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CANADA AND MULTILATERAL SECURITY OPERATIONS: COMMITMENT AND REALISM

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ABSTRACT

Canada has long been an active supporter of multilateral security operations, which include peacekeeping missions organized by the United Nations (UN) and peace enforcement operations conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While these operations have become more numerous and more costly in the post-Cold War era, Canada's defence spending has not increased significantly. Rather, the low will for defence spending remains a constant feature in Canadian federal politics. This paper aims to investigate this apparent anomaly and to provide an appreciation of the complexities of Canada's defence policy in the post-Cold War age. It concludes that as long as the current politics of international peacekeeping and the paradigms of Canada's foreign and defence policies remain unchanged, the gap between Canada's stated commitment to participate in multilateral security operations and her defence spending will remain. This commitment-defence spending gap will continue to be manifested in the well-recognized gap between the Canadian Forces' allocated tasks and its actual operational capability to fulfil those tasks, otherwise known as its commitment-capability gap.

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INTRODUCTION

When is it justifiable for a government to deploy its military to help secure peace in foreign lands? This question may have been debated since the political sovereignty of nation-states was recognized in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.[1] But arguably, it has become more significant to governments around the world only since the United Nations (UN) was established in 1948. The is because the UN, since its founding, has launched various multilateral initiatives to help keep peace (and more recently, to help create peace), whenever regional or civil conflicts of troubled areas around the world have caught the attention of the international community. As the UN's most recent report of its peace and security activities (also known as the Brahimi Report) noted, these operations have included not only traditional peacekeeping, or "trucekeeping" missions,[2] but also more recent peacemaking[3] and peace-building[4] initiatives to foster regional stability. Multilateral by intent and design, these operations have provided grounds to which countries around the world have contributed their military capabilities, under the name of international peace and security.

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[1] Marsh 2000, 74.

[2] Described in the Brahimi Report as "a 50-year old enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the past decade from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after inter-State wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars." (United Nations 2000, 2-3) The term "trucekeeping" is taken from Joseph Jockel's 1994 study of Canada's involvement in international peacekeeping. (Jockel 1994, 4)

[3] Described in the Brahimi Report as "peacemaking activities as being concerned more with diplomatic and mediation activities." (*Ibid*, 3) It is now generally recognized now that such efforts typically require the military to first enforce peace with the use of heavier combat force compared to "trucekeeping" operations. Canadian military doctrine describes such peace enforcement operations as "a [coercive] conflict termination activity using either direct or indirect intervention." (Canada, B-GL-300-001/FP-000, 138)

[4] Described in the Brahimi Report as "activities undertaken in the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war." (*Ibid*, 3)

To that end, Canadian governments seem to have found no difficulty in participating in multilateral security operations.[5] Since 1948,[6] as frequently reminded by Canadian politicians, Canada has participated in "virtually every single peacekeeping operation ever mounted by the UN."[7] In th52 012 111ating In th52 012 a 282.99982 708.9ded 352(In th52 012 rkabTjadian

multilateral security operations as affirmation of that conclusion.[10] In this respect, it is noteworthy that the current government, led by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, has not only maintained, but further strengthened that commitment in the post-Cold War era, by stating in the *1994 Defence White Paper* that a contingency force from the Canadian Forces would always be ready to participate in "multilateral operations anywhere in the world under UN auspices, or in the defence of a NATO member state."[11] In aggregate, this contingency force would comprise 10,000 personnel and combat assets across all three services,[12] which is remarkable considering the small size of the Canadian Forces. The fact that this commitment has been maintained to this day points to Canada's continuing political will to remain active in the field of multilateral security operations.

It is therefore curious to note that Canadian governments, at the same time, have not had strong political will to spend on Canada's military forces. Logic would seem to dictate that the greater a country's enthusiasm toward multilateral security operations, the higher its defence spending should be, to ensure that its military can better fulfil that role. Given that multilateral security operations incur heavy costs – as the Brahimi Report has noted, UN peacekeeping missions have cost, just for the start-up phase alone, between US$50 million and US$200 million each[13] – one would therefore expect Canada's defence spending to be reasonably high. Yet, in October 2002, the Toronto Star reported that Canada's annual defence budget had not grown beyond $12 billion since the Chrétien government came into

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[10] See Canada, Department of National Defence 1964, 1971, 1987, 1994.
[11] Canada, Department of National Defence 1994, 38.
[12] Jockel 1994, 4.
[13] United Nations 2000, 27.

power in 1993.[14] Canada's peacekeeping hero Major-General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie added that since 1993, the defence budget had been reduced by twenty-five per cent, which resulted in it being "woefully inadequate" for funding the numerous deployments of the Canadian Forces during the later half of the 1990s.[15] In September 2002, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington D.C. think-tank, reportedly stated that Canada would soon have to "leave its defence solely to the US" if her defence spending was not significantly raised.[16] Three months later, Canadian business leaders expressed through a poll conducted by the Financial Post that the Canadian government should allocate 24 per cent of all its new spending toward maintaining the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces, as well as home security measures.[17]

In this respect, Joseph Jockel, the noted American watcher of Canadian affairs, has made an interesting observation:

> One of the differences between the United States and Canada in the post-Cold War world is that Americans like to pay for armed forces but don't really like to deploy them, whereas Canadians like to deploy their armed forces but not especially to pay for them.[18]

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[14] The Toronto Star, 9 October 2002.

[15] The National Post, 24 September 2002.

[16] The Vancouver Sun, 17 October 2002. In a similar vein, the US Ambassador to Canada has consistently lobbied Ottawa over the past few years to step up Canada's defence spending, to sustain what he has termed as "the world's most unique security partnership." (Sokolsky 2001, 342) See also The Canadian Press, 26 September 2002. In similar fashion, the NATO's Secretary General, Lord Robertson, "[admonished] Ottawa for its poor record on defence spending" shortly after he was appointed. (Sokolsky 2001, 342)

[17] The National Post, 6 January 2003.

[18] Jockel, 1999, 9. In the same vein, MacKenzie, at the height of the public debate on Canada's defence spending last September, wrote a satirical piece titled *Mr. Bush, Help us be all that we can be*. (The National Post, 24 September 2002)

This observation, with its underlying sarcasm, does not give a fair account of the complexities of both countries' defence policies in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, in Canada's case, it raises a number of interesting questions. How reluctant, in real, is the Canadian government toward defence spending? Has the low defence spending affected the Canadian Forces' ability to participate in multilateral security operations? How committed, actually, is Canada toward multilateral security operations?

To the uninitiated observer, the answers to these questions may remain fairly clouded by the prevailing political rhetoric. Thus, this paper argues that a real gap exists between Canada's stated commitment of its military toward multilateral security operations and Canada's political will to spend on defence.[19] Additionally, this gap remains irrecoverable as long as the current politics of international peacekeeping and the paradigms of Canada's foreign and defence policies remain unchanged. The argument will be presented by investigating the longstanding claims of the Canadian Forces' commitment-capability gap,[20] the reasons for Canada's commitment to participate in multilateral security operations, and the background of the government's reluctance to spend on defence.

The intent of this paper is not to criticize Canada's commitment to multilateral security operations. Nor is it to deplore Canada's defence spending. It would be unfair to draw either conclusion without a robust evaluation of Canada's foreign and defence policies, for which the scope of this study is insufficient. This paper merely aims to provide an

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e [19] Specifically, the gap is defined as being existent when th

appreciation of the complexities of Western defence policy-making in the post-Cold War age. In this respect, one finds that Canada's case is indeed good to study, given that the political complexities are abundant.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: COMMITMENT AND CAPABILITY

Canada has been closely identified with UN peacekeeping since Lester Pearson, as Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, played a central role in the creation of the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) mission in 1956 during the Suez crisis, and in the following year, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for that.[21] Therefore, Pearson's achievement was likely the catalyst that caused the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker to shed Canada's official vagueness during the 1950s regarding the place of UN peacekeeping in her defence policy.[22] In 1959, the Difenbaker government stated that Canada would provide military forces "to assist [the UN] in attaining its peaceful aims."[23] Since then, formal statements of commitment to participate in UN peacekeeping have been included in all defence white papers of Canada.[24] In the post-Cold War era, that commitment has been expanded to cover multilateral security operations organized by NATO.[25]

The last stated commitment, which is contained in the *1994 Defence White Paper* of the Chrétien government, and which remains current to this day, is unique for at least two other reasons. First, unlike previous commitments, it is not subordinate in priority to the Canadian Forces' other traditional tasks (namely, the defence of Canadian sovereignty and defence cooperation with the US). While there was no mention of priorities in the 1994 white paper, it nevertheless seemed from the tone of the paper that contribution to multilateral

[21] Jockel 1994, ix.
[22] Byers 1993, 180.
[23] Quoted by Byers. (*Ibid*, 181)
[24] See, respectively, Canada, Department of National Defence 1964, 1971, 1987, 1994.
[25] Canada, Department of National Defence 1994, 27-39.

security operations was just as important, if not more important, compared to the abovementioned other two tasks.[26] Second, unlike previous commitments, specific forces are listed under that commitment for participation in multilateral security operations. As stated in the 1994 white paper, in addition to an immediate stand-by force comprising an infantry battalion group, a main contingency force would always be available for multilateral security operations anywhere in the world under UN or NATO auspices. The operations could include preventive deployment of forces, traditional peacekeeping, peace observation missions, enforcement of the will of the international community, collective defence of Canada's allies, post-conflict peace-building operations, and other measures to enhance regional stability and confidence-building.[27] Furthermore, the contingency force would comprise a joint task force headquarters and assets up to a naval task group with appropriate air support, three separate battle groups or a brigade group, a wing of fighter aircraft, and one squadron of tactical transport aircraft – a total of about 10,000 military personnel.[28] This force would always be available for deployment either within three months in full, or within three weeks in part.[29]

In retrospect, the Chrétien government's stated commitment of its military toward multilateral security operations does not seem odd. After all, when the Cold War ended, Canadians had heralded the arrival of the "golden age of Canadian peacekeeping."[30] In line

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[26] Bland 1997, 284.

