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**NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE:
A MAJOR OPPORTUNITY FOR CANADA**

By/par Maj Pierre Bérubé

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this essay is to persuade the reader that to advance its national interests, Canada should participate in the implementation and operation of the National Missile Defence (NMD) Programme as part of its defence relationship with the United States. The paper initially provides background on the Canada-U.S. defence relationship, describes the proposed NMD system and why it is important to the United States, and outlines the general implications for Canada. It argues that participation is important to Canada to ensure the protection of its sovereignty, the defence of its people and territory, and the achievement of foreign and defence policy goals, including political and economic objectives. The essay also acknowledges arguments that have been made against Canadian NMD participation such as the continued value of deterrence, effects on global and regional stability, the lack of technological development, and possible increases to the defence budget. It concludes that participation in the NMD programme provides Canada with advantages that far outweigh any disadvantages and that participation is an excellent opportunity for Canada to advance its national interests.

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Chapter 1 – INTRODUCTION

After the end of the Cold War, it appeared that there was little threat of a ballistic missile attack on North America. Accordingly, the issue received little attention in the United States and Canada. In 1998, this line of thinking was interrupted and changed by the release of a report to Congress of the *Commission on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*, known as the *Rumsfeld Report*. It argued that a number of “rogue” states would soon develop the capability to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles at the United States, believing that this capability would be developed within as little as five years.¹ To counter the threats described in the report, President Bill Clinton signed the *National Missile Defense Act* into law in July 1999 and development of a missile defence system began with a view to deployment “as soon as technologically possible.”² This law established a plan that was focused on the protection of all 50 U.S. states against a small number of missiles from “rogue” states such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq, or against accidental launches by Russia or China.³ The Canadian government’s position regarding the issue was revealed by information released by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). It stated, “the conclusions of Rumsfeld’s report are open to debate, but were reinforced after India and Pakistan had conducted nuclear tests early in 1998 and when North Korea test-fired a new longer-range missile over Japanese territory later that same year.”⁴

¹ *Executive Summary of the Report to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*. Donald H. Rumsfeld, chairman [<http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/105thcongress>], 104th Congress, Government of the United States, July 15th 1998, p 3.

² Mary H. Cooper, “Missile Defense,” *CQ Researcher*, Vol. 10 No. 30, Congressional Quarterly Inc, (September 08, 2000), [<http://library.cqpress.com>], p 16.

³ See Mary H. Cooper, “Missile Defense...,” pp 2,3.

⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “US Strategic and Missile Defence Initiatives,” [http://www,dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/usstraten.asp], October 2002, p 1.

The National Missile Defence (NMD) initiative was not the first time that defence against ballistic missile attack had been considered. In fact, the origins of the U.S. missile defence programme can be traced as far back as the 1940s. However, intensive U.S. research efforts began in the 1950's and continued in the following decades in an effort to develop defences against the emerging Soviet long-range missile threat. Research continued following brief deployments of extremely limited systems in the 1960's and 1970's, but the possibility of a missile defence system to protect U.S. territory was resurrected in 1983 with President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). SDI was met with aggressive worldwide resistance mainly because it was likely to reduce the stability that had been achieved through the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). During the 1990's missile defence efforts eventually evolved into the current research efforts for a much more limited system.⁵ Notwithstanding, the apparent success of the U.S. Army's *Patriot* missile defense system in the 1991 Gulf War, continued missile proliferation, and the *Rumsfeld Report* seemed to combine to provide significant momentum to the development of systems to defend against short-range missiles and to spark keen and renewed interest in continental missile defence systems. This high level of attention appeared to continue after President Bush made it a major part of his election campaign in 2000.

After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the interest in missile defence seemed to increase even further. The U.S. commitment to the defence of its homeland seemed stronger than ever and this resolve included defence against ballistic missiles. In fact, "in the United States, homeland

⁵ Historical background information is drawn from Mary H. Cooper, "Missile Defense...", pp 12-15.

security and homeland defence were moved to the front burner.”⁶ Ernie Regehr, an analyst who writes on behalf of *Project Ploughshares*, an organization that opposes National Missile Defence (NMD), acknowledged that the United States and Canada, “like the rest of the world, face serious ballistic missile threats and our governments have a duty to try to offer us some protection.”⁷ He further stated that “any homeland security policy worth its name should obviously make the homeland safer, so the Bush Administration is not wrong to mark ballistic missile defence for prominent attention.”⁸

What does all this mean for Canada? Member of Parliament David Pratt stated in April 2000 that the subject of NMD raised a number of particularly interesting questions for Canada in terms of its possible or potential participation. They included “what are the implications for NORAD [North American Aerospace Defence Command] if we refuse to participate?...Do we accept U.S. arguments about the legitimacy of the current and potential threats?...What happens to the whole concept of mutually assured destruction?”⁹ These questions and others appear valid and should be explored to arrive at an appropriate course of action for Canada. So far, Canada has limited its activities regarding NMD only to research and consultation with the United States and other nations.¹⁰ This position is in keeping with the *1994 Defence White Paper* which indicated that such activity can be conducted to gain a better understanding of missile defence along with the future evolution of North American, and perhaps even NATO-

⁶ Don McNamara, “September 11, 2001 – September 11, 2002,” *On Track, Conference of Defence Associations Institute*, Volume 7 Number 3, (9 October 2002), p 12.

⁷ Ernie Regehr, “Getting Serious About the Missile Defence Threat,” *Project Ploughshares Monitor*, [<http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/MONITOR/monm02.html>], Spring 2002, p 1.

⁸ *Ibid*, p 1.

⁹ David Pratt, in Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. *Canada and National Missile Defence, Proceedings of the Annual Spring Seminar*, (Ottawa, Canada, 20 April 2000), p 5.

¹⁰ Department of National Defence, “Canada-United States Defence Relations—Canada’s Policy on Ballistic Missile Defence,” [http://www.forces.ca/menu/Canada-us/bg99.055_e.htm], 7 Oct 02, p 2.

wide, aerospace defence arrangements.¹¹ Further, the potential impact on global strategic stability, existing non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament and other issues concerning Russia, China, and South Asia, will depend on which kind of missile defence system the U.S. will propose and develop.

Among the main issues to consider in evaluating whether Canada should participate in NMD are the protection of Canadian sovereignty, the defence of Canada, and the achievement of foreign and defence policy goals. In terms of defending Canada, military considerations such as NORAD, the new U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and the issue of interoperability with U.S. forces should also be evaluated. It is important to note that NORAD, because of its missions for the surveillance and defence of North America and of its co-location with U.S. Space Command, is considered by some to be the natural focal point for a possible missile defence programme.¹² As well, issues dealing with Canadian political and economic concerns are also important to consider.

So far, in the absence of a clear U.S. plan, Canada has not taken a stance for or against National Missile Defence and according to the Department of National Defence (DND), it is still using every opportunity to express its concerns to try to influence U.S. thinking.¹³ Further, the United States has not yet asked Canada to participate in missile defence, waiting, according to former Defence Minister Eggleton, until Washington has

¹¹ Department of National Defence, "Canada-United States...", p 2.

¹² Ibid, p 5.

¹³ Ibid, p 4.

decided what type of a system it wants to build. In the meantime, as he said at that time, Canada is “open-minded” about the Bush Administration’s plan.¹⁴ This does not appear to have changed since then. In the end, while it is expected that the U.S. will deploy a system regardless of Canada’s position, the decision to participate can only be taken after evaluating all factors in order to determine whether it is the best course of action for Canada. Notwithstanding, there appear to be many advantages and few disadvantages to making a positive decision. This paper will argue that if it wishes to advance its national interests, Canada should actively participate in the implementation and operation of the National Missile Defence programme as part of its defence relationship with the United States.

To conduct an analysis, the paper will first provide background on the subject of NMD, including a description of Canada’s current defence relationship with the United States. It will describe the NMD programme and review the threats that NMD is expected to counter to demonstrate why the programme is important to the United States. Arguments that support Canadian participation will then be examined, including discussions on how NMD will contribute to the protection of Canadian sovereignty, the defence of Canada, and the achievement of Canadian foreign and defence policy goals. The next portion of the paper will review arguments that have been made against Canadian participation in the NMD programme. These include contentions that the continued value of deterrence undermines the need for NMD and that NMD deployment could cause renewed nuclear proliferation and regional instability. Arguments that the programme is technologically infeasible and too expensive for Canada will also be

¹⁴ Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues. *The Missile Defence Debate: Guiding Canada’s Role*, International Consultation on US Missile Defence, University of British Columbia, 16 Feb 2001, p 1.

examined. The essay will conclude that participation in NMD presents an excellent opportunity for Canada to advance its national interests.

Chapter 2 – BACKGROUND

The Canada-U.S. Defence Relationship

To undertake an analysis as to whether Canada should participate in the NMD programme, it is important to review a number of important background factors including Canada's defence relationship with the United States, the expected capabilities of the programme, the reasons for its importance to the U.S., and exactly what interests are at stake in terms of Canada's foreign and defence policy goals.

First, a description of how the nature of Canada's defence relationship with the United States applies to the NMD issue follows. It is key to note that the defence relationship is part of a fundamentally sound economic and friendly partnership. From the U.S. perspective, according to the U.S. Department of State, "the bilateral relationship between the United States and Canada is perhaps the closest and most extensive in the world...U.S. defense arrangements with Canada are more extensive than with any other country."¹⁵ These arrangements include a sharing of NATO mutual security commitments and, since 1958, close cooperation between U.S. and Canadian military forces on continental air defence within the NORAD framework. The Department of State confirmed this closeness by stating that "the military response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 both tested and strengthened military cooperation between the U.S. and Canada."¹⁶

¹⁵ U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Canada," [<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm>], Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, June 2002, p 2.

¹⁶ Ibid, pp 2,3.

The Canadian viewpoint provides much the same evaluation as the U.S. Department of State. In April 2001, Deputy Prime Minister John Manley commented that the Canada-U.S. “security and defence relationship is unparalleled and fundamentally sound, rooted in NORAD, NATO, the UN and other mechanisms.”¹⁷ Canadian Lieutenant-General George Macdonald summarized the military aspect of the relationship during a presentation to the *Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence* in May 2002 by stating “the United States is Canada’s most important ally and defence partner.”¹⁸ He affirmed that defence and security relations between the U.S. and Canada are longstanding, well developed and very successful, reflecting a unique friendship that has evolved over the course of the 20th Century and emphasizing a close economic interdependence and a set of common values.¹⁹ These U.S. and Canadian views both provide convincing evidence of the significance and the strength of Canada’s defence relationship with the United States.

