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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLEGE DES FORCES

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EXERCICE/EXERCISE NEW HORIZONS

**UNIFICATION OF THE CANADIAN FORCES: IT'S HARD TO BE GREEN**

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*...Force generation - the many activities involved in developing and preparing military forces for operational employment - is still almost exclusively undertaken by the three Services ...Arguably, this situation places undue emphasis on maintenance of the status quo, and does not foster a more unified approach amongst the services.<sup>1</sup>*

Canadians who have either lived through or studied the unification of the Canadian Forces (CF) in 1968 may recognize this quote as an argument made at the time to describe the dysfunctional Canadian military. It was argued that the unification of the three services under a single commander was required to ensure that the Army, Navy and Air Force would work together to achieve a common goal. This opening quote, however, is not from the 1960s, but rather from a paper published by the Vice Chief of Defence Staff and the Director-General Strategic Planning in June 2000. Today's focus for Canada's military is on 'joint' operations. Doctrinally, a joint operation is defined as "an operation involving two or more services of a single country".<sup>2</sup> As illustrated by the opening quote, there is concern among senior military officers that the Canadian military does not work well together and that service priorities take precedence over CF-wide interests. This point was again re-iterated by a CF Lieutenant General in his address to the CF College in April 2003 when he stated that although the CF unified in the 1960s, the three services continue to "think independently" in their approach to operations<sup>3</sup>. Thus the inevitable question arises as to what the unification of the Canadian Forces did for Canada's military and whether this unification has been successful. As the title of this paper suggests, it would appear that the CF has had a very difficult time trying to be 'green', that is, having the common vision that putting CF members in a common 'green' uniform was intended to foster.

The unification of the CF was a significant event that tried to change the course of Canada's military. For all the controversy, resignations and acrimony however, has the CF changed that much since 1968? Today the Canadian military still basically operates as

three distinct Commands, each lobbying for funding, each setting its own 'way ahead' and with very little regard for the other environments. This paper will illustrate that the CF has not unified into the single service envisioned in the 1968 Reorganization Act and that it operates today, for the most part, as three distinct services.

The analysis of the unification of the CF will begin with a brief examination of the existing 1960s circumstances that caused the government to create the 1968 Reorganization Act. This will establish the context for further discussion. Next, each of the four goals of unification will be analyzed to illustrate that none of these stated goals has been met. To illustrate that the three services operate as distinct services, the Canadian model for unification will be compared to the existing military structure of the United States to demonstrate that the failed unification of the CF has created a Canadian military structure that closely resembles the US military's. It will be argued that this current structure has the three services functioning as distinct entities, continuing to struggle to work together. Finally to reinforce the fact that this lack of unification has been acknowledged by the CF's senior leadership, the paper will conclude with a brief discussion on the impact of the CF's failed unification and highlight how today's Canadian military is trying to achieve synergy and harmony among the Army, Navy and Air Force.

To begin the examination, it is important to understand the 1960s climate that led the Liberal government to pursue unification, and the one man who led the charge. The 1960s were typical of much of Canada's fiscal history. The competition for limited federal dollars led all government departments to use all means necessary to make the most of their budgets. Making matters more difficult, expensive technology was being introduced which further compounded defence fiscal planning. In 1963, a new federal government took office under the leadership of Lester B. Pearson, and Paul Hellyer was appointed Minister

of National Defence. Paul Hellyer was Canada's youngest Member of Parliament when first elected in 1949 and the youngest cabinet minister when appointed to the government of Louis St. Laurent eight years later.<sup>4</sup> It was the belief of many that the young, aggressive politician was determined to use his new defence portfolio as a catalyst to enhance his political career<sup>5</sup>, and he wasted no time taking swift, dramatic action. Shortly after assuming the Minister of Defence portfolio, Hellyer noted significant difficulties with the existing structure of the Canadian military. He believed that the three services were heading in different directions and that their efforts needed to be better coordinated. The Minister believed that the three services had completely different concepts for fighting the next war. The air force was planning a short-term thermonuclear exchange, the army anticipated a long drawn out campaign in Europe, and the navy was somewhere in the middle with its emphasis on antisubmarine warfare.<sup>6</sup> Hellyer felt that there was “no strategic unity, there was no unity of planning and no adequate machinery for setting priorities with respect to roles and missions, and the equipment necessary to fulfill them.”<sup>7</sup> He believed that a fundamental change in the way that the three services planned and conducted operations was required. In an effort to reduce costs, increase operational effectiveness and enhance career opportunities within the military services, Paul Hellyer introduced legislation that would unify the Canadian Forces.<sup>8</sup>

