CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
CSC 29 / CCEM 29

EXERCISE NEW HORIZONS

**A CRITICAL GAP: THE NEED FOR A JOINT LOGISTICS TRAINING STRATEGY
FOR THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE**

By SQNLDR NEIL COLLIE, RAAF

A CRITICAL GAP: THE NEED FOR A JOINT LOGISTICS TRAINING STRATEGY
FOR THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE.

Introduction

In the last decade, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has been involved in an increasing number of overseas operations. This involvement has included deployments in support of UN and UN authorized Peace Support Operations (PSO), and Humanitarian and evacuations in the Asia Pacific Region. More recently, Australia has deployed war-fighting capability in support of coalition operations in Afghanistan and the Arabian Gulf. The ADF contribution has normally operated under the Joint Task Force (JTF) construct, with elements of two or more of the ADF services deployed under the command of a JTF Commander.

The joint nature of operations demands that a robust Joint Logistics framework must exist that supports the deployed effort. However, in the ADF the understanding Joint Logistics doctrine and procedures remains unsatisfactory, and the preparation of RAAF Junior Logistics Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs), in this area in particular has been poor. The focus of training at the tactical level—the Junior Officer and SNCO—remains on Single Service Logistics (SSL), and although joint logistic concept exists at operational level, it has been filter downwards, and execution at tactical level remains, in the main, inefficient.

Yet the ADF has 'succeeded' in these operations. However, success has been dependent on the fact that quality Junior Officers and SNCOs have been able to cope 'on the run'. Problems that have manifested themselves at tactical level have been solved or mitigated through individual resourcefulness rather than through knowledge and application of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) pertaining to Joint Logistics. The process of 'coping on the run', 'learning by osmosis' or even 'just in time training' (JIT) is an inadequate and risky modus operandus. The Officer Commanding of the RAAF No.395 Expeditionary Combat Support Wing (OC

395ECSW), Group Captain (GPCAPT) Mark Gower argues that 'based on current activity, we need to train and practice in joint training/familiarisation.'[1] The answer is to develop robust Joint Logistics doctrine that is translated at tactical level into common joint procedures. These procedures need to be articulated in a training syllabus composed of common training outcomes. This syllabus needs to be then included in RAAF Senior NCO and Junior Officer logistics training to complement the SSL training.

A common Joint Logistics Training Outcomes Component should be therefore be developed as part of the training strategy for Senior NCOs and Junior Officers of the ADF, and in particular, the RAAF.

Scope

This paper will examine the historical development of ADF Joint and Single Service Logistics doctrine, structures, and systems. It will analyse the impact of Australian Defence restructuring and reform over the last decade on the ADF logistics system and initiatives recently begun to promote recovery, and identify that a 'gap' in Joint Logistics training at tactical level still exists. The paper will then outline a suggested training structure covering issues of course design, training outcomes and objectives, and training oversight with a view to closing this gap. This paper will be written from a RAAF perspective, and will draw predominantly on activity ongoing in the ADF, and within RAAF in particular.

Historical Development ADF Joint Doctrine

The immediate post-Cold War environment did not provide the promised 'Peace Dividend'. For the ADF the latter decade of the 20th Century was a period of ever-increasing operational tempo. The most recent Defence White Paper published in 2000 states that 'priority

---

[1] Group Captain Mark Gower *Comments on his view of logistics interoperability* unpublished email of 10 Mar 03

tasks [include] contributing effectively to international coalition forces to meet crises beyond our immediate neighbourhood.'[2] Events since 2000 prompted a minor review to Australia's defence posture. In the review document, the Australian Defence Minister states that Australia's review of its defence posture in the light of recent changes to Australia's strategic environment will 'inevitably result in increased emphasis on readiness and mobility, on interoperability, [and] on the development and enhancement of important new capabilities.'[3]

As a result of the ADF being increasingly involved in operations during the 1990s (and still being involved in 2003) it became evident that the ADF lacked depth in joint thought, doctrine and structure. This situation was addressed when, in 1995 it was recognised that the existing ADF Command and Control (C2) structures were unsatisfactory and failed to achieve unity of command or effective joint arrangements at the operational level.[4] In 1997, Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQAST) was established, delegating command at the operational level to the Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST) with a responsibility to conduct campaigns, operations and specific activities for the defence of Australia and its interests.[5]

Development of HQAST provided renewed impetus in the concurrent task of developing ADF Joint doctrine. Doctrine development is normally the responsibility of the ADF Warfare Centre (ADFWC). The Australian Department of Defence outlines ADFWC's mission:

---

[2] Australian Department of Defence *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence*

The ADFWC is a joint unit established to study, develop, teach, promulgate and provide advice on Australian Defence Force joint and combined warfare doctrine, procedures and tactics.[6]

ADFWC does not normally develop tactical level doctrine or procedures, assuming this task to be achieved by the individual services in accordance with joint doctrine.[7] ADFWC has also tended to concentrate on war-fighting doctrine as opposed to support doctrine. The list of training courses offered by ADFWC shows that of the seventeen programmes available only one—the Joint Logistics Planning Course (JLPC)—is concerned with the support to operations.[8] The JLPC, whilst being a valid contribution towards the training of logistics officers from all three services, confines itself to logistics planning at the operational level. ADFWC assumes that the students are conversant with the joint environment through previous training and/or experience.[9] Unfortunately, whilst a lot of experience is now available, very little if any, formal Joint Logistics doctrine or training exists that supports this assumption.

