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Change is the Mother of Invention:
Changes in Canadian Forces Leadership Doctrine Will Facilitate Leadership in Mixed Civilian/Military Settings

By / par LCol S.J. Gregory

Abstract

The leadership doctrine of the Canadian Forces must change. Societal changes, the impact of evolving technologies and the nature of the headquarters all point to a need for this change. New doctrine must allow the Canadian Forces member, leader and commander to effectively operate in mixed military/civilian settings in garrison and deployed on operations. Three drivers for this change are examined: the military member, the operating environment and the setting within which the member must operate. The Canadian Forces leadership environment is analysed by looking at the past, the present and the future. The essay concludes that more effective military leadership within mixed civilian/military settings is possible by adopting contemporary leadership doctrine.

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The leadership doctrine of the Canadian Forces (CF) must change. Societal changes, the impact of evolving technologies on the operating environment and the nature of the headquarters within the CF all point to a need for this change. This new doctrine must allow the CF member, leader and commander to effectively operate in mixed military/civilian settings both in garrison and deployed on operations. There are three drivers for this change of leadership doctrine: the military member, the operating environment and the setting within which the member must operate.

The first driver for a revision of leadership doctrine is the nature of the military member joining today as compared to those who joined in 1973 when the CF last published leadership doctrine. In general, members joining in 1973 willingly adopted the military culture and accepted the discipline. Identities and unit cohesion could be inculcated without conflicts of individualism. This is no longer the case. Recruits today are generally better educated and more individualistic. This presents some indoctrination and team building challenges as well as potentially conflicting with the ideals of a traditional military ethos.

The operating environment is the second driver for the revision of leadership doctrine. Evolving technologies require the military commander to understand the impact of actions within a military, political, cultural and economic context. This will demand a heretofore unprecedented level of multi-agency analysis and cooperation. Recent experience in Afghanistan has shown that there is a growing need to conduct more comprehensive inter-agency analysis during strategic option development and while conducting operations. This second driver refers to the need of the military member to cooperate effectively in teams

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involving other government departments (OGDs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector conducting integrated analysis of asymmetric threats or second, third or fourth order effects of potential actions. Leaders (military or civilian) must be able to guide these teams and exploit their products.

The last driver pointing to a needed revision of leadership doctrine is the CF's requirement to operate more effectively with the civilian members of the defence team. National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), other levels of static headquarters, both national and supranational, and deployed headquarters both on domestic and international operations all have a growing civilian component. These civilians may be integral to the staff, as in the case with NDHQ, contractors providing support on international deployments, members of OGDs or members of NGOs. This integrated nature of headquarters is both a practical and statutory reality, most prevalent but not limited to NDHQ, which must be embraced. This essay will conclude that adjustments to CF leadership doctrine are necessary today at every level to allow CF leaders to function more effectively in mixed military/civilian settings.

The CF leadership environment will be analysed by looking at the past, the present and the future. A brief analysis of CF leadership doctrine of the past, the nature of the military member to which it applied and the lessons learnt since its introduction will be conducted. This will be followed by an examination of how the CF is dealing with the current CF leadership climate. The paper will examine the pressures and complexities of operations and garrison work today, and the culture of newer military members as a product of Canadian society. Finally, this essay will demonstrate how adopting contemporary leadership doctrine will satisfy this complex environment and provide for more effective military leadership within a mixed civilian/military setting.

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A brief analysis of the recent history of military leadership doctrine development within Canada is appropriate. Leadership is a highly documented subject, yet the CF has not revised its leadership doctrine manual since 1973. This is not to say nothing has been done. Numerous studies, reports and commissions related to military leadership have presented findings and many of their recommendations have been implemented.[1] Unfortunately, most of this work has been reactionary in nature responding to failures in leadership.[2] The contents of the last leadership manual are nonetheless important as an indicator of the need for change.

At the time of its publication, the CF leadership manual described two philosophies underlying leadership doctrine: a philosophy espoused by John Locke (1632-1704) and that espoused by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).[3] Three approaches to leadership were described: authoritative, participative and free-rein.[4] Despite what might be considered obvious shortcomings today, this doctrine was highly appropriate, perhaps even 'avant-garde,' for the CF member and Canadian society that existed at that time. Some of the ideas presented, like the principles of leadership, are perennial.[5] The doctrine was workable in its day because members were willing to conform and be indoctrinated. They were less individualistic and

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[1] A vast library of studies can be found at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute at http://WWW.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca/cfli/engraph/home_e.asp. The reports referred to include the *MND Report to the Prime Minister on Leadership and Management in the CF (1997)* and the *Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry (1997)*, amongst others.

