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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
CSC 29 / CCEM 29

EXERCISE/EXERCICE NEW HORIZONS

Homeland Defence – A Continental Requirement

by /par LCol/Lcol J.M. Simpson

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Abstract

Following the terrorists attacks of 11 September 2001, the concept of homeland security took on a new meaning and level of commitment in both Canada and the United States.

Initiatives have been launched nationally by both nations to address this new assymetric threat. However, retention of the vital economic, social, and cultural relationship that the two countries share will also require closer collaborative defence arrangements. Pursuit of this closer cooperation and improved interoperability will require Canada to make some difficult choices on some controversial issues.

This paper will start by examining Canada's historical and current defence and security relationship with the U. S. and the initiatives being implemented or proposed by the two nations. Next, the two main current issues of controversy in pursuing closer cooperation will be reviewed. This paper concludes that the vital Canadian national interests of preserving a high standard of living and retaining influence in continental defence matters would be better served through the pursuit and implementation of closer security relations with the U.S.

“Our security -- in its broadest possible political, economic and military sense -- is inextricably linked to the United States. Our common values and political ideals bind us. It is our willingness to defend these very ideals, indeed our very societies, which unites us. The government and the people of Canada have demonstrated our solidarity with the United States, whatever it takes. Our commitment is total, and we will give our undivided support to the United States now.”¹

Deputy Prime Minister John Manley, 17 September 2001

Introduction

In his research note prepared for the Canadian Department of National Defence in January 2001, Dr Sean Maloney stated that “homeland defence is an emerging threat area that will require attention in the near future.”² Tragically, a mere nine months later his prediction was realized in dramatic fashion. Following the stunning attacks of 11 September 2001, the concept of homeland security took on a new meaning and level of commitment in both Canada and the United States. From that day, Canadians and Americans could no longer consider themselves necessarily immune from the types of terrorist acts previously restricted to less stable areas of the world. Fueled by militant Islam, terrorism suddenly became the major threat to democratic and pluralist states, one particularly hard to defend against in the wide-open North American society.³ The terrorists had every opportunity to choose the target while requiring relatively few resources. The fact that potential perpetrators were willing, if not honoured, to die in the process only made prevention even harder, considering that, in order to deliver a successful attack, they only had to get lucky once.

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The tragic loss of 2801 innocent lives⁴ and the ingenuity of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the crash of the fourth hijacked airliner in the Pennsylvania countryside shocked the world. While citizens from many countries were killed by these acts (including 24 Canadians⁵), the psychological trauma undeniably fell hardest on Americans who were accustomed to believing that the U.S. homeland was, essentially, sanctuary from foreign terrorist attacks. This was not a random act of violence, but rather, a well-planned sneak attack against a nation that had become complacent. To minimize the possibility of reoccurrence, reaction by U.S. government officials was both swift and resolute. Major domestic initiatives were quickly launched to address shortfalls in procedures and to increase protection for its citizens and infrastructure. Following the determination that Afghanistan was not only harbouring, but also actively supporting the involved terrorist organization, that country was invaded in rapid fashion by a strong and cohesive coalition comprised of many nations. U.S. President George Bush repeatedly stated that he would seek and destroy each and every regime that supported terrorist activity against the U.S.,⁶ with the on-going war in Iraq being but one more example of that determination and resolve.

While none of the targeted sites were in Canada, the attacks hit, both literally and figuratively, close to home. Canadians shared the feeling of horror as they acknowledged that the North American lifestyle had been violated as never before. In response, the

⁴ <http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/09/07/ar911.wtc.toll/index.html>

⁵ <http://www.canada.com/national/features/september11/>

Canadian government implemented significant initiatives to reduce the risk of terrorism attacks and was resolute in contributing military forces to the coalition in Afghanistan.

