. Eloi Craters and Mount Sorrel. More than anything, however, The Battle of the Somme - 1 July to 18 November 1916 - served as a catalyst to force a sweeping doctrinal and tactical transformation throughout the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), as the British suffered 60,000 casualties in the first day of the battle - the heaviest casualty rate in a single day in Britain's history.²⁵ The CEF fared no better, after successive failures, MGen Currie, Comd 1st Division convened a Board of Inquiry, followed by a personal commander's investigation intent on having the division learn from its mistakes. Currie provided the corps commander with a six page covering letter summarising 23 pages of findings.²⁶ He states in the report:

“To tell a Machine Gunner to take up his position at M.14.b.2.6 or a bomber to establish a block at M.8.d.3.0 is an absurd order unless some other means of fixing this point has been explained”²⁷

Furthermore, with respect to gaining and holding an objective Currie made two very pertinent points that would serve the corps very well in the months to follow. He stated

"the getting of the Trench does not mean the getting of the Objective. We must not only clear the enemy out of the Trenches, but we must control all of his approaches to it[sic]"²⁸

Currie's final two lessons deal with the level of leadership among the officers and the level of training of new drafts of men. He pointed out that in England; there existed no standardized Canadian training system or a professional training instructor cadre. He concluded that many

²⁵ J. Swettenham, *To Seize The Victory: The Canadian Corps in World War I*, (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1965), 115.

²⁶ National Archives of Canada, MG 30 E100, Currie Papers Vol 35, file 159 'Report made by the Board of Inquiry', Oct 16, 1916

²⁷ Ibid, 7.

²⁸ Ibid, 8.

of the officers and men had never seen a trench before and received inadequate combat training before arriving in France.²⁹

The four-month period following the Somme and prior to Vimy Ridge was without question the pivotal period for the CEF fighting force – the Canadian Corps. During this period, the winter of 1916/1917, virtually every service within the Corps was reformed and the corps attack doctrine underwent a metamorphosis. This reform was of course taking place across the British Army. The three most important documents to surface during this period included two official manuals, SS135 *Instructions for Training of Division for Offensive Operations* issued in December 1916 and SS143 *Instructions for Training of Platoons for Offensive Action* issued on 14 Feb 1917.³⁰ The third document was an unofficial document authored by MGen Currie entitled *Notes on French Attacks, North-East of Verdun in October and December, 1916*, submitted to Canadian Corps commander Sir Julian Byng on Jan 23rd 1917.³¹

In SS 135, *Instructions for training of Division for Offensive Operations*, the notion of the heroic infantry surging ahead, unsupported with bayonets fixed, was essentially abandoned in favour of assaulting infantry advancing as closely and quickly as possible behind a creeping artillery barrage.³² On the 5th of January 1917, shortly after SS 143 was published, Sir Julian Byng sent Sir Arthur Currie to Verdun to represent the Canadian Corps at two day battlefield study consisting of tours, lectures and conferences. Currie returned and synthesized his thoughts into recommendations, producing a 17-page report. In the report he championed the primacy of artillery, manoeuvre and platoon tactics, emphasising that "Our Troops must be taught *the power of manoeuvre*[Currie's

²⁹ National Archives of Canada, 'Report made by the Board of Inquiry'..., 8.

³⁰ Ibid, 76-77

³¹ National Archives of Canada, MG 30 E100, Currie Papers Vol 35, file 159 'Notes on French Attacks, North-East of Verdun in October and December, 1916.'

³² P. Griffith, *Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), 77.

italics]."³³ Herbert Wood writes that Currie's advocacy of platoon tactics finally ended "the techniques of sending waves of individuals towards a mere spot on the map selected by the staff."

Three weeks after Currie submitted his Verdun report, SS143 *Instructions for Training of Platoons for Offensive Action* was published and sent for distribution throughout the BEF. This manual signified officially a clean break from the old infantry tactics. It formalized the new platoon structure and tactical at

by the Canadian Corps in concert with the larger BEF initiative. The scope of the corps' professional transformation as a result of the PD/OPD system was truly incredible as witnessed by the famous 'last Hundred Days.' During this period, the Corps advanced through eighty miles of enemy occupied territory in rapid succession in just 96 days, decisively defeating over fifty German divisions, roughly one quarter of the German Army.

4. WW II – Professional Transformation Revisited

The OPD system specifically designed to support the Canadian Corps in the later stages of WW I was of course dismantled when the war ended and virtually all traces of a professional army evaporated during the inter-war period: 1919 to 1939. As Steven Harris argues, the army was not entirely to blame for its inability to conduct realistic training during this period; both British influences and General McNaughton's views regarding what comprised a good OPD system had an influence.³⁶ General McNaughton was appointed Chief of the General Staff in 1929. He was arguably the most influential military figure during this time period; a brilliant officer with broad appeal, described by Dr. Granatstein as "part soldier, part scientist, part politician."³⁷ His overriding belief in the primacy of science and technology influenced officer development. Indeed, many technically minded officer such as engineers found themselves picked to command divisions at the start of the war even though their last command was at the platoon or company level and they had little else in the way of tactical training.³⁸ To complement this tiny Canadian Army was entirely reliant on British doctrinal guidance which was in a state of disarray and constantly changing. This tended to make Canadian officers even more reliant on the British "to do their thinking for them."³⁹ With the notable exceptions of LCol E.L.M. Burns and Captain G.G. Simonds, who engaged in an

³⁶ Ibid, 210.

³⁷ J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals – The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War*, (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co., 1993), 63.

³⁸ Harris, *Canadian Brass...*, 211.

³⁹ Ibid, 204.

impressive doctrinal debate, through articles published in *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, there was a paucity of serious professional military debate amongst the Canadian Officer Corps.⁴⁰

Shortly after the Canadian Army engaged in battle during WW II, it became apparent that the officers were ill-prepared, as virtually no realistic pre-war OPD system existed. Even before battle was joined, eight of twenty-two generals who commanded divisions, corps or the deployed army, were fired for incompetence before they saw combat. A further two were fired after their first battle.⁴¹ Nevertheless, there were various attempts to formalise a structured OPD system with marginal results. In 1941, officer training centres (OTC) opened in Ontario and British Columbia, followed in 1942 with a senior officers course and in 1943, a company commanders course. Commanders review reports on each course revealed the training was sub-standard and that the officers possessed little in the way of professional and educational knowledge.⁴² Resultantly, battle field conduct was amateurish.

The disaster in Dieppe, in August 1942 certainly focused matters. However, training was taken back to the basics –platoon level and then worked progressively higher. At the higher level, combined operations training – as a result of Dieppe, was competing with open (land) warfare training. Lessons learned from exercise ‘Tiger’ in 1942 and exercise ‘Spartan’ in 1943 all lamented on the weakness of training in general. However, more disturbingly, was the identified weakness in senior officer. After ‘Spartan’ it was apparent that First Army Commander, General McNaughton was not suitable for operational command, nor were some of his subordinates suitable for tactical command – 2nd Division commander, MGen Roberts, being one example.⁴³ The poor performance of the army would initiate, as it had in the past, experiential-based learning PD. Canadian Army lessons learned in the Desert and in Tunisia were applied in Normandy, yet more than anything, training

⁴⁰ Ibid, 203.

⁴¹ Ibid, 211.

⁴² John A English, *Failure in High Command – The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign*, (Ottawa: The Golden Dog Press, 1995), 72.

imperatives from Montgomery's Eighth Army, then subsequently 21st Army Group promulgated in the form of *Current Reports* and *Army Training Memorandum* would serve as the battlefield PD system.⁴⁴ Clearly, the lack of a credible OPD system hindered the army's efforts to professionally transform. Furthermore, the OPD system was tactically focussed in order to deal with battlefield necessity and thus did not adequately prepare Canadian officers to interact at the operational or strategic level.

