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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
CSC 30 / CCEM 30

EXERCISE/EXERCICE NEW HORIZONS

**NATIONAL POWER:  
DOES CANADA HAVE ENOUGH  
TO PROJECT ITS VALUES ABROAD?**

By /par Maj John F. Somerville

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## **ABSTRACT**

National Power:

Does Canada Have Enough To Project Its Values Abroad?

By Major John F. Somerville

Canadian values are projected abroad as an objective of foreign policy through national power. To continue, Canada needs more national power. This paper examines the concept of national power in general as its elements, the strength and skill of its instruments, and the international community's response to it.

The paper then looks specifically at Canadian national power. It illustrates its argument with the recent example of Canadian involvement in Afghanistan. It shows that Canada is wealthy in its elements of national power, but that the state of the diplomatic and military instruments of national power used to project its values is badly depleted following long term Government neglect and underfunding. To project Canadian values abroad, the Government should fund its diplomatic and military instruments proportionate to its economic standing in the world. This investment would enable Canada to satisfactorily project its values abroad and positively impact the global community.

# National Power: Does Canada Have Enough To Project Its Values Abroad?

By Major John F. Somerville

According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) policy, *Canada in the World*, “Canada occupies a position of leadership among the open, advanced societies which are becoming increasingly influential as world power is dispersing and becoming more defined in economic terms.”<sup>1</sup> There are many means by which Canada influences the world. When Canadians interact with the world outside, they exert Canadian influence. They could be tourists abroad, entrepreneurs conducting worldwide business, diplomats involved in trade negotiations, aid workers overseas, or soldiers on a United Nations mission. In all cases where Canadians interact with the people of different countries, they exert influence. The influence that the majority of Canadians exert on the world is unmanaged, but the Government of Canada intentionally manages international influence in a form called national power.

Canada uses its national power to pursue foreign policy objectives. Part of the third in the current list of three objectives is the “projection of Canadian values,”<sup>2</sup> itemized as “respect for democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the environment.”<sup>3</sup> The projection of these values involves a concerted effort by the Department of National Defence (DND) and DFAIT through what is promoted as Canada’s 3D Approach to

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada in the World* (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1995), 9.

<sup>2</sup> The three foreign policy objectives are “[t]he promotion of prosperity and employment; [t]he protection of [Canadian] security, within a stable global framework; and [t]he projection of Canadian values and culture.” Ibid, 10.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, 34.

foreign relations: defence, diplomacy and development.<sup>4</sup> The Government is confident that the global adoption of these values will improve the stability and prosperity of both the international community and Canada.<sup>5</sup> The altruism of this objective is noble, but there should be little doubt that the specific national interests of security and prosperity also play a significant role. Nevertheless, the Government does claim that the projection of Canadian values is front and centre to its involvement in peace operations and diplomatic efforts and is well entrenched in the decision mechanisms that shape allocations of development assistance.<sup>6</sup> Still, there is concern regarding Canada's ability to project its values successfully due to a waning influence or a lack of national power.

It is this paper's contention that if the projection of Canadian values abroad is to remain a foreign policy objective, then Canada needs to have more national power. This paper will examine the general concept of national power and its constituent parts. It will examine Canadian national power and its applicability to the projection of Canadian values. It will look specifically at the example of the Government's concentrated efforts in Afghanistan. Finally, the paper will recommend that the Canadian Government reinvest in DFAIT and DND in order to bolster the national power required to project Canadian values abroad.

To project Canadian values abroad, the Canadian Government is prepared to use its "privileged position to influence change."<sup>7</sup> With regards to that privileged position,

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<sup>4</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Building Bridges in Afghanistan." *Canada World View* 20, (Autumn 2003): 4.

<sup>5</sup> DFAIT, *Canada in the World . . .*, 34.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, 34-35, 42.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 9.

