

## Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the [Communications Policy of the Government of Canada](#), you can request alternate formats on the "[Contact Us](#)" page.

## Information archivée dans le Web

Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n'a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s'appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada.

Conformément à la [Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada](#), vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « [Contactez-nous](#) ».



## **Abstract**

Australia is a nation that occupies a unique place in the World. It is a relatively sparsely populated nation of Western descent and values nestled in a region that is dynamic and diverse. Aside from geography, the cultural, ethnic, linguistic and societal diversity of the region ensures that Australia has little commonality with its neighbouring states of the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, a distinct change has occurred in the role and degree of influence that Australia exerted within the region over the past thirty years. Prior to 1970, Australia relied upon Great Britain and the United States for strategic influence in pursuit of its national interests. By the new millennium, Australia had developed into a confident and accomplished nation capable of wielding considerable influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The question to be asked was how did this change come about?

When one evaluates the evolution of Australian defence policy over this period, in conjunction with economic, foreign and immigration policies, a clear pattern of growth emerges in Australia's strategic influence. In the period 1970-1980, Australia's strategic influence had been based on a defence policy of 'Forward Defence', which gave way to an insular one of 'Continental Defence'. Continental defence gave way to 'Self Reliance' in the 1980s which subsequently developed into the more outward focused 'Forward Response' during the nineties. It was during the 1990s that Australia made the greatest progress with the integration of defence policy into Australian economic, foreign and immigration policies. Without this 'Whole-of-Nation' strategic approach, Australia would not have developed either the confidence or capability to build and lead a regional

coalition to resolve the 1999 provincial problem that was East Timor. Like no other, this event demonstrated that through the thirty-year evolution of defence policy, in conjunction with other policies, Australia had developed into an Asia-Pacific 'Middle Power' in its own right.

## Table of Contents

<b>1.0 Introduction.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2.0 Seeking a New Direction: 1970 to 1980.....</b>	<b>12</b>
2.1 Strategic Circumstances: 1970 to 1980.....	15
2.2 Foreign Affairs and Trade: 1970 to 1980 .....	20
2.3 Domestic Political Scene: 1970 to 1980 .....	25
2.4 Summary: 1970 to 1980.....	30
<b>3.0 Seeking Engagement in the Asia-Pacific: 1980 to 1990 .....</b>	<b>31</b>
3.1 Strategic Circumstances: 1980 to 1990.....	34
3.2 Foreign Affairs and Trade: 1980 to 1990 .....	42
3.3 Domestic Political Scene: 1980 to 1990 .....	47
3.4 Summary: 1980 to 1990.....	51
<b>4.0 Engagement to Ambivalence: 1990 to 2001 .....</b>	<b>53</b>
4.1 Strategic Circumstances: 1990 to 2001.....	54
4.2 Foreign Affairs and Trade: 1990 to 2001 .....	60
4.3 Domestic Political Scene: 1990 to 2001 .....	66
4.4 Summary: 1990 to 2001 .....	70
<b>5.0 Thirty Years of Defence Evolution in Retrospect .....</b>	<b>71</b>
<b>Appendix 1.....</b>	<b>76</b>
Countries of the Asia-Pacific .....	76
<b>Glossary .....</b>	<b>77</b>
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>82</b>

It is true that we are not a numerous people, but we have vigour, intelligence and resource, and I see no reason why we should not play, not only an adult, but an effective part in the affairs of the Pacific.

Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, 1939<sup>1</sup>

## 1.0 Introduction

Even today, there exists intense speculation over who exactly discovered the great southern land that is now known as Australia. Dutch Navigators in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century tentatively named this large landmass in the southern hemisphere as *Hollandia Nova* (New Holland). However, there is no question that it was two British explorers, Captain James Cook and Mathew Flinders who are largely credited with both the claiming and naming of *Terra Australis* (meaning Southern Land) for Great Britain in 1770. Despite not knowing the exact size and composition of Australia (the anglicised form of *Terra Australis*), the British House of Commons were quick to realise the potential of this new land and in 1779, made the decision to establish a penal colony at Botany Bay.<sup>2</sup> Thus, in typical British economical fashion, they resolved two issues for the price of one. Australia was to be settled and developed by those social undesirables who had been clogging the current prison system.<sup>3</sup>

Instrumental in its development as a future nation were the one hundred and fifty-nine thousand convicts transported to Australia over an eighty year period.<sup>4</sup> Exactly what shape that the nation would take was probably not foreseen by the esteemed members of the House of Commons in 1779. The convicts and their guards had established a small

---

<sup>1</sup> Doctrine Wing. *Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*. Australian Defence Force Publication, 2002, 47.

<sup>2</sup> *Book of Australian Facts*. Reader's Digest, Sydney, 1992, 18-24.

<sup>3</sup> On 13 May 1787, eleven ships carrying 770 convicts departed Portsmouth and 251-days later, arrived safely at Botany Bay on 20 January 1788.

<sup>4</sup> *Book of Australian Facts*. Reader's Digest, Sydney, 1992, 26.

outpost of western culture in a remote land. There was little knowledge of Australia's resources, location or even neighbouring lands and peoples. Extensive exploration was already underway to determine the possibilities that Australia had to offer from its resources and geographic location.

It was these series of explorations over the years that determined that Australia was the world's smallest continent (or largest island)<sup>5</sup> with a land mass half as large again as Europe or approximately the same size as the United States of America (USA).<sup>6</sup> To circumnavigate the continent, one would need to undertake a voyage of just under twenty-six thousand kilometres.<sup>7</sup> However, such a voyage would be worth it when one considers that in modern times, Australia has been described as the 'World's Quarry' with vast mineral, energy and gem deposits.<sup>8</sup> Australia was also blessed with significant natural resources such as timber, fishing and extensive land suitable for agriculture. It is small wonder that such a sparsely populated, yet immensely resource wealthy land, became very attractive to other nations within the region resulting in large numbers of legal and illegal immigrants.

Equally, it was Australia's lengthy and controversial immigration policy that arguably generated the greatest source of tension with other nations within the Asia-Pacific Region. The origins of this notorious policy, which became known as the 'White

---

<sup>5</sup> *The World Fact Book 2002*. Australia, 3 <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos>>.

<sup>6</sup> *Book of Australian Facts*. Reader's Digest, Sydney, 1992, 226.

<sup>7</sup> *The World Fact Book 2002*. Australia, 2 <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos>>.

<sup>8</sup> In 1988-89, Australia was the world's largest producer of diamonds (mainly industrial quality), alumina, bauxite, mineral sands, the fourth largest producer of iron, nickel and gold, and the eighth largest producer of copper. On the energy side, Australia has significant deposits of black and brown coal, oil, natural gas and uranium (*Book of Australian Facts*. Reader's Digest, Sydney, 1992, 238-241).

Australia Policy’, can be traced back to the 1850s.<sup>9</sup> White miners resented the large numbers of Chinese immigrants<sup>10</sup> who had flocked to the newly discovered goldfields and white farm labourers vehemently opposed the productive indentured labourers from the Pacific Islands called ‘Kanakas’.<sup>11</sup> With the coming of Federation, leading local politicians “warned that there would be no place for ‘Asiatics’ or ‘coloureds’ in the Australia of the future.”<sup>12</sup> Indeed, this belief was reinforced with the arrival of Australian Federation in 1901 when one of the first Acts passed by the new Federal Government was the ‘Immigration Restriction Act 1901’<sup>13</sup>. While the purpose of this Act was “to place certain restrictions on immigration and to provide for the removal from the Commonwealth of prohibited immigrants”<sup>14</sup> and was lauded by the white Australians of the time<sup>15</sup>, it can be argued that this Act effectively excluded Australia from the Asia-Pacific region. The detrimental effect that this Act had on Australian relations with the other nations of the Asia-Pacific region and Australia’s efforts to over-come this stigma, will be examined later in this paper. However, there is no question that this long-lived

---

<sup>9</sup>Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. *Abolition of the White Australia Policy*. Australian Immigration Fact Sheet correct as at 13 February 2003, 1.

<<http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/08abolition.htm>>

<sup>10</sup> Between 1851-60, approximately 50 000 people per year were migrating to Australia. Of these arrivals, the Chinese formed the largest non-European group. Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. *Over Fifty Years of Post-war Migration*. Australian Immigration Fact Sheet correct as at 29 May 2001, 2. <<http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/04fifty.htm>>

<sup>11</sup> Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. *Abolition of the White Australia Policy*. Australian Immigration Fact Sheet correct as at 13 February 2003, 1.

<<http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/08abolition.htm>>

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.


<sup>13</sup> This Act was the first in a series to restrict non-whites in Australia. The Pacific Island Act 1904 and Sugar Cultivation Act 1913 were aimed at the ten thousand Kanakas in country. Other Acts were aimed at the Japanese dominated pearling industry and Indian and Malay labourers. (Day, David. *The Rise and Fall of the White Australia Policy*. Australian Studies Lecture, University of Melbourne, 6 May 1997).

<sup>14</sup> People prohibited by the Act included the insane, the sick (infectious), anyone likely to become a burden on society. It also prohibited prostitutes, criminals and anyone under contract from performing manual labour within Australia. (*Ibid.*, 2).

<sup>15</sup> The Australian Prime Minister, William Hughes, declared in 1919 that the Act was “the greatest thing we have achieved”. (*Ibid.*,2).



immigration policy appeared remarkably short-sighted in that it did not take into account Australia's geographic position and future role within the Asia-Pacific region.



**Map 1 – Asia - Pacific Region**

The Asia-Pacific region is an immense area and encompasses 44 countries (see Map 1 and Appendix 1).<sup>16</sup> The Pacific region alone consists of over 7500 islands comprising 22 countries and territories containing a wide variety of ethnic, cultural and linguistic groupings.<sup>17</sup> The region is also home to approximately 60 % (about 3.7 billion people) of the world's population including six of the ten most densely populated nations

<sup>16</sup> Annex A details the respective countries which constitute the Asia-Pacific region (*Countries of the Asia-Pacific Region*. <http://www.apcss.org/Countries/countries.html>)

– China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Japan.<sup>18</sup> Currently, there are 27 countries within the Asia-Pacific region that receives population-funding assistance from the United Nations for various social and economic development programs.<sup>19</sup> This assistance constitutes a third of the United Nations Populations Funds total expenditure. 17 of these countries are regarded as Category ‘A’ nations and consequently required substantial support.<sup>20</sup> A paradox exists in that this region is also regarded as the world’s pre-eminent economic region and has led the world in economic growth for the past twenty years.<sup>21</sup> It has become readily apparent over the years, that extremes between culturally diverse nations, contributes towards regional friction and uncertainty. Many of the Category ‘A’ nations face domestic instability. Long-standing and deep-seated arguments between nations such as Japan and Korea, India and Pakistan, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands continue to fan the flames of discontent. Such diversity, from a cultural, historical, economic and linguistic perspective combine to create a dynamic and volatile region filled with opportunity and risk. Positioned quite literally in the middle of this unpredictable region are the predominately Western nations of Australia and New Zealand.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> United Nations Population Fund Report. *Asia and the Pacific: A Region in Transition*. New York, August 2002, 66.

<sup>18</sup> United Nations Population Fund Report. *Asia and the Pacific: A Region in Transition*. New York, August 2002, 6.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>20</sup> Category ‘A’ Nations are regarded as the least developed nations with an annual per capita GNP below US\$900 and meet four or less of the UN’s demographic and socio-economic indicators (infant and maternal mortality rates, female literacy, HIV/AIDs, supervised births, contraception prevalence, adolescent fertility rate and secondary net enrolment ratio (*Ibid.*, 4, 66-67).

<sup>21</sup> Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *Promoting Integration with Asia-Pacific Region*. <[http://www.australia.ch/eng/trade/promoting\\_integration\\_aspec.asp](http://www.australia.ch/eng/trade/promoting_integration_aspec.asp)>

<sup>22</sup> Current figures describe the major ethnic group of Australia and New Zealand as 92% and 79.1% Caucasian / European respectively. (*The World Fact Book 2002*. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos> )

While the role New Zealand plays within the region will be examined in later sections, it will be considered as secondary to Australia's role in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>23</sup> From first settlement to the early years of World War Two (WW2), Australia readily supported Britain in any and all undertakings. The British, in pursuit of their own strategic goals, employed Australian military forces towards that end. The fact that Australian strategic goals did not enter into the matter only became apparent in early 1942 when the Japanese had landed in New Guinea, attacked the Australian mainland by air and sea and looked set to either invade or blockade Australia from the north.<sup>24</sup> The Australian Prime Minister of the time, John Curtin, made the crucial decision to break from over a century of acceding to the British control and forged a new alliance with the United States to defend Australia against the Japanese threat.<sup>25</sup> This decision heralded a new beginning for Australia in the Asia-Pacific although it can be argued that Australia had simply exchanged one dominant power for another. Australia followed the United States lead into Vietnam and appeared to act on many of the United States policies and initiatives within the Asia-Pacific as if it were their own. It was not until the United States withdrew from Vietnam in the seventies, that Australia realized that she stood alone and if Australia desired to play an effective role in the Asia-Pacific, many important foreign and defence policy changes were required.

---

<sup>23</sup> In terms of early history including British rule, New Zealand closely parallels that of Australia. One

There is no doubt that the past three decades have seen the development and emergence of Australia as a 'Middle Power' within the Asia-Pacific region. The early 1970s saw a period of testing for Australia where she was no longer fully supported by the foreign, economic and security policies of a major power.<sup>26</sup> Lacking this crutch, Australia was forced to seek and develop her own policies and see to her own defence. It was an "extreme form of independence" that had been forced upon Australia by Britain and the United States.<sup>27</sup> Throughout the seventies and into the eighties, Australia had to struggle to forge and maintain productive associations with the nations of the region. Throughout this struggle, defence, foreign, trade and immigration policies which had been developed in isolation, repeatedly conflicted with Government priorities and each other. Such conflicts resulted in mixed messages being sent to neighbouring states as Australia sought to win over nations with whom she shared no ethnic, cultural, or historical background. Defence and foreign policy in particular was extremely disjointed throughout this period which had a significant effect on how Australia was perceived by the region. This was readily apparent through the eighties and early nineties when the defence policy appeared to be internally focused while foreign, trade and immigration policies were externally focused. Indeed, it was not until the mid-nineties, that the international significance of a capable and effective defence policy operating in conjunction with clear and robust foreign and economic policies became apparent. By the dawn of the new millennium, Australia had developed into a Middle Power in the

---

<sup>26</sup> Although Australia retained a number of multilateral defence agreements such as ANZUS, SEATO and ABCA, contributing nations like the US and UK were making critical decisions that had dramatic impact on Australia's defence, foreign and economic policies. This impact will be covered throughout the paper.

<sup>27</sup> Hudson, W.J. *Australia in World Affairs, 1971-1975*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney Australia, 1980.

Asia-Pacific and had become proficient in exercising multifaceted influence towards the goal of regional peace and stability.

The changes in Australian Defence Policy from 1970 to 2001 are a reflection of the evolution of Australia's perception of its local environment and its increasing role as a middle power in the Asian – Pacific region. To support this position, this paper will examine the emerging trends of Australia's defence policy in conjunction with foreign and economic policy throughout each of the three decades from 1970 to 2001. The periodical changes in strategic circumstances, foreign affairs, trade and immigration policies in addition to the political climate of the day, will be used throughout the paper to validate Australia's progression from the shadow of superpower dominance to a mature and talented nation capable of exerting effective influence and stability within the Asia-Pacific region.

## **2.0 Seeking a New Direction: 1970 to 1980**

Perhaps one of the most important lessons learned by Australia from WW2, was the need for a stronger and robust peacetime defence.<sup>28</sup> Australia had previously based its defence on the provision of military forces to Britain with the expectation that Britain or more specifically, the Royal Navy, would shield Australia from any attack.<sup>29</sup> With further Japanese gains in Asia including the fall of Singapore, the flaws in this Defence Policy became apparent to Australia forcing her to turn to the United States in self-preservation. Following WW2, Australia now found herself in the throes of a strategic dilemma in that it was an inherently Western society amidst rising Asian nations. This

---

<sup>28</sup> Gavin Fry. *A Century of Army: The Australian Army in Profile*. Department of Defence, Canberra, 2000, 14.

<sup>29</sup> Gary Brown and Laura Rayner. *Upside, Downside: ANZUS: After Fifty Years*. Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 2001, 5.

dilemma caused successive federal Governments to view “the national situation as inherently one of long term insecurity”.<sup>30</sup> Correspondingly, Australia now looked to establishing formal defence alliances with dominant nations and organisations.<sup>31</sup>

In pursuit of this objective, Australia became of the founding members of the United Nations (UN) as, under Article 24 of the UN Charter, the Security Council has “the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. When one considers that Article 52 of the Charter grants the Security Council the authority to “call upon regional organisations to maintain peace and security as appropriate”, it is no surprise that Australia entered into formal regional defence relationships with *both* the United States and Britain in the form of ANZUS<sup>32</sup> and SEATO<sup>33</sup> treaties. Each treaty was for collective defence in the event of an attack on any signatory by a third party. Australia continued to weave its web of defence policy based on powerful friends with commitment to the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement of 1957. Britain, along with Australia and New Zealand, were committed to providing defence assistance to Malaysia and Singapore in the form of forward basing of air, land and sea assets.<sup>34</sup> This combined and joint force was known as ANZUK (Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom) and would defend Malaysia or Singapore in the event of an attack.<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> Coral Bell. *The American Alliance and the Revolution in Military Affairs*. University of Sydney, Australian Centre for American Studies, Sydney, 1998, 72-73.

<sup>31</sup> Gary Brown and Laura Rayner. *Upside, Downside: ANZUS: After Fifty Years*. Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2001, 5-6.