Unification was defined as “the merging of the armed forces and their supporting structures into a single organization with a unitary hierarchy”<sup>9</sup>. It is important to note that "integration", the civilianizing of National Defence Headquarters, is a term that is often confused with unification. Integration occurred in 1972 under then-Defence Minister Donald McDonald. It's goals, designed to increase civilian control over military matters, are beyond the scope of this paper. The documents that formally implemented Hellyer's

unification plan were the 1964 White Paper on Defence, Bill C-90 - An Act to Amend the National Defence Act, and Bill C-243 - the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act. The White Paper expressed the government's views on the future roles and responsibilities of the military, Bill C-90 created a single Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and integrated the command structure, and Bill C-243 resulted in unification of the CF. Under the provisions of Bill C-243, passed on 1 February 1968, "the three existing services, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force, were abolished and Canada's armed forces became a single service called the Canadian Forces".<sup>10</sup> Although his plans and policies were not widely supported by the Cabinet<sup>11</sup>, Paul Hellyer's strong will and political ambitions made him a forceful politician who was not easily influenced. The military response was dramatic: two senior generals retired in 1964 and seven admirals followed suit in 1967, as did Hellyer's own Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Frank Miller.<sup>12</sup> To say that unification was unpopular amongst the majority of serving military personnel is a significant understatement. In fact, unification has often been described by serving members as "an unmitigated disaster for Canada's Armed Forces".<sup>13</sup> Many of the reasons for this dissatisfaction will become evident as the discussion continues. So what then did unification accomplish?

Having briefly reviewed the historical issues that led to CF reorganization, an analysis will follow to discuss whether unification has been successful. To do this, the goals of unification will be analyzed to explore whether in fact these goals have been met. In his 1966 address to the Canadian Parliament on the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act, Minister Hellyer outlined four principles or goals of the single service. They were: establishing a common identity, improving career advancement opportunities, realizing financial savings and increasing operational effectiveness.<sup>14</sup>

The first goal of unification was the aim of creating a common identity amongst the three services. As will be seen, this implicitly meant the elimination of single service affiliation. The government felt that the creation of a unified military would establish a common identity and that with this single affiliation, servicemen would “have an overriding loyalty to the whole force and its objectives on behalf of Canada”.<sup>15</sup> The first step was to create a common uniform, with common rank insignia. Coupled with the creation of a single uniform, unification progressed quickly with the combining of support functions at all levels. Instead of creating a pride and loyalty in the whole force however, combining the support services of the three environments merely created "what amounted to a fourth service, and the identification of its members with a support branch rather than an operational unit or force, created a rift between the supporters and the operators".<sup>16</sup> The quest for this overriding loyalty was met with almost instant resentment. Servicemen were loath to give up their unit affiliation, their identity and their traditions. From the outset military members had tremendous difficulties accepting the common (green) uniform and deeply resented abandoning their service identity. Of the decision to switch to a single uniform and the ensuing attempt to disassociate members from prior regimental and service loyalties it was said that unit cohesion, "that almost mystical mix of the warrior's psychology, family dynamics ... that all good armies and their commanders coveted, was casually thrown to the wind".<sup>17</sup> Canadian military members were asked to surrender their pride and loyalty in their service that had developed over the years in favour of a single uniform and a single service, void of environmental affiliation. This was, in the final analysis, too much to ask.

Following the initial shock and resentment, underlying opposition to the single service continued throughout the early 1970s. Further, unification was "crippled by the

reappearance of service-based headquarters first in the army and navy and then, in 1975 with the authorization of Air Command".<sup>18</sup> In 1990 Hellyer himself characterized the creation of Air Command as a "big step backwards".<sup>19</sup> As early as 1978 dissatisfaction with the single service concept was so pronounced that upon taking office under the Joe Clark government in 1979, Defence Minister Allan McKinnon, a retired army major who was "uncompromisingly opposed to unification"<sup>20</sup>, appointed a Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces "to examine the merits and disadvantages of unification of the Canadian Forces".<sup>21</sup> This Task Force was chaired by G.M. