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IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTERS OF DEFENCE STUDIES:

**ADVANCING WITH PURPOSE:
ASSESSING THE CANADIAN
ARMY STRATEGY**

**ENGAGES, VERS L'AVANT: UN
ASSESSMENT DU STRATEGIE DE
L'ARMEE CANADIENNE**

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Abstract

While it is impossible to predict the future, it is important that any strategy developed to prepare the Army for answering the nation's needs be consistent with policy guidance, and not be merely the prerogative of the Army Commander. In May 2002 the Canadian Army published *the Army Strategy, Advancing with Purpose: One Army, One Team, One Vision*. The strategy proposes a radical change to the structure of the Canadian Army, transforming it into a medium weight, information age army which is strategically relevant and tactically decisive. This paper examines the Army Strategy in order to show that it is consistent with three specific policy directives: Canada's foreign policy statement *Canada in the World*; the *1994 Defence White Paper*, and the Canadian Forces strategic guidance *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020*. By establishing that *Advancing with Purpose* is consistent with both government and department policy, this paper validates the approach selected by the Canadian Army to prepare for the future.

INTRODUCTION

The Army has not been capable of effectively demonstrating the ability to adjust to the evolving strategic environment nor has it designed an affordable force structure that can achieve the vision consistently articulated in official policy since 1994¹

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in September 2001, and Canada's support for efforts to combat international terrorism, have resulted in an uncharacteristic focus on national military capabilities amongst the Canadian public and Parliamentarians.² The participation of Army troops in combat operations in Afghanistan in 2002 reinforced an enduring image in the minds of Canadians of a professional, high calibre army operating under the constraints of insufficient funding and antiquated equipment.³ That the Canadian Forces should be perceived by the public as ill-equipped is not an anomaly in Canada: The Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) has quoted LGen Guy Simonds as having stated that "of all the traditions Canada has inherited in the military field, none is more persistent than public neglect of and indifference to national defence, until face to face with an emergency."⁴ Yet the global dynamic created by Canada's commitment to fighting terrorism has resulted in public and editorial support for increased funding of the Canadian Forces.⁵ This has, in part, resulted in a \$1.6 billion

¹ Major Paul Fleury, "Splitting the Difference: The Army and Emerging Canadian Forces Strategy," (Master's thesis, Canadian Forces College, 2002), 2.

² Roy Rempel, *The Chatter Box: An Insider's Account of the Irrelevance of Parliament in the Making of Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy* (Toronto: Breakout Educational Network, 2002), 193.

³ John Ward, "Alliance calls for billions in new defence spending, new ships, planes," *Canadian Press*, 2 May 2003; available from <http://www.canada.com/search/story.aspx?id=58cc51f8-999b-4e20-99a8-14157a848a78>; Internet; accessed 4 May 2003.

⁴ LGen Mike Jeffery, "Speaking notes for an address to the Army Strategic Planning Session 6" (speech given to the Army Strategic Planning Session 6, Cornwall, Ontario, 2 Nov 2002), available from <http://www.armyonline.army.mil.ca/CLS.D44611.asp>; Internal Defence Wide Area Network; accessed 2 April 2003.

⁵ Mike Harris, "You call this a foreign policy?" *Globe and Mail*, 2 April 2003, A15; Andrew Coyne, "Mr Martin gets it right," *National Post*, 2 May 2003, A15; The Toronto Star, "Editorial: Canada's military deserves a boost", 14 February 2003, A25.

budget increase to the military for the fiscal years 2003-2005, and an \$800 million increase annually after 2005.⁶

There have been many assessments of the readiness of the Canadian Forces over the past few years.⁷ Although such reports generally tend to focus on equipment and training deficiencies resulting from insufficient funding, questions have been raised both within and outside of the Department of National Defence about the manner in which the military spends the money that it does receive.⁸ Certainly the annual reports published by the Auditor General question, in great detail, the specifics of many spending programs in the military.⁹ There has also been a growing recognition that while an increase in funding for the Canadian Forces would improve capabilities, an increase in efficiency and productivity within the military is necessary in order to create an element of trust between the government and the Department of National Defence.¹⁰ There must be confidence that money invested in the military is being spent in a productive, accountable manner.

⁶ Director General Public Affairs, "Budget 2003 and the Department of National Defence", 19 February 2003, available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Reports/budget03/index_e.htm; Internet; accessed 04 May 2003.

⁷ The Conference of Defence Associations Institute, *A Nation At Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: The Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2002); Department of National Defence, *At A Crossroads: Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff 2001-2002* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2002), etc.

⁸ In his annual report to Parliament, Gen Ray Henault, Chief of Defence Staff, stated that "while more money is always welcome, it alone will not solve the problem, nor will it eliminate the need to make tough choices on how best to optimize and modernize the Canadian Forces. Department of National Defence, *At A Crossroads*, ii; Senator Douglas Roche, "Military Spending, alone, will not bring Security," *The Hill Times*, November 18, 2002; Internet, available from <http://www.thehilltimes.ca/2002/november/18/roche/>, accessed 4 May 2003.

⁹ Auditor General Reports on National Defence can be accessed through the Internet at http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/other.nsf/html/00nd_e.html.

¹⁰ Senator Douglas Roche, "Military Spending, alone, will not bring Security," 1.

Several reports published by defence interest groups have critically assessed the Canadian Army's ability to perform the tasks assigned to it in the *1994 White Paper*.¹¹ As a professional organization, the Canadian Forces must ensure that it is able to clearly respond to any challenges of its ability to perform the roles assigned to it by government. In order to ensure that the Army is postured to accept and optimize any budgetary increases, there needs to be an intellectually sound and operationally efficient strategy for recruiting, equipping, training, deploying, and sustaining its troops.¹² The Army must articulate how it will accomplish its mandated tasks, while setting goals to ensure that it is able to modernize and remain relevant in the years to come.

The Canadian Forces, the government and the Canadian public also have a vested interest in ensuring that the Army is conducting its business in an efficient manner. Specifically, there is the right to know that the Canadian Army, amongst others, is able to accomplish the tasks which are expected of it. Yet there is a dearth of informed public debate over the capabilities and future direction of the Canadian military.

In May 2002 the Canadian Army published a strategy for transforming the Army into a medium weight, information age army. This strategy, titled *Advancing with Purpose, The Army Strategy: One Army, One Team, One Vision*, has received favorable comment from many sources, not the least of which is the current Minister of National

¹¹ See The Conference of Defence Associations publication *Caught in the Middle: An Assessment of the Operational Readiness of the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations, 2001), as one example.

¹² MGen (ret) Lewis Mackenzie stated in 2000 that "In my entire lifetime, I have never seen the window of opportunity open so wide for public support of the military...and yet I've never seen the Canadian Forces (CF) so ill-equipped and ill-prepared to take advantage of it". Lewis MacKenzie, "Opening Remarks", in *Advance or Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21st Century*, ed. David Rudd, Jim Hanson and Jessca Blitt (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000), 1.

Defence.¹³ The vision on how to transform the Canadian Army, and into what it should be transformed, was the result of a lengthy process involving most of the senior leadership of the Army.¹⁴ It is the yardstick against which all medium and short term plans in the Army are formulated, yet there has been relatively little public discussion of the strategy either within or outside of the Army. There has been no public validation of the Army Strategy to show that it will accomplish the tasks and goals assigned to it.¹⁵

This paper will show that the Army Strategy is consistent with the policy direction provided by both the government and the Department of National Defence. Chapter one will identify and define the policy direction that guides the Canadian Army. A detailed examination will then be conducted in chapter two on the construct of the Army Strategy in order to understand what the strategy seeks to attain. Finally, chapter three will show how these policies are addressed in *Advancing with Purpose* in order to demonstrate that the Army Strategy addresses all government and department direction.

¹³ In a speech delivered to the Conference of Defence Associations on 27 February 2003, the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable John McCallum, stated that he was “impressed by General Jeffrey's vision of the army of the future”. See www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1014; Internet, accessed 23 April 2003.

¹⁴ Department of National Defence, “Army Strategy: Strategy Background”, available from <http://www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/stratbackground.asp>; Internet; accessed 04 May 2003.

¹⁵ For ease, *Advancing with Purpose, the Army Strategy: One Army, One Team, One Vision* will be referred to as either *Advancing with Purpose* or the Army Strategy.

CHAPTER ONE

POLICY DIRECTION TO THE CANADIAN ARMY

For military officers, there is always a bottom line. In an operational setting, the bottom line, or the essential task which must be accomplished, is referred to as the mission statement. The mission statement is a (preferably) short, precise statement of what must be accomplished with the resources available, and the reason that it must be done. This crucial information allows a commander to clearly understand why he must accomplish a given task. It also gives him the perspective which will permit him to develop alternate plans to accomplish the desired intent. The mission statement is taught throughout the military hierarchy, from junior leadership positions to the highest levels of command. For this paper to analyse the ability of the Canadian Army's strategy to achieve both government and Department of National Defence objectives, the mission statement must be examined. In order to fully understand the many nuances contained in the mission statement, however, one must first be aware of the policy direction which the Army must adhere to. This chapter will examine the policy direction provided to the Canadian Forces, in order to set the stage for an analysis of the mission statement of the Canadian Army. The linkage between foreign and defence policies will be established, and the specific tasks and capabilities which are derived from policy will be outlined.

There are two types of policy guidance provided to the Canadian Forces: government policy, and internal department policy that originates within the Department of National Defence.¹⁶ Although these two types of policy direct the Department of

¹⁶ For ease, policy which is internal to the Department of National Defence will hereafter be referred to as DND policy.

National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces as a whole, they impact directly upon the Canadian Army, and as such are a key factor in any analysis of the army and its tasks. Government policy generally emanates from a source policy document, such as the *1994 Defence White Paper*, and constitutes the official policy of the Government of the day.¹⁷ DND policy is provided by either senior bureaucrats in the Department of National Defence, or serving senior officers, who set policies which will accomplish governmental goals.

The Government of Canada has two source documents which specify policy for the Department of National Defence: *The 1994 Defence White Paper* and the 1995 statement of Canada's Foreign Policy, *Canada in the World*. Although verbal statements from the government also constitute government policy, and can have a dramatic impact on policy direction, the defence and foreign policy papers are the primary policy pronouncements which guide planning for national defence. *The 1994 Defence White Paper* gives specific direction to the Department of National Defence on the issues of manning, capabilities, and structure. *Canada in the World* provides guidance to the Department of National Defence by indicating the areas in which the government intends to employ the armed forces to further national interests.

¹⁷ Although a policy paper is the source document from which policy emanates, there are a number of other ways in which policy can be expressed. Verbal statements from either the Prime Minister or the Minister of National Defence also constitutes policy direction, as does a federal budget, an alliance commitment, or a formal report from Parliament such as the annual Report on Plans and Priorities.

The National Interest

Although a democratic government has many responsibilities, the underlying philosophy of its actions should be to act in a manner which will be most advantageous to its citizens. While the national interest has been defined as a summation of “the most important wants and needs of a nation” they generally refer only to a nation’s goals on the international stage.¹⁸ Joseph Nye has eloquently argued that in the post-Cold War world, it is advisable to define the national interest in both domestic and international terms.¹⁹ For the purposes of this paper, the national interest will be considered as the basic determinants that guide state policy in relation to both intranational and international affairs.²⁰

There are three national policies which allow a government to pursue its objectives on the international stage: foreign, defence, and economic.²¹ Foreign policy has been defined as “the projection of the government’s interests beyond the boundaries of the state”, and is the focal policy towards which the extranational components of economic and defence policies should be oriented.²² Defence policy has two key components, both of which relate to the security of the nation. The first component deals solely with the physical defence of the nation and its citizens, and is the primary reason

¹⁸ John M. Collins, *Grand Strategy* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1974), 1-3; Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 258.

¹⁹ Joseph Nye, “Why the Gulf War Served the National Interest”, *The Atlantic* 267-268 (July 1991), 64.

²⁰ This definition is a modification of the definition offered by Evans and Newnham (see note 4) adapted by the author to accept the idea of Joseph Nye.

²¹ Richmond M. Lloyd, “Strategy and Force Planning Framework”, in *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed., ed. The Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, National Security Decision Making Department, Naval War College, (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000), 7.

²² Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1997), 3.

for the existence of armed forces.²³ The second aspect of defence policy is to support national interest by contributing to foreign policy goals. Colin Gray has noted that defence policy should "...be designed and funded to meet the anticipated demands made by a Canadian foreign policy."²⁴ Defence policy must therefore provide "a military instrument to support foreign policy."²⁵ To be effective, foreign policy should be supported by a credible defence policy, and defence policy should be in the service of clearly defined foreign policy goals.²⁶ Economic policy, while also having both intra- and extra-national aspects, will not be considered in this paper, except to note that economic priorities of the Government affect the funding levels for defence, and therefore the capability of the Canadian Forces to accomplish their assigned tasks.²⁷ With the linkage of foreign and defence policies being clear, it is relevant within the scope of this paper to examine what expectations or tasks, both stated and implied, are required of the Canadian Forces, and of the Canadian Army, by Canada's foreign policy.

²³ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy: One Army, One Team, One Vision* (Ottawa: Dept of National Defence, 2002), 1.

²⁴ Colin Gray, *Canadians in a Dangerous World* (Toronto: The Atlantic Council of Canada, 1994), 13.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁶ Report of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future*, The Honourable Allan J. MacEachern and Jean-Robert Gauthier, M.P., Joint Chairs (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group - Publishing, Public Works and Government Service Canada, 1994), 12.