5. The Cold War – Evolution and Devolution of OPD

After a gruelling six-year war, the transition to demobilisation, normalcy and relative tranquillity set in. Given this environment and the need to balance the Prime Minister's call for reducing expenditures to almost post-war levels, new Defence Minister Brookes Claxton responded brilliantly with a 'White Paper' entitled *Canada's Defence*.⁴⁵ One of Claxton's themes focussed on the proper training and qualification of officers - all lessons gleaned from war. Indeed he states in *Canada's Defence*:

The role of the officer in modern war can only be properly discharged if they have education and standing in the comm

this Claxton established a National Defence College (NDC) at Kingston. The NDC officially opened in December 1947 with the first course commencing on 5 January 1948.⁴⁸

In February 1948, the Czechoslovakian government was overthrown by communists; in June the Soviets precipitated the Berlin blockade by sealing off the western occupied sectors of Berlin, and in August of 1949 the Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb. Already a member of the UN, on April 4th 1949 Canada signed the North Atlantic Treaty and effectively became a partner in a military alliance that squared off against the Soviets. The Cold War was on. The outbreak in 1950 of the shooting war in Korea, within the context of the larger Cold War, would mark the beginning of a period which is generally described as the apogee of Canadian Army peacetime professionalism. During the period 1950 to 1963, defence policy was largely NATO driven with a common focus that hinged upon collective security and deterrence. As a result the army had a focus, professional education and training was a priority and tactical level combat formations rotated into larger allied army formations where they could conduct realistic warfighting training.

From 1953 to 1957 the 1st and 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (CIBG) rotated into Allied Command Europe (ACE) on two year tours of duty, as forward right of I (British) Corps. While the army was honing its tactical expertise with the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR), Brooke Claxton and Lieutenant-General (LGen) Guy Simonds, Army Chief of the General Staff (CGS) set up a first-rate OPD system. Simonds reinforced the concept that officer professional development was directly related to career development and professionalism. Specifically, officers were required to pass a series of formal qualifying exams at each rank before they could be selected for Staff College or be promoted. The exams comprised of written and practical portions aimed at having the officer train conceptually at two rank levels above his current rank. Officers were expected to write lieutenant to captain exams by not later than one's third year of commissioned service, and the

⁴⁸ John. A. English, *Lament For An Army: The Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism*, (Toronto, Irwin Publishing, 1998), 85.

captain to major exams by not later than three years after promotion to captain.⁴⁹ The written portion of the exams comprised of five specific examinations such as military law, military history, staff duties and military writing, current affairs, organisation and administration and tactical operations.⁵⁰ An officer could only attempt the practical field portion upon successful completion of the written exams. Officers were not required to identify themselves by name or unit to ensure complete fairness in the evaluation of the exams. The ramifications with respect to career development were clear. To pass these exams with ‘distinction’ meant that one could be awarded accelerated promotion. To fail on the other hand meant that one could not be promoted, failure three times meant that one would never be promoted. In addition to this, officers were also required to pass staff college entrance exams. Clearly the government’s commitment to NATO, and Claxton and Simonds’ efforts to institutionalize a first rate OPD system directly enabled the army’s successful transformation to what most describe as the Canadian Army’s peacetime apogee.

The 1960s and 1970s can perhaps be best described as integration, unification and de-NATO-isation or what Jack Granatstein called the “long, dark night of the spirit.”⁵¹ Prime Ministers Lester Pearson and Elliot Trudeau set the tone for the years to come. First, PM Pearson reordered the collective security priorities from NATO to UN peacekeeping operations and mandated organisational changes - integration and unification. Reducing NATO commitment, leading to less focussed training was exasperated by the organisational changes that adversely affected army officer education. A tri-service staff college was created based on the airforce model; one that Simonds felt simply did not suit the Army as it did not deal in leadership nor teach the army general staff system. Once implemented, the Canadian Forces Staff College (CFSC) superseded the Canadian Army Staff College (CASC). The later then became the Canadian Land Force Junior Staff College (CLFJSC).⁵²

⁴⁹ English, *Lament For An Army...*, 48.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 48.

⁵¹ J.L. Granatstein, and R. Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy*, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1990), 234.

⁵² English, *Lament For An Army...*, 53.

As C.P. Stacey colourfully lamented “the rats had got to it.”⁵³ Finally, in 1966, army-qualifying exams were terminated. Consequently, the OPD from an army perspective was seriously eroded. The worst however was yet to come.

On April 20th 1968, Pierre Elliot Trudeau was elected Prime Minister and he would remain in power, save for a short period, for the next sixteen years. He believed that Canada’s national interests were not compatible with Canadian NATO driven policy of the previous two decades.⁵⁴ As a result, in 1970, 4 CMBG - the army’s vanguard fighting formation, was reduced from 6000 soldiers to 2800 soldiers. Further, the brigade group was reassigned from the high profile front line position with the BAOR in Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), south to Central Army Group (CENTAG) in a reserve role on two airfields in the vicinity of Lahr. Sean Maloney described the reduction and move of the brigade group as the nadir of its proud existence, while former commander NORTHAG, General Sir John Hackett described it as “disastrous”.⁵⁵ Granatstein was correct; the next several years were truly a long dark night of the spirit. All aspects of military professionalism: corporateness, expertise, responsibility and ethos - declined. The army senior leadership, trying to cope with an eroding sense of corporateness resulting from integration and unification, was now being shaken to its foundation. Expertise was next to suffer. That specialized and perishable skill set was fast eroding and with the drastic NATO commitment reduction, it would all but disappear; other elements of OPD - education and training – would suffer as well. There were no longer promotion requirements, little money was allocated for sending officers to US, UK, German or French staff colleges, and there was little opportunity to receive graduate level university education and few allied exchanges. Finally, the aspect of professional responsibility and military ethos – unlimited liability, or the service before self axiom, began to crumble. By the end of the decade civilianisation of the defence establishment was well entrenched. Senior military leaders resembled bureaucrats, a distinct gulf between senior leaders

⁵³ Ibid, 53.

⁵⁴ Granatstein and Bothwell, *Pirouette...*, 8.

and junior leaders emerged and there was a pervasive '9-5 job' mentality.⁵⁶ Canadian Army peacetime professionalism had reached its nadir as a result of a loss of operational focus and dismantled OPD system.

The Cold War period provides an interesting study as it sharply contrast the impact of OPD on military professionalism and ability of the force to effectively transform. The 1950s and 1960s were witness to a first-class OPD system that fuelled the professional transformation of a 14,185 strong post war army into a highly professional peacetime standing army numbering close to 100,000.⁵⁷ Clearly in contrast, when the OPD suffered systematic dismantlement during the post-unification years, army professionalism suffered and indeed the army descended into the abyss and arguably did not rise again until after Somalia. This is patently evident by contrasting the army of the mid 1950s with that of the mid 1970s.

Clearly, the Canadian Army underwent three gross-motto professional transformations. The first two changes occurred as a result of two world wars where the affect of professional development on transformation was patently obvious. The third transformations arose due to the advent of the Cold War where a more complex evolution, then devolution occurred. In all three cases, the ability to transform the force into a professionally competent body was inextricably linked to the OPD system. The next chapter will delve into the post-Somalia professional transformation and how the a comprehensively re-engineered OPD system enable remarkable success.

⁵⁵ S. Maloney, *War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany 1951-1993*, (Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson LTD, 1997), 242.