Canada is said to have greater political influence than is warranted by its military and economic strength because such attractive causes as foreign aid and peacekeeping are included within its stated national interests.<sup>8</sup> Intended international influence is synonymous with national power,<sup>9</sup> and the Canadian Government has often pursued attractive international causes as a means of increasing its international influence or national power.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, there have been concerns that Canada is not living up to its international obligations,<sup>11</sup> that it is only attempting to conduct “foreign policy on the cheap,”<sup>12</sup> and that Canadian instruments of national power are all “less effective than a generation ago.”<sup>13</sup> Even the Government’s Speech from the Throne of February 2004 reflected the sentiment that Canada’s national power had weakened when it stated that Canadians “want to see Canada’s place of pride and influence in the world restored.”<sup>14</sup>

So, what is national power? According to Joseph Nye, “Power, like love is easier to experience than to define or measure.”<sup>15</sup> According to Frederick Hartmann, national

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<sup>8</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 10.

<sup>9</sup> K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995), 117.

<sup>10</sup> Daryl Copeland, “The Axworthy Years: Canadian Foreign Policy in the Era of Diminished Capacity,” *Canada Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy*, ed. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001): 155-158.

<sup>11</sup> Past Canadian Foreign Minister John Manley was quoted as saying, “You can’t just sit at the G-8 table and then, when the bill comes, go to the washroom.” Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World*, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2003), 1.

<sup>12</sup> Kim Richard Nossal, “Foreign Policy for Wimps,” *The Ottawa Citizen*, (23 April 1998): A.19.

<sup>13</sup> Cohen, *While Canada Slept . . .*, 22-23.

<sup>14</sup> DFAIT, “Building Bridges in Afghanistan.” *Canada World View . . .*, 3-4.

<sup>15</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 25.

power “is the strength or capacity that a sovereign nation-state can use to achieve its national interests.”<sup>16</sup> Nye says that power “is that quality that enables one nation to influence another nation so as to cause the second nation to do something that it might not do otherwise.”<sup>17</sup> John Mearsheimer depicts power as “the currency of great-power politics . . . . What money is to economics, power is to international relations.”<sup>18</sup> Some see power narrowly as the ability “of one state to force another to do something,”<sup>19</sup> while others see national power as a value unto itself.<sup>20</sup> Within this paper, national power will be treated as indistinguishable from intended international influence and its ultimate measure: the empowerment that it gives a country’s politicians or statesmen to fulfil their country’s national interests.<sup>21</sup>

A country’s national power is made up of three components: the resources that contribute to the power; the acts that apply the power; and the response by the target country or countries to those acts.<sup>22</sup> Power is difficult to measure because of the variability of all three. Resources that comprise power differ greatly in scale and distribution; the methods of application vary considerably; and the responses to applied power are unpredictable. Under different circumstances or when dealing with different

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<sup>16</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann, *Relations of Nations*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed., (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1983), 41.

<sup>17</sup> Nye, *The Paradox of American Power* . . . , 4-5.

<sup>18</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 12.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, 57.

<sup>20</sup> Arnold Wolfers, “ ‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (December 1952): 484.

<sup>21</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1985), 117.

<sup>22</sup> Holsti, *International Politics A Framework for Analysis* . . . , 118.

issues, a nation's power is prone to changes in intensity and/or significance.<sup>23</sup> Still, despite the imprecision, there is a correlation between inventories of power resources (or the elements of national power) and the measure of national power.<sup>24</sup>

Different lists of the elements of national power have been developed. Jablonsky lists eight elements of national power under the headings of natural and social determinants.<sup>25</sup> Hartmann advocates seven elements of national power within the categories of raw materials and refined tools,<sup>26</sup> whereas Morgenthau and Thompson describe nine elements of national power characterized as either relatively stable or constantly changing.<sup>27</sup> All of these authors admit that the elements are, in reality, so interrelated that they cannot be isolated. However, their agreed-to elements of national power include geography, natural resources, population, economy, government, and military.<sup>28</sup> Generally, any other elements of national power can be grouped into a subset of one or more of the aforementioned.