²⁷ The major influence economic policy has upon defence policy is in the allocation of resources to the Department of National Defence. While economic policy is undeniably linked to defence and foreign policies, it does not provide explicit guidance to the military (except in specific budget provisions in addresses from the Throne), and therefore will not be explored further in this paper.

Foreign Policy

Canada's existing foreign policy was published in 1995 after extensive public consultation.²⁸ Published under the title *Canada in the World*, it documents the goals which the government of Canada will pursue in its relations with other nations, and with international organizations. *Canada in the World* articulates three key objectives which will be pursued by the government in international relations: the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of Canadian security within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture.²⁹ Given the symbiotic relationship between defence and foreign policies, any examination of Canadian military policies should consider foreign policy aspects which impact on the employment of the Canadian Forces.

The underlying theme in *Canada and the World* is the Canadian national interest.³⁰ The national interest is defined throughout the document, at least partially, in economic terms. The approach taken by the government in 1994 was that the consideration of economic factors was a prerequisite for all activities to be undertaken on the international stage. Canada would not commit resources to activities merely because they were morally or ethically correct: the financial crisis affecting all facets of domestic policy would also have an impact on the country's international actions.³¹ This approach was a significant departure from past Canadian policy pronouncements which had placed

²⁸ Although the *White Paper* was published in 1994, the clear linkages and commonality of themes between the defence and foreign policies published by the government imply that the policies were not written in isolation of each other.

²⁹ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada in the World* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1995), 10.

³⁰ Andrew Cohen, "Canada in the World: The Return of the National Interest." *Behind the Headlines*, Volume 52, No. 4 (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1995), 8.

³¹ *Ibid.*

a priority on Canada's international obligations, and was viewed by many as a pragmatic response to the fiscal trouble Canada was experiencing at the time.³²

Canada in the World stressed that there was no direct military threat facing Canada. As such, any perceptions that conventional armed forces, as part of an alliance designed to contain an aggressive enemy, should be the mainstay of security policy were no longer appropriate. Instead, a broader definition of security would be adopted. While conceding that "membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) Agreement remain key guarantees of our military security"³³, *Canada in the World* went on to state that protecting Canada's security must go beyond military preparedness. Indeed, the changing security environment "demands a broadening of the focus of security policy from its narrow orientation of managing state-to-state relationships, to one that recognizes the importance of the individual and society for our shared security."³⁴ The conclusion drawn was that this new, broader focus of security could "best be achieved - at least cost, and to best effect - through approaches that broaden the response to security issues beyond military options and focus on promoting international cooperation, building stability and on preventing conflict."³⁵

While viewing threats to security from a number of sources, Canada's foreign policy clearly indicated that strong conventional forces were no longer sufficient, nor perhaps desirable given the lack of a conventional military threat to the international

³² The 1987 White Paper on Defence stated that "The Government recognizes that conventional defence must be strengthened in order to improve deterrence, reduce the likelihood of war, and raise the nuclear threshold." Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* (Ottawa, Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1987), 22.

³³ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada in the World*, 19.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.

system. Nonetheless, while *Canada in the World* specifically stated that “movement will continue away from security policies based on containment toward new architectures designed to build stability and cooperation”³⁶, it also recognized that there was a specific role for Canada’s military to play in international security. An examination of Canada’s foreign policy, therefore, leads to several key deductions for military planners. These deductions, which seek specific capabilities from the Canadian Forces, are outlined in Table 1.

³⁵ Ibid., 25.

³⁶ Ibid., 24.

Table 1. Key Policy Statements From *Canada in the World*

	Policy Statement	Key deduction for the military capabilities
1	“Membership in NATO and NORAD remain (the) key guarantees of Canada’s military security.”	Canada’s intent to remain engaged with the U.S. in the bilateral defence of North America, and in NATO, requires that the military be capable of working within both the NATO military structure and with U.S. military forces, and that the Canadian Forces be able to provide the capabilities required by the government to contribute to these Alliances
2	“It remains necessary to maintain a military capability appropriate to the uncertain and evolving international environment”	The unpredictability of the international environment requires that the Canadian Forces retain a flexible capability to respond to unforeseen circumstances. The capability for graduated (or escalating) military involvement must be credible
	“The international community must have a graduated set of diplomatic and military options to prevent conflicts from degenerating into war.”	
3	Multilateral institutions such as the United Nations are normal venues for conducting preventive diplomacy, however Regional security organizations can play an effective role when the United Nations is unable to act.	Canada will likely seek increased participation in Regional alliances, therefore capabilities which are complementary to military forces within the EU, Pacific Rim states and the OAS should be maintained.
	“threats to Canada’s security are transnational or global in nature. In consequence, Canada will work with others in a variety of multilateral fora to ensure cooperative international action”	
4	“The success of the United Nations is the key vehicle for pursuing Canada’s global security objectives, and the success of the UN is fundamental to Canada’s future security.”	Credibility in conducting operations has been established, and the capability to support UN peacekeeping missions through specialist troops and expertise must be maintained. Canadian military personnel should be capable of effectively assisting in the reform of the UN peacekeeping structure.
	Canada “wants the UN to be fully capable of dealing with the array of new global security threats... Canada intends to press for improvements in the means of implementing UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement decisions in a timely and effective way... Canada is leading a ground-breaking study of options for a UN rapid reaction capability”	
	“Canadian military personnel will continue, within national means, to be available at international headquarters and in the field to support and direct multilateral peace operations”	

Source: Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, *Canada in the World: Government Statement* (Hull, PQ: Canada Communications Group-Publishing, Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1995).

Canada in the World is an official pronouncement of government policy, and it clearly states that national security is one of the top three priorities for the government. It also clearly indicates that Canadian security is best preserved through global security, and that the government intends to use the Canadian Forces to contribute to global security. Amplification of the role that the Canadian Army will play (within the context of the Canadian Forces) in contributing to global security is contained in the Government's defence policy.

Defence Policy

Although the *1994 Defence White Paper* was published several months prior to the 1995 Foreign Policy Paper, there is a clear linkage between military direction and foreign policy goals.³⁷ While *Canada in the World* outlined what the Canadian government intended to accomplish internationally, the *1994 Defence White Paper* (hereafter referred to as the *White Paper*) outlined the capabilities which the government expected from the armed forces. It also listed the likely situations in which these capabilities would be put to use, both domestically and in support of foreign policy.

The first, and most elemental task of the Canadian Forces was clearly defined : “The primary obligation of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces is to protect the country and its citizens from challenges to their security”.³⁸ This important definition ensured that defence policy was not concerned solely with armed

³⁷ Both policy papers were published shortly after the Liberal Party of Canada formed the Government, and were the product of extensive public and parliamentary input. Both the Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, *Security in a Changing World, Summary Volume*, and the Report of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future*, had a significant impact on the formulation of defence and foreign policy.

conflict which threatened territorial integrity, but was more broadly focussed on the less tangible concept of security. The *White Paper* clearly enunciates the view that “Canada’s economic future depends on its ability to trade freely with other nations”, and as such Canada has a vital interest in doing its part to ensure global security.³⁹ Indeed, the *White Paper* clearly states that although there exists no “immediate, direct military threat to Canada”, there were numerous challenges to international security which posed threats to Canada in the form of refugee flows, obstacles to trade, and damage to principles.⁴⁰ Thus the Canadian Forces would contribute to the security of Canada by assisting in the maintenance of international stability. For this, and other reasons listed in the *White Paper*, the government directed that the Canadian Forces maintain multi-purpose, combat capable forces.

Multi-purpose combat capable forces are the cornerstone of the *White Paper*. Such forces are characterized by their ability to participate in conflicts at both high intensity (full combat), low intensity (peacekeeping missions), or at any intermediate level, while maintaining the flexibility to adapt to the situation of the moment.⁴¹ While the term multi-purpose combat capability does not imply that Canada would seek to acquire all of the capabilities required for participation in high intensity warfare, it does infer that the Canadian Forces will maintain the minimum capabilities required in order to participate in these operations. Multi-purpose combat capable forces were viewed as

³⁸Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994), 2.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴¹ While DND does not provide a formal definition of multi-purpose combat capable forces, the web site for the director general strategic plans (DGSP) offers two component definitions. Multi purpose forces are defined as “a flexible and combat-ready Total Force capable of operating effectively and efficiently in a multi-threat environment”. Combat capability is defined as “the state of organizations that reflects the ability to execute a combat mission.” http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/dpg/dpg97/gloss_e.asp

the best means to maintain the capability to perform military functions across the full spectrum of conflict.⁴²

The maintenance of multi-purpose combat capable forces was intended to allow the government “the necessary degree of flexibility and freedom of action when it comes to the defence of its interests and the projection of its values abroad”.⁴³ The foundation of the *White Paper* is the maintenance of flexibility which would allow the government options in selecting how to employ the Canadian Forces in pursuit of national interests, as defined and articulated through foreign policy. A force structured only for peacekeeping roles would be of little use to the country should a major conflict develop that required Canada to fight alongside NATO or other allies. Similarly, given the critical state of finances in 1994, the decision to allocate scarce resources to the equipping of large military forces possessing all of the military capabilities required to fight alone in a high intensity conflict was considered prohibitively expensive.⁴⁴ Reaffirming the government’s commitment to collective security, the *White Paper* directed that the Canadian Forces maintain multi-purpose, combat capable forces which could operate across the spectrum between low and high intensity conflicts. While maintaining existing capabilities, a cut to the Defence budget necessitated a reduction to the personnel, equipment and training level of the Canadian Forces.⁴⁵

The *White Paper* clearly reinforced the need for the Canadian Forces to be able to defend Canada, while recognizing that the Canadian Forces would not be able to do so

⁴² Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 14.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁴⁴ Canada did not possess all of the capabilities required to fight in a high intensity environment prior to 1994, and it would have required a substantial increase in the defence budget to purchase these capabilities.

⁴⁵ The budget for the Department of National Defence for the fiscal year 1995-96 was \$11.08 billion, a drop of \$465 million from 1994-95. Department of National Defence, *1995-96 Estimates Part III Expenditure Plan* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1995), 5.

without assistance. Reliance on alliances for the defence of Canada would remain a keystone of Canadian Defence Policy, and the adoption of collective security required Canada to provide assurances to other nations that capable forces would be provided in the name of collective defence. For the Canadian Land Forces (referred to hereafter as the Canadian Army), the *White Paper* provided specific direction on expectations, and on specific competencies required.

The tasks for the Canadian Army were both specific in directing the capabilities required for Alliance commitments, and generic in indicating what roles must be fulfilled. There are 3 main commitments, each for a single formation sized force, as well as a number of smaller commitments. Table 2 outlines the specific forces which the Canadian Army must provide. While these commitments appear significant, it is worth noting that the Canadian Army is tasked to provide a maximum of a single brigade group (defined in the *White Paper* as three infantry battalions, an armour regiment, an artillery regiment, and associated combat support and combat service support elements) and an infantry battalion group at any one time, within three months of notification, and that this force would be earmarked to fulfill any of the three defence commitments.⁴⁶ Within 21 days of notifications “single elements or the vanguard components” of the force must be ready to deploy, and be sustainable indefinitely in a low-threat environment.⁴⁷ The forces to be provided within three months are referred to as the Main Contingency Forces (MCF), while those required within 21 days are referred to as the Vanguard Forces. Both MCF and Vanguard forces will be discussed further in chapter 3.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 39.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Table 2: Commitments to Collective Security for the Canadian Army

Commitment	Defence Objective	Army Capability Commitment	Comment
Canada-US Basic Security Plan	Provide forces to contribute to the defence of North America	Brigade Group with associated support elements	This commitment has priority over the other two.
UN or other multinational missions	Contribute to international stability	Brigade Group. Infantry Battalion Group. Signals units. Engineers.	Broken down into main contingency forces (MCF) and vanguard forces.
Defence of NATO member states	Fulfill NATO commitment to collective security	Brigade Group. Infantry Battalion Group. Signals units. Engineers.	The contingency forces maintained for UN or multilateral operations would immediately be made available to NATO if required.

Source: Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994).

The *White Paper* also outlined significant procedural direction for the Army and the Canadian Forces as a whole. New equipment would only be procured if it could be suited to the widest range of defence roles, and contributed to maintaining a core military capability. Headquarters staff would be reduced by one third, with the intent of reallocating personnel slots to provide the Army with greater manpower. The Reserves, viewed as a national institution which provides a vital link between the Canadian Forces and local communities, would shrink in overall size, but would have their capacity to contribute to the overall operational capability of the military increase. This was to be accomplished through an overall reduction in reserve manpower, a streamlining of reserve organizations and rank structures, which would permit improved training and operational relevance.⁴⁹ In line with the commitment to collective defence, the Canadian Army was to maintain the ability to fight “alongside the best, against the best.”⁵⁰ While the *White Paper* directs that the Canadian Forces be able to participate in multilateral

⁴⁸ Ibid.

operations under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), NATO, or other coalition framework, it specifically states that “the government wants the Canadian Forces to maintain the ability to work closely with their US counterparts in a variety of situations.”⁵¹

The *White Paper* also acknowledges the statutory requirement for the Canadian Forces to respond to requests for Aid to the Civil Power and assistance to civil authorities. Several objectives were listed for the Army to contribute to these capabilities: maintaining and demonstrating the ability to control activities within Canadian territory (with a strong inference on the ability to control remote Northern areas); being prepared to contribute to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief within 24 hours (and sustain this effort for as long as necessary); maintaining a capability to assist in mounting, at all times, an immediate and effective response to terrorist incidents; and being able to respond to requests for Aid of the Civil Power and sustain this response for as long as necessary.