[27] Canada, Department of National Defence 1994, 31-33.

[28] Jockel 1999, 4.

[29] Canada, Department of National Defence 1994, 38-39.

[30] Jockel 1994, 2. Jockel elaborates that "[a]t the cold war's end it seemed for a while to many Canadians that a golden age of Canadian contributions to international peace and security might be about to begin … Canada's peacekeeping experience, coupled with its well-recognized commitment to the UN, appeared to have left it especially suited to play if not a leading role, then at least a significant one in the building of a new world order." (Jockel 1994, 1)

with this expectation, the previous government, led by Brian Mulroney, had "virtually repudiated" the longstanding international practice of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, by calling for Canada and the international community to intercede in the savage domestic conflicts of the early 1990s for humanitarian reasons.[31] From this posture, and also because many Canadians worried about the UN bureaucracy's ability to effectively manage its peacekeeping activities (in the aftermath of debacles in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia),[32] Canada undertook an active approach to improve the UN's organization of its peacekeeping activities. The activism included calls for improved peacekeeping training and UN organizational and financial reforms, as well as calls for functional improvements in areas such as the UN's information and analysis capability and logistic systems.[33] In this light, the Chrétien government's support for multilateral security operations, which includes not only its strong 1994 commitment toward multilateral security operations, but also initiatives like the establishment of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre,[34] seems no more than a continuation of Canada's longstanding enthusiasm in international security affairs, which has earned her a fine reputation as a responsible member of the international community.

One could point out that the intensity of the 1994 commitment is nevertheless remarkable, given that the world had already seen the proliferation of regional and savage civil conflicts after the end of the Cold War, as well as the UN's ineffectiveness in coping with these conflicts, when it was first declared. In any case, the 1994 commitment was

[31] Delvoie 1999, 11.
[32] Jockel 1994, 3-5.
[33] *Ibid*, 8-10.
[34] Delvoie 1999, 18.

reaffirmed in the later half of the 1990s. When Lloyd Axworthy took over the appointment of Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 1996, he launched his vision of "human security," which he described as being "much more than the absence of military threat" and including "security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights."[35] Somewhat against the intention of Axworthy, who also underplayed the utility of military forces in his other doctrine of "soft power,"[36] the human security agenda has further entrenched the Canadian Forces' association with multilateral security operations. Between 1996 and 1999, the Canadian Forces participated in at least 12 new multilateral security operations – combat or otherwise, organized by, among others, the UN, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Almost half of these operations incurred major deployments numbering between 350 to 1,300 personnel each.[37] While the human security agenda has offered no specificity in prioritizing the Canadian Forces' participation in multilateral security operations, it provided the rationale for all those deployments. In that sense, the human security agenda has reaffirmed the Chrétien government's 1994 commitment of the Canadian Forces toward multilateral security operations.

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[35] Jockel 1999, 5-6.

[36] As Jockel elaborated, "[t]he concept of 'soft power' is drawn from the work of U.S. political scientist Joseph Nye, although some Canadian critics claim that Mr. Axworthy has distorted some of Professor Nye's precepts, including those touching on the role of military power in world affairs. Still somewhat ambiguous in the Canadian case, 'soft power' appears to mean convincing others through effective diplomacy (especially coalition building), and through the power and innovation of one's thinking. As the minister himself has defined it, 'Soft power is the art of disseminating information in such a way that desirable outcomes are achieved through persuasion rather than coercion.'" (*Ibid*, 5-6) In accordance with this idea, Axworthy focused his efforts in human security in non-military aspects such as the abolishment of landmines, the establishment of the International Criminal Court, and common measures to protect children's rights. (Hampson et al 2001, 3-5)

[37] Jockel 1999, 18-22.

Against this backdrop, the high operational tempo of the Canadian Forces that emerged from the Chrétien government's 1994 commitment has caused certain concern among the Canadian public. In particular, the pro-defence lobby has argued (and continues to argue) that the Canadian Forces is operationally not capable of delivering that commitment in full.[38] An important nuance should be noted in that argument. The argument rested not on an opposition to the government's commitment toward multilateral security operations, but rather the assertion that the government had neglected defence spending since they took over in 1993, to the extent that the Canadian Forces was operationally not capable of meeting that commitment in full.

Jockel has stated that under the Chrétien government, Canada's defence budget decreased by 23 per cent (from $12 billion to $9.4 billion) between 1993 and 1999. The greatest drop occurred in 1995, when the operations, maintenance, and capital spending of the Department of National Defence (DND) were significantly reduced after the announcement of the "deficit-busting budget" of Paul Martin, then the finance minister, in that year. For instance, the regular personnel strength of the Canadian Forces was cut to about 60,000 shortly after that announcement.[39] Twenty-eight bases, stations, units and installations, which were deemed unnecessary, were also promptly closed.[40] In the last three years, even though the defence budget has not decreased further, it has also not increased

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[38] David Rudd of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies has observed that "[i]t is … possible that the broad 'human security' agenda, which spells out a wide variety of policy goals, and which clearly harbours an interventionist streak will involve a greater number of diverse commitments and further lay bare the deficiencies in the CF's operational capabilities." (Jockel 1999, viii)

[39] Jockel 1999, 14-15. Comparatively, the regular personnel strength was about 75,000 in 1993 (See Table 1.2, Jockel 1999, 10)

[40] *Ibid,* 15.

significantly. These trends point to the Chrétien government's continuing low will to spend on Canada's defence.



Figure 1: Canada's Defence Spending, 1993-2002
(Source: Canadian Forces College, Toronto)

Several other sources, including the Auditor-General,[41] the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence,[42] the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran's Affairs (SCONDVA),[43] and various defence analysts,[44]

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[41] For instance, the Attorney-General has opined that "[o]f the 1998-1999 defence budget's total of $9.3 billion, $1.6 billion (17 percent) was for capital. That is obviously below the 20 to 30 percent that has conventionally been declared by Canadian defence analysts as adequate to prevent obsolescence and the deterioration of essential defence equipment." (Jockel 1999, 120)

[42] Canada, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2002, 82-85.

[43] Canada, Standing Committee for National Defence and Veteran Affairs 2002, 81.

[44] See, for instance, Conference of Defence Associations Institute 2002, 7.

have made similar observations of the Chrétien government's low will for defence spending. In this respect, they often conclude that the low defence spending has resulted in the obsolescence and deterioration of the Canadian Force's equipment and operational capability. In 1999, Jockel investigated how that situation affected the Canadian Forces' ability to meet the government's 1994 stated commitment toward multilateral security operations. His findings are summarized below:

- The army brigade group committed in 1994 as part of the contingency force for multilateral security operations was not able to sustain its overseas presence in operations involving more than a low-intensity "trucekeeping" situation for more than six months. Additionally, it was not prepared to execute high-intensity combat, due to major shortfalls in its current inventory, and also because the army, in general, had not exercised at the brigade level for some time.[45]

- The Canadian Forces did not have any assets to transport the army's key logistical, artillery and armour equipment (all of which are heavy and oversized, but which could still be part of the army's contingency force for multilateral security operations) overseas. This increased the potential of the

[45] Jockel 1999, 115-116.

contingency force not being able to deploy according to the timelines stated in the 1994 defence white paper.[46]

- While the air force and naval components of the contingency force could be deployed, the air force's CF-18 fighters needed to be modernized,[47] and the navy's surveillance capability was limited by the lack of a functional naval helicopter for forward maritime reconnaissance and by the inadequate capabilities of the existing Aurora long-range patrol aircraft. Furthermore, the navy's ability to deploy independent task groups, in accordance with the 1994 white paper, was dependent upon two obsolete fleet replenishment vessels.[48]

These findings remain largely accurate to this day. In October 2002, the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA) warned that if the government's defence spending funding was not significantly increased, the Canadian navy could be relegated to the status of no more than "an offshore territorial defence navy" by the year 2005. Additionally, up to half of the army's weapons and vehicle fleets could become non-operational within 18 months, due to the lack of spare parts.[49]

Such state of affairs – effectively a renewed definition of the Canadian Forces' commitment-capability gap – is obviously not ideal for both the Chrétien government and the

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[46] *Ibid*, 61-63.

[47] See Department of National Defence news release on the award of the CF-18 modernization contract. (Canada, NR-01.023, dated 27 April 2001)

[48] Jockel 1999, 116.

[49] The Toronto Star, 9 October 2002, and The Globe and Mail, 8 October 2002.

military. This is especially so in the post-Cold War era, where the international community's willingness to intervene in regional and civil conflicts around the world means that combat-capable forces, rather than lightly armed "trucekeepers," are often required. In this light, Jockel predicted in his 1999 study that the Chrétien government would soon face the "hard choice" of either raising its defence spending, or further reducing the size of the Canadian Forces and their tasks.[50] However, to this day, the Chrétien government has neither cut the tasks of the Canadian Forces, nor increased its defence spending by a margin wide enough to resolve the latter's commitment-capability gap.[51] Why has this been so, and can the apparent gap between Canada's stated commitment toward multilateral security operations and her defence spending ever be reconciled? The answers to these questions are necessarily derived from the investigation of the root causes for that commitment, as well as those for the government's low defence spending.