The elements of national power alone will not project power in any organized fashion. For that, governments have instruments of national power. These instruments include the economic or trade instrument, the diplomatic or political instrument, and the

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<sup>23</sup> Nye, *Bound to Lead* . . . , 189; and David A. Baldwin, "Power and International Relations," *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Tomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, (Trowbridge: Sage Publications, 2002): 180.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 180.

<sup>25</sup> David Jablonsky, "National Power," *Parameters* 27 no. 1 (Spring 1997): 38-48.

<sup>26</sup> Hartmann, *Relations of Nations* . . . , 44.

<sup>27</sup> Morgenthau and Thompson, *Politics among Nations* . . . , 127-169.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 151-153; David Jablonsky, "National Power," . . . , 38-48; and Hartmann, *Relations of Nations* . . . , 43.



military instrument.<sup>29</sup> The economic instrument is comprised of the international trade and tariff policy, agreements, and regulations. The political instrument is made up of diplomatic and foreign missions including foreign development assistance. The military instrument is made up of the military forces, associated alliances and agreements. These same instruments, it should be noted, are also listed above as elements of national power, but in the former case they are looked at as resources, in the latter they are instruments. As resources they have potential; as instruments, they have an intended use on the international stage. The government, the economy and even the military can all exist in great strength within an isolationist country and yet project little to no power. It is when these resources are placed in support of an outward looking foreign policy that they may become useful instruments capable of projecting or applying national power.<sup>30</sup>

The country's representatives, be they politicians or statesmen, wield their respective nation's power to fulfil their nation's foreign policy objectives and interests by way of acts.<sup>31</sup> Acts can vary fr12 0 0 12 121.92ee9435.7 338.22 Tmdispectisse orn

takes, and how others perceive it.<sup>32</sup> This perception by others forms what is called reputation for power, or prestige.<sup>33</sup> The measure of relative power or comparative strength of nations is the ultimate measure of power.<sup>34</sup> This relative power will normally be revealed through responses, especially if there is any hint of risk to the sovereignty or prestige of any party concerned.<sup>35</sup> Reputation may be used in place of the application of power (such as a direct threat or attack) in the give and take business of international relations. Reputations are built upon the perceptions of others concerning a country's instruments of national power: their strength, condition and how skilfully they are used.<sup>36</sup> Yet reputation does not guarantee predictability or consistency. This is because the power that may be brought to bear is apt to vary greatly between issues, countries and moments in time, or because of other international and domestic influences that ebb and flow throughout the system.<sup>37</sup> Hence, a country must maintain its power resources and keep up the quality of its instruments of power in order to uphold its reputation.<sup>38</sup>

According to Joseph Nye Jr., power “is becoming less fungible, less coercive, . . . less tangible,”<sup>39</sup> and now exists in a continuum that extends from attractive co-optive influence to blatant coercion, or from soft power to hard power respectively.<sup>40</sup> Soft power is defined as the ability to influence through attractiveness or getting others to join

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<sup>32</sup> Holsti, *International Politics A Framework for Analysis* . . . , 118-120.

<sup>33</sup> Morgenthau and Thompson, *Politics among Nations*. . . , 94.

<sup>34</sup> Holsti, *International Politics A Framework for Analysis* . . . , 7, 69.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 121-122.

<sup>36</sup> Morgenthau and Thompson, *Politics among Nations*. . . , 94-96.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 174; and Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” *Handbook*. . . , 180.

<sup>38</sup> Morgenthau and Thompson, *Politics among Nations*. . . , 97-98.

<sup>39</sup> Nye, *Bound to Lead* . . . , 1.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 267.

in using “cultural attraction, ideology, . . . international institutions,”<sup>41</sup> negotiating skills, coalition building, diplomatic initiatives,<sup>42</sup> or agenda setting.<sup>43</sup> Hard power is the combination of “inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks)”<sup>44</sup> used to convince others to alter their stance, policies or alliances.