Overall, the *White Paper* instructed the Department of National Defence to be prepared to conduct a number of different operations, with the clear intent of allowing the government the flexibility to contribute as much, or as little, as it chose to any given scenario. The stated assumption of a lack of direct military threat to Canada, combined with the commitment to participate in defensive alliances which would ensure the physical security of the nation, allowed the government great flexibility in structuring and employing the Canadian Forces in support of the national interest. As there was no requirement to try to protect the territorial integrity of the country by itself, the Canadian

⁴⁹ Ibid., 45.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 14.

Forces could instead be structured for use in implementing foreign policy.⁵² Canada's defence policy was intended to provide broad support to her foreign policy, and this would be done by maintaining a variety of capabilities that Canada could utilize in contributing to international stability. Table 3 lists the specific force commitments with which the *White Paper* tasks the Canadian Army.

⁵¹ Ibid., 21.

⁵² The Canadian government has never issued a direct statement which would imply that its military forces would be expected to defend the country without external assistance.

Table 3: Tasks for Canada's Army - Extracts from The *White Paper*

<i>Policy Statement in the White Paper</i>	<i>Specific Implication for Canada's Army</i>	<i>Comment</i>
Canada will provide contingency forces	Brigade Group Infantry Battalion Signals Units Engineers	As outlined in Table 2. Forces to be used, in priority, for Defence of North America, NATO Article 4 operations, and support to UN or other multilateral operations
Must be able to "fight alongside the best, against the best"	Equipment modernization and training must remain compatible with that of the most advanced armies.	Interoperability with all NATO Allies is desirable
Maintain the ability to operate effectively at sea, on land, and in the air with the military forces of the United States in defending the northern half of the Western hemisphere	Maintain interoperability with ground forces.	Priority for interoperability will be with US forces. Comprises training, standard operating procedures, equipment compatibility, staff procedures.
The Reserves are a national institution and provide a vital link between the Canadian Forces and local communities. A greater proportion of the Reserves resources must go towards improving their operational capability and availability.	Land force reserve structure must undergo significant change	

Source: *Canada, Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper. Ottawa: Dept of National Defence, 1994.*

From a study of the foreign and defence policy documents which constitute formal government policy for the Canadian Forces, three dominant themes emerge. First, ensuring Canadian security is clearly the main mission of the Canadian Forces. Although a formal definition of security is not provided, references from these two policy documents refer to the physical and economic security of Canadians, as well as the physical protection of the nation. While the obligation of the Canadian Forces to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Canada is noted, there is no explicit expectation

that the Canadian Forces are required to undertake such a defence without assistance from other military forces.

Second, there is no direct military threat to Canada. Rather, it is the threat to Canada's interests (economic, diplomatic and human security) which constitutes the most immediate potential 'enemy' of Canadian security. This threat manifests itself through global insecurity, and it is in Canada's interests to assist in maintaining a globally secure environment. The Canadian Forces will be employed in support of Canadian foreign policy initiatives in order to contribute to global security. The United Nations will be the preferred vehicle for contributing to global security, although other multinational organizations may also be used.⁵³

Third, the government will participate in defensive alliances such as NATO and The Canada-U.S. Defence Plan in order to ensure protection from military attack. The Canadian Forces are to provide military capabilities which will allow for Canadian participation in such alliances. Specific minimum levels of forces will be maintained which will fulfill *White Paper* commitments (see Table 2), and also allow for contributions to stability operations in a multilateral forum should there not be an extant requirement for troops in an Alliance context. The most effective way to maintain the options desired for participation in alliances and multilateral operations is to maintain a multi-purpose, combat capable force structure.

These three themes comprise the underlying intent of governmental policy for the employment of the Canadian Forces. From this intent, the Department of National Defence has derived a strategy for how it will accomplish its tasks over the next fifteen years as the global security context changes. If direction contained in the Army Strategy

is in accordance with the three themes discussed above, and fulfills its obligations as listed in tables 1,2 and 3, then it has generally fulfilled the policy direction provided by the Government of Canada. The other aspect of policy direction that the Army Strategy must meet is that provided by the Department of National Defence.

Policy Direction Within the Department of National Defence

As discussed above, the government's policy and direction for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces is contained in the both foreign policy and defence policy. In the absence of supplementary direction in the form of government speeches, budgets or updates, direction to the Canadian Forces ends with these two policy documents. Yet there remains a need for government policy to be translated into a plan and a structure to accomplish the assigned tasks and objectives. This translation of policy occurs through direction published under the authority of the Minister of National Defence, and is referred to as internal department direction.⁵⁴ This section will look at the internal departmental direction which impacts on the Canadian Army strategy.

The Department of National Defence, having received its policy guidance from the government, has the obligation to conduct both short term and long term planning. Short term planning directs how operations will be conducted in the one to three year timeframe, and ensures that resources are properly allocated in order to accomplish

⁵³ Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 30.

⁵⁴ The *National Defence Act* established the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence as separate legal entities operating under the authority of the Minister of National Defence. Both CF policy (issued by the CDS) and DND policy (issued by the Deputy Minister) are considered internal department direction. See Douglas Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995),144.

assigned tasks. Long term planning provides direction for issues which will substantially affect the military and its ability to accomplish tasks in the future, and covers areas such as manning and recruiting levels, weapons systems development and purchases, and force structure. While this paper will focus on the long term plan devised by the Canadian Forces, a short introduction to short term planning directives is necessary to fully understand how long term policy is implemented. Table 4 outlines the various long and short term business and strategic plans which impact on the Canadian Army.

Table 4: Short and Long Term Planning Directives

Source of Direction	Short Term Directive Document	Long Term Directive Document
Government of Canada	Approved Report on Plans and Priorities	<i>1994 Defence White Paper</i>
Department of National Defence	Defence Plan On-line	<i>Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020</i>
Canadian Army	Strategic Operating Resource Direction (SORD)	<i>Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy: One Army, One Team, One Vision</i>

Short Term Planning

In 2001, the Planning, Reporting and Accountability Structure (PRAS) came into effect, requiring that government ministers submit a business plan annually to Parliament.⁵⁵ For the Department of National Defence, this business plan is referred to as *Defence Plan On-Line* (or more often as the *Defence Plan*), and is presented to Parliament in the Annual Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP).⁵⁶ Once approved by Parliament (and thereby becoming government policy), it is the short term planning directive implemented by the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.

⁵⁵ Department of National Defence, *Departmental Plans, Priorities and Performance*; available from http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dppp_e.asp#pras; Internet, accessed 8 May 2003.

⁵⁶ The 2003-2004 RPP can be found at http://www.vcds.forces.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/rpp_e.asp.

Based on the direction contained in the annual *Defence Plan*, the Canadian Army produces its own short term plan as a component of the CF. The army business plan is referred to as the *Strategic Operating Resource Direction*, or *SORD*.

Long Term Planning

The long term policy direction provided to the army commander comes from the departmental policy paper *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020* (*Strategy 2020*). Although long term planning necessarily orients on future capabilities and tasks, consideration must be taken of the structure of extant forces, and of the tasks assigned to them. The challenge for the Army Strategy lies in bridging the current force structure supported annually in the SORD (which must be configured to complete the existing direction and tasks set out in government policy), with the development of a force structure which is anticipated to fill the nation's requirements in the future. While the Army has a force development structure for transitioning force structures and capabilities from existing forces to those required in the future, this paper will only consider the direction provided in *Advancing With Purpose* and how it positions the Canadian Army to fulfill its assigned tasks. *Strategy 2020* is the long term departmental policy which the Army must adhere to in developing its own long term planning guidance. By examining *Strategy 2020* in some detail, it will then be possible to assess whether or not the Army Strategy has adhered to government and department policy direction.

STRATEGY 2020

The introduction to *Strategy 2020* correctly identifies the requirement for long lead times to change existing force structures in stating that “defence must, within the current policy framework, project forward to recognize a range of potential alternative futures and develop a robust strategy that delivers the essential defence capabilities.”⁵⁷ The intent of *Strategy 2020* is to “provide a roadmap on how best to implement Canada’s Defence Policy in light of current emerging defence challenges”⁵⁸, ensuring that the decisions taken today are compatible with what a detailed analysis has shown will be required in the future. This is an essential component of defence policy, given that the development of a new military capability can take several decades when the various factors of acquisition, training and integration with existing capabilities are taken into account. However, as noted by defence expert Colin Gray, “intelligent, well informed and certainly well-intentioned people are capable of serious errors in judgement. It is extraordinarily difficult to plan efficiently for future security.”⁵⁹ A wrong variable taken as an assumption can lead to an irrelevant force structure or billions of dollars invested in an unnecessary capability. For this reason the guidance provided in *Strategy 2020* is proscriptive of likely scenarios which will, much like Canada’s defence policy, allow options when dealing with international situations. It must also be recognized that *Strategy 2020* provides direction to the entire Department of National Defence, and not just the Canadian Forces, therefore there is a broad audience of both military and civilians guided by this document.

⁵⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, *A Strategy for 2020*, 1.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Gray, 3.

Strategy 2020 emphasizes that there are direct and indirect threats to national security which may require a military response, and therefore the maintenance of a broad level of combat capability which can be tailored to specific situations is in the best interests of the nation. Defence planning is “based upon the capabilities Canada needs to protect and promote its interests and values in a responsive manner, rather than upon direct threats to our well being.”⁶⁰ There are a number of benchmark terms employed within *Strategy 2020*, all of which are designed to ensure that Defence remains positioned to defend Canadian security. There are five strategic imperatives, eleven critical attributes with corresponding strategic direction, five principal domains of distinctive competencies and eight key strategic objectives. While all of the benchmark terms are cogently described, they are also indicative of a commitment within the Department of National Defence to apply current management techniques to the structuring of military capabilities.

The main goal of *Strategy 2020* is “to position the force structure of the CF to provide Canada with modern, task-tailored, and globally deployable combat-capable forces that can respond quickly to crises at home and abroad, in joint or combined operations.”⁶¹ Strategic direction is provided for eleven critical attributes which are to be taken into consideration when designing any force structure or making decisions affecting capabilities decisions. But the core of *Strategy 2020* lies in the eight key strategic objectives which were intended to guide and direct defence planning and investments into the next century. Each objective was given a five year target which would allow for a progressive and quantifiable attainment of the long term objective.

⁶⁰ Department of National Defence, *A Strategy for 2020*, 2.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

These eight strategic objectives constitute the direction from the Chief of the Defence Staff to each of his subordinate commanders for setting an agenda for the future.⁶² It is therefore against these eight strategic objectives, as well as against deductions made from foreign and defence policy documents, which the Army Strategy must be measured for relevance. Table 5 outlines the eight strategic objectives of *Strategy 2020*.

Table 5: The Strategic Objectives of *Strategy 2020*

	Objective	Description
1	Innovative Path	Create an adaptive, innovative and relevant path into the future.
2	Decisive Leaders	Develop and sustain a leadership climate that encourages initiative, decisiveness and trust while improving our leaders' abilities to lead and manage effectively.
3	Modernize	Field a viable and affordable force structure trained and equipped to generate advanced combat capabilities that target leading edge doctrine and technologies relevant to the battlespace of the 21st century.
4	Globally Deployable	Enhance the combat preparedness, global deployability and sustainability of our maritime, land and air forces.
5	Interoperable	Strengthen our military to military relationships with our principal allies ensuring interoperable forces, doctrine and C ⁴ I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence).
6	Career of Choice	Position Defence as a rewarding, flexible and progressive workplace that builds professional teams of innovative and highly skilled men and women dedicated to accomplishing the mission.
7	Strategic Partnerships	Establish clear strategic, external partnerships to better position Defence to achieve national objectives.
8	Resource Stewardship	Adopt a comprehensive approach to planning, management and comptrollership, focused on operational requirements, that prepares us to respond rapidly and effectively to change.

Source: Canada, Department of National Defence. *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1999.

At this point it is clear that while defence capabilities are mandated by the government, it is within the Department of National Defence that decisions are taken about what specific direction to pursue or what force structure to transition to in order to best achieve the mandated capabilities. *Strategy 2020* notes that “the Government of

⁶² For the Department of National Defence, the strategic objectives constitute direction from the Deputy Minister to her subordinate departments.

Canada provides the mandate for Defence, and the resources needed to achieve this mandate, and then relies on Defence to respond when called upon.”⁶³

Decisions taken on how to change existing structures in order to respond to projected situations in the future will always be fraught with controversy, as the lack of specific direction from the ultimate national authority leads those with strong views or vested interests in existing or potential capabilities to dispute the direction chosen. For the Canadian Army, it is the Chief of the Land Staff who, in consultation with the Chief of the Defence staff and other members of the Department of National Defence, sets the strategy and final objectives for the Canadian Army. Any assessment of how well this strategy will respond to future situations is purely speculative, and only if the military is called upon to respond to a situation will the true test of its capabilities be demonstrated. Colin Gray has noted that “success in defence planning should not be measured against the impossible standard of the avoidance of surprise, but rather the purposeful avoidance of severe vulnerabilities”.⁶⁴ The only existing criteria against which the Army Strategy can be measured are the specific and implied tasks set out in governmental policy, and against how well the strategy adheres to the Departmental direction contained in *Strategy 2020*. Prior to considering the strategy and its correlation to policy direction, however, Chapter 2 will analyze the construct of the Army Strategy.