Specifically, the relationship is based on more than 80 treaty-level defence agreements, over 250 memoranda of understanding, and approximately 145 bilateral committees that together administer military cooperation. While Canada-U.S. defence cooperation was formally initiated with the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement, the relationship now has as its cornerstone the binational North American Aerospace Defence Agreement, which provides both countries with aerospace warning and

¹⁷ Honourable John Manley in Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. *Playing in the “Bush League”*: *Canada-U.S. Relations in a new Era, Proceedings of the Annual Spring Seminar*, (Toronto, Canada, 12 April 2001), p 12.

¹⁸ Lieutenant-General George Macdonald, “Canada-U.S. Defence Relations, Asymmetric Threats and the U.S. Unified Command Plan,” [http://www.forces.gc.ca/eng/archive/speeches/2002/may02/vcd_s_e.htm], 6 May 2002, p 1.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p 1.

control.²⁰ About 600 Canadian military personnel serve in the U.S. in predominantly NORAD-related assignments, and Canadian government and industry representatives visit the United States 20,000 times every year on defence matters. Discussions cover a multitude of significant issues such as planning, operations, combined exercises, defence production, logistics, research and development, communications and intelligence sharing.²¹

At the strategic level, the importance of Canada-U.S. bilateral relations, including the NMD issue, was highlighted after the inauguration of President George W. Bush when Foreign Minister John Manley and Prime Minister Chrétien traveled to the U.S. in early 2001 to review the bilateral agenda.²² Canadian foreign relations experts have indicated that it would appear that “both countries have an interest in ensuring that differences are resolved expeditiously and that opportunities for co-operation are exploited.”²³ In fact, it is significant to note that the management and perhaps refashioning of the Canada-U.S. relationship became a top priority for [Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade] DFAIT officials. Canada’s decision on whether to actively participate in the NMD programme might be a noteworthy example of an issue that will put this new “philosophy” to the test.²⁴

Perhaps the nature of Canada’s defence relationship with the United States and the importance of the NMD issue were most succinctly summarized by former Canadian

²⁰ Lieutenant-General George Macdonald, “Canada-U.S. Defence Relations...”, p 1.

²¹ *Report of the Standing Committee on National Security and Defence*, The Honourable Colin Kenny, chairman. Ottawa, Canada, September 2002, p 39.

²² Fen Osler Hampson, Normand Hillmer, and Molot Appel, eds. “The Return to Continentalism in Canadian Foreign Policy,” *Canada Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy*. (Oxford University Press, Don Mills, Ontario, 2001), p 11.

²³ *Ibid*, p 11.

Ambassador to the U.S., Alan Gotlieb. He stated that the defence relationship was very important both before and during the Cold War and that it is very important now. He cautioned, however, that when Canada takes a position that may be seen in Washington as having a material impact on U.S. national interest, Canada must be very careful.²⁵ With regard to NMD, he further explained that “perhaps we [Canada] are moving into that position in terms of National Missile Defence. This could very well be the single most important issue in affecting the attitude towards Canada in Washington in the near term...”²⁶ It would therefore appear to be reasonable to conclude that the NMD issue will be a most important factor in the evolving Canada-U.S. bilateral relationship.

What is NMD?

To respond to the possibility of a ballistic missile attack by a rogue state, President Bill Clinton signed into law *The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (H.R. 4 ENR)*, which had been passed by the *One Hundred Sixth Congress of the United States*. It states,

It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible and effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense.²⁷

²⁴ Fen Osler Hampson, Normand Hillmer, and Molot Appel, eds. “The Return to Continentalism...”, p 11.

²⁵ Ambassador Alan Gotlieb, in Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. *Playing in the “Bush League”...*, p 40.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p 40.

²⁷ Quoted from James Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds, *Rockets’ Red Glare: Missile Defenses and the Future of World Politics*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001), p 325.

Influenced by the perception that such a threat could arise much sooner rather than later, the Congress passed the bill quickly and with an overwhelming majority.²⁸ In the fall of 2000, nearing the end of his term, President Clinton deferred the decision to proceed with the deployment of NMD. This delay was based on the need to allow for additional time to determine the system's technological feasibility and operational effectiveness, in addition to an apparently sincere desire to let the next administration be completely involved in any decisions concerning the future of the programme.²⁹ Much has happened since that time. The United States is rapidly proceeding under the Bush administration with the continuing development of a ballistic missile defence system to protect its homeland.³⁰ It has consulted with NATO and with Russia in an effort to do so in cooperation with friends and allies. While there have been concerns expressed by Russia, China and some NATO members, Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to link discussions of U.S. plans to deploy the system with the possibility of cuts in both U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals.³¹ Highlighting the importance of NMD is the fact that for the United States, missile defence is now the single largest research and development category in the Defense Department's budget with the administration requesting more than US \$7 billion in fiscal year 2003.³²

How would such a system work? While the national missile defence systems now being contemplated are superficially similar to previous systems, new technologies are providing today's missile defences with new operational capabilities. The NMD system

²⁸ Dr. Elinor C. Sloan, "Asymmetric Threats—The Homeland Dimension," Directorate of Strategic Analysis Research Note 2001/4, Ottawa: DND Canada, August 2001, p 7.

²⁹ Ibid, p 7.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Dawn Stover, "The New War in Space," *Popular Science*, Vol. 261 Issue 3, [<http://plinks.epnet.com>], September, 2002, p 4.

being planned by the U.S. uses missiles, launchers and radars to accomplish its mission. Space-based sensors and early warning radars, much like current NORAD systems, will augment it. The concept is that intercepts will begin with launch detection by satellites using infrared sensors that track missile rocket motors until they burn out. Initial tracking data will tell early warning radars where to expect to see missiles entering their fields of view. These radars will form more accurate tracks of inbound missiles and pass this data to super high frequency radars. These high frequency radars will track incoming warheads and any accompanying objects as they descend toward their impact points. All the tracking data will pass through a battle management system that will compute an intercept point and command the launch of one or more interceptor missiles. As the interceptor flies to meet the warhead, the battle management system regularly provides it with increasingly accurate reports of the target's trajectory and position. Using these in-flight updates, the interceptor missile autonomously alters its course to meet the target. As the interceptor approaches the intercept point, optical sensors make the effort to pick out the warhead from among other objects or debris that may be present. As the approach continues, infrared sensors that are capable of greater resolution and able to distinguish among objects of different temperature to provide differentiation from decoys, take over from the optical sensors. The infrared sensors guide the kill vehicle to a collision with the warhead, destroying it by the force generated by two, several hundred

pound masses, colliding at a combined speed of approximately ten kilometers per second.³³ In addition to using this kinetic energy weapon, the Pentagon is also studying directed-energy weapons such as space-based or airborne lasers that could be used to attack missiles as they become airborne.³⁴

The planned NMD system will initially deploy a ground-based radar and about twenty ground-based interceptors with a kinetic kill capability, intended to be effective against a small, unsophisticated ICBM capability. It is planned to expand this capability to deal with larger, more sophisticated threats with about one hundred interceptors at a single site. Eventual expansion to a third level using multiple (likely two) interceptor sites with more than one hundred interceptors is also planned.³⁵ It is important to note that, as indicated in an assessment published in the DND Space Appreciation 2000, the dominance of Cold War beliefs that missile defence is technologically unfeasible are being replaced by a recognition that missile defence is becoming much more technically feasible and cost-effective through the use of the previously described kinetic kill technologies.³⁶

Why is NMD Important to the United States?

On 15 July 1998, the *Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*, chaired by the current Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, concluded that “concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United

³³ This description was drawn from Dennis M. Ward, “The Changing Technological Environment,” in *Rockets’ Red Glare: Missile Defences and the Future of World Politics*, ed by James Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001), pp 86-87.

³⁴ Dawn Stover, “The New War in Space...,” p 5.

³⁵ Department of National Defence, *Space Appreciation 2000*, Directorate of Space Development, Ottawa: DND Canada, 1999, p D-6.

³⁶ *Ibid*, p 11.

States, its deployed forces and its friends and allies.”³⁷ The Commission’s final report continued by stating that these developing threats in North Korea, Iran and Iraq were in addition to those threats still posed by the ballistic missile arsenals belonging to Russia and China, countries that remain in what the Commission called “uncertain transitions”. Further, these newer ballistic missile-equipped states could inflict major destruction on the U.S. within approximately five years of a decision to acquire the capability.³⁸ The Commission highlighted its serious concerns by emphasizing that

Ballistic missiles armed with WMD payloads pose a strategic threat to the United States. This is not a distant threat... The threat is exacerbated by the ability of both existing and emerging ballistic missile powers to hide their activities from the U.S. and to deceive the U.S. about the pace, scope and direction of their development and proliferation programs.³⁹

This statement clearly indicated the Commission’s grave concerns on the possibility of attack by weapons of mass destruction delivered by ballistic missiles. It also indicated that the Commission seemed to have no confidence that non-proliferation efforts, by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) for example, had been or could be effective against both existing and emerging missile powers. Specifically, tests in 1998 by North Korea of the *Taepo Dong 1* multi-stage missile and continuing North Korean development of an improved version, the *Taepo Dong 2*, showed that the North Koreans might be able to strike the continental United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload.⁴⁰ By being capable of hitting the U.S., these missiles possess ranges that are far beyond the 300 kilometres permitted by the MTCR.⁴¹ Continuing missile tests by Iran,

³⁷ *Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat...*, pp 2-3.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p 3.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p 14.

⁴⁰ Michael O’Hanlon, “Star Wars Strikes Back,” *Foreign Affairs*, (November/December 1999), p 70.

⁴¹ Charles Ball, “The Allies,” in *Rockets’ Red Glare...*, p 273.

Iraq and North Korea Further would further seem to support the conclusions of the *Rumsfeld Report*.