CHAPTER TWO – CURRENT TRANSFORMATION

An Emergent Threat Environment

The last 15 years has presented a hitherto unseen environment where unconventional threats appear to be the norm. During this period, the army has been conducting Operations other Than War (OOTW) in an asymmetric environment of failed states, non-state actors, terrorists, governmental and non-governmental organisations. Although army units, for the most part have still deployed with allies as part of a larger military formation there is no longer the tactical insulation once enjoyed when conducting conventional operations. The non-linear and non-contiguous battlespace in which the army has been conducting OOTW throughout Africa, Afghanistan, Rwanda, East Timor, Haiti and Bosnia, have demonstrated that the tactical barriers are no longer prevalent. Moreover, within these operational theatres, our leaders have found themselves fighting General Krulak's so-called 'Three Block War', conducting peacekeeping, humanitarian and warfighting operations, all near simultaneously. Clearly, the OPD system that existed in 1989 was not sufficient to prepare army officers to meet this new environment. The impetus for change however did not come about until revelations of what went wrong in Somalia came to the fore.

Impact of Somalia

In December, 1992 the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG) deployed to Somalia as part of an American led, UN endorsed Unified Task Force (UNITAF) on Operation Deliverance. The aim of the UNITAF mission was to impose peace on the warring factions in order to allow relief supplies to reach the famine ravaged country.⁵⁸ As can be immediately deduced, in a country without government, law or order, where warlords ruled, mission accomplishment would

⁵⁶ C.A. Cotton, *Military Attitudes and Values of the Army in Canada*, (Willowdale: CFPARU, 1979).

⁵⁷ B Crane, *Canadian Defence Policy*, (Toronto: John Deyell LTD, 1964), 23.

⁵⁸ David Bercuson, *Significant Incident – Canada's Army, The Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996), 2.

likely not be achieved using traditional military methods. Rather, the environment looked a lot like the ‘three block war.’ Although the CARBG did some exceptional work in Somalia, events of March 16, 1993 revealed systemic problems within the Army. The murder of a Somali teenager would trigger a wholesale review of the CF - the Army in particular, and would have a huge impact on the professional development system. After an exhaustive inquiry and numerous reviews, two key documents were published in 1997. The Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Douglas Young submitted to the Prime Minister a *Report on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces (Minister’s Report)*⁵⁹ while the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia submitted their report shortly thereafter (*Somalia Commission Report*).⁶⁰ Both reports were candid in their assessment. The *Minister’s Report* called into question the CFs “leadership, its discipline, its command and management, and even its honour.”⁶¹ The *Somalia Commission Report* conclude that “a failure of military values lies at the heart of the Somalia experience.”⁶² Also, many of the Minister’s Special Advisory Group members lamented that the lack of formal education of the officer corps was a key shortcoming.⁶³ As a result, the CF has taken great steps to professionally transform, creating a new OPD system focussed on military values and ethos, leadership and education.

Key OPD Reform – Past is Prologue to Change

As a result aforementioned reports, the CF went through a thorough review of the OPD system to address the shortfalls identified. The start point, or source document for implementing recommended changes remained a benchmark report produced 28 years earlier. The *Report of the*

⁵⁹ *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, (Ottawa, 25 March 1997). Referred to hereafter as *Minister’s Report*.

⁶⁰ Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia*, (Ottawa, 30 June 1997). Referred to hereafter as *Somalia Commission Report*.

⁶¹ *Minister’s Report...*, 1.

⁶² *Somalia Commission Report*, ES-46.

Officer Development Board, known as the *Rowley Report*, published in 1969 is a tremendously detailed and exhaustive three volume work that remains the cornerstone document on Canadian officer OPD.⁶⁴ Since the *Rowley Report* many professional development studies were published, some of which included the *Senior Officers Development Report* in 1986, the *Report of the Officer Development Review Board* in 1995, and the *Report of the Board of Governor's Study Group Review of the Undergraduate Programs at RMC*, in 1997. All of this to say, many of the shortfalls identified in the *Minister's Report* and the *Somalia Commission Report* of 1997 with respect to military values and ethos, leadership and education, had been already addressed, complete with recommendations, in these previous studies. Nevertheless, the *Rowley Report* seems to have been the key; it has been referenced in every PD report and study conducted since its publication, to this day. Its recommendations proved to be an OPD recipe for success.

The *Rowley Report* examined pre-commissioning education and training, intermediate rank development, senior officer development, the concept for a Defence College, post-graduate education, organisation and management.⁶⁵ The *Rowley Report* board recommended that entry level training consist of first common, then branch specific or specialty training; furthermore, that all candidates – prior to them being commissioned - meet such a standard in said training that would allow them to be posted to their units.⁶⁶ Regarding entry education, the report concluded that officer candidates “will require higher education, to the baccalaureate level, prior to being commissioned.”⁶⁷ The report goes into incredible detail with respect to recommended percentages of desired degree types – liberal arts, science and engineering for each officer branch. Interestingly, 28 years later, in the 1995 *Report of the Officer Development Review Board* it was recommended that entry level education should only be

⁶³ The chief proponent of this view was Jack Granatstein, see *A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence* by Dr. J.L. Granatstein, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 25 March, 1997.

⁶⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence, *The Rowley Report*.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, Vol II, Parts 5-9.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, Vol II, 19.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, Vol II, 24.

community college level, while the baccalaureate level remained desirable.⁶⁸ This would seem to corroborate Dr Granatstein's view that that military is education-adverse. He opined in his submission to the 1997 *Minister's Report* that the "CF has a remarkably ill-educated officer corps, surely one of the worst in the Western world. Only 53.29 percent of officers have a university degree and only 6.79 percent have graduate degrees."⁶⁹ Finally, the *Rowley Report* concluded that "officer cadets must develop attributes of character that cause them to adopt, as a lifetime commitment, the principles and ethic of the military profession"⁷⁰ Furthermore, the report states that all pre-commissioning training "must be implemented in recognition of this requirement."⁷¹

The *Rowley Report* recommended that at the junior/intermediate level of officer training, all captains should attend junior level staff training, not just army officers. It further recommended that staff college instructors possess a minimum baccalaureate level education and that eventually this be raised to post-graduate level.⁷² As land forces promotion exams were recently cancelled, the report board recommended an army command and staff course be designed and that all army captains should attend. Furthermore, the report stated that a preparatory studies program include an academic requirement consisting of studies in Canadian Government, evolution in Modern War, military economics, behavioural sciences and military leadership and management.⁷³ Chapter Seven of the *Rowley Report* – The development of Senior Officers, is essentially a blueprint for much of what has been recently implemented during the past few years at the Canadian Forces Staff College (CFC). The report board commented that the existing National Defence College (NDC) should not be considered a career course, that the students were not examined nor required to conduct in-depth research and that the college lacked sufficient research staff.⁷⁴ Accordingly, it was recommended that

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, Vol I, 8.

⁶⁹ Granatstein, *A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence...*, Section H.

⁷⁰ *The Rowley Report*, Vol II, 32.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, Vol II, 32.

⁷² *Ibid*, Vol II, 188.

⁷³ *Ibid*, Vol II, 200

⁷⁴ English, *Lament for an Army...*, App 2.

an advanced military studies course (AMSC), primarily for LCol, a national securities course (NSC) for Col and public servants, a centre of strategic studies (CSS) and a gaming facility be designed and delivered at a new Canadian Defence College.⁷⁵ In addition the requirement for post-graduate education for future officers was also recognised. It was further recommended that officers be offered the opportunity to pursue a post-graduate degree from either a civilian university, a Canadian Military College (CMC) or the new Canadian Defence College (CDC).⁷⁶ Finally, the *Rowley Report* board recommended that the entire officer professional development system, including the CMC and CDC, be commanded by a separate organisation directly responsible to the CDS. Although these comprehensive recommendations were tabled in 1969 and largely endorsed in the 1986 and 1995 OPD reports, most were not implemented until after the scathing 1997 *Minister's Report* and *Somalia Commission Report*.