Changes to ADF Logistics Structures and Systems

HQAST and ADFWC however, should not be overly criticised. Indeed, Joint thinking in the ADF has reached a reasonably mature stage at strategic and operational level. To understand why the development of a common joint procedures is yet to occur, one must examine the impact of post Cold-War restructuring within the ADF that occurred whilst the HQAST concept was being developed.

During the period from 1991 to 2003, the ADF has been subject to large-scale downsizing and restructure. The 1991 Force Structure Review was conducted to examine the

---

[6] Australian Department of Defence *The Role of the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre*: available from http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/: accessed 18 Apr 03
[7] Durrel-Young, Thomas *Top Down: Planning Joint Doctrine, The Australian Experience*: available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1212.pdf: accessed 18 Apr 03
[8] Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre *Courses*: available from http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/adfwccourses.htm: accessed 18 Apr 03
[9] Ibid

relative priority of present and planned ADF capabilities in the post Cold War environment, and

to introduce cost-saving measures. These measures including the sale of defence facilities, the

contracting out of a range of base support and other functions to the civilian sector, the

replacement of service personnel with civilians in certain areas, and the replacement of regular

with reserve personnel, and significantly, the rationalisation of training activities.[10]

The themes contained in the Force Structure Review were echoed in later reviews. The result

was that the ADF logistics landscape was fundamentally altered, and the single service

'ownership' of generic logistics functions was drastically reduced. Many of these functions were

rationalised and strategic level ownership fragmented amongst various elements within the

Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) and Corporate Services and Infrastructure Group

(CSIG).[11] Single service 'owned' elements are now limited largely to first line (and some second

line) combat support functions, and deep support activities become the responsibility of generic

tri-service or joint organisations. The problem was that these organisations developed in

isolation, and with very little strategic direction. Indeed, no structure at strategic level was

developed to oversee or coordinate the whole process, and as a consequence full oversight of the

supply chain process was obscured. As Wing Commander Nigel Huckstepp observed when

commenting on the health of the Air Force Logistics Employment Group[12] (LEG):

> If the senior level corporate governance of the functions does not exist or if the strategic
> level picture is incorrect, the operational and tactical levels have a high risk of being
> compromised. In essence, the fundamental core of supply operations is the supply chain,
> at all levels.[13]

---

[10] Australian Department of Defence, *Force Structure Review, Report to the Minister for Defence* (Canberra ACT Australia: Australian Government Publishing Service 1991)

[11] Huckstepp, Wing Commander Nigel *Sustainment of the Air Force Logistics Employment Group* Unpublished Report to AFHQ Canberra, Mar 02

[12] The Air Force Logistics Employment Group (LEG), which comprises the Logistics Officer (LOG) Specialisation and the Clerk Supply (CLKSPLY), Supplier (SPLR) and Cook musterings

[13] Huckstepp, Wing Commander Nigel *Sustainment of the Air Force Logistics Employment Group*

The restructuring and refocus within the operational environment of HQAST, intended to reassert unity of command, was successful in achieving it primarily in terms of warfighting capability. The concurrent reorganisation of the wider logistics system however, resulted in a dispersed and generally misunderstood logistics support system. From an operational perspective, unity of command as it applied to the supply chain, was not being achieved.

Lack of unity of command in the logistics system has been evident in many recent operations. In Jan 2002 the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) 'Management of ADF Deployments to East Timor Report' highlighted the ADF's limitations in critical logistics skill areas brought about by significant reductions in logistics personnel. The report also referred to unaddressed systemic logistic weaknesses that had been identified following ADF deployments to Somalia and Papua New Guinea. The report concluded that a satisfactory supply chain management process that included verification procedures and documentation for Australian equipment and personnel contributions was not in place in East Timor.[14]

There is evidence of recent improvement in the state of ADF Joint Logistics intended to reestablish unity of command in logistics. The first move was to review the structure of DMO that had been created by amalgamating the three single services Logistics Commands, and to separate the direct support to operations responsibility from the procurement and industry support structures. The direct support to operations responsibility now belongs to Joint Logistics Command (JLC) which is more immediately responsive to the needs of COMAST and HQAST.

JLC however, has evolved from a primarily Army-centric structure. The operations element of HQ JLC in Melbourne was formed by re-tasking the previously Army Logistics Command operations cell as a Joint Logistics cell. An attempt made to increase its 'jointness' by

---

[14] Australian National Audit Office *Management of ADF Deployments to East Timor Report* (Canberra ACT Australia: Australian Government Publishing Service 2002)

inviting RAAF and RAN to populate vacant positions with their own staff officers. RAAF and RAN were slow to do they were at the time seeking to reduce logistics personnel in accordance with the 'savings' identified in the plethora of reviews discussed above. JLC therefore, remained very 'green' and as such does not display a great understanding of the idiosyncrasies involved in support to air and maritime operations.