Some skeptics have asked why the U.S. should bother with missile defences when it remains vulnerable to suitcase bombs, ships carrying nuclear weapons, or cruise missiles launched from boats or submarines near U.S. shores. Proponents of NMD argue that ballistic missile defences are not a panacea for all threats and that America is strategically naked against ballistic missiles since they can be delivered very quickly. This makes them “especially dangerous to the United States under crisis or wartime conditions.”⁴² Accordingly, in considering the missile threat, James Wirtz, in his introduction to the 2001 publication *Rockets’ Red Glare—Missile Defenses and the Future of World Politics*, wrote “the idea of using active defenses to destroy warheads launched against America and to bolster deterrence is gaining domestic political support within the United States. Americans can expect to have some form of national missile defense by the end of the decade.”⁴³ On 1 May 2001, President Bush, in a speech at the National Defense University in Washington, highlighted the critical importance of NMD to America by stating,

...this is still a dangerous world; a less certain, a less predictable one. More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and biological weapons. Some already have developed a ballistic missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances and incredible speeds, and a number of these countries are spreading these technologies around the world...Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of the world’s least responsible states. Unlike the Cold War, today’s most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states—states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life... We must work with allies and friends who wish to join us to defend

⁴² Michael O’Hanlon, “Star Wars Strikes Back...”, p 75.

⁴³ James Wirtz, “Introduction,” in *Rockets’ Red Glare...*, p 1.

against the harm they can inflict... We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation.⁴⁴

In addition to describing why NMD was important, the speech also appeared to reinforce a belief that, for the U.S., arms control and non-proliferation efforts have not worked.

This view, if correct, would provide another reason why the NMD programme is important to Americans.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 have served to focus debate on the importance of NMD even further. During a U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute Conference, Dr. Daniel Goure of the *Lexington Institute*, argued that the attacks redefined U.S. national security strategy with missile defence as the centerpiece for a new strategy⁴⁵ and that “in the aftermath of 9/11 and with North Korea now having a second nuclear program, it seems to me that the debate over missile defense is over...philosophically, it’s a done deal.”⁴⁶ In his analysis, Dr. James Fergusson, Deputy Director of the *Centre for Defence and Security Studies* at the University of Manitoba, stated that missile defence has long been an integral component of homeland defence. He acknowledged that 11 September 2001 served to confirm the fear that enemies will have no difficulty in striking the U.S. using asymmetric methods and that these enemies will not be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation.⁴⁷ These views appear to leave little doubt that NMD is vital to the United States as it becomes a key component of U.S. homeland defence. In fact, the

⁴⁴ Quoted from Appendix K, in *Rockets’ Red Glare...*, p 334.

⁴⁵ Dr. Daniel Goure from a conference brief by LTC Raymond Millen, *Conference Brief--Missile Defense*, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, p 2.

⁴⁶ Dr. Daniel Goure quoted in Pat Towell, “Bush’s Missile Defense Victory Signifies Changing Times,” *CQ Weekly*, Vol. 60 Issue 41, [<http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=7731484&db=mth>], 26 October 2002, p 2.

⁴⁷ James Fergusson et al, “Round Table: Missile Defence—Post September 11th,” *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 9 No. 2, (Winter 2002), p 111.

Bush Administration assessed NMD to be so critical that on 13 June 2002, it took a significant step toward advancing U.S. missile defence efforts by deciding to formally withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty⁴⁸ which had limited the development of missile defence systems in both the U.S. and Russia until that time.

Canadian Interests—Foreign and Defence Policy

What does this all mean for Canada? More specifically, which Canadian foreign and defence policy goals are affected by the United States decision to develop and deploy a National Missile Defence system? According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canada, like most countries, pursues foreign policy to achieve key objectives. One of these objectives is the protection of Canadian security within a stable global framework.⁴⁹ Further, DFAIT confirmed that as the 1994 Defence White Paper indicated, Canadian memberships in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) Agreement remain the key guarantees of Canadian military security.⁵⁰ In view of Canada's relatively small military and its limited ability to defend itself, it can be seen that relationships with its allies become pivotal in helping to ensure Canada's defence. In terms of regional security, the Canadian government declared,

Our defence relationship with the US is key for the security of Canadians. Canada's longstanding cooperation with the US through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and NORAD has enabled us to share the security burden for North America at a significantly lower cost and with more effectiveness that Canada could achieve on its own.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Facts on File World News Digest, "Disarmament: U.S. Formally Withdraws from ABM Treaty: Other Development," [<http://www.2facts.com>], 20 June 2002, p 1.

⁴⁹ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada in the World," [http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cdn-world], 4 April 2002, p 2.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p 6.

⁵¹ Ibid.

These statements clearly show that Canada depends on participation in global and regional relationships to ensure its security and that these relationships, especially that with the United States, help in providing Canada with a level of security beyond what it could expect to achieve on its own. The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Lieutenant-General George Macdonald, in an address to the *Standing Committee on National Security and Defence* in May 2002, effectively summarized Canada's interests and the significance of Canada's defence relationship with the U.S. by stating,

A longstanding principle of Canadian defence policy is that defending Canada is best done in a collaborative manner with the United States. Canada and the United States rely on each other for help in protecting their territory and approaches. If this collaboration is not maintained, the United States will defend the continent on its own, leaving Canada without the influence we currently enjoy as a result of this defence partnership.⁵²

It is also important to understand that the issue of the benefits that Canada receives as a result of its defence partnership with the U.S. is a vital aspect of the relationship. Professor Joseph T. Jockel, a well-respected analyst on Canada-U.S. defence issues, contends that the close relationship between NORAD and the United States Space Command (USSPACE) has "suited Canadian interests splendidly. It has allowed Canada to continue to share command and control costs for air defence with the U.S., and has also providsmm

NORAD and USSPACE.⁵⁴ David B. Dewitt, Professor of Political Science at York University in Toronto, further characterized the issue by stating that “while it may be too harsh to state, as some have, that Canada has been a free rider in terms of these overarching security arrangements, there is little doubt that in both soft and hard terms, substantial benefits were offset at minimal costs.”⁵⁵ He emphasized the importance of alliances to Canada’s defence and security interests by stating that there is little doubt that by not fully participating in NATO and NORAD, the political, economic and military costs to Canada would have been enormous. In September 2002, the *Standing Committee on National Security and Defence* confirmed that Canada recognizes that its security depends to a large extent on world security, and particularly the security of North America.⁵⁶ Accordingly, Canadians should view NMD in this context.

There are, in sum, a number of factors to consider in attempting to determine whether Canada should participate in the NMD programme. These consist of Canada’s relationship with the U.S., including defence and economic aspects, the capabilities of the NMD system, and the importance for the United States to deter and defend against missile attacks. Other aspects include the effect of NMD on Canadian interests, such as the effect of Canada-U.S. defence cooperation on Canada’s limited ability to defend itself, as framed by its foreign and defence policy goals. These factors will provide the context for the arguments that follow.

⁵⁴ Joseph T. Jockel, “After the September Attacks: Four Questions About...,” p 16.

⁵⁵ David B. Dewitt, “Future Directions in Canadian Security Policy: From a Marginal Actor at the Centre to a Central Actor at the Margins,” [<http://sookmyung.ac.kr/%7Ecanada/dewitt2.htm>], Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, Toronto, 1999, p 6.

⁵⁶ *Report of the Standing Committee...*, p 6.

Chapter 3 – WHY PARTICIPATION IN NMD IS IMPORTANT FOR CANADA

Several strong arguments for Canadian participation in NMD can be made. First, participation in NMD could contribute significantly to the protection of Canadian sovereignty. It could also add considerably to Canada's ability to defend itself by enhancing the NORAD relationship, by establishing a relationship within US Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and by improving Canadian military interoperability with the U.S. Further, it would also assist in the achievement of Canadian foreign and defence policy goals. This argument includes factors such as political considerations, the Canadian government's commitment to its responsibility for the defence of Canada, and the benefits of legitimization by Canada of the NMD programme. Equally important, participation in NMD could assist with the positive resolution of other Canada-US bilateral issues. Finally, significant financial benefits to Canada are also possible if it participates in the NMD programme. These arguments will be examined in this chapter.

Protection of Canadian Sovereignty

A most important consideration for participation in the NMD programme is the protection of Canadian sovereignty. Although it has been said that participation would accomplish the opposite effect, it may be one of the strongest arguments for Canadian participation in NMD. According to Professor Don Macnamara, a retired Canadian Forces General and a Senior Fellow in the *Queen's University Centre of International Relations*, "credible and effective military capabilities that can be integrated with those of the United States in any North American defence entity will be essential to the preservation of Canadian sovereignty."⁵⁷ He specified that this challenge was already a

⁵⁷ Don McNamara, "September 11, 2001 – September 11, 2002," *On Track*, Conference of Defence Associations Institute, (Vol. 7 No. 3, 9 October, 2002), p 14.

component in the NMD debate that was intensified as a result of the events of 11 September 2001 and includes the NORAD relationship and the development of the new US NORTHCOM.⁵⁸ Lieutenant-General Macdonald agreed with this viewpoint stating that “cooperation with the U.S. on continental defence is not an abrogation of sovereignty. Rather it is the exercise of sovereignty. By discussing options, Canada can choose the scope, means and structure of such cooperation, and can play an active role...”⁵⁹ Accordingly, NMD can be seen as a significant defence cooperation opportunity that Canada can choose to act upon to exercise its sovereignty.

Further, Frank Harvey, the Director of the *Centre for Foreign Policy Studies* at Dalhousie University, has stated that since no current measures have succeeded in stopping WMD proliferation, there are no real policy alternatives to NMD.⁶⁰ How does this affect Canadian sovereignty issues? Harvey makes the case that Canadian officials have been desperately trying to avoid the impression that Canada is subservient to any U.S. security initiative and, therefore that Canadian policies are guided by the requirement to remain “distinct”. They are not guided, if he is correct, by the implications of proliferation for Canada. Accordingly, Harvey said that “being different for the sake of difference is as damaging to Canadian sovereignty as simply following the American lead on every security and defence issue.”⁶¹ The point would seem to be that Canada would be unwise to forego the protection offered by the limited defence shield that NMD will provide, pride or “difference” notwithstanding. Further supporting this argument, Granatstein thinks that Canada “has no obligation to say “ready, aye ready”

⁵⁸ Don McNamara, “September 11, 2001...,” p 14.

⁵⁹ Lieutenant-General George Macdonald, “Canada-U.S. Defence Relations...,” p 8.