Strategic Direction for Change – A New OPD System

Changes to the OPD system during the last ten years have proven to be the overriding factor in post-Somalia transformation. There have been huge leaps made in terms of an OPD systems approach and in all of the fundamental areas previously discussed: education, leadership and military values and ethics. With respect to a new systems approach, the current framework seen in diagram 1, was first introduced and recommended in 1995 by the *Officer Development Review Board*.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ *The Rowley Report*, Vol II, 246/7.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, Vol II, 298/99.

⁷⁷

Diagram 1 – OPD System Framework

The Review Board developed the framework based on the *Rowley Report*, the Officer General Specifications (OGS) and the 1994 White Paper. The original notion saw the four pillars related to the officer development periods based loosely on rank: pre-commissioning, junior, intermediate and senior levels.⁷⁸ The education pillar has been heavily scrutinized as detailed above and is seen as the key to the system. The training pillar is designed to deliver individual training to meet the needs of the CF, environments and specific military occupational classifications (MOC). Experience complements the education and training by allowing the member to develop critical skills such as leadership, through practical application. Finally, self-development is encouraged based on the individual's professional goals. This has since been more precisely defined and aligned based on the four officer developmental periods (DP) as depicted in diagram 2.⁷⁹

⁷⁸

Ibid, Vol 1, 6.

⁷⁹

DAOD 5031-8 Officer Professional Development.

Officers	DP	Rank/Appointment	Reg F QL
	1	OCdt 2Lt Lt	Basic
	2	Capt/ Lt(N)	
	3	Maj/ LCdr LCol/ Cdr	Advanced
	4	Col/ Capt(N) General/ Flag Officers	

Diagram 2 – Officer Developmental Periods

A DP is designed as a timeframe in an officer’s career during which he or she is trained, employed and given the opportunity to develop specific occupational or professional skills and knowledge. The training levels of accountability, responsibility, competency, military leadership and professional knowledge increase commensurate with the DPs. The current OPD system has matured since the original conception in 1995 as a result of recommendations from the *Minister’s Report* and the *Somalia Commission Report*; accordingly, much has been accomplished in a relatively short timeframe. Specifically, a coordinated effort to articulate a CF strategic outlook – something that hitherto had been lacking – was produced in June 1999. *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020 (Strategy 2020)* set the strategic decision making framework for the CF to guide defence planning in the future.⁸⁰ The document identifies five major domains of competencies –

⁸⁰ Department of National Defence, *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1999).

command and leadership, multi-skilled people, doctrine, technology and training, modern management practices, and special relationship with principal allies.⁸¹ That same year, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) initiated a forward-looking process to ensure that the CF continued to have the leadership that it required to be successful in the 21st century. Accordingly, he appointed a Special Advisor (SA) for Officer Professional Development (OPD) with a team responsible for drafting the strategic guidance for the CF officer corps and the OPD system; this became known as Officership 2020.⁸² Concurrently, a revised OGS and Land Environmental Specifications (LES) were produced as well as various CF Occupational Analysis reports; in the case of the army the Combat Arms Occupational Analysis was published in September 2000.⁸³ To support these strategic initiatives, Military HR Strategy 2020 was also tabled.⁸⁴ In terms of organisational structure, in April 2002, the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) was created based loosely on the original *Rowley Report* model. The CDA provides a centralized organization to guide and oversee professional development. It has under command, the Directorate of Professional Development, the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, the Royal Military College and the Canadian Forces College among other key organisations.⁸⁵ Finally, in 2003 the CDA produced a keystone manual entitled *Duty With Honour – The Profession of Arms in Canada*.⁸⁶

As a result of the aforementioned CF strategic direction the army embarked on producing its own vision and strategy. Land Force Strategic Direction and Guidance (LFSDG 98) underwent a

⁸¹ Ibid, 8

⁸² Department of National Defence, *Officership in the 21st Century, (Officership 2020): Strategic Guidance for the Canadian Forces Officer Corps and the Officer Professional Development System*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2001). Also available from: http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca/2020/engraph/officership/background/background_e.asp ; Internet accessed 15 Apr 04.

⁸³ Canadian Forces Occupational Analysis Report - Combat Arms Officers and NCMs, (September 2000).

⁸⁴ Department of National Defence, *Military HR Strategy 2020: Facing the people Challenges of the Future*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2002).

⁸⁵ Canadian Defence Academy Web Page, Available from: http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca/index/engraph/general/org/orglrg_e.asp ; Internet accessed 15 Apr 04.

fundamental review and was updated early in 2000 (LFSDG 01). Concurrently, the Commander of the Land Staff (CLS) convened several Strategic Planning Sessions (SPS) to map out the Army strategy. In 1999, Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts (DLSC) produced the *Future Army Development Plan* and the *Future Army Conceptual Framework*.⁸⁷ Both documents attempted to define the new future security environment (FSE) and associated challenges with a view of breaking away from the crisis management paradigm of the past to articulate a strategic vision for the future. This is articulated in terms of the Army of Today – current year to year 4, the Army of Tomorrow – years 5 to 10, and the Army of the Future – years 11 to 25 and beyond.⁸⁸ All of these efforts came into focus with the 2002 publication of the current army strategy *Advancing With Purpose – The Army Strategy*.⁸⁹ In February 2002, the Directorate of Army Training (DAT) as the responsible agency in the Land Force Doctrine and Training System (LFDTTS), for the implementation of army professional development produced a comprehensive and ambitious army professional development and implementation plan.⁹⁰ The plan is fully integrated with the CF OPD system based on the four pillars of education, training, experience and self-development sitting on the foundation of leadership, warfighting skills and professional knowledge. The plan has met with great success at the DP 1 and DP 2 levels and has experienced set backs at the DP 3 and DP 4 levels. The aggregate effect of all of the aforementioned initiatives was the production of an excellent OPD system that has transformed an army in disgrace to the highly professional and respected army that exists today.

Current OPD Model

⁸⁶ Department of National Defence, *Duty With Honour – The Profession of Arms in Canada*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003).

⁸⁷ *Future Army Development Plan*, (Kingston: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 8 Mar 99), and *Future Army conceptual Framework*, (Kingston: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 28 Sep 99).

⁸⁸ DLSC, *Future Army Development Plan...*, 1.

⁸⁹ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose – The Army Strategy* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2002).

⁹⁰ *Training Directive – Implementation of the Army Professional Development Plan*, (Kingston: Directorate of Army Training, 1 Feb 2002).

In accordance with the recommendations in the *Rowley Report*, et al, all officers cadets, prior to commissioning, now require a baccalaureate level education. The Royal Military College's (RMC) Continuing Studies department also has in place programs to allow current service officers who do not hold a baccalaureate level degree, to pursue one at RMC. DP 1 commences upon entry into the CF and includes the period up to the completion of occupational qualifications (OQ). A new Qualification Standard (QS) for DP1 entitled the *Enhanced Leadership Model* (ELM) was developed as a result of shortcomings identified in the various reports aforementioned.⁹¹ Essentially, the ELM puts greater emphasis on 'officership' before environmental and MOC training is conducted. Training consists of six weeks of an initial assessment period (IAP) to determine the candidate's leadership potential, motivation, personal traits and socialization, followed by eight weeks of basic officer training (BOTP). Upon success, the officer cadet will continue on to environmental qualification (EQ) and occupational qualification (OQ) training to prepare them for their first operational employment.⁹² For army officers, the EQ consists of the new DAT implemented common army phase (CAP) course. During this phase the training objectives focus on low level tactical training, physical fitness and weapons training while the education objectives include leadership, ethos, doctrine, creative thinking and decision making.⁹³ Following this army officers conduct phase 3 and phase 4 of their specific OQ training, which essentially delivers more specific low level tactical training designed to prepare them to lead a platoon or troop.⁹⁴

DP 2 is designed to develop junior officers, giving them increased general, environmental and occupational qualifications, skills and knowledge. This is achieved through a combination of formal training courses and practical experience at units and formations. All Officers are required to complete the Officer Professional Military Education (OPME) programs during the DP 1/DP 2

⁹¹ *Qualification Standards, Officer General Specifications, Development Period 1 (Enhanced Leadership Model)*, CFRETS, 20 Jun 2001.