<sup>32</sup> The ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and United States) treaty was signed 1 September 1951 (Gary Brown and Laura Rayner. *Upside, Downside: ANZUS: After Fifty Years*. Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 28 August 2001 at <http://aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/2001-02/02cib03.htm>).

<sup>33</sup> SEATO (South-East Asian Treaty Organisation) was signed in September 1954 and became Australia’s second pact with the US. Its membership also included Britain, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines (Smith, Gary; Cox, Dave & Burchill, Scott. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 55-56).

<sup>34</sup> ANZUK: *Last of the ‘Colonial’ Units in SE Asia* <<http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-conflicts-periods/malaya-korea/anzuk.htm>>

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

It was this pennant for aligning itself with ‘Super-Friends’ that prompted critics such as Australian academic, John Ingleson, to describe Australia’s foreign policy as “... one of ‘loyalty to the protector’, in the first instance to Britain and after the Second World War, to the United States”.<sup>36</sup> Unfortunately, this trend was not just restricted to domestic critics. Member nations of the region viewed Australia’s willingness to be dominated by Britain or the United States as confirmation of suspicions that Australia was indifferent to neighbourhood problems.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, Australia’s active pursuit of national defence via a British or United States protective umbrella was in fact, undermining its position and relationship with those very nations that ultimately posed a potential threat to its security. This security dilemma that Australia found itself in was amplified with the announcement of British intentions to withdraw all of its military forces east of the Suez in January 1968 followed by President Nixon’s 1969 ‘Guam Doctrine’<sup>38</sup> and stated intent to withdraw US forces from Vietnam. The defence ramifications arising from these actions by its staunch allies shocked Australia and its people. In the interests of national security, a fundamental and rapid reshaping of Australia’s defence policy and capabilities was required.

The intrinsic and essential changes to Australian defence policy through the Seventies was significant and ultimately, did little to improve Australia’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region. In response to the ever-changing strategic circumstances, transformation of Australian foreign and trade policies and domestic political variances,

---

<sup>36</sup> Hudson, W.J. *Australia in World Affairs, 1971-1975*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney Australia, 1980, 283.

<sup>37</sup> O’Neill, R. *The Defence of Australia - Fundamental New Aspects*. Australia National University, Canberra 1976,

<sup>38</sup> This doctrine arose as a result of rising casualties from the Vietnam War and increased US reluctance to become involved in any future Asia-Pacific conflict (Smith, Cox & Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 65).

all contributed to a fresh yet flawed defence policy. These flaws restricted Australia's progression to becoming a true regional power.

### **2.1 Strategic Circumstances: 1970 to 1980**

To fully grasp the limitations in Australia's defence policies through 1970 to 1980, one first needs to comprehend the chaotic strategic circumstances in which Australia found herself. Treaties and alliances were changing, dominant powers were withdrawing and newly independent nations and associations were rising in the region. It was in this environment that Australia found it had a 'derivative' defence policy in which the major coordinates were derived from either Britain or United States.<sup>39</sup> Australia's defence policy and resulting force structure has been described as "a commitment of single service expeditionary forces that were not required to operate jointly, but were each slotted into the combat forces of our major allies."<sup>40</sup> There is no doubt that Australia's defence policy, through its reliance on Britain and the United States, was insufficient for the strategic events unfolding within the Asia-Pacific region during this period. Without a defence force capable of operating as an individual entity, Australia was simply unprepared to stand alone in the region. Devoid of the guiding influence of Great Britain or the United States, Australia's defence policy lost focus and meandered through the remainder of the decade. The rootless nature of the defence policy demonstrated that Australian politicians appeared to lack a clear understanding of the region's strategic circumstances and security issues. Unmistakably, the fact of having a

---

<sup>39</sup> Robert O'Neill. *The Defence of Australia - Fundamental New Aspects*. Australia National University, Canberra 1976, 53.

<sup>40</sup> Robert O'Neill. *The Defence of Australia - Fundamental New Aspects*. Australia National University, Canberra 1976, 53.



defence policy that was reliant on another country eventually had a detrimental effect on Australian national interest and security in the Asia-Pacific.

In relation to security, both ANZUK and ANZUS had committed Australia to a policy of 'Forward Defence' where the objective was to prevent the spread of communism.<sup>41</sup> It was this policy that drew Australia into such conflicts as Korea (1950), Malaya (1955), Vietnam (1963-1972)<sup>42</sup> and North Borneo during the Indonesia 'confrontation' (1965). Conducting conflicts abroad appealed to Australian successive Governments as it was thought preferable to fight wars overseas rather than on Australia territory or on its approaches.<sup>43</sup> Britain's decision to withdraw and the United States Guam Doctrine<sup>44</sup>, along with the 'encroachments' of Soviet naval forces and increasing influence of China within the region, alarmed Australia.<sup>45</sup> Her defence treaties had become increasingly irrelevant.

The decline of British influence and its intent to withdraw saw the birth of a new defence covenant, the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) that replaced the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement of 1957.<sup>46</sup> Under this agreement, Singapore and Malaysia were responsible for their own defence with Australian, New Zealand and Britain

---

<sup>41</sup> Gary Smith, Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 56-57.

<sup>42</sup> In 1963-1964, Australia's contribution to Vietnam was in the form of military advisors. Conscriptio was introduced in November 1964 and a brigade sized group deployed under the auspices of SEATO in April 1965 (NSW HSC ONLINE - *Modern History: Australia's Involvement in the Indochina War* [http://www.hsc.csu.edu.au/modern\\_history/international\\_studies/indochina/indo\\_viet/page33.htm](http://www.hsc.csu.edu.au/modern_history/international_studies/indochina/indo_viet/page33.htm))

<sup>43</sup> Gary Smith, Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 57.

<sup>44</sup> The message of this doctrine was that irrespective of what was written in their treaties with the USA, these allies are expected to take a greater responsibility for their own security unless threatened by a major power with nuclear weapons (Gary Smith, Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 65).

<sup>45</sup> W.J. Hudson. *Australia in World Affairs, 1971-1975*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney Australia, 1980, 164.

<sup>46</sup> FPDA (Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand and Britain) was proposed in June 1968 and came into effect 1971 (ANZUK: Last of the 'Colonial' Units in SE Asia (<http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-conflicts-periods/malaya-korea/anzuk.htm>))

pledging to ‘immediately consult’ on appropriate measures following an attack on either nation.<sup>47</sup> Although this agreement initially saw Australian ground forces under the auspices of ANZUK remain overseas, Australia moved away from the policy of forward defence and withdrew of its ground contribution. Thereby, Australia became a major factor in the subsequent disbandment of ANZUK in 1975.<sup>48</sup> This move also paralleled the decline of Western military cooperation within SEATO. The Australian Labor Government under Prime Minister Whitlam, moved to phase out Australian involvement in SEATO and in 1977, SEATO was officially disbanded.<sup>49</sup> Perhaps one of the major detrimental effects of this decision by Australia was that its forces lost operational contact with their New Zealand counterparts. This period marked a divergence in Australian – New Zealand military cooperation especially given that New Zealand maintained its ground force commitments in Singapore under a new bilateral agreement.<sup>50</sup> An unintended but significant ramification of this divergence for both countries was the change in Asian perceptions of both countries. Through the withdrawal of its forces, suspicions were raised that Australia was not serious about contributing to regional security. New Zealand’s obvious commitment on the other hand, lent it a certain authority and doors of regional economic opportunity were subsequently opened to it alone.<sup>51</sup> The detrimental effects derived from this change in perception had significant strategic and economic consequences to Australia that haunted it throughout the decade and well into the next.

---

<sup>47</sup> <http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-conflicts-periods/malaya-korea/anzuk.htm>.

<sup>48</sup> Although Australia withdrew its ground forces from Malaysia in 1975, it continued to base two Fighter Squadrons in Malaysia and RAN vessels in Singapore for a number of years under this agreement (W.J. Hudson. *Australia in World Affairs, 1971-1975*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney Australia, 1980, 19-20).

<sup>49</sup> *Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO)*. Columbia Encyclopaedia, Sixth Edition, 2001  
<<http://www.bartleby.com/65/st/SthEATO.html>>

<sup>50</sup> W.J. Hudson. *Australia in World Affairs, 1971-1975*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney Australia, 1980, 19-20.

However, further inadvertent strategic consequences that related to the ANZUS treaty and the ASEAN relationship continued to reinforce Asia perceptions of Australian indifference over this period and thereby, effect Australia's influence. Successive Australian Governments had promoted the ANZUS alliance as the solution to all of Australia's security concerns. Prime Minister Harold Holt's catch cry 'all the way with LBJ' and Prime Minister Gorton's speech declaring 'that wherever the United States is resisting aggression ... then we will go Waltzing Matilda with you' in the late 1960s, were met with derision in ASEAN circles.<sup>52</sup> Such an image, could and did, damage Australia's image with its neighbours. In 2001, a parliamentary paper from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade stated that:

There is no guarantee that without the security that ANZUS has provided, Australia would not have developed as an inward looking, less open and secure, more xenophobic society, a sort of apartheid-era South Africa in the South Pacific.<sup>53</sup>

ASEAN members had begun to develop the concept of an Asian-Pacific Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971 that was brought to fruition in 1976 as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia.<sup>54</sup> Despite being admitted as a 'Dialogue Partner' to ASEAN in 1974,<sup>55</sup> Australia had completely overlooked two important strategic points. Firstly, Australia's enthusiastic embrace of ANZUS along with its willingness to be involved in US led conflicts and the continued maintenance of US bases on its territory, worked against the very ideals that ASEAN was striving

---

<sup>51</sup> W.J. Hudson. *Australia in World Affairs, 1971-1975*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney Australia, 1980, 19-20.

<sup>52</sup> Gary Brown and Laura Rayner. *Upside, Downside: ANZUS: After Fifty Years*. Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2001, 5-6.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>54</sup> Association of South-East Asian Nations: *Overview of South-East Asian Nations*. <<http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm>>

<sup>55</sup> Association of SouthEast Asian Nations: Overview of ASEAN-Australian Relations. <<http://www.aseansec.org/12974.htm>>

towards (thereby always precluded the winning of ASEAN trust or association). Secondly, Australia's interests in any potential Asia-Pacific conflict would not always correspond with those of the United States. If the United States had an alliance with Australia's opponent, then the possibility exists that any mediation or even involvement by the United States may actually work against Australian national interest.<sup>56</sup> The regional reality brought about by ANZUS and Australia-US relations was all too clear. Basically, as Australia was not threatened by a Russian or Chinese invasion throughout 1970s, then the apparent security benefits from ANZUS were actually detrimental to Australia's regional development and influence.

Nevertheless, Australia's focus on ANZUS cannot be held solely accountable for detrimental effects on ASEAN relations. In 1975, a founding member of ASEAN, Indonesia, invaded the Portuguese territory of East Timor and was roundly condemned by the United Nations including Australia and other ASEAN members. Despite this condemnation, the world community perceived Australia's subsequent recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor in January 1978 as 'betrayal' of regional peace and stability. Such a perception undermined Australia's ability to exert regional influence and one could logically conclude that it would have had a telling effect on the Australian Government's self-confidence to attempt to exert any further influence. Supporting this argument would be the fact that Australia had succumbed to pressure by Indonesia, a larger and more dynamic nation with which she had bilateral trade and defence arrangements.<sup>57</sup> Indonesia at the time, had a far larger and more capable military

---

<sup>56</sup> O'Neill, R. *The Defence of Australia - Fundamental New Aspects*. Australia National University, Canberra 1976, 125.

<sup>57</sup> P.J. Boyce & J.R. Angel. *Independence and Alliance: Australia in World Affairs 1976-80*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983, 140-141.

and was also the leader of ASEAN and therefore, in control of the region's economic direction. Australia's recognition of Indonesian sovereignty of East Timor was in direct contrast to her professed beliefs in human rights and commitment to regional peace and stability and subsequently, appeared to have been an act of 'appeasement' by a weaker nation. It appears that during this decade, Australian politicians were uncertain of Australia's strategic environment or the form and shape that national defence policy should take therein.

## **2.2 Foreign Affairs and Trade: 1970 to 1980**

When one considers the defence implications arising from the changes to Australian foreign affairs and trade, the imperfections become apparent. Firstly, despite geographic location and potential new markets within the region, Australia's largest trading partner from 1901 to 1970 was Great Britain.<sup>58</sup> The United States followed by other European nations, constituted the remaining bulk of Australia's trading partners with some Asian nations such as Japan only beginning to gain a share of the Australian market in the late sixties.<sup>59</sup> It stands to reason that while Great Britain and the United States remained Australia's largest trading partners (and therefore their economics were linked), both of these nations shared a vested interest in the maintenance of peace and security within the region. However, with the rise of the European Community and subsequent attempts by Britain to join the Common Market, British trade with Australia diminished substantially.<sup>60</sup> There can be no question that the reduction of British economic interest in Australia was also a factor in Britain's 1968 decision to withdraw

---

<sup>58</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *One Hundred Years of Trade*. Australian Government, February 2002, 2-6.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

from the Asia-Pacific. Equally, the United States, in pursuit of its own domestic and foreign policy agendas through the Guam Doctrine, simply did not consider trade with Australia as critical to its own economic and strategic circumstances. Hence, Australia has lost a significant portion of its export market<sup>61</sup> and defence posture in a very short period of time. The Australian Government (shocked out of their complacency) was forced to seek for new markets and friends within the region, even among old adversaries like Japan and communist China.

Despite post-WW2 fears of a resurgent Japan, Cold War fears of communism and the 'Domino Theory' and perhaps even a fear of Asia itself, Australia made regional overtures for economic and defence benefits.<sup>62</sup> Japan needed the raw materials and energy resources and Australia needed the economic benefits. A bilateral trade relationship was quickly established and in 1970-71, Japan became Australia's largest trading partner. The significance of Japan as a trading partner is apparent when one considers that the total Australian exports to Japan had improved by a factor of two when compared with the United States and a factor of three with Great Britain's totals.<sup>63</sup> Over the decade, this bilateral relationship strengthened considerably. In a number of speeches between June 1976 and 1980, the Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Frazer, outlined common Australia-Japanese interests including the extent and quality of bilateral trade, geographic location, mutual interest in the peace and stability of the region and the

---

<sup>60</sup> Smith, Cox & Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 57.

<sup>61</sup> By 1970-71, Australia's exports to the UK and US had fallen over the past 20 years to 3.9% and 9.8% respectively from 32.7 % and 15.2% (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *One Hundred Years of Trade*. Australian Government Publishing Service, February 2002, 6).

<sup>62</sup> Smith, Cox & Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 60-61.

sharing of a security relationship with the United States. Australia signed the 'Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation' with Japan in June 1976 and was entered into force on 21 August the following year. The 'Basic Treaty' as it became known, was to strengthen strong economic links and establish political principles for the conduct of bilateral communication over a wide range of topics.<sup>64</sup> It was not a defence treaty, however it did have defence implications in that it promoted peace and regional stability. Of a similar nature, was Australia's diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China on 21 December 1972 through the Sino-Australia Recognition Agreement, the relaxing of previous isolationist policies towards Taiwan in 1976 and the increased links with the non-communist Republic of Korea.<sup>65</sup> Diplomatic manoeuvrings, along with the establishment of non-Government organisations such as the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC),<sup>66</sup> saw seven Asian-Pacific nations in the top ten of Australia's export market. Australia had commenced integration within the Asia-Pacific and developed vested interests with those nations whom were previously thought to constitute a potential threat.

Although developing trade links promoted peace and stability, being a sparsely populated, yet inherently wealthy country amidst the world's most populated and relatively impoverished region meant that immigration would always have an effect on Australia's diplomatic standing and economic relationship with its regional neighbours.

---

<sup>63</sup> By 1979-80, Japan received 26.8% of Australia total exports compared to the EC (of which Britain was now a part) and US of 14.1% and 10.9% respectively (P.J. Boyce & J.R. Angel. *Independence and Alliance: Australia in World Affairs 1976-80*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983, 222).

P.J. Boyce & J.R. Angel. *Independence and Alliance: Australia in World Affairs 1976-80*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983, 189-192.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 207-213.

<sup>66</sup> PBEC is an association of business leaders from 19 Pacific nations and serves as a forum to discuss economic issues and develop contacts. It was founded in 1967, but its input was not felt until 1974 (Pacific

The White Australia Policy was a justifiable point of contention by Australia's Asian and Pacific neighbours and would continue to work against Australia's national interest. For most of the century, Australia had been sheltered from international pressure over this policy through being a British dominion and thereby having very little international standing. With the removal of this protection and in light of rising international condemnation such as that faced by South Africa through its 'Apartheid' policy, Australia moved to dismantle its discriminatory immigration policy in late 1960s through the scrapping of the controversial European language test. Given the security concerns raised by the withdrawal of Britain and the United States, Australia could ill afford to become an international 'pariah' nation like South Africa.<sup>67</sup>

Despite the White Australia Policy being officially dismantled by the Whitlam Government in 1972, the controversy continued. The aftermath of the Vietnam War saw many refugees seeking and being refused entry into Australia for apparently bureaucratic and arguably racist reasons. Member countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) were highly critical of Australia's refusal to take larger numbers of refugees with the Prime Minister of Singapore stating:

... {the refugees} could sail on to more salubrious countries ... There's the great wealthy continent of Australia, and they have a very sympathetic Prime Minister who believes that the White Australia policy is most deplorable and damnable, and here is his chance.<sup>68</sup>

---

Basin Economic Council - Australian Committee. *PBEC - The Independent Voice of Business in the Pacific* (<http://www.sunsite.anu.edu.au/pbec/aboutpbec.htm>).

<sup>67</sup> Gary Smith, Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 31.

<sup>68</sup> P.J. Boyce & J.R. Angel. *Independence and Alliance: Australia in World Affairs 1976-80*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983, 133.