It has been estimated that, in the first 3 months following the attacks, an additional \$58 billion was earmarked by the U.S. to increase the security and defence of the nation; that figure is undoubtedly much higher now.⁷ Hence, there should be no questioning of the U.S. commitment to this cause. However, if the unique economic, social, and cultural relationship that the U.S. and Canada share is to be maintained, collaborative defence must also be addressed. Increasing homeland defence by unilaterally sealing its borders is not a realistic option for the U.S. Yet, if the U.S. perceives that Canada is not pursuing this security issue with equal dedication, significant disruption of expedient cross-border traffic might result. While this would affect U.S. commerce to some extent, it would be disastrous for the Canadian economy. Hence, it is in the interests of both nations to increase cooperation on continental defence matters.

This request for closer cooperation and improved interoperability between both the military and civilian security agencies of the two nations will require Canada to make some difficult choices. As these choices will be based on controversial issues, they will not meet with unanimous support. Proponents claim that closer cooperation will improve collective security and mutual trust, and reduce national expenditures through bi-national cost-sharing. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, they suggest that the U.S. will

⁶ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html>

⁷ Steven M. Kosiak. US Funding for Homeland Defense and Combating Terrorism
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/B.20020124.US_Funding_for_Hom/B.20020124.US_Funding_for_Hom.htm

proceed, single-minded, to enact whatever measures it considers necessary to safeguard its territory, if Canada declines to participate. Hence, it is argued, the cost of not entering into such increased arrangements, or even displaying adequate dedication to the matter, will result in Canada sacrificing a substantial amount of the influence it currently enjoys on matters of continental defence. Opponents of this issue, however, suggest that the dominating influence of the U.S. in any expanded arrangements would lead to significant loss of Canadian sovereignty and even go so far as to predict “the inevitable end of Canada as an independent state.”⁸

This paper will contend that the Canadian national interests of preserving a high standard of living and retaining influence in continental defence matters would be better served through the pursuit and implementation of closer security relations with the U.S. It will start by examining Canada’s historical and current defence and security relationship with the U. S. Next, this paper will look at the initiatives being implemented or proposed by the two nations, both unilaterally and bi-nationally, in response to the security threat. Finally, the two main current issues of controversy in pursuing closer cooperation, namely the establishment of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the National Missile Defense (NMD) program, will be reviewed.

Discussion

For a variety of reasons, Canada and the United States share a unique relationship unlike any other two countries. Both nations were built on the beliefs in the fundamental

⁸ Paul Hellyer. Fortress America Means Goodbye Canada. 17 October 2001
<http://www.cyberclass.net/hellyer.htm>

importance of democracy, human rights and free markets, all in accordance with the rule of law. Many of the similarities and the differences between Canada and the U.S. can be traced to historical dealings, which have run the full spectrum from absolute agreement to total disagreement on various policy matters, including security and defence. Close defence and security ties with the U.S. date back to the late 1930s, as Canada reduced its reliance on the United Kingdom and forged a much stronger economic relationship with its southern neighbour. This new arrangement was first emphasized during a speech at Queen's University in Kingston in 1938, when President Franklin Roosevelt stated, "the people of the United States will not stand by idly if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire."⁹ In turn, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King responded a few days later that "Canada shall remain as immune from attack.... as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that...enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by land, sea or air to the United States across Canadian territory."¹⁰ As noted by historian Jack Granatstein, this effectively pledged that Canada would maintain sufficient defensive strength to deter any threat to the U.S. from coming through our country, and that we would never become a strategic liability.¹¹ In August 1940, Roosevelt and Mackenzie King met again, this time at Ogdensburg, N.Y., and agreed on the first steps for a defence alliance by establishing the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), a forum that continues to this day.

Following the Allied victory in World War II, Canada and the United States were collectively instrumental in the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