At Task Force level, the Army has assumed the responsibility for providing logistics support to a JTF through the Logistics Support Force (LSF). The LSF is a former Army formation originally designed to provide third line support to Land elements. Again, there is no representation from RAAF or RAN, and this has been a subject of recent discussion where it became apparent that HQLSF did not fully understand the range of services or capabilities that RAAF are able to provide, nor appreciate the liaison or C2 requirements.[15] There exists therefore, an air of distrust among RAAF and RAN logisticians who have often thought that they are being denied a 'fair go' under these arrangements. Misunderstanding of 'joint' procedures that closely resemble Army procedures, the lack of transparency, and the 'green' nature of JLC and LSF is viewed—albeit somewhat unfairly—as an attempt to force RAAF and RAN to amend their individually developed procedures to accord with Army ones.

Nonetheless, the fact that such a structure exists is a major step forward, and the fact that ADF deployments overseas are likely to be predominantly, although not exclusively, 'green' in nature has compelled the RAAF (and RAN) to embrace rather than fight the concept. In December 2001 a review was conducted, endorsed by the Defence Committee, into the capacity of logistics arrangements in place at the strategic and operational levels to enable the ADF to

---

[15] HQ RAAF Combat Support Group *Brief on the LSF Interface* Sep 02

mount and sustain protracted offshore operations in Australia's immediate neighbourhood.[16] The

report recommended the logistic staff capacity of Strategic Command Division (SCD) within

Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ), HQ Australian Theatre, HQ JLC and Service HQs be

increased, particularly in terms of staffing from RAAF and RAN. Most importantly, the report

identified that an executive authority for logistics at the strategic level would be required to

provide oversight over the development of ADF Joint Logistics doctrine and training.

In summary, the ADF is emerging from a period of general upheaval and stress caused by

the need to reorganise in the post Cold-War environment. Pace of reform, coupled with a lack of

direction and coordination of reform, against a backdrop of increased operational tempo has

meant that many activities remained neglected during this period. Foremost among those

neglected areas has been the development of doctrine, and specifically the development of Joint

Logistics doctrine. The sparse amount of doctrine that has emerged has not been communicated

within the defence logistics community. Moreover, the ADF has been slow to develop Joint

Logistics SOPs, nor has it developed any formal training to teach these procedures. This is a

critical gap that requires to be examined seriously, and measures taken at strategic level to

provide oversight.

In the following section of this paper the impact of these changes on the RAAF is

examined, with an analysis of what the RAAF has done to recover from the impact, and where

gaps remain that affect the provision of logistics in deployed operations.

Impact of ADF structural reform on RAAF logistics

The process of reform was successful in achieving savings. However, an unintended

consequence was to reduce back staffing numbers too far in the RAAF logistics support

---

[16] ADHQ Report to the Defence Committee *Review into the Capacity of Logistics Arrangements in Place at the Strategic and Operational Levels to Mount and Sustain Protracted Offshore Operations in Australia's Immediate*

functions. Contracting out, and reductions in other areas led to a loss of corporate memory, and audit mechanisms such as Command and staff visits to units and Unit Self-Review Programs (USRP) were abandoned due to staffing shortages. Staffing shortages also meant that processes such as the review and amendment of Defence Instructions, Standing Orders and SOPs would fall into disarray.[17]

Many of the personnel savings in the RAAF Logistics Employment Group (LEG) were at the Wing Commander (WGCDR) and Squadron Leader (SQNLDR) level. These officers had been the focal point of logistics knowledge at units, and they were no longer available to guide and mentor Junior Officer and SNCO logistics support staff, or senior Base Management.[18] Other cost cutting measures included a review of training delivery in line with the rationalisation of training activities mandate of the 1991 Force Structure Review. It was quite clear from the outset that training was viewed as a 'cost' as opposed to an 'investment'. Logistics training at Junior Officer level became trivialised with the Basic Logistics Officers Course (BLOG) being reduced to a four week course in 2001, and the Senior Logistics Officers' Course being discontinued. Access to specialist courses was also limited, with a result that it was later concluded that 'current core training competencies [were] not adequately preparing logistics personnel for employment'[19] either within Australia or for deployment on joint operations.

The reduction in the Air Force LEG workforce, its fragmentation amongst a number of other ADF organisations, the absence of role definition or redefinition, and the lack of doctrine emerging as meaningful training, resulted in uncertainty, a loss of direction and focus, and poor

Neighbourhood 14 Dec 01.

[17] Veitch, G. *Logistics Sustainability Project* Unclassified Internal Minute to Director General Personnel (Air Force) Feb 02

[18] Ibid

[19] Huckstepp, Wing Commander Nigel *Logistics Sustainability Project* Dot Point Brief for Chief of Air Force Advisory Committee Jun 02

morale.[20] The separation rate reached 'unsustainable proportions',[21] and the severest loss was felt at the Flight Lieutenant (FLTLT) to WGCDR level where experienced officers were departing, and taking with them what little corporate knowledge remained. It was acknowledged that the RAAF LEG was in serious trouble, and these difficulties were manifesting themselves poor support to air operations both in Australia and overseas. In the absence of a strategic approach to the solution, and with little oversight or guidance emerging from Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ), RAAF had to take matters into its own hands to attempt to initially stabilise, then rectify the situation.

What the RAAF has done to address the impact of ADF structural reform on RAAF logistics

Moves towards addressing the problems in the RAAF LEG began with the initiation of the RAAF Logistics Sustainability Project (LSP) in December 2001. The LSP was mandated to identify and implement a LEG recovery programme that would ensure that the LEG was appropriately structured, trained and populated to support RAAF and wider ADF capability requirements.