Immigration, whether by selected individuals or refugees, along with the ghost of the White Australia Policy would continue to adversely affect Australia's foreign influence and defence policy. A good example of this adverse effect occurred in April 1976 when a small Vietnamese refugee boat sailed undetected into Darwin harbour.<sup>69</sup> This boat was the forerunner of many and demonstrated that Australia was unable to detect or defend against incursions in its maritime approaches. This influx of refugees, along with the serious pressure applied by the ASEAN countries to accept more refugees, showed that Australia sovereignty was as vulnerable to erosion as any other nation in the region. In recognition of a mutual interest, Australia and ASEAN cooperated from 1978 to 1980 to successfully resolve the refugee crisis and restrain Vietnam's expansion into Kampuchea.<sup>70</sup> It was only in response to the recognition of a 'mutual interest' crisis that Australia actively participated to resolve a regional issue.

Nevertheless, Australia had now taken an active part in promoting peace and stability within the region through its foreign policy. One of the tools that Australia employed in this role, albeit in a haphazard manner, was the use of defence aid. Attached to defence aid is the belief that both the national defence of Australia and the recipient will benefit from it thus making a subsequent contribution to regional stability. Australia applied its defence aid in three regional locations: ASEAN, Papua New Guinea and various South-Pacific nations.<sup>71</sup> Throughout 1970s, various economic, political and strategic reasons resulted in defence aid being reduced or increased in a chaotic fashion by the Government of the day. The halving of defence aid to the soon-to-be independent

---

<sup>69</sup>P.J. Boyce & J.R. Angel. *Independence and Alliance: Australia in World Affairs 1976-80*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983, 131.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 133-136.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 129.

Papua New Guinea in 1975 after a protracted defence association and despite not yet having a long-term agreement in place is just one example of this random application.<sup>72</sup> When considering the apportionment of defence aid, the Australian Government of the day appeared to overlook the historical similarities in Great Britain's discarding of Australian defence relations the previous decade and the strategic importance of Papua New Guinea in the defence of Australia emphasised in WW2. The regional uncertainty created by this example stemmed from a lack of political understanding of Australia's strategic circumstances and a relevant defence policy.

### **2.3 Domestic Political Scene: 1970 to 1980**

The idea that Australian politicians lacked a complete understanding of the strategic circumstances including the defence implications appeared as a rather strange twist of fate when one considers that the Whitlam Government swept to power in 1972 after 23 years in Opposition on national defence issues such as Australian involvement in Vietnam, conscription and US bases on Australian territory.<sup>73</sup> If a Party were campaigning on defence and foreign policy issues after 23 years of reflection, one would logically conclude that this Party had a detailed and innovative plan just waiting for the chance to implement it. However, this was proved not to be the case as Labor accelerated a move away from 'Forward defence' without much thought as to what would replace it. The deficiency of the forward defence policy had created a vacuum that required new defence strategy, doctrine, and restructuring to fill it.

---

<sup>72</sup> This decision was the result of an overall defence budget cut and a political desire by Australia to avoid being cast as a 'neo-colonialist' infringing on PNG sovereignty (W.J. Hudson. *Australia in World Affairs, 1971-1975*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney Australia, 1980, 22-23).

<sup>73</sup> W.J. Hudson. *Australia in World Affairs, 1971-1975*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney Australia, 1980, 17-19.

A national defence policy has to be based on a threat assessment. The problem for the Whitlam Government was that whilst the Cold War continued, it was considered extremely unlikely that Australia would face a major attack from the USSR or even a rising power such as China.<sup>74</sup> Therefore, the defence strategy had to move to counter small-scale attacks against Australian territory. This particular strategy assumed that the most likely contingency would be a conflict fought on Australian soil (without US military forces) rather than offshore operations. The term 'Continental Defence' was coined to describe this 'Fortress Australia' strategy.<sup>75</sup>

In early 1973 the then Defence Minister, Mr Lance Barnard, formally renounced the forward defence strategy.<sup>76</sup> For long-term defence planning purposes, the Whitlam Government declared that Australia did not foresee the prospect of an external attack within the next 10-15 years. Criticism of the Whitlam Government's analysis focused not on the lack of a threat, but rather on the apparent arbitrary time period proposed. It was acknowledged that, other than the superpowers, any nation contemplating hostile intentions towards Australia would have to invest several years of effort to develop the required capability for a major attack.<sup>77</sup> The Whitlam Government's argument can be made for a strategic warning / lead time of five to ten years if one considers that the production of major equipments and capabilities require some years. To leap beyond that interval to 15 years as the Whitlam Government did, appears rather fanciful in their ability to predict the long-term strategic outlook. Particularly so when one also considers

---

<sup>74</sup> O'Neill, R. *The Defence of Australia - Fundamental New Aspects*. Australia National University, Canberra 1976, 125.

<sup>75</sup> W.J. Hudson. *Australia in World Affairs, 1971-1975*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney Australia, 1980, 13-14.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

the relative indeterminate nature of the region and the fact that the majority of Asian-Pacific nations were developing new relationships with each other and the superpowers.<sup>78</sup>

Australia's own relationship with the world's superpowers throughout the 1970s was disorganised. Criticism of the US bombing campaigns of the Vietnam War by the Whitlam Government in 1972 caused the Nixon Administration to become self-protective of its relationship with Australia. This attitude became self-evident when the leasing rights of US installations in Australia were renegotiated. The Whitlam Government viewed the US installations as both a potential nuclear target and a violation of Australian sovereignty since Australia had no daily control over them.<sup>79</sup> However, not wanting to further jeopardise the already waning ANZUS treaty, the Whitlam Government did not fully press the United States on the installation's issue and consequently, only secured minor concessions.<sup>80</sup> Similarly, Australia-UK relations were affected when Mr Whitlam declared SEATO as "moribund and an anachronism from the period of containment of China"<sup>81</sup> and subsequently reduced Australian commitments to ANZUK. This situation increased British domestic pressure for a comparable withdrawal and thereby hastened the end of SEATO.<sup>82</sup> In the case of the Soviet Union and China, the Whitlam Government was content to follow the US lead in Soviet relations and as previously stated, moved ahead with developing a new relationship with China.<sup>83</sup> However, the pendulum of Australian-superpower relations swung the other way when the Liberal Frazer Government came to power in 1975.

---

<sup>78</sup> W.J. Hudson. *Australia in World Affairs, 1971-1975*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney Australia, 1980, 15.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>80</sup> Gary Smith, Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 70.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>82</sup> W.J. Hudson. *Australia in World Affairs, 1971-1975*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney Australia, 1980, 18.

Upon coming to power, Prime Minister Frazer immediately labelled the Whitlam Government's foreign policy as "holding unrealistic notions that an age of peace and stability had arrived in the world."<sup>84</sup> The Frazer Government further concluded that the world situation was 'deeply disturbing', détente with the USSR was not effective in stabilizing world peace and security and that the United States had best realise that the USSR was maintaining its focus on achieving world domination.<sup>85</sup>

In a foreign policy speech on 1 June 1976, the Frazer Government reversed Australia's approach to the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region with the intent of keeping them engaged within the region to defend against the Soviet threat.<sup>86</sup> In pursuit of this goal, Australia attempted to extend military cooperation with the US in the Indian Ocean to counter the increased Soviet naval presence there. The Frazer Government lifted the 10-year ban on US nuclear-powered ships entering Australian ports that the Whitlam Government had previously enforced, granted a 10-year lease on all US installations in Australia rather than the previous annual lease arrangement and offered increase use of Australian air and naval facilities. The main difference of Frazer's approach compared to Australia's previous 25 years of Cold War foreign policy was that it focused exclusively on the Soviet threat and completely rejected the communist threat and falling domino theory posed by the expanding Chinese influence.<sup>87</sup> However, despite the opposing views on strategic threat, the Frazer Government did little

---

<sup>83</sup> P.J. Boyce & J.R. Angel. *Independence and Alliance: Australia in World Affairs 1976-80*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983, 321-333.

<sup>84</sup> P.J. Boyce & J.R. Angel. *Independence and Alliance: Australia in World Affairs 1976-80*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983, 321.

<sup>85</sup> The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 appeared to support Mr Frazer's point of view on USSR intentions during this period (Ibid., 321-323).

<sup>86</sup> Gary Smith, Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 70-71.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

to alter the course of defence policy set by the 1972 Defence Review and actioned by the Whitlam Government.<sup>88</sup>

In all fairness however, the Fraser Government had been forced to accept a strategy of restructure that had been underway for almost three years and consequently, there was little impact that could be made immediately.<sup>89</sup> A case in point is while the Whitlam Government advocated the need for Australian 'self-reliance' and stressed the importance of enhancing the capabilities of Australian industry to meet the military's requirements, the allocation of funds for new capital equipment had fallen by almost 70% over the five years and therefore did not support a self-reliant premise.<sup>90</sup> Given the long lead-times required for development and manufacture of new equipment and thus enhanced military capabilities, there was little that the Fraser Government could have done. The Whitlam Government had consigned the realisation of both a self-reliant and capable military to the 1980's and beyond.<sup>91</sup>

With the legacy of the Whitlam Government's defence policy haunting them, the Fraser Government prepared for the next decade with the acceptance of a new White Paper in 1976. This Defence White Paper advocated continental defence, self-reliance, ANZUS and the prospect of a low-level threat to Australian territory rather than a major

---

<sup>88</sup> The Australian Defence Review 1972 publicly recognised that Australia needed an increasingly self-reliant military strength (Coral Bell. *Nation, Region and Context*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 122. Australian National University, Canberra, 1995, 32).

<sup>89</sup> The change to continental defence advocated by the Whitlam Government commenced with a simple statement that 'Australia must now assume the primary responsibility for its own defence against any neighbourhood or regional threats'<sup>89</sup> and an endorsement of a major restructure of the Australian Defence Force along functional lines. The proposed defence restructure was already quietly underway having commenced in 1972 under the outgoing Liberal government (W.J. Hudson. *Australia in World Affairs, 1971-1975*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney Australia, 1980, 24-25).

<sup>90</sup> In 1969-70, capital expenditure was 15.8% (A\$173.985M) of the Australian Defence vote. By 1974-75, it had fallen to 4.8% (A\$86.180M) (Ibid., 28).

<sup>91</sup> While the Fraser Government increased defence capital expenditure by approximately 66% (A\$156M), much of this was to pay for equipment ordered by the McMahon Government in the late 1960s. A similar

attack, all of which were favourites theorems of the Whitlam Government.<sup>92</sup> This White Paper did not specify how Australia might be attacked such as guerrilla warfare or small raids on facilities or armed incursions. It also focused on the defence of Australian territory and neglected the maritime approaches.<sup>93</sup> What this meant was that both the Whitlam and Frazer Government's approach to developing an appropriate force structure, doctrine, training and procurement was *ad hoc* thereby, ensuring that Australian Defence policy throughout the decade, could not be integrated with other Government policies and priorities.

#### **2.4 Summary: 1970 to 1980**

There can be no doubt that this decade posed a series of crucial challenges to both the Australian Government and the Australian Defence Establishment of the day. In a very short period of time, Australia lost the protective umbrella provided by Britain and the United States, finding itself isolated and vulnerable in a seemingly hostile strategic environment. Government failure to respond decisively to trade and foreign affairs issues weakened the regional environment and Australia's position in it. A factor in highly critical Government decisions in issues such as East Timor may have stemmed from the lack of a strong and capable military force.

The end of SEATO and ANZUK, along with the detrimental effect on ANZUS by the Guam doctrine, left Australia with little choice, but to move to a 'continental defence'. Such a defence policy placed the emphasis on deterrence of attack on Australian territory and thereby, restricted the Government's ability to support its foreign

---

amount was needed for both industry and Defence to stay abreast of developing weapon technology (Ibid., 12-13).

<sup>92</sup> Paul Dibb. *The Conceptual Basis of Australia's Defence Planning and Force Structure Development*. Canberra Papers of Strategy and Defence No 88. Australian National University, Canberra, 1992, 75-83.

policy within the region. While the need to implement defence reform was recognised and instigated, the lack of political strategic integration together with insufficient funding, resulted in little positive effect being achieved by the end of 1979. Australia would enter the next decade as a vulnerable nation with an exceedingly limited ability to exercise regional influence in pursuit of its national interest.

### **3.0 Seeking Engagement in the Asia-Pacific: 1980 to 1990**

If nothing else, the period 1970-79 demonstrated that within the radically shifting strategic environment, Australia needed to develop an effective 'national' defence strategy. Such an approach would have to be developed from first principles and address issues like defence force regional responsibilities, likely conflict scenarios, capability and force structure requirements and Australia's approach to the revolution in military affairs.<sup>94</sup> Australia entered 1980 with the concept of continental defence and the expectation that Australian forces would have to deploy and fight on their own. It was anticipated that any conflict would be against hostile forces operating on Australian soil and low-level in nature. The ripple effect following Britain's and the United States withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific coupled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and Chinese expansionism, ensured that national defence would remain a key issue with successive Australian Governments.

In relation to the Australian Governments of the day, the influence of just two Australian Prime Ministers was exerted over this period. The Liberal Government under Malcolm Frazer continued its policies until defeated on 11 March 1983 after seven years in power by Robert (Bob) Hawke's, Australian Labour Party. Bob Hawke continued as

---

<sup>93</sup> W.J. Hudson. *Australia in World Affairs, 1971-1975*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney Australia, 1980, 16.



Prime Minister until being deposed in December 1991 by a leadership challenge. It was the Hawke Government that had the most significant impact upon Australian defence policy with the commissioning of the *1986 Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities* Report, known as the Dibb Review, which was subsequently followed by the new Defence White Paper, *The Defence of Australia 1987*.<sup>95</sup> From these reports, the boundaries of Australia's strategic defence interest within the region began to take shape but in the only context of a 'Continental' defence strategy operating from Australian territory.<sup>96</sup> If nothing else, these Hawke Government reports reflected the change from the past Government mindsets under Whitlam and Frazer, that Australia's national security is inextricably bound *with* rather than *against* the nations of the Asia-Pacific.<sup>97</sup>

Following this fundamental alteration in strategic direction, defence planners faced a similar challenge to that of the previous decade. In the absence of a creditable threat, how does one develop an effective defence policy from which capability requirements, force structure, doctrine and training flow? Paul Dibb who wrote the 1987 White Paper continued with the theme that defence began and ended on the coastline of Australia. Dibb disregarded his own analysis from 1983 over the potential threat to Australian claims on the Antarctic continent from resource hungry nations.<sup>98</sup> Australia

---

<sup>94</sup> Robert O'Neill. *The Defence of Australia - Fundamental New Aspects*. Australia National University, Canberra 1976, 54.

<sup>95</sup> Paul Dibb's article, *The Evolution and Future of Australian Defence Policy* contained in Coral Bell. *Nation, Region and Context*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 122. Australian National University, Canberra, 1995, 35.

<sup>96</sup> While both reports consider potential threat to Australian Sea Lines of Communication, the potential threat is discarded on the basis of cost to develop and maintain such capability to defend them and, more importantly, the assumption that Australia could in fact survive the closing of SLOC through self-reliance (Dibb Report, 17 and 1987 White Paper, para 3.26 – 3.32).

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>98</sup> Dibb stated, "...that as world natural resources became scarce and technology evolved, nations who claimed large areas of the remote Arctic and Antarctica, might find their respective territorial claim challenged by armed force." (Paul Dibb. *Australia's external Relations in the 1980s: The Interaction of Economic, Political and Strategic Factors*. Croom Helm, Canberra, 1983, 31).

has an extensive claim over the Antarctic of 5,880,000 square kilometres and as of 1980 with the continental defence policy, little or no ability to defend it.<sup>99</sup> The Government's acceptance of Dibb's recommendation in the White Paper to "... pursue political, as distinct from military, solutions to any disputes"<sup>100</sup> sidelines any offshore defence planning issue nicely. However, regardless of the endless arguments over *perceived* verses *credible* threat, perhaps the most disconcerting challenge that faced defence planners was the ever-increasing proposition that the role of force in international affairs had amplified in importance over the past 30 years.<sup>101</sup> Was the future role of the Australian Defence Force in international affairs to be the new defence planning consideration in the absence of a credible threat?

Such an idea contains some merit when one considers that following WW2, decolonisation throughout the world had seen the creation of 85 new countries many of which were beset by instability issues arising from immature political organisations, tribalism, historical, ethnic and religious differences and disputed boarder and territorial claims. Within the Pacific region alone, six island nations had become independent in the latter years of the 1970s with the first election opportunities for political rivals falling due in the early 1980s along with subsequent concerns by Australia for regional conflict.<sup>102</sup>

---

<sup>99</sup> Australia's claim over Antarctica accounts for approximately 42% of the continent. This area is more than  $\frac{3}{4}$  the size of Australia itself and Australia has maintained three mainland and one island base there since 1947 (*Book of Australian Facts. Reader's Digest*, Sydney, 1992, 290).

<sup>100</sup> Defence White Paper. *The Defence of Australia 1987*. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, March 1987, 19.

<sup>101</sup> Paul Dibb. *Australia's external Relations in the 1980s: The Interaction of Economic, Political and Strategic Factors*. Croom Helm, Canberra, 1983, 31.

<sup>102</sup> Pacific nations that declared independence through 1970s were: Tonga and Fiji (1970), Papua New Guinea (1975), Solomon Islands and Tuvalu (1978) and Kiiabati (1979). (Ken Ross. *Regional Security in the South Pacific: The Quarter-Century 1970-95*. Canberra Papers of Strategy and Defence No 100. Australian National University, Canberra, 1993, 61-63).

There appeared to be a case that the Australian military and therefore, defence policy would be expected to play a role in regional international affairs.