⁹ Granatstein. A Friendly Agreement... p 3

¹⁰ Ibid, p 3

(NATO) in 1949, which aimed to safeguard the security of Western Europe for Soviet power.¹² The parallel threat to North American continental security was the emergence of a Soviet nuclear-capable bomber force and subsequent intercontinental ballistic missile capability. As any attack on the U.S. using either of these means would require overflight of Canadian airspace, geographic position made Canada that much more important to the strategic defence of the U.S. and resulted in even closer cooperation. This led to the stand-up of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) in 1957 and the construction of several co-funded radar chains across Canada to warn of such any attack.¹³ Although the requirement for consultation with both governments, and the permanent appointment of Canadian officers as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of NORAD, provided Canada with a significant amount of influence over continental air defence, differences in political policies between the two countries surfaced. Despite Canada's initial agreement to accept nuclear warheads for use by its forces, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, who was described as "a bundle of contradictions wrapped in indecision"¹⁴, quickly recanted, much to the chagrin of the Americans. Later, during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Diefenbaker's initial unwillingness to order the Canadian units assigned to NORAD to an increased alert level was interpreted by the U.S. as a refusal to help defend North America. Although this incident did raise the ire of the U.S. leadership and hinder relations, it also demonstrated very clearly that Canada did indeed retain command of its forces, hence participation in NORAD was truly an exercise, and

¹¹ Ibid, p 3

¹² http://www.reformed.org/webfiles/antithesis/v1n5/ant_v1n5_NATO.html

¹³ <http://www.pinetreeline.org/other/other10/other10n.html>

¹⁴ Granatstein. A Friendly Agreement... p. 5

not a compromise, in sovereignty.¹⁵ As is likely to occur between any two sovereign nations, regardless of how close their relationship, policy disagreements on global matters would continue on occasion over the next twenty-five years. Noteworthy examples were the Canadian government's opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, as well as Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's 50% reduction of forces committed to NATO in 1968.¹⁶

There have also been significant demonstrations of solidarity between the two nations. In response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was quick to commit air and naval assets to the U.S. led coalition that subsequently fought the Gulf War. A similar commitment was made in support of the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999. Notwithstanding these recent notable contributions, with the demise of the USSR, during the 1989-1991 period, having eliminated the only serious threat to North America, the resulting peace dividend led to a succession of diminishing budgets and a subsequent downsizing of the Canadian Forces. Perhaps as a result of reductions in both military personnel and equipment, increased interoperability with U.S. forces was pursued with vigour. Although the trend of diminishing Canadian defence budgets was reversed in 1999, the subsequent increases have not been substantial. Despite public statements by senior American officials that Canada needs to start paying its share of the costs¹⁷, there are low expectations that this is likely to occur. Experts agree that the CF remains badly under funded, and that Canada

¹⁵ <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/history/canada8-en.asp>

¹⁶ Granatstein. *A Friendly Agreement...* p 6

¹⁷ <http://207.5.93.167/blog/arc20021117.htm>

will effectively continue to rely on the U.S. for a disproportionate share of its defence.¹⁸

As one critic, not inaccurately, once noted, “Canada pretends it defends itself, while the U.S. pretends it doesn’t.”¹⁹

Both Canada and the U.S. advertise with pride that they share the longest undefended border in the world.²⁰ Both countries are prosperous, technologically advanced and perhaps most importantly of all, by global standards, safe. This is not just a North American perception; the U.N. Human Development Report consistently ranks both Canada and the U.S. within the top countries in the world in which to live.²¹ The standard of living is high, and both nations can rightly consider themselves envied by many, if not most, other countries for the high level of human rights, personal freedom, prosperity, and security that is enjoyed.

From a Canadian perspective, its geographical location confers immense benefits. It gives Canada primary access to the world’s most potent economy, on which it relies to a tremendous extent. Canada has the world’s 33rd largest population, yet the 8th largest economy. With trade between the two nations totaling over \$1.2 billion per day and 87% of Canadian exports going to the U.S.²², it can be safely said that Canada’s high standard of living is, almost exclusively, due to its economic relationship with its southern neighbour. Culturally and socially, the ties are equally close. There are over 200 million border crossings every year and Canadians and Americans, for the most part, watch the

¹⁸ Granatstein. *A Friendly Agreement...* p 13

¹⁹ Granatstein. *A Friendly Agreement...* p 15.

²⁰ <http://gocanada.about.com/library/weekly/aa070200a.htm>

²¹ <http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/UNAndDevelopment.asp>

same television shows, wear the same types of clothes, listen to the same types of music and eat the same kinds of foods.