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[50] Jockel 1999, 119. Scot Robertson has alluded to a third option: cutting the military's costs. However, he also acknowledged that this was no longer viable in the current context. (Robertson 2002, 21)

[51] For instance, the defence received an annual increase of only $800 million (plus $150 million in each of the next two years) in the latest federal budget announced in February 2003 (The Canadian Press, 18 February 2003) – far short of what the pro-defence lobby, for instance, the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, had claimed was necessary to restore the alleged decline of the Canadian Forces. (The Globe and Mail, 8 October 2002)

CANADA'S COMMITMENT: POSSIBLE RATIONALES

ALTRUISM: TWO SIDES OF REALITY

A logical starting point for investigating the reasons for the Chrétien government's stated commitment toward multilateral security operations is the *1994 Defence White Paper*, where the commitment was originally declared. In this respect, it is significant that the white paper starts on the footing that "[a]s a nation that throughout its history has done much within the context of international alliances to defend freedom and democracy, Canada continues to have a vital interest in doing its part to ensure global security."[52] Furthermore, it states that "[e]ven where Canada's interests are not directly engaged, the values of Canadian society lead Canadians to expect their government to respond when modern communication technologies make us real-time witnesses to violence, suffering and even genocide in many parts of the world."[53] Similar statements can be found later in the paper, for instance, where it states that "Canadians have a strong sense of responsibility to alleviate suffering,"[54] and "[w]e care about the course of events abroad, and are willing to work with other countries to improve the lot of all manner of peoples."[55]

From these statements, one would think that altruism, or rather, the spirit of self-sacrifice for the sake of humanity, drove the Chrétien government into making the 1994

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[52] Canada, Department of National Defence 1994, 3.
[53] *Ibid*, 6.
[54] *Ibid*, 12.
[55] *Ibid*, 27.

stated commitment. In this light, it is worth discussing the actual significance of altruism in Canada's participation in multilateral security operations.

Altruism is not incapable of driving democratic governments toward committing their armed forces to the cause of international peace and security. As the popular writer Michael Ignatieff has argued in his book *The Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*, public compassion and moral obligation – generated to some extent by traditional Western social beliefs, as well as disturbing memories of genocide in the Second World War and the awareness of the huge presence of military stockpiles left unused from the Cold War – has played a major part in the Western nations' recent humanitarian interventions. This was particularly so in the 1990s, when the extensive reach of the media allowed the savage images of faraway civil or regional conflicts to be brought closer to the Western nations. Anchored by non-government organizations championing human rights and development causes, public altruism acquired sufficient institutional power to move the Western governments toward humanitarian interventions.[56] While these arguments do not seem sufficient to explain the Western humanitarian interventions of the 1990s,[57] it is noteworthy that the former US Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Nye has also argued that public values can provide sufficient motivation for democratic governments to contribute troops to multilateral security operations. As he argued,

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[56] Ignatieff 1997, 90.

[57] For instance, Russia's recent involvement in UN peacekeeping has been regarded as part of its strategy to "assert its position as the primary power in the Commonwealth of Independent States." (MacFarlane and Schnabel 1995, 79) Ignatieff has also argued that the US intervened in the Bosnian conflict in the mid-1990s to preserve her alliances with Europe. (Ignatieff 1997, 95)

> In a democracy, the national interest is simply the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world. It is broader than strategic interests, though they are part of it. It can include values such as human rights and democracy if the public feels that these values are so important to its identity that it is willing to pay a price to promote them. …A democratic definition of the national interest does not accept the distinction between a morality-based and an interests-based foreign policy. Moral values are simply intangible interests. Leaders and experts may point out the costs of indulging these values. But if an informed public disagrees, experts cannot deny the legitimacy of public opinion.[58]

In this respect, Canadian altruism toward the plight of less fortunate people in faraway places is not unreal. Jockel has observed that "[i]t is not at all starry-eyed to conclude that Canadians and their government have been motivated in substantial part by altruism or simple international voluntarism."[59] Furthermore, in 1961, the morally charged Canadian public essentially forced the Diefenbaker government to participate in the chaotic UN operation in the Congo, despite its reluctance to do so.[60] The primary reason for this seems to be the strong belief of Canadians in their national values: democracy, the rule of law and human rights.[61] Moreover, Professor David Dewitt of York University has opined that Canadians are often personally and historically tied to faraway areas of conflict, due to the high penetration of immigrants, businesses and ideas into Canada.[62] Additionally, Canadians can afford to seek peace and stability in those areas from "a relatively unencumbered and secure position."[63] Besides, Canadians are not immune to the oft-quoted "CNN factor," which refers to the ability of the mass media, especially television, to provoke governments to intervene in the affairs of other troubled regions or countries for

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[58] Quoted by Sokolsky. (Sokolsky 2001, 347)
[59] Jockel 1994, 13.
[60] Legault 1999, 68.
[61] Canada, The Government 1995, ii.
[62] Dewitt 2000, 170.
[63] *Ibid*, 170.

humanitarian reasons.[64] Louis Delvoie, for one, has argued that in the absence of other apparent policy rationales, the "CNN factor," and the moral outrage that was generated in its aftermath, was the main reason for Canada's participation in the UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Rwanda and Zaire during the 1990s.[65] In particular, Canada's efforts to assist Rwandan refugees trapped in Eastern Zaire in 1996 (due to civil wars in both Rwanda and Zaire) were apparently instigated by Prime Minister Chrétien himself, since "[he] was moved in the first instance by the television pictures of the plight of the refugees."[66]

However, one would hesitate to state that altruism has therefore been the primary reason for the past stated commitments of the Canadian Forces toward multilateral security operations by Canadian governments. On one hand, it is not implausible that altruism, or at least the need to be seen as being altruistic within the international community, has been significant to some extent in that respect. This is particularly so when one considers that contrary to the popular idea of Canada as an international peacekeeper,[67] there were actually three periods in Canada's history when her interest in the UN and its peacekeeping activities was in fact quite low. The first period was from the late 1940s to 1957, when the faith of Canadians in the UN's effectiveness diminished during the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949 and the 1950 Korean War. The second period was from 1967 until the end of the Cold War, when public disillusionment regarding the UN set in again after the withdrawal of UN forces from the Congo and the ejection of UNEF I (which Canada had helped to create) from the Sinai, prior to the start of the Six Day War. The third period was during the later half of the

[64] Delvoie 1999, 14.
[65] *Ibid*, 14-16.
[66] *Ibid*, 15.
[67] Maloney 2002, 5.

1990s, after the world witnessed the UN fiascos in Rwanda, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia.[68] Despite these periods of public disillusionment, Canada has continued her enthusiastic participation in multilateral security operations. This could be explained by the significant role that altruism played in driving Canadian governments toward that participation.

Indeed, while it is unlikely that the altruism of the Canadian public suffered much during those periods of disillusionment, its support for UN peacekeeping surely decreased then. Given that public opinion is a key determinant of Canadian defence policy,[69] Canada's participation in multilateral security operations should therefore have decreased during those periods. However, Canadian never withdrew from its commitment to participate in those operations. Instead, in the later half of the 1990s, Canada participated in those operations at a rate just as high, if not more, as that in the initial years of that decade. This could be due to the continued sense of moral obligation toward enriching the less fortunate parts of the world that Canadian governments felt, given Canada's relative wealth and stability.

Yet, there have been instances where other pragmatic considerations seemed to override any altruistic inclinations of Canadian governments. For instance, the distinguished Canadian historian Professor J. L. Granatstein has pointed out that Canada initially was unwilling to participate in UN peacekeeping.[70] This was because the government at that time, led by Mackenzie King, saw peacekeeping as "a drain on very scarce Canadian defence

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[68] Maloney 2002, 4.
[69] Conference of Defence Associations Institute 1994, x-xi.
[70] Quoted by Jockel. (Jockel 1999, 11)

resources, a thankless task, a potentially divisive mission at home, and a way in which Canada might be dragged by other countries into distant conflicts in which it had little interest."[71] Accordingly, King refused to be drawn into the very first peace mission conducted by the UN in 1948 (in the Middle East) because of his belief that the deployment of a UN army was the only solution to the Palestine problem, and that any enthusiasm on Canada's part would result in pressure by the international community for possibly a great number of Canadian troops to be sent to that ree.99l.7lETEMC /Span ≠MCID 1 ÞBDC ad liBT/TT0 1 TfTj-80.

be gained by committing Canadian troops to UN peacekeeping – interests which were strong enough to overturn King's pragmatic concerns.[74]

From those instances, it is evident that even though Canadian altruism has been (and will likely remain) a significant factor for the Canadian Forces' participation in multilateral security operations, it probably is not the primary reason for the Chrétien government's strong 1994 commitment of its military toward those operations. In this respect, it is noteworthy that David Haglund has also argued that Canada's activism in international security affairs is not based on altruism alone. Rather, it is underpinned by grand strategy based on realistic self-interests.[75] Chas Freeman's observation that nations participate in humanitarian interventions partly because of self-interests,[76] and Felix Oppenheim's and Martha Finnemore's conclusions (in their respective studies on the limits of morality in foreign policy-making and the interaction of national and international political interests) that no individual state is realistically immune to the influence of the international state system[77] bear further truth to that argument.[78] To discern the realistic rationales for the Chrétien government's strong 1994 commitment of the Canadian Forces toward multilateral security operations, one would have to consult academic analyses of Canada's past involvements in international peacekeeping.

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[74] Maloney 2002, 23-29. These interests will also be discussed later in this paper.

[75] See David Haglund's article entitled "Here Comes M. Jourdain: A Canadian Grand Strategy out of Molière" in the *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Spring 1998).

[76] Freeman 1997, 55.

[77] See Oppenheim 1991, 30, and Finnemore 1996, 3.

[78] While these observations are not Canadian in origin, they are arguably apply to Canada's case as well.