⁶⁰ James Fergusson et al, “Round Table: Missile Defence ...,” p 115.

⁶¹ Ibid, p 115.

every time Washington calls, but it must be clear on how best to advance Canadian interests...Canada needs to recognize that sometimes its sovereignty and interests can be best served by saying yes to the United States...”⁶² In particular, he explained that with the defence and foreign policy reviews currently underway, Ottawa has the opportunity to bring Canadian policies into line with new realities and by creating a new relationship with the U.S. that rather than weaken Canada, can enhance its ability to make independent choices and protect Canadian sovereignty.⁶³ It would seem that to Canadians, this line of thinking is critical and that it is important to consider that saying “no” for the sake of saying “no” will not always work to Canada’s advantage. Saying “yes” is an exercise of Canadian sovereignty that works, ultimately, to protect it.

Granatstein bluntly, but effectively, summed up this argument:

The situation can, therefore, be stated very simply. What threatens Canadian sovereignty more? Hiding our heads in the sand ostrich-like and watching the United States do the job without consultation with Ottawa? Or acting as a sovereign nation by working with our friends and enhancing our capacity to protect the citizens of North America?⁶⁴

As succinct as this statement is, it is perhaps difficult to disagree. In fact, it would seem that by being proactive and moving quickly to participate in NMD, Canada would send a clear message that it is willing and prepared to advance its interests by protecting its sovereignty as part of its relationship with the United States.

Defence of Canada--General

At a basic level, the government’s ultimate mission is to protect and defend Canada and its citizens. Within this mission, DND is responsible to participate in

⁶² J.L. Granatstein, “A Friendly Agreement in Advance—Canada-U.S. Relations Past, Present and Future.” *C.D. Howe Institute Commentary*, (No.166, June 2002), pp 16-17.

⁶³ *Ibid*, p 17.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*.

bilateral and multilateral operations with Canada's allies.⁶⁵ As part of this responsibility, it can be argued that participation in NMD could be an essential element for the continued physical defence of Canadian territory. In a paper prepared for the *Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century*, Fergusson et. al., argued that it is in Canada's vital interest to seriously consider the U.S. decision to develop and deploy a limited ballistic missile defence system for North America because by offering support, Ottawa will be in a better position to ensure that Canada's security interests are considered and protected.⁶⁶ This claim is significant and is really a function of Canada's geographic position. More specifically, the geographic proximity of major Canadian cities to the United States is an important, if not critical factor in the NMD debate. This element of the argument has been well described by a former NORAD Deputy Commander, Canadian Lieutenant-General Robert Morton. He stated that there is a potential direct threat to Canadian territory from missiles aimed at major American population centres from the Middle East or East Asia which could, "with a small error in direction or distance, end up falling short and landing in Canada. So, whether, we [Canada] are involved as a partner in a missile defence system or not, we could be an unintended target."⁶⁷ This consideration is at the heart of the debate and in the end, defence should be considered to be an overriding concern. As Morton says, "...the rogue state problem is dangerous and the consequence of our neglecting it could be horrific...and the accidental launch problem, unlikely as that may be, has been my worst nightmare for years. NMD would address both these risks."⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Department of National Defence, "Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020," Ottawa: DND Canada, June 1999, p 2.

⁶⁶ James Fergusson, Frank Harvey and Robert Huebert, "To Secure a Nation : The Case for a New Defence White Paper," Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, 2001, p 7.

⁶⁷ Lieutenant-General Robert W. Morton, in Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. *Canada and National...*, p 72.

⁶⁸ Ibid, pp 79-80.

It is in these practical terms that the issue should ultimately be viewed. The defence of Canada--the safety and security of its people--is the government's primary responsibility. Participation in the operation of NMD would help the Canadian government to advance its interests by helping to effectively fulfill this national responsibility.

Defence of Canada—NORAD

The continued effectiveness of NORAD for the defence of Canada has been strongly linked to NMD participation. The NORAD defence relationship has been the first line of defence for Canada since the late-1950's. As a part of this partnership with the U.S., benefits to Canada include access to U.S. resources including satellite systems, command and control networks, intelligence systems and United States Space Command assets that are collocated with NORAD in Colorado Springs.⁶⁹ As well, while Canada contributes only about twenty percent of the total NORAD personnel, it maintains status as an equal partner in the relationship.⁷⁰ In view of the importance of NORAD as a significant example of Canada-U.S. defence cooperation, the question of how Canada's participation in the operation of NMD would affect this relationship is a considerable one. DFAIT points out that while NORAD, because of its missions for aerospace surveillance and defence and its co-location with the U.S. Space Command, is considered to be a natural focal point for NMD, NMD is not one of NORAD's current missions. To add it to NORAD's mandate would require Canadian consent.⁷¹ This further demonstrates the partnership role Canada plays within NORAD.

It is important to recognize that NORAD's role has continually evolved as the NORAD agreement has been renewed every five years since its beginnings. Granatstein

⁶⁹ *Report of the Standing Committee...*, p 25.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p 25.

indicated that “the changing thrust of NORAD is best demonstrated by the replacement a number of years ago of “air defense” in name by “aerospace defense.”⁷² He added that the United States would likely place NMD under NORAD control since it would want to take advantage of the existing warning systems that NORAD possesses.⁷³ J. Marshall Beier, a researcher at the *Centre for International and Security Studies*, confirmed this claim during a visit to NORAD where he was advised that NMD was going ahead and would involve NORAD with or without Canadian agreement.⁷⁴ Jockel has argued that “without Canadian participation in NMD, NORAD has no real future.”⁷⁵ He explained that NORAD’s very heart is the process by which it would warn of and assess an attack on this continent. To accomplish this function, it relies on data from both U.S. and Canadian air defence operations and from systems that are entirely operated by the U.S., which detect and track ballistic missiles and other activity in space. An “assessor” who is a general officer provides confirmation of an attack and an assessment of it. Canadian and Americans make up the NORAD staff responsible for both warning and assessment and they rotate as assessors.⁷⁶ It is important to note that as indicated earlier, the U.S. plans to link operational command of the NMD system to the NORAD warning and assessment process since only minutes are available for decision-making in the event of a missile launch towards North America.⁷⁷ Placing NMD under NORAD would therefore seem to be the most logical manner in which to proceed. If Canadians do not participate in the operation of the NMD system, they could no longer fully play their traditional role

⁷¹ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “US Strategic and Missile...,” p 5.

⁷² J.L. Granatstein, “A Friendly Agreement in Advance...,” p 10.

⁷³ Ibid, p 10.

⁷⁴ J. Marshall Beier, “Postcards from the Outskirts of Security: Defence Professionals, Semiotics, and the NMD Initiative,” *Canadian Foreign Policy*, (Vol. 8 No. 2, Winter 2001), p 39.

⁷⁵ Joseph T. Jockel, “After the September Attacks: Four Questions...,” p 15.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p 15.

in the warning and assessment process. This would mean that NORAD would lose its reason for being.⁷⁸ This is a critical concern and it would therefore appear to be most important that Canada recognize the link between NMD and the continued evolution of NORAD and consider participation as an opportunity to further develop and enhance its defence relationship with the United States.

Granatstein shares the view that this issue is significant for Canada, agreeing that if NMD is put under NORAD and Canadians employed there do not fully participate, there are clear negative implications for Canada. The U.S. might close down NORAD or move its responsibilities to U.S. Space Command. The demise of NORAD would take with it almost all Canadian influence over continental air defence, and it would almost certainly affect the vast flow of intelligence Canada receives from U.S. sources.

Alternatively, Granatstein also indicated that if Canada accepted NMD and missile defence came under NORAD, Canada's influence might actually increase.⁷⁹ He was not suggesting that Canada would acquire "go/no go" authority over NMD if NORAD assumes responsibility but that Canada would have the right to consultation and participation as well as a right to a place at the table when decisions are made.

Accordingly, he thinks that Canada has no choice, "the earlier Canada agrees to support the NMD decision, the better."⁸⁰ Dr. Joel Sokolsky, a professor at Canada's Royal Military College, while somewhat less specific, agreed with Granatstein, indicating that many Americans, including U.S. senators, are probably not aware of the number of Canadians that work for NORAD in Cheyenne Mountain. He questioned whether those

⁷⁷ Joseph T. Jockel, "After the September Attacks: Four Questions...", p 15.

⁷⁸ Ibid, p 15.

⁷⁹ J.L. Granatstein, "A Friendly Agreement in Advance...", p 10.

who are pushing for implementation of NMD realize how close Canadians are in terms of NORAD operations and procedures. He stated that there is a view that if Canada kicks up a fuss over NMD, the U.S. might say that it is time to take another look at NORAD, and that would be a problem for Canada.⁸¹ As can be seen, this viewpoint is shared by a number of experts.

From a military operations point of view, Morton strongly believes that NMD should become a NORAD mission, integrated into its command and control structure. He stated that “it is almost inconceivable that anytime soon the missions of aerospace warning and aerospace control (including air attack and defence) will become irrelevant to North American security.”⁸² He added that the essential capabilities are already entrenched in NORAD and that these capabilities, including space-based sensors and ground-based missile detection radars that comprise the present system, when upgraded, will cue and direct the NMD kinetic kill interceptors. Further, and of critical importance to operations, he emphasized that “because time is so critical and the system is exclusively defensive in nature, it makes good sense to tie surveillance data and engagement data, and present that fused information to one commander.”⁸³ Accordingly, if Canada were not to participate in NMD, the resulting segregation of data solely to accommodate artificially divided mission responsibilities would be militarily unwise and result in a major disruption in the shared responsibility for continental defence.⁸⁴ These are major considerations that appear to apply to an even greater degree since the events of

⁸⁰ J.L. Granatstein, “A Friendly Agreement in Advance...,” p 10.

⁸¹ Dr. Joel Sokolsky, in Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. *Playing in the “Bush League”...*, p 89.

⁸² Lieutenant-General Robert W. Morton, in Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. *Canada and National...*, p 78.

⁸³ Ibid, p 78.

⁸⁴ Ibid, pp 78, 80.

11 September 2001. In fact, they are significant for Canada in the NMD debate since they deal directly with countering threats and defending Canada, and are based on the fundamental processes that form the core of Canada's military relationship with the United States. From this highly practical viewpoint, participation would seem to be vital to advancing Canadian national interests.