Concurrent with the initiation of the LSP, was the decision to resurrect the Logistics Sponsorship (LOGSPON) section in Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ) Canberra. LOGSPON is the focal point on workforce structure, effectiveness and health, occupational proficiencies and competencies, domestic and overseas training requirements, and career development guidelines.[22] As the LOGSPON is normally led at GPCAPT level, it was assessed that a higher level of logistics representation was needed for strategic influence, both inside and outside the

---

[20] Veitch, G. *Logistics Sustainability Project*
[21] Huckstepp, Wing Commander Nigel *Logistics Sustainability Project*

11

RAAF. An Air Rank Officer with a logistics background was therefore appointed as the Head of

the Logistics Employment Group (HLEG) in an advisory capacity. Additionally, the Air Force

Logistics Advisory Council (AFLAC) was established to support LOGSPON and HLEG. The

AFLAC is a forum of senior officers that examines issues affecting the delivery of logistics

support to the Air Force.[23]

Where training was concerned, the LSP identified a lack of professional development

opportunities as a key factor with respect to retention, for personnel within the LEG. In response

to this, the Logistics Professional Development Program (LPDP) was developed. The purpose of

the LPDP is to provide Logistics Officers, Clerk Supply, Supplier and Cook Airmen/Airwomen

with the means to pursue ongoing professional development in broad areas of logistics

employment. The LPDP is aligned with, and complements the RAAF training continuum and

ensures RAAF logistics personnel maintain professional competence to effectively enable the

production of Air Force capability. The LPDP however, looks outward from the point of view of

accessing civil training and accreditation. It does not address ADF training in Joint Logistics.[24]

LOGSPON however, have recently 'fast tracked' a review of the Logistics Officer

Occupational Specification[25], and from it, a review of the Logistics Officer Training

Specification. This has led to the production of a far more useful RAAF Logistics Training

Model. Yet, whilst this model is a vast improvement on what existed before, it remains weak in

---

[22] Directorate of Planning and Logistics-Air Force *Logistics Sponsorship* in *The Logistics Flyer* Internal Newsletter for RAAF Logistics Officers, Jul 02
[23] Royal Australian Air Force Defence Instruction *Head of the Logistics Employment Group and the Air Force Logistics Advisory Council* Feb 03
[24] RAAF LOGSPON Information Circular *Logistics Professional Development Program (LPDP)* Feb 03
[25] In RAAF parlance an 'Occupational Specification' is a document that defines the employment requirements of a specific group of Air Force employees. Information in the Occupational Specification includes the competencies required by different ranks within the group, the minimum standards to which the tasks are to be performed, the requirements for entry to the group, and details of training and advancement within the group.

the area of Joint Logistics. The subject of Joint Logistics training has been broached by the

HLEG, however the matter remains unresolved.[26] In the next section of this paper the new

RAAF Logistics Training Model will be analysed, and an area identified within the model for the

introduction of a Joint Logistics training at tactical level component.

Analysis of the revised RAAF Logistics Training Model in the Joint Logistics context

The revised RAAF Logistics Training Model is illustrated at Figure 1. The model shows

a continuum of training where the individual progresses in rank, and it allows for training

received by officers commissioned from the Ranks to skip the Logistics Officers Initial Course

(LOIC)—the replacement for the old Basic Logistics Officers' Course (BLOG)—under

Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL). Focusing on the military aspects of training, it is intended

to be paralleled by civil training and development received as part of the LPDP, and the officer's

'all arms' generic training required by the Professional Military Education and Training (PMET)

programme.

---

[26] Project Board for the RAAF Logistics Sustainability Project Phase 2 M*inutes of the Meeting of the Project Board for the Logistics Sustainability Project Phase* 2 Held in AFHQ Canberra 21 Feb 03, Item 7

Fig 1 - RAAF Logistics Training Model[27]

Rank Progression (Officers)	Training Model Stages (Officers)	Training Model Stages (Airmen)	Rank Progression (Airmen)
WGCDR (Strategic)	Logistics Officers Advanced Course (LOAC)	RPL Bypass	
	⬆		
FLTLT/SQNLDR (Operational)	Logistics Officers Executive Course (LOEC)	⬅	
	⬆		
PLTOFF/FLGOFF/ FLTLT (Tactical)	Logistics Officers Initial Course (LOIC)	Supply Supervisors Course (SSC)	SNCO (Tactical)
		⬆	
		Supplier/Clerk Supply CPL Competencies	Corporal (Tactical)
		⬆	
		Supplier/Clerk Supply LAC Competencies	Leading Aircraftsman (Tactical)
		⬆	
		Supplier/Clerk Supply AC Competencies	Aircraftsman (Tactical)

Of note is the re-introduction of training at intermediate level with the Logistics Officers

Executive Course (LOEC), and the new concept of further training with the Logistics Officers

Advance Course (LOAC). As yet, course design approval for these two courses is yet to take

place, however the concept dovetails well with the PMET structure and provides for much

---

[27] RAAF School of Technical Training *RAAF Logistics Training Model* RAAF Base Wagga NSW, 2002

needed 'whole officer' training as the combined PMET and RAAF Logistics Training Model at
Fig 2 below demonstrates.