NATIONAL SECURITY: RHETORIC AND REALITY

In his 1994 study of Canada's relationship with international peacekeeping, Jockel noted that up to 1986, both the Canadian Senate and the House of Commons stated "we see practically no point in thinking of national security as distinct from international security. We start from the assumption that the threat to Canada is one and the same with the threat to international stability and peace."[79] This was in view of the common argument, which lasted between the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the end of the Cold War in 1990, that UN peacekeeping in the Third World helped to ensure Canada's physical security.[80]

This argument was based on the belief that UN peacekeeping helped to prevent the regional and civil conflicts of the Third World from escalating into a larger conflict between the US and the Soviet Union involving the use of nuclear weapons,[81] which was not improbable, given that the Cold War environment was "best characterized as a chess game, of which bloc controlled what area and which ideology influenced the inhabitants of the contentious regions in the Third World."[82] Canada's participation in UN peacekeeping was therefore arguably a way to protect her national survivability during the Cold War. This argument was particularly significant since Canada, due to its geographical location between

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[79] Jockel 1994, 13.
[80] *Ibid*, 13.
[81] Maloney 2002, 8.
[82] *Ibid*, xiii.

the US and the Soviet Union, would have suffered greatly in any nuclear conflict between the two protagonists.[83]

During the Cold War, Canada's participation in UN peacekeeping was also seen as a way to further her value in NATO, the basis of Canada's forward defence from the Warsaw Pact nations. To this end, Canada's participation in UN peacekeeping helped to ensure that power vacuums that emerged from Third World conflicts would not be filled by Communist ideology.[84] It also helped to ensure that the Soviet Union would not be able to freely establish its control in those areas of conflict, which might become useful as military bases in a larger global conflict with NATO.[85] On some occasions, the participation was deemed necessary to protect the integrity of NATO. As Jockel has noted, in deciding to participate in the UNEF I mission in 1956, the Canadian government considered that Canada's involvement would help to mend the growing rift between the US, the UK and France, three key members of NATO.[86] Additionally, Canada's participation in the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964 arguably helped to check the conflict between Turkey and Greece, two other Canadian allies located on the southern flank of NATO.[87] In any case, Maloney has observed that between the 1950s and the 1960s, Ottawa's decision to participate in UN peacekeeping operations (the Cyprus mission included) was sometimes discussed first within

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[83] Jockel 1994, 13.

[84] Maloney 2002, 8. It is also noteworthy that "Canada could count on being called upon again and again by the UN to serve as peacekeeper because the politics of the cold war usually excluded others, the big powers in particular, from such responsibilities." (Jockel 1994, 63) Moreover, as Dewitt has observed, "developing countries … [valued] Canada as an advanced Western country with no imperial or colonial legacy but with direct access to the big powers." (Dewitt 2000, 177)

[85] Maloney 2002, 246.

[86] Jockel 1994, 14.

[87] Maloney 2002, 191-217.

NATO and later within the UN.[88] This points to the deduction that during the Cold War, one of Ottawa's reasons for contributing Canadian troops to UN peacekeeping missions was to maintain Canada's influence within NATO. This was especially so during the 1950s, when Ottawa was strategically focused on countering the security threats posed by the Cold War.[89]

In light of the above arguments, Canada's participation in UN peacekeeping during the Cold War could be attributed to the argument that Canada's security was inseparable from the security of the larger international environment. With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1990, the Chrétien government maintained this line of reasoning, but in a different way. Where Canada no longer faced any significant direct military threat from another nation, the government asserted, as contained in the *1994 Defence White Paper*, that "Canada continues to have a vital interest in doing its part to ensure global security, especially since Canada's economic future depends in its ability to trade freely with other nations."[90]

This argument was elaborated in the government's foreign policy white paper, *Canada and the World*, which was published in 1995. Two main premises for that argument were furnished. First, the paper maintained that a whole range of transnational issues – for example mass migration, crime, disease, environmental degradation, overpopulation, and underdevelopment – affected the peace and security of the international environment. Second, it stated that "the forces of globalization" meant that those issues increasingly

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[88] Maloney 2002, xii. Maloney adds that "[t]here were even discussions as early as 1956 for the creation of a NATO peacekeeping force separate from the UN forces, a debate which continued into the 1960s."

[89] Richter 1996, 1.

[90] Canada, Department for National Defence 1994, 3.

affected Canada's national security – in particular, her economic security.[91] Given these premises, the 1995 white paper argued that Canada needed to continue her efforts to promote global peace and stability.[92] Presumably, this included the Canadian Forces' continued participation in multilateral security operations.

Thomas Friedman has highlighted the potential instability that the increased economic interconnectivity of post-Cold War globalization has brought to the world.[93] From that perspective, the argument that global peace helps to ensure Canada's economic prosperity seemingly applies. Indeed, it also seems to explain Canada's participation in some multilateral security operations during the 1990s. For instance, regarding Canada's recent participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in East Timor, David Bashow has pointed to Canada's substantial trade interests with Indonesia, which date back to 1975 and which were valued at around $8 billion in the year 2000 (in terms of Canadian direct investment in Indonesia).[94] One could also quote Canada's substantial participation in the 1995 NATO IFOR mission in the former Yugoslavia as another case in point. Given that Canada has traditionally felt "more at home ideologically"[95] with NATO compared to the European Union, it is not inconceivable that the government saw Canada's participation in the IFOR mission as one way to strengthen Canada's economic ties with Europe, which has always

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[91] Canada, The Government 1995, ii.
[92] *Ibid*, ii.
[93] Friedman 1999, ix-xiii.
[94] Bashow 2000, 24.
[95] Haglund 2000, 101.

been a high priority action item within the Chrétien government's foreign policy, for both economic and political reasons.[96]

However, to stretch the above argument into one where Canada's economic security depends so greatly on global peace and security, that the Chrétien government's heavy 1994 commitment of the Canadian Forces toward multilateral security operations was necessary,[97] seems to overstate the case. Several viewpoints support this deduction. First, given their inherent complexity and practical difficulties, multilateral security operations are not necessarily the best way to resolve the transnational threats highlighted in the 1995 foreign policy white paper. Maloney's observation that "the use of UN peacekeeping as a surrogate force [in Canada's defence] … was considered to have run its course by 1967"[98] is indicative in this respect.

Second, a definite relationship between those transnational threats and Canada's economic security can hardly be drawn. As Dewitt has noted, those security issues are inchoate, often indirect and distant where national sovereignty is concerned.[99] Sokolsky has also argued that regional and domestic conflicts in Eastern Europe and Africa are of little economic consequence to Canada, since over eighty percent of Canada's international trade is conducted with the United States and most of the remaining twenty per cent is conducted

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[96] Canada, The Government 1995, 14.

[97] Sokolsky has observed that the Chrétien government sees Canada's economic security as a vital interest. (Sokolsky 2002, 7) One could point to the government's statements in its 1995 foreign policy white paper, that "[t]he promotion of prosperity and employment is at the heart of the Government's agenda," and "[t]he promotion of global peace … remains a central element of our foreign policy," as further affirmation of that conclusion. (Canada, The Government 1995, ii)

[98] Maloney 2002, 8.

[99] Dewitt 2000, 170.

with Europe and Japan.[100] In the same vein, regarding Canada's involvement in the recent Kosovo conflict, Jockel and Sokolsky have pointed out that few Canadians "travel there, export to or from there, or invest money there."[101] Additionally, Dewitt has stated that the countering of these threats are not necessarily matters of national defence in the first place.[102] These arguments make the point that neither the transnational threats highlighted in the 1995 white paper, nor Canada's economic security in light of those threats convincingly justify the Chrétien government's strong and open-ended commitment of the Canadian Forces toward multilateral security operations. In particular, it seems that the ends do not justify the means employed.

Nevertheless, the Chrétien government has not abandoned its strong but vague commitment to participate in multilateral security operations. Nor has it discarded its argument that the commitment is justified by the interest of maintaining Canada's economic security. Part of this may be due to the political necessity for the Chrétien government to conjure up a vital interest, in place of the previous defence rationale, to explain its strong commitment of the Canadian Forces toward multilateral security operations. In that light, the argument that Canada's economic security is critically dependent on international peace and stability, convincing or not, is obviously appealing to the Canadian public (as it is to any other public which values economic prosperity). Part of it may be because the Chrétien government was driven, in making their heavy stated commitment in 1994, by other

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[100] Sokolsky 2001, 346. Sokolsky adds that "[t]he record of the 1990s shows that it is possible to have many cases of regional instability, including numerous wars, and still have a prosperous, expanding and stable international economic order for that part of the world most important to the Canadian economy, the wealthy northern west, especially North America."

[101] Jockel and Sokolsky 2000, 2.

[102] Dewitt 2000, 171.

underlying rationales that it was unwilling to state in public. In any case, it is likely from the government's insistence that in addition to the rhetoric of Canadian altruism, the government will continue to articulate Canada's economic security as being the vital interest behind its strong commitment of the Canadian Forces toward multilateral security operations.

NATIONAL POWER, THE FUNCTIONAL PRINCIPLE AND NATIONALISM

In seeking to explain Canada's participation in multilateral security operations in the post-Cold War era, Louis Delvoie has separately observed that most analysts explain Canada's participation in UN peacekeeping in light of Canadian foreign policy aspirations, Canadian domestic politics, or Canada's international image and reputation.[103] For instance, he quotes Andrew Cooper as having argued in the past that Canada's participation in UN peacekeeping serves as "a symbol of Canada's world view," "a staple tool for the application of constructive internationalism" and "an area of issue specific advantage."[104]

Regarding Canada's foreign policy aspirations, various academics have recognised that Canada's participation in UN peacekeeping has helped to secure for Canada soft benefits such as reputation, status and influence within the international community.[105] Jockel has further observed that Canadian governments have traditionally used small contributions of its military resources to demonstrate solidarity with Canada's allies and other international

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[103] Delvoie 1999, 2.
[104] *Ibid*, 2.
[105] Dewitt 2000, 177. See also Delvoie 1999, 2, and Jockel 1994, 15.

organizations of her political interest, in order to leverage Canada's influence in the alliances and those organizations. Furthermore, Alex Morrison has noted that UN peacekeeping has provided Canadian governments with an opportunity to "put the functional principle into practice and to exercise leadership at the international level."[106]

The functional principle mentioned by Morrison refers to the longstanding notion in Canadian foreign policy that the influence of small powers in international affairs should be "greatest in connection with those matters with which they are most directly concerned."[107] Consistent with this principle, Canadian foreign policy bureaucrats have exercised Canada's influence within the international community by highlighting in each and every one of its international involvements the relevance of Canada's interests, the direct contributions made by Canada, and the capacity of Canada to participate in the situation concerned.[108] In this respect, Canada's participation in UN peacekeeping has become the grounds for the practice of the functional principle. This is not only because within the UN, Canada has the right to be heard,[109] but also because, as discussed earlier, Canada found itself a niche role as NATO's representative in UN peacekeeping during the Cold War. In this light, given that peacekeeping operations were relatively safe and infrequent during the Cold War,[110] which meant that the military resources expended in these operations were not substantial, UN peacekeeping has allowed Canada to garner international influence within the international

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[106] Quoted by Delvoie 1999, 2.