Being geographically, economically and culturally so closely linked to the U.S. has significant benefits for Canada; it also has some drawbacks. One is a reduced sense of national identity as Canadians feel themselves often overwhelmed by the wishes, desires and sheer strength of a more dominant nation. To fight off this perceived domination in the enduring search for its national identity and sovereignty, Canadians tend to view themselves as much “non-Americans” as they do Canadians. This feeling was conveyed in the popular “Joe Canadian” Molson commercial, which succeeded by emphasizing the differences between the two countries.²³ It has been suggested that the only reason Canadians look so hard for differences between Americans and themselves is because those distinctions are, in fact, far outnumbered by the similarities. The search to find the right balance between warm friendship and cool detachment has been pursued for so long that the struggle to define the Canada-U.S. relationship has, in itself, become part of the Canadian identity.

The attacks of September 11th have had a profound impact on most western nations, but most specifically the U.S. As a result, America has launched two major initiatives to prevent future attacks, namely, the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the creation of Northern Command (NORTHCOM). The DHS is the most significant transformation of U.S. government security agencies since

²² <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/menu-en.asp?mid=1&cat=1029>

1947, when Harry S. Truman merged the various branches of the U.S. Armed Forces into the Department of Defense to better coordinate the nation's effort against military threats.²⁴ DHS represents a similar consolidation, both in style and substance, with 22 previously disparate civilian agencies now coordinated under one department to protect the nation against threats to the homeland. The new department's first priority is to protect the nation against further terrorist attacks. Component agencies will analyze threats and intelligence, guard the borders and airports, protect critical infrastructure, and coordinate the U.S. response during future emergencies.

Canadian cooperation with DHS has been close and well coordinated, perhaps as much by necessity than anything else. As the Canadian economy is so reliant on both exports to, and imports from, the U.S., one of the priorities of the Canadian business world is the prompt and simple cross-border movement of goods. Within that sector, time is money. With this economic incentive in mind, the U.S. has, for several years, increasingly perceived Canada as being soft on immigration and law enforcement, specifically in the areas of smuggling people and international criminal activity.²⁵

U.S. Senator Susan Collins, who chairs a powerful Senate committee overseeing homeland defence, stated: "Canadian immigration is looser than in the U.S. and more porous and represents a vulnerability."²⁶ This belief was further enforced by the Ahmed Ressam case, a Montreal resident who was arrested by U.S. Customs officials trying to

²³ <http://www.snopes.com/inboxer/petition/joesrant.htm>

²⁴ http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme_home1.jsp

²⁵ Maureen Appel Molat and Fen Osler Hampson, eds. Vanishing Borders. (Don Mills: Oxford Press, 2000) p 11

²⁶ <http://www.herald.ns.ca/stories/2003/02/28/pWorld208.raw.html>

take an explosives-laden car from British Columbia into the state of Washington in December 1999.²⁷ As subsequent investigations revealed, Ressam had been able to enter Canada in 1994 with a false passport, claim refugee status, commit numerous crimes, draw welfare benefits, and easily evade deportation by creating a false identity as a Canadian citizen with a Canadian passport.²⁸ In response to this incident, Canada implemented new immigration regulations to tighten refugee determination policies, and imposed harsher penalties for those using or selling false documents. Extra immigration control officers were hired and posted abroad to stop terrorists before they arrive. As a result, nearly 8,000 individuals were denied boarding for flights to Canada in 2002.²⁹

While Canadians do not necessarily feel the same threat from terrorism, the risk should not be underestimated. The following assessment from the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is sobering:

With the possible exception of the United States, there are more international terrorist organizations active in Canada than anywhere in the world. This situation can be attributed to Canada's proximity to the United States, which currently is the principal target of terrorist groups operating internationally; and to the fact that Canada, a country built upon immigration, represents a microcosm of the world.³⁰

There was also an acknowledgement by Canadian officials that even if their territory was not directly targeted, geographic proximity to several conceivable U.S.