Just as the 1970s had shaken the comfortable assumptions of Australian strategic policy, the strategic environment of the 1980s tested Australia's strategy of continental defence and exposed shortcomings in its relationship with the Government's foreign affairs policies. A subsequent examination of the Asia-Pacific strategic circumstances, Australian positions on foreign affairs and trade and the political direction over the period 1980-1990 will demonstrate that while the evolution of Australian defence policy continued throughout this period, it remained not yet fully integrated with foreign policy. Australia's ability to influence events within the Asia-Pacific region was growing, however due to significant shortcomings in defence capabilities; influence was restricted primarily to diplomatic and trade matters.

### **3.1 Strategic Circumstances: 1980 to 1990**

Australia entered the 1980s with a clear, but unsophisticated national defence position based on the overly simplistic strategic assumption that "there is no tangible identifiable threat."<sup>103</sup> Devoid of a visibly defined threat, defence planners remained challenged for much of the decade on the question of an appropriate force structure and doctrine requirements. Perhaps it was the apparent predisposition to concentrate on the low-level tactics and perceived hostile actions rather than considering the origins, political context, objectives or strategies driving any future aggression that contributed to this quandary. From this situation, one could construe that both Government and defence planners did not fully appreciate the strategic circumstances influencing Australia's role

in the Asia-Pacific. Australia's ANZUS alliance with the United States undoubtedly continued to have some bearing on Australian strategic thinking here, particularly in regard to regional actions by large powers such as the USSR, France, China, Japan and India.

There is no question that it was both the Frazer then the Hawke Government's preoccupation with a perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union that represented as the driving force behind Australian – US defence relations. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 seemed to confirm these perceptions. Of particular concern to Australia, was the continued build-up of Soviet naval presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Vietnam had apparently become a 'client' state of the USSR and had granted basing rights to Soviet military forces in Cam Ranh Bay for over 100 aircraft and a permanent fleet of 15 warships along with intelligence and communication facilities.<sup>104</sup> By 1982, Australian strategists like Dr T.B. Millar had reviewed the interests of the major powers within the Asia-Pacific and concluded that:

... Soviet policies were directed at projecting Soviet power and influence throughout the region ... only the Soviet Union gave evidence of being generally unsatisfied and probing for targets of opportunity and had not yet appeared to have reached the summit of its ambitions in terms of global deployment of power and influence ... but there were no indications that it was prepared to use force to obtain bases of its own.<sup>105</sup>

In an effort to come to terms with this particular change to regional strategic circumstances, Australia's Defence Minister, Ian Sinclair stated on 19 November 1982 that "Forward defence and the maintenance of close defence associr -165 c201 A5.1 cot BM/P <</MCID 6 >

Defence Cooperation Program and alliance arrangements was seen as strategically essential.”<sup>106</sup> Was Australia in fact now proposing a return to the forward defence policy that it had rejected less than a decade earlier? The 1976 Defence White Paper had concluded that there no major threat to Australia in the foreseeable future. Now the Frazer Government appeared to consider the Soviet presence to be a potential threat and reacted through a number of fundamental defence initiatives aimed a bolstering Australia’s defence posture.<sup>107</sup>

The Hawke Labour Government which won power in 1983, shared the previous Government’s concerns on the Soviet presence, but adopted a more pragmatic approach. Prime Minister Hawke stated that while the Soviet situation was a concern, the Labour Government did not perceive it as a threat of aggression.<sup>108</sup> Nevertheless, the Hawke Government used the Soviet Union’s propensity for employing surrogate third world forces to exploit opportunities (rather than confront the US directly which would possibly lead to nuclear escalation), as the basis for the continued argument that Australia faced a low-level threat.<sup>109</sup> The Hawke Government made its position in regards to the Soviet Union quite clear in the 1987 Defence White Paper by stating:

Australia is part of the Western community of nations. Australia therefore supports the ability of the United States to retain an effective strategic balance with the Soviet Union. A redistribution of power in favour of the Soviet Union in the central balance, or an extension of Soviet influence in our region at the

---

<sup>105</sup> Ray Sunderland. *Problems in Australian Defence Planning*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 36. Australian National University, Canberra, 1986, 17.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Construction of naval and airfields in northern Australia, replacement of the tactical fighter force with the F/A 18, expansion of the Army Reserve, increased defence aid to ASEAN and Pacific nations and more emphasis placed on the Five Power Defence Agreement are just a few of the Frazer initiatives (Ibid., 18).

<sup>108</sup> US News and World Report with Australian Prime Minister, Bob Hawke on 20 June 1983 (Ibid., 19).

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., 30.

expense of the United States, would be a matter of fundamental concern to Australia, and would be contrary to our national interests.<sup>110</sup>

Effectively one could argue that with these statements in addition to further integration into the United States' worldwide military network, Australia had once again chosen a side. This anti-Soviet position would have moved Australia up on the Soviet nuclear-targeting list and thereby, actually *decreased* its security rather than improved it.<sup>111</sup>

While the Hawke Government was not blind to this threat, it continued to contribute to US nuclear deterrence efforts under the US Defence Support Program (DSP). Prime Minister Hawke stated on 6 June 1984,

The risk of nuclear war [is] remote and improbable provided effective deterrence is maintained. Australians cannot claim the full protection of that deterrence without being willing to make some contribution to its effectiveness.<sup>112</sup>

The Hawke Government's 1987 Defence White Paper reaffirmed Australia's strategic commitment to the United States military deployments within the region, DSP and ANZUS.<sup>113</sup> Considering that Whitlam and Frazer were poles apart on these issues, Hawke's affirmation could almost be described as a 'bipartisan' agreement. Such a description would no doubt cause staunch Labor voters to shudder, the fact remains that this was a fundamental shift from the Whitlam Labor Government's stance of the previous decade and a key aspect of Australian attempts to keep the United States

---

<sup>110</sup> Defence White Paper. *The Defence of Australia 1987*. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, March 1987, 3.

<sup>111</sup> Dennis Phillips. *Cold War 2 and Australia*. Allen & Unwin, Australia, 1983, 80.

<sup>112</sup> Desmond Ball. *Australia and the Global Strategic Balance*. Canberra Papers of Strategy and Defence No 49. Australian National University, Canberra, 1989, 58.

<sup>113</sup> Defence White Paper. *The Defence of Australia 1987*. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, March 1987, 3-5.

engaged in the Asia-Pacific.<sup>114</sup> Finally, both dominant political parties had reached a common deduction regarding Australian defence policy and US involvement in it.

However ANZUS, and thereby the strategic relationship between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, underwent a crisis in 1985 which threatened to collapse the entire treaty. In response to domestic public pressure, the New Zealand Labor Government under David Lange banned the entry of nuclear power and / or nuclear-armed warships into its ports.<sup>115</sup> In line with its policy to ‘neither confirm or deny’ the carriage of nuclear weapons, the United States immediately suspended its obligations to New Zealand under the treaty.<sup>116</sup> Despite initial concerns, Australia’s strategic relationship with the United States was not damaged by this incident and in fact probably enhanced with Australia becoming the United States sole interlocutor in the South Pacific.<sup>117</sup> In addition to this situation, Australia’s influence over New Zealand was also strengthened by the fact that Australia became New Zealand’s only remaining strategic ally and thus, could exert considerable diplomatic leverage.<sup>118</sup>

The sinking of the Greenpeace protest ship *Rainbow Warrior*, in Auckland harbour by French agents drove home this fact to New Zealand in 1985. Although this incident was an act of state-sponsored terrorism and a clear breach of New Zealand sovereignty, without strategic support from the United States or Australia, New Zealand

---

<sup>114</sup> Bob Hawke has been described as “the most pro-US of all Australian Labor Leaders to ever acquire high office” (Coral Bell. *Nation, Region and Context*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 122. Australian National University, Canberra, 1995, 126).

<sup>115</sup> Throughout its 1984 election campaign, NZ Labour Party capitalised on the nation’s anti-nuclear sentiment and thus, painted themselves into the proverbial corner (Firth, Stewart. *Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Allen & Unwin, Australia, 1999, 36).

<sup>116</sup> Gary Smith, Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 53.

<sup>117</sup> Coral Bell. *Nation, Region and Context*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 122. Australian National University, Canberra, 1995, 127.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

succumbed to economic pressure from the French Government and released the convicted agents into French custody where they were promptly pardoned.<sup>119</sup> Thus, the ultimate outcome of this crisis for Australia was that ANZUS had now symbolised two *bilateral* agreements with the United States and New Zealand respectively and had strengthened Australia's overall strategic position.<sup>120</sup> As evident from the 1987 White Paper, ANZUS would continue as the corner stone of Australia Defence policy into the next decade.

Nevertheless, strategic events in the later years of the 1980s within the Asia-Pacific region promised that the next decade would be disorderly for Australian defence and foreign affairs matters. China's expansionism continued to be a concern to both Australia and the region following China's seizure of some of the Spratly Islands in 1988-89.<sup>121</sup> However, these concerns were tempered by the realisation that China's ability to project power into Australia's immediate region remained limited as China's strategic focus remaining on the Soviet threat. Thereby, much of China's defence budget went to its Army rather than Navy.<sup>122</sup> A fact that becomes relevant to Australia when one considers the 1987 White Paper's emphasis on defending Australia's air-sea gap. To cross the gap, one requires substantial naval assets that China did not possess. While China's increasing influence was of concern, Australia did not consider China to constitute a direct threat to Australian security.

---

<sup>119</sup> Coral Bell. *Nation, Region and Context*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 122. Australian National University, Canberra, 1995, 129.

<sup>120</sup> Gary Smith, Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 53.

<sup>121</sup> William M. Carpenter and David G. Weinck. *Asian Security Handbook 2000*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2000, 12.

<sup>122</sup> Paul Dibb. *The Conceptual Basis of Australia's Defence Planning and Force Structure Development*. Canberra Papers of Strategy and Defence No 88. Australian National University, Canberra, 1992, 129.



In response to their own security concerns however, ASEAN States commenced procurement of modern air and sea weapon systems and platforms in the late 1980s. Such procurements did not give the Association or one of its members the capability to project or sustain major military action against Australia, however concerns emerged that these nations would achieve a technological edge over the Australia Defence Force.<sup>123</sup> This development was addressed in the 1987 Defence White Paper with a Government commitment to increase defence spending in Capital Procurement and facilities by 40% over the next five years.<sup>124</sup> The intent was to purchase and base modern naval vessels in Australia's north to defend the air-sea gap against, from at least the Hawke Government's perspective, unlikely threats. However, the Hawke Government appeared to have overlooked the rising instability within the South Pacific region.

The latter half of the 1980s proved to be a tumultuous time for regional South Pacific security. The early years had seen peaceful elections and where mandated, smooth transitions of power in four of the nine Pacific nations holding general elections.<sup>125</sup> Two successive coups in Fiji by the Fijian military in 1987 followed the next year by violent civil disturbances in Vanuatu marked the end of this peaceful period. Within New Caledonia and Tonga, there was significant political unrest and increased unpleasantness in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the Solomon Islands relations, not to

---

<sup>123</sup> Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia purchased F16s, Malaysia purchased Tornados and Wasp anti-submarine helicopters. Thailand also purchased two US Harpoon equipped frigates with ASW capabilities. Australia's air and naval forces were becoming increasingly outdated and required replacement in the near future (Ibid 129-130).

<sup>124</sup> In 1986-87, 28% of expenditure was on capital equipment, 5% on facilities, 40% on personnel and 27% on operating costs (Defence White Paper. *The Defence of Australia 1987*. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, March 1987, 102-104).

<sup>125</sup> Both Fiji and PNG conducted their 1982 general elections well with only minimal political controversy which did not effect their stability and following their dramatic independence from France in 1980, Vanuatu first election in November 1983 also went well (Ross, Ken. *Regional Security in the South*

mention the increased use of force by PNG's military over Bougainville's secessionist movement. On top of this instability, was a series of natural disasters which devastated several South Pacific nations.<sup>126</sup> The Hawke Government was forced to deploy Australian military assets to assist either in disaster relief, or, in the case of Bougainville, Fiji and Vanuatu, to be positioned nearby in order to evacuate Australian nationals if the situation deteriorated further.<sup>127</sup> As these events demonstrated, the Australian military responded to an *international role obligation* within the South Pacific rather than the predisposed requirement to defend Australia from an aggressor.

Clearly, the defence policy outlined in the 1987 Defence White Paper maintained an internal *defence* focus limiting the ability of the Australian military to be employed to influence regional affairs. While the White Paper had acknowledged the strategic importance of South Pacific nations to Australia, it concentrated solely on the provision of defence aid in the form of finance, training and equipment rather than developing the capability for military intervention when required. Throughout the 1980s, the Australian strategic focus for military assets and capabilities continued to be on a defence of the air-sea gap by air and naval forces with the army as the last line of defence on the coast.<sup>128</sup> Consequently, due to a lack of assets, doctrine and training, the Australian military response to these crisis was *ad hoc*. As these Pacific crises demonstrated, the Australian

---

*Pacific: The Quarter-Century 1970-95*. Canberra Papers of Strategy and Defence No 100. Australian National University, Canberra, 1993, 63).

<sup>126</sup> Western Samoa (massive forest fire, 1983), French Polynesia, Fiji and Vanuatu (cyclone 1984), Solomon Islands (cyclone 1986) and Vanuatu (cyclone 1987) (*Ibid.*, 65-66).

<sup>127</sup> William M. Carpenter and David G. Weincek. *Asian Security Handbook 2000*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2000, 62-63.

<sup>128</sup> The Dibb Review and 1987 Defence White Paper argument was for a 'Defence in Depth' force structure which saw Australian air and naval forces operating in the air-sea gap with a consequently smaller and least significant army defending the coast like the Maginot Line strategy (Michael Evans. *From Deakin to Dibb: The Army and the Making of Australian Strategy in the 20th Century*. Land Warfare Studies Centre, Working Paper No 113, Canberra, Australia, June 2001, 26).

Defence Force's capability to conduct joint expeditionary operations was significantly degraded. Clearly the focus of the Hawke Government's defence policy centred solely on the *geographic* defence of Australian territory and thus, was flawed in its ability to utilise military capabilities to effect regional foreign policy throughout this decade and into the next.

### 3.2 Foreign Affairs and Trade: 1980 to 1990

This is not to say that Australian foreign policy stagnated throughout the 1980's, but rather was developed in pursuit of economic interests rather than security strategies. Certainly, Australia took advantage of the blossoming regional economic opportunities under Prime Minister Frazer in the early 1980's and the Hawke Government exploited these opportunities as their highest priority.<sup>129</sup> In response to rising criticism of Australian protective tariffs by ASEAN and Pacific Island states,<sup>130</sup> a Frazer Government report, *Australia and the Third World*, argued persuasively for a reduction in Australian protectionist measures.

It is in Australia's long-term interests, both in terms of its own economic development and in terms of assisting Third World countries, to reduce tariff and other restrictions on imports into Australia. Determined action of a substantive nature should be initiated quickly to move in this direction so as to facilitate the transition to a more outward-looking Australian industrial structure and to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the economic growth now taking place overseas, particularly in the Asian region.<sup>131</sup>

---

<sup>129</sup> Paul Dibb. *Australia's external Relations in the 1980s: The Interaction of Economic, Political and Strategic Factors*. Croom Helm, Canberra, 1983, 63-65.

<sup>130</sup> By 1983, Australia aid to ASEAN states was relatively insignificant and the Frazer Government realised the need for ASEAN goodwill for continued development of Australian export market. ASEAN reticence on the apparent defects of Australian economic policy remained a stumbling block that needed to be addressed. The South Pacific Island states were equally vocal, yet lacked the economic leverage due to the importance of Australia as an economic partner (Ibid., 67).

<sup>131</sup> G. Evans. *Australia and the Third World: Economic Perspectives* contained in Paul Dibb. *Australia's external Relations in the 1980s: The Interaction of Economic, Political and Strategic Factors*. Croom Helm, Canberra, 1983, 81.

The two aspects of this report and subsequent Government acceptance, was that it failed to link economic strategies with regional security implication and moreover, if the defence industry focus was on self-reliance, how could it also be outward looking?

The dilemma for the Frazer and Hawke Governments was that the Australian economy and industrial base was in crisis and if a bleak future was to be avoided, a restructure of Australia's economy was considered necessary.<sup>132</sup> As the globalisation of production and finance in the world got underway in the 1970s, Australia had failed to position itself to take advantage of these important structural changes and had thus become increasingly unable to 'balance the books'.<sup>133</sup> Defence had to take second place to this more immediate requirement.<sup>134</sup> This is evident when one considers that despite the Hawke Government's 1987 White Paper commitments to developing indigenous scientific and industrial capabilities,<sup>135</sup> it was not matched by an increase in defence funding.<sup>136</sup> Truly, this was not a surprise given its belated recognition of the economic importance of Asia two years previously and its subsequent pursuit of multilateral

---

<sup>132</sup> Gary Smith; Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 166-167.

<sup>133</sup> In the late 1960s and into 1970s, Australia had one of the OECD's most protected economies. Most of this protection was provided by the post-WW2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). By early 1980s, in violation of GATT rules, Europe and North America protectionism and neo-mercantilism (subsidies and non-tariff barriers) were on the rise and consequently, undercutting Australian markets and cash flow (Ibid., 166).

<sup>134</sup> On the issue of Australian Defence industry and self-reliance, the Australian Bureau of Statistic 1984 report stated "Defence industry policy recognises that complete self-sufficiency in the supply of the Defence Force's equipment is neither necessary or practicable for Australia in its current strategic, economic and technological circumstances" (R.J Cameron. *Year Book Australia, No 68, 1984*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 1985, 55).

<sup>135</sup> Defence White Paper. *The Defence of Australia 1987*. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, March 1987, 111.