Rank Progression	RAAF Logistics Training Model Stages	PMET Stages
WGCDR (Strategic)	LOAC	CSC
FLTLT/SQNLDR (Operational)	LOEC	ISC
PLTOFF/FLGOFF/FLTLT (Tactical)	LOIC	JOIC

Fig 2 - Combined PMET and RAAF Logistics Training Model

The officer attending the JLPC delivered by ADFWC can achieve the Joint Logistics
training input required at the level of the LOEC. The JLPC Course Outline notes that 'this course
is suitable for senior CAPT(E) and MAJ(E). The aim is to train selected officers in logistic
planning to support Joint Operations at the Operational Level.'[28] Assuming that the officer has
advanced to SQNLDR, and has had the benefit of having attended the JLPC, further joint
training specifically in logistics is unlikely to be necessary. Jointness will be achieved at strategic
level through a combination CSC and LOAC coursework, and experience gained up to that point
in his or her career. Thus, if a Joint Logistics Training column were to be added to the combined
PMET and RAAF Logistics Training Model at Fig 2 above the combined PMET, RAAF
Logistics Training, and Joint Logistics Training Model would appear as in Fig 3 below:

Rank Progression	RAAF Logistics Training Model Stages	PMET Stages	Joint Logistics Training
WGCDR (Strategic)	LOAC	CSC	Continuing Exposure
FLTLT/SQNLDR (Operational)	LOEC	ISC	JLPC
PLTOFF/FLGOFF /FLTLT (Tactical)	LOIC	JOIC	

Fig 3 - Combined PMET, RAAF Logistics Training, and Joint Logistics Training Model

---

[28] Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre *Joint Logistics Planning Course (JLPC) Outline*: available from
http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/adfwccourses.htm: accessed 24 Apr 03

From Fig 3, it can be seen that it is at tactical level that the problem of lack of joint training remains. The LOIC is modular in structure, now ten weeks in length, and is a vast improvement on the now defunct BLOG Course, however, an examination of the course structure module flow diagram at Fig 4 below reveals that Joint Logistics are paid scant attention.

Logistics Officers Initial Course Module Flow	
MODULE ONE (2 Days) *Organisation of Defence Logistics*	**MODULE EIGHT (5 Days)** *Logistics Finance (ASRP-AF)*
MODULE TWO (2Days) *Integrated Personnel Management*	**MODULE NINE (1 Day)** *Integrated Logistics Support*
MODULE THREE (2 Days) *Procure Goods or Services (BESD)*	**MODULE TEN (7 Days)** *Supply Computing Systems*
MODULE FOUR (3 Days) *Unit 401: Plan Procurement (PSPPROC 401A) (BESD)*	**MODULE ELEVEN (1 Day)** *Procurement Activities*
MODULE FIVE (2 Days) *Unit 402: Request, Evaluate and Receive Offers (PSPPROC 402A) (BESD)*	**MODULE TWELVE (5 Days)** *Warehousing and Distribution*
MODULE SIX (2 Days) *Unit 403: Award Contracts (PSPPROC 403A) (BESD)*	**MODULE THIRTEEN (2 Days)** *Unit Movement Officer (JMCO-SYD)*
MODULE SEVEN (2 Days) *Unit 404: Manage Contracts (PSPPROC 404A) (BESD)*	**MODULE FOURTEEN (8 Days)** *Logistics Deployments*

Element of Competency Module 14 Logistics Officers Initial Course	Performance Criteria
4.1 Prepare logistics deployment bids/forecasts	4.1.1 Various *deployment programmes* are reviewed 4.1.2 Resource allocation bids are assessed/raised/ submitted 4.1.3 Annual allocations are received/reviewed/ amended
4.2 Conduct Pre-Deployment planning	4.2.1 *Planning conferences/meetings* are attended/convened/ensured 4.2.2 *Tasking instructions* are raised/received/reviewed/actioned 4.2.3 *Logistics requirements* are identified/assessed/reviewed/coordinated/actioned 4.2.4 *Transport modes* are assessed 4.2.5 *Deployment documentation* is raised/submitted 4.2.6 Confirmations are received to allow reassessment of requirements 4.2.7 Alternate arrangements are developed as required 4.2.8 Deployment items are checked for serviceability/availability
4.3 Manage Deployment/re-deployment Activities	4.3.1 Co-ordinate logistics aspects of mobilisation 4.3.2 *Briefs* are prepared/conducted/delegated as required 4.3.3 Mobilisation process is conducted/ensured 4.3.4 Interface with internal/ external agencies is conducted 4.3.5 Duties are conducted as required IAW ADF Unit Movement Officer Aide Memoire 4.3.6 Dis-embarkation activities are co-ordinated/conducted 4.3.7 Post-deployment reports are prepared
4.4 Manage reconstitution duties	Deployment *logistics schedules* are reviewed Logistics short falls are identified/rectified Documentation is completed as required

Fig 5. Logistics Officers Initial Course Module Flow - Breakdown of Competency Elements of Module 14[30]

Module 14 only seems to prepare the officer at basic level for the four generic phases of a deployment; deployment bids and forecasts, pre-deployment planning, deployment and redeployment, and reconstitution. Nowhere in the Performance Criteria is mentioned the issue of

---

[30] Ibid

Joint Logistics, or how the officer will situate their resupply procedures within a joint context. The difficulties that occurred for RAAF units when deployed in East Timor for example, occurred because the logistics personnel did not understand the network of linkages that existed within the deployment, nor were they trained in how to determine those linkages.[31]

The only course currently available at Junior Officer (and SNCO) level that addresses any joint issues is the five day generic Introduction to Joint Warfare Course (IJWC). This course (also run by ADFWC) is designed only to introduce Junior Officers and SNCO's to the planning of operations in a joint environment. In five days, eleven broad subject areas that include C2, logistics, joint doctrine and procedures, force element groups (air, land, and maritime), information, amphibious, airborne, and evacuation operations, Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Law of Armed Conflict, targeting, and planning for low level joint operations.[32] Whilst, in the absence of anything else, the IJWC is marginally useful, it still fails to provide the adequate depth in those areas of Joint Logistics tactical detail that should be considered as a basic element in Junior Officer and SNCO logistics training for all three services.