Defence of Canada—US NORTHCOM Issues

The development of a successful Canadian military relationship with the newly established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is another issue directly related to Canadian NMD participation. In April 2002, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced the creation of a new unified command, U.S. NORTHCOM as part of the U.S. global unified command system. This occurred as a direct result of the September 2001 terrorist attacks and the Command was formally established in October. It was assigned responsibility for homeland security including aerospace, land and sea elements, and civil support.⁸⁵ It is important to note that NORTHCOM is co-located with NORAD in Colorado Springs and that its commander is the same officer who commands NORAD.⁸⁶ This arrangement clearly shows the direct relationship between NORAD and NORTHCOM. It follows therefore, that NMD, by being organized under NORAD, would, in effect, become a component of U.S. homeland defence as part of NORTHCOM. Accordingly, Canadians in NORAD would be participating in NORTHCOM processes. By participating in NMD, Canadians might therefore expect to play a greater role in the defence of both the U.S. and Canada, through NORAD and

⁸⁵ Lieutenant-General George Macdonald, "Canada-U.S. Defence Relations...", p 5.

⁸⁶ J.L. Granatstein, "A Friendly Agreement in Advance...", p 11.

NORTHCOM, with all the information and intelligence sharing potential that might become part of the relationship.

In addition, while Canadian military staff officers are currently exploring Canada's possible future role with regard to NORTHCOM, the *Standing Committee on National Security and Defence* made a compelling argument on the issue of how to best defend Canada. This argument demonstrates that a proactive approach could work to Canada's benefit by ensuring that Canada participates in the decisions that concern the protection of its territory. In his testimony before the Standing Committee, Dr. Granatstein clearly outlined this argument:

The question [of Canadian defence]...must be approached with realism. The U.S. is determined to improve its homeland defence and is certain to approach this subject, as it must, from a continental perspective. The news release announcing Northern Command declared its area of responsibility to be all of North America, including Canada and Mexico, and gave its commander in chief the task of "security cooperation and military coordination" with other nations. Canada thus can choose to either stand back and allow the Americans to plan for the protection of Canadian territory, or to participate in the decisions.⁸⁷

As discussed in the above paragraphs, there is a connection, a common thread to NMD participation, NORAD, and NORTHCOM. Accordingly, with Canadian participation in NORTHCOM, through NORAD and NMD, Canada could benefit by being better able to defend itself by participating in any decision-making concerning its defence and by gaining continued and perhaps even greater access to U.S. information and intelligence. In this manner, Canada would further advance its national interest by enhancing its ability to defend itself within the NORTHCOM framework.

⁸⁷ J.L. Granatstein quoted in the *Report of the Standing Committee...*, p 20.

Defence of Canada—Interoperability

Of perhaps equal importance is the issue of military interoperability. As indicated in the 1994 Defence White Paper, a stated goal of Canada's defence policy is to "continue to rely on the stability and flexibility of its relationship with the United States to help meet defence requirements in North America and beyond." This includes the ability to operate effectively at sea, on land and in the air with the military forces of the United States.⁸⁸ The question of how NMD participation would enhance interoperability is one that has been examined by some experts. In their paper on the Canadian Forces "doctrine" of interoperability, Middlemiss and Stairs argued that given a greatly elaborated system of interoperability at many levels, it would be very difficult for the Canadian government to express open opposition to NMD participation since it would be inconsistent with the underlying premises of interoperability. It would also enormously complicate the military's attempt to maintain credibility with its American counterpart upon which the implementation of interoperability ultimately depends.⁸⁹ This argument clearly demonstrates the importance of participation in NMD as part of maintaining required interoperability with the U.S.

As part of a future strategy, DND's position fits well within this concept since DND's strategy attempts to "strengthen our military relationship with the US military to ensure Canadian and U.S. forces are interoperable and capable of combined operations in key areas."⁹⁰ And while DND does not make foreign policy, this position makes it clear that DND wishes to strengthen, not just maintain, this relationship. As well, *DND*

⁸⁸ Department of National Defence, "1994 White Paper..." p 5.

⁸⁹ Danford W. Middlemiss and Denis Stairs, "The Canadian forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues," *Policy Matters*, Vol. 3 No. 7, June 2002, p 32.

⁹⁰ Department of National Defence, "Shaping the Future..." p 6.

Strategy 2020 states “we must plan to nurture this relationship by strengthening our interoperability with the US Armed Forces...[by] pursuing collaborative ways to respond to emerging asymmetric threats to continental security.”⁹¹ For Canadians, it would therefore seem that participation in the operation of an NMD system would be an ideal manner in which to work toward strengthening the military relationship with the US. It would also permit Canada to continue to play an enhanced, meaningful role in combined operations and most importantly, advance its interests by providing for the defence of Canada in close cooperation with the United States through increased interoperability with American forces.

Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy Goals--General

It has already been established in this paper that Canada’s foreign, defence and security policies seek to enhance Canadian security by helping to achieve global and regional security. For example, as seen earlier, in a global context, Canada has been supportive of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control. Regionally, Canada actively participates in NORAD to defend North America. Both of these policy areas provide the context within which Canada’s decision on its participation in NMD will be made. Indeed, with specific regard to missile defence, the 1994 White Paper states that Canada’s future potential role in ballistic missile defence will not be determined in isolation, but in conjunction with the continuing evolution of North American and NATO aerospace defence arrangements.⁹² It further indicates that Canadian involvement would have to be cost-effective and affordable, make an unambiguous contribution to Canadian defence needs and build on missions that the Canadian Forces (CF) already perform,

⁹¹ Department of National Defence, “Shaping the Future...,” p 8.

⁹² Department of National Defence, “1994 White Paper...,” p 8.

including surveillance and communications missions.⁹³ In addition, “Canada will continue to rely on the stability and flexibility that its relationship with the United States provides to help meet this country’s defence requirements in North America and beyond.”⁹⁴ These assessments highlight the importance of the involvement of the United States in the achievement of Canadian foreign and defence policy goals. From a global perspective, another vital factor affecting Canada’s decision concerning its policy on missile defence is “the importance of not only U.S. global reach and power projection, but its [Canada’s] willingness to maintain a global posture.”⁹⁵ Dr. James Fergusson makes the case that Canada’s shared goals and interests with the U.S. make it part of a global order that has been constructed and maintained by the U.S. and that Canada has benefited significantly from this international order. By partnering with the U.S. on NMD, Canada would remain engaged internationally and continue to be in a position to exert its influence on global issues.⁹⁶

Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy Goals—Political Considerations

In terms of foreign and defence policy goals, it is important to recognize the political considerations that apply in the debate on whether to participate in NMD. To help achieve Canadian goals and defend Canada, Canada needs America’s help. The *Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence* recognized that politically, Canada has no alternative but to accept America’s assistance if Canadians wish to remain secure.⁹⁷ Accordingly, since the signing of the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement,

⁹³ Department of National Defence, “1994 White Paper...,” p 8.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p 8.

⁹⁵ James Fergusson et al, “Round Table: Missile Defence...,” p 120.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p 120.

⁹⁷ *Report of the Standing Committee...*, p 26.

cooperation with the United States has been a key factor in maintaining a credible defence for Canada.

Within this context, there is an important argument to be made for Canada to participate actively in the implementation of the NMD programme. It was well outlined by J.L. Granatstein who indicated in a recent commentary that Canadians often poke the US with the “sharp stick” of supposedly superior Canadian morality but must recognize that its superpower neighbor has global responsibilities and burdens and it often tires of Ottawa’s caution, endless remonstrances and prickly independence when all the US wants and needs is political support.⁹⁸ The reality, according to Granatstein, is that “every Canadian knows instinctively that Canada cannot be truly independent of the United States in a military or economic sense. We are part of a vast and powerful if informal U.S. empire now, just as a century ago Canada belonged to the British Empire.”⁹⁹ He explained that while the Americans can be bullies on occasion, generally they have been Canada’s best friend and have let Canada go its own way unless it impinges on U.S. security and that today the situation is much the same.¹⁰⁰ The *Standing Committee* agreed with this general assessment by coming to the clear conclusion that Canada-U.S. defence cooperation continues to serve this country’s fundamental interests extremely well¹⁰¹ and this continues to apply after the events of 11 September 2001. Fergusson emphasized that the attacks have “persuaded Washington that missile defence is more necessary than ever, and with Russia’s muted response to the abrogation of the ABM treaty, the political climate is favourable. If Canada continues to hold back,

⁹⁸ J.L. Granatstein, “A Friendly Agreement in Advance...,” p 1.

⁹⁹ Ibid, p 17.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Department of National Defence, “1994 White Paper...,” p 3.

Washington may decide to go it alone. That would seriously damage the bilateral relationship.”¹⁰² It would seem that this position is important for Canada to consider and David Rudd, the Executive Director of the *Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies*, also supported this argument when he stated “National Missile Defence and counter-terrorism are regarded in Washington as top national priorities...our common border and shared aerospace require that we take them seriously lest the U.S. take action that may negatively impact us.”¹⁰³ Finally, Don Macnamara effectively summarized this political cooperation argument in the following manner:

Canada’s security equation has been changed by September 11, 2001. But because we are privileged to live next to the most powerful and wealthy nation in history, Canada will be challenged to defend its sovereignty and security in the face of the vastly superior political, economic and military power of the United States, a nation that is determined to ensure the defence and security of its homeland against the perceived terrorist threat. Canada must, therefore, ensure that it does what it can to protect its vital interests and that must ultimately and logically mean co-operation with the United States.¹⁰⁴

Accordingly, Canada should carefully consider this line of reasoning and realize that politically, participation in NMD can also be seen as a significant defence cooperation opportunity. Accordingly, it is reasonable to support a conclusion that Canada should participate to enhance its defence cooperation efforts with the U.S.

Furthermore, from a global policy perspective, the main political obstruction to NMD appears to have been overcome. According to Jockel, Ottawa had refused to say whether it would participate in NMD because it was fearful of worldwide arms control implications. Russian acquiescence to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty coupled

¹⁰² James Fergusson, “Time for a Decision on North American Missile Defence,” *Policy Options*, (April 2002), p 1.

¹⁰³ David Rudd, in Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. *Playing in the “Bush League”*..., p 2.

¹⁰⁴ Don McNamara, “September 11, 2001...,” p 15.

with unilateral US cuts in weaponry, to which Russia is expected to reciprocate,¹⁰⁵ should open the door to Canadian participation in NMD.¹⁰⁶ From this perspective, it would also seem that it is no longer necessary for Canada to delay a decision to participate.

Accordingly, with these considerations in mind, to advance its national interests, there appears to be little reason for Canada not to participate.

Foreign and Defence Policy Goals—Canada’s Responsibility to Defend Itself

A related consideration also important to the achievement of Canadian foreign and defence policy goals is Canada’s responsibility to defend itself. As stated by the *Standing Committee*, “we must also guard our sovereignty responsibly. Canada cannot abrogate its responsibility to defend itself, and to share in the defence of North America.”¹⁰⁷ This is not a new contention and, in fact, it has significant precedent. Granatstein illustrated the cooperative defence relationship that existed then by indicating that, in 1938, President Roosevelt proclaimed that the “people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire.”¹⁰⁸ King replied a few days later that Canada would ensure that the U.S. was as immune from attack or invasion as it could be and that it would not permit enemy forces to attack the U.S. by “land, sea or air” from Canada. This statement pledged, in effect, that Canada would maintain sufficient defensive strength to deter any incursions aimed at the U.S. and that Canada would never become a strategic liability to its neighbor.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ There is a treaty on strategic arms cuts currently before the Russian government. See: Facts on File World News Digest, “Disarmament: U.S. Formally Withdraws...,” [http://www.2facts.com], 20 June 2002, p 1.

¹⁰⁶ Joseph T. Jockel, “After the September Attacks: Four Questions About...,” p 15.

¹⁰⁷ *Report of the Standing Committee...*, p 26.

¹⁰⁸ As quoted by Granatstein in J.L. Granatstein, “A Friendly Agreement in Advance...,” p 3.

¹⁰⁹ J.L. Granatstein, “A Friendly Agreement in Advance...,” p 3.

This defence arrangement did not change during the post-war years and the relationship is as clear today as it was then. While many Canadians do not appear to be aware of security threats, it is not difficult to deduce that failure to take responsibility for the defence of Canada would result in leaving the country vulnerable to attack, terrorist or otherwise, and perhaps cause America some concern over its security as well. Accordingly, in today's context, as indicated by the *Standing Committee*, "if we are not willing to be part of the solution, American decision-makers are likely to start thinking of us as part of the problem...In simple moral terms Canada must become more committed to the defence of North America...if we do not signal a willingness to defend the continent, its defence will be taken out of our hands."¹¹⁰ This argument can be extended to the NMD issue since NMD would provide enhanced defence capability for both the U.S. and Canada. According to Fergusson, the U.S. will be defended from missiles in the near future and, as a result, Canada will also be defended as a simple function of geography. It is important to recognize that, as he states, "this defence should not simply be a free ride on the US. It would be hypocritical at a minimum for Canada to stand aside and preach against missile defence, while knowing that the US will defend it anyway."¹¹¹ Even more extreme in his views, Granatstein has stated that "perhaps the reflexive anti-Americanism that characterizes so much of public debate in Canada springs from our guilty conscience. Canada is a defence freeloader, and like spongers everywhere, we dislike those who carry the burden for us."¹¹² Politically, this perception is not very flattering and would seem to question Canada's credibility and commitment to its defence. By partnering with the U.S. on NMD, Canada would show that it is prepared to

¹¹⁰ *Report of the Standing Committee...*, p 26.

¹¹¹ James Fergusson et al, "Round Table: Missile Defence ...," p 121.

carry part of the burden, thereby providing a direct, credible, and tangible contribution to its own defence and national interests.

Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy Goals—Legitimization

A final political consideration important to the achievement of Canadian foreign and defence policy goals is the significant potential effect of an agreement by Canada to participate in NMD. By agreeing to participate, some experts have said that Canada would lend a considerable degree of legitimization to the programme for the United States. Fergusson approached this viewpoint by stating that it is “a political argument for Canadian participation. It would provide political legitimacy to the U.S. system, not least because of Canadian arms control and disarmament credentials.”¹¹³ Jim Robbins, a Canadian business leader, echoed this view by maintaining that “although there may be claims to the contrary, ...the United States measures Canadian contribution more from a policy approval and confirmation of approach perspective than a monetary perspective.”¹¹⁴ This is an important observation, which endorses an approach that Canadian participation might involve only a contribution from a political approval perspective, and nothing more. A panel of experts whose members were from Germany, Norway, Russia, Canada and the United States, met in March 2000 to discuss the proposed NMD programme and endorsed this view. It concluded, among other things, that “Canada is a key player in the NMD debate and a significant international influence with great leadership potential” and that “if Canada endorsed the Americans’ NMD, the United States would acquire a valuable ally, “moral legitimacy”, and a distinct advantage

¹¹² J.L. Granatstein, “A Friendly Agreement in Advance...,” p 16.

¹¹³ James Fergusson, “Time for a Decision on North American Missile Defence,” *Policy Options*, (April 2002), p 36.

¹¹⁴ Jim Robbins, in Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. *Playing in the “Bush League”*..., pp 60-61.

in obliging support from other NATO countries.”¹¹⁵ James Fergusson shares this belief, stating that:

...American interest in Canadian participation is partially a function of Canada’s political value to legitimize missile defence internationally. Non-participation is not likely to stop deployment, especially given the current state of affairs in Congress. But, it would likely undermine Canada’s political value, and thus its perceived influence in Washington. This is not to suggest that Canada can always influence or move Washington, especially given the complexity of American politics. However, it is not the reality of influence that counts, but the perception. As long as others believe that Canada has special influence in Washington, there exists significant political value for Canada.¹¹⁶

This statement provides an excellent synopsis of how Canadian participation would help give legitimacy to NMD and could result in potential political benefits for Canada and advance its interests by giving it additional respect and possible leverage on other global issues.

NMD Linkages to other Canadian Areas of Interest

Canadian participation in the operation of an NMD system is also supported by considerations beyond defence and security issues. In fact, while such linkages are not normally associated or discussed in terms of defence issues, a number of experts have expressed that agreement to participation in NMD could bring other types of significant benefits to Canada. Bob Keyes, Senior Vice President International at the *Canadian Chamber of Commerce*, stated that defence and foreign policy issues play into the Canadian economic and trade relationship with the U.S. He questioned whether Canada could be seen as the best of economic partners if it didn’t take the same approach on military matters and acknowledged that Canadian support for NMD is sometimes

¹¹⁵ “Report from the Roundtable,” *Canadian Foreign Policy, Policy Options*. (Vol 7 No 3, Spring 2000), p 121.

¹¹⁶ James Fergusson, “Déjà Vu: Canada, NORAD and Ballistic Missile Defence,” Occasional Paper #39, University of Manitoba Centre for Defence and Security Studies, 2000, pp 24-25.

mentioned by U.S. commentators in the same breath as the economic relationship.¹¹⁷ Jockel also pointed out that in a broad sense, linkages do exist between defence issues and other considerations. He indicated that although Canadian policy makers usually deny the existence of linkage between defence and other issues, Canada's defence problems may have something to do with the inability to generate U.S. government interest in, for example, softwood lumber trade difficulties or U.S. problems with the Canadian Wheat Board.¹¹⁸ Specifically, he affirmed that without participation there would be some ripple effects into other areas of Canada-U.S. relations, beyond the military sphere. At the very least, the "bilateral defence economic relationship...probably would be shakier as it became harder to justify special exemptions for Canadian firms."¹¹⁹

Taking this approach a step further, Morton described that the defence relationship provides Canada with an important avenue of approach to the U.S. on many issues. He explained that over the last 60 years, defence cooperation with the U.S. has not only contributed directly to Canadian and American security, it has created a positive atmosphere that has permitted Canada to deal with the United States on a number of trans-border and international issues.¹²⁰ He is convincing when he states that with Canadian participation in NMD, Canada's interests would be better served. Participation

¹¹⁷ Bob Keyes, in Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. *Playing in the "Bush League"...*, p 33.

¹¹⁸ J.L. Granatstein, "A Friendly Agreement in Advance...", p 16.

¹¹⁹ Joseph T. Jockel, in Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. *Canada and National...*, p 87.

would show the U.S., responsible for over 85 percent of Canadian trade, that Canada wants to contribute to continental security and to continue to receive benefits from the large U.S. economy. He further indicated that “while such cross-sector linkages are normally discounted by responsible officials they resonate with the man on the street in Richmond or Dallas who carries the short end of the defence stick, and wonders who his friends are.”¹²¹ In light of these arguments, it can be understood that a defence relationship enhanced by NMD participation would provide indications to the U.S. that Canada wishes to contribute to North American security and could enhance Canadian economic opportunities in the U.S. These considerations would certainly appear to work toward advancing Canadian national interests.

Economic Considerations

The linkage to economic concerns begs the question of whether NMD can directly benefit Canada economically. According to the *Standing Committee, Statistics Canada* presents a clear picture of the interdependence of the Canadian and United States economies where each country is the other’s largest customer and biggest supplier.¹²² In fact, Keyes argues that the relationship is so well developed that Canada and the U.S. are well down the path to economic integration.¹²³ With the strength of this economic relationship in mind, a decision not to participate in NMD could affect a wide range of Canadian economic interests. Fergusson has indicated that while Canada has obtained privileged access to the American market and that while Canadian companies remain dependent upon this access, non-participation in NMD could be extremely significant in

¹²⁰ Lieutenant-General Robert W. Morton, in Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. *Canada and National...*, p 80.

¹²¹ Ibid, p 80.

¹²² *Report of the Standing Committee...*, p 27.

that Canada may lose future opportunities for industry contracts.¹²⁴ He has also argued that a negative decision could also lead to spillover into the wider defence industrial relationship that could damage Canada's economy since defence revenues account for an estimated average of 30 percent of Canadian dual use--commercial and defence--company revenues. The strength of the Canadian defence industry is in the aerospace and electronic sectors and those areas are the most vulnerable to disruptions from the U.S.¹²⁵ It would therefore not be unreasonable to conclude that a negative decision on NMD could bring about such disruptions and consequently, have negative economic consequences for Canada. Such consequences would not be in Canadian national interests.

In sum, there are a number of strong arguments that support Canada's participation in the operation of an NMD system. As described, participation will greatly contribute to protecting Canadian sovereignty rather than threatening it. It will provide a significant additional defence capability through an enhanced role for NORAD with full Canadian involvement in aerospace defence operations including NMD. Through NORAD and NMD, participation in NORTHCOM would also enhance Canadian defence capability. In addition, NMD participation would increase Canadian interoperability with U.S. forces and further enhance defence capabilities. It would also assist in achieving Canadian foreign and defence policy goals by giving Canada a continued voice in defending itself within the North American context and by giving Canada a perceived

¹²³ Bob Keyes, in Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. *Playing in the "Bush League"...*, p 31.

¹²⁴ James Fergusson, "Déjà Vu: Canada, NORAD..." p 22.

¹²⁵ Ibid, p 22.

degree of influence with the United States that could help Canada continue to play a significant role at the global level. Equally important, it could also provide excellent new trade and economic opportunities for Canadian industry. In view of these considerations, Canada should, above all, view NMD participation as a significant opportunity to advance its national interests.

Chapter 4 – REASONS FOR NOT PARTICIPATING

While there are convincing reasons for Canada to participate in the operation of an NMD system, critics have raised issues that might suggest that it should not take this course of action. The continued value of deterrence, the effect of NMD on global and regional stability, perceptions of technological limitations, undesirable increases in defence spending, and the perceived advantages of continuing to have the U.S. defend Canada have all been suggested as arguments against Canadian participation in NMD. This chapter will examine these issues to determine if they might be reason enough for Canada to decide to not participate in NMD.

The Continued Value of Deterrence

The concept of nuclear deterrence has been a key component of global stability since the beginning of the Cold War. It appears to have worked to prevent war between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. for over fifty years. Indeed, the prospect of mutually assured destruction appears to have succeeded in maintaining stability and some believe that it is still the most important component in U.S. strategic defence policy. John Newhouse, a Senior Fellow at the *Center for Defense Information in the U.S.*, believes that “the most effective way of coping with a supposed threat of missile attack is and will remain deterring it with awesome strategic power.”¹²⁶ However, this view has been questioned and some believe that it is no longer true. Michael Margolian, an analyst with *DND’s Directorate of Strategic Analysis* agrees with findings in the *Rumsfeld Report* and considers that the major security challenge for the United States stems from regimes that are developing weapons of mass destruction who possess small numbers of long-range missiles; “regimes for which a strategy that relies solely on the threat of nuclear

retaliation may be ill-suited.”¹²⁷ This challenge to deterrence was substantially reinforced after the attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001. Fergusson has indicated that the attacks have served to confirm that once terrorists and rogue states acquire long-range ballistic missiles, they will not be deterred from using them.¹²⁸ Further, it would seem that it might be most difficult to retaliate against an unknown perpetrator who launches a missile into North America from a ship off its coast. Accordingly, it would seem that deterrence alone is probably no longer enough to prevent future attacks on the U.S. or North America. As a result, missile defences would certainly assist in defending against attacks that deterrence could not prevent.

Further, national missile defence might, in itself, serve to enhance deterrence. Camille Grand of the *Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI)* stated that missile defence provides a technical fix to a difficult strategic problem that offers countries that acquire such capability an unmatched military tool that would, in effect, work to help strengthen deterrence against attack.¹²⁹ After all, a potential attacker might not attempt to strike if he perceives that there is little or no chance of success. Accordingly, missile defences, while not replacing deterrence, could help in maintaining global stability. While it is perhaps not readily apparent, this might be an important potential effect of NMD deployment. Canadian participation could help to support this potential benefit of the NMD programme.

¹²⁶ John Newhouse, “The Missile Defense Debate,” *Foreign Affairs*, (July/August 2001), p 98.

¹²⁷ Michael Margolian, in Department of National Defence, Directorate of Strategic Analysis, *Strategic Assessment 2001*, Ottawa, Canada, 2001, p 116.

¹²⁸ James Fergusson, “Time for a Decision on...,” p 35.

¹²⁹ Camille Grand, in Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, “International Perspectives on Missile Proliferation and Defenses,” Monterey, California, March 2001, p 9.

Effect on Global and Regional Stability

Some experts have expressed concerns about NMD deployment causing renewed nuclear arms proliferation not only in Russia, but in Southern Asia as well. Nuclear arms control has been the goal of many agreements including the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In terms of possible increased proliferation in Russia, James J. Wirtz, chairman of the National Security Affairs Department at the *Naval Post Graduate School* in the United States, pointed out that the ABM Treaty between the Soviets (and later the Russians) and the Americans banned the development of large scale strategic missile defences and became a cornerstone of the Soviet-American arms control regime and of the concept of mutually assured destruction. He explained that opponents of strategic defences argued that attempts to protect the U.S. or Soviet populations from missile attack would set off an arms race between offensive and defensive systems that would be expensive and unlikely to function.¹³⁰ Even as late as the fall of 2000, the Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov expressed his concerns about the development of a U.S. strategic missile shield. He argued that the ABM Treaty was the foundation of arms control agreements and that if this foundation were “destroyed, this interconnected system would collapse...”¹³¹ Notwithstanding these concerns, Russian government opposition has been melting away and Russia’s President Putin reacted nonchalantly to President Bush’s December 2001 announcement that the U.S. was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, stating that the

¹³⁰ James Wirtz, “Introduction,” in *Rockets’ Red Glare...*, p 3.

¹³¹ Igor Ivanov, “The Missile Defense Mistake—Undermining Strategic Stability and the ABM Treaty,” *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 2000), p 15.

withdrawal did not affect Russian security.¹³² It is noteworthy that this withdrawal was also accompanied by a unilateral cut in U.S. missiles and a new Russian-American arms cut treaty.¹³³ This development, combined with the fact that the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has met with little opposition or comment from Russia appears to indicate that Wirtz was correct in his assessment that the importance of the ABM Treaty has dramatically declined since the end of the Cold War.¹³⁴ Accordingly, it would seem that since there is little concern from the Russian government over the U.S. withdrawal, it would not be unreasonable to expect that there is equally a limited risk of missile proliferation in Russia.

While it appears that Russian concerns have not materialized, there are concerns in other parts of the world. In Asia, China has expressed serious misgivings over the U.S. NMD programme. It has rejected arguments regarding missile threats against America and believes that the threat of attacks from “rogue” states is exaggerated. It considers that the real aim of NMD is to contain Chinese power and influence.¹³⁵ This position is probably due to the belief that NMD could provide an effective strategic defence against its currently small arsenal of approximately 24 strategic missiles. According to Marshall J. Beier, a researcher at the *York University Centre for International and Security Studies*, China would feel threatened because its small number of weapons would not present a credible deterrent to a U.S. attack if NMD were deployed.¹³⁶ It would therefore seem

¹³² Joseph T. Jockel, “After the September Attacks: Four Questions About...,” p 15.

¹³³ Facts on File World News Digest, “Disarmament: U.S. Formally Withdraws...,” [http://www.2facts.com], 20 June 2002, p 1.

¹³⁴ James Wirtz, “Introduction,” in *Rockets’ Red Glare...*, p 4.

¹³⁵ Elizabeth Speed, “Spotlight on...China,” in Department of National Defence, Directorate of Strategic Analysis, *Strategic Assessment 2001*, Ottawa, Canada, 2001, p 33.

¹³⁶ Marshall J. Beier, “Postcards from the Outskirts of Security: Defence Professionals, Semiotics, and the NMD Initiative,” *Canadian Foreign Policy*, (Vol. 8 No. 2, Winter 2001), p 45.

reasonable for China to increase its missile stocks and further develop its missile technology.

Further, in a regional context, Timothy D. Hoyt, a professor in the national security studies program at *Georgetown University*, expressed concerns that “if NMD leads to an acceleration of Chinese strategic force modernization, India may feel compelled to increase its own arsenal.”¹³⁷ Ashok Kapur, a recognized expert on Indian strategic policy, supports this notion by stating that competition between China and India is inevitable and that to manage this competition, “a level playing field of conventional and nuclear strength is essential to keep the Sino-Indian military gaps manageable.”¹³⁸ Hoyt also noted that increases to India’s capability could cause a proliferation chain reaction since “any change in Indian strategic forces or doctrine will create pressure on Islamabad to mount a Pakistani response.”¹³⁹ In other words, a regional arms race in South Asia could result from a Chinese effort to increase its strategic arsenal due to NMD deployment by the U.S. It is this aspect of the debate that appears to be the largest obstacle to overcome in terms of the non-proliferation and arms control argument because it appears that for the Chinese, they would have the most to lose if their missile capability were not increased. This would therefore seem to be a valid concern in terms of the impact of a decision to deploy NMD and would perhaps require diligent American diplomatic efforts with China to prevent the possibility of regional nuclear arms proliferation in South Asia.

¹³⁷ Timothy D. Hoyt, “South Asia,” in *Rockets’ Red Glare...*, p 251.

¹³⁸ Ashok Kapur, *Pokhran and Beyond—India’s Nuclear Behaviour* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p 182.

¹³⁹ Timothy D. Hoyt, “South Asia,” in *Rockets’ Red Glare...*, p 251.

As indicated earlier, the U.S. appears to have concluded that arms control is no longer effective as a stabilizing element. Canada, on the other hand, as previously discussed, has long supported arms control as a method of ensuring non-proliferation, security and stability. The complexity of the issues and the potentially destabilizing effect in South Asia of NMD deployment might have an impact on Canada's decision to participate in the NMD programme. From the foregoing, it would seem that while Russian concerns appear to have been allayed, the Chinese question is still a factor to consider. In the end, it will be important to determine whether this issue is significant enough to be considered as a "show-stopper" for Canada, or one that should be addressed through diplomatic or other means.

Lack of Technological Development

NMD critics have also often used the lack of technological development as an argument against NMD deployment. In fact, it has been said that technological obstacles were a key reason for the failure of previous U.S. missile defence programs.¹⁴⁰ Over the last several years many have used rocket interceptor test failures and radar problems¹⁴¹ as indications that a capable NMD system is perhaps far from becoming a reality. As a result, it would seem that Canadians do not appear to have considered that a limited NMD system is becoming a reality. Accordingly, perceptions of technological difficulties may have made it easy for Canada to dismiss or perhaps even to ignore the importance of the NMD participation issue. These perceptions, however, no longer seem current since technology may no longer be the obstacle it once was. According to

¹⁴⁰ James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defence*. Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2001. p 4.

¹⁴¹ Arms Control Association. "Arms Control Today—U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance," [<http://www.armscontrol.org>], July/August 2002], p 1.

American experts Lindsay and O’Hanlon, “for decades, effective defenses against long-range ballistic missiles were derided as fantasy. Now many NMD critics agree that some kinds of defenses are becoming feasible.”¹⁴² Further, “technology has improved, making it possible to build effective defenses against smaller threats that the new ballistic missile powers pose.”¹⁴³ Lindsay and O’Hanlon also pointed out that while there are technical challenges such as the requirement to deal with decoy warheads during a mid-course intercept, much work is also ongoing to effectively handle this challenge. For example, the introduction of boost phase defence is an example of the thinking that will contribute to increasing the effectiveness of a complete and layered missile defence system.¹⁴⁴ In addition, Dennis Ward, a U.S. analyst, stated that although the NMD systems that are now being considered are superficially similar to previous systems, new technologies are giving today’s missile defences new and better operational capabilities. He supported this statement by indicating that new technology, which includes improvements in sensor capabilities, interceptor missile speeds, communications and on-board sensors have added immeasurably to future NMD capability.¹⁴⁵

In Canada, DND’s Directorate of Space Development has also analyzed the technological aspect of NMD and acknowledged these improvements stating,

the evolution of the range of programmes within the US, as well as internationally, clearly indicates a strategic environment in which BMD will be a functional reality by the end of the next decade [by 2010]. All the evidence points to an emerging reality of multiple missile defence systems; systems that will collectively be able to cover the boost, post-boost, mid-course, and terminal phases of a ballistic missile’s flight, and

¹⁴² James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O’Hanlon, *Defending America...*, p 14.

¹⁴³ *Ibid*, p 7.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p 15.

¹⁴⁵ Dennis M. Ward, “The Changing Technological Environment,” in *Rockets’ Red Glare...*, p 86.

one that will be layered into a comprehensive tactical through to strategic defence structure.¹⁴⁶

Accordingly, the Directorate has argued that the new strategic environment, where a growing belief that certain rogue states are undeterable by the threat of nuclear retaliation and concerns about the willingness of Western “publics” to accept casualties, has generated the conditions for the U.S. to move the missile defence issue from the research laboratory into the operational world.¹⁴⁷

In addition, with Washington’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement that had limited the development of missile defences, the U.S. will be free to accelerate the development of these defences. The withdrawal from the treaty clearly indicates that the U.S. is fully committed to NMD. Coupled with the post-September 11 strategic environment, it is not unreasonable to expect that the United States will work even harder to ensure its defence. In the end, the technology argument may have provided a way for Ottawa to avoid making a participation decision or delaying it for as long as possible. Now that there is evidence to show that technology is not the barrier it once was, it is perhaps difficult to consider that it is a valid reason for Canada not to participate in NMD.

Expense/Increase in Defence Budget

In the 1990’s, declining defence budgets resulted in considerable financial pressures on the Defence Department. During that time, it was often reported that cuts in defence funding made it difficult for DND to fulfill its requirements and maintain the

¹⁴⁶ Department of National Defence, Directorate of Space Development, *Space Appreciation 2000...*, p 11.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid*, pp 11, D-4.

demanding tempo that resulted from operations after the end of the Cold War. In fact, in February 2003, the Department was still facing a shortfall of over \$900 million for the fiscal year ending in March 2003.¹⁴⁸ It would therefore not be unreasonable to expect that there would be concerns with the financial implications regarding a decision for Canada to participate in NMD. If it were determined that the cost of participation would be unacceptably high, it might be a valid reason to question Canadian participation in the NMD programme. Granatstein points out that the *Finance Department* might have some concerns that if Canada expands NORAD to cover homeland defence, financial pressures might be strong enough that they could be difficult to ignore.¹⁴⁹ How great a portion of homeland defence would be needed to cover NMD operations is not certain. According to Fergusson, however, it is expected that increased attention in terms of Canadian participation in NMD will likely be directed to the budgetary costs for Canada, especially considering the continuing financial strain in the defence budget.¹⁵⁰

Notwithstanding, financial concerns may not present a substantial obstacle in terms of Canadian participation in NMD. One reason for this possibility is that the United States does not necessarily expect Canada to contribute to NMD development in a financial sense. The U.S. has at no time indicated that it expects a monetary contribution, nor is it likely to do so since it is well aware of the current strains on Canadian defence spending.¹⁵¹ Accordingly, there may not be a requirement for a substantial financial

¹⁴⁸ Honourable John McCallum, "Speaking Notes for the Minister of National Defence at the Conference of Defence Associations Annual General Meeting," [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1014], 27 February 2003.

¹⁴⁹ J.L. Granatstein, "A Friendly Agreement in Advance...", p 11.

¹⁵⁰ James Fergusson, "Déjà Vu: Canada, NORAD...", p 20.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*, p 20.

commitment and therefore, an increase to the defence budget might not be a significant factor to consider in making the participation decision. In fact, historically the U.S. has completely borne capital costs for installations that are located in the U.S. and, as indicated earlier, American interests behind Canadian participation stem from “a combination of longstanding cooperation with Canada on North American defence, and the political value of Canadian participation in wider foreign and defence policy terms.”¹⁵² Accordingly, the financial aspect is perhaps not a significant barrier to participation in the NMD programme.

Possible Advantages of Continued Dependence on the U.S. for Defence

Another argument that can be made is that Ottawa doesn't need to participate in NMD because the government knows that America will nonetheless defend Canada. The question to ask becomes “would Canadians prefer to continue to ride free on U.S. military capability?”¹⁵³ Granatstein has indicated that the government may have already answered the question, stating that the low defence budget in 2001 says that “...yes, Canada will take the free ride, thank you very much. As someone once put it, Canadians pretend to defend Canada, and the United States pretends it does not!”¹⁵⁴ This is not a very flattering statement about Canadians and as Granatstein points out, it matters to the military that Canadians are freeloaders and it matters to the nation and to the rest of the world because it indicates a lack of seriousness by the government.¹⁵⁵ A lack of seriousness in an area as critical as defence and security might be further perceived by others as a lack of seriousness or resolve on other important policy areas as well. So

¹⁵² James Fergusson, “Déjà Vu: Canada, NORAD...,” p 20.

¹⁵³ Wendy Dobson quoted in J.L. Granatstein, “A Friendly Agreement in Advance...,” p 15.

¹⁵⁴ J.L. Granatstein, “A Friendly Agreement in Advance...,” p 15.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, p 15.

while one might argue that it might make financial sense to continue to “freeload” for defence it does not necessarily send a message that Canadians would like the rest of the world to see. Accordingly, Canadians would surely want others to see that they are serious and therefore freeloading for defence is ultimately not a suitable alternative. Participation in NMD would show that Canada is serious about major policy issues and it would therefore be in Canada’s best interest to participate.

In sum, this chapter has examined arguments that have been made against Canadian participation in the NMD programme. It would seem that most are not strong enough to support a decision not to participate. Only one argument, that which concerns the potential for renewed regional arms proliferation in South Asia would appear to be cause for some concern. A determined diplomatic effort, mainly by the U.S., would probably be necessary to reduce concerns in this area and might resolve the situation. On its own, however, considering the overall benefits of participation, it would not seem to be significant enough to cause Canada to decide not to participate in NMD.

Chapter 5 – CONCLUSION

To conclude, in recent years the U.S. has displayed significant concern over the threat of continued missile proliferation and the menace posed by terrorists, as demonstrated by the attacks that occurred on 11 September 2001. To respond to these threats the United States is aggressively pursuing the development of a National Missile Defence shield that could see initial deployment by the end of this decade. Further, Washington's withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 seems to provide a clear indication of U.S. determination and commitment to dealing with these threats. The development of the NMD programme is significant since it appears to have redefined U.S. reliance on deterrence and introduced defence from missile attack as a major feature of U.S. strategic policy.

While a direct attack might not seem to be a significant concern for Canada, due to its geographic proximity to the U.S., it could be an unintended victim of an attack on America. Since a missile defence shield would also protect Canada, the NMD issue is relevant and important to Canadians. As well, development of the NMD system is not progressing in a vacuum. Linkages to economic and political issues have also been described as important. Accordingly, in addition to defence concerns, the manner in which Canada decides to address the NMD issue could have a significant impact on Ottawa-Washington bilateral relations. The Canada-U.S. relationship has been described as perhaps the closest and most extensive in the world. The State Department portrays the defence aspect of this relationship as being more extensive than with those of any other country. From Canada's point of view, as the smaller of the two partners, the relationship is even more significant since it has relied on this relationship with the U.S.

as key to Canada's security. Analysts have argued that the relationship has allowed Canada to effectively share in fulfilling its North American security responsibilities at a significantly lower cost than it could on its own. Since Washington will build a missile shield with or without Canadian participation, experts appear to agree that if this relationship is not maintained, the U.S. will defend the continent on its own leaving Canada without the political influence it currently enjoys and without a say on how it will be defended. By participating in NMD, Canada would send a clear signal that it is committed to providing for its own defence as well as that of North America, as it has done since the signing of the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement. As well, while some critics have said that Canada would be abrogating its sovereignty by participating in the implementation of programme, a number of experts have argued that by participating in the operation of the NMD system, Canada would be acting as a sovereign state, working with its main ally to enhance its capacity to protect the territory and citizens of Canada and the United States.

Further, experts have also demonstrated that if it does not participate, there could be damaging repercussions to Canada's relationship with the U.S., which could result in jeopardizing the advantages and benefits that Canadians obtain from it. Many have indicated that this would occur if Canada's role in NORAD were marginalized as a result of a decision not to participate in NMD. They contend that if Canadians are not involved, NORAD could become irrelevant, making it very difficult for Canada to have a say in any decisions that would affect the defence of its people and territory. In addition to running this risk, particularly in its ability to contribute to its defence in a meaningful way through NORAD, Canada would also risk losing its access to the substantial

intelligence and other information it receives as a result of the NORAD partnership. It could also miss out on prospects to enhance Canadian defence and security capabilities by increasing its military interoperability with U.S. forces and by taking advantage o

national interests, Canada should actively participate in the implementation and operation of the NMD programme as part of its defence relationship with the United States.

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