⁹² Ibid, 1-2/6 – 1-4/6.

⁹³ DAT, *Training Directive...*, E6-87/3

⁹⁴ Canadian Forces Occupational Analysis Report..., 7-17/31.

timeframe. The OPME program consists of five courses: Introduction to Defence Management (DCE 001), Introduction to Military Law(DCE 002), Canadian Military History (HIE 208), the CF and Modern Society: Civics, Politics and International Relations (POE 206) , Science and War: The Impact of Military Technology (HIE 475), and Leadership and Ethics(PSE 402).⁹⁵ For army officers, DP 2 is a PD intensive period. The first training opportunity for combat arms officers following their initial unit posting would be the Army Team Operations Course (ATOC) which is designed to provide those officers with tactical operations training at the sub-unit level within the battle group (BG) context.⁹⁶ The premiere training course at this level is the Army Operations Course (AOC), formerly the Land Force Command and Staff Course (LFCSC). This course consists of a mix of self study, distributed learning, and residency based training and education. The course places a heavy emphasis on warfighting, staff duties and procedures while also incorporating CF OGS required elements.⁹⁷ Phase 1 of AOC consists of unit directed training and a self-study package. Phase 2 of AOC is seven weeks of distributed learning consisting of theoretical leadership, doctrine, ethics and staff training. Phase 3 of AOC is an eleven week residential phase that focuses on practical application of material covered in phase two culminating in an Operations Other Than War (OOTW) exercise and a final warfighting exercise – Ex Final Drive.⁹⁸ Although graduation from AOC is not a prerequisite for promotion to major, it is a prerequisite to attend the premiere DP 3 course - CFC's Command and Staff Course (CSC); however, successful completion of the OPME program is required for both promotion to major and selection for the CSC. Finally, the last OPD course usually taken by army combat arms officers prior to promotion to major is the Combat Team Commander's Course (CTCC) which prepares those selected officers for sub-unit tactical command.

⁹⁵ Royal Military College, Division of Continuing Studies Home Page, Available from: http://www.opme.forces.gc.ca/engraph/home_e.asp ; Internet accessed 15 Apr 04.

⁹⁶ DAT, *Training Directive...*, E6-101/3

⁹⁷ Ibid, E6-101/3.

⁹⁸ A Briefing delivered by the Commandant LFCSC to the Commanding Officer's Course, Kingston, 21 March 2004.

Developmental Period 3 is informally broken down into two components – DP 3A for majors and DP 3B for LCol. The rationale for this split does not appear to be consistent within CF or Army doctrine. In section three of the 1999 OGS, DP 3 is broken down into “3a, which applies to majors and has a predominantly tactical focus; and 3b, which applies to LCol and has a predominantly operational focus.”⁹⁹ However, the latest OGS (March 2001), describes DP 3 in terms of one stage yet in a subsequent chart DP 3A and DP 3B is indicated – without explanation. In *Report of the DP 3 Delivery Options Study Group*, the group did not find significant differences in the task, skills and knowledge requirements between majors and LCol and thus did not recommend splitting the developmental period.¹⁰⁰ This notwithstanding, although DP 3 is shown as one period in DAOD 5031-8 *Canadian Forces Professional Development* and the in Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) literature, it still appears in its sub-components in the OGS as well as in most of the army documentation. In the 2002 PD Implementation Plan, DAT articulated an ambitious plan to design and run environmental specific courses – the Army Staff Course (AMC) in DP 3A and the Army Operational Planning Course (AOPC) in DP 3B in order to specifically address army training concerns.¹⁰¹ To date this plan has not come to fruition and has been shelved pending further review. Consequently, CSC remains the cornerstone of DP 3 training. The aim of the CSC is to develop senior officers for key tactical level command and operational-level staff appointments as part of component or joint operations in national or combined forces. CSC offers a year long professional military education program with emphasis placed on the following program goals: Command, Leadership and Ethics, Communications Skills, Operational Art Theory, Joint and Combined Operations, and National Security and Defence Studies.¹⁰² In addition, officers, if accepted by RMC,

⁹⁹ Department of National Defence, A-PD 055-002 PP-001, *Canadian Forces Officer General Specifications*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1999), 3-1.

¹⁰⁰ *Report of the DP 3 Delivery Options Study Group*, 20 June 2001, E-2

¹⁰¹ DAT, *Training Directive...*, Appendix 34 and 38 to Annex E.

¹⁰² Canadian Forces Calendar, 2002/2003. Available from: http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/info_e.html; Internet accessed 16 Apr 04.

can undertake additional curriculum and confirmation elements to qualify for a Masters of Defence Studies (MDS) degree.¹⁰³

Development Period 4 is designed to prepare senior officers for roles as joint and combined commanders and defense executives. All formal development courses are delivered at CFC; they include the Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC), the National Security Studies Course (NSSC) and the National Security Studies Seminar. The aim of the AMSC is to prepare selected LCol, Col and equivalent naval ranks for command and staff appointments at operational level headquarters within national and international organizations. AMSC program goals include Operational Art, Operational-Level Campaigning, Component Warfare, Joint and Combined Operations, and Command, Leadership and Ethics.¹⁰⁴ NSSC is designed to prepare general/flag officers, selected colonels/naval captains and civilian equivalents, for strategic leadership responsibilities; specifically with respect to the development, direction and management of national security and defence policy. The course is concentrated at the strategic level, focusing on command and leadership, national security policy, strategic operations and strategic management.¹⁰⁵ Finally, the NSSS is a 12 day seminar that covers a plethora of national security issues; these include geo-strategic approach to national security, Canadian perspective and issues related to national security, preparation of a Canadian strategic assessment and development of a Canadian national security strategy.¹⁰⁶

The CARBG's well-publicized failings in Somalia exposed systemic failings in leadership, officer education and in military ethos. As a result the CF embarked on a serious and remarkable road to transformation. Three key reports clearly identified the shortcomings and the CF, followed by the Army, issued strategic direction for change. This change came in the form of a reconstructed OPD

¹⁰³ Ibid, CSC Section, 13.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, AMSC Section, 12.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, NSSC Section, 11.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, NSSS Section, 17.

system; a system based on education, training, experience and self-development. The results, just a few years later were remarkable. All officers now must to have an undergraduate degree as an entry-level requirement. The BOTP was re-engineered and an enhanced leadership model was developed. Initial army training was standardized to ensure that all army officers received the same training. Furthermore, a much-enhanced education package was added to the training package. PME was greatly improved in the form of OPME exams. DP 2 level training has been redesigned for army officers is exceptional with the new AOC course as its flagship. DP 3 and 4 training has been continually improved, notably with the emergence of the AMSC, NSSC and the NSSS. Clearly, this revised OPD system is largely responsible for transforming the Somalia era army into the well-trained, ethically grounded army of today.

CHAPTER THREE – THE OPD IMPERATIVE FOR THE FUTURE

Regardless of specific force structure and equipment decisions. Army leaders and soldiers need to be imbued with military ethos. In addition, education, training and professional development systems must be adapted to the new strategic realities¹⁰⁷

- Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy

Future Security Environment

Clearly, the security environment has changed drastically since the end of the cold war. Furthermore, the CF, and Army in particular, were not adequately prepared to operate in the new environment. Tragically, it took events in Somalia to fuel the professional transformation that still continues today. These transformation efforts have been substantial; fuelled by a re-engineered OPD system that delivered to officers' far superior training and education than they received years ago.