The situation would be improved were a separate, Discrete Joint Logistics Module or course developed to complement the RAAF LOIC, and also complement the Army and RAN LOIC equivalents. This would provide the Joint Logistics training that is absent in the combined PMET, RAAF Logistics Training, and Joint Logistics Training Model as illustrated in Fig 3 above. Thus, for RAAF Logistics Officers, the mature combined PMET, RAAF Logistics Training, and Joint Logistics Training Model would appear as in Fig 6 below:

---

[31] Collie Squadron Leader *Neil Logistics Post Operations Report* in *Comoro Airfield Support Group Post Operations Report Covering RAAF Operations in East Timor (UNTAET) Dec 2000 to Mar 01*, Mar 01
[32] Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre *Introduction to Joint Warfare Course (IJWC) Outline*: available from http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/adfwccourses.htm: accessed 24 Apr 03

Rank Progression	RAAF Logistics Training Model Stages	PMET Stages	Joint Logistics Training
WGCDR (Strategic)	LOAC	CSC	Continuing Exposure
FLTLT/SQNLDR (Operational)	LOEC	ISC	JLPC
PLTOFF/FLGOFF /FLTLT (Tactical)	LOIC	JOIC	Discrete Joint Logistics module or course

Fig 6 – The 'Mature' Combined PMET, RAAF Logistics Training, and Joint Logistics Training Model

It is reemphasised then, that a common Joint Logistics Training Outcomes Component must be developed as part of the training for Junior Logistics Officers of the ADF, and in particular, the RAAF. Whilst the RAAF Supply Supervisor's Course (SSC) for RAAF SNCOs has not been analysed, the discrete Joint Logistics Training Module proposed by this paper should also be available to compliment the SSL. Likewise it should be available to SNCOs of the Army and RAN logistics categories. The discrete Joint Logistics Training Module should have its core competencies defined by the existence of sound and robust Joint Logistics Doctrine. The next section of this paper proposes how this might be achieved.

Discrete Joint Logistics Module—Oversight, training design, and delivery responsibilities

Design of a discrete Joint Logistics Module requires that a number of steps should be taken. The first step is to determine where in the ADF Logistics structure oversight responsibility for course design should be placed. Since the determination of a robust Joint Logistics approach should be necessarily be 'Top-Down', the most appropriate level would be strategic. The process should be driven within ADHQ on behalf of the Chief of Defence Force (CDF), and through the Defence Logistics Board (DLB). Recently formed at strategic level recently, is the Logistics Education and Training Policy Group (LETPG) responsive to the DLB. Significantly, among the responsibilities of the LETPG are the requirements to identify and recommend, to the Defence Education and Training Committee (DETC), improvements to common/Joint Logistics training

and education, and also to develop a core competency framework for common/Joint Logistics roles.[33] As yet, no significant amount of output or guidance has emerged from the LETPG, however, the Training Authority responsibility must remain specifically the purview of the LETPG in developing a Discrete Joint Logistics Module.

From the RAAF perspective, LOGSPON and HLEG should prompt discussions at the AFLAC, with a view to prompting the DLB and LETPG towards taking steps to assemble a Joint Working Group to design an Occupational Specification for the 'Joint Tactical Logistician'. The Working Group should also and provide some impetus to the early development of robust Joint Logistics doctrine, as the membership that is suggested below are also be the stakeholders as far as Joint Logistics Doctrine is concerned.

The stakeholders forming the Occupational Specification Joint Working Group needs to include representatives at strategic, operational, and tactical level, and chaired by a representative from the LETPG if it is to be comprehensive in its analysis and conclusions. Participants at strategic level should be selected from the RAAF HLEG and LOGSPON, and their equivalents in Navy and Army. At operational level participants should be drawn from the J1/4 Cell at HQAST, and from the pool of logisticians in HQ Air Command, HQ Maritime Command, HQ Land Command, HQ Special Operations Command. Representatives from JLC, and HQ 1 Joint Movement Group will be most important, with tactical level input being provided by logisticians from the RAAF Combat Support Group, Army's Logistics Support Force, and from Navy's Fleet Support organisation.

The Occupational Specification needs to concentrate on those Joint Logistics core competencies whose development responsibility belongs to the LETPG, and that are missing

---

[33] Defence Education and Training Committee *The Logistics Education and Training Policy Group and the Logistics Education and Training Working Group* Briefing Document 18 Feb 02

from the range of core competencies delivered at single service level, and from which a Training Specification can be derived. As a start point, the competencies should be broadly reflective of the competencies stated in the Course Outline for the JLPC and should include knowledge of; Joint Logistics Doctrine, the Joint Supply chain for deployed operations, theatre and AO distribution and evacuation systems and procedures, and use of the Joint Logistics Lines of Communications (JLLOCs). Other core competencies are likely to emerge with deeper analysis, however the necessary work needs to be commenced as soon as possible.