⁶³ Department of National Defence, *A Strategy for 2020*, 3.

⁶⁴ Gray, 11.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ARMY STRATEGY

In May 2002, the Canadian Army published *Advancing With Purpose, The Army Strategy: One Army, One Team, One Vision*. This document was published to guide the Canadian Army into the next decade, and it cited the tactical successes which the Army had experienced over the past decade. *Advancing with Purpose* was written in order to “formulate a strategic plan, consistent with departmental strategy, to address some serious problems facing the Army and ensure the Army’s continuing relevance”.⁶⁵ The strategy was written to guide all components of the Army: the Regular Forces, the Reserve Forces, and civilian members. Subject to regular revision to ensure continuing relevance, *Advancing with Purpose* was to be the source document to be used when addressing all aspects of Army planning, but most notably force structure, equipment procurement, personnel policies and training. This chapter will examine *Advancing with Purpose* in order to provide for a better understanding of the Army Strategy. This will set the baseline for Chapter Three of this paper, which will assess how well *Advancing with Purpose* meets the tasks set for the Army.

Advancing with Purpose was written in a concise, proscriptive manner which clearly outlined in three key parts how the Army would position itself for the future. Part one covered the strategic context in which the Army existed; part two provided direction on the capabilities that the “Army of Tomorrow” was to possess; and part three outlined

⁶⁵ CLS website, www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/stratbackground.asp

generally how the strategy was to be implemented.⁶⁶ Thirty-three pages long (including two Annexes), it was written with all of the hallmarks of a military document: it was short, concise, and filled with terminology currently in vogue at the Department of National Defence. While there is no specific direction on the immediate changes which would have to occur in order to accomplish the strategy, it gives thematic guidance which, when incorporated with short term direction contained in the annual Strategic Operating Resource Directive (SORD), provides objectives for army planners.

The Strategic Context

Part one of *Advancing with Purpose* reiterates many of the factors identified in governmental policy documents and in *Strategy 2020*.⁶⁷ This reinforces the link with the various source documents which provide the overview and context for Army operations as described in Chapter one of this paper. The lack of a direct military threat to Canada, and the importance of the military acting as “one of the principal instruments for implementing Canadian foreign policy”, are both highlighted.⁶⁸ The threats to global peace and security are noted, as is the “increasingly global economic environment” which can cause a threat to international stability and thereby have a direct impact on Canadian security.⁶⁹ Domestically, the most likely threats to Canadian security are described as the “threats of international terrorism, asymmetrical attacks and violations of ... national

⁶⁶ The Army strategy is conceptually based upon the concept of the Army as a force for the protection of the Canadian people and the Canadian way of life. (10.02 0 0 10.02 217.33619662198 605.62006 Transfer)

sovereignty”.⁷⁰ The strategy lists four defining tasks which necessitate the existence of the Army:

1. to defend the nation against any enemy;
2. to protect vital national interests;
3. to contribute to international peace and security; and
4. to promote national unity and well being.

Next, the strategy outlines in broad terms the requirement for the Army to exist, and reinforces the requirement for the Army to be employable by the government as an instrument of policy. The mission of the Army is defined in *Advancing with Purpose* as **“to generate and maintain combat capable, multi-purpose land forces to meet Canada’s defence objectives”**.⁷¹ If the Army is able at all times to accomplish this mission, then it will have accomplished its major obligation to the government for day to day capabilities.

The real challenge for the Land Staff lies in predicting what Canada’s defence objectives will be in the future. Government and Department guidance covers only what the Army must be capable of doing. Given the long lead times required to develop and field equipment and capabilities required for a modern military, it is essential that significant intellectual effort be devoted to preparing for the future.⁷² There must be a constant balance between investing in current capabilities to optimize the effectiveness of the Army, and investing in future capabilities which will allow the Army to respond to future defence challenges.⁷³

⁶⁹ Ibid., 5.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid., 6.

⁷² Department of National Defence, *A Strategy for 2020*, 1.

⁷³ LGen Mike Jefferey, “Speaking Notes” (Address to the Army Strategic Planning Session 6, Cornwall, On, on 2 Nov 2002), 6; available from www.armyonline.army.mil.ca/CLS/D44611.asp; accessed 28 April 2003.

While it is impossible to accurately predict the country's future security needs, the Army has developed several groups on identifying trends in warfare and security, and sponsored several papers, seminars and symposia in order to quantify future threats to international security. From the conclusions drawn from these groups, the Army selected several themes which would dominate the direction provided in the Army Strategy: sustainable expeditionary capability; interoperability which allows for meaningful participation in coalition operations; well educated leadership; and versatility.⁷⁴

As the next step in developing a rational strategy for the future, the Army identified five key strengths and nine "significant and troubling weaknesses."⁷⁵ Table 6 lists the major deductions made by the Land Staff, as well as the assessed strengths and weaknesses of the Canadian Army. The strengths were identified to ensure that while providing a direction for future planning, the Army Strategy did not degrade or eliminate desirable capabilities which the Army already possessed. Instead, the strategy would incorporate these desirable capabilities into its direction. The weaknesses were listed in order to ensure that the strategy would specifically address areas in need of improvement. These weaknesses were summed up in the telling phrase that "a lack of unity in thought, purpose and action is too often apparent".⁷⁶ The deductions of the strengths and weaknesses on the Army as it currently exists in today's strategic environment, and these deductions provide the first look at what the Army staff feels should be accomplished in order to improve the existing army.

⁷⁴ Department of National Defence Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, *Report Number 99-2: The Future Security Environment* (Kingston, ON: Canada Communications Group, 1999), 17.

⁷⁵ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, 6.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

Table 6: Strengths and Weaknesses of the Canadian Army

Army Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❑ Overall quality and motivation of Canadian soldiers and leaders ❑ Introduction of new equipment such as the Coyote and LAV III ❑ Use of excellent training areas ❑ Broad public support for the Army
Army Weaknesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❑ Poor physical infrastructure ❑ Significant shortfalls in direct and indirect firepower, and in Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities ❑ Serious personnel issues, particularly high personnel tempo ❑ An excessive draw on Reservists to compensate for Regular Force deficiencies ❑ Command and Control capabilities which are stretched ❑ Inadequate formation level collective training, resulting in skill fade in important warfighting skills ❑ Low morale levels, based in part in a sense of mistrust of the senior leadership
Deductions made by the Land Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❑ The army needs to be more agile and lethal ❑ Army leaders and soldiers need to be imbued with the military ethos within modernized education, training and professional development systems which were adapted to new strategic realities ❑ Must be innovative in determining what capabilities need to be resident in the Army, and what can be expected from allies, coalition partners, or even other components of the CF ❑ There is an urgent need to provide balance in the Army of Today, particularly between the field force, the training system and the support system. In particular, the quality of life of personnel who are subject to excessive operational and training demands; formation level combat capability; and morale of the Army all needed to be addressed in the search for balance ❑ The Army force development process requires additional work in order to achieve sufficient definition for a ten-year force structure model ❑ The Army must focus on multi-purpose combat capability, modernization, interoperability, deployability and engagement with Canadians

Source: Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose, The Army Strategy: One Army, One Team, One Vision* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2002), 6-12.

After outlining the Army force development structure (the three horizon Army of Today, Army of Tomorrow and Army of the Future), *Advancing with Purpose* reviewed the eight departmental change objectives of *Strategy 2020*.⁷⁷ Acknowledging that the Army is obliged to conform to all eight change objectives, it was pointed out that

⁷⁷ For a detailed explanation of the three-horizon army force planning process, see Department of National Defence Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, *Report Number 99-2: The Future Security Environment* (Kingston, ON: Canada Communications Group, 1999), i.

successive direction in the annual *Defence Plan* publications has directed the Army to focus on change objectives 3 (Modernize) and 4 (Globally deployable).⁷⁸

The first chapter of *Advancing with Purpose* therefore outlines broad strategic considerations for the Army's role in defending Canadian security, identifies the force development structure which will allow the Army to evolve in order to meet defence j

Campaign plan is defined as “a plan for a series of related military operations to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space.”⁸⁰ Adapted for the strategic planning process, a campaign plan would outline a series of steps required to take the Army from its current configuration to the desired end state. When applied to a planning environment rather than the conduct of actual hostilities, the terminology and sequencing of campaign planning remain relevant.

Campaign planning, as outlined in *B-GJ-005-500/FP-000 CF Operations Planning Process*, follows a logical process of identifying a mission, selecting a single (or potentially several) Centre of Gravity, identifying decisive points, and selecting an objective.⁸¹ When the process is complete, a commander should be able to visualize objectives which need to be assigned to subordinates. Once these objectives are attained, either simultaneously or in sequence, they will contribute to the achievement of a decisive point. The achievement of all decisive points will, in theory, lead to the attainment of the targeted Centre of Gravity. Once the Centre of Gravity has been attained, the desired end state will be achievable. An important element of the process is the identification of criteria which will be indicative of success. The criteria for success can be designated early or late in the process, but it is important that they be enunciated so that commanders and subordinates can clearly identify when success has been achieved. Figure 1 outlines the campaign planning structure in graphic form.

⁸⁰ Jay Shafritz, Todd Shafritz and David Robertson, *The Facts on File Dictionary of Military Science* (New York: Facts on File, 1989), 74.

⁸¹ Department of National Defence, *B-GJ-005-500/FP-000 CF Operations Planning Process, Ed. 2* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2002), 2B-1.




Figure 1: Campaign Planning milestones⁸²

Part two of *Advancing With Purpose* is entitled “Building the Army of Tomorrow”, and provides the direction for the Army to begin its transformation. This section begins by stating the Commander’s vision for the army:

The Army will generate, employ and sustain strategically relevant and tactically decisive medium-weight forces. Using progressive doctrine, realistic training and leading-edge technologies, the Army will be a knowledge-based and command-centric institution capable of continuous adaptation and task tailoring across the spectrum of conflict. The cohesion and morale of our soldiers will be preserved through sharing a collective covenant of trust and common understanding of explicit and implicit intent. With selfless leadership and coherent management, the army will achieve unity of effort and resource equilibrium. The Army will synchronize force development to achieve joint integration and combined interoperability with the ground forces of the United States, other ABCA countries and selected NATO allies. As a broadly based representative national institution with a proud heritage, the Army will provide a disciplined force of last resort and contribute to national values and objectives at home and abroad.⁸³

The most important aspect of the Army Strategy – its center of gravity – is defined in the Army Strategy as being institutional credibility.⁸⁴ Although recognizing that the Army had increased its institutional credibility in the years preceding 2002, it is clearly stated that for *Advancing with Purpose* to be a successful strategy, institutional credibility needs to be enhanced further. The strategy proceeds to define five key

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, 13.

elements (referred to as relational facets of institutional credibility) which, both individually and in concert, will increase the Army's credibility, and will be indicators that institutional credibility had been achieved. These five elements (legitimacy with the Canadian public, relevance to national leadership, trust within CF/DND, identity within the Army, and expertise sought by Allies) provide measurable goals for the achievement of institutional credibility, and are specific enough for detailed plans to be formulated.

Three decisive points have been designated as key stepping-stones for the Army in achieving the institutional credibility which it has designated as the Centre of Gravity: capability, sustainability and unity. The first decisive point, capability, refers to the quality of capabilities which the Army provides in combat capable field forces. In effect, this decisive point underlines the fact that regardless of the form and structure of any future Army, the effectiveness of the Army will be based in the training and capabilities of its combat forces, and that this capability must not be permitted to degrade in the pursuit of a transformed army.⁸⁵

The second decisive point, sustainability, addresses one of the key structural weaknesses in today's army. The desired end state in sustainability is a balanced force structure which provides sufficient resource flexibility to invest in technology or equipment modernization. In effect, a sustainable army is one which could be tasked on any given operation and continue indefinitely, without undue burden being placed on either personnel, structure or equipment. The concept of managed readiness is first introduced here, postulating that by not maintaining all units at the highest level of

⁸⁴ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, 4.

⁸⁵ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, 16.

training, the long term physical and moral health of personnel will be enhanced, and resources will be optimized to allow appropriate investments.

The final decisive point, unity, refers to one of the greatest weaknesses identified in the first chapter of *Advancing with Purpose*. Referred to as unity of thought, purpose and action, this decisive point addresses the internecine competition between Regiments, branches and staffs in the pursuit of parochial interests or individual perceptions of what actions are in the best interests of the country and the Army. Although couched in vague and inoffensive terms, this final decisive point clearly refers to the imbalance of training between formations, the lack of a clearly articulated path for the Army to follow, and the rivalries between units and corps which often place Regimental interests over those of the army as a whole.⁸⁶

Advancing with Purpose next outlines the essential core of the Army Strategy, the four strategic objectives which define the critical issues which the Army must address in order to advance in a controlled, decisive manner towards the end state desired by the Commander. The Strategic objectives are:

1. connect with Canadians;
2. shape Army culture;
3. deliver a combat capable, sustainable force structure; and
4. manage readiness.