²⁷ <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/news/1999/nr-99-33.htm>

²⁸ <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/trail/etc/canada.html>

²⁹ <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/press/speech/itc.html>

³⁰ http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/operat/ct_e.html

targets could have grave effects on Canadian cities.³¹ Even a limited nuclear or biological attack on, for example, Detroit or Buffalo would severely impact Southern Ontario. As a result of this new appreciation of the threat, other Canadian initiatives were implemented to increase security, including the Anti-Terrorism Act, which creates measures to identify, prosecute, convict, and punish terrorist groups and provides new investigative tools to law enforcement and national security agencies.³² The 2001 Canadian budget also allocated an additional \$6.5 billion increase in funding to both CSIS and the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP), amongst other agencies, to increase security within the Canadian society at large.³³ Finally, Canada and the United States have also implemented a new border security initiative, called the Smart Border process. Its intention is to have the two nations work together to identify and track security threats before they reach North America, without impacting on the regular flow of travel and trade. Integrated enforcement teams have been set up to cooperate in guarding our shared borders and to increase information exchange between law enforcement, intelligence, and border enforcement agencies.³⁴ These enforcement teams have made numerous arrests, thereby likely disrupting criminal networks attempting to smuggle both illegal migrants and contraband into the continent or across the border.³⁵

³¹ The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Eighth Report: Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility. September 2002. p 17

<http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep08sep02-e.htm>

³² http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/government/C-36/C-36_4/C-36_cover-E.html

³³ <http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget01/bp/bpch5e.htm#sec1>

³⁴ http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/security/ibets_e.htm

³⁵ Ibid

While the DHS is a domestic organization primarily concerned with the civilian aspects of security, the U.S. also has an extensive military structure to address its global interests. This structure, the so-called Unified Command Plan (UCP), underwent revisions as a result of the 11 September attacks and now consists of 10 distinct commands. Five of these commands are organized on a geographical basis, and five are based on functional lines. The UCP establishes the missions, force structure and geographic responsibilities for combatant commanders, and the specific responsibilities for functional commanders. Prior to this latest revision, there was no single command responsible for the security of the U.S. itself; rather, there were various homeland security missions being performed by various combatant commanders. To consolidate these efforts, NORTHCOM was established and became operational in October 2002.³⁶ It will exercise command over all national military forces that operate within the United States in response to external threats and in support of civil authorities. NORTHCOM's area of responsibility will cover Alaska, the continental United States, Canada, Mexico, portions of the Caribbean, and the contiguous waters in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans up to 500 miles off the North American coastline.

The fact that Canada has now been included in the area of responsibility (AOR) of a new, unilateral U.S. military command was certain to alarm those concerned about undue influence from a more powerful neighbour. Moreover, as a U.S.-only UCP combatant command, NORTHCOM is not open to membership by other countries³⁷, and it is this misconception that may be the cause of some of the Canadian concern and

³⁶ <http://www.geocities.com/libertystrikesback/homeland.html>

confusion. Hence, it is not that the U.S. does not wish to exclude Canada from joining NORTHCOM, but rather that joining is not an option under the UCP. Unfortunately, opponents of closer defence ties such as Michael Byers have promulgated this myth in his book “*Canadian Forces under U.S. Command?*”.³⁸ Additionally, numerous polls and articles have asked Canadians whether they believe Canada should “join” NORTHCOM.³⁹ This has, of course, created the impression that Canada has that decision to make, with the possibility of Canadian military personnel falling under command of an American officer. However, it should be noted that, in this exclusion, NORTHCOM would be no different than any of the other regional commands. While co-operation is sought with friendly nations in each region, the commander directs only the activities of assigned U.S. forces and never assumes command of foreign forces within that AOR. Hence, the fear of Canadian troops being integrated into a U.S. command structure due to the standup of NORTHCOM need not be an item of concern. Canadian military personnel will continue to patrol their own national air and maritime approaches, as will U.S. forces south of the border. Canada and the United States currently share 80 treaties and 250 memoranda of understanding on defence issues. In none of those documents does Canada agree to automatically participate in any military operation that U.S. authorities might insist is in the interests of one or both countries.⁴⁰

³⁷ <http://committeerepubliccanada.ca/English/News/Slug015.htm>

³⁸ Michael Byers. *Canadian Forces Under U.S. Command*. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 2002) p 3

