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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
CSC 29 / CCEM 29

EXERCISE NEW HORIZONS/EXERCICE NOUVEAUX HORIZONS

**COMPARE AND CONTRAST LITHUANIAN AND CANADIAN FORCES
OPERATIONS PLANNING PROCESSES**

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La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

Last year during the Prague summit, Lithuania, and six other Central European countries were invited to join NATO. In 2004 all of these countries will become full NATO members. The strategic goals of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania include the development of National Defence System and NATO integration (The Guidelines for Development 2). Integration is impossible without interoperability. The importance of interoperability is highlighted by the fact that significant casualties among allied forces during operation “Iraqi Freedom” were caused by friendly fire (Cordesman 12). These accidents caused, in part, by the lack of interoperability among coalition members. “Operational interoperability directly influences the combat effectiveness of NATO forces, particularly those involving multinational formations” (NATO Handbook 178). Lithuania plans to have a fully NATO-interoperable mechanized infantry battalion by 2003. By the end of 2006 Lithuania plans to prepare a reaction brigade able to participate in Article 5 operations together with NATO forces (Lithuania: Adding Value 4). This brigade as well as all Lithuanian Defence Systems must be NATO interoperable. The interoperability covers all aspects that are needed for effective co-operation under all circumstances. The Commandant of Baltic Defence College, Brigadier General Clemmesen, identifies four main elements for effective co-operation between military units: speaking a common language, technological compatibility, common procedures and basic formats, and common military cultures (116-121).

Common procedures and basic formats are one of the main elements of interoperability. This includes standardized order and reporting formats, communications procedures and forms, as well as similarities in staff structures and working and planning formats. The Lithuanian Forces (LTF) are in the process of creating procedures corresponding to NATO standards. The Operations Planning Process (OPP) is an important part of procedures.

“Planning is an essential part of command and control, helping us to decide and act more effectively. As such, planning is one of the principal tools the commander uses to exercise command and control” (United States, MCDP 5 26).

The LTF OPP was prepared with reference to manuals of the United States, Denmark, and Germany, and NATO Guidelines for Operational Planning. It was approved by the commander of the Lithuanian Armed Forces in 1999. The aim of issuing this document was to standardize the operations planning process and to coordinate it with NATO procedures (Gynybos Stabas 5). The author of this essay believes this aim was not completely achieved. Accordingly, this essay will argue that Lithuanian integration into NATO will necessitate some amendments to the Lithuanian Armed Forces Operations Planning Process.

To do so, the Lithuanian Armed Forces OPP and the Canadian Forces (CF) OPP will be compared and recommendations will be made to amend the LTF OPP to better correspond with NATO standards. Why was the Canadian OPP chosen for comparison? First, “it closely aligns with the process described in the NATO Bi-SC Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP) Aug 2000 version” (Canada, B-GJ-005-500/FP-000 ii). Second, Canada has been a member of NATO more than fifty years and its Armed Forces are completely interoperable with other NATO countries. Finally, Canada is a great country but is not a major military power. Similarly, Lithuania will never be a large military power.

D99-011 Stabo darbo organizavimo pagrindai-99 (The principles of Staff organization and operations-99) is the title of the manual of Lithuanian Armed Forces OPP. This manual dictates the planning process at the tactical and operational levels, describes basic doctrine of the role, relationships, organization and responsibilities of staff in the LTF (Gynybos Stabas 5). This manual is presented in four major sections: commander and staff relationships, staff organization, staff responsibility and accountability, and the OPP. The Commander and staff

section functions are described according to their contribution to the OPP. A commander may establish procedures and may organize the staff as necessary to conform to the mission, resources available, level of command, and staff experience. However, the staff organization should conform generally to the doctrine described to maintain a common understanding among commanders, units, and staffs (Gynybos Stabas 5). The commander is responsible for all that his staff does or fails to do. He cannot delegate his responsibility (Gynybos Stabas 19).

Commander's responsibilities described by the LTF OPP conforms with Canadian thinking.