[2] The Somalia Inquiry and its recommendations, that followed the beating death of a Somali detainee at the hands of CF members, is a good example of the type situation described. See Karol W.J. Wenek. *Looking Back: Canadian Forces Leadership Problems and Challenges Identified in Recent Reports and Studies.* Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2002 for other examples.

[3] Department of National Defence. *A-PD 131-002/PT-001, Leadership, Volume 2, The Professional Officer.* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1973), 2-1 to 2-13.

[4] *Ibid,* 3-1 to 3-13.

[5] *Ibid,* 2-11.

less rights conscious. Generally speaking, members originated from rural areas, were relatively less well educated than members joining today and generally originated from one or the other of the two founding ethnic groups. There was very little perceived requirement for military/civilian interaction since the military culture was essentially a closed one.

In looking back at the period of time since the last leadership doctrine was published by the CF, three broad areas of lessons learnt can be assessed that impact on the current leadership situation with each being examined briefly: values, ethics and leadership approaches. With respect to values it has been said that, ". . . [before] anything else we must recognize that a functioning military requires bonds of trust, sacrifice, and respect within its ranks, and similar bonds of support and respect between an army and the nation it represents."[6] Some notable and public failures in this regard have been the impetus for seeking to improve the CF in this area.[7] There has also been a significant body of material published condemning the shortcomings of the military education system, in particular of officer professional development, and of the military institution as being incapable of learning.[8] On an individual basis, the criticism focused on the lack of well-rounded liberal arts education. "Value on technical and scientific education has placed the goal of developing well-rounded individuals possessing fundamental training-including ethical

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[6] Lieutenant-Colonel C.A. Cotton, "A Canadian Military Ethos." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* Vol 12, no. 3 (Winter 1982–83): 11.

[7] Examples include over-drinking and other inappropriate conduct while on operations, inappropriate use of publicly furnished housing, the use of CF helicopters for out-of-season hunting, and the use of public funds to maintain and operate fishing camps amongst others.

[8] See Captain Eric T. Reynolds, "Ethical Competence and the Profession of Arms: A Contemporary Challenge to Military Institutions." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* Vol 23, no. 2 (December 1993), 32, General G.C.E. Thériault, and Dr. W.A.B. Douglas. "Arms and the Canadian: The Future of the Military Profession." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* Vol 26, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 7, or David L. King. "We need a Romanow Commission for defence and foreign policy." *Policy Options* (April 2002): 7–14.

competence-on the back burner."[9] At the institutional level there have been two criticisms related to learning. The first criticism was the failure of the institution to be adaptive to the needs of society: "Characterized by their own internal norms of stability, conceived by a specific type of society and unable to adapt quickly, military institutions may either become dysfunctional or anachronistic in a pluralistic society."[10] The second criticism in regards to learning related to the closure of National Defence College. It is a widely held belief that the elimination of this senior leadership institution, where General and Flag officers and their counterparts from industry and government trained together, was a strategically significant loss.[11]

The second area of lessons learnt is that of ethical shortcomings. The need for ethical leadership in the military has been clearly understood for millennia; however, the period since the last leadership doctrine was published appears to have been a particularly bad period for highly publicized failures within the CF. Some have said that these failures are linked to the quality of recruits, a lack of ethics-based education within the military, poor examples being set by senior officers, or a promotion system that rewards careerism.[12] Regardless of the source of the ethical shortcomings, it must be admitted that there have been some spectacular ethical failures made worse by attempted cover-ups. Thoughts regarding the current situation and the relationship of ethics to the future leadership environment will be offered in the following sections.

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[9] Captain Eric T. Reynolds, "Ethical Competence . . . , 32.

[10] *Ibid*, 32.

[11] General G.C.E. Thériault, and Dr. W.A.B. Douglas. "Arms and the Canadian: The Future of the Military Profession." . . . ,7 or David L. King. "We need a Romanow Commission . . . , 7–14.

[12] Major C. R. Shelley, "A Crisis of Character? Ethical Development in the Canadian Officer Corps." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* Vol 25, no. 4 (June 1996), 23.