¹⁰⁷ Department of National Defence, Advancing With Purpose..., 12.

This imperative must continue as the challenge of *Army Transformation* lies in the uncharted territory that is defined by the future security environment. The CLS, LGen Rick Hillier states “a most important force driving transformation is the changing nature of the threats to stability . . . and to our soldiers while they are deployed on missions.”¹⁰⁸ Detailed threat analysis of the FSE has been promulgated in both CF and Army strategy. CF strategy tends to describe the FSE in terms of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) whereas the Army strategy complements this and goes into much more detail about the threat environment in order to define the battlespace. *Strategy 2020* forecasts the FSE in a Geo-politically view where ethnic unrest, religious extremism, and resource disputes will likely remain a source of conflict with advanced technologies such as weapons of mass destruction proliferating among not only states but unpredictable non-state actors. Furthermore, military operations will be conducted in an asymmetric threat environment at an accelerated pace, necessitating rapid co-ordination of political and military objectives.¹⁰⁹ The Army has invested great effort during the past four years in trying to define the FSE and the concept for future army capabilities within this environment. As eluded to above, the army has examined the FSE with more granularity, attempting to define the future battlespace within the FSE. This effort is captured in great detail in *Future Force – Concepts for Future Army Capabilities*. In *Future Force* the future battlespace is forecasted to be “volatile, uncertain, constantly changing, and ambiguous. Furthermore there will be “increased emphasis on info[rmation] op[eration]s, S[it]uational] A[wareness], and small, agile, dispersed units required to operate in non-linear environments supported by instantaneous precision effects.”¹¹⁰ The complexity of the future battlespace will likely increase exponentially due to several factors; these include the asymmetric nature of the threat, adversary’s choice of urban terrain, blurred operations (three block war concept), dimensional expansion of the battlespace, the

¹⁰⁸ LGen Rick Hillier, Speech entitled *Commander Speaks about Army Transformation*, delivered on 20 Oct 2003.

¹⁰⁹ Department of National Defence, *Strategy 2020*..., 4.

¹¹⁰ *Future Force – Concepts for Future Army Capabilities*, (Kingston: Directorate Land Strategic Concepts, 2003), 75.

human/technology interface and the challenge of real-time media coverage.¹¹¹ In order to successfully transform, the army will have to be able to successfully operate in this environment; an environment that French Military analyst Phillippe Delmas describes “as different from the Cold War as it is from the Middle Ages...”¹¹² To operate in this aforementioned environment, it will take more than increased investment in new technologies such as equipment and weapons system, but rather a further investment in our leaders. Our leaders will need to mentally navigate through this asymmetric environment that blends the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war into one, and that blurs the distinction of friend from foe, of combatant from non-combatant. In the future, more than ever before, the most effective military technology to cultivate will be the officers mind; this can only be achieved through OPD. If we are to continue successfully in *Army Transformation*, it is the OPD system that will remain the key to ensuring that future army leaders are properly prepared to meet the unique challenges of the FSE and new ‘strategic battlespace.’

Military Ethos.

Richard Gabriel argues that “a profession must never become a refuge for those who abandon their humanity, eliminating all other social obligations in deference to purely professional standards,” and that “a true member of the military must also be a humanist.”¹¹³ Clearly, one could apply this assertion to the Army during the Somalia period and conclude that as a profession the institution failed to conduct itself in the manner thus recommended. The new strategic battlespace would suggest that operations like Somalia will become the norm rather than the exception in the model of US Marine General Krulak’s so-called ‘Three Block War.’ This scenario paints military forces conducting near simultaneous, peacekeeping, humanitarian and warfighting operations within a three block radius. Moreover, as General Krulak points out “the inescapable lesson... is that their outcome

¹¹¹ Ibid, 63.

¹¹² Ibid, 61.

¹¹³ Richard A. Gabriel, *To Server With Honor*, (Westport: Greenwood), 1956, 85.

may hinge on decisions made by small unit leaders and by actions taken at the lowest levels.”¹¹⁴

Certainly, this was witnessed on the nation’s television sets during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, as the British 7th Armoured Division conducted operations in the vicinity of Basrah, Iraq.

All of this to say, the ability to make ethical decision, in the face of extreme confusion and ambiguity as described above is a clear requirement for our army leaders. Fortunately, the CF has invested a major effort in promulgating military ethos throughout the force - *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* devotes an entire chapter to military ethos. The challenge that remains is how the OPD system can best confirm that our leaders will conduct themselves in accordance with Canadian values, expectations and beliefs and further imbue in them the Canadian military values. Accordingly, two methods are offered to enhance an already strong program; one involving screening and the other PME/training. Sir John Hackett states that while a man can be morally corrupt in many ways he can still be outstanding in other areas. Furthermore, he may be outstanding in his occupation, yet still be a bad man. What the bad man cannot be, Hackett argues, is a good soldier.¹¹⁵ What happens if this bad man shows up at the recruiting centre? As eluded to in the *Rowley Report*, all pre-commissioning training should be implemented in recognition of the requirement for officers to possess the required military ethics.¹¹⁶ Immediately after a candidate has successfully been recruited, the OPD system takes over, and the candidate attends a six week initial assessment period (IAP), as part of the Enhanced Leadership Model (ELM) for basic officer training (BOTP). This training puts greater emphasis on ‘officership’, with a view to determining the candidate’s leadership potential, motivation, personal traits and socialization.¹¹⁷ The IAP could be enhanced to include a substantial interactive ethics package that should be designed to get an indication of the individual’s baseline ethical outlook and value base. Those shown not to have a desired baseline of military values

¹¹⁴ General Charles C. Krulak, “Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War”, *Marines* 28, Iss 1 (Jan 99): 26.

¹¹⁵ Sir John W. Hackett, “The Military in the Service of the State,” *War, Morality and the Military Profession* 2nd ed., MM Wakin, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 119.

¹¹⁶ Department of National Defence, *The Rowley Report...*, Vol II, 33.

and ethics, along with noted weaknesses in the other areas of assessment should not progress with selection.

With respect to training, there is an annual ethics training program in place. However, in order to better deliver the training, ‘ethical dilemma’ scenarios should be incorporated in all tactical training, much in the same way that ROE and LOAC issues are incorporated. In this way, army leaders will grow accustomed to factoring ethics into the tactical estimate and the decision making process. Indeed, the ethical decision will be the most important decision the leader will need to make; furthermore, given the current focus on ethics in the CF combined with the above offered recommendations, army leaders should be well prepared for future challenges.

Education

*Education and training...is an organizations most powerful leaders development message because it so obviously reflects investment*¹¹⁸

- General Gordon R. Sullivan & Michael Harper, *Hope is not a Method*

In order to operate in the future battlespace, it will not suffice to be simply highly trained. The challenge of adapting to rapidly changing situations both functionally and positionally, synonymous with blurred operation within an asymmetric environment will render nugatory traditional training methodologies; where training is defined as “a predictable response to a predictable situation.”¹¹⁹ Dr. Ron Haycock argues further that education, defined as a “reasoned response to an unpredictable situation,” will become increasingly and relatively more important as officers will need to be able to think critically

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 1-3/6

¹¹⁸ General Gordon R. Sullivan & Michael Harper, *Hope is not a Method*, (Toronto: Random House, 1996), 215.