Staff consists of a personal staff group, a special staff group and a general staff group. The general staff group is organized along traditional lines and consists of Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Civil-Military Cooperation, Communication, and Information Systems sections. The staff composition defined in manual D99-011 is similar to the CF operational level headquarters staff defined in manual Canadian Forces Operations (Canada, 9B-GG-055-0004/AF-000 7-6/7-8). The main task of a staff is to help the commander make and implement decisions. Staff organization and procedures are structured to meet the commander's critical information requirements (Gynybos Stabas 9). The staff's efforts must always focus on supporting the commander and on helping him support his subordinate units (Gynybos Stabas 19).

The main objective of this essay is to compare the Lithuanian and Canadian OPP systems. D99-011 Manual provides a description of the complete OPP and an abbreviated OPP to be used in a time-constrained environment. Patton states "a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week" (Heinl 239). There are four main methods to save time in the process: first, to increase commander's involvement, second, the commander will become more directive in his guidance, third, limit the number of course of actions developed and wargamed,

and fourth, maximizing parallel planning (Gynybos Stabas 67). The abbreviated process increases the risk of overlooking key factors or uncovering a better option. On the other hand, the complete OPP is a time consuming process and the commander must decide in each case what is more valuable “a good plan now or a perfect plan next week”. The commander is responsible for the OPP and he decides what procedures should be used in a particular situation. Both the LTF OPP and CF OPP are flexible and provide complete and abbreviated processes. The CF OPP provides for an abbreviation of the planning process as the commander defines how to abbreviate the planning process in Commander’s Initial Guidance (Canada, B-GG-055-0004/AF-000 4-4, 2B-1). The OPP helps a commander and his staff examine a situation and to make correct, logical decisions (Gynybos Stabas 37). The LTF and CF OPP steps are as follows:

LTF OPP steps	CF OPP steps
1. Receipt of New Mission	1. Initiation
2. Mission analysis	2. Orientation
3. Course of Action Development	
4. Course of Action Analysis	3. Course of Action Development
5. Course of Action Comparison	
6. Course of Action Approval	
7. Orders Production	4. Plan Development
	5. Plan Review

Each step of the process starts with an input that builds upon the previous step. Errors made early in the process will impact on later steps (Gynybos Stabas 39). The Canadian OPP has five steps, but the third step, Course of Action Development, includes four Lithuanian OPP steps. The fifth step in CF OPP is Plan Review. D99-011 does not provide for this step. Despite the

different titles and numbers of planning process steps, the LTF and CF OPP are quite similar. The differences between the two systems will be analyzed step by step later in the essay.

Step One - Receipt of New Mission in LTF OPP and Initiation in CF OPP. During this step the operations planning group must be activated, planning tools gathered, Commander's Initial Guidance prepared and the Warning Order issued. Once the mission is received, the commander and his staff must do a quick initial assessment. The main questions to be addressed are: time available from mission receipt to mission execution, time needed to plan, determination of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and determination of the staff estimates already available to assist in planning. After the time assessment, the commander must decide whether or not use the full OPP, or to abbreviate the process (Gynybos Stabas 40). The commander then gives Initial Guidance to the staff. Commander's Initial Guidance includes the same information in both the Lithuanian and Canadian OPP. The last step in the New Mission Receipt phase is to issue a Warning Order to subordinate and supporting units. The Warning Order must include the type of operation, the general location of the operation, the initial time line, and guidance for reconnaissance. Warning Orders facilitate parallel planning that is essential to speed up the process for subordinate units (Gynybos Stabas 40). CF Manual B-GJ-005/FP –000 makes provisions that the commander may issue initial guidance and “a Preliminary Warning Order could be issued at this stages if subordinate and or supporting formations are known” (4-4). According to D99-011, the commander must brief initial guidance and issue the Warning Order. In general, the LTF and CF OPP are similar in this first step, however, there are significant differences. Manual D99-011 does not provide for initiation of the planning process at the operational and strategic levels, and does not provide for receiving political direction from the Government. It determines that the “operations planning process begins with the receipt or

anticipation of a new mission. The new mission can either come from a higher commander's order or is derived from an ongoing operation" (Gynybos Stabas 39). The differences in the first step shows that despite manual D99-011 being dedicated to both tactical and operational level operations planning, the conclusion can be made that the manual is more oriented to tactical level. The manual's authors emphasized the tactical level of planning, because the Lithuanian Armed Forces are small. The biggest tactical unit is a brigade. The tactical level is the main level for Lithuanian Armed Forces but each country must be prepared to act at the operational and strategic levels because "the operational level is not defined by the number and size of forces" (Canada, B-GG-005-004/AF-000 1-5/1-6). "The strategic level of conflict is that level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives" (Canada, B-GG-005-004/AF-000 1-4). There is a shortfall in the LTF OPP that it does not provide tools for government to embody national security objectives using national resources including the armed forces. The LTF does not have another OPP manual for planning at the operational and strategic levels, therefore, this manual should be amended. The LTF OPP should include provisions for initiating the OPP at operational and strategic levels, and format for Initiating Directions. Also, a description of planning at different levels (tactical, operational and strategic) should be included.