[107] As quoted from diplomat Hume Wrong's letter to Norman Robertson, the undersecretary of state for external affairs in 1942, regarding "Canada's role and status in the direction of war and the shaping of peace during inter-allied World War II negotiations." (Chapnick 2000, 189)

[108] *Ibid*, 189.

[109] Jockel 1994, 15.

[110] Malony 2002, 9-10.

community at a disproportionately low cost. As Dewitt has summarized, "[b]eing a liberal internationalist within the United Nations and other multilateral frameworks has been both relatively positive and safe."[111]

Any discussion on the functional principle would be incomplete without an investigation of Canada's longstanding quest to establish itself as a middle power in the international community. Launched by Brooke Claxton, Canada's wartime minister for defence, toward the end of the Second World War, the quest for that status – a theoretical construct of international politics which envisioned the creation of an intermediate level between the few great powers and the many small powers in world order – was initially pursued as a way to protect Canada from being commonly grouped with the small powers once the war ended and Canada's substantial contribution to the war effort was forgotten.[112] While Claxton eventually failed to secure a permanent status for Canada as a middle power in the United Nations, Canada's quest for that status was continued, not only by the Canadian foreign affairs establishment but also the Canadian academia.[113] This became the context for Canada's employment of the functional principle, first, by seeking a visible role as a UN peacekeeper, and later, in the late 1990s, by transforming that enthusiasm into the more expansive (and politically more vague) activism in the area of human security. Indeed, as Axworthy's attachment of the term "soft power" to the human security agenda indicates, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's (DFAIT) pursuance of the

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[111] Dewitt 2000, 177.
[112] Chapnick 2000, 189-192.
[113] *Ibid*, 192-193.

functional principle in the 1990s was always underlined to some extent by the desire to increase Canada's leverage, or power, within the international community.[114]

Certainly, Jockel has argued that in the post-Cold War era, it has become more difficult for Canada to secure its desired middle power position through participation in multilateral security operations. This was in view of the fact that more countries, like Germany and Japan, have followed Canada's formula of creating international leverage through participation in multilateral security operations. Furthermore, Canada's advantage as NATO's peacekeeping representative has become irrelevant, since the "Cold War formulas" for composing UN peacekeeping contingents no longer applies.[115] Nonetheless, the Chrétien government has apparently not discarded that *modus operandi*. As Dean Oliver has gathered from defence official Vincent Rigby's recent article regarding the Department of National Defence's (DND) involvement in the human security agenda,[116] the DND has always viewed "[h]uman security [as] a military project, too."[117] While Oliver has admitted that his conclusion is a slightly mischievous interpretation of Rigby's arguments,[118] he has nevertheless elucidated a key point: in spite of the high operational tempo that the Chrétien government's commitment toward multilateral security operations has generated, the DND and the Canadian Forces has always been (and will likely remain) strongly supportive of that

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[114] Chapnick has argued that the human security agenda was driven by Axworthy's desire to establish Canada as a middle power. (*Ibid*, 202-206) In this respect, it is noteworthy that Ferguson agrees that moral appeal is a source of national power in international politics. (Ferguson 2003, 22-24)

[115] Jockel 1994, 24.

[116] The aim of that article was ostensibly to counter allegations that the human security agenda had soured relations between the DFAIT and the DND and thereby invited suspicions that the Canadian Forces did not support that agenda. (Rigby 2001, 39)

[117] Oliver 2002, 135.

[118] *Ibid*, 135.

commitment. Justifiable or not, such an attitude helps to explain the government's continued strong commitment of the Canadian Forces toward multilateral security operations to this day.

On that note, one might ask why Canadian governments in the past and present have been so preoccupied with the notion of elevating Canada from the small powers in the international community. While the reasons are complicated,[119] certain key rationales can be discerned. One such rationale, it would seem, is Canada's longstanding concern about defining its national identity both domestically and internationally, especially with regard to the US.[120]

Jockel has observed that Canadians long for "distinctive roles in international affairs" in order to "differentiate them in the world's eyes and at the same time bolster their own sense of national identity in the face of the benign, but very real, American challenge."[121] That observation reveals a certain sense of anxiety regarding the dominance of the US – economically, militarily, diplomatically and culturally[122] – that Canadians have long felt since the end of the Second World War. This is partly because Canada, as Garth Stevenson has observed, is not a small nation by world standards, but, economically, she pales in

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[119] As Garth Stevenson has commented, "[t]o attempt to catalogue, let alone to evaluate, the "determinants" of Canadian foreign policy is a formidable task. Almost any political, social or economic characteristic of Canada might, and probably does, influence foreign policy, but the very vastness of the subject makes difficult the task of imposing some order on the data and some intellectual rigour on the analysis." (Stevenson 1989, 35)

[120] Jockel 1994, 16.

[121] *Ibid*, 17.

[122] Huntington 1999, 36.

comparison with the US.[123] In this light, the fact that Canada is both economically and militarily dependent on the US has undoubtedly created even more consternation for Canadians.

Beyond that, the close ties between the two countries have ironically presented a certain sense of threat to Canada's national identity and national unity. Anglophone Canadians who lived next to the Canada-US border have always seemed in danger of being inadvertently too culturally integrated with the Americans.[124] On the other hand, the desire of the Québécois to be close to the US represen

from "rich, … capitalist, and largely Anglophone liberal democracies."[128] Given this concern, debates over Canadian foreign policy have often focused on ways and means to exert influence over the US in her conduct of her foreign and defence policies.[129] Additionally, beginning with Sir John A. Macdonald's efforts to promote ties with the United Kingdom,[130] and lasting through the 1970s with Pierre Trudeau's ill-fated policy of the "Third Option,"[131] Canadian policy-makers have attempted to balance the US dominance over Canada by forming counterweights via Canada's external relations with the larger international community.[132] In the event, other than her ties with Europe, Canada's activism in international security affairs has become one of the desired counterweights.

In the case of the Liberals, one could add that the inclination to free Canada from US dominance was also due to their traditional penchant for promoting autonomy and self-government.[133] Additionally, as suggested earlier, that inclination is probably driven by concern about Canada's national unity, which has been beleaguered by not only the longstanding differences between Anglophone and Francophone Canadians, but also the multiple ethnicities within Canadian society, and the varying sense of national belonging among its large population of immigrants.[134] In any case, it is arguable that the perceived need to distinguish Canada from the US, while maintaining strong ties with the US in view of Canada's security and economic interests, has always been a predominant concern of

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[128] Stevenson 1989, 45.

[129] Jockel 1994, 16-17.

[130] Stevenson 1989, 38.

[131] Referring to the idea of promoting trade with the European Community as a counterweight to the protectionist economic policies of the Nixon Administration. (Stevenson 1989, 43)

[132] Jockel 1994, 18.

[133] English 2001, 95-97.

[134] Stevenson 1989, 47-49.

Canadian governments, both in the past and the present. Among other reasons, that concern has been a significant driver of their efforts to gain influence and power for Canada on the international stage.

From the above arguments, one could also conclude, in a circular way, that the desire to strengthen Canada's national identity, to distinguish Canada from the US or otherwise, has been itself a reason for the Chrétien government's strong commitment of the Canadian Forces toward multilateral security operations.[135] This is in view of the prevailing myth of Canada as having a special aptitude and calling for UN peacekeeping, or what Maloney has named as the "Great Canadian Peacekeeping Myth."[136]

Maloney has pointed out that the "Great Canadian Peacekeeping Myth" was directly related to the longstanding ideology of "Canadian Exceptionalism,"[137] which entails that Canada, among other things, is different from the US in terms of moral superiority. In particular, the myth is linked to the ideology by the popular Cold War notion that Canada was a "neutral" peacekeeping nation, as opposed to the "belligerent" United States who waged war in places like Vietnam, Granada and Panama.[138] Certainly, Jockel has argued that the notion of Canada as being a neutral peacekeeping nation was unfounded, given Canada's

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[135] In fact, Jockel has also observed that "[a]s one Canadian analyst has put it, 'to all intents and purposes, peacekeeping is the only major area of Canadian military activity that is not continental…peacekeeping is what we do that is not with the United States.' Or, another scholar has observed, 'peacekeeping is seen as an independent, distinctively Canadian activity and our internationalism as an antidote to too much continentalism.'" (Jockel 1994, 18)

[136] Maloney 2002, 2.

[137] *Ibid*, 2-6. Maloney states that Canadian governments, nationalist commentators and Canadian popular culture have carefully maintained the ideology of "Canadian Exceptionalism" over the past three decades.

[138] Jockel 1994, 21.

past participation in the two world wars and her NATO involvement in the Cold War.[139] Furthermore, the ideology of Canadian Exceptionalism has become untenable in the post-Cold War era, since the US' participation in multilateral security operations is no longer encumbered by its previous Cold War constraints.[140] Despite these arguments, Canadian efforts to distinguish Canada on the basis of moral superiority have apparently not ceased. This is evident from Axworthy's claim, during his tenure as foreign minister, that the human security agenda is essentially the "*Canadian* approach to the pursuit of global peace and security"[141] (italics added).