<sup>136</sup> Immediately following the release of the White paper, Defence funding decreased from 2.9% to 2.5% GDP (Ian Castles. *Year Book Australia 1989, No 72*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 1990, 56).

diplomacy which one could say, culminated in 1989 with the creation of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation group (APEC).<sup>137</sup>

APEC was a Hawke Government initiative to pave the way for trade liberalisation and investment amongst Pacific Rim nations at the time that similar trade arrangements had been achieved such as the Canada-US Free-Trade Agreement and the ASEAN Free-Trade Area (AFTA) amongst South-East Asian nations. The concept of APEC was to embrace all of these alignments within one grouping and aside from bringing Australia into a dynamic international market; it would also unite practically half of the world's economies.<sup>138</sup> Initially, it was proposed that the United States be excluded from APEC membership, as the secondary aim of APEC was to form a future-trading bloc similar to that of the European Union, but under Japanese leadership.<sup>139</sup> The Australian position on this attempted exclusion of the United States was one of the 1980s examples where the Hawke Government was prepared to jeopardise the ANZUS security over economic security.<sup>140</sup> In response to the United States continual under-cutting of Australia's export markets, the Labor Government's Foreign Minister, Mr Bill Hayden, stated in 1986:

What contribution to Australia's security could out-weigh the subversion of Australia's economy (by the United States)? If Australia cannot earn enough export income, it would be unable to purchase the military equipment for its own defence and that of Western interests in the region.<sup>141</sup>

---

<sup>137</sup> Gary Smith; Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy. Economic Security*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 170-171.

<sup>138</sup> Stewart Firth. *Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy. Foreign Economic Policy*. Allen & Unwin, Australia, 1999, 33.

<sup>139</sup> Gary Smith; Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy. Economic Security*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 171.

<sup>140</sup> Stewart Firth. *Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy. Foreign Economic Policy* Allen & Unwin, Australia, 1999, 32.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

However, excluding the United States from APEC would have also reduced the degree of influence by Australia and other APEC members to influence the regional economic policies by the United States. Even more importantly, it would have reduced the degree of engagement by the United States within the region, particularly given China's and the Soviet Union's expansionist policies.<sup>142</sup> Prime Minister Hawke, who quelled Government dissention, did not overlook this fact and the United States was accepted into the inaugural APEC meeting in September 1989.<sup>143</sup> Regardless of any cost to defence, APEC was seen by the Hawke Government as the best option for securing Australia's future economic prosperity.<sup>144</sup>

However, as discussed earlier, the formation of APEC marked the culmination of the Labor Government's regional economic diplomacy efforts. Following the Hawke Government's decision to 'float' the Australian dollar in December 1983 which exposed the economy to foreign competition, Australia's external debt grew rapidly from 1985 on-wards.<sup>145</sup> A falling Australian dollar meant that Australia's balance-of-payments and foreign debt increased significantly, requiring more Australian exports to service the debt. The Australian Treasurer, Paul Keating, warned in 1986 that Australia was in danger of becoming a 'banana-republic' and that Government had to cut spending and increase exports.<sup>146</sup> Consequently Australia actively sought to increase exports within the

---

<sup>142</sup> *Promoting Integration within the Asia-Pacific Region.*

<[http://www.australia.ch/eng/trade/promoting\\_integration\\_apec.asp](http://www.australia.ch/eng/trade/promoting_integration_apec.asp)>

<sup>143</sup> Gary Smith; Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy. Economic Security.* Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 171.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, 170.

<sup>145</sup> Stewart Firth. *Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy. Foreign Economic Policy.* Allen & Unwin, Australia, 1999, 31.

<sup>146</sup> Coral Bell. *Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy. Hawke and Redefinitions.* Oxford University Press, Australia, 1988, 186.

Asia-Pacific region, in particular to Japan, Indonesia and New Zealand.<sup>147</sup> Signalling that trade and economic performance, rather than defence was now at the core of Australia's national interest, the Hawke Government merged the Department of Foreign Affairs with the Department of Trade into the new Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 1987.<sup>148</sup>

In line with this aim of improving economic performance, Labor also amended Australia's immigration policy and annual intake quotas. Although the ghost of the White Australia policy continued to haunt Australia particularly in relation to Asian refugees, the Hawke Government shifted emphasis to skilled migrants regardless of their ethnic background. The thinking was to increase Australia's productivity base with the country of origin footing the bill for the migrant's upbringing and education.<sup>149</sup> This was in direct contrast to the Frazer Government's policy where immigration was reduced in 1982 by 15,000 to approximately 80,000 per annum in order to *reduce* pressure on Australian unemployment.<sup>150</sup> However, given Labor's focus on economics and the positive benefits of immigration (increased skilled labour base and better relations with over-crowded Asian neighbour states which thus opened the export markets), the Hawke

---

<sup>147</sup> In this aspect, Australia was relatively successful although much of the benefits were diminished due to the low value of the Australian dollar (about 60 US cents). From 1980-81 to 1990-91, Australian exports to Japan, Indonesia and New Zealand virtually tripled to \$14.3 B, \$2.5 B and \$1.4 B respectively (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *One Hundred Years of Trade*. Australian Government, February 2002, 2).

<sup>148</sup> Stewart Firth. *Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Foreign Economic Policy. Allen & Unwin, Australia, 1999, 31.

<sup>149</sup> Coral Bell. *Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy*. Alliance and Dependency. Oxford University Press, Australia, 1988, 196.

<sup>150</sup> Australian Immigration/Migration Statistics. *Immigration – Federation to Century's End*. Department of Immigration Report, 2001, 11 available at <<http://www.immi.gov.au/statistics/publications/federation/index.htm>>

Government dramatically increased the intake quotas from 84,000 in 1985 to a peak of 145,000 in 1989.<sup>151</sup>

It is not to say that this 72% increase in immigration intake eliminated ASEAN's criticism of Australian immigration policy. Aside from Chinese students claiming refugee status following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, Australia further restricted its policy on refugees by no longer automatically granting asylum to arrivals.<sup>152</sup> This was in response to an arrival in Darwin in November 1989 of a boatload of Indo-Chinese people claiming refugee status, but who were actually fee-paying passengers. Government policy shifted to hold such arrivals in detention facilities, often without legal assistance, until such time that their actual status could be determined.<sup>153</sup> Considering Australia's human rights rhetoric in line with the automatic internment of refugees, a credibility gap developed which damaged Australia's standing with its Asian neighbours and the international community as a whole.<sup>154</sup> The upshot for Defence of this new Government direction was that Australia remained vulnerable to infiltration from its northern approaches and such policies fuelled regional resentment and anti-Australian sentiment. Australian politicians did not appear to contemplate the integration of defence strategies and with their economic and foreign policies.

### 3.3 Domestic Political Scene: 1980 to 1990

Both of the Australian Governments of this decade demonstrated a remarkable similitude in their foreign policy and strategic outlook. Malcolm Frazer and Bob Hawke

---

<sup>151</sup> Australian Immigration/Migration Statistics. *Immigration – Federation to Century's End*. Department of Immigration Report, 2001, 12-13 available at <<http://www.immi.gov.au/statistics/publications/federation/index.htm>>

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>153</sup> Gary Smith; Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Human Rights. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 221.



were each convinced that the long-term security of Australia rested with the United States under the ANZUS umbrella, while Australia's economic future lay with Asia. Each Government released a Defence White Paper acknowledging that Australia did not face the threat of a major attack in the foreseeable future. However, the key difference between the two defence strategies was that the Frazer Government sought to increase defence capabilities through capital procurement and closer alignment with the United States in order to assist in the countering of Soviet regional expansionism.<sup>155</sup> The Hawke Government on the other hand, while acknowledging the Soviets were a security concern, chose to strengthen economic links rather than defence with the United States.<sup>156</sup> This approach brought the 'low-level' threat stratagem to primacy within the 1986 Dobb Report and subsequent, Defence White Paper's argument for defence of Australia's northern air-sea gap.<sup>157</sup> Was the Hawke Government simply adopting the defence posture of the proverbial ostrich for purely economic reasons, or was this the advent of a new type of defence strategy?

Throughout the decade, the Hawke Government was increasingly criticised by the Australian public for sacrificing defence to fund social welfare programs.<sup>158</sup> However, a noteworthy feature of this debate at the time was the tendency to focus solely on the tactics and hostile actions without considering the origins that triggered the foreign

---

<sup>154</sup> International criticism levelled at Australia regarded this policy as not only misguided and ethically dubious, but potentially in breach of internationally agreed human rights standards. (Ibid., 223).

<sup>155</sup> Robert O'Neill and D.M. Horner. *Australian Defence Policy for the 1980s*. University of Queensland Press, Australia, 1982, 106-107.

<sup>156</sup> Coral Bell. *Nation, Region and Context*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 122. Australian National University, Canberra, 1995, 126.

<sup>157</sup> The 1987 White Paper shifted defence focus to 'Defence in Depth' with Australia's naval and air forces being in the front-line off the coast and the Army operating in northern Australia to defeat the remnants that manage to land (Michael Evans. *From Deakin to Dobb: The Army and the Making of Australian Strategy in the 20th Century*. Land Warfare Studies Centre, Working Paper No 113, Canberra, Australia, June 2001, 26).

aggression.<sup>159</sup> As an Australian academic, Professor N.G. Butler correctly identified in 1982,

Wars are not the outcome of chance or idiosyncrasies. Their origins lie in economic conflict, ideological differences and interracial incomprehension. We need to have the wit to deal with all three. It is in this and not the choice of hardware that we will succeed or fail ... to cope with all three sources of potential hostility requires a careful [and flexible] appraisal of defence, foreign and domestic economic policies.<sup>160</sup>

Perhaps the Hawke Government's attempts to engage with Asia through economic and trade development, wide-ranging regional discussions and significant changes to Australia's immigration policy, was simply another strategy for attaining increased Australian security? There are a number of political decisions made throughout the late 1980s that appear to support this argument.

Consider Australia's relationship with Indonesia throughout this decade with particular regard to East Timor. Remembering that Indonesia had invaded and annexed East Timor in 1975 and despite extensive condemnation by the United Nations (including Australia), the Frazer Government recognised Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor in 1979.<sup>161</sup> With Frazer's and later, Hawke's pursuit of closer political and economic ties with other Asian nations, particularly China, Indonesian suspicion of Australian intent grew.<sup>162</sup> Notwithstanding East Timor 'self-determination' being Labor Policy during the 1983 election campaign, the Hawke Government soon made overtures to Indonesia to

---

<sup>158</sup> Gary Smith; Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy. Environment*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 199.

<sup>159</sup> Tony Godfrey-Smith. *Low Level Conflict Contingencies and Australia Defence Policy*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 34. Australian National University, Canberra, 1985, 53.

<sup>160</sup> Noel Butler. *Australian Defence: Our Own Worst Enemy?* Contained in Robert O'Neill and D.M. Horner. *Australian Defence Policy for the 1980s*. University of Queensland Press, Australia, 1982, 111.

<sup>161</sup> Patrick Walters. *Australia and Indonesia*. Deakin University Australia and Asia Study Guide. School of Australian and International Studies, Deakin University, Geelong, Australia 1996, 99.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*

rebuild relations, despite the Indonesian military brutally crushing East Timorese resistance to Indonesian rule in 1985.<sup>163</sup> Nevertheless, in August of that year, the Hawke Government reneged on their election promises and became the second Australia Government to recognise Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. This watershed occurrence was the first of three such central proceedings that markedly improved Australian-Indonesian relations. The release of the 1986 Dibb Review with its subsequent 1987 Defence White Paper and the signing of the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty in 1989 were the other two events.<sup>164</sup>

The Dibb Review argued that in defence terms, Indonesia was Australia's most important neighbour with neither the motive nor capability to threaten Australia and was more concerned with regional stability.<sup>165</sup> The Review also pointed out Australia's fundamental security interest in promoting regional stability within the Asia-Pacific. When Australia's commitment to this strategy was enunciated in the Defence White Paper and followed by a series of high-level visits in 1988-89 by Australian and Indonesian defence and diplomatic officials, relations thawed markedly. The Timor Gap Treaty assisted in this strengthening of ties as a long-running disagreement over the undersea international boundary had now been converted into a vehicle for developing and exploiting the resources under the Timor Sea.<sup>166</sup> Indonesian and Australian

---

<sup>163</sup> Labor Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden argued at the time that a more constructive relationship with Indonesia would give the Government more leverage on human rights and other issues (although one might counter asking how the Indonesian conquest and continued brutal oppression of the people of East Timor did not constitute a breach of human rights?) (James Cotton. *East Timor and Australia: AIAA Contributions to the Policy Debate*. Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1999, 9).

<sup>164</sup> Patrick Walters. *Australia and Indonesia*. Deakin University Australia and Asia Study Guide. School of Australian and International Studies, Deakin University, Geelong, Australia 1996, 100-102.

<sup>165</sup> Dibb, Paul. *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*. Report to the Minister of Defence, March 1986. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986.

<sup>166</sup> Patrick Walters. *Australia and Indonesia*. Deakin University Australia and Asia Study Guide. School of Australian and International Studies, Deakin University, Geelong, Australia 1996, 101.

authorities assumed joint responsibilities for maritime surveillance, customs, immigration and environmental protection within this region. The improvement in Australia's security and economic relations with the world's most populous nation began to see Australia's influence grow within the region. By the end of 1989, Australia had begun to describe itself as a 'Middle Power' within the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>167</sup> Whether it was yet capable of attaining that expectation and exerting influence throughout the region and into the next decade, remained to be seen.

### **3.4 Summary: 1980 to 1990**

The 1980s proved to be a critical period for Australia in terms of international relations, economic development and strategic security. Without a credible threat on the immediate horizon, Australia chose to primarily concentrate its energies and resources on expanding its influence throughout the Asia-Pacific region by means of foreign and economic policies. The overall national security provided through defence capabilities and agreements, continued to remain on the political agenda of both the Frazer and Hawke Governments although very much in second place during the latter years of the decade. After all, the Australian Governments of the day were convinced that should a major threat materialise, ANZUS would guarantee the intervention of the United States and thus, preserve the integrity of Australian security. The only possible threat to Australian soil was in the course of a short-notice low-level conflict centred on infiltration and small-scale raids by Special Forces. This line of thought gave way to the

---

<sup>167</sup> "A recurring theme throughout the government's foreign policy is the role of Australia as a 'middle-power coalition-builder. Indeed, the government celebrates this role." (Gary Smith; Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 200).

1986 Dibb Review and 1987 Defence White Paper that confirmed the requirement for only a small core military force to counter any low-level conflict.

Despite widespread public criticism of these documents with regards to the apparently narrow 'defend-the-coastline' vision, one must acknowledge the resulting positive diplomatic and security benefits, however inadvertent. Relations with Indonesia improved significantly from that point on, particularly given that the Hawke Government had not only granted official recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, but had also signed a potentially lucrative oil and gas exploration treaty. While the morality of the Hawke Government may be criticised for this decision, one can appreciate the economic and security dilemma that they found themselves in.

Through the floating of the Australian Dollar and the under-cutting of export markets by the United States, the Australian economy was in crisis. Notwithstanding the assurances of the 1987 White Paper, there were few resources available to Defence. Added to this situation, the Pacific region appeared increasingly unstable with military coups in Fiji and unrest in other nations. The preliminary operations launched by Australia to evacuate their citizens from these trouble spots if required, were less than ideal due to a lack of suitable assets, training, force structure and doctrine. Although the foreign and trade policies instigated by the Hawke Government were a step in the right direction of ensuring national security at the diplomatic level, clearly the defence policy was not yet integrated. Government claims to the contrary, Australia nonetheless emerged from the 1980's lacking the diplomatic, economic and military influence to be termed a true 'Middle Power' in the Asia-Pacific region.

#### 4.0 Engagement to Ambivalence: 1990 to 2001

Australia entered the 1990s with the expectation that the developments of ever-changing alignments and arrangements between the major powers and regional states in the Asia-Pacific would have an effect on Australia's future strategic environment.<sup>168</sup> In particular, the nations of the South Pacific were perceived to be in a period of transition where instability had become increasingly prevalent.<sup>169</sup> The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended not only the Cold War,<sup>170</sup> but also the unlikely regional threat posed by the Soviet Pacific fleet. Security within the Asia-Pacific continued to be uncertain as relations between India and Pakistan deteriorated with the potential for regional nuclear war rising exponentially.<sup>171</sup> It had become apparent that in an increasingly complex strategic environment, Australia like many other nations had to chart a new and innovative course to ensure their respective security. Gorbachev himself offered a possible solution when he contended that a nation could not determine security solely through military means, but through "a comprehensive system of international security that embraced economic, ecological, humanitarian as well as political and military, elements."<sup>172</sup>

It was due to this changing strategic perspective that Australia committed itself to shifting defence focus towards true self-reliance and supporting regional stability along

---

<sup>168</sup> Dora Alves. *Evolving Pacific Basin Strategies: The 1989 Pacific Symposium*. National Defence University Press, Washington DC, USA, 1990, 293.

<sup>169</sup> Coral Bell. *Agenda for the Nineties: Studies of the Contexts for Australian Choices in Foreign and Defence Policy*. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1991, 203.

<sup>170</sup> Academics appear to disagree on the exact date the Cold War (I or II) ended. Was it the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Re-unification of Germany in 1990, the collapse of communism in Aug 1991 or the break-up of the USSR at the end of 1991? One thing is for certain, with the disintegration of the USSR in late 1991, there could be no more Soviet threat in the Asia-Pacific region (Michael, J Hogan. *The End of the Cold War: Its Meanings and Implications*. Cambridge University Press, New York, USA, 1992, 144).