The second step in the Lithuanian OPP - Mission Analysis - is similar to the Orientation step in the Canadian OPP. Mission Analysis consists of seventeen substeps, which are not necessarily sequential. Mission Analysis is crucial to the OPP. It allows the commander to begin his visualization. Mission Analysis defines the nature of the problem and begins the process of determining feasible solutions (Gynybos Stabas 40). The main substeps are common to both the Lithuanian and Canadian OPP: analyze higher level order, develop Mission

Statement, conduct Mission Analysis Briefing, and issue Commander's Planning Guidance and the Warning Order. Despite the similarity in process and common substeps the LTF OPP and CF OPP have some differences. The most significant one is the final product of step two. According to manual D99-011, the output of Mission Analysis is a Mission Analysis Briefing and a Warning Order. Manual B-GJ-OO5-500/PF-000 determines that "the key product of the Orientation Step is the Commander's Planning Guidance" (4-5). The final product of step two is a shortfall of the LTF OPP. The Commander's Planning Guidance is the main document, a landmark for operations planning. The Mission Analysis Briefing is only a planning tool but not the goal of step two. The United States Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 5 Planning (MCDP 5) emphasizes the importance of commander's guidance: "under the commander's direction and guidance, the process shifts among the various planning modes, types, and levels, seeking to harmonize the factors that define the planning environment" (91). The emphasis should shift from Mission Analysis Briefing to Commander's Planning Guidance in LTF OPP. A Warning Order can be issued if necessary, but it cannot serve as Commander's Guidance because it is issued for subunits, not for staff. Commander's Planning Guidance in the LTF OPP does not include a Mission Statement and Commander's Intent despite the fact that they are developed during this phase of the OPP. It is very important to include the Commander's Intent and Mission Statement in Commander's Planning Guidance because they are crucial for planning. Field Marshal Sir William Slim wrote that the commander's intent "is always the most important because it states – or it should – what the commander intends to achieve. It is one overriding expression of will by which everything in the order and every action by every commander and soldier in the army must be dominated" (211). **The Commander's Intent and Mission Statement should be included into LTF OPP.**

Another anomaly surfaces when comparing the LTF and CF OPP; the LTF OPP does not use the terms Centre of Gravity, Decisive Point, Endstate, and Criteria for Success. Common language is the first step to interoperability. Without common language, forces cannot co-operate effectively. Common language creates the basic formation for co-operation. Involved states have to accept, absorb, and use common, standardized terminology, similar headquarters structures, and planning formats to avoid misunderstanding, friction, and accidents (Clemmesen 118-119). The terms Centre of Gravity, Decisive Point, Endstate and Criteria for Success should be included in the LTF OPP. These terms are very important in the planning process at the strategic and operational levels of war.

The next difference between the LTF and CF OPP is that the LTF OPP's Mission Statement includes the question "How". "How will the commander employ available assets" (Gynybos Stabas 45)? A conclusion can be drawn from this that the LTF uses command style vice mission oriented style leadership, and that the commander may limit the flexibility and initiative of subordinate commanders as a result. This conclusion highlights that Lithuania was a part of the Soviet Union where only centralized command style leadership was used. Today, however, Lithuania is trying to build a Western style armed forces. This is illustrated by the fact that more than 1200 Lithuanian military officials have been trained at educational institutions in NATO countries and only one in Russia during last ten years (Lithuania: Adding Value 5). Both the LTF OPP and CF OPP declare a centralized planning and decentralized execution philosophy of command. The question "How" in Mission Statement is a simple oversight. The LTF OPP Mission Statement should be changed to correspond with the CF OPP. The Mission statement must not include the question "How".