³⁹ http://www.cric.ca/en_html/opinion/opv4n33.html

⁴⁰ Standing Senate Committee. *Eighth Report....* p 16

Today, perhaps the best example of effective and mutually beneficial defence cooperation between the two nations continues to be the NORAD alliance, in which Canada enjoys a considerable amount of influence. Although the U.S. pays about 90% of the NORAD budget, Canada supplies approximately 20% of the personnel. Two of the key leadership positions, namely that of Deputy Commander-in-Chief and the Director of Combat Operations, are always held by Canadian officers. Lest one believe that these are token appointments, it is worth noting that the officer directing all U.S. air defence actions during the attacks on 11 September was a Canadian general officer. Although publicized in the U.S., this fact did not raise any concern or attention, presumably because it was considered quite acceptable by the Americans. The fact that Canadians were trusted with such a high level of authority by their U.S. counterparts during such a critical period indicates the strength of a defence partnership carefully nurtured over five decades. NORAD's success has not only shown how two sovereign nations can coordinate defense needs and maintain vigilance for the common good of both countries, but also forms a time-tested blueprint for future cooperative efforts.

That the assigned continental defence missions of both NORTHCOM and the bi-national NORAD overlap to a significant degree is perhaps best witnessed by the fact that the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD (CINCNORAD) also heads up NORTHCOM. This overlap in both mission statement and assigned forces has raised many important and valid questions about NORTHCOM's relationship with, and impact on, NORAD. To address these issues, Canada and the U.S. have agreed that it would be highly beneficial to pursue some level of Canadian cooperation within NORTHCOM. Such collaboration

would seek to ensure that both agencies, and in fact both nations, perform as effectively as possible in a common defence. To this end, Canada and the U.S. have established a joint planning group to discuss how NORAD and NORTHCOM can best interface to prevent or mitigate threats or attacks by terrorists on North America. As well, it would ensure a cooperative and well-coordinated response to national requests for military assistance in relation to terrorist, or other, threats or attacks, natural disasters, or other major emergencies in Canada or the United States.

As NORAD already addresses the aspects of continental aerospace defence, the aforementioned planning group's focus will include maritime and land-based threats, as well as cooperation and support to civil authorities in Canada and the United States. The Group will be based at NORAD Headquarters in Colorado Springs, and will be headed by the Deputy CINCNORAD (once again, a Canadian officer). All ensuing plans and arrangements shall be separate from existing bi-national aerospace defence arrangements under the NORAD Agreement. There will be no standing forces assigned to this planning group, nor will any resulting agreements obligate either country to coordinate its actions with the other – cooperation will take place only if and when both governments agree. Senior Canadian military officials argue that rather than being a threat to sovereignty, close cooperation and prudent planning with the U.S. through the Planning Group will be, in effect, an exercise of sovereignty.⁴¹

⁴¹ Dr Paul Mitchell. Faculty Note on NORTHCOM Conference. (Toronto: CFC 2002)

There is another U.S. initiative that poses a more serious dilemma for Canada when considering closer defence cooperation. This involves the announced deployment of the National Missile Defense (NMD) system,⁴² designed to intercept and destroy a small number of long-range ballistic missiles launched at the United States. This system will use radar and satellite systems optimized to detect and track a missile attack, as well as ground-based interceptor missiles designed to destroy the approaching warheads by colliding with them as they fly through space.⁴³ While the principle of employing a defensive system against a ballistic missile attack may be attractive, the deployment of such a system could have major, and potentially very damaging, implications for global security. As the fielding of such a system may undermine existing arms control agreements, and thereby contribute to another nuclear arms race, it may provoke dangerous reactions from other countries such as Russia and China. The U.S. position is that the system is not intended to upset the strategic balance that has been achieved between nations. Rather, it is to guard against the threat of a limited strategic ballistic missile attack from a rogue nation, or even a small accidental or unauthorized launch of strategic ballistic missiles from nuclear capable states.⁴⁴

While no formal invitation has been extended to Canada to participate in the NMD program, it is believed that one will soon be forthcoming.⁴⁵ It should be noted that Canadian participation in this program is not strictly necessary, “for neither Canadian territory, waters, nor airspace, nor any contributions by the Canadian military, would be