Each strategic objective is defined, and then given specific five and ten year targets to achieve.⁸⁷ This conscious setting of benchmark goals was the result of a determination on the part of the Army staff to develop a relevant strategy which could be continually


⁸⁶ A number of papers have been written on both the advantages and disadvantages of the Regimental system, where loyalties to units (often referred to as “hat badge issues”) at times take precedence over the best interests of the Army as a whole. For an exploration of hat badge issues, see Lcol C.M. Fletcher, “The Regimental System-A Double Edged Weapon”, *Armour Bulletin*, volume 32 No.1 (1999): 8.

assessed for progress, and modified to ensure continued relevance. The four strategic objectives are all explicitly related to *Strategy 2020* to demonstrate the Army's commitment to unity of purpose within the Canadian Forces. Figure 2 outlines how *Advancing with Purpose* has followed the campaign planning process in order to lay out the future for Canada's Army. As the Army Strategy is written to provide direction to the Army itself, by framing the strategic plan within the campaign planning process a

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Define the mission to be Accomplished:
The Commander's Vision:
The Army will generate, employ and sustain strategically relevant and tactically decisive medium-weight forces. Using progressive doctrine, realistic training and leading-edge technologies, the Army will be a knowledge-based and command-centric institution capable of continuous adaptation and task tailoring across the spectrum of conflict. The cohesion and morale of our soldiers will be preserved through sharing a collective covenant of trust and common understanding of explicit and implicit intent. With selfless leadership and coherent management, the army will achieve unity of effort and resource equilibrium. The Army will synchronize force development to achieve joint integration and combined interoperability with the ground forces of the United States, other ABCA countries and selected NATO allies. As a broadly based e

Measurement of Success
Legitimacy with the Canadian public
Relevance to national leadership
Trust within CF/DND
Identity within the Army
Expertise sought by Allies



The Strategic Objectives

Connect with Canadians

The first strategic objective, Connect with Canadians, emphasizes that the Army must do a better job with public relations (PR), but mandates more than just an improved PR campaign. In effect, Connect with Canadians recognizes the fact that the Canadian military has, by virtue of its bases being primarily located away from major population centers, lost touch with both Canadians and Canadian institutions. It strives to utilize the Army's existing structure (which includes Reserve units embedded within Canadian society) to promote a better understanding and awareness of the Army. Seeking to engage the public on security and defence issues, it will allow the Army to be more reflective of Canadian society, and better understood by the nation.

Shape Army Culture

The second strategic objective, Shape Army Culture, was selected in order to address a large cultural gap between the norms of Canadian society and those of the Army. While not intended to impose all of the values and behaviours of society on the military, the inclusion of this objective on a list of the four critical challenges facing the Army indicates the seriousness with which Army leadership viewed the gap between the Army and society. *Advancing with Purpose* recognized that "Canadian society ... continues to be shaped by important changes in individual attitudes and values, the evolution of a 'rights culture', and a diminished tolerance for hierarchy and authority".⁸⁸ While neither applauding nor condemning these attitudes and values, the strategy recognizes that for the Army to remain representative of the Canadian public and

reflective of our societal norms, the Army must either adopt these norms or build a credible, acceptable case for specific exemptions. In this way, the ethos of the warrior spirit would be reconciled with the advanced democratic nature of our society.

Deliver a combat capable, sustainable force structure

The third strategic objective, Deliver a Combat-Capable, Sustainable Force Structure, addresses the core of the Army's challenge for the future. This objective is directly linked to the Army mission (to generate and maintain combat capable, multi-purpose land forces to meet Canada's defence objectives) and to the Army Commander's vision (the Army will generate, employ and sustain strategically relevant and tactically decisive medium-weight forces). The envisioned (although undefined) army structure would provide combat ready forces for both domestic and military operations, and would make maximum use of technology to ensure that it was both relevant and desirable for Coalition operations. The intent is to provide troops with a high value which is qualitative, rather than quantitative. The force must also be 'strategically relevant' and 'tactically decisive' on the future battlefield, which implies a very high level of training and lethality.

Rather than commit to particular structures, *Advancing with Purpose* notes the recent trend of sending unit or even sub-unit sized elements on international operations, and as such introduces the notion of a 'tactically self sufficient unit' (TSSU). These forces are task tailored capability packages, and break the mould of National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) being tied to peacetime organizations when considering forces for employment. Allowing maximum flexibility in the selection of forces to use for any

⁸⁸ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, 18.

given situation, this objective clearly provides a capability highly valued by the government. While the formation (Brigade or higher) is defined as a necessary structure for providing an effective training environment for TSSUs, and for force generation, the intent of TSSUs is to recognize that small elements committed to an international tasking will allow for the sustainability desired by the Army staff. It also introduces a degree of reality into the employment considerations for an Army as small as Canada's.

There were four specific ten year targets associated with the objective of delivering a combat-capable, sustainable force structure, each of which has significant implications for the Army in requiring a substantial commitment of resources, and a shifting of priority. First, and possibly most difficult to achieve without substantial resourcing, is to transform into a medium-weight, information age army. A medium weight army is defined as one where technology has allowed a high degree of lethality and protection, currently (and formerly) provided by weight, to be incorporated into platforms which will allow for strategic responsiveness as well as operational and tactical agility.⁸⁹ In effect, new vehicles, which are transportable by future strategic airlift and surface vessels, will offer the opportunity for a high strategic mobility which Canada does not currently possess with its mechanized forces and lack of strategic transport. As Canada does not have a resourced procurement plan for either a direct fire support platform to replace Leopard tanks, nor for light, mobile indirect fire platforms to replace M109s, this objective either requires substantial funding commitments from the government or commits the Canadian Army to fighting in a coalition force which will provide the direct and indirect fire capabilities required to fight in a high intensity combat

⁸⁹ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, 31.

scenario.⁹⁰ This latter course seems to be the most likely, as a further definition of medium weight forces (MWF) states that “the high level of combat power inherent in a MWF is derived from both its integral capabilities and its ability to make full use of coalition assets making it employable across the spectrum of conflict.”⁹¹

The second ten year target is to achieve interoperability. Interoperability is to be achieved with allies at NATO degree 3 (which is defined as the seamless sharing of data involving the automated sharing of data between systems based on a common exchange model in the field of C3), as well as “appropriate and practicable “ joint integration and combined interoperability at brigade level with the forces of the US, other ABCA (America, Britain, Canada and Australia) countries and select NATO nations.⁹² While a seemingly innocuous goal and laudable in and of itself, in reality this is a highly difficult objective, as all of the allied forces are pursuing their own modernization programs. To have NATO Degree 3 interoperability amongst forces which are pursuing their own national programs of force modernization, and in particular digitization, will be extremely difficult to achieve, and is not the provenance of a single nation.⁹³ The recognition that Canada has a role to play in achieving interoperability is, however, significant in that it ensures that planners continue to work within bilateral or multilateral organizations when planning future equipment or capabilities.

Other targets which merit attention include the establishment of a command support capability and the enhancement of experimentation capability (to include the

⁹⁰ A resourced procurement plan would be one which has specific funds set aside in one, or several, budgets to cover the costs of procurement.

⁹¹ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, 31.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 21.

⁹³ NATO, as an example, strives to enhance interoperability between member military forces through regulations such as standing NASTO agreements (STANAGs) and other agreements on equipment, doctrine and reporting.

instrumentation of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Center). Interestingly, achievement of Phase 2 goals for Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) which relate to change and growth is specifically provided with the proviso “subject to funding”. Although government policy specifies that the role and capability of the Reserve Forces must be strengthened, the Army has effectively stated that it will not pursue this initiative without additional funding. This topic will be addressed further in chapter three.

Manage Readiness

The fourth strategic objective is Manage Readiness. Rather than maintain a uniform standard of training across the Army, in mandating the level of readiness the Army is seeking to achieve three specific goals. First, it will save money by reducing training costs, as not all units will require the highest level of training in a given year. This will allow for the conduct of regular, consistent brigade group level field training exercises (the lack of which had been noted as one of the major weaknesses in the estimate conducted by the army staff, as documented in table 6). Second, the Army plans to ease the high operational tempo of units by reducing the number of units or TSSU’s available for short notice deployment on operations. This will be accomplished by lowering the training (or readiness) levels of some units. Third, the Army hopes to introduce stability in the planning of unit employment. This will allow for better personnel management, as well as ensuring that training activities are relevant and timely.

Manage Readiness will reduce flexibility for the government in that units not trained at a high level of readiness will be unavailable for short notice deployments without significant (and time consuming) training activities. The Army Staff, however,

has judged that this reduction in flexibility is more than offset by the resulting lightening of the burden on individuals and units, which will allow for a better personnel tempo and increased morale and physical health for the soldiers. A key part of this strategy, as enunciated in the five and ten year targets, is a predictable training schedule which will allow for effective expenditures of resources while ensuring that the entire army is employed on an equitable basis. This in turn was expected to lead to enhanced personnel retention by improving the predictability of operational and training activities. Retention of experienced Army personnel is viewed as one of the most cost effective means of maintaining the existing military capabilities.

Implementation of the Army Strategy

Part three of *Advancing with Purpose* was devoted to the implementation of the Army Strategy. Noting that there were three key factors that could affect the implementation of the Army Strategy (lack of funding from the Department, public policy agendas, and the existing structure and culture which might be resistant to the change outlined), *Advancing with Purpose* emphasizes an annual assessment of progress and constant updating of the strategy. The detailed implementation of the plan would be outlined in the annual Strategic Operating Resource Directive (SORD). *Advancing with Purpose* concludes with the statement that success of the Strategy, which would produce a sustainable, effective and relevant Army of tomorrow, was a duty that the army leadership owed “to our soldiers and to our nation.”⁹⁴

⁹⁴ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, 30.

In sum, *Advancing with Purpose* is a structured, thematic guidance that will allow for short term management of the Army while ensuring that development of the Army had tangible objectives to attain. While generally viewed with approval both within and outside of the Department, it was a vital first step towards correcting deficiencies within the army structure and operating environment which were creating unsustainable pressures.⁹⁵ The Chief of the Defence staff noted that “the Army is facing some of the most significant sustainability challenges in the CF, having borne the brunt of the high operational tempo experienced by the CF over the past decade”.⁹⁶ This chapter has shown that *Advancing with Purpose*, developed using the campaign planning process, outlines a vision, an associated centre of gravity, three decisive points and four strategic objectives which will guide the Army in its development. Chapter three of this paper will look at how well the Army Strategy addresses the needs of the nation, as they are defined through both governmental policy and internal Department of Defence direction.

⁹⁵ Department of National Defence, *At a Crossroads: Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff 2001-2002* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2003), 28.

⁹⁶ Department of National Defence, *At a Crossroads*, 15

CHAPTER THREE

ASSESSING THE STRATEGY

There are many factors which contributed to the requirement for developing an Army Strategy at the beginning of the 21st Century. While the Army had enjoyed many successes in overseas operations, there was a recognition that it was not well postured for an evolving security environment, and substantial change was needed in the absence of, or even in the event of, funding increases.⁹⁷ There was an appreciation of the many strengths inherent in the Army, but the Army staff also identified a number of “significant and troubling weaknesses”.⁹⁸ There was a recognition by senior military leaders, civilian academics and even Parliamentarians that the burden being placed upon individual soldiers was too great.⁹⁹ Finally, there was a growing recognition that the direction in which the Army was moving forward was not necessarily the same direction that the Canadian Forces wanted the Army to move in.¹⁰⁰ For the strategy to be effective, it would have to answer to all of these factors. Yet the most important test of the validity of the strategy lies in its ability to fulfill the government and department policy which are the mandated requirement for the Army.

Chapter one highlighted the fact that there were three main policy references for the Canadian Army: *Canada in the World*, the *1994 Defence White Paper*, and *Strategy 2020*. There are numerous specific statements of tasks or principles in these policy documents which apply, either directly or indirectly, to the Canadian Army. This chapter

⁹⁷ Department of National Defence, *At a Crossroads*, ii.

⁹⁸ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, 6.

⁹⁹ “It has been clear for some time that the Army of Today is performing a broad array of current tasks effectively, but at a rate that is unsustainable given its present structure”. *Advancing with purpose*, 6.

will look at how well the Army Strategy addresses these tasks and intents. In order to assess how well the Army strategy addresses them, each will be examined individually, with the relevant references in *Advancing with Purpose* being cited to show where the strategy does, or does not, address government or department direction.

The Army Strategy and Foreign Policy

As discussed in chapter one, Canada's foreign policy provides a reference of how the government intends to employ the Canadian Forces in support of Canadian national interests. While the primary responsibility of the Canadian Army is to respond to specific direction provided in the *Strategy 2020*, to be truly relevant the Army Strategy should also adhere to the general intent provided in foreign policy. In Chapter 1, four key deductions were drawn from the various policy statements listed in *Canada in the World* (see Table 1). The first deduction was that Canada's intent was to remain focussed on the bilateral defence of North America with the forces of the United States, and engaged within NATO.¹⁰¹ These tasks require that the military to be capable of working both with the military forces of the United States, and also within the NATO military structure. The Army Strategy addresses this deduction in six specific places, as outlined in Table 7.

Chapter two of this paper outlined how *Advancing with Purpose* defines institutional credibility as the centre of gravity for the Army. One of the key indicators that institutional credibility will have been achieved is that the Army's expertise is sought by allies. By listing the expertise sought by allies as an indicator of success, the Army

¹⁰⁰ Major Paul Fleury, "Splitting the Difference," 58.

¹⁰¹ For ease of referral, bilateral defence of North America with the United States will be referred to as simply bilateral defence.

Strategy forces a consideration of what capabilities will be valued by allies in the future, and orients the direction of the Army towards these capabilities. The strategy also seeks to transform the Army into a modern, information age force. This transformation will ensure that the Army can fulfill the *White Paper* direction of being able to fight “alongside the best, against the best”, which will make the Army a desirable ally to any military or political alliance.¹⁰² There are three specific goals listed in the Army Strategy which will, when achieved, contribute to the military effectiveness and ability of the Army to work with the most modern armies in the world: Connect with Canadians, Deliver a Combat-Capable, Sustainable Force Structure, and Manage Readiness. Table 7 outlines how each objective contributes to the ability to work with both NATO and the Armed Forces of the United States.