<sup>171</sup> Kendall W Stiles. *Case Studies in International Politics, Second Edition*. Addison Welsley Longman, 2002, 242.

with the incorporation of defence into Australia's foreign and trade policies. This undertaking naturally fell to the two Australian Governments of the 1990s. Paul Keating succeeded Bob Hawke as the Labor Prime Minister on 20 December 1991 after a leadership challenge with the Howard Liberal Government winning power in March 1996.<sup>173</sup> As stated by Gorbachev, security can only truly be achieved through a combination of [primarily] economic, political and military elements. If Australia achieved an appropriate level of this required integration, then Australia would also be in a position to not only lead other nations to influence the major powers, but also to support and strengthen international institutions to achieve foreign policy goals and adopt a putative activist approach to problems that transcend national boundaries and can only be tackled by multilateral collaboration. A nation which achieves this standing is consequently able to successfully exert regional influence in pursuit of its own objectives and therefore, is truly a 'Middle' or 'Regional Power'.<sup>174</sup> The continued examination of the evolution of Australian Defence policy with respect to strategic circumstances, foreign affairs and trade and domestic political agendas will demonstrate that by 2001, Australia had matured to be a true middle power in the Asia-Pacific region.

#### **4.1 Strategic Circumstances: 1990 to 2001**

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent fading of superpower rivalries emphasised Australia's necessity to redefine its relationship with the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>175</sup> Throughout the Cold War, global politics had been bipolar with the world

---

<sup>172</sup> Michael, J. Hogan. *The End of the Cold War: Its Meanings and Implications*. Cambridge University Press, New York, USA, 1992, 130.

<sup>173</sup> Australianpolitics.com, *Australian Prime Ministers Since 1901*.  
<<http://www.australianpolitics.com/executive/pm/list.shtml>>

<sup>174</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 1991-95*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia, 1997, 19-21.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

divided into three groupings. Those nations aligned either with the United States or the Soviet Union formed the two largest of these groupings with the nations who were non-aligned with either faction forming the third grouping. Now, as Huntington contends, global politics had become multipolar and multicivilisational.<sup>176</sup> The abject and complete removal of the Cold War ‘Soviet threat’ saw the ANZUS security blanket was well and truly stripped from Australia’s strategic security policy. Australia was confronted with the prospect of facing not only the region, but also the world solely on the basis of its own interests, values and understandings. The silence of the Labor Government’s position on ANZUS in the early 1990s was deafening as they made “prodigious efforts to create a new conceptional discourse and institutional architecture” for ‘Australia’s’ region.<sup>177</sup> The Hawke and later, Keating Government ‘shift towards’ Asia which had commenced in the late 1980s, undoubtedly gathered momentum into 1990 with the increased belief that Asia would play a critical role in Australia’s future world influence.<sup>178</sup>

Fundamental to Australia’s engagement in Asia were the two pillars of Australian policy of the 1990, APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum. ASEAN in particular, was resistant to suggestions that their annual meetings should be devoted explicitly to the review of security issues or that their membership expands beyond South-East Asia.<sup>179</sup> However, ASEAN’s position on these issues changed somewhat following the

---

<sup>176</sup> Samuel P Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996, 21.

<sup>177</sup> Some of these developing concepts included regional military security, regional economic cooperation and regional community institutions such as APEC and ARF (Gary Smith; Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 228).

<sup>178</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 1991-95*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 1997, 2.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.



disappearance of the Soviet threat and subsequent draw down of the US military forces in the region.<sup>180</sup> ASEAN, as a body, perceived that a ‘window of opportunity’ had appeared for the expansion of regional powers such as Japan, China and possibly India.<sup>181</sup> As the economic giant of the region with the strongest and most capable modern navy, Japan was seen as a potential ignition source of a regional arms race with China forcing resident nations like Australia and ASEAN members to follow suit.<sup>182</sup> ASEAN, like Australia, had correctly identified that the Asia-Pacific region had become increasingly complex, multipolar and distinctly more volatile.

Almost too late, ASEAN came to the realisation that the value of a continued US military presence in the region lay not in the use of such forces in combat, but in their deterrent value to regional ambitious and unfriendly powers.<sup>183</sup> The nature of Australia’s unique defence relations with the United States under the auspices of ANZUS was suddenly viewed in a different light by ASEAN. ANZUS, which had previously been the proverbial albatross to Australian-ASEAN relations, was now viewed by ASEAN as the key to maintaining US commitment to regional security.<sup>184</sup> The subsequent creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 brought together eighteen nations to discuss preventative diplomacy, non-proliferation and military transparency and other measures

---

<sup>180</sup> Following the end of the Cold War, the US suddenly withdrew from Subic Bay and Clark Air Base in the Philippines in 1991-92. This reinforced perceptions of a decline in US commitment to the region (J.N. Mak. *ASEAN Defence Reorientation 1975-1992: The Dynamics of Modernisation and Structural Change*. Canberra Papers of Strategy and Defence No 103. Australian National University, Canberra, 1993, 36).

<sup>181</sup> Ibid.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid, 37.

<sup>183</sup> Haji Ahmad Zakaria. *The United States Military: Southeast Asian Views*. Strategy, Vol 1, No 1, 1992, p72.

<sup>184</sup> Coral Bell. *Nation, Region and Context*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 122. Australian National University, Canberra, 1995, 107-108.

aimed at building confidence in regional security.<sup>185</sup> As a founding member of ARF, Australia maintained the line that China should be welcomed as a valued participant in regional security affairs rather than be excluded through a sense of apprehension. Incidentally, one of ARF's (and Australia's) foremost successes was the 1995 announcement by China that it would henceforth publish information about its national defence policies as a measure of increasing regional peace and stability.<sup>186</sup> The move by Australia to successfully integrate China, Taiwan and Hong Kong into APEC in 1991 followed by the holding of the second APEC Leaders meeting in Indonesia has been described as a diplomatic masterstroke. Effectively, the perceived Chinese threat appeared to have been neutralised and ASEAN had been locked into a timetable for trade liberalisation under APEC auspices.<sup>187</sup> Australia's influence with regional organisations such as ASEAN and APEC had grown significantly as had its relations with individual nations like China and Indonesia.

By 1995, there was particular importance placed on the improvement of Australian relations with Indonesia. The Australian-Indonesian relationship had suffered considerably following the killings of at least 50 East Timorese civilians by Indonesian soldiers during a memorial procession in Dili on 12 November 1991. Australian led criticism and condemnation along with the production of a highly influential and damning documentary did much to weaken Australian-Indonesian relations.<sup>188</sup>

---

<sup>185</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 1991-95*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 1997, 26.

<sup>186</sup> Australia's Foreign Minister at the time, Gareth Evans was particularly satisfied by this announcement claiming, "[this] is exactly what we and other have been arguing for in the ARF as a means of increasing trust in the region." (Ibid).

<sup>187</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 1991-95*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 1997, 2.

<sup>188</sup> James Cotton. *East Timor and Australia: AIIA Contributions to the Policy Debate*. Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1999, 10-11.

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Keating saw Indonesia as of vital strategic importance to Australia in that it was a key ASEAN and regional player.<sup>189</sup> Consequently, the Keating Government negotiated a security agreement with Jakarta in December 1995 where the parties agreed:

...to consult each other in the case of adverse challenges to either party or to their common security interests and if appropriate, consider measures which may be taken either individually or jointly...<sup>190</sup>

As Australia's desire to move closer to Asia increased, so too did the impetus for good relations with Indonesia. Despite adverse public opinion over allegations of Indonesian oppression in East Timor, Australia reached three major agreements with Indonesia on mutual security, maritime border issues and regional economic cooperation from 1995 to 1997.

However, East Timor as a domestic issue continued to effect Australian international relations not just with Indonesia, but also with Portugal and the United Nations. Portugal had taken Australia to the International Court of Justice over the Timor Gap Treaty claiming that as East Timor was a Portuguese Territory, the treaty should have been negotiated with Portugal not Indonesia. Furthermore, Australia had infringed upon East Timor's right to self-determination and sovereignty over their resources through such a treaty and consequently, was in breach of UN resolutions. Although the Court decided not to rule on the case, international pressure was brought to bear on Australia through criticism that the treaty was a means for Australia to share the booty

---

<sup>189</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 1991-95*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 1997, 6.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

with an invader.<sup>191</sup> Undoubtedly it was criticism such as this that sparked the Howard Government in 1997 to officially abandon support for Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor and subsequently led to Australia's intervention in September 1999.<sup>192</sup> Australia's commitment to East Timor was a major new departure from Australian regional policy.

While Asia provided much of the regional policy challenge to Australia throughout the 1990s, the South Pacific region posed its own unique test. In light of the changing regional security and economic environments, Pacific Island Countries (PIC) demanded greater support and understanding from both Australia and New Zealand.<sup>193</sup> Nowhere was this better demonstrated than the establishment of the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) in Bougainville. New Zealand had led a Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) to Bougainville in December 1997 until it was replaced (due to budget reasons) by the Australian led PMG on 1 May 1998. Both consisted of regional groupings drawn from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu in order to facilitate the peace process required to resolve a local dispute. Only Australia and New Zealand had the resources and diplomatic power to force the peace process on the two belligerents. Of particular note was that Australia did not automatically side with its former protectorate, Papua New Guinea, but elected to remain neutral and assist in the conflict resolution.<sup>194</sup> Such a move greatly enhanced Australia's standing in the Pacific region and ability to influence events to promote peace and stability within the region. Australia's strategic influence was

---

<sup>191</sup> Similarities were also drawn between Iraq's conquest of Kuwait in 1990 and Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. This was not something that Australia wished to be associated with. (Stewart Firth. *Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Allen & Unwin, Australia, 1999, 196-197).

<sup>192</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996 - 2000*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 2001, 7.

<sup>193</sup> Coral Bell. *Agenda for the Nineties: Studies of the Contexts for Australian Choices in Foreign and Defence Policy*. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1991, 203.

being felt throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Much of this success can be attributed to the integration of Defence policy into Australia's foreign affairs and trade policies.

#### **4.2 Foreign Affairs and Trade: 1990 to 2001**

The idea that Australia integrated its defence policy into trade policy is somewhat surprising given that Australia initially attempted to exclude its closest defence ally, the United States, from inclusion in APEC in 1989. Throughout the early 1990s, Prime Minister Hawke repeatedly stated to Asian nations that one of APEC's roles was to thwart the increased unilateralism of US trade policies.<sup>195</sup> An example of this new direction came in 1994 when the Keating Government backed Japan over the United States in their automobile dispute.<sup>196</sup> One could consider that the key to this new alignment was the fact that Asian nations had become progressively more resentful of Washington's increased use of unilateralism in its foreign economic policies.<sup>197</sup> Given the number of blossoming defence relations amongst many of the ASEAN countries, Australia correctly identified an opportunity to not only improve its economic development, but also to establish greater regional ties. Closer economic ties and relations would improve Australia's overall security. After all, the Guam Doctrine, followed by the withdrawal of US military units from the Philippines after the demise of the Soviet Union, had made the United States' position on regional security abundantly clear. Since the ANZUS umbrella was no longer the key to Australian security, Australia could afford to integrate its defence policy into its regional economic policy.

---

<sup>194</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996 - 2000*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 2001, 158-159.

<sup>195</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 1991-95*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 1997, 8.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, 95.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

Certainly, Australia's economic performance over the remainder of the 1990s including the Asian financial crisis of 1997 supports this premise. While the economic crisis had an adverse effect on Australian exports to Asia, a high rate of growth to other markets such as New Zealand, the United States and the European Union offset any lasting detrimental effects as shown in Graph 1. This high rate of growth, coupled with a decrease in inflation and unemployment, saw the emergence of a strong Australian economy at the end of the decade.<sup>198</sup> By 1999-2000, the balance of Australia's trading relationships was in the Asia-Pacific region with the focus being on APEC and ASEAN member nations.<sup>199</sup> The only free-trade agreements that Australia pursued over the late 1990s was with New Zealand through the Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement and the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) despite attempts by both Canada and Chile in 1996 to negotiate similar agreements.<sup>200</sup> Australia's economic performance won praise from international bodies such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1998.<sup>201</sup> ASEAN countries in particular sought advice from Australia with the intention of replicating Australia's economic reforms and policy settings in order to weather any future financial crises.<sup>202</sup> Australia's image and regional standing had improved markedly with Australia becoming an economic role model and confidant. This led Prime Minister Howard to state in 1998;

---

<sup>198</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996 - 2000*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 2001, 279-280.


<sup>199</sup> By 2000, nine of Australia's ten major trading partners were member of APEC. The UK ranked sixth and was the only non-APEC member (AusStats. *Year Book Australia 2002: International Accounts and Trade: Special Article - Trade Since 1900*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 2003. <<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs...exports,asia,pacific,trend,history>>)

<sup>200</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996 - 2000*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 2001, 284-285.

<sup>201</sup> World Trade Organisation. *Trade Policy Reviews: Australia: June 1998*. <[http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/tpr\\_e/tp76\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp76_e.htm)>

Australia is more respected in Asia now than it was five years ago because we have done well and we've been able to help ... Australia is relatively speaking stronger now and has got more influence than it had before.<sup>203</sup>

In its responses to the Asian economic crisis, Australia sought and achieved the establishment of a place at the regional table on Australia's own terms. Having linked its security and economic policies, Australia looked to integrating its foreign policy.



**Graph 1 – Australia's GDP Growth over Asian Economic Crisis**

<sup>202</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996 - 2000*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 2001, 310.

<sup>203</sup> *Australian Financial Review*, 22 September 1998 (Ibid, 311).

<sup>204</sup> [http://www.tradestrategies.com.au/pdfs/trade\\_report\\_p2.pdf](http://www.tradestrategies.com.au/pdfs/trade_report_p2.pdf)

In the corporate plan for 1994 – 1996, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) listed the primary foreign policy objective to be ‘the increase of Australia’s economic prosperity’ with ‘a particular focus on the Asia-Pacific’.<sup>205</sup> Given the fact that APEC members constituted nine of Australia’s ten major trading partners, one would argue that the Asia-Pacific had become Australia’s sole economic focus. Nonetheless, the Howard Government’s strategy appears to have been that the greater the degree of Australian integration into the regional marketplace, the greater the returns in economic and regional security. While many nearby countries appeared to increasingly welcome Australian involvement in neighbourhood affairs, Malaysia stood apart and its leader, Dr Mahathir repeatedly demonstrated his willingness to veto Australian participation at every opportunity.<sup>206</sup> Dr Mahathir blocked Australia’s attempts to participate in the 1996 and 1998 Asia-Europe Summit (ASEM) and the new ASEAN Plus Three grouping (ASEAN with China, Japan and South Korea) in December 1998.<sup>207</sup> This was consistent with Dr Mahathir’s long-standing strategy of keeping Australia out of the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) and as distant as possible from ASEAN itself.<sup>208</sup>

In April 2000, Alexander Downer, the Australian Foreign Minister described this as ‘emotional’ as opposed to ‘practical’ regionalism. Emotional regionalism he defined as “an emotional community of interests associated with the region, ethnic and cultural associations which Australia does not share.” Practical regionalism on the other hand,

---

<sup>205</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *Annual Report 1993-94*. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994, 14.

<sup>206</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 1991-95*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 1997, 30.

<sup>207</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996 - 2000*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 2001, 316-317.



was “looking at ways to work with *our* region to secure *our* own economic and security objectives.”<sup>209</sup> This perspective and given that ‘securing a favourable security environment’ was the second objective listed in DFAT’s Corporate Plan, certainly leaves no doubt that Australia was indeed integrating its economic, foreign and defence policies in the latter half of the 1990s.<sup>210</sup> The intervention in East Timor is perhaps the best example of Australia’s willingness to lead an international force into a regional *Asian* affair despite the inevitable criticism from Malaysia and even more understandably, Indonesia.

This willingness to lead was a decisive change to Australia’s approach to foreign policy and its regional self-image. Revelling in the international success of the intervention, Downer claimed,

It demonstrated the falsity of saying that Australia is ‘only’ a small or middle power ... in 1998 our GDP was 14<sup>th</sup> largest in the world – bigger than all the countries of East Asia except Japan and China ... we are also a scientifically sophisticated nation that is at the forefront of technological innovation, and well placed to lead the world into the new age of the information economy ... [and] we have a strong and capable defence force.<sup>211</sup>

Regional reactions gave way to criticism of the ‘Howard Doctrine’ in September 1999 where Prime Minister Howard suggested in an interview that Australia could play a

<sup>208</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 1991-95*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 1997, 30.

<sup>209</sup> The *Australian*, 26 April 2002 (James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996 - 2000*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 2001, 318).

<sup>210</sup> The Government’s 1997 Foreign Affairs White Paper outlines the intention and strategy to integrate Australia’s security, economic and political interests through a comprehensive approach to bilateral relations in the Asia-Pacific (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *In the National Interest*. Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1997, 53-54).

<sup>211</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996 - 2000*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 2001, 313.

unique role in the security of the Asia-Pacific by leading responses to low-intensity conflicts while the United States remained the regional security ‘lender of last resort’.<sup>212</sup>


Asian reaction was varied with Malaysia claiming that Australia was attempting to lord it over Asia and that regional affairs should be handled by the countries of that region. Japan went as far to assert Howard’s comments as “a claim of Western superiority over Southeast Asian nations and an attempt to force ‘white’ ideals on them.”<sup>213</sup> No doubt the ‘white’ reference hinted at the defunct ‘White Australia Policy’ and the storm of controversy over an Australian MP, Pauline Hanson with her alleged anti-immigration comments.<sup>214</sup> However, as Graph 2 shows, 62% of Australia’s immigration intake for the period 1990-2000 came from the Asia-Pacific region. The facts borne out by the Government’s immigration policy effectively countered any Hanson induced racism criticism by regional neighbours. Consequently, neither the Hanson immigration nor Howard Doctrine issues proved to be detrimental to Australia’s overall strategic position or its capability to trade and interact within the Asia-Pacific. The core components of Australia’s national interest appeared to have protected and enhanced by a remarkable sense of astuteness by the Australian Governments of the 1990s.