“Hard and soft power are related and can reinforce each other.”<sup>45</sup> Both serve to enable a country’s representatives to meet their goals by influencing other states such that a country with both wealth and military force will be more attractive and more persuasive than one that has neither.<sup>46</sup> Just as culture and ideology are more attractive if founded on material success and the ability to keep it, soft power is viable only if a state is able to maintain hard power.<sup>47</sup> A country’s financial and military resources contribute to its self-confidence and cultural pride that, in turn, translate into soft power.<sup>48</sup>

Looking now to Canadian national power, one can get a sense of its strength by examining the Canadian elements of national power, the Canadian instruments of national power, and Canada’s reputation in the world community. Canada continues to

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 1.

<sup>42</sup> Lloyd Axworthy, “Why ‘soft power’ is the right policy for Canada,” *The Ottawa Citizen*, 25 April 1998, B.6.

<sup>43</sup> Agenda setting is also called structural power, and is afforded to those nations that have a significant input to multilateral agendas, rules, arbitrators, referees, and standards. The states that shape these systems have considerable power in international relations, and generally exercise more influence than the debated issues. K.J. Holsti, *International Politics A Framework for Analysis* . . . ,128.

<sup>44</sup> Nye, *The Paradox of American Power* . . . , 8.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 9.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 9-10.

<sup>47</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “The Challenge of Soft Power,” *Time Magazine*, 22 February 1999, 30; and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Touchstone, 1997), 109.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, 92.

be blessed with many of the basic essential elements of national power including abundant natural resources and an ideal location next to a most powerful and accommodating neighbour. Although the population of Canada is small for the size of the country, numerous positive aspects offset that shortfall. It has the seventh largest economy in the world, one of the best quality-of-life ratings and a secure place within the advanced societies of the world, with a skilled, well educated, socially adaptable and diverse population.<sup>49</sup> Canada, the /Sprehas tn

Canada is a young country, yet despite a sovereign history of 137 years, and a contemporary Canadian foreign policy of only 60 years,<sup>52</sup> it has had a significant effect on the world and has developed a reputation for having a successful foreign policy. For instance:

Canada's shift towards an outward-looking approach to the world during and after the Second World War led to a role of active participation in the foundation of the UN's economic and political system, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. [Canada's] part in the creation of NATO stands out, as does [its] influence in the launching of peacekeeping, both within and outside the UN. Canadian views on disarmament, the Colombo Plan, [and] the Law of the Sea, were influential and produced lasting results.<sup>53</sup>

To achieve that reputation for success, considerable investment was made in Canada's instruments of national power. For two decades following the Second World War, Canada participated on the world stage as what some would call a "major player"<sup>54</sup> with similarly powerful countries and the newest superpower, the United States. The strength of Canada's military, the skill of its diplomats and the intelligence of its economic experts enabled Canada to lead and participate in the formation of many institutions.<sup>55</sup> Often, Canada achieved recognition for the quality of its statesmen and their many initiatives, including peacekeeping, disarmament, and recently human security. These and other initiatives have been valuable to Canada's influence in the world. They contributed to Canada's reputation and attracted many countries to join in.

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<sup>52</sup> Cohen, *While Canada Slept* . . . , 4.

<sup>53</sup> *Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-2000* . . . , xiii.

<sup>54</sup> Andrew F. Cooper, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions*, (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon Canada, 1997): 9.

<sup>55</sup> Thomas F. Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*. 2d ed. (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002): 42-51.

Without calling it soft power, Canada's foreign policy has long been vociferous regarding the promotion of its attractive and co-optive power. Soft power has been generated through Canadian membership in the exclusive G-8 and almost every other multilateral organization, agency and club, plus a host of institutions and agencies, many of which Canada helped found.<sup>56</sup> Canada also participates in alliances, including those involving the United States, such as NATO, NORAD and NAFTA. Canada is in a unique situation as neighbour and partner with the undisputedly most powerful nation on earth. In keeping with Huntington's sentiment that "[c]ountries with cultural affinities cooperate economically and politically,"<sup>57</sup> the cultural commonality of Canada and the United States contributes to the strength and success of the partnership.<sup>58</sup> Lately, the increasing interdependence and economic integration of the two countries has served to increase Canadian economic power to the extent that Canada is now more economically important to the United States and its prosperity than ever before.<sup>59</sup>