¹¹⁹ Definition of training and education coined by RMC professor Ronald Haycock. Cited in *Future Force...*, 69.

in the face of the unknown.¹²⁰ Accordingly, this imperative can be achieved by making minor adjustments to the current OPD system in order to better adapt it to the new strategic reality. Firstly, officers will need to be educated earlier in their careers – both professionally and academically. The current OPD system addresses initial academic education by requiring all officers to hold an undergraduate degree as an entrance level requirement. However, complementary professional education (PME) and post-graduate education is delivered too late in an officer’s career. Dr. Steven Metz argues that the need for conceptual and doctrinal flexibility is paramount, and that those who can adopt the quickest will likely succeed; moreover relying on drills and predictable responses will no longer suffice.¹²¹

Dr. David Last expands on this theme, stating that officers need “a strong intellectual grasp of strategy and operational planning early in their careers.”¹²² In the current OPD system, in depth study into conceptual military theories and paradigms as well as doctrinal theory is introduced in the OPME modules throughout DP 1 and DP 2 and not delivered in a concentrated manner until CSC in DP 3. With respect to DP 3, Army officers currently attending CSC are majors and LCol that are all post sub-unit command: at an average age of 42 years on the current CSC, it is too late to be receiving this PME. Indeed the DP 3 Study Group concluded that the education being delivered on CSC was “on average seven years later than the preferred period.”¹²³ This is particularly important given certain realities. One, the Army will likely not be able achieve operational goals independently, but rather as a component part of a international coalition or national force as part of a joint and combined

¹²⁰ Ibid, 69.

¹²¹ Metz, *Future Geo-political Context in which Leadership will be exercised: Future War, Future Battlespace...*, 16-19.

¹²² Major, Dr. David Last, “Educating Officers: Post-Modern Professionals to Control and Prevent Violence,” in *Contemporary Issues in Officership: A Canadian Perspective*, ed. LCol Bernd Horn (Toronto: Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000), 21.

effort. Furthermore, given the size of the army, army expeditionary deployments will be limited to sub-unit, unit and HQ components.¹²⁴ With this in mind one of the options for effectively contributing in the new strategic battlespace is the concept of Tactical Self-Sufficient Units (TSSU). A TSSU is a “rapid deployable all-arms manoeuvre unit that is capable of conducting a wide range of tasks across the complete spectrum of the force.”¹²⁵ Given this concept, the junior major commanding a TSSU could require a similar level of training and education that is currently offered at the Colonel/General level. This would seem to corroborate the aforementioned point that the the PME needs to be delivered earlier.

Secondly, the education delivered needs to be a broad based academic liberal arts focus, synchronized with complementary PME, with a view to developing cognitive skills and reasoned judgement. Dr. Last argues that officers need to be educated in such a manner so as to understand the human condition of war and violence in society. Furthermore that this imperative is predominant as strategy, doctrine and technology are all subservient to this purpose.¹²⁶ Given that the spectrum of conflict is not clearly divided as it was in the past, Dr. Last argues that “flexibility of mind that arises from a broad education must compensate for our inability to predict the circumstances under which forces will be employed.”¹²⁷ This assertion seems to be supported by the CDS’s *Debrief the Leaders* Survey; in the survey 1000 officers were asked to comment on deficiencies they encountered while conducting mission, both domestically and abroad. A lack of understanding of the nature of the conflict in their context and its relation to Canadian interests was cited. Also, insufficient knowledge of the local culture and its relationship to the conflict as well the relationship of the NGOs

¹²³ *Report of the DP 3 Delivery Options Study Group...*, 2.

¹²⁴ DLSC, *Future Force...*, 162.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, 164.

and IO's involved was reported.¹²⁶ Finally, there was only superficial understanding of conflict resolution, mediation and negotiation theory and techniques. Clearly, then as Dr. Last suggests, a broad tool box of skills that comes with well developed cognitive skills is essential before practical training can be useful. Indeed, as LGen Evraire put it, officers "must possess a 'knowledge base' and particular skills that extend far beyond the realm of combat."¹²⁹

Clearly, the OPD system meets the baseline requirements; however, with a few modifications, our leaders should be fully armed to adapt to and conquer the new strategic battlespace. First, in general terms, all officers should complete a degree in liberal arts. Officer cadets wishing to become technical specialist such as engineers would have the 4-year degree program design so as to receive concentrated liberal arts curriculum in the first two years and a concentrated engineering curriculum in the final two years. This would necessitate a more directive degree curriculum with little flexibility for electives. In order to enhance a broader perspective, it is recommended that RMC negotiate an exchange program with Queens University whereby all liberal arts officer cadets complete one year of their studies at Queens – optimally during third year. With respect to initial PME, army officers should complete the OPME program in a single three-month package directly following BOTP and prior to proceeding on CAP in a similar fashion to how the Air Force delivers the OPME program. Furthermore, some of the DP 3 level PME delivered on the CSC should be moved forward and delivered to army officers on AOC; specifically, the Officership Studies

¹²⁶ Last, *Educating Officers: Post-Modern Professionals to Control and Prevent Violence...*, 9.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 19.

¹²⁸ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century - OPDP Statement of Operational Requirements*, Draft, (Ottawa: DND Canada, Jan 2000), 16.

¹²⁹ LGen Richard Evraire, "General and Senior Officer Professional Development in the Canadian Forces," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, (Dec 1990), 34.

and Strategic Studies programs. Accordingly, the Officership Studies program delivered on AMSC should be moved forward and delivered on CSC. With respect to post-graduate education, the MDS degree offered at CSC should be cancelled. Instead, CSC should be reorganized as a two year course, the first year in its current format, taking into account changes recommended above, and a second year comprising of an academic post-graduate (PG) degree program. A suitable model for this would be the School of Advanced Military Science (SAMS) program at the US War College in Leavenworth. All army officers selected for CSC, would be required to complete both years unless they already possess a PG degree. To complement this PG option, the army should be allocated more sponsored, non-technical, PG positions.

Training

Tactical training of army officers under the current OPD system has improved dramatically over the past few years. LFDTS efforts through initiatives by DAT, the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College (CLFSC) and the Combat Training Centre (CTC) with respect to DP 1 and DP 2 training have paid dividends with the successful implementation of CAP, ATOC and AOC as described in chapter two. However, in order to ensure continued success in *Army transformation* the OPD system must continue to provide predictive tactical training based on set drills, while increase the amount of training that complements the recommended educational approach – developing officers that can better reason. The draft concept paper *How the Canadian Army will FIGHT* details a force employment concept for the future; in it the author cautions that traditional predictable symmetric battlefield scenarios will be highly unlikely in future land conflict.¹³⁰ The Army

¹³⁰ *How the Canadian Army will FIGHT (Draft) – A Force Employment Concept Paper, 2.*

Future Seminar on Leadership came to the same conclusion, finding that the ambiguity and complexity of the FSE would render drills and predictable responses unsuitable.¹³¹ As was demonstrated in chapter two, current training has all of the ingredients for success; however, with a further rationalization and synchronization of the recipe for delivery, the OPD system will be optimally suited to deliver the key enabling training to ensure that future army leader can adapt to the new strategic reality.

During DP 1, it is critical that flexibility of thought is instilled in army leaders before they receive predictive tactical training. Specifically, to complement the three month OPME program, officers proceeding on CAP should receive an enhanced program of existing Education Objectives (EdO) 101 to 107 to emphasise issues and skills relating to doctrine, leadership, ethics, critical thinking, decision making and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), with a view to having them approach upcoming predictive training with a critical mind.¹³² This training should also include an introduction to negotiation, facilitation, mediation and conflict resolution skills. Following CAP and prior to arriving at the unit, the OQ training needs to augment traditional tactical training – offensive, defensive and transitional operations. More training emphasis needs to be placed on developing leaders who can transition between OOTW and asymmetric warfighting scenarios focussing on a knowledge based approach to achieve information dominance in accordance with current army strategy.