The final broad area of lessons learnt relates to leadership trends that have developed. While there is certainly a good deal of generalization in the comments, transactional leadership became the basic form of military leadership since 1973. Criticism of this leadership method is extensive: "The transactional leader is less likely to accept responsibility when his mission fails; in those cases he can easily place the blame on subordinates who did not 'fulfill their contract.'"[13] When the transactional leadership approach is combined with ethical failures an ambitious careerist advances at the expense of those with whom he or she works:

> In the many criticisms of military leadership which have been published in recent years, much attention has been given to the image of a ruthless, ambitious careerist, intent upon furthering his own interests in his climb up the hierarchical ladder in spite of or even because of the high personal cost he has extracted from contemporaries, subordinates, or the actual military mission itself.[14]

Considerable research has been conducted in each of these three areas of lessons learnt: values, ethics and leadership approaches. Elaborate plans and programs have been developed and implemented, and the CF and each environment have published extensively on the subjects. This establishes the recent historical context of CF leadership doctrine, the nature of the individual to whom the doctrine was applied, and the broad areas of lessons learnt since the last leadership doctrine was published. On this foundation, an analysis of the current leadership environment can be performed. The analysis will include CF members' leadership shortcomings in today's environment, the integrated nature of HQs, and the accountability and responsibility framework at NDHQ and its applicability to both military and civilian members. The military member of today will be examined in the areas of values,

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[13] Colonel Malham M. Wakin, "Ethics of Leadership," in *Military Leadership*, ed. James H. Buck and Lawrence J. Korb (Beverly Hills:Sage Publications, Inc., 1981), 103.

cultural integration, competency profiles, motivation and ethics and compared to civilian members of the defence team.

In examining the current CF leadership environment – the reality of the cultural separation between military and civilian staff members of the defence team, despite the obvious benefits of collaborative working relationships and the reality of an integrated NDHQ, will be highlighted. While this paper cannot afford the space for a detailed analysis of the workings of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the CF, sufficient space will be devoted to demonstrate the importance of the military/civilian relationship in this and all HQs. A brief analysis of civilian and military members of the team will also be undertaken.

It is clear that the integrated nature of HQs is a growing phenomenon. The fact that NDHQ is an integrated HQ is a reality that for all appearances will exist for the foreseeable future, being heralded as the best structure to 'manage' (a word that will be revisited later) the complex business of defence.[15] When one understands the accountability framework of the Department and the CF it is really quite easy to imagine the leadership revision that will complement this setting. The defence framework within which NDHQ operates is one of civilian over-watch, Parliamentary accountability and legislated authority and responsibility. The Minister, through legislation and Parliamentary accountability, is responsible for all aspects of DND and for the management and direction of the CF.[16] The Deputy Minister

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[14] *Ibid*, 96.

[15] Department of National Defence. Chapter 16 - "Integrated National Defence Headquarters" in *Chief of the Defence Staff Guidance to Commanding Officers*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2000), paragraph 1609.6.

[16] This is very much a simplification of the workings of NDHQ at the senior level. A more comprehensive discussion can be found in Department of National Defence. Chapter 16 . . . or Douglas L.

(DM) is responsible for the provision of policy advice, internal departmental management and interdepartmental coordination while the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) is charged with the command, control and administration of the CF.[17] It is also important to note that the CDS and other senior members of the CF provide constant military advice to ". . . civil authorities to help shape Canada's security policy."[18]

For the purpose of this discussion of leadership, there are two key consequences of this structure that contribute to the drive towards leadership revision: the Department's accountability framework[19] and the Department's senior committee processes. The first consequence is the fact that the military chain of command extends from the CDS to all military members, while the line of Departmental authority and accountability extends from the people of Canada through their government to every member of the Department and CF. This means that military members are accountable to the CDS for matters related to military strategy, planning and command, control and administration of the CF while all members of the Department and CF are accountable to the Minister for the appropriate application of delegated legal, policy and administrative authorities.[20] The second consequence is the fact that there exists a committee system that allows the CDS and DM to consult with senior managers (military and civilian) and obtain their advice.   Together these consequences mean

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Bland, "Military Command in Canada," in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Leadership*, ed. Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, 121-136. St Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001.