Training should be delivered at one of the single service logistics schools, however the Army Logistic Training Centre (ALTC) is the largest and probably the best able to cope with the demands of new course. Staff would be drawn from all three services, and would be fully integrated and involved in course development, validation, and amendment in consultation with the LETPG. The precise method and length of training delivery would be determined during detailed course design work, but classroom work should be accompanied by visits to joint logistics headquarters and service providers, in particular the deployable elements, and coursework should be completed with some type of tabletop planning exercise.

The quality of the training could only be assured given the full commitment of all three services under the stewardship of the DLB through the LETPG. The option to take the Module and factor it into the single service JOIC equivalent courses should be avoided. Selection of this option would eliminate the opportunity to network early with logistics colleagues from different services. Additionally training standardisation and delivery quality would be vulnerable to compromise. Validation would be achieved by an ongoing course critique, with formal follow up required from students as they apply this knowledge in the field. Course design would be

reactive to developing logistics doctrine, through an annual course design review to be driven by the LEPTG as the Training Authority.

Conclusion

This paper maintains that a common Joint Logistics Training Outcomes Component should be developed as part of the training strategy for Senior NCOs and Junior Officers of the ADF, and in particular, the RAAF. This component must be derived from robust Joint Logistics doctrine that is translated at tactical level into common joint procedures, articulated in a training syllabus or module composed of common training outcomes to complement the SSL training of each ADF service.

In analysing this issue this paper began by examining the historical development of ADF Joint and Single Service Logistics doctrine, structures, and systems. In doing so, it documented the formation of HQAST as the ADF's Operational Headquarters that has led to a mature joint approach to contingency operations within Australia and overseas. The paper also examined the negative impacts of Australian Defence restructuring and reform that have occurred over the last decade, and in the ADF logistics system in particular. The evidence presented during this analysis exposed weaknesses throughout the ADF logistics systems, specifically its fragmentation, staff shortages, reduced emphasis on training. Also exposed was the lack of strategic oversight, and ongoing lack of robust Joint Logistics Doctrine and training. These weaknesses were demonstrated to have percolated through to the field. A series of ADF and other government department reports have criticised the execution of logistics during a number of recent and current deployed joint operations.

This paper examined a number of initiatives recently begun to promote recovery in the RAAF. The paper examined the role of the Logistics Sustainability Project in pointing the way

forward, and the recent genesis of structures at strategic level such as the RAAF Logistics Sponsor and Head of the Logistics Employment Group, concluding that these were positive steps. The third initiative that was examined, was the newly developed RAAF Logistics Training Model, with specific attention being focused on the Logistics Officers' Initial Course. In analysing the Training Specification for this course, the paper was able to identify that that the gap in Joint Logistics training at tactical level still exists.

This paper then, urges that a strategy that should be rapidly developed training structure covering issues of course design, training outcomes and objectives, and training delivery and oversight with a view to closing this gap. The ADF Logistics structure oversight responsibility for course design should be at strategic level, through the Defence Logistics Board's Logistics Education and Training Policy Group. A Joint Working Group should be assembled to design an Occupational Specification for the 'Joint Tactical Logistician', and promote the early development of robust Joint Logistics doctrine. The Occupational Specification Joint Working Group must include representatives at strategic, operational, and tactical level joint and single service logistics organisations.

The Occupational Specification must develop Joint Logistics core that are missing from the range of core competencies delivered at single service level. A single training venue is urged, with the Army Logistic Training Centre recommended as the most appropriate facility, and with staff drawn from all three services. A process for training validation must be established overseen by the LEPTG as the Training Authority.

In 1997, Major General Mueller, the then Commander Support Australia stated that:

A joint logistic system can work successfully only by unity of command, development of common objectives and common processes and training, fast and free exchange of information, appointment of good logistics commanders and staffs, development of

23

mutual confidence and establishment of a compatible, though at times imperfect, organisation.[34]

This paper concludes that the organisation is 'imperfect' and that the gap in Joint Logistics training at tactical level is a manifestation of this imperfection. The ADF logistics organisation must, as a matter of priority, address this issue. This paper is intended to provoke some thought within the organisation, provide a suggested strategy for its resolution, and recommend this strategy for further consideration.

---

[34] Mueller Major General D M *Support Command Australia* A paper presented at the Defence Procurement Conference, Canberra, 1997 available from http://www.pasols.org/log15-9.htm: accessed 21 Apr 03

Glossary of Abbreviations

AC	Aircraftsman
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADFA	Australian Defence Force Academy
ADFWC	Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre
ADHQ	Australian Defence Headquarters
AFHQ	Air Force Headquarters
AFLAC	Air Force Logistics Advisory Council
ALTC	Army Logistic Training Centre
AO	Area of Operations
ANAO	Australian National Audit Office
BLOG	Basic Logistics Officers Course
CF	Canadian Forces
COMAST	Commander Australian Theatre
CO	Commanding Officer
CPL	Corporal
CSC	Command and Staff Course
CSIG	Corporate Services and Infrastructure Group
C2	Command and Control
DETC	Defence Education and Training Council
DLB	Defence Logistics Board
DMO	Defence Materiel Organisation
FLTLT	Flight Lieutenant
HLEG	Head of the Logistics Employment Group (RAAF)
HNS	Host Nation Support
HQAST	Headquarters Australian Theatre
INTERFET	International Force in East Timor
IJWC	Introduction to Joint Warfare Course
ISC	Intermediate Staff Course
JIT	Just in Time Training