Economically, Canada has become stronger in the last ten years. The Government's commitment to cut public spending resulted in significant reductions to the public debt and considerable confidence gains in the Canadian economy and in Canadian international trade.<sup>60</sup> This strength of the Canadian economy, however, did not translate into the instruments of national power that project Canadian values. Although Canada

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<sup>56</sup> Cohen, *While Canada Slept* . . . , 15.

<sup>57</sup> Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* . . . , 28.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid*, 28.

<sup>59</sup> Christopher Sands, "Fading Power or Rising Power: 11 September and Lessons from the Section 110 Experience," *Canada Among Nations 2002: A Fading Power*, ed. By Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot, (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002): 72.

<sup>60</sup> Cohen, *While Canada Slept* . . . , 109.

used its economic instrument to uphold values in the past, as in the case of its stand against apartheid in South Africa,<sup>61</sup> this type of action is rarely taken. For example, in 1989 and again in 1994, the Canadian Government consciously sidestepped human rights issues in China to pursue an economic partnership to further Canadian jobs and prosperity.<sup>62</sup> Still, Canada's wealth certainly contributes to its attractiveness and, if the Government so wished, that wealth could be converted to alternate forms of national power. The Government could use the economic instrument as a hard power inducement or threat to entice or coerce countries to adopt or better adhere to the Canadian values, but again this is not in keeping with recent Canadian behaviour.<sup>63</sup> Given that the economic instrument has been used mainly to further prosperity both for Canada and its trading partners,<sup>64</sup> and has not been directly applicable to the projection of Canadian values, further examination of the instruments of national power will concentrate mostly on the diplomatic and military.

Economy notwithstanding, Canada's ability to project power has waned. Both DFAIT and DND continue to be engaged in the world, but for the last ten years the stated priority for both departments has been to reduce their budgets. *Canada In the World* claims that Canadians understand that until the Government gets its "own financial house in order, [it] will be seriously limited in [its] ability to act abroad to further Canadian objectives."<sup>65</sup> The *1994 Defence White Paper* states that Canadian prosperity and

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<sup>61</sup> Cranford Pratt, "Ethical values and Canadian foreign policy: two case studies," *International Journal* 56, no.1 (Winter 2000-2001): 43-49.

<sup>62</sup> Cooper, *Canadian Foreign Policy* . . . , 123.

<sup>63</sup> Cohen, *While Canada Slept* . . . , 162.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid*, 122-124.

<sup>65</sup> DFAIT, *Canada in the World* . . . , 8.

quality-of-life “is threatened by the steady growth of public sector debt,”<sup>66</sup> and therefore the defence budget was cut to “less than 60 percent of that assumed in the 1987 Defence White Paper.”<sup>67</sup> So budgets in both departments were substantially reduced.<sup>68</sup> These trends were not just limited to the last ten years. In fact, the instruments of national power have been cut to varying degrees for a number of decades.<sup>69</sup>

A net loss in Canadian national power is evident. Canada is suffering attenuation of its diplomatic and military instruments of national power<sup>70</sup> and with them the ability to utilize its power to project Canadian values. Compared to the past, DFAIT diplomats are underpaid, overworked, and are subject to slower rates of advancement. Consequently, they are collectively of poorer quality than were their predecessors.<sup>71</sup> CIDA development assistance has also declined significantly.<sup>72</sup> Meanwhile, the military is hard pressed to meet operational commitments.<sup>73</sup> According to John Manley, Canada is failing to live up to its obligations and is “still trading on [its] reputation that was built two generations and

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<sup>66</sup> Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1994): 9.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>68</sup> These budgetary cuts were credited, as previously noted, with contributing to significant improvements in the Canadian economy. Cohen, *While Canada Slept . . .*, 109.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 22-33, 109.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 29-31; and Dean Oliver, “Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy,” *Advance or Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21st Century*, ed. David Rudd, Jim Hanson and Jessica Blitt (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000): 9-10.

<sup>71</sup> Cohen, *While Canada Slept . . .*, 30.

<sup>72</sup> Maureen Appel Molot and Norman Hillmer, “The Diplomacy of Decline”: *A Fading Power*, ed. By Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot, (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002): 2-3.

<sup>73</sup> J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Phyllis Bruce Books and HarperFlamingoCanada, 2004), 176.



more ago.”<sup>74</sup> With membership may come power, but as Manley said, “to play a role in the world, even as a small member of the G-8, there’s a cost.”<sup>75</sup>

Canadian policy affirms an intention to influence the world by projecting Canadian values that will be realized when those values are “reflected and advanced internationally,”<sup>76</sup> but the instruments of national power required to meet this objective are neither sufficient nor proportionate to what Canada possesses in the way of other elements of national power.<sup>77</sup> Consequently, Canadian national power has waned to the point where Manley, as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2001, admitted that Canada was not capable of influencing unexpected situations on the world stage.<sup>78</sup>

For over 50 years, Canadian foreign policy and political objectives have shaped Canadian military capabilities, and military resources have been arguably sufficient to meet those objectives.<sup>79</sup> Despite there being “no immediate direct military threat to Canada”<sup>80</sup> since the end of the Cold War, the Canadian Forces have been committed to various missions that reflect Canadian values. This was the case when Canada participated in the air strikes in Kosovo<sup>81</sup> and most recently when they participated with coalitions deployed in Afghanistan and in Haiti. In all of these cases, global security

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<sup>74</sup> Cohen, *While Canada Slept* . . . , 1.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid*, 1.

<sup>76</sup> DFAIT, *Canada in the World* . . . , 8.

<sup>77</sup> Oliver, “Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy,” . . . , 9.

<sup>78</sup> Molot and Hillmer, “The Diplomacy of Decline”: *A Fading Power* . . . , 2.

<sup>79</sup> Douglas Bland, “A sow’s ear from a silk purse: Abandoning Canada’s Military capabilities,” *International Journal* 54, no. 1 (Winter 1998/1999): 148-149.

<sup>80</sup> DND, *1994 Defence White Paper* . . . , 12.

<sup>81</sup> Steven Handelman, “Bombed in the Balkans,” *Time Magazine*, April 19, 1999: 33.

interests were at stake, as were Canadian values. Defence policy recognizes that by participating in multilateral operations abroad, Canada promotes Canadian values, and “improve[s] the lot of all manner of peoples.”<sup>82</sup>

The *1994 Defence White Paper* holds that the Canadian Forces have “the means to apply military force when Canadians consider it necessary to uphold essential Canadian values and vital security interests at home and abroad.”<sup>83</sup> But, what is enough? According to that same document, it is what Canadians consider necessary and affordable.<sup>84</sup> Yet, Canada has the seventh largest economy and “the 34<sup>th</sup> largest population in the world, but its regular armed forces are the 56<sup>th</sup> largest and it has the 77<sup>th</sup> largest reserve.”<sup>85</sup> Despite the need to maintain “a military capability appropriate to this still uncertain and evolving international environment,”<sup>86</sup> the Canadian “armed forces cannot honour commitments in war or peace.”<sup>87</sup>

Today, compared to its peers, Canada’s military forces are weak. In fact, they are the weakest they have been since the beginning of the Cold War.<sup>88</sup> Canada’s military are, by most industrialized nation’s standards, short-staffed, under-financed, overstretched, and poorly equipped.<sup>89</sup> Many have warned of an upcoming collapse of the military, such as the senate committee that in 2002 urged “the Government to cancel Canada’s

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<sup>82</sup> DND, *1994 Defence White Paper* . . . , 27.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid*, 8.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid*, 8.

<sup>85</sup> Cohen, *While Canada Slept* . . . , 27.