The Army vision also addresses the requirement to maintain the ability to work with U.S. forces and within the NATO military structure. The Army vision states that the Army is to “achieve joint integration and combined interoperability with the ground forces of the United States, other ABCA countries and selected NATO allies.”¹⁰³ If the vision is achieved, integration and combined interoperability with the US and selected NATO allies will have been enhanced. The Commander’s vision for the Army therefore sets a desired end state which will directly contribute to the foreign policy requirement of being capable of working with U.S. forces and NATO.

¹⁰² Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 3.

¹⁰³ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, 13.

Table 7. Statements in the Army Strategy which contribute to the foreign policy implied goal of maintaining the capability to work with U.S. military forces and NATO.

Strategy Statement	Supporting Statement	How this contributes to the Army's capability to work with U.S. military forces and NATO
Five Relational Facets of the Army's Centre of Gravity were defined to indicate that the Army Commander's vision has been achieved.	Expertise sought by allies is one of the relational facets of institutional credibility.	By listing the expertise sought by Allies as an indicator of success, the Army Strategy forces a consideration of what capabilities will be valued by allies in the future, and orients the direction of the Army towards these capabilities.
Strategic Objective 1: Connect with Canadians	The Army must improve its understanding of the national and international institutions that affect its environment and with which it works.	By ensuring that the Army becomes more familiar with international institutions that affect its environment (of which NATO and the United States military can be considered primary institutions), the Army leadership will be constantly reminded of the relevance of these institutions to Canada's national interests. This will ensure that they remain a primary point of focus.
Strategic Objective 3: Deliver a combat-capable, sustainable force structure	The Army structure will produce combat ready forces capable of operating in the land environment for domestic and expeditionary imperatives.. it must leverage technological advantages in key areas to permit sufficient modernization to remain strategically relevant and tactically decisive on the future battlefield.	By providing strategically relevant and tactically decisive forces, Canada's Army will be highly valued and desirable in NATO, North American bilateral defence initiatives, and other military or political alliances.
	Ten year target: Transform into a medium-weight, information age army..one that, through continuous modernization, remains an agile, lethal and survivable force.	This target reinforces capabilities which will make the Canadian Army relevant and desirable to both NATO and U.S. forces.
	Achieve interoperability with allies at NATO Degree 3 in the field of C3. Achieve appropriate and practicable joint integration and combined interoperability at brigade level with the forces of the U.S....and selected NATO allies.	As military technology progresses in cost and complexity, those forces able to operate alongside the most modern armies (which are members of NATO, and include the U.S. military) will remain desirable in both organizations.
Strategic Objective 4: Manage readiness.	Contribute to deployability through improved combat readiness of the vanguard and Main Contingency Forces(MCF).	Vanguard and MCF forces are commitments made by the government to NATO and bilateral defence agreements with the U.S. (as well as the U.N.). This improvement in the readiness of forces committed to NATO is within the scope of ensuring relevance for both organizations.

The second deduction drawn from *Canada in the World* is that the unpredictability of the international environment requires that the Canadian Forces retain a flexible capability to respond to unforeseen circumstances, and that the capacity for graduated (or escalating) military involvement must be credible (See Table 1). This flexibility and capability for graduated response is addressed throughout the Army Strategy on a physical, psychological and intellectual basis. Canadian Forces Doctrine has recognized that basic combat skills are necessary in operations throughout the spectrum of conflict.¹⁰⁴ For this reason, an emphasis is placed on training for high intensity operations while recognizing the need for specialized training in the skills required in low to medium intensity operations.

While the requirement for the physical skills required to perform tasks across the spectrum of conflict is emphasized, there is also a recognition that ethos and culture are “prerequisites to the continued development of an army able to deal with the kind of complex security environments (envisioned).”¹⁰⁵ The Army Strategy specifically refers to the requirement to “establish the long-term basis for continued success across the spectrum of conflict”, and sets the development of tactically self-sufficient units (TSSUs) as the building block from which tailored capabilities can be generated.¹⁰⁶ Table 8 lists the specific objectives which will contribute to the Army’s ability to respond in a credible manner to unforeseen situations across the spectrum of conflict. The numerous references to flexible response capability to conduct operations across the spectrum of

¹⁰⁴ Department of National Defence, *B-GL-300-001 FP-000 Conduct of Land Operations-Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1998), 133.

¹⁰⁵ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, 18.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 20.

conflict show that the task of maintaining a flexible response capability has been addressed by the Army Strategy.

Table 8. Statements in the Army Strategy which contribute to the foreign policy implied goal of maintaining a credible capability to respond to situations across the spectrum of conflict.

Strategy Statement	Supporting Statement	How this contributes to the Army's ability to respond across the spectrum of conflict
Strategic Objective 2: Shape Army Culture	Ethos and culture are prerequisites to the continued development of an army able to deal with the kind of complex security environment (envisioned).	Addresses the need of the Army to have leaders and soldiers who are intellectually and culturally prepared to deal with all levels of conflict.
	TSSU will be the building block, from which tailored capabilities can be generated.	The emphasis is on tailored capabilities, which allows for the selection or grouping of a force based on the skills required. The utilization of TSSUs as a building block will enhance flexibility.
Strategic Objective 3: Deliver a combat capable, sustainable force structure.	Must establish the long-term basis for continued success across the spectrum of conflict.	Addresses the requirement to maintain an expertise in low intensity conflicts, while maintaining the ability to transition on short notice to high intensity operations.
	Must ensure that the structures at both the formation and unit levels remain flexible and adaptable so that task tailoring for specific missions is possible, practical and efficient.	Addresses the need to be able to tailor capabilities to any specific mission, which will result in flexibility for the Army and options for the government.
	The Army will transform into a medium weight, information age army...one that, through continuous modernization, remains an agile, lethal and survivable force.	This target addresses the need to ensure the capability to participate in high intensity operations.
	Five year target to achieve Phase 2 goals of Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR)	This will introduce new capabilities relevant to homeland defence and asymmetric threats, increasing options for responding to any threat or conflict scenario.
	Implementation of a managed readiness approach must produce the required levels of capability and readiness, allowing the Army to meet its assigned tasks, but also build-in sufficient recuperation time for individuals and units.	While recognizing limitations upon the Army's ability to respond to every and all situations, the Army Strategy clearly seeks to maintain capability for low to high intensity conflicts while addressing the need for sustainability.
	Prioritization will be required to improve deployability and capitalize on improved CF strategic lift resources, thereby serving to enhance the Army's strategic utility.	This target seeks to ensure that the Army is ready to respond on short notice to respond to Nation

The third deduction from *Canada in the World* is that Canada will likely seek increased participation in Regional alliances, therefore capabilities which are complementary to military forces within the EU, Pacific Rim states and the OAS should be maintained (see table 1). The goal of developing a modern, lethal, agile force which is globally deployable, able to be task tailored and employed in operations across the spectrum of conflict, makes the Army a force which would be desirable by any military or political alliance. Thus the Army Strategy seeks to maximize the capabilities which would allow the government the greatest latitude in cooperating with regional security alliances. The fact that the Army Strategy specifically mentions particular countries and alliances infers that the greatest priority will be accorded to working with those nations. Other than ABCA and NATO, no other alliances or partnerships are mentioned by name, although there is a reference to achieving command, control and communications interoperability with “allies”.¹⁰⁷ As neither the EU, Pacific Rim nations (other than Australia) nor OAS are mentioned by name, it might be interpreted that the Army Strategy does not address this implied goal of foreign policy. One must consider, however, that by developing a modern, deployable, strategically relevant and tactically decisive army as the strategy seeks to do, there are no preclusions to participation in regional alliances. Thus while this goal is not specifically addressed within the strategy, the capabilities sought ensure that there is an ability to achieve the goal of working within regional alliances. Table 9 lists the specific references to capabilities which will support the foreign policy implied goal of maintaining capabilities which are complementary to military forces within the EU, Pacific Rim and the OAS.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 21.

Table 9. Statements in the Army Strategy which contribute to the foreign policy implied goal of maintaining capabilities which are complementary to military forces within the EU, Pacific Rim and the OAS.

Strategy Statement	Supporting Statement	How this contributes to the Army's capability to work with the military forces of the EU, Pacific Rim or OAS
Objective 1: Connect with Canadians	Five year target: Establish an Army-focussed security and defence conference program to encourage the development of academic discourse.	It can safely be assumed that a security and defence program would encompass regional security institutions and Canada's involvement with them. This would likely raise the level of involvement of public and Army knowledge of these institutions, and may result in increased direction by the government to work with these organizations.
	Five year target: Establish deliberate and structured relationships based on exchanges, Liaison Officers (LOs), and secondments with relevant organizations outside the Army.	Although the context for this target is civilian organizations which will allow the Army to connect with Canadian society, there is scope for enhanced participation in organizations relating to regional security organizations to be included here.
Objective 2: Shape Army culture	Reformulate the Army ethos to recognize the social, strategic and operational realities of the 21 st century.	As outlined in <i>Canada in the World</i> , regional organizations play an important role in contemporary international affairs. As such, regional organizations will likely form a part of the "social, strategic and operational realities of the 21 st century".
Objective 3: Deliver a combat capable, sustainable force structure	Ten year target: Achieve interoperability with allies at NATO Degree 3 in the field of C3. Achieve appropriate and practicable joint integration and combined interoperability at brigade level with the forces of the US, other ABCA countries and selected NATO allies	The countries covered under the auspices of "US, ABCA nations and selected NATO allies" possess the most advanced military capability existing in the world today. By achieving interoperability with these forces, the Army would be capable of working with any advanced military in the world. Most NATO nations are also members of the EU, and as such achieving this goal would advance the ability of the Army to work within the EU.
	Remain strategically relevant	Given Canada's economic ties to the EU and Pacific Rim, and its security interests in South America, the ability to play a military or humanitarian role in any of these areas will be a prerequisite for strategic relevance.

The final deduction drawn from *Canada in the World* is that credibility in conducting operations has been established by the Canadian military, and the capability to support U.N. peacekeeping missions through specialist troops and expertise must be maintained. As such, Army military personnel should be capable of effectively assisting in the reform of the UN peacekeeping structure (see Table 1). This deduction is addressed in the Army Strategy primarily through the maintenance of capability (one of

the decisive points of institutional credibility) and an improvement in the readiness of forces committed to UN operations. The ability to perform tasks across the spectrum of conflict has been, and will remain, a key capability to participate in U.N. missions. The strategic objective of managed readiness, with its stated intent of relieving the high personnel tempo associated with repeated operational tours, is also intended in part to increase retention amongst the soldiers and officers of the Army. Retention of experienced personnel will contribute to the Army's ability to provide specialist troops and expertise valued by the United Nations. Table 10 lists the specific goals which will contribute to the foreign policy implied goal of retaining the capability to support U.N. peacekeeping missions through specialist troops and expertise.

Table 10. Statements in the Army Strategy which contribute to the foreign policy implied goal of retaining the capability to support U.N. peacekeeping missions through specialist troops and expertise.

Strategy Statement	Supporting Statement	How this contributes to the Army's capability to work with the military forces of the EU, Pacific Rim or OAS
One of three decisive points listed in the strategy is capability	The quality of current capability on operations cannot be allowed to suffer in our efforts to build a more modernized and effective Army of Tomorrow.	Maintenance of current capability while increasing collective training opportunities is a stated goal of the Army Strategy.
Strategic Objective 3: Deliver a combat capable, sustainable force structure		Recognized combat capability will make the Army desirable on U.N. missions where escalation of a conflict occurs. ¹⁰⁸
Strategic Objective 4: Manage Readiness	Five year target: Enhance personnel retention by improving the predictability of operational and training activities.	Retention of trained and experienced personnel will maintain a capability within the Army which will be valuable to the U.N.

Chapter one of this paper outlined four key deductions for the Army to be able to respond effectively to Canada's foreign policy: The requirement to work within NATO and with U.S. forces in the bilateral defence of North America; the maintenance of

¹⁰⁸ Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 28.

flexibility and capability for graduated military involvement; the retention of the skills necessary to participate in UN missions and assist in the reform of the UN structure; and the need to maintain capabilities complementary to regional security organizations such as the EU, OAS and Pacific Rim states. While the first three of these four deductions have been shown in tables 7, 8, and 10 to be specifically addressed by the Army Strategy, the fourth deduction is not directly referred to in the strategy. Neither the EU, OAS nor Pacific Rim states are mentioned in *Advancing with Purpose*. However, the capabilities which would allow the Army to be complementary to the militaries of these regions are clearly intended to be achieved by the Army, as shown in table 9. The Army Strategy, therefore, responds to all of the implied tasks of Canada's Foreign Policy.

The Army Strategy and Defence Policy

The *White Paper* provides the government's policy direction to the Department of National Defence. The specific tasks for the Canadian Army which are derived from this policy guidance are listed in chapter one of this paper. While ideally the Army Strategy should adhere to the spirit of both foreign and defence policy for it to be relevant, it must adhere to the letter and spirit of departmental direction which is issued by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).¹⁰⁹ Any judgement of the relevance of the Army Strategy should therefore be based primarily on how well it adheres to the policy direction contained in *Strategy 2020*. An analysis of how the strategy supports the direction in the *White Paper* does, however, serve to highlight the coherence of the strategy, and the relevance of the Army to the Canadian Forces.