JLC	Joint Logistics Command
JLPC	Joint Logistics Planning Course
JLLOC	Joint Logistics Line of Communication
JOIC	Junior Officer Initial Course
JSSC	Joint Services Staff Course
JTF	Joint Task Force
LEG	Logistics Employment Group (RAAF)
LETPG	Logistics Education and Training Policy Group
LOAC	Logistics Officer's Advanced Course
LOCC	Logistics Officer Common Course (Canadian)
LOEC	Logistics Officer's Executive Course
LOGSPON	RAAF Logistics Sponsor
LOIC	Logistics Officer's Initial Course
LPDP	Logistics Professional Development Program
LSF	Logistics Support Force
LSP	RAAF Logistics Sustainability Project
PSO	Peace Support Operation
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
PMET	Professional Military Education and Training programme.
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RPL	Recognition of Prior Learning
SCD	Strategic Command Division
SNCO	Senior Non-Commissioned Officer
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SQNLDR	Squadron Leader
SSL	Single Service Logistics
UN	United Nations
USRP	Unit Self-Review Program
WGCDR	Wing Commander
395ECSW	No.395 Expeditionary Combat Support Wing

Bibliography

Published Sources

Australian Department of Defence *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force* (Canberra ACT Australia: Australian Government 2000)

Australian Department of Defence *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003* (Canberra ACT Australia: Australian Government Publishing Service 2003)

Australian Department of Defence, *Force Structure Review, Report to the Minister for Defence* (Canberra ACT Australia: Australian Government Publishing Service 1991)

Australian National Audit Office *Management of ADF Deployments to East Timor Report* (Canberra ACT Australia: Australian Government Publishing Service 2002)

Department of National Defence Canada Logbranch Secretariat *A Handbook on the Canadian Forces Logistics Branch* (Ottawa, Canada, Department of National Defence 2000)

Internet Sources

Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre *Courses*: available from http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/adfwccourses.htm: accessed 18 Apr 03

Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre *Introduction to Joint Warfare Course (IJWC) Outline*: available from http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/adfwccourses.htm: accessed 24 Apr 03

Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre *Joint Logistics Planning Course (JLPC) Outline*: available from http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/adfwccourses.htm: accessed 24 Apr 03

Australian Department of Defence *The Role of the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre*: available from http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/: accessed 18 Apr 03

Durrel-Young, Thomas *Top Down: Planning Joint Doctrine, The Australian Experience*: available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1212.pdf: accessed 18 Apr 03

Mueller Major General D M *Support Command Australia* A paper presented at the Defence Procurement Conference, Canberra, 1997 available from http://www.pasols.org/log15-9.htm: accessed 21 Apr 03

Treloar, Air Vice-Marshal R.B. *The Australian Theatre* A paper presented to the 2000 RAAF Air Power Conference, Canberra Australia: available from http://www.defence.gov.au/aerospacecentre: accessed 17 Apr 03

Australian Department of Defence Internal Sources

ADHQ Report to the Defence Committee *Review into the Capacity of Logistics Arrangements in Place at the Strategic and Operational Levels to Mount and Sustain Protracted Offshore Operations in Australia's Immediate Neighbourhood* 14 Dec 01

Collie Squadron Leader, Neil *Logistics Post Operations Report* in *Comoro Airfield Support Group Post Operations Report Covering RAAF Operations in East Timor (UNTAET) Dec 2000 to Mar 01*, Mar 01

Defence Education and Training Committee *The Logistics Education and Training Policy Group and the Logistics Education and Training Working Group* Briefing Document 18 Feb 02

Directorate of Planning and Logistics-Air Force *Logistics Sponsorship* in *The Logistics Flyer* Internal Newsletter for RAAF Logistics Officers, Jul 02

Huckstepp, Wing Commander Nigel *Logistics Sustainability Project* Dot Point Brief for Chief of Air Force Advisory Committee Jun 02

Huckstepp, Wing Commander Nigel *Sustainment of the Air Force Logistics Employment Group* Unpublished Report to AFHQ Canberra, Mar 02

RAAF Combat Support Group *Brief on the LSF Interface* Sep 02

RAAF LOGSPON Information Circular *Logistics Professional Development Program (LPDP)* Feb 03

Royal Australian Air Force Defence Instruction *Head of the Logistics Employment Group and the Air Force Logistics Advisory Council* Feb 03

RAAF School of Technical Training *Logistics Officers Initial Course Training Specification* RAAF Base Wagga NSW, 2002

RAAF School of Technical Training *RAAF Logistics Training Model* RAAF Base Wagga NSW, 2002

Project Board for the RAAF Logistics Sustainability Project Phase 2 M*inutes of the Meeting of the Project Board for the Logistics Sustainability Project Phase* 2 AFHQ Canberra 21 Feb 03

Unpublished Sources

Gower, Group Captain, Mark *Comments on his view of logistics interoperability:* unpublished email of 10 Mar 03

Veitch, G. *Logistics Sustainability Project* Unclassified Internal Minute to Director General Personnel (Air Force) Feb 02