⁴² <http://www.afpc.org/mdbr/mdbr84.htm>

⁴³ <http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/monitor/mons00d.html>

⁴⁴ <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/nmd/>

needed by the U.S. for the operation of NMD".⁴⁶ But if invited, the Canadian government will have to consider its policy of non-proliferation of strategic weapons systems and weapons in space⁴⁷ in deciding whether to accept. While support for this initiative would require a shift in Canadian policy, refusal could carry a number of consequences. The primary mission of NORAD is to provide warning of missile and air attack against North America,⁴⁸ which is, in part, also what NMD is designed to do. For this reason, the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD (CINCNORAD) has stated that the U.S. will wish to place the NMD command and control elements within the NORAD structure.⁴⁹ The NORAD leadership that conducts attack warning, assessment and response is comprised of both Canadian and U.S. general officers that rotate interchangeably. A failure by Canada to participate in NMD will strip NORAD of its core function and would put Canadian personnel at Colorado Springs in a very awkward position.⁵⁰ If Canadians could not participate in the operation of the NMD system, they could no longer fully perform their primary function, and NORAD would lose its real *raison d'être*.⁵¹ Obviously a demise of NORAD would have significant repercussions, as it would require Canada to either defer full and unilateral control of the aerospace defence of the continent to the U.S. or be prepared to absorb the huge costs of creating its own aerospace defence capability.

⁴⁵ Molat and Hampson. *Vanishing borders...* p 15

⁴⁶ <http://lxmi.mi.infn.it/~landnet/NMD/rauf.pdf>

⁴⁷ [http://www.city.toronto.on.ca/legdocs/2003/agendas/council/cc030204/nomj\(12\).pdf](http://www.city.toronto.on.ca/legdocs/2003/agendas/council/cc030204/nomj(12).pdf)

⁴⁸ <http://norad.military.getbulky.com/>

⁴⁹ Molat and Hampson. *Vanishing borders...* p 75

⁵⁰ Mitchell. *Faculty note...*

⁵¹ Dr Joseph Jockel. *Canadian Military Journal Vol 3, No 1* (Ottawa: DND Canada, Spring 2002) p 15

“I don’t think the average Canadian wakes up every morning worried about sovereignty. I think some of them wake up, a lot wake up, worried about security. I think we ought to focus on security. We ought to do everything we can to make sure that these kinds of attacks don’t happen again –either here [Canada] or in the United States or anywhere.”⁵²

Paul Cellucci, U.S. Ambassador to Canada

Notwithstanding the solid progress made on some collective measures such as the Smart Border process and the NORTHCOM Planning Group, tensions and disagreement between the two nations on countering this new asymmetric threat have already surfaced. Despite pledges by the government that “Canada’s commitment to the war on terrorism was total” and that Canada would “give its undivided support to the United States”,⁵³ Canada subsequently announced that it would not support a U.S.-led military action against Iraq⁵⁴. This would have involved joining a coalition of over 45 countries, including traditional Canadian allies such as Great Britain and Australia, in removing a regime alleged to have both Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and ties to terrorist organizations.⁵⁵ Senior U.S. officials have described the Canadian position as both “disappointing” and “upsetting”,⁵⁶ and foreign intelligence experts say this could harm anti-terrorism efforts in Canada as U.S. agencies become increasingly reluctant to share sensitive information with their Canadian counterparts.⁵⁷ Although neither government will confirm the link, there is also much speculation that the sudden cancellation of President George W. Bush’s visit to Ottawa, scheduled for May 2003, is tied to current

⁵² Byers. Canadian Forces... p 25

⁵³ <http://www.patriotresource.com/wtc/intl/0917/canada2.html>

⁵⁴ <http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2003/03/17/45053-cp.html>