The last significant step two shortfall of LTF OPP is that the Commander's Planning Guidance includes questions that are not examined during Mission Analysis Briefing. Questions regarding deception, fire support, mobility and counter mobility guidance, and specific courses of action to consider or not to consider are not included in mission analysis briefing (Gynybos Stabas 46-7). The commander gives his guidance after the Mission Analysis Briefing but it is difficult to give guidance without an analysis of these questions. The Canadian OPP is clear and logical in that "the commander's approval of the Mission Analysis forms the basis of the final outcome of the Orientation Step - The Commander's Planning Guidance" (Canada, B-GJ-055-500/FP-000 4-7). The Mission Analysis and Mission Analysis Briefing must include all of the Commander's Planning Guidance questions.

One more difference between the LTF OPP and CF OPP is that LTF OPP emphasizes the importance of intelligence and reconnaissance at step two. The LTF OPP determines the Initial Reconnaissance Plan during this phase of planning process. After the Initial Intelligence Preparation of the battlefield and determination of the initial Commander's Critical Information Requirements, the staff identifies gaps in intelligence information and determines an Initial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan. The goal of this plan is to launch reconnaissance assets as soon as possible. Moreover, any likely enemy courses of action are presented during the Mission Analysis Briefing (Gynybos Stabas 42-44). This information is crucial for planning. Dr. Gary Klein, who has been analyzing the decision making process for half of his life, states "people - whether they are nurses, fire fighters, tank commanders, or division commanders - can only solve problems and make decisions starting from what they know" (291). LTF OPP is more useful than the CF OPP regarding reconnaissance and intelligence at this stage. Manual B-GJ-055-500/FP-000 says nothing about Initial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plans, and Enemy

Courses of Action are developed in step three at the same time as Friendly Forces Courses of Action.

In comparing the second step of the LTF and CF OPPs, one can conclude that Canadian and Lithuanian commanders emphasize different things. Canadian commanders concentrate on organizing their staff for planning. The key product is the Commander's Planning Guidance. Lithuanian commanders are more concentrated on preparation their subordinate units. The key products are a Mission Analysis Briefing and the Warning Order. The Commander's Planning Guidance may be written or oral while the Warning Order is a written formal document (Gynybos Stabas 47). The conclusion may be drawn that planning is not the most important thing for Lithuanian commanders and that staff, not the commander, drives the planning process. This is a significant shortfall. Effective planning requires the direct involvement of the commander. Planning is the fundamental responsibility of command. In any unit or formation, the commander should be the chief planner. The commander must drive the process. He must provide clear, forceful planning guidance to his staff. Commanders should be involved in the conceptual aspects of planning (United States MCDP 5 85).

Four Lithuanian OPP steps: Course of Action (COA) Development, COA Analysis, COA Comparison, and COA Approval conform to one Canadian OPP step – Course of Action Development. The result of these four LTF OPP steps is one COA selected and approved by the commander (Gynybos Stabas 48). The staff develops COAs for analysis and comparison after receiving Commander's Planning Guidance. Each COA must meet the criteria of suitability, feasibility, acceptability, exclusivity, and completeness. The COA development step finishes with the COA briefing to the commander (Gynybos Stabas, 48-53). The next step is COA Analysis (Wargaming). The commander selects COAs for wargaming. The goal of wargaming

is to try to foresee the dynamics of battle action, reaction and counteraction. During the COA comparison, a decision matrix is used with evaluation criteria to assess the effectiveness of each of COA (Gynybos Stabas 58-61). The Commander's decision briefing is the last action in this step of the OPP. After the decision briefing, the commander decides on the COA he believes to be the most advantageous (Gynybos Stabas 64). The Lithuanian OPP and Canadian OPP are similar in the main features of this step of the planning process; nevertheless, there are some shortfalls in the LTF OPP. First, after Course of Action Approval the staff does not produce a Concept of Operations, but issues a Warning Order – a written formal document (Gynybos Stabas 64-5). The LF OPP does not use the term Concept of Operations. This creates problems similar to those associated with Commander's Planning Guidance and Warning Order in Step Two. Specifically, Concept of Operation is oriented toward the staff planning process, while the Warning Order is issued for subordinate commanders. Again, this implies that readiness of subunits is more important to the commander than operation planning. Operations planning should be the most important thing to the commander. "Commanders must be centrally involved in planning" (United States MCDP 5 2). The term Concept of Operation should be used in LTF OPP, and should be issued after Course of Action Approval. Common terminology is critically important for interoperability,