---

<sup>212</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996 - 2000*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 2001, 316.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid.

<sup>214</sup> Malaysia stated that it would not react in any manner as to harm existing bilateral trade ties but warned such comments may harm foreign investment. *Hanson Win Rocks Australia-Asian Ties* <<http://www.huaren.org/hottopic/id/061698-01.html>>



**Graph 2 – Australian Immigration Figures by Region 1999-2000<sup>215</sup>**

#### **4.3 Domestic Political Scene: 1990 to 2001**

Although the Labor Government had commenced Australia's move towards engaging in the Asia-Pacific region, it was not until Paul Keating became Prime Minister that 'Asian Engagement' became the main Government focus and also the subject of much criticism from the Opposition Party, the Australian public and from the region itself. While it could be argued that Defence had never been a major priority of an Australian Labor Government, there is little doubt that Keating's drive towards Asian engagement was motivated by a sense of economic marginalisation, strategic loneliness

<sup>215</sup> This graph is available from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade [http://www.dfat.gov.au/ani/appendix\\_one.pdf](http://www.dfat.gov.au/ani/appendix_one.pdf)

and political irrelevance.<sup>216</sup> The Keating Government's view was that 'Australia's security now lay *in* the region rather than *against* it.'<sup>217</sup> An example of this view would be the signing of the Australian-Indonesian Agreement of Maintaining Security in December 1995. This Agreement was not a defence pact but rather a concurrence to consult on security issues.

In regards to defence issues, the Keating Government released a strategic defence review in 1993 and a Defence White Paper in 1994 where the premise of self-reliance was reiterated as a military doctrine. Furthermore, the ANZUS alliance was now described as only *a* key element of Australian defence policy rather than *the* key element in previous White Papers.<sup>218</sup> Through these documents, Labor introduced their concept for the requirement of a strategic partnership with Southeast Asia:

Our growing national links with South-East Asia have important implications for Defence. Increasingly, our defence relationships with South-East Asia will be characterised by the concept of partnership ... Australia has the opportunity to develop new patterns of defence relationships with South-East Asia that will strengthen the future security of the region ... we should aim to develop defence relationships based on the concept of partnership that increasingly reflect the growing sophistications of regional capabilities, regional perceptions of a more complex strategic environment, and the evolution of a sense of a regional community.<sup>219</sup>

In response to the changing strategic environment and to Australia's economic circumstances, the Keating Government had focused their defence interests on the provision of strategic partnerships with Asia while reducing the defence budget and

---

<sup>216</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996 - 2000*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 2001, 16.

<sup>217</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 1991-95*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 1997, 25.

<sup>218</sup> The 1994 White Paper devoted only 5 pages to ANZUS as 'a key element' of Australian Defence as opposed to the 1987 White Paper's constant reference to the US alliance throughout the document.

<sup>219</sup> Department of Defence. *Strategic Review 1993*. Defence Centre Publications, Canberra, 1993, 22-23.

implementing cost saving measures.<sup>220</sup> Labor's 1994 defence policy continued the shift away from forward defence to defending the Australian continent (either in it or near it) and as such, was a political compromise rather than a radical reordering of defence arrangements.<sup>221</sup> Subsequently, it is believed that the election failure of the Keating Labor Government in 1996 was the result of its failure to link its vision of Australia in the region to the interests and concerns of the Australian public which included economic security and defence.<sup>222</sup> Despite his assertions to the contrary, the Australian voters and regional countries thought that Keating was attempting to convert Australia into an Asian nation and subsequently rejected him and his Government.<sup>223</sup> However, it was plain that Keating's concept of 'cooperative security' would involve consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy and interdependence rather than unilateralism.<sup>224</sup> The new Howard Government had slightly different ideas.

In regards to Australian foreign policy over the decade, it has been described that if the first five years was Keating's 'Asian Engagement', then the next five years under Howard is best described as 'Asian Ambivalence'.<sup>225</sup> While the Howard Government continued with engagement in Asia as a policy, it did so in a more selective and

---

<sup>220</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 1991-95*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 1997, 64.

<sup>221</sup> Stewart Firth. *Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Allen & Unwin, Australia, 1999, 168.

<sup>222</sup> Gary Smith; Dave Cox & Scott Burchill. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 228.

<sup>223</sup> "Behind all these charges seemed to lay the belief that Australia faced only one simple choice: to be Asian or to be European ... I never saw Australia in those terms. Australia is not and can never be, an Asian nation any more that we can or want to be European or North American or African. ... We can only be Australian" (Paul Keating. *Engagement – Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific*. MacMillan Australia, 2000, 15).

<sup>224</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 1991-95*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 1997, 5.

articulated manner. For example, in 1997 the Howard Government released Australia's first Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper which among other issues such as the effects of globalisation, emphasised a 'Whole-of-Nation' approach to policy decisions. This approach was designed to link international and domestic strategies in order to coordinate effectively. It acknowledged that Australian foreign, defence, trade, immigration policies were all linked and that this connection reflected the reality of advancing Australia's interests.<sup>226</sup>

This trend continued three years later with the release of the new Defence White Paper in 2000 where the Howard Government sustained the integrated 'Whole-of-Nation' approach with a number of clear policy statements. These included the expectation that defence could reasonably play a future role in international affairs and that the upgrade of forces was necessary not just for defence but also to increase capacity to contribute to regional security.<sup>227</sup> With particular respect to Southeast Asia, *Defence 2000* also detailed the range and importance of Australia's extensive bilateral defence relationships not only for security, but also in the pursuit of multilateral networks to achieve other strategic objectives.<sup>228</sup> It was now apparent that Australia would pursue its national interest within the Asia-Pacific with a focused and joint effort through its major Departments such as Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade and Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. Regional criticism of Australian policy would be

---

<sup>225</sup> James Cotton and John Ravenhill. *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996 - 2000*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 2001, 4.

<sup>226</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *In the National Interest*. Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1997, 73.

<sup>227</sup> The new Defence Policy became known as 'Forward Response' as opposed to the 1994's 'Self Reliance'. (Defence White Paper 2000. *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 2000, 9 & 5 and Cotton, *The National Interest in a Global Era*, 201).

<sup>228</sup> Defence White Paper 2000. *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 2000, 39.

listened to and respected, but not pandered to. As stated by the Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer in 2002, “I make no apology for the simple fact that serving our own national interest is our main aim ... our driving force. That sounds like an obvious point but it is one that is often overlooked.”<sup>229</sup> Australia was now driving forward into the new century as a true power in the Asia-Pacific region.

#### **4.4 Summary: 1990 to 2001**

There can be no doubt that by the year 2001, Australia had matured into a significant regional power capable of exerting influence within the Asia-Pacific region in pursuit of its national interest. The intensive diplomatic efforts in the early 1990s to integrate Australia’s economy into the regional market place while still continuing to diversify in other markets such as the European Union and Pacific Rim, protected Australia from the 1997 Asian economic crisis. In fact, these efforts not only preserved the Australian economy, they also enhanced Australia’s economic and diplomatic influence in the region and by default, made a significant contribution to Australia’s regional security.

The subsequent spin-off benefits of bilateral and multilateral economic and trade networks became critical in development of Australia’s Defence policy and thereby, regional security. Under the Hawke / Keating Labor Governments, the policy of self reliance was advocated and advanced. Arguably, Australia’s ability to project power and influence was not simultaneously advanced as cooperation rather than confrontation was the main Government theme.

---

<sup>229</sup> Alexander Downer, MP. *Australia’s Foreign Policy and International Relations*. Speech made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. Canberra 21 Aug 2002.  
<[http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2002/020821\\_fa\\_fp\\_ir.html](http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2002/020821_fa_fp_ir.html)>

The Howard Government on the other hand, continued with Labor's 'Asian Engagement' policy while simultaneously integrating a 'whole of nation' approach with Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade and Immigration. As proven by the East Timor intervention and subsequent Defence 2000 White Paper, Australia was prepared to assume the leadership role despite regional criticism and deploy military forces outside Australian territory in pursuit of regional and national interests. This new defence policy of 'forward response' saw Australia build a coalition on its own accord to successfully resolve a regional problem using significant military, economic and diplomatic influence. This episode was indeed a signal to the Asia-Pacific region and the World that Australia was now a confident and capable Middle Power.

### **5.0 Thirty Years of Defence Evolution in Retrospect**

There can be no doubt that Australian Defence Policy has undergone major and essential changes over the past thirty years in response to ever-changing global and regional strategic circumstances. Ever since the establishment of the first colony in 1788, Australia enjoyed the protection of its homeland, people and to a great extent, its interests by a powerful nation like Great Britain and the United States. Up to 1970, Australia's defence policy had revolved around the principle of 'Forward Defence' in support of its larger sponsor nations military and foreign policies. Such a defence policy combined with a deep and abiding sense of loyalty to Great Britain and the United States, saw Australia commit military forces to nearly every conflict that either of these two nations were involved in. Australia's willingness to participate in these conflicts earned it regional distrust by neighbouring countries and a defence force that was simply not capable of operating without super power support. The withdrawal of Great Britain from



the region combined with the simultaneous reduction of defence assistance by the United States under the Guam (or Nixon) Doctrine, resulted in a significant sense of shock and isolation in Australia. Along with this sense of shock came the realisation that Australia was vulnerable and an immediate review of the Defence Policy and Australia's strategic circumstances was required.

After examination of Australia's evaluation and response to regional strategic circumstances through the 1970s while paying particular regards to defence policy, it was apparent that Government failed to respond decisively to regional trade and foreign affairs issues. Consequently, it can be argued that this failure did not contribute to the stability of the regional environment and thereby weakened the region and Australia's position in it. The Australian Government's highly controversial decision to accept and officially acknowledge Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor despite such aggression contravening everything that Australia professed to value is an excellent example of this weakened position. A factor in this failure to influence regional events may have stemmed from the lack of a strong and capable military force.

The move to a 'continental defence' policy following the end of SEATO and ANZUK with the diminishing importance of ANZUS left Australia with a 'deterrence style' defence policy that restricted the Government's capability to shore up its foreign policy within the region. Without political strategic integration and sufficient funding, Australia's ability to influence regional events and protect its national interests through a robust military was minimal. Australia entered the next decade as an exposed nation with exceedingly inadequate capability to bring to bear regional sway in pursuit of its national objectives.

Through the 1980s, both the Frazer and Hawke Governments chose to exercise regional influence solely by means of foreign and economic policies. A strategic review of Australia's national interests and defence policy had concluded that there was no credible long-term threat to Australia by a major power. Given its geographic isolation, it concluded, Australia only needed to be concerned with low-level threats posed by small raiding forces operating in the north and therefore, required just a small core military defence force to deter such aggression.

The public acknowledgement by the Government of the day that it did not consider any nation a threat saw a practically immediate improvement in Indonesia-Australian relations. This improvement culminated with the signing of Timor Gap oil and gas exploration treaty and provided the Australian Government with some economic hope for the future following the economic woes of the past few years.

The Government's foreign policies were beginning to have an effect on Australia's economic influence but did little to contribute to regional security. The 1987 Defence White Paper advocated self-reliance while still maintaining the continental defence line, and consequently, had minimal impact on the extension of Australian influence or regional stability. It would not be until the next decade that Australia would see the fruition of its economic and foreign policies in addition to a fundamental change in defence policy.

This fundamental change was brought about through the Howard Government's 'whole of nation' approach to defence, foreign, trade and immigration policies in the late 1990s. Such a change would not have been possible without the efforts of the previous Government. The Keating Government had made a significant contribution towards this

approach by means of an aggressive foreign policy aimed at establishing extensive regional bilateral and multilateral economic networks. From a strong economic and diplomatic support base, Australia was able to withstand the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis and concurrently extend welcomed assistance to regional neighbours. Bilateral and multilateral ties combined with good relations contributed to regional and domestic security. The difference for defence came with the integration into foreign, trade and immigration policies. The defence focus shifted from internal through self-reliance (continental) to a more outward looking and robust framework under 'forward response'.

The test for Australia came with the successful operation to restore stability and support self-determination in East Timor in 1999. This was something Australia was neither politically prepared nor militarily capable of attempting in 1975. In conducting the East Timor operation, Australia, of its own volition, built and led a large coalition that consisted of both regional and non-regional nations. The confidence to build, lead and act decisively with a coalition of regional neighbours with whom a few short years ago, regarded Australia as the interloper, did not come from just a single policy.

The Middle Power characteristics of leadership, coalition buildings and decisive action do not develop from policies constructed in isolation to each other. A successful economic policy can only identify common interests and provide a certain degree of leverage between nations. On the other hand, a deep-rooted and positive foreign policy establishes the dialogue necessary to build a coalition and act but does not assure either the success of the act or the leadership role. Similarly, the construction of a robust defence policy where the military forces are prepared and capable of playing a role in international affairs rather than solely focused on the defeat of an aggressor does not












































necessarily guarantee the success of the act. However, it does lend itself to supporting the leadership role and establishing government confidence in the ability to act. While other policies such as immigration and human rights contribute to these three main policies, it is the degree of self-assurance that both the prospective host nation and coalition partner has in each of these policies which gives them the poise to act decisively. Only from the self-belief derived from the seamless integration of these three main policies, does a nation generate the ability to extend influence over a region as a 'Middle Power'.

The 1999 intervention in East Timor occurred at the behest of an Asian-Pacific Middle Power. Through this intervention and with the integration of its major policies, Australia demonstrated that it was a true middle power in the Asia-Pacific and capable of exerting significant regional influence in pursuit of its national interests. This circumstance could only have occurred through the necessary and indispensable evolution of Australia's defence policy over the past thirty years.

## Appendix 1

## Countries of the Asia-Pacific

(<http://www.apcss.org/countries/countries.html>)

 <a href="#">Australia</a>	 <a href="#">Mongolia</a>	 <a href="#">Madagascar</a>	 <a href="#">Thailand</a>
 <a href="#">Bangladesh</a>	 <a href="#">Nauru</a>	 <a href="#">Malaysia</a>	 <a href="#">Tonga</a>
 <a href="#">Bhutan</a>	 <a href="#">Nepal</a>	 <a href="#">Maldives</a>	 <a href="#">Tuvalu</a>
 <a href="#">Brunei</a>	 <a href="#">New Zealand</a>	 <a href="#">Marshall Islands</a>	 <a href="#">Vanuatu</a>
 <a href="#">Burma (Myanmar)</a>	 <a href="#">Niue</a>	 <a href="#">Mauritius</a>	 <a href="#">Vietnam</a>
 <a href="#">Cambodia</a>	 <a href="#">North Korea</a>	 <a href="#">Micronesia</a>	 <a href="#">United States</a>
 <a href="#">Canada</a>	 <a href="#">Pakistan</a>		
 <a href="#">China</a>	 <a href="#">Palau</a>		
 <a href="#">Comoros</a>	 <a href="#">Papua New Guinea</a>		
 <a href="#">Cook Islands</a>	 <a href="#">Philippines</a>		
 <a href="#">Fiji</a>	 <a href="#">Russia</a>		
 <a href="#">India</a>	 <a href="#">Samoa</a>		
 <a href="#">Indonesia</a>	 <a href="#">Singapore</a>		
 <a href="#">Japan</a>	 <a href="#">Solomon Islands</a>		
 <a href="#">Kiribati</a>	 <a href="#">South Korea</a>		
 <a href="#">Laos</a>	 <a href="#">Sri Lanka</a>		

## Glossary

<b>ABCA Program</b>	American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies' Standardisation program	The original ABCA agreement was officially signed in Dec. 1949, with America, Britain and Canada as the initial members. Australia joined them in 1963. New Zealand became an associate member through Australia in 1965. The aim of the program is to maintain and extend the levels of military cooperation and standardisation between the member nations.
<b>AFTA</b>	ASEAN Free-Trade Area	Signed in January 1992, AFTA comprises of 10 member countries with the ultimate objective increasing ASEAN's competitive edge as a production base geared for world market through the elimination of intra-regional tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
<b>ANZUK</b>	Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom	Under the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement of 1957, Britain, Australia and New Zealand, were committed to providing defence assistance to Malaysia and Singapore in the form of forward basing of air, land and sea assets.
<b>ANZUS</b>	Australia, New Zealand and United States	The ANZUS treaty is a common defence treaty and was signed 1 September 1951. This alliance with the United States and New Zealand is the cornerstone of Australia's defence and foreign policies. Whilst New Zealand no longer participates to any extent in ANZUS, the 50-year-old agreement was invoked by the Australian Government in 2001 in response to the terrorist attacks on the US.
<b>APEC</b>	Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation group	Founded November, 1989 as a forum to further cooperation on trade and investment between nations of the region and the rest of the world, APEC currently has 21 members: Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; Republic of the Philippines; Russia; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; USA; Vietnam
<b>ARF</b>	ASEAN Regional Forum	Created in 1994, ARF brought together eighteen nations to discuss preventative diplomacy, non-proliferation and military transparency and other measures aimed at building confidence in regional security.