Simply put, one of the reasons why OPD is key to *Army transformation* is that the main aim of the system is to build better leaders. Regardless of technologies, organisation,

¹³¹ *Canadian Army Leadership in the 21st Century...*, 19.

weapons or equipment, it is the leaders who will transform the army by adapting to the new strategic battlespace. Colonel Tim Heinenmann, suggests that future army leaders will have to be able to ‘see below the grass line’, that is to say, to be able to think beyond the combat estimate to identify and analyse the root cause to a problem and develop strategies to deal with it.¹³³ He suggests that this will involve a set of skills or competencies that have not necessarily been part of traditional military leadership training. These are defined as interpersonal, conceptual, technical, tactical, influencing, operating and improving.¹³⁴ Interpersonal skills will allow the leader to develop both insight and foresight into those around him as well as the environment. Sullivan posits that future leaders will need this skill as the pace of change will place “unprecedented demands on leaders to sense their environments and to respond in increasingly compressed time cycles.”¹³⁵ The requirement for leaders to develop conceptual skills was discussed earlier when dealing with liberal education. Suffice to say, leaders who can see patterns where others cannot, then act rapidly and decisively will be well equipped to operate in a future asymmetric environment.¹³⁶ The requirement for technical skills has been in demand for a number of years as a result of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). However, these skills are best taught commensurate with the specific military OQ or specialist specification (OSS) training requirement so as not to compete with the recognised requirement for broad based liberal arts education. Specifically, technology training can be delivered in military training facilities together with

¹³² EdO 101 to 107 are as follows: Army Leadership Theory, Creative Thinking and decision Making, Role of the Canadian Army, Ethos of the Canadian Army, Ethics and Army Leadership, Army Doctrine and Law of Armed Conflict.

¹³³ Colonel Tim Heinenmann, “US Army Perspectives on Future Leadership”, *Canadian Army Leadership in the 21st Century, Report of the Army Future Seminar – Leadership*, ed. Roberta Abbott and Colonel M.D. Capstick, (Kingston, Feb 7, 2002).

¹³⁴ Ibid, 38.

¹³⁵ Gordon and Harper, *Hope is not a Method...*, 219.

PME in order to maximize training effectiveness so that PME can be synchronized with practical application in order to maximize the retention of technical skills.¹³⁷ This initial training will no doubt occur first during phases three and four of OQ training; however, it must continue as described above through DP 2 and beyond.

The tactical leader should be able to apply personal knowledge, conceptual knowledge, doctrinal constructs and assess internal and external information in order to apply leadership.¹³⁸ In the US construct, the leader endeavours to see first, understand first and act

First, Understand, Assess, Act

addressing the challenges of the future. Conferences such as the Army Futures Seminar on Leadership co-sponsored by LFDTS and held at the CLFCSC in February of 2002 is one indication that training development will continue to address the new strategic reality. Current initiatives indicate that army junior leaders will be well prepared. In an effort to ensure that all army captains attend AOC, DAT and CLFCSC are developing backlog modelling and special residency phase options.¹⁴² The career management process, OPD system and the Army Training Operational Framework (ATOF) are now better synchronized in an effort to ensure that the AOC is attended by army captains of 3-5 years in rank (which is the target rank). The DAT initiatives to design army specific developmental period 3 training in the form of t

Experience

Intuitively, it is reasonable to conclude that leadership and command experience directly contributes to an increased level of confidence as it allows a leader to hone his expertise. Research tends to support this subjective view, particularly when the experiential employment is designed in accordance with developmental objectives.¹⁴³ The current OPD system recognizes this requirement, and thus it is asserted that ensuring that army officers receive complementary experience is a matter of managing an officer's career in order to balance education, training and experience. Though not a simple task given time and resource demand, some recommendations are offered. All army officers must be afforded initial command or leadership experience as a Lt/Capt with no exceptions, as this critical leadership experience must be closely nested with complementary education and training. Key DP 2 level experience should fall into four broad categories: key unit staff positions, formation HQ staff positions, instructional positions and program management/specialist management positions. All army officers, following completion of AOC should acquire experience in at least one of the categories outlined above. All majors must acquire direct command or leadership experience – in terms of the combat arms this would be sub-unit command. During DP 3, army officers selected to attend CSC should also complete one posting with an allied army while in the rank of major or LCol. Similarly, those CSC graduates identified with tier one potential should all receive three specific billets during DP 3 and DP 4: unit command, a strategic level national posting and an operational level foreign posting with an allied nation. This benchmark level of experience would serve to

Army Training, 24 Jun 2003).

¹⁴³ Colonel S. Beare, "Operational Leadership, Experience in Officer Professional Development: A Pillar in Peril", (Toronto: CFC AMSC 3 Paper, 2000), 34.

complement the aforementioned education and training and effectively round out the OPD system.

CONCLUSION

Military transformations are often discussed in terms of organization or the purchasing and application of new technologies such as equipment or weapons systems. However, the military is by definition a profession, and transformation is lead by people, by the officers in this case, not by inanimate objects or structures. In order to transform the profession, the officers first must transform and then drive the transformation. Logically then, officer professional development

(OPD); that is to say education, training, experience and self-development must be the driving factor behind military transformation. This has been clearly evidenced for the Canadian Army in past transformations, and is even more prevalent today. Accordingly, the key to achieving success in *Army Transformation* is officer professional development.

OPD has been the common thread, or backbone to every major Canadian Army transformation - WW I, WW II, the Cold War, and post - Cold War. During WWI, an ad-hoc experiential-based learning system was developed into an institutionalized professional development system that transformed a minuscule and ill-prepared cadre into a superb professional fighting corps. Twenty years of neglect would take its toll on that once proud army, before the immediacy of war once again initiated transformation. WWII provides a contrast to WWI, whereby it can be seen how a poor OPD system resulted in a protracted and sluggish professional transformation. During the Cold War, it was evident to see that the Canadian Army NATO focus, combined with a superior OPD system enabled the army to achieve its professional apogee in terms of a peacetime army. Conversely, it was clear to see how professionalism can unravel as a result of losing operational focus and dismantling the OPD system. This is obvious when one compares the Canadian Army of the 1950s with that of the 1970s. One thread was clearly evident throughout the three transformations; OPD was a direct enabler of successful professional transformation.

The end of the Cold War, brought with it great change. A new more volatile security environment emerged which necessitated non-traditional military operations. The army found itself on unfamiliar ground. Preparing for defensive operations on the inter-German was replaced by conducting OOTW operations in the asymmetric environment of a failed state. Clearly, the diluted OPD system of 1980's could not prepare army officers for this changed reality. As a result of Somalia, keying on recommendations from three principal reports, the CF completely re-engineered the OPD system. The result of this process transformed an army in disgrace to the highly respected institution that it is today. Once again, OPD was the key to transformation.

Clearly, historical precedence illustrated that OPD was the enabler to professional transformation; furthermore there is nothing to suggest this truism would change in the future. Certainly, the new strategic realities that the future outlooks predict make the case even stronger. In a future battlespace that will be increasingly asymmetric and ambiguous, where warfighting, OOTW and humanitarian operations may all intertwine, it is the leader that must adapt in order to ensure the success of *Army Transformation*. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that leaders will be required to make ethical decisions in the face of extreme ambiguity; consequently, army leaders must conduct themselves in accordance with the military ethos and Canadian values. Officers will also need to be better educated to enable them to come to rapid, well-reasoned conclusions in the face of unpredictable situations. The FSE will demand that officers be well-trained leaders with broad skill sets to operate more intelligently and independently than ever before and that they leverage experience in the face of the unknown. All of this strongly demonstrates that it is the officer-leader who must adapt and overcome; who will lead the way to transformation. The mechanism that develops the requisite knowledge and skills sets in the officer, so that he may adapt, is the officer professional development system – the key to transformation.

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