The next difference between the LTF OPP and CF OPP is that LTF OPP does not provide detailed wargaming after Course of Action Approval. Also, Courses of Action are developed in too much detail before the Information Briefing is delivered. During Courses of Action Development, before Information Briefing, the Array Initial Forces and the Scheme of Maneuver must be prepared. The Scheme of Maneuver demands a detailed operation plan (addresses nineteen questions) (Gynybos Stabas 50-1). The Canadian OPP demands that COAs describe

how the mission may be accomplished and to answer questions relating to who, what, when, where, why and how (Canadian forces College, CFC 106 (3) CJ SOH II-2-3-B-3/3). According to CF OPP, only the COAs selected by the commander for wargaming must be developed in detail. The LTF OPP provides for the development and wargaming of all COAs to the same level. This is a shortfall that should be amended. The detailed development of only selected COAs and wargaming of only approved COA saves time.

The third significant difference between LTF and CF OPP at this stage is that four LTF OPP steps conform to one CF OPP step. The four LTF OPP steps should be combined into one step. This is not extremely important and will not influence the quality of the decision, however, commonality in the OPP helps to prevent misunderstanding. Common format of the OPP helps to improve interoperability.

The last step of the Lithuanian Forces OPP is Orders Production. Based on the Commander's Decision the staff refines the selected COA, completes the plan and prepares to issue the order. Orders or plans provide all necessary information subordinates require for execution, but without unnecessary constraints that would inhibit subordinate initiative (Gynybos Stabas 66). Manual D99-011 defines techniques for issuing orders, administrative instructions for preparing plans and orders, and also determines formats for orders and plans. Orders format is the same as in the CF OPP and consists of five main chapters: Situation, Mission, Execution, Service Support, and Command and Control and Signal (Gynybos Stabas 87-113).

Despite this step being similar in general terms, there are some differences. First, the LTF OPP Mission (Orders' chapter 2) and Tasks/Missions to Sub Units (Order's chapter 3b) consist of three parts: tasks to be accomplished, tasks that one should be prepared to accomplish, and tasks that may be necessary to be accomplished (Gynybos Stabas 96). This is quite significant.

The CF OPP says nothing about “tasks that one should be prepared to accomplish, and tasks that may be necessary to be accomplished”. The CF OPP clearly states the mission or task for each maneuver unit that is to be accomplished (Canada, B-GJ-055-500/FP-000 6D2). Simplicity is one of the fundamental tenets of planning philosophy. Simple plans are easier to generate and comprehend, easier to modify and, more importantly, to implement (United States, MCDP 568-69). The LTF OPP plans with three types of tasks and missions that are too complicated. The way to simplify plans is “to keep the number of actions or tasks in the plan to the minimum required by the situation” (United States, MCDP 5 69). LTF OPP attempts to forecast and dictate events too far in the future. There is a tendency to plan on the assumption that the future will be continuation of present situation, and underestimate the scope of changes that may occur. “The evidence shows that most plans are overcome much sooner than anticipated by the planners” (Hayes 3). The tendency to plan to far into the future is a shortcoming of LTF OPP. LTF OPP should write the tasks and Mission Statement to correspond with the CF OPP. “A clear, concise statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what is to be done, when it will take place, where it will occur, and why it is being conducted (Canada, B-GJ-055-500/FP-000 6D2).

The next difference between the LTF OPP and CF OPP is that LTF OPP does not use the term Concept of Operations in the Operation Plan and Operation Order. Order’s chapter 3 Execution includes elements, such as maneuver, scheme of fares, reconnaissance and surveillance, engineer, and air defence that describe the Concept of Operation without using the term. The term Concept of Operation should be used in Operation Plan and Operation Order to avoid misunderstanding.

The LTF OPP also lists and sequences annexes and appendixes to the operation plan and operation order. Manual D99-011 provides for twenty-two annexes and fourteen appendixes (91-2). The number and sequence of annexes and appendixes do not correspond with the list of annexes and appendixes in the CF OPP (Canada, B-GJ-055-500/FP-000 6D1-1). This anomaly is not crucial for quality of final product, as the majority of annexes and appendixes are the same in both OPP. However, changing the list and sequence of annexes and appendixes to correspond to the CF OPP would help avoid misunderstanding.