One reason for such efforts may be the continued faith of the government in the ability of Canada's participation in UN peacekeeping to strengthen Canada's identity and to help maintain her national unity. With regard to Canada's identity, some parts of the "Great Canadian Peacekeeping Myth" are after all not false. For instance, Canada's multiculturalism and bilingualism, and the Canadian Forces' past experience in UN peacekeeping, does mean that Canadians were particularly well suited for the role of peacekeeping.[142] To that end, Jockel has observed that where the international community's perception of Canada was concerned, "[v]ague images of snow, mounties (sic), and hockey have been joined by those of Canadian peacekeepers."[143] Moreover, peacekeeping is an activity which all Canadians – Anglophone and Francophone alike – support and commonly identify with.[144] In this light,

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[139] *Ibid*, 22-23.
[140] Jockel 1994, 25-26.
[141] Quoted by Chapnick. (Chapnick 2000, 205)
[142] Jockel 1994, 19-20.
[143] *Ibid*, 19.
[144] *Ibid*, 18.

even if the Canadian government's commitment of the Canadian Forces toward multilateral security operations no longer allows Canada to clearly differentiate herself from the US, that commitment is nevertheless still desirable. Hence, Canada's commitment of the Canadian Forces toward multilateral security operations is likely to remain driven by the desire to strengthen Canada's national identity, or, as Adam Chapnick has put it, to "promote nationalism through an internationally recognized identity."[145]

THE "AMERICANIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING" AND CANADA'S PROSPERITY

Considering how the Canadian Forces' participation in multilateral security operations has been influenced by the desire to distinguish Canada from the US, it is remarkable how the realistic rationale of maintaining goodwill with the US has also driven Canadian governments toward that participation. For instance, in 1973, the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau, who is well remembered for his nationalism vis-à-vis the US, effectively succumbed to Washington's pressure for Canada to participate in the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) operation in Vietnam, despite its reluctance to do so.[146] More recently, one can point to the Chrétien government's substantial

[145] Chapnick 2000, 188.

[146] As Jockel recounts, "the Canadians served long enough on their second national tour of duty in Vietnam to help provide a fig leaf to cover the U.S. retreat from the quagmire." (Jockel 1994, 14)

deployment of Canadian troops to the NATO IFOR mission – despite its initial ambivalence toward US calls for support – as another case in point.[147]

As suggested earlier, the rationale of maintaining goodwill with the US is based on Canada's critical dependence on the US, in terms of not only Canada's economic prosperity, but also her national security.[148] As Granatstein has pointed out, Canada's economy and economic infrastructure is exceptionally integrated with that of the United States, not least because of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA).[149] As for Canada's security, since the end of the Second World War, Canada has been dependent on the US for her defence against attacks from the air. This is evident from the nature of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which was established in 1958 to defend Canada and the US from the Soviet long-range bomber and missile threats.[150] In that arrangement, the US has always furnished the greater part of the military capabilities, and accordingly, the commander of the NORAD military command has always been an American general.[151] More recently, the concern of the Canadian government regarding the US' establishment of its Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the ongoing US missile defence initiative bears further testimony to Canada's dependence on the US for security. While these initiatives have evoked certain reservations in Canadian public, such as those of Canadian sovereignty and the peace of the international community, it is conceivable that the Canadian government, in that respect, has been concerned about NORAD's future as

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[147] Sokolsky 1997, 42. Sokolsky also argued that the ambivalence was due to the Chrétien government's worry that the Canadian Forces was not able to participate to the expected scale.

[148] Granatstein 2002, 4.

[149] The National Post, 23 October 2002

[150] Jockel 1993, 164.

[151] See *Ibid*, 166, and Granatstein 2002, 5.

well.[152] In view of these observations, it is arguable that even though Canada and the US share certain similarities in values and culture,[153] Canadian governments recognise the need to maintain a strong relationship with the US, due to Canada's security and economic interests in that relationship.

Regarding the relation of Canada's participation in multilateral security operations to the rationale of maintaining goodwill with the US, one aspect of multilateral security operations in the post-Cold War era is worth noting. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has become significantly more involved in multilateral security operations, within the context of both the UN and NATO. As Joel Sokolsky has observed, "the US is taking a direct role in the when, why and how of traditional peacekeeping operations, and is obtaining UN authority for peace-enforcement efforts under its leadership when the objectives largely support American interests or ideals."[154]

This development started with the US administration's renewed interest in UN peacekeeping after the success of the 1990 Gulf War. In particular, UN peacekeeping seemed to offer the US a way to draw more countries into the business of international peacekeeping. This would help the US, the sole superpower in the world, to avoid international pressures for her participation in those operations, beyond that necessary to meet her national

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[152] The discussion of these two issues is beyond the scope of this paper, due to their complexity. See, for instance, Granatstein 2002, 10-14, and James Fergusson's article entitled "National Missile Defence, Homeland Defence, and Outer Space" in *Canada Among Nations 2001*, for a more detailed background of the two issues.

[153] Sokolsky 1993, 146.

[154] Sokolsky 1997, 51.

interests.[155] In this light, the US initially adopted the approach of "assertive multilateralism" with regard to UN peacekeeping. However, the Clinton administration soon turned away from this approach after some unsatisfactory experiences with UN peacekeeping – particularly the 1993 UN mission in Somalia, where American lives were lost. Amidst significant domestic criticism of the UN's demonstrated financial and organizational inefficiencies,[156] a new approach emerged. The main thrust of the change was hawkishly simple. As recommended by Richard Armitage in 1994, "instead of lecturing the UN and saying 'no,' the United States had to bend the UN to our will."[157] Specifically with regard to UN peacekeeping, "the issue was not whether US forces would participate, but – by exercising US leadership – ensure that 'no U.N. peacekeeping operation anywhere should go forward without our explicit approval and guidance.'"[158]

This became the underlying theme of the fateful Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), *U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, issued by the White House in May 1994, which set out strict conditions for the US' participation in multilateral security operations. Essentially, the directive stated that where US troops were needed for multilateral interventions, Washington would lead the operation, but only under a UN mandate, and not under the command and administration of the UN bureaucracy.[159] In other words, as Sokolsky has argued, it amounted to the proclamation that multilateral security

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[155] *Ibid*, 21.

[156] As Sokolsky has observed, "[p]eacekeeping became a lightning rod for opposition to the Clinton administration's foreign policy, which seemed to place too much trust in the world body." (Sokolsky 2002, 5)

[157] Quoted by Sokolsky. (Sokolsky 1997, 23)

[158] Quoted by Sokolsky. (Sokolsky 1997, 23)

[159] Sokolsky 2002, 5.

operations would be done "the American way or not at all."[160] Indeed, most new and major multilateral security operations started in the 1990s have been executed either by US-led "coalitions of the willing," once the UN mandates were issued, or by the US-led NATO, where the UN failed to move and NATO's involvement was relevant.[161]

Sokolsky has termed this development in multilateral security operations as the "Americanization of peacekeeping."[162] That US national interests and political agendas have dominated multilateral security operations in this way should not be surprising. After all, Carole Jerome has observed that the political self-interests of the major UN nations,[163] and economic and corporate interests have always been significant in international decisions regarding multilateral security operations.[164] In that light, the "Americanization of peacekeeping" is but one recent example of that observation. However, what is significant in this case is that in the post-Cold War era, Canada all the more cannot afford to remove herself from multilateral security operations. Indeed, not only has the Mulroney government been particularly anxious to support the US in their renewed involvement in UN peacekeeping,[165] but also the Liberal government led by Prime Minister Chrétien, who, for that matter, had won the elections in 1993 "determined to distinguish himself from his predecessor."[166] On top of Canada's substantial security and economic interests in her

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[160] *Ibid*, 6.

[161] *Ibid*, 6.

[162] Sokolsky 1997, 2.

[163] Including the US, Russia, France, the UK and China.

[164] Jerome 2001, 38.

[165] Sokolsky 1997, 41.

[166] Hampson et al 2001, 6. Certainly, it is indicative in this respect that the Chrétien government had readily supported the US-sponsored UN mission in Haiti. (Sokolsky 2002, 6) More recently, the US-led "war on terrorism," where Granatstein has observed that Prime Minister Chrétien, despite his uneasy relationship

relationship with the US, such pragmatism was surely driven by the fact, as Allan Gotleib, a former Canadian ambassador to the US, has observed, that it is a matter of "no access, no influence" where the US administration is concerned.[167] In this respect, the Chrétien government's strong 1994 commitment of the Canadian Forces was arguably driven, among other reasons, by the realistic rationale of maintaining goodwill with the US.

It would however be overstating the case to suggest that the Chrétien government has been primarily driven by the interest of maintaining goodwill with the US in all of Canada's post-Cold War participation in multilateral security operations. The most recent example of a US-led multilateral security operation – the second Gulf War – is an example where the government apparently dropped that rationale, in favour of maintaining a "principled stand" of participating in multilateral security operations only when they were sanctioned by UN mandates.[168] The reasons for that decision remain unclear – it could possibly be due to the desire to maintain a unique Canadian identity, or the fear of over-commitment of the Canadian Forces, or both reasons, among others. In any case, this example drives home the observation that so long as the rationale of maintaining goodwill with the US is significant in Canada's actual participation in multilateral security operations, the government arguably has been calibrated, rather than compelled, by that rationale. Furthermore, it is apparent that the

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between President Bush (George W.), took just "a few days to sniff the wind" before deciding to align Canada with the US in its war on terrorism. (Granatstein 2002, 8)

[167] The National Post, 3 December 2002.