[17] Department of National Defence. Chapter 16 . . . , paragraphs 1606.3 to 1606.7.

[18] Department of National Defence. *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2003), 41.

[19] See Department of National Defence. Chapter 5 - "Accountability and Organization" in *Chief of the Defence Staff Guidance to Commanding Officers*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1 January 2003) for a more detailed discussion of the department's accountability framework.

[20] Department of National Defence. Chapter 5 . . . , paragraphs 508.4 to 508.5.

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that military and civilian staff, regardless of who they report to, are accountable for the actions taken within their authority, have a duty to work collaboratively within the team context driven by the committee system and often have very similar competencies appropriate to their positions. The only exception to this similarity relates to military duty and this will be discussed in greater detail later in this section.

In looking at the current situation with regards to the military member of the defence team in today's leadership environment and how it drives the requirement for leadership change, some of the values, culture, competencies and ethics issues require examination. These criteria are chosen because they are often sited as those things that distinguish military members from their civilian counterparts.

In looking first at values, ". . . the legitimacy of the profession of arms requires that it embodies the same values and beliefs as the society it defends, . . ."[21] A satisfactory list of appropriate military values would include, ". . . subordination of the good of the self to the good of the nation and military unit, courage, obedience, loyalty, [and] integrity."[22] There are numerous possible sources for a list of values however this is as good a listing as any.[23] Why is it then that, ". . . [today] it seems that the first question someone asks when something goes wrong is 'Who can I blame?' or, 'Who has the deepest pockets from which I can collect?'"[24] The answer is that the notion of looking for blame is a residual consequence

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[21] Department of National Defence. *Duty with Honour: . . . ,* 29.

[22] Colonel Malham M. Wakin, "Ethics of Leadership," . . . , 102.

[23] Department of National Defence. *Duty with Honour: . . . ,* 20-31, lists duty, loyalty, integrity and courage.

[24] Arthur E. Gans, "Vocation or Job: A Warrior's Place in a Rights-Driven Society." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* Vol 24, no. 2 (December 1994), 12.

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of the transactional leadership approach utilized for so long within the CF. There is also a

cultural and ethical component to this breakdown in core values as will be seen.

The repatriation of the Canadian Constitution, and with it the Charter of Rights and

Freedoms (1982), has had a significant impact on Canadian society in general and the

military in particular. Generally speaking Canadians today are far more rights conscious than

duty conscious than they were in the past. Some would argue that rights have completely

supplanted duties or responsibilities.[25] While in Canada this situation is often attributed to

the repatriation of the Constitution, it is not a phenomenon limited to Canada and:

> . . . much of the transformation that has affected western liberal democracies
> has complicated if not undermined the foundations of a sound military culture.
> It is a transformation that has brought individual human rights and
> individualism to the fore, within a context of growing materialism spawned by
> rising affluence.[26]

Cultural impacts are also seen in the general population. It has been said that, ". . . living in a

pluralistic society poses challenges in terms of choices, values, attitudes and behaviour."[27]

These challenges have typically been assessed as related to integrating new military

members. Further:

> Generally speaking, our military personnel must now learn to build their
> identities in more precarious and less durable relationships. In addition, the
> sense of belonging to a group (unit cohesion?) is more fragile, individualism
> has increased, and detachment with regard to structured institutions has been
> more accentuated.[28]

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[25] *Ibid*, 11.

[26] General G.C.E. Thériault, and Dr. W.A.B. Douglas. "Arms and the Canadian: The Future of the Military Profession." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* Vol 26, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 7.

[27] Captain Eric T. Reynolds, "Ethical Competence . . . , 32.

[28] *Ibid*, 32.

The population of the CF is slowly becoming more culturally diverse and is gradually embracing minority attitudes and lifestyles. Members joining today typically have high school degrees or more. They are better informed and are more socially and politically aware of domestic and international events than their predecessors. They are also more conscious of their rights. This has placed a demand for change on the stereotypical view of the inculcation of recruits.

There are more dimensions to these challenges to consider. Nowadays, military members must also interact with the general population socially and professionally. Socially, uniformed members of the defence team are no longer garrisoned in remote locations isolated from the people of Canada. Mess life is not the centre of the member's social life and his or her children are no longer educated at DND schools. Professionally, CF members have a requirement to interact with civilian members of the defence team, private contractors, OGDs, and NGOs both in garrison and deployed on operations. This issue will be examined in relation to future leadership methods in the section following an analysis of the competency and ethical issues related to cultural integration.

The idea of using competency as a way of describing leadership attributes is gaining in popularity. Core competencies characterizing leadership attributes for positions in the public service and those of military members are very similar. In examining the Public Service's Career Assignment Program, 14 leadership competencies have been defined for senior executives.[29] This methodology bears striking resemblance to the work done by Doctor Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann concerning competency, authority and

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[29] Public Service Commission: Career Assignment Program; available from http://www.psc-cfp.gc.ca/cap/03/03a04b_e.htm; Internet; accessed 2 September 2003.

responsibility,[30] and earlier work on competencies for executive leadership.[31] This is

important for two reasons: firstly there is a developing consensus in the methodology of

describing effective leadership within the military and the public service based on

competencies; and secondly there is growing agreement in describing the core competencies

for military and civilian members.

The last area of today's leadership environment to explore is ethics. DND's Defence

Ethics Program is applicable to both military members and civilian staff of the department.[32]

An Ethical Relationship[33] describes Departmental policy on the nature of the defence team's

relationship with the private sector. There is no distinction made between military and

civilian members of the team in either of these policies. And while much is made of ethical

failings of military members when they occur, a recent National Post article illustrates that

civilian bureaucrats are not immune to these problems.[34] But military ethics go beyond the

business ethics described within either the DND Ethics Program or *An Ethical Relationship*.

One must remember that a military organization has an ultimate utility – to fight. What

makes the military profession different in this regard is that its ethical standards are more

stringent than those of the civilian member of the defence team. This stems from the

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[30] Dr. Ross Pigeau and Carole McCann, "What is a Commander?" in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral,* ed Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris (St Catharines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 79-120.

[31] Henry S. Miller, *The Executive Leader: Is He The Same In Wartime?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1988), II-18 to II-23.

[32] Department of National Defence. "Defence Ethics Program," DAOD 7023-1 (2003-09-01); available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/admfincs/subjects/daod/7023/1_e.asp; Internet; accessed 6 April 2004.

[33] Department of National Defence. *An Ethical Relationship: The Department of National Defence, the Canadian Forces and the Private Sector* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1999).

[34] Andrew McIntosh, "Public Works to Fortify Ethics," *National Post*, 15 September 2003, 1; or more recently, "AG Calls for Greater Ethical Reform in Government," *National Post*, 11 February 2004; available from http://www.canada.com/national/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=d9a6f839-2da8-46a5-9898-b41f85b8641e; Internet; accessed 11 February 2004.

military's client base being society itself, from the level of moral responsibility of sending others to their deaths and from the potential personal liability of taking lives or losing your own life in battle. In linking the discussion of the current situation regarding ethics back to the questions of the quality of recruits, the lack of ethics-based education, poor examples from senior leadership and a flawed promotion system, the following points should be noted. Armed forces have historically recruited from society's outcasts; the argument that the quality of individuals joining the CF is a factor for the ethical climate is not accepted.[35] Training and education are far more important in setting and maintaining a high ethical standard, and to this end ethical training and education have been made integral to every member's initial and developmental training and professional education. The issue of setting a good example by senior officers has improved in the current leadership climate, but the momentum of this improvement must be maintained. Finally, the performance appraisal and promotion system is again showing signs of needing correction from score inflation as a result of a side effect of transactional leadership. Relating this ethical climate back to the leadership question:

> Ethical competence for today presupposes that the institution and the individual will question choices which have been taken for granted, probe basics, accept doubt, live with precarious solutions, as well as admit that current situations may not necessarily be resolved by simply parroting the models of the past.[36]

A transformational leadership style is appropriate to deal with these situations, situations that in the past would have been perceived as challenges to authority, situations that demand an adaptive learning environment. This discussion of ethics does not imply that

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[35] Major C. R. Shelley, "A Crisis of Character? . . . , 23.

[36] Captain Eric T. Reynolds, "Ethical Competence . . . , 33.

the Departmental perspective of ethical commonality of CF members and civilian coworkers is not supportable in a new CF leadership environment. It means an additional ethical component for the military member. This will be discussed in terms of future leadership consequences and a learning environment in the following section, but before moving there it is necessary to highlight a couple of qualifiers to the foregoing.

There is no intention in this argument to say that military members and civilian coworkers share the same values, culture, competencies and ethics or even that they share the same lines of accountability. Military members still have to be prepared to conceivably give their life in the service of Canada. "What may be needed today to produce an individual able to stand in the 'crucible of combat' when most of his formative years have been spent in a society that emphasizes rights over duty and responsibility."[37]   The additional ethical dimension of this has just been demonstrated. In terms of values it is still the case that ". . . self-sacrifice rather than self-interest is an essential ingredient both of military leadership and of military service in general."[38]

development of CF leadership doctrine demonstrated how during the period since the last leadership doctrine was published three important areas of lessons have been identified: values, ethics and leadership approaches. In looking at the drivers for leadership change through the lens of lessons learnt since 1973, the current leadership environment was examined. Some harsh criticisms were levelled at CF members' leadership shortcomings in today's environment: in areas of values, cultural integration, motivation and ethics.

It has been suggested that transformational leadership is appropriate for the military and civilian setting in which a military member finds him or her self.

> The transformational leader sets the moral tone for his subordinates by the example of integrity he provides in both his official duties and in his private life. Honesty cannot be instilled by contract – but it may be enhanced by education about its importance to mission accomplishment and by example. Courage cannot be instilled by contractual arrangement, nor should it be expected if the basic mission orientation is merely contractual. It seems clear that selflessness is more generated than sublimated by any contractual/ transactional grounding of the military ethic.[39]

The following section will look at transformational leadership, encompassing concepts like competencies within the departmental accountability framework, in the future CF leadership environment as a means to accommodate the values, ethics and cultural issues associated with mixed military/civilian HQs.

In looking at the leadership doctrine revision necessary for CF members to operate effectively in the future, it is necessary to project the drivers of CF leadership doctrine revision, the military member, the operating environment and the setting within which the member must operate, into the future. In considering the broad area of the military member, it has already been mentioned that individuals joining the CF today are better educated, more

culturally diverse and more rights conscious than those joining in the past. Research about

CF leadership indicates that the trend towards generally higher education standards amongst

recruits and their less respectful attitude towards authority, as compared to earlier

generations, are driving a need to move away from the transactional method or position

authority method of leadership.[40] Leaders will have to be prepared to accept challenges and

questions from subordinates who are more rights conscious. This suggests that

transformational leadership techniques may be more appropriate.[41]

The ethical element of the future leadership environment will be increasingly

important. The " . . . leaders who exhibit consistent, fair and clear ethical standards set the

tenor for morale and professional success at their commands."[42] In foreshadowing this

importance, a recent DND document concerning organization and accountability stated:

> In general, individuals are being given greater latitude to do their jobs, and in
> so doing they gain more personal and professional satisfaction. In turn, they
> are expected to exercise a greater measure of self-discipline and exemplify
> flawless ethical behaviour in the performance of their duties and in the use of
> resources. The idea is to deal with mistakes openly and to use them as
> opportunities to improve individual and organizational performance.[43]

The importance of this is that military and civilian members of the defence team will

continue to share a requirement for ethical conduct. It is also apparent that military and

civilian leaders will have to take responsibility for their (and their subordinates') actions and

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[39] Colonel Malham M. Wakin, "Ethics of Leadership," . . . , 105.

[40] Karol W.J. Wenek, *Looking Back: Canadian Forces Leadership Problems and Challenges Identified in Recent Reports and Studies.* Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2002, 26-28.

[41] See Peter G. Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice.* London: Sage Publications, Inc., 2001, pages 131-159 for a detailed description of transformational leadership.

[42] Captain Robert R.J. Phillips, "A Principle Within: Ethical Military Leadership." An address to the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics XVIII, January 25–26, 1996, 13.

be seen to be taking this responsibility as well as being held accountable to their superiors for what they have or have not done.[44]

For the military member, ". . . integrity, obedience, loyalty – these qualities take on even more significance in the modern military as it becomes more difficult for military leaders to inculcate them in their people."[45] What this means is that the importance of integrated ethics training and professional development education at all periods of a member's career cannot be overstated. Combining this training and education process, and possibly score controls or other revision to the CF Personal Appraisal System, will also partially address careerism. Finally, there is a benefit of ethics training related to the relationship between the member and society since **" . . .** the military leader who views his oath of office as merely a contractual arrangement with his government sets the stage for a style of leadership critically different from the leader who views that oath as his pledge to contribute to the common good of society."[46]

Clearly, while there is a requirement to extend ethics training and ongoing professional development education to both military and civilian members of the defence team, this will not be enough. To achieve a transformational approach to leadership within the CF a component of training for the civilian members of the team must highlight the uniqueness of military service.

> 'But no one is asked to die for General Motors.' That, bluntly, is the essential
> difference between a civilian job and the service of a member of the military

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[43] Department of National Defence. *Organization and Accountability, Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of DND*, 2nd ed. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, September, 1999), 1.

[44] *Ibid*, 1-3.

[45] Colonel Malham M. Wakin, "Ethics of Leadership," . . . , 109.

[46] Colonel Malham M. Wakin, "Ethics of Leadership," . . . , 100.

forces . . . . That is the unlimited liability contract. It is my contention that to fulfill that contract requires something more than a 'job mentality.'[47]

Leadership competencies have been previously discussed. The following highlights their relationship to culture:

> Recent social, political, economic, and demographic changes have forced the CF to modify its mission, values, culture, and philosophy regarding its role in an increasingly global environment. To adapt to this environment, new leadership competencies are required.[48]

The complementary nature of the military and civilian member of the defence team and the utility of a transformational leadership approach is evident in the fact that, ". . . competencies required for effective strategic leadership in the CF will overlap to a certain extent with those required for private sector leaders. The CF will also have unique aspects to incorporate within their competency model."[49]

The CF is a complex organization undergoing constant change. Military leaders must be assessing the changes taking place in society and seeing how they relate to the recruit of tomorrow.[50] Military leaders must be receptive to change; the institution must be a learning environment.

> Therefore, according to experts in the field, effective leaders of complex organizations must be prepared to map out a long range strategy that includes constant monitoring and adjustment of the organization's culture. Coupled with this process is an ongoing program of professional development so that members of the organization will have the knowledge required to implement necessary changes.[51]

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[47] Arthur E. Gans, "Vocation or Job: . . . , 10.

[48] Stephanie Paquet, Laura Hambley and Theresa Kline. *Strategic Leadership Competencies in the Canadian Forces*. Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, March 2003, 4.

[49] *Ibid*, 23.

[50] Arthur E. Gans, "Vocation or Job: . . . , 13.

[51] Allan D. Engli

A culture receptive to change is an important benefit of a transformational leadership approach since " . . . innovation in large organizations is usually constrained more by the organization's culture than technology."[52] Changes in military culture will narrow the traditional gap between military and civilian members of the defence team. While there continues to be unique requirements for military service, the convergence of military and civilian cultures will allow and require the use of transformational leadership approaches with both groups in the defence team.

The second argument for the use of a transformational leadership approach in future CF leadership doctrine is the impact of technology on the operating environment, particularly in the areas of communications and digitization. The speed and distribution of communications creates linkages between the military member, government and society that did not exist in the past. Technological innovation is allowing sophistication in multi-disciplined analysis that will be critical in a world of asymmetric threats where militaries attempt to reduce casualties:

> The operating environment will also necessitate the use of networked interdependent Services (i.e. Navy, Army, Air Force) capable of planning, conducting and executing operations in a non-contiguous battlespace, in cooperation with other government departments, and international agencies.[53]

"To operate in this daunting environment we require a reorientation of how we think and operate within a battlespace. Political acumen and a clear understanding of the national

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[52] William K. Lescher, "Network-Centric: Is It Worth the Risk?" *US Naval Institute Proceedings* 125, no 7 (July 1999), 60.

[53] Department of National Defence. "How the Canadian Army will FIGHT: A Force Employment Concept Paper," (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, Draft dated 15 Jan 2004), 2.

interest and policy will be key."[54] This requires a range of competencies that include an appreciation of all of the instruments of national power and of the potential strategic consequences of the actions of an individual, but even these will not be sufficient. A spirit of collaboration and cooperation, a transformational leadership approach, will be critical in this environment. Further:

> The broad range of information and skills necessary for effects-based analysis suggests that the military and DOD must establish an interagency analytic EBO support center. Such an interagency center is consistent with the demand for transformational capabilities that push military doctrine and organization beyond traditional jointness and interservice planning and operations. With a transformed military, the Nation's leadership can work toward the creation of a national foreign policy that seamlessly blends military, economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian tools into a common framework in pursuit of common political objectives.[55]

While a CF leadership doctrine espousing the merits of transformational leadership for these technological challenges of the future will go a long way towards allowing the inter-agency analysis and cooperation that will be critical for success, a true spirit of collaboration and cooperation would be enhanced by reestablishing the ". . . National Defence College (NDC) – the one organization that brought senior service and civilian students together to consider the country's overall security needs . . ."[56] This leads to a discussion of the mixed civilian/military nature of HQs.

The third significant trend impacting on the need for leadership doctrine revision within the CF is the need for military members to operate in mixed civilian/military

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[54] Department of National Defence. "How the Canadian Army will FIGHT: . . . , 2.

[55] Desmond Saunders-Newton and Aaron B. Frank. "Effects-Based Operations: . . . , 5.

[56] General G.C.E Thériault, and Dr. W.A.B. Douglas. "Arms and the Canadian: . . . , 8 or David L. King, "We need a Romanow Commission for defence and foreign policy." *Policy Options* (April 2002): 7–14.

settings.[57] The broad factors driving this need have been discussed, but it is also important to remember the impact of technology on the operating environment as discussed above. As well, NDHQ will remain an integrated HQ and others at the operational and tactical levels will become increasingly integrated. Finally, service at a United Nations or North Atlantic Treaty Organization HQ, static or deployed, will require an ability to lead in a mixed civilian/military setting. Domestic operations and international operations will see an ever-increasing need for complex analysis involving expertise from outside of DND. This expertise could come from OGDs, from NGOs or from International Organizations (IOs). In addition to contractors playing their traditional role in the procurement area, requiring military members to work effectively with them, they are playing an increasingly important role in support of routine garrison activities as well as in support of operations, both in theatre and in force projection. These facts drive the need for a military leadership doctrine that accommodates mixed civilian/military settings – transformational leadership.

This paper illustrates that the societal changes, evolving technologies and the mixed military/civilian setting in HQs both in garrison and deployed on operations are among the factors driving the need for change in the leadership doctrine of the CF. It was demonstrated that adjustments to CF leadership doctrine are necessary today at every level to allow CF leaders to function more effectively in mixed military/civilian settings.

An analysis of the recent historical development of CF leadership doctrine demonstrated how, during the period since the last leadership doctrine was published in 1973, three important areas of lessons have been identified: values, ethics and leadership

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[57] Karol W.J. Wenek, *Looking Back: . . .* , 27-28.

approaches. In the area of values, past failures of leadership were identified as well as the misplaced emphasis on technical education and the loss of access to a senior educational opportunity for military and civilian participants. Past ethical failures and their cover-ups were mentioned as well as the impact of transactional leadership as a fuel for careerism and avoidance of accepting blame when things go wrong.

In looking at the drivers for leadership change through the lens of lessons learnt since 1973, the current leadership environment was examined. Some harsh criticisms were levelled at CF members' leadership shortcomings in today's environment: in areas of values, cultural integration, motivation and ethics. The integrated nature of HQs was identified as a reality for today and the future and particular emphasis was placed on the authority, accountability and responsibility framework at NDHQ and its applicability to both military and civilian members. Competencies were also identified as an area of convergence between military and civilian members. By examining the military member of today in the areas of values, cultural integration, competency profiles, motivation and ethics it was demonstrated that there is a steady convergence between military and civilian members of the defence team in these areas with some notable specific exceptions, particularly in the area of military ethos. Given this steadily growing convergence between military and civilian members of the defence team, the complementary nature of the military and civilian contributions was recognized.

Finally, the paper examined the future leadership environment. The applicability of a revised leadership doctrine to future CF members was evaluated against the members themselves. Then the impact of future technological change was examined, with a particular emphasis on the requirement for inter-agency analysis and the need for understanding of

complex interdependencies as well as down-stream impacts. This was followed by an examination of the reality of continued and expanding pressure for mixed civilian/military HQs in the future.

A lot has changed since the CF last published leadership doctrine: the nature of the member joining the CF; the operating environment in which the member serves; and the extent of the mixed military/civilian settings within which the member must serve. It is time for change. This essay has demonstrated that adopting a contemporary leadership doctrine will satisfy this complex environment and provide for more effective military leadership in mixed civilian/military settings.

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