Orders Production is the last step of the LTF OPP. The CF OPP provides for the Plan Review after the Plan Development step. It is an important step to avoid mistakes, and to keep pace with the influences derived from evolving operational conditions. Planning is a continuous process involving the ongoing adjustment of means and ends. Planning should be viewed as an evolutionary process involving continuous adjustment and improvement toward the best the best executable solution until the process is interrupted by the imperative to act. Like planning, plans should be dynamic. The static plan is of no value in a fluid situation (Reinhardt 5). The other reason why the Plan Review should be included into LTF OPP is the learning process during planning. The main benefits of planning are derived not from consuming the products – that is, plans – but from engaging in their production. The process of planning matters more because of the learning and shared understanding that result when planning is done properly (Ackoff 28). It is a significant shortfall that the LTF OPP stops after issuing the plan. All Plan Review activities provided in CF OPP: Progress Review, Periodic Review, Detailed Exercise or Wargaming, Reinitiating and Issuing Amendments should be incorporated into the LTF OPP (Canada, B-GJ-055-500/FP-000 4-16).

The main goal in suggesting amendments to the LTF OPP has been to improve interoperability with NATO countries. The criteria used in formulating suggested amendments are correspondence to the CF OPP and improvement the quality of the process. The existing operation planning process may not be perfect. “Many officers and noncommissioned officers describe the military decisionmaking process with phrases such as “too complex,” “too burdensome,” or simply “too slow”(McLamb 1). Clemmesen notes, “Major power’s militaries may expect their partners to make the adaptation. For smaller states, however, that option does not exist” (116). Armed Forces of small countries’ must adapt to the NATO OPP. Accordingly LTF OPP needs some general plan amendments. First, a glossary of the main OPP terms should be included into the manual. Common terminology is crucial for interoperability with NATO countries and for better mutual understanding among units inside the Lithuanian Armed Forces because officers have different educations, as they studied in different countries and the same terms can be interpreted in different ways. Second, a new chapter *Lithuanian Forces Operations* should be included in the manual. This chapter should describe domestic and international operations (Canada, B-GJ-055-500/FP-000 1-3-5). Lithuanian Forces participate in international operations, different bilateral and multilateral projects but staffs plan for and play staff exercises solely for the defence of Lithuania. The requirement of planning international operations will increase after Lithuania becomes a full member of NATO. The operations planning manual must provide for the complete spectrum of operations.

The Lithuanian Armed Forces are in the process of creating procedures to correspond to NATO procedures. In general, the Lithuanian Forces OPP philosophy and format are similar to the Canadian Forces OPP, but there are some shortfalls. One of the biggest problems is with regard to interoperability and terminology. Some key terms such as: Center of Gravity, Decisive

Point, Endstate, Criteria for Success, Concept of Operation are not used in the LTF OPP. The second shortfall in comparison with the CF OPP is format. Lithuanian Armed Forces OPP does not provide for plan review. It is a significant defect for planning quality. Moreover, the CF OPP has one step for Course of Action Development. The LTF OPP divides this process into four separate steps. This is not critical to the quality of the final product (Operation Plan), but common steps are required to avoid misunderstanding. The next shortfall in the LTF OPP is its emphasis on different goals. The main product of CF OPP orientation step and LTF OPP mission analysis step is different despite similar procedures. Lithuanian OPP pays little attention to Commander's Planning Guidance, and does not issue a Concept of Operation. Another anomaly is that the LTF OPP manual does not differentiate between International and Domestic Operations and differences in planning at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. This is a serious problem because it does not provide for the full spectrum of operations. Finally, some differences in format in the Operation Plan and Operation Order's format may lead to misunderstanding. Planning is valuable when done properly, using methods appropriate to the conditions and the activities being planned. Done appropriately and well, planning is an extremely valuable activity what greatly improves performance and is a wise investment of time and effort. In contrary, done poorly and inappropriately, planning can be worse than irrelevant and a waste of valuable time and energy (United States, MDPS 5 6). The preceding analysis demonstrates that the LTF OPP should be amended to promote interoperability requirements and to improve the quality of the process.

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