<sup>86</sup> DFAIT, *Canada in the World* . . . , 24.

<sup>87</sup> Cohen, *While Canada Slept* . . . , 197.

<sup>88</sup> Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* . . . , 242-243.

<sup>89</sup> Cohen, *While Canada Slept* . . . , 27.

international military commitments and bring its troops home.”<sup>90</sup> Indeed, both the political and military instruments have suffered significant cutbacks and governmental neglect for decades, most notably over the last ten years, so that their respective capabilities have waned.<sup>91</sup>

The current Afghanistan situation is an excellent example of how Canada should have been able to employ its instruments of national power to promote and project Canadian values abroad. Canada joined the coalition that went into Afghanistan following the terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2001. It went to pursue the objectives of security and reconstruction of the war torn country in order to prevent Afghanistan from remaining a haven for terrorism.<sup>92</sup> The interim administration of Afghanistan that was recognized within the Bonn Agreement of 2001 was committed to peace, reconstruction and free elections, in line with Canadian values, so Canada re-established diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in January 2002.<sup>93</sup> Soon after, 850 Canadian soldiers were dispatched to assist the United States forces to remove the remaining elements of the Taliban regime. Canada also sent naval and air forces for a full commitment of some 1,900 personnel, plus it pledged monetary development support through various organizations to help with the provision of humanitarian assistance and internal stability initiatives.<sup>94</sup> Canada was implementing its 3D Approach of defence, diplomacy and development, as DFAIT and DND worked closely to promote security,

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid, 27.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid, 22-27.

<sup>92</sup> DFAIT, “Building Bridges in Afghanistan,” *Canada World View* . . . , 3.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid, 4.

provide shelter, water and power, rebuild schools and hospitals, and promote closer ties between Afghanistan and Canada.<sup>95</sup> In August 2002, Canada opened an embassy in Kabul, and installed a new Ambassador. In all, Canada had, by way of its 3D Approach, committed over one billion dollars in support of Afghanistan.<sup>96</sup>

Canada successfully employed its instruments of national power to project and protect its values in Afghanistan. It did this within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and through its Canadian 3D Approach.<sup>97</sup> Unfortunately, the Canadian military contribution was not capable of continuing for the entire mission,<sup>98</sup> because the Canadian Forces was reportedly out of steam. The job was not complete, but the Canadian military made no secret that it did not have the personnel, funding or materiel to maintain a suitable presence on the ground.<sup>99</sup> In July 2002, the Canadian Forces could not afford to stay and so pulled out of the mission.<sup>100</sup> In the summer of 2003, the Canadian Forces returned to Afghanistan as part of ISAF, but again, due to resource constraints, it was only to be there until the summer of 2004, after which the “army would need eighteen months without significant overseas deployment for recuperation.”<sup>101</sup> Prior to 14 April 2004, Canada was prepared to withdraw its military personnel from Afghanistan, aside from a small contingent, and leave follow-on military support primarily in the hands of its ISAF partners.

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid, 4.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid, 4-5.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, 3-5.

<sup>98</sup> Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* . . . , 175-176.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid, 175-176.

<sup>100</sup> Cohen, *While Canada Slept* . . . , 28.

<sup>101</sup> Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* . . . , 176.

The message that Canada has been sending is neither consistent nor indicative of the values it claims to promote. Despite being able to sit at the G-8 table, Canada has shown that it is unable to afford to have the instruments of national power necessary to project its own values. It therefore appears that Canada is not willing to pull its weight.