<b>ASEAN</b>	Association of South-East Asian Nations	Five countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, founded ASEAN on 8 August 1967
<b>ASEAN Plus Three</b>	ASEAN with China, Japan and South Korea	ASEAN Plus Three (APT) is the dialogue process that brings together China, South Korea, Japan and ASEAN aimed at greater regional economic coordination. Although distant, its natural extension would be an East Asian Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
<b>ASEM</b>	Asia-Europe Summit	The first ASEM occurred on 1 March 1996 from the recognized need to strengthen the linkage between Asia and Europe.
<b>Asia-Pacific region</b>		The Asia-Pacific region is an immense area and encompasses 44 countries ranging from Russia in the north, Iraq in the West, Australia in the South and Canada and the United States in the East.
<b>Basic Treaty</b>	Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (Australia - Japan)	The 'Basic Treaty' was to strengthen strong economic links and establish political principles for the conduct of bilateral communication over a wide range of topics. It was not a defence treaty, however it did have defence implications in that it promoted peace and regional stability.
<b>CER</b>	Closer Economic Relations	A free-trade agreement between Australia and New Zealand signed on 28th March 1983.
<b>Continental Defence</b>	Replaced the 'Forward Defence' Policy	'Continental Defence' coined to describe this 'Fortress Australia' strategy and came into effect in early 1973.
<b>DFAT</b>	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade	The Australian Government department responsible for foreign affairs and trade policies and was created 24 July 1987 through the amalgamation of Department of Trade and Customs and the Department of Foreign Affairs.
<b>DSP</b>	Defence Support Program (USA and Allies including Australia)	United States' worldwide military network where Allies contributed to US nuclear deterrence efforts through the provision of bases and facilities.
<b>EAEC</b>	East Asian Economic Caucus	In Dec. 1990, the concept of an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) is advanced (but not implemented). but by Oct 1991, ASEAN reaches agreement on creating the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC).

<b>EU</b>	European Union	The European Union (EU) was set up after the 2nd World War and has 15 Member States and is preparing for the accession of 13 eastern and southern European countries.
<b>Forward Defence</b>	Australian Defence Policy until 1973	The basis of this policy was to prevent the spread of communism through the forward basing of military assets overseas.
<b>Forward Response</b>	Australian Defence Policy (2000)	Outline in Defence White Paper. <i>Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force</i> . Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 2000.
<b>FPDA</b>	Five Power Defence Agreement (Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand and Britain)	FPDA was proposed in June 1968 and came into effect 1971 replacing the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement.
<b>GATT</b>	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade	GATT was a set of post-WW2 trade rules designed to protect the economies of smaller countries.
<b>Guam Doctrine</b>	Also know as the 'Nixon' Doctrine	President Nixon's 1969 doctrine message was that irrespective of what was written in their treaties with the USA, these allies are expected to take a greater responsibility for their own security unless threatened by a major power with nuclear weapons
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund	The IMF came into official existence on December 27, 1945 and is an international organization of 184 member countries. It was established to promote international monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and orderly exchange arrangements; to foster economic growth and high levels of employment; and to provide temporary financial assistance to countries to help ease balance of payments adjustment
<b>MP</b>	Member of Parliament	



<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development	an international organisation helping governments tackle the economic, social and governance challenges of a globalised economy
<b>PBEC</b>	Pacific Basin Economic Council	Founded in 1967 PBEC serves as a forum for regional business leaders to discuss economic issues and develop contacts and is an association of business leaders from nineteen Pacific economies.
<b>PECC</b>	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council	Established in 1980, PECC now has 25 Member Committees, including two associate members, from all over Asian-Pacific region and is a unique tripartite partnership of senior individuals from business and industry, government, academic and other intellectual circles
<b>PIC</b>	Pacific Island Countries	The Pacific region consists of over 7500 islands comprising 22 countries and territories containing a wide variety of ethnic, cultural and linguistic groupings.
<b>PMG</b>	Peace Monitoring Group	PMG was created and led by Australia and replaced TMG on 1 May 1998 . It consisted of regional groupings drawn from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu in order to facilitate the peace process between PNG and Bougainville.
<b>PNG</b>	Papua New Guinea	PNG was a Protectorate of Australia until achieving independence in 1976.
<b>PRC</b>	Pacific Rim Countries	PRC is comprised of 21 nations that ring the Pacific: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam and the United States.
<b>SEATO</b>	South-East Asian Treaty Organisation	SEATO was signed in September 1954 and became Australia's second pact with the US. Its membership also included Britain, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines. SEATO was officially disbanded in 1977.
<b>Timor Gap Treaty</b>	Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty	The Treaty was signed in 1989 as a joint oil and gas exploration venture between Australia and Indonesia.
<b>TMG</b>	Truce Monitoring Group	TMG was created and led by New Zealand in Dec 1997 and consisted of regional groupings drawn from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu in order to facilitate the peace process between PNG and Bougainville.

<b>USA</b>	United States of America	
<b>USSR</b>	Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics	The USSR disintegrated in late 1991 following the collapse of the Communist Party in June.
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organisation	WTO replaced the GATT system and Australia became a member of WTO in 1 January 1995
<b>WW2</b>	World War Two	1939 - 1945
<b>ZOPFAN</b>	Asian-Pacific Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality	The concept of an Asian-Pacific Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) was proposed by ASEAN in 1971 and was brought to fruition in 1976 as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia.

## Bibliography

2002 Economic Outlook. *Economic Report - Australia*

<http://www.apecsec.org.sg/member/memberecreport/aus.html>

ABC World New On-Line Feature Article. *East Timor since Indonesia's Invasion*. Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2000.

Albinski, Henry Stephen. *Australia and the United States: Strategic and Defence Cooperation Futures*. Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, University College Australian Defence Force Academy, 1993

Albinski, Henry Stephen. *Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia: The Impact of Vietnam and Conscription*. Duke University Press, North Carolina, 1970.

Alves, Dora. *Evolving Pacific Basin Strategies: The 1989 Pacific Symposium*. National Defence University Press, Washington DC, USA, 1990.

Alves, Dora. *Pacific Security Toward the Year 2000: The 1987 Pacific Symposium*. National Defence University Press, Washington DC, USA, 1988.

Anderson, Ken and Dibb, Paul. *Strategic Guidelines for Enabling Research and Development to Support Australian Defence*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 115. Australian National University, Canberra, 1996.

ANZUK: *Last of the 'Colonial' Units in SE Asia* <http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-conflicts-periods/malaya-korea/anzuk.htm>

Arup, Christopher. *Innovation, Policy, and Law: Australia and the International High Technology Economy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

ASEANPAGE: *A Brief History of ASEAN* <http://www.geocities.com/aseanpage/history.html>

ASEANPAGE: *Southeast Asia pre-ASEAN* <http://www.geocities.com/aseanpage/preASEAN.html>

*Asia - Pacific: A Regional Overview*. <http://www.webmasterworld.com/forum32/110.htm>

Association of SouthEast Asian Nations: *Overview of ASEAN-Australian Relations*.

<http://www.aseansec.org/12974.htm>

Association of SouthEast Asian Nations: *Overview of SouthEast Asian Nations*.

<http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm>

Association of SouthEast Asian Nations: *The Founding of ASEAN*.

<http://www.aseansec.org/7069.htm>

AusStats. *Year Book Australia 2002: International Accounts and Trade: Special Article - Trade Since 1900*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 2003.

<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs...exports,asia,pacific,trend,history>

*Australian Army History - Changing Commitments 1971-77*.

[http://www.defence.gov.au/army/ahu/history/changing\\_commit.htm](http://www.defence.gov.au/army/ahu/history/changing_commit.htm)

Australian Defence On-Line. *Defence and Security 2001*.

<http://www.austemb.org/australiadefenceandsec.html>

Australian Department of Defence. *Force Structure Review: Report to the Minister for Defence*. Canberra: The Department, 1991.

Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *Promoting Integration with Asia-Pacific Region*. [http://www.australia.ch/eng/trade/promoting\\_integration\\_aspec.asp](http://www.australia.ch/eng/trade/promoting_integration_aspec.asp)

Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. *Abolition of the White Australia Policy*. Australian Immigration Fact Sheet correct as at 13 February 2003.

<http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/08abolition.htm>

Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. *Over Fifty Years of Post-war Migration*. Australian Immigration Fact Sheet correct as at 29 May 2001.

<http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/04fifty.htm>

Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. *The Evolution of Australia's Multicultural Policies*. Australian Immigration Fact Sheet correct as at 24 May 2002.

<http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/06evolution.htm>

Australian Immigration/Migration Statistics. *Immigration – Federation to Century's End*.

Department of Immigration Report, 2001 available at

<http://www.immi.gov.au/statistics/publications/federation/index.htm>

Australianpolitics.com, *Australian Prime Ministers Since 1901*.

<http://www.australianpolitics.com/executive/pm/list.shtml>

Baker, Richard W. and East-West Center. *The ANZUS States and Their Region: Regional Policies of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.

Ball, Desmond. *Australia and the Global Strategic Balance*. Canberra Papers of Strategy and Defence No 49. Australian National University, Canberra, 1989.

Beaumont, Joan. *Australian Defence: Sources and Statistics*. The Australian Centenary of History of Defence, Volume VI. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia, 2001.

Bell, Coral. *Nation, Region and Context*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 122. Australian National University, Canberra, 1995.

Bell, Coral. *A Mixed Bag of Dilemmas: Australia's Policy-making in a World of Changing Rules*. Research Paper, No 24. Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 20 June 2000 at <http://aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1999-2000/2000rp24.htm>

Bell, Coral. *Agenda for the Nineties: Studies of the Contexts for Australian Choices in Foreign and Defence Policy*. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1991.

Bell, Coral. *Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Australia, 1988.

Bell, Coral. *The American Alliance and the Revolution in Military Affairs*. University of Sydney, Australian Centre for American Studies, Sydney, 1998.

*Book of Australian Facts*. Reader's Digest, Sydney, 1992.

Boyce, P.J. & Angel, J.R. *Independence and Alliance: Australia in World Affairs 1976-80*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983.

Brown, G. and Rayner, L. *Upside, Downside: ANZUS: After Fifty Years*. Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 28 August 2001 at <http://aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/2001-02/02cib03.htm>

Cameron, R.J. *Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No 61, 1975 and 1976*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 1977.

Cameron, R.J. *Year Book Australia, No 64, 1980*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 1981.

Cameron, R.J. *Year Book Australia, No 68, 1984*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 1985.

Carpenter, William M. and Weincek, David G. *Asian Security Handbook 2000*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2000.

Castles, Ian. *Year Book Australia 1989, No 72*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 1990.

Castles, Ian. *Year Book Australia 1991, No 74*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 1992.

Castles, Ian. *Year Book Australia 1992, No 75*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 1993.

Castles, Ian. *Year Book Australia 1994, No 76*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 1995.

Castles, Ian. *Year Book Australia 1995, No 77*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 1996.

Cotton, James and Ravenhill, John. *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 1991-95*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 1997.

Cotton, James and Ravenhill, John. *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996 - 2000*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 2001.

Cotton, James. *East Timor and Australia: AIIA Contributions to the Policy Debate*. Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1999.

*Countries of the Asia-Pacific Region*. <http://www.apcss.org/Countries/countries.html>

Day, David. *The Rise and Fall of the White Australia Policy*. Australian Studies Lecture, University of Melbourne, 6 May 1997.

Defence White Paper 1994. *Defending Australia*. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, November 1994.

Defence White Paper 2000. *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 2000.

Defence White Paper. *The Defence of Australia 1987*. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, March 1987.

Department of Defence, Defence Committee, *Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1973*. Canberra, 1 June 1973.

Department of Defence. *Strategic Review 1993*. Defence Centre Publications, Canberra, 1993.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *Annual Report 1993-94*. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *In the National Interest*. Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1997.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *One Hundred Years of Trade*. Australian Government Publishing Service, February 2002.

Dexter, David. *The New Guinea Offensives*. Canberra: Griffin Press, 1961.

Dibb, Paul. *Australia's external Relations in the 1980s: The Interaction of Economic, Political and Strategic Factors*. Croom Helm, Canberra, 1983.

Dibb, Paul. *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*. Report to the Minister of Defence, March 1986. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986.

Dibb, Paul. *The Conceptual Basis of Australia's Defence Planning and Force Structure Development*. Canberra Papers of Strategy and Defence No 88. Australian National University, Canberra, 1992.

Dobell, Graeme. *US and Australia: Great and Powerful and Back Again*. Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter 22, No. 9 (September 1996-October 1996): 6.

Doctrine Wing. *Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*. Australian Defence Force Publication, 2002.

Evans, Michael. *From Deakin to Dibb: The Army and the Making of Australian Strategy in the 20th Century*. Land Warfare Studies Centre, Working Paper No 113, Canberra, Australia, June 2001.

Evans, Paul M. *Studying Asia Pacific Security*. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. University of Toronto - York University, Canada, 1994.

Ferguson, James R. *Australian Defence Policies: Alliance or Independence?* Bond University, Queensland, Australia, 2001 <http://www.international-relations.com/wbip/wbnlec5.htm>

Firth, Stewart. *Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Allen & Unwin, Australia, 1999.

Fry, Gavin. *A Century of Army: The Australian Army in Profile*. Department of Defence, Canberra, 2000.

Godfrey-Smith, Tony. *Low Level Conflict Contingencies and Australia Defence Policy*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 34. Australian National University, Canberra, 1985.

Hanson Win Rocks Australia-Asian Ties <http://www.huaren.org/hottopic/id/061698-01.html>

Head, Mike. *East Timor and Australia's Oily Politics*. 8 March 2000 <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/mar2000/timo-m08.shtml>

Hetherington, J. *Blamey, The Biography of Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey*. Australia: Angus and Robertson, 1954.

Hogan, Michael, J. *The End of the Cold War: Its Meanings and Implications*. Cambridge University Press, New York, USA, 1992.

Hookey, H and Roy, D. *Australian Defence Planning: Five Views from Policy Makers*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No120. Australian National University, Canberra, 1997.

Hudson, W.J. *Australia in World Affairs, 1971-1975*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney Australia, 1980.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996.

Hutcheson, John. *Wars of Conscience: Human Rights, National Security and Australia's Defence Policy*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 140. Australian National University, Canberra, 2001.

Keating, Paul. *Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific*. Pan Macmillan, Sydney Australia, 2000.

Langtry, J.O. and Ball, Desmond. *Controlling Australia's Threat Environment: A Methodology for Planning Australian Defence Force Development*. Australian National University, Canberra, July 1979.

Mak, J.N. *ASEAN Defence Reorientation 1975-1992: The Dynamics of Modernisation and Structural Change*. Canberra Papers of Strategy and Defence No 103. Australian National University, Canberra, 1993.

McLennan, W. *1996 Year Book Australia, No 78*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 1997.

McLennan, W. *1997 Year Book Australia, No 79*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 1998.

McLennan, W. *1998 Year Book Australia, No 80*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 1999.

McLennan, W. *1999 Year Book Australia, No 81*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 2000.

McLennan, W. *2000 Year Book Australia, No 82*. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 2001.

Methven, Phillip. *The Five Power Defence Arrangements and Military Cooperation among the ASEAN States: Incompatible Models for Security in Southeast Asia?* Canberra Papers of Strategy and Defence No 92. Australian National University, Canberra, 1992.

Moore, John, MP, Minister for Defence. *White Paper Defence 2000: Executive Summary*. Department of Defence, 6 December 2000 <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/execsum.htm>



NSW HSC ONLINE - *Modern History: Australia's Involvement in the Indochina War*  
[http://www.hsc.csu.edu.au/modern\\_history/international\\_studies/indochina/indo\\_viet/page33.htm](http://www.hsc.csu.edu.au/modern_history/international_studies/indochina/indo_viet/page33.htm)

O'Neill, J.P. *Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No 58, 1972*. Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra, Australia, 1973.

O'Neill, R. *The Defence of Australia - Fundamental New Aspects*. Australia National University, Canberra 1976.

O'Neill, Robert and Horner, D.M. *Australian Defence Policy for the 1980s*. University of Queensland Press, Australia, 1982.

Pacific Basin Economic Council - Australian Committee. *PBEC - The Independent Voice of Business in the Pacific* <http://www.sunsite.anu.edu.au/pbec/aboutpbec.htm>

Pacific Basin Economic Council - Australian Committee. *PBEC's International General Meetings*  
<http://www.sunsite.anu.edu.au/pbec/pbecinternat.htm>

Phillips, Dennis. *Cold War 2 and Australia*. Allen & Unwin, Australia, 1983.

*Promoting Integration within the Asia-Pacific Region*.  
[http://www.australia.ch/eng/trade/promoting\\_integration\\_apec.asp](http://www.australia.ch/eng/trade/promoting_integration_apec.asp)

Quayat, David. *The United Nations and Regional Organisations: A New Paradigm for Peace?*  
 Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, November 1999 <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/1999/quayat99.htm>

Ross, Ken. *Regional Security in the South Pacific: The Quarter-Century 1970-95*. Canberra Papers of Strategy and Defence No 100. Australian National University, Canberra, 1993.

Smith, Gary; Cox, Dave & Burchill, Scott. *Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996.

*Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO)*. Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2001  
<http://www.bartleby.com/65/st/SthEATO.html>

Stiles, Kendall W. *Case Studies in International Politics, Second Edition*. Addison Welsley Longman, 2002.

Strategic Review Paper. *Australia's Strategic Policy*. Department of Defence, Canberra, 1997.

Sunderland, Ray. *Problems in Australian Defence Planning*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 36. Australian National University, Canberra, 1986.

Thayer, Carlyle. *Australian Perceptions and Indonesian Reality*. Lecture to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, University of Otago, Dunedin, 12 May 1988  
<<http://www.uc.pt/timor/ozindo.htm>>

*The World Fact Book 2002*. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos>

Thwaites, M.J. *The 1987 Defence White Papers: Australian and Canadian Perspectives and Aspirations*. A Course Paper produced for the Canadian Forces College, April 1988.

United Nations Population Fund Report. *Asia and the Pacific: A Region in Transition*. New York, August 2002.

Walters, Patrick. *Australia and Indonesia*. Deakin University Australia and Asia Study Guide. School of Australian and International Studies, Deakin University, Geelong, Australia 1996.

Ward, Michael B. *The Regional Concentration of Defence Spending: Issues, Implications and Policies Concerning Defence Infrastructure Development in Australia*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 38. Australian National University, Canberra, 1986.

World Trade Organisation. *Trade Policy Reviews: Australia: June 1998*. [http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/tpr\\_e/tp76\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp76_e.htm)

Zakaria Haji Ahmad. *The United States Military: Southeast Asian Views*. Strategy, Vol 1, No 1, 1992.