The first task derived for the Army from the *White Paper* is the provision of contingency forces for collective security (see table 3). The army specific contingency forces were a brigade group, an infantry battalion, signals units and engineers. These forces are to be made available for three purposes, which are, in order of priority, (1) the defence of North America; (2) in defence of a NATO member state; and (3) participation in multilateral operations anywhere in the world under UN auspices. The contingency forces are broken into two groups, each with a specified level of readiness to be achieved. The vanguard force, consisting of an infantry battle group, is to be ready within three

¹⁰⁹ As outlined in chapter one, foreign policy has an indirect linkage with defence policy. Foreign policy is the government's stated intent for employment of the CF in pursuit of the national interest, while defence policy is the government's direction to DND regarding what it must accomplish. It is the responsibility of the CF to ensure that it meets the direction contained in defence policy, and it will accomplish this by assigning tasks to the Army, Navy and Air Force. The requirement for the Canadian Army is to meet the direction contained in departmental policy, in this case *Strategy 2020*. If in doing so the Army contributes

weeks of notification.¹¹⁰ The remaining force, referred to as the Main Contingency Force (MCF), is to be ready for employment in an offshore theatre of operations, within three months of notification.¹¹¹ Although these timelines have not been tested since the *White Paper* was published, the Army Strategy has indicated that there is a need to augment the readiness of contingency forces, and to specify the timelines it will adhere to.¹¹²

The Army Strategy clearly enunciates that brigade and brigade groups are essential structures which provide trained forces for the government. It states, however, that “formations are needed as the basis for force generation in its widest context.”¹¹³ While the broader training and employment of forces is facilitated by the structure of the Army into brigades and brigade groups, the *White Paper* task of providing contingency forces requires that MCF be deployed, fully trained, to an offshore theatre within 90 days. This implies that the Army must maintain an expertise in operations conducted at the brigade group level. The Army Strategy indicates that “the Land Force must optimize its resources to facilitate the continued development of a formation-based structure and its associated level of expertise”.¹¹⁴ There are, additionally, specific targets which mandate that improved combat readiness of both vanguard and MCF forces be attained in order to contribute to the deployability of forces. Training at the brigade group level is cited as a specific five year target to be attained.¹¹⁵ This clear enunciation of standards for combat readiness and deployment affirms that the Army Strategy addresses the *White Paper* task

to both defence and foreign policy, this reinforces the relevance of the strategy; however, the obligation for the Army is to meet the direction issued by the CDS.

¹¹⁰ Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 39.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, 22.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 23.

of providing contingency forces. Table 11 lists the objectives which support the *White Paper* task of providing contingency forces for collective security.

Table 11: Direction in the Army Strategy which contributes to the provision of contingency forces for collective security.

Statement in the Army Strategy	Supporting Statement	How this contributes to the provision of contingency forces
Strategic Objective 3: Deliver a combat capable, sustainable force structure	In Canada, formations are needed as the basis for force generation...these formations include the brigades and brigade groups...the Land Force must optimize its resources to facilitate the continued development of a formation based structure and its associated level of expertise.	Unequivocal statements that the brigades and brigade groups will remain as the primary formation structures within the Army. This is an essential element of maintaining the expertise necessary to provide the MCF.
Strategic Objective 4: Manage Readiness	Ten year target: contribute to deployability through improved combat readiness of the vanguard and MCF to be in an offshore theatre of operations within 21 days and 90 days respectively.	Clear enunciation of the task to provide contingency forces.
	Five year target: Adopt an approach to training at the brigade-group level that rebuilds and maintains an acceptable level of collective skills and formation level readiness for the more demanding MCF missions...	Addresses training standards to ensure readiness for high intensity operations by MCF or vanguard
	Five year target: optimize use of equipment and expenditures of ammunition, fuel and other resources by matching resource allocations to specified readiness standards	Focuses scarce resources towards units or formations tasked with MCF or vanguard tasks to ensure their readiness
	Five year target: conduct regular, consistent brigade group-level field training exercises where battle groups are trained in a formation context	Ensures that battle groups will be trained to operate in the correct context. No mention of ensuring that a brigade group is trained in a divisional or corps context, where it would likely be employed if MCF were deployed.

The second task derived from the *White Paper* is that Canada must be able to fight “alongside the best, against the best.”¹¹⁶ The specific implication for the Army is that equipment modernization and training must remain compatible with that of the most advanced armies (see table 3). By mandating that the Army “achieve appropriate and practicable joint integration and combined interoperability... with the forces of the U.S.,

other ABCA and selected NATO allies”, arguably the Army Strategy has dictated that the Army has been directed to fight alongside the best. Certainly, the countries named possess the most advanced military capabilities existing at this time, and for the foreseeable future. At the same time, by mandating regular training and validation of units through the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC), the Army Strategy has dictated a very high level of competence for the forces.¹¹⁷ Table 12 lists the objectives in the Army Strategy which support the *White Paper* task of fighting “alongside the best, against the best.”¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 14.

¹¹⁷ A specific five year target for CMTC is to achieve instrumentation, which will allow for training in a Weapons Effects Simulation (WES) environment. Data posted on the Canadian Army WES site (http://www.forces.ca/dless/wes/main_e.html) indicates that “experience gained by other armies clearly indicates that live simulation systems such as WES are the best tools to accurately simulate the effects of weapon fire and to objectively measure performance and readiness”.

¹¹⁸ Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 14.

Table 12: Direction in the Army Strategy which contributes to the *White Paper* task of fighting alongside the best, against the best.

Statement in the Army Strategy	Supporting Statement	How this contributes to fighting alongside the best, against the best
Decisive points of capability, sustainability and unity	These three decisive points mutually reinforce each other to produce resolute and (unity) multi purpose operational effectiveness (capability) that can be current and relevant across time (sustainability)	The combined achievement of the three decisive points will result in institutional credibility, the Army's centre of gravity. To reach the decisive points of capability, sustainability and unity will require a thorough and challenging training regime for the members of the Army. This will lead to the ability to fight alongside the best, against the best.
Strategic Objective 1: Connect with Canadians	<p>Although polling shows considerable public support for Army activities, there is a continuing need to promote a more balanced and deeper understanding of what the Army is doing and where it is going.</p> <p>Ten year target: Create an open, outward-looking Army environment that seeks opportunities to communicate its successes and failures and actively engages the public in meaningful dialogue.</p> <p>Five year target: Establish a stakeholder program for national leaders and opinion makers</p> <p>Five year target: Establish an Army- security and defence conference program to encourage the development of academic discourse</p> <p>Five year target: Establish deliberate and structured relationships based on exchanges, liaison officers, and secondments with relevant organizations outside the Army</p> <p>Five year target: Establish effective community links in every geographic location the Army has a presence.</p>	This objective, and all of its associated targets, will affect the public will and political resolve to employ the Army in conflicts. Only with the confidence in the skills and training of its soldiers will the public, and by extension the political leadership, feel comfortable in employing the Army. Connecting with Canadians and ensuring a public comprehension of the abilities of the Army will set the conditions to allow the government the flexibility to employ the Army.
Strategic Objective 2: Shape Army culture	Reinforce the Army ethos and culture, in harmony with and supportive of stated Canadian values, to emphasize the Army's basic purpose- combat and the conduct of operations.	This objective will, when attained, result in a mission focussed Army, committed to its values and aware of the sacrifices it is expected to make. This will result in a more professional army
Strategic Objective 3: Deliver a combat capable, sustainable force structure	<p>The Army structure will produce combat ready forces capable of operating in the land environment for domestic and expeditionary imperatives...it must leverage technological advances in key areas to permit sufficient modernization to remain strategically relevant and tactically decisive</p> <p>Ten year target: transform into a medium weight, information age army, one that remains an agile, lethal and survivable force.</p> <p>Five year target: Establish a command support capability that builds on the synergy offered by ISTAR and digitization in an appropriate structure</p>	<p>A technologically modern force, trained for combat, which is strategically relevant and tactically decisive should be able to fight alongside the best, against the best.</p> <p>A force which is considered to be an information age army which is agile, lethal and survivable, and is likely to be considered one of the best in the world.</p> <p>Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) are combat multipliers which allow a force to exert force in a directed manner. ISTAR capabilities are actively sought by all forces in order to dominate the battlefield</p>
Strategic Objective 4: Manage Readiness	<p>Ten year target: improve combat readiness</p> <p>Ten year target: achieve enhanced interoperability and joint warfare capability</p> <p>Five year target: achieve a learning environment based on adoption of the After Action Review process, complete incorporation of the Lessons Learned Process, and comprehensive confirmation and validation</p>	<p>Increased combat readiness will allow for forces capable, on short notice, to engage adversaries across the spectrum of conflict.</p> <p>Enhanced interoperability and joint warfare capability improves the ability of the Army to fight with other military forces.</p> <p>All three processes discussed will serve to enhance the combat abilities of the Army.</p>

The third task derived from the *White Paper* is that the Army must maintain the ability to operate effectively with the military forces of the United States in defending the North American continent. While the term interoperability mandates the ability to work together, the differences in equipment, doctrine and tactics make this commitment a formidable challenge given that the United States Army is the most technologically advanced military force existing today. The Army Strategy recognizes the challenge and cost of maintaining interoperability with the U.S. The strategy specifically mandates levels of interoperability that must be maintained, specifying that there be a “seamless sharing of data involving the automated sharing of data between systems based on a common exchange mode in the field of command, control and communications”, as well as “appropriate and practicable joint integration and combined interoperability at brigade level with the forces of the U.S.”¹¹⁹ Table 13 lists the objectives in the Army Strategy which support the *White Paper* task of maintaining interoperability with the U.S.

Table 13: Direction in the Army Strategy which contribute to the *White Paper* task of maintaining interoperability with the U.S.

Statement in the Army Strategy	Supporting Statement	How this contributes to interoperability with the U.S. military
Strategic Objective 3: Develop a combat capable, sustainable force structure	Ten year target: Achieve interoperability with allies at NATO Degree 3 in the field of C3. Achieve appropriate and practicable joint integration and combined interoperability at brigade level with the forces of the U.S.	Unequivocal direction on maintaining interoperability with U.S. forces, although use of the terms “appropriate and practicable” leave some question as to the standards required
	Five year target: Understand and pursue selected Future Combat Systems (FCS) and other allied initiatives across the combat functions	The <i>White Paper</i> defines the United States as “Canada’s most important ally.” ¹²⁰ Pursuing FCS or other technology initiatives with the U.S. will enhance interoperability.

¹¹⁹ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, 21.

The fourth task derived from the *White Paper* was to ensure that a greater proportion of the Reserve Forces resources go towards improving their operational capability and availability, and that in order for this to occur the land force reserve structure must undergo significant change (see table 3). The Reserves are specifically mentioned in the Army Strategy, which indicates that the strategy “applies to all components of the Army-Regular (and) Reserve ... and that each of these components were given due consideration when developing the strategic framework”.¹²¹

Transformation into a medium-weight, information age army is specifically defined to include the alignment of Regular, Reserve and civil components of the Land Force.¹²² Yet the only specific target for the reserve force is written with the caveat “subject to funding”. As reform of the Reserves is dictated by the *White Paper*, and acknowledged by the Army senior leadership as necessary, the decision to make reform of the Reserves contingent upon funding at first appears to be inconsistent with the government’s policy direction. Upon closer inspection, however, changing the structure of the Reserves is in fact addressed.

The Army has developed a plan, Land Forces Reserve Restructure (LFRR), to make the Reserve Forces more relevant and efficient. Divided into two phases, LFRR adopted a sequenced approach to reforming the Reserves. LFRR phase one, which saw an increase in the strength of the Reserve force and new tasks being assigned to Reserve units, was completed by January 2002. LFRR Phase two, which involves eventually increasing the strength of the Reserves to 18 500, addressing equipment needs and developing new capabilities in the Reserve forces, could be implemented once funding

¹²⁰ Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 20.

¹²¹ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, 3.

was made available.¹²³ The decision by the Chief of the Land Staff to make LFRR Phase 2 contingent upon funding reflects a conscious and informed decision that all of the tasks assigned to the Army cannot be carried out while ensuring that the Army is posturing for the future. By preparing a plan but indicating that it cannot be carried out without additional funding, the Army has given a professional and accountable response to the Chief of Defence Staff that it cannot perform all of the tasks expected of it. In March 2003 the government announced additional funding specifically to allow LFRR phase 2 to proceed.¹²⁴ LFRR Phase 2 will proceed as an integrated part of the Army Strategy, therefore as of 03 April 2003, the Army Strategy addresses the *White Paper* direction to make the reserve capability more meaningful and effective in contributing to Canada's defence effort. Table 14 lists the Army Strategy direction which addresses the *White Paper* task of reforming the reserve structure.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ More information on Land Forces Reserve Restructure is available from <http://www.army.dnd.ca/lfr/>; Internet, accessed 05 May 2003.

¹²⁴ CF News release, 03 April 2003, "Second Phase of Land Forces Reserve Restructure Begins" available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1037; Internet; accessed 04 April 2003.

Table 14: Army Strategy Direction which addresses reform of the Reserve component.