On 14 April 2004, Prime Minister Martin announced that the Canadian military commitment to Afghanistan was being extended with a further deployment of 800 soldiers for a year from August 2004. The Prime Minister's announcement included recognition that Canadians "must do more than stand for [their] ideals. [They] must back them up with action."<sup>102</sup> The Prime Minister acknowledged that the Canadian Forces need more equipment and need to continue to commit military forces to shoulder Canadian responsibilities on the world stage.<sup>103</sup> However, in response to the Prime Minister's announcement, Douglas Bland, the chairman of the defence-management studies program at Queen's University, said that the country would take eight to ten years just to secure the contracts necessary to reequip the Canadian Forces.<sup>104</sup> Current Canadian national power is reflected in the dubious status of the Canadian Forces' immediate future. Despite the Prime Minister's expressed commitment to the Afghanistan mission and Canadian values, he did not explain how the military would overcome the immediate equipment and staffing shortfalls resulting from long-term

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<sup>102</sup> Prime Minister Paul Martin quoted in article by Kevin Cox, "Martin boosts defence spending," *Globe and Mail*, 15 April 2004, A4.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid*, A4.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid*, A4.

government neglect and downsizing.<sup>105</sup> This shortfall, if as dramatic as the pundits were saying, could jeopardize Canada's efforts in Afghanistan.

To demonstrate continued commitment, the Canadian Government must take an active role in promoting respect for democracy, rule of law, human rights and the environment. Given the continuing state of the world, this commitment will demand hard military power.<sup>106</sup> To promote Canadian values abroad, Canada must be prepared to deploy a direct and rapid military response,<sup>107</sup> even when there is a risk that such military operations could become both complex and prolonged. Unfortunately, the Canadian Forces do not have sufficient resources to handle protracted operations.<sup>108</sup> For the moment, Canadian "foreign policy expectations are running well ahead of [the] military means to support them"<sup>109</sup> to the extent that by "the end of 2003 the Canadian Forces' personnel were exhausted, their equipment rusted out, their coffers all but empty."<sup>110</sup> With Prime Minister Martin's announcement of the extended mission in Afghanistan<sup>111</sup> in the face of military experts' warnings of overextension and the need for recuperation,<sup>112</sup> the immediate future of the Canadian Forces is in even more peril.

Although Canada has the majority of the elements of national power in abundance, it does not currently have sufficient national power to project its values

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<sup>105</sup> Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?*. . . , 163-198.

<sup>106</sup> Nye, "The Challenge of Soft Power," . . . , 30.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, 30.

<sup>108</sup> Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?*. . . , 175-176.

<sup>109</sup> Oliver, "Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy," . . . , 9.

<sup>110</sup> Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?*. . . , 198.

<sup>111</sup> Cox, "Martin boosts defence spending," . . . , A4.

<sup>112</sup> Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?*. . . , 176.

abroad. It is wealthy, culturally diverse and well situated geopolitically. Nevertheless, the diminished calibre of its diplomatic and military instruments is indicative of Canada's waning national power. When it comes to the foreign policy objective of projecting Canadian values abroad, Canada does not have enough power to comprehensively adhere to its own 3D Approach. If the Government were to reinvest in DFAIT and DND over the long term, with specific attention to correct current shortfalls in the states of the respective staffs and equipment, Canadian power would be increased considerably. If the investment would be proportionate to the economic placement that Canada has in the world, then it should be able to project its values confidently, if not successfully.

This paper looked at Canadian values and the foreign policy objective of projecting those values abroad. It examined the concept of national power and its constituent elements. It looked at Canadian national power to determine if it is adequate for the task. It showed that the willingness of the Government to commit military forces for peace operations is in keeping with Canadian values, yet recently there have been signs of weakness due to a lack of resources. The Afghanistan example was used to show how the Government is pursuing the 3D Approach to promote Canadian values, but this example also exposed the military resource shortfalls that are jeopardizing this foreign policy objective. The paper concluded that due only to the weakened state of its instruments of national power, Canada does not have the power to adequately project Canadian values abroad. Consequently, if the Canadian Government intends to retain that foreign policy objective, it needs to reinvest in its instruments of national power, namely: DFAIT and DND. Perhaps if those Canadian diplomatic and military instruments of national power were of a size and competence proportionate to Canada's

economic position in the world, Canada might muster the soft and hard power to satisfactorily project its values abroad. For the time being, the vision of Canada secure in a world community that is willing to reflect and advance respect for democracy, rule of law, human rights and the environment is certainly worth a significant investment.



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