⁵⁵ <http://www.goacom.com/news/news2003/mar/msg00081.html>

⁵⁶ Ibid, p 2

⁵⁷ Greg Weston. Cold shoulder has a cost. Toronto Sun. 23 March 2003, p 16

American discontent with Canada.⁵⁸ While it is too early to assess the negative effects on Canada-U.S. relations resulting from the Canadian position on Iraq, Jack Granatstein states “there’s a big difference between having a President who basically wants to help, and having one who wants to punish you or is indifferent to you.”⁵⁹ In discussing what he describes as “an overwhelming, all-encompassing concern for the security of the homeland” by the U.S., and Canada’s role in this process, Douglas Bland states:

Should Canada hesitate or seek to avoid these new obligations, then it seems likely that the United States will closely guard its northern border, undertake covert intelligence operations in Canada, and act unilaterally to defend the United States by deploying its armed forces over North America wherever and whenever the president decides.⁶⁰

Although Dr Bland’s assessment may be a bit dramatic, the clearly demonstrated U.S. commitment towards homeland security, and with it continental security, cannot be questioned. This is not a threat to Canadian sovereignty; it merely requires cooperation. As former U.S. Ambassador to Canada Gordon Giffin noted:

It is not necessary to become a sycophant of the US or US policy in order to maintain the extraordinary relationship between the countries. That said, on military and security issues, it is not necessary to play the role of the loyal opposition either. The time-worn phrase – best friends, closest allies – from time to time has to be re-invigorated.⁶¹

Canada’s links to the U.S. are key to its high standard of living. If the U.S. perceives that Canada is not devoting an appropriate level of attention to the homeland

⁵⁸ <http://www.suntimes.com/output/news/cst-nws-can17.html>

⁵⁹ Julian Beltrame. *Washington is watching*. MacLean’s Magazine, 31 March 2003, cover story.

⁶⁰ Dr Douglas Bland. *Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?* (Kingston: IRPP February 2002), p 4.

⁶¹ <http://www.canambusco.org/News.php>

security issue, that standard of living will likely be affected. With close to 90% of Canadian trade heading to the U.S. – compared with a mere 25% of U.S. trade coming to Canada – Washington’s ability to affect the Canadian economy is significant.⁶²

Conclusion

Canada and the U.S. have shared a close and productive security and defence relationship since 1938. The NORAD alliance, which has served both countries very well since its inception over 45 years ago, is but one example of highly successful Canadian-U.S. cooperation in the pursuit of a common goal. However, as the tragic attacks of 11 September 2001 so clearly demonstrated, the emergence of an asymmetric threat to North America has forced the nations to revisit their homeland security procedures. Additionally, if the economic and cultural ties, which are important to the U.S., but critical to Canada, are to be maintained, increased collective continental defence measures must also be addressed. Some of the bi-national initiatives, such as the Smart Border process, have been implemented without controversy, yet others, specifically the standup of NORTHCOM and the potential Canadian involvement with the U.S. NMD program, are a source of dispute in Canada. With regards to NORTHCOM, much of the concern is due to the misconception that this new command will place Canadian military personnel under U.S. command. On the contrary, close cooperation between the nations through the NORTHCOM Planning Group will ensure an effective common defence in preventing or mitigating threats or attacks by terrorists on North America. While Canadian support for the NMD program will require a change in governmental policy, a

⁶² Granatstein. A Friendly Agreement... p 15.

decision to not support the implementation of NMD will likely result in the demise of NORAD. The termination of that alliance would force Canada to either forego the ability to conduct aerospace defence of its territory or be prepared to absorb the huge costs of creating its own capability to perform that mission.

Canada is essentially left with two options. It can either retain a voice in continental defence matters through closer cooperative participation or it can cede that authority to the U.S. Canada cannot be truly independent of the U.S. in a military or economic sense. Any disruption of commercial cross-border traffic will have a significant effect on the Canadian economy, and hence the high standard of living.

Closer cooperation with the U.S. on continental security will not detract from Canada's status as a sovereign and independent nation. Sovereignty is not diminished when it is used with partners and allies to strengthen the country and protect its people. Rather, sovereignty is enhanced when nations work together in voluntary ways in their common interest. While Canadians should raise valid concerns about further integration with U.S. agencies and about domination by a more powerful nation, their blind desire to protect against a misperceived threat to their sovereignty must not jeopardize Canada's fundamental national interests – physical security and economic well-being.

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