Statement in the Army Strategy	Supporting Statement	How this improves the ability of the Reserves to contribute to the overall operational capability of the Army
Strategic Objective 1: Connect with Canadians	Establish effective community links in every geographic location the Army has a presence.	An enhanced presence or profile of the Reserves across the country will result in an improved capacity to provide Aid to the Civil Power or disaster relief.
Strategic Objective 2: Shape Army Culture	Ten year target: Reinforce the Army ethos and culture, in harmony with and supportive of stated Canadian values, to emphasize the Army's basic purpose-combat operations.	The Reserves occupy a unique position in Canadian society, belonging to both the civilian and military communities. As such, they are able to interpret essential differences in values of each community, and attempt to bridge over differences. The Reserves can ensure that the military stays in tune with the values of Canadians, and articulate any necessary differences to both communities.
Strategic Objective 3: Deliver a combat capable, sustainable force structure	In Canada, formations are needed as the basis for force generation in its widest context. This includes training and administering units, as well as creating TSSUs through the grouping of capability sets that the formations control. These formations include the brigades....	The regular force is grouped into brigade groups, while the Reserve force is structured around Brigades. This is a clear reference to the utility of (Reserve) Brigades being utilized as force generators.
	Transform into a medium-weight, information age army...should include the alignment of Regular, Reserve and civilian components of the Land Force.	Integration of the Reserves into the Army of Tomorrow will give them a key role in the operational capability of the Army.
	Five year target: (subject to funding) achieve the Phase 2 goals for LFRR relating to change and growth.. introduce new capabilities relevant to homeland defence and the asymmetrical threat.. increase productivity and relevance to Army objectives.	The introduction of new capabilities to the Reserves, while increasing relevance to Army objectives, will allow the Reserves to contribute to improving the operational capability of the Army.
Strategic Objective 4: Manage Readiness	The capabilities resident in the Regular and Reserve components will tend to become less distinct as some specialized, largely Reserve capabilities in demand for current operations such as the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) are actually at a higher level of readiness than some regular units.	This is a clear demonstration of the Reserves assuming a role which contributes to the operational effectiveness of the Army.
	Generate troops from low readiness forces for mature Peace Support Operations	This will free up Regular force troops for additional operations, tasks or training.

The other major task outlined in the *White Paper* for the Canadian Army is to conduct Aid of the Civil Power operations. These operations can consist of assisting other federal agencies within Canada, controlling activities in Canadian territory, contributing to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, or response to terrorist incidents. Aid of the Civil Power (ACP) is not specifically addressed in the Army Strategy, although it cites the fact that the Army exists “first and foremost to protect vital national interests”, as well as to contribute to international peace and security, and to promote national unity and well being.¹²⁵ This task is addressed indirectly through the directive to establish effective community links, which would aid in the performance of ACP tasks, and the focus on capability across the spectrum of conflict. The intent of the Army Strategy is to develop a force which is able to conduct all operations from high intensity warfighting to low intensity peacekeeping duties. This force is to be characterized by well trained troops which have an inherent flexibility in employment due to high levels of discipline and training, as well as flexible command and control and logistic capabilities.¹²⁶ An army capable of adapting to either high or low intensity conflicts would be well postured to participate in ACP operations. Table 15 lists the Army Strategy objectives which will contribute to the Army’s ability to perform ACP tasks.

¹²⁵ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, 5.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 22-23.

Table 15: Army Strategy Objectives which will enhance the Army's ability to conduct ACP tasks.

Statement in the Army Strategy	Supporting Statements	How this improves the Army's ability to perform ACP tasks
Strategic Objective 1: Connect with Canadians	Five year target: Establish effective community links in every geographic location where the Army has a presence	Community links will allow for a smooth link up with civilian or federal agencies in the event of ACP operations.
	Ten year target: Maximize capital efficiency across the Army's geographic footprint...divest non-essential property to other agencies...further consolidation of facilities where practical.	While establishing community links will provide improved capability to conduct ACP, by divesting itself of non-essential properties, the Army will be reducing its "footprint" in some communities. If these properties are the sole military facilities in a community, then by selling them off the Army will in fact be degrading its ability to conduct ACP operations in those communities
Strategic Objective 3: Deliver a combat capable, sustainable force structure	The Army structure will produce combat ready forces capable of operating in the land environment for domestic and expeditionary imperatives.	This is a clear direction to the army that it must be prepared to conduct domestic operations.
	The land force must optimize its resources to facilitate the continued development of a formation based structure and its associated level of expertise to establish the long term basis for continued success across the spectrum of conflict.	ACP operations are located at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, and are clearly included in this statement.
	Ten year target: Transform into a medium-weight, information age army...focussing on a medium force structure does not negate the potential role and missions that could be assigned outside of this capability to operate in unique environments.	This statement is indicative of the Commanders desire to have a capability which can go beyond high intensity conflict, spanning unique environments which could potentially include ACP operations.
	Five year target: achieve Phase 2 goals for LFRR relating to change and growth...improve...training, introduce new capabilities, relevant to homeland defence and the asymmetric threat.	An increase in the manning, capability and training of Reserves will provide the Army with a better base with which to conduct ACP operations.

This section has shown that the Army Strategy addresses all of the *White Paper* tasks and commitments which are specific to the Army. There is only one area where the Army Strategy does not provide specific guidance to accomplish the *White Paper* tasks: in reforming the Reserves so that they are more meaningful and effective in contributing to Canada's defence effort. The Army Strategy does, however, provide direction and guidance to integrate reserve reform into the evolving Army structure, subject to

additional funding. As has been shown, this funding was produced in April 2003, and as a result Reserve restructure is proceeding in accordance with the Army Strategy.

The Army Strategy and *Strategy 2020*

The final policy document which is relevant to the Army, and the one which above all others must be adhered to, is that promulgated by the Department of National Defence. *Strategy 2020* is referred to numerous times in the Army Strategy, and the eight departmental change objectives listed at in chapter one (see table 5) are listed and briefly described in the main body of *Advancing with Purpose*. While the Army Strategy indicates that “successive versions of *Defence Planning Guidance* and *Defence Plans* has focussed our attention on objectives 3 and 4” (modernize and become globally deployable), an analysis of how well the Army Strategy addresses all eight departmental change objectives is of value in assessing how well *Advancing with Purpose* adheres to policy direction.¹²⁷

The first change objective, Innovative Path, requires that an adaptive, innovative and relevant path into the future be developed. The three criteria enunciated (adaptive, relevant and innovative) are all addressed within the Army Strategy, employing the same terminology. All elements of this change objective are contained in the Army vision, which requires that the Army generate, “...employ and sustain strategically relevant...” forces.¹²⁸ These forces must be “..capable of continuous adaptation..”¹²⁹ The requirement for innovation is outlined in the vision, which requires that “using progressive doctrine,

¹²⁷ Ibid., 10.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 13.

realistic training and leading edge technologies, the Army will be a knowledge based and command centric institution.”¹³⁰ The *Strategy 2020* departmental change objective of Innovative Path is addressed within the Army Commander’s vision for the Army, and as such is incorporated in the Army Strategy.

The second departmental change objective, Decisive Leaders, is also embedded in the Army Commander’s vision. This objective was described in *Strategy 2020* as the requirement to develop a leadership climate that encourages initiative, decisiveness and trust while improving our leaders abilities to lead and manage effectively (see table 5). The Army vision contains several key statements which adhere to the spirit of this objective, notably that “with selfless leadership and coherent management, the Army will achieve unity of effort and resource equilibrium.”¹³¹ Additionally, the vision states that “the cohesion and morale of our soldiers will be preserved through sharing a collective covenant of trust and common understanding of explicit and implicit intent.”¹³² These unequivocal statements of a competence and trust based leadership structure clearly adhere to the departmental change objective of decisive leaders.

The third departmental change objective, modernize, requires that the Army field a viable and affordable force structure trained and equipped to generate advanced combat capabilities that target leading-edge doctrine and technologies relevant to the battlespace of the 21st century (see Table 5). Once again the Army vision incorporates this guidance in stating that the Army will “generate, employ and sustain strategically relevant and

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

tactically decisive medium-weight forces”.¹³³ The vision’s reference to leading edge technologies, and the direction to “synchronize force development to achieve joint integration.. with the ground forces of the U.S., ABCA countries and other NATO allies” complements the departmental goals of relevance and modernizing. The Army strategic objective number 4, Manage Readiness, makes specific reference to the affordability of training by directing that the Army “optimize use of equipment and expenditures of ammunition, fuel and other resources by matching resource allocations to specified readiness standards.”¹³⁴ Likewise, when the Army strategic objective number 3 refers to maximizing capital efficiency across the Army’s geographic footprint, it is with the goal of balancing resources and reducing realty assets, which supports the goal of an affordable force structure.¹³⁵

The fourth departmental change objective, globally deployable, is addressed through the Army Strategy’s direction to proceed to a medium weight army, and also in the focus on increased standards of readiness which will allow for quicker deployment. While the attainment of a capability for global deployability rests to a large extent on the Department of National Defence procuring strategic lift assets, the Army has recognized that it must tailor its equipment to ensure that when lift is available, it can be used to move personnel and equipment in an optimal manner. For this reason, the move towards a medium weight army will assist in achieving global deployability. By identifying medium weight equipment prior to the purchase of strategic lift assets, the Army will ensure that it can purchase the equipment that it desires, and that the lift assets will have to be tailored to the requirements of the existing equipment.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 23.

The spirit of the fifth departmental change objective, interoperable, is evident throughout the Army Strategy. Defined as a requirement to strengthen military to military relationships with Canada's principal allies, ensuring interoperable forces, doctrine, and command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I), the Army has made this one of the principal themes of its strategy.¹³⁶ The Army vision states that the Army will "synchronize force development to achieve joint integration and combined interoperability with the ground forces of the U.S, ABCA countries and other NATO allies", a goal which encompasses the departmental change objective. Additionally, references in the Army strategic objective number 3, which has a five year target of achieving "appropriate and practicable joint integration and combined interoperability at brigade level with the forces of the U.S., other ABCA countries and selected NATO allies", underline the commitment to interoperability.¹³⁷

The sixth departmental change objective, career of choice, seeks to position defence as a rewarding, flexible and progressive workplace that builds professional teams of innovative and highly skilled men and women dedicated to accomplishing the mission(see table 5). The Army seeks to imbue this spirit in its vision, stating that "the cohesion and morale of our soldiers will be preserved through sharing a collective covenant of trust."¹³⁸ Seeking to ensure that the Army is a "broadly based representative national institution with a proud heritage", the Army leadership is emphasizing the values which will make the Army the career of choice of young Canadians.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 21.

¹³⁶ Department of National Defence, *A Strategy for 2020*, 10.

¹³⁷ Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose*, 21.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 13.

The seventh departmental change objective, strategic partnerships, is addressed in the first Army strategic objective, Connect with Canadians. Specific five year targets for the Army objective include the establishment of a focused stakeholder program for national leaders and opinion makers, the establishment of an Army focused security and defence program to encourage the development of academic discourse, as well as the establishment of deliberate and structured relationships based on exchanges, liaison officers, and secondments with relevant organizations outside the Army. The importance of strategic partnerships has gained acceptance in the Army leadership, and the importance placed upon this objective is evident in its inclusion as one of only four strategic objectives for the Army.

The final departmental change objective, resource stewardship, seeks to adopt a comprehensive approach to planning, management and comptrollership, focused on operational requirements that prepare the department to respond rapidly and effectively to change (see Table 5). The Army addresses this issue in striving for “selfless leadership and coherent management,”¹³⁹ and in designating governance, management and resources as three of five key dimensions to implementing the Army Strategy.¹⁴⁰ The importance of resource stewardship has been recognized by assigning it a prominent place in the implementation concept.¹⁴¹

While the Army Strategy states that departmental guidance has focussed the Army on departmental change objectives 3 and 4, all eight change aspects are covered in various forms throughout the Army Strategy. To a great extent, the spirit of all eight change objectives are covered in the Army vision, and the fact that the Army strategic

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 27.

objectives often amplify this direction is indicative of the intent to ensure that the Army is firmly anchored to the Departmental plan for addressing Canada's defence needs in the future.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

CONCLUSION

In publishing *The Army Strategy, Advancing with Purpose: One Army, One Team, One Vision*, the Canadian Army has laid out the path which it intends to follow to prepare for the future. The strategy has proposed a significant departure from the status quo of the existing Canadian Army, directing that the Army change into a medium weight, information age army. Through direction issued annually in the SORD, the Army will begin to transform into a force which will be strategically relevant and tactically decisive. The Army Strategy, however, is an internal department document which was issued by, and pertains only, to the Army. There has been virtually no public discussion over the direction in which the Army Strategy plans to take the Army in preparing for the future, and little attempt by the academic community to validate the Army Strategy.

This paper has shown that the Army Strategy is consistent with, and fully supportive of, the policy direction provided by both the government and the Department of National Defence. A detailed examination of DND policy has shown that *Advancing with Purpose* fully conforms to the CF direction provided in *Strategy 2020*. The Army Strategy also addresses the specific and implied direction contained in Canada's foreign and defence policies. To use the terminology employed in the *Advancing with Purpose*, there is "unity of thought, purpose and action" with the CF, DND and the government.¹⁴²

Knowing that the direction in which the Army is heading towards aligns with that of the CF sets a baseline of credibility which positions the Army well to accomplish its mission. It will allow the Army to achieve the institutional credibility which is vital for it

to conduct operations, to solicit (when required) additional resources from the CF, and to respond to any public challenges to its ability to perform the roles assigned to it.

Advancing with Purpose has set a clear, achievable and defensible road for the Army in preparing for the future. If given the support of the Army's officers and soldiers, it will allow the Canadian Army to train, equip and fight the nation's battles in an efficient, sustainable manner.

¹⁴² Ibid, 16.

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