[168] See "Canada Stays out of War on Iraq: The Canadian government position on the war in Iraq." [http://canadaonline.about.com/library/weekly/aa031803a.htm]. 18 March 2003.

inherent conflict between that rationale and the public anxiety of US dominance over Canada will continue to be a source of concern for the Canadian government.[169]

also apparent that the future participation of the Canadian Forces in multilateral security operations, US-led or otherwise, is likely to continue, but at a rate and intensity calibrated according to realistic considerations of Canadian interests in the Canadian-US relationship, Canadian nationalism, the costs of the operation in question, and last but probably not least, the military's actual capability. Indeed, as Sokolsky has observed, this has always been the Canadian government's approach to Canada's participation in multilateral security operations.[175]

[175] Sokolsky has observed in Canada's past participation in multilateral security operations that "[delicate weighing of the national interests will be forgotten and the national interest will be adjusted to rationalize participation, not the other way around. Everything will rest upon the international and domestic circumstances prevailing at the time and if they are favourable, the [Canadian Forces] will participate. Will the public support the deployment? Can it be persuaded to support it? What will our allies do to us if we do not go? Who else is going? And, most important, if we go, how little can we get away with? To be sure, Ottawa will send as few as possible and it may send unprepared forces, but always some will be sent." (Sokolsky 2001, 348)

CANADA'S DEFENCE SPENDING

THE IMPACT OF SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS

It would not be surprising to find that the realistic attitude of Canadian governments toward Canada's participation in multilateral security operations also applies toward Canada's defence spending. In this respect, it is noteworthy that Canada's defence spending has long been debated intensely between two opposing camps. One camp (labelled, for the sake of this argument, as the "peace groups") considers any public spending to develop and maintain a combat-capable military as being wasteful.[176] The other camp (the pro-defence lobby) diametrically opposes the peace groups' view[177] and argues that the Canadian Forces' longstanding commitment-capability gap needs to be resolved – not only to allow Canada to defend herself against any threats, but also to ensure that Canada remains internationally respected.[178] To this end, since public opinion is a primary determinant of Canadian defence policy,[179] it is arguable that the strong presence of the peace groups has been a significant reason for Canada's low political will to spend on military defence.

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[176] See, for instance, Gwynne Dyer's book *War*. (Toronto: Stoddart, 1985) Jockel has also observed that the peace groups prefer the Canadian Forces to focus "almost exclusively on low-risk peacekeeping capabilities." (Jockel 1999, 31-32)

[177] For instance, Oliver, a self-professed pro-defence academic, has opined that "ideological carping on the declining utility or outright illegitimacy of a nation's armed forces is a hoary fiction Canadians would be wise not to indulge." (Oliver 2002, 124)

[178] For instance, Conference of Defence Associations Institute 2002, 2-6.

[179] Conference of Defence Associations Institute 1994, x-xi.

To the mind of the peace groups, public funds were better spent on social programmes in areas like education and health care, rather than Canada's military forces. Such thinking has probably been determined by what they saw as the futility of the Canadian Forces in Canada's defence. After all, geographically, as C.P. Stacey has observed over sixty years ago at the beginning of the Second World War, Canada is protected from military attacks by land and sea by the three oceans that surround her.[180] Historically, as Granatstein has pointed out, Canada's defence has always been assured by her alliances to great powers.[181] Furthermore, as Adrian Preston recounts, "Canadian political society until 1945 [has] survived as a product not of any magical powers of deterrence and diplomacy on her own account but of the acquiescent state of Anglo-American relations."[182] Indeed, given such observations, and considering the costs required and Canada's relative financial capacity, Canadians have long considered the need to raise professional armed forces for Canada's defence as being unrealistic.[183] In that light, it is not inconceivable that the peace groups have remain persuaded that Canada has no need to build and maintain a combat-capable military.

In any case, the peace groups in Canada have long made the case for less federal funding to be spent on the military, and more on social programmes.[184] In this respect, the end of the Cold War should have made it easier for the peace groups to gain credibility for their cause. After all, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the NATO's containment and deterrence strategies, Canada, as with most other NATO nations, no longer

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[180] Stacey 1940, 48.
[181] Granatstein 2001, 41.
[182] Granatstein 2001, 41.
[183] Preston 1971, 194.
[184] Jockel 1999, 4-5.

faces any significant direct military threat. In this regard, one would think that the pro-defence lobby has had a more difficult time arguing the need for the Canadian Forces to remain combat-capable.[185]

This, however, has not been the case. Given Canada's enthusiastic participation in multilateral security operations during the 1990s, the need for the Canadian Forces to remain combat-capable has been just as important, if not more important, compared to the Cold War era.[186] This is because as Canada continued to participate in the multilateral security operations in the 1990s, it became all the more obvious that the Canadian Forces needed to be equipped with "more than binoculars and blue berets."[187] This is in view of the fact that a significant proportion of those operations in the post-Cold War period required the employment of combat capable troops, rather than lightly armed peacekeepers. This was particularly so for the operations conducted in areas with civil conflicts, where the warring parties were typically a mix of regular and irregular forces, and negotiated truces were often not respected.[188] Under such circumstances, where "there [was] no complete peace to keep,"[189] the UN eventually departed from its long-standing definition of peacekeeping and

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[185] As Dean Oliver has noted, "[h]aving fought and won the 'war without battles,' what was left for a victor's army to do?" (Oliver 2002, 125)

[186] Jockel and Sokolsky 2000, 11-13.

[187] Jockel 1999, 23. During the Cold War, Canadian troops had been deployed to a variety of multilateral security operations ranging from peace observation missions to stabilization, counterinsurgency and peace enforcement missions. However, the fact that combat capability was required for multilateral security operations remained relatively unknown, due to the low frequency of instances where combat activity was actually required, and also the general connotation (due in no small part to the common use of the term "peacekeeping" by "the popular press and even the professional analytical community" to denote the full span of multilateral security operations) that peacekeeping involved only "trucekeeping," or "interpositionary peacekeeping." (Maloney 2002, 7)

[188] Jockel 1994, 4.

[189] *Ibid*, 5.

gave peacekeeping forces formal powers to use combat force for peace enforcement.[190] This happened for the 1993 UN mission in Somalia,[191] as well as those in Haiti and Bosnia.[192]

It is not inconceivable that the peace groups felt a certain sense of anxiety about such developments, since they added strength to the pro-defence lobby's argument that the Canadian Forces needed money to maintain her combat capability. Indeed, as Oliver[193] and Reid[194] have observed, public sympathy for the Canadian Forces' commitment-capability gap has increased in recent years. In this light, the occasionally virulent attacks by the peace groups on the credibility of the DND and the Canadian Forces in public, for instance, when financial irregularities were found,[195] could perhaps be explained by that anxiety. In any case, the peace groups have continued to present their case strongly in the post-Cold War era. For instance, they have argued that Canada no longer needs a combat-capable military when "there was no longer any 'war' to be fought."[196] Additionally, they have constantly quoted polls suggesting that the Canadian public preferred social spending to defence spending.[197]

Certainly, it is clear that Canadian governments have never totally subscribed to the views of the peace groups – this much is evident in the continuing political commitment to maintain the combat capability of the Canadian Forces, as last stated in the *1994 Defence*

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[190] *Ibid*, 5-6.
[191] *Ibid*, 6.
[192] Sokolsky 2002, 5.
[193] Oliver 2002, 132.
[194] The Vancouver Sun, 8 March 2003.
[195] See, for instance, The Globe and Mail, 9 October 2002 and 3 January 2003, and The Halifax Herald Limited, 14 October 2002.
[196] Oliver 2002, 133.
[197] See, for instance, Staples 2002, 6, Southam Newspapers, 29 December 2002, and The National Post, 22 October 2002.

White Paper.[198] Nonetheless, the peace groups have continued to maintain an institutional presence in Canada's defence debate. In this sense, one expects that the peace groups will continue to play a significant role in keeping Canada's defence spending low.

THE LIBERAL TRADITION: ADVANCE AND RETREAT

The poor relationship between the Liberal government of Prime Minister Chrétien and the Canadian Forces has often been cited as a reason for Canada's low defence spending as well. In March 2003, the National Post in fact claimed that the government was "anti-military", when pointing to the deteriorated state of the Canadian Forces.[199] In this regard, the Chrétien government's hasty decision to cancel the planned acquisition of military helicopters (despite a heavy termination fee of almost half a billion dollars[200]) upon being elected in 1993[201] certainly indicates its disregard, if not actual distaste, for the military to some extent. One could also point to the foreign policy guidance of Lloyd Axworthy, Prime Minister Chrétien's foreign minister in the late 1990s, as another case in point. As Fen Osler Hampson and Dean Oliver have discerned, one of its tenets is that military force has become less relevant in the international politics of the post-Cold War era.[202] Jockel and Sokolsky have argued that Axworthy had propagated this notion during his tenure as the foreign

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[198] Canada Department of National Defence 1994, 12.

[199] The National Post, 29 March 2003.

[200] Jockel 1999, 75.

[201] These helicopters would have replaced the Canadian Forces' search and rescue and Sea King helicopters. (Jockel 1999, 68).

[202] Quoted by Jockel. (Jockel 1999, 6) This has been disputed by several scholars. See, for instance, Kim Nossal's article "Foreign policy for wimps" in *The Ottawa Citizen*, 23 April 1998, and Michael Ignatieff's article "Time to Walk the Walk" in *The National Post*, 14 February 2003.

minister because Canada, in what was then its state of decline, "simply could not afford as much 'hard power,' not even the limited amount it had before."[203] Oliver and Stairs have separately suggested that the tenet was possibly driven by competition between the DFAIT and the DND for federal funding.[204] In any case, it is apparent that the tenet would not have emerged if Axworthy had had a greater regard for the military.

The Chrétien government has not been alone in their disregard for the military. Byers, back in 1975, highlighted the "lack of interest and/or understanding of military issues shown by successive cabinets"[205] as a reason for the government's lack of support for the military. John English has also observed that throughout Canadian history, the Liberals have generally had a strained relationship with the military.[206] In this respect, Maloney's observation of the Trudeau government in the 1970s comes to mind:

> [In] seeking to present the Third World with a non-colonial, non-imperialistic all-Canadian image, [the Trudeau government] generally considered Canada's NATO commitments, encumbered with all those nasty nuclear and conventional weapons, as the mad sibling locked in the basement window whenever polite company came over for dinner.[207]

Douglas Bland, in a speech made in year 2000 expounding the realities of Canadian defence policy, explained the reasons for the poor relationship between the Liberals and the Canadian Forces. In addition to their inherent prejudice against the military, the Liberals

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[203] Jockel and Sokolsky 2000, 7.
[204] See Jockel 1999, 6, and Stairs 1999, 393.
[205] Shadwick 2002, 46.
[206] English 2001, 101-103.
[207] Maloney 2002, xii.

generally regarded the Canadian military officer corps as a political liability. This was because the latter, in acting according to its own accord, had occasionally contradicted the interests of Canadian politicians. Instances of this situation included Canada's uncoordinated entry into the NORAD agreement, as well as the AVRO Arrow jet fighter project, which was eventually aborted. Moreover, the military's cover-up of the 1993 incident in Somalia (where Canadian troops tortured and killed a local youth[208]) and other internal scandals in the mid-1990s confirmed that the military was "political dynamite best kept far from the cabinet table."[209]

While the Chrétien government's disregard for the military may have been true, this does not necessarily mean that they oppose the military's existence. As highlighted earlier, in the *1994 Defence White Paper*, the Chrétien government had rejected the calls of the peace groups to do away with the combat capability of the Canadian Forces. As the white paper stated, the government is committed to "[maintaining] a prudent level of military force to deal with challenges to our sovereignty in peacetime, and retain the capability to generate forces capable of contributing to the defence of our country should the need arise."[210] In this light, it would be more correct to state that the Chrétien government has instead followed a course of realism in its defence spending. This is apparent from the fact that it has constantly stayed on ambiguous middle ground between the peace groups and the pro-defence lobby[211] – presumably, to ensure that it does not lose political support from either sector. Perhaps more significantly, it is also apparent from the government's realization that Canada needs a

[208] See Jockel 1999, 26-31, for the background of the 1993 Somalia incident.
[209] Bland 2000, 22-23.
[210] Canada, Department of National Defence 1994, 12.
[211] Oliver 2002, 126.

combat-capable military to maintain her seat at the various international organizations of her interest. As the *1994 Defence White Paper* also states, "by opting for a constabulary force – that is, one not designed to make a genuine contribution in combat – we would be sending a very clear message about the depth of our commitment to our allies and our values, one that would betray our history and diminish our future."[212]

To this end, Middlemass and Sokolsky have observed that Canadian governments, in maintaining Canada's seat in NATO and NORAD during the Cold War, have long run the course of "spending just enough" for the Canadian Forces.[213] In this light, the Chrétien government's realism, as discussed earlier, is no more than an extension of that spending philosophy. This is apparent in the development of the much-touted second defence "review" of the Chrétien government. In February 2002, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, former defence minister Art Eggleton, under apparent pressure from the media, announced that a full defence review would be undertaken.[214] However, after prolonged uncertainty over its scope, timeframe and form,[215] the DND still has not carried out that review. Instead, it has gone no further than launching public consultations regarding an "update" of Canada's defence policy.[216] While the reasons for the DND's apparent reluctance to conduct a full defence review remain unclear, it is possible that it is driven, at least in part, by the government's concern that a full review in the post-September 11 mood

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[212] Canada, Department of National Defence 1994, 13.

[213] Middlemiss and Sokolsky 1989, 214-220.

[214] Colonel A. Sean Henry (Retired), "The Elusive Defence Policy Review: A CDA Review," [http://www.cda-cdai.ca/library/defpolrev.htm]. Last accessed 24 April 2003.

[215] Shadwick 2002, 46.

[216] Canada, Department of National Defence, "Defence Update Consultation Site," [http://www/dnd/ca/menu/consult/index_e.asp]. Last accessed 24 April 2003.

can generate more defence spending than what it considers is necessary. After all, Sokolsky has observed that where budget surpluses have been available, the government has not spent more on defence because "it did not believe it had to in order to secure vital Canadian interests."[217] In particular, the government has always believed that Canada does not need a strong military, since Canada's security and prosperity is not dependent on that, but rather largely on her good relationship with the US. Furthermore, where Canada's combat capability is necessary in this age of the "Americanization of peacekeeping," the government realizes that Canada will never make a militarily important contribution to US-led multilateral security operations. Rather, Canada's moral support matters more, and in that light, token combat packages are often enough to gain the appreciation of the US. In that sense, the Canadian Forces' combat capability, while necessary, is apparently not significant to the government.[218]

Not all Canadians agree with the Chrétien government's realism in this respect. Martin Shadwick has observed that amidst the uncertainty of the government's promised defence review, many writers have made the case for that review to be carried out.[219] However, in a larger perspective, these writers remain no more than the minority of the Canadian public. While Canadians, in general, are not, as what the peace groups and those in Canada's foreign affairs establishment make it out to be, anti-military or unmilitary in nature,

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[217] Sokolsky 2002, 7.

[218] *Ibid*, 7.

[219] Shadwick 2002, 46. See Oliver 2002, 129-131, and Colonel A. Sean Henry (Retired), "The Elusive Defence Policy Review: A CDA Review," [http://www.cda-cdai.ca/library/defpolrev.htm] as well.

they are largely unconcerned with Canada's defence.[220] Shadwick has argued that this was due not only to the existence of the "Militia myth" – the idea that Canadian citizens can always be easily transformed into a credible fighting force during periods of crisis[221] – but also to the geography and history of Canada's defence, as discussed earlier. In any case, Canadians, as observed by Jockel, have largely allowed the government "a free hand in setting defence policy."[222]

Given such circumstances, one can expect that Canada's defence spending will continue to be low in the foreseeable future. This is not due simply to the presence of the peace groups, or any disregard that the Chrétien government may have for the Canadian Forces. More accurately, it is due to the government's pragmatic attitude of always "spending just enough" – by its standards – to maintain Canada's international alliances and influence in international organizations of her interest. In this light, even if Canada's defence spending rises in the near term, the increase is likely to be slow.

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[220] Shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US, Granatstein stated in his presentation to the SCONDVA that "Canadians have never lost the colonial attitude they had at the foundation of the European settlement," and that "Canadians have always been prepared to let someone else make the strategic decisions, pay most of the bills, and do most of the dying. (Granatstein 2001, 41) C.P. Stacey made a similar remark in 1940: "Canada's history is marked by an alternation of long periods when the national defences are utterly neglected with short violent interludes, arising out of sudden foreign complications, when the country wakes up to the inadequacy of the defences and tries to make up for earlier inactivity by measures taken in the teeth of the crisis." (Stacey 1940, 53)

[221] Shadwick 1994, 15.

[222] Jockel 1999, 31.

CONCLUSION

Through the 1990s, Canada has maintained its strong commitment of the Canadian Forces toward multilateral security operations, as stated in the *1994 Defence White Paper*. While those operations became more costly and more numerous during that decade, Canada's low defence spending however ensured that the Canadian Forces remains operationally incapable of fully meeting its allocated tasks, as contained in that commitment. In that sense, Canada has faced, for some time, a real gap between her stated commitment toward multilateral security operations and her defence spending.

In explaining the strong stated commitment of the Canadian Forces toward multilateral security operations, several observations are worth noting. First, although Canadian altruism toward the problems of less fortunate peoples in other parts of the world is significant, it is probably not the primary reason for the Canadian government's heavy stated commitment of the Canadian Forces toward multilateral security operations in the post-Cold War era. In addition to altruism, other realistic rationales, such as the desire to strengthen Canada's identity and her influence in international organizations, and the need to maintain goodwill with the US where the "Americanization of peacekeeping" is concerned, may have driven the government into making that commitment too. These rationales, if true, are likely to continue to drive the government toward maintaining its strong statements of commitment toward multilateral security operations, not least because of the prevailing American interest and leadership in these operations. In this, however, it is likely that the government will continue to be persuaded by realism in its participation – specifically, case-by-case

involvement, in accordance with pragmatic considerations of cost, public sentiment, international interests, and not least, the military's capability. Such realism will ensure that the Canadian Forces' participation does not occur at a rate beyond that achievable by its actual operational capability.

On the other hand, Canada's defence spending is not expected to pick up significantly in the foreseeable future. This is not because the Canadian public, as a whole, is against defence spending, since Canadians are largely unconcerned with the defence of their nation. It is also not due primarily to the ardent efforts of the peace groups in keeping military spending down, or any inherent disregard for the military that the government may contain, though these may all be probable factors in explaining the low defence spending. More accurately, it is due to the inclination of the Canadian government to follow, similar to Canada's participation in multilateral security operations, a course of realism in charting Canada's defence spending. In this, given that it did not consider a strong military as a critical prerequisite for Canada's security and prosperity, the government has always been guided by the philosophy of spending just enough to maintain the Canadian Forces' combat capability – not least, in the post-Cold War era, for making token contributions toward US-led multilateral security operations. To this end, due to the nonchalance of the Canadian public toward Canada's defence, the government has always been allowed largely a free hand in making its defence decisions. In this light, the government's current realism is likely to continue keeping Canada's defence spending low.

From the above deductions, it is arguable that the gap between the government's stated commitment to participate multilateral security operations and her defence spending is

likely to continue into the future. To narrow this gap, the government either has to significantly cut its stated commitment toward multilateral security operations, or to increase significantly its defence spending. However, both eventualities are unlikely to happen as long as the current politics of international peacekeeping and the paradigms of Canada's foreign and defence policies remain unchanged. In this sense, Canada's commitment-defence spending gap is likely to remain irrecoverable, at least in the near term. As it has always been, this will remain an issue not of mindless ambiguity, but rather that of realistic complexity in Canada's defence policy in the post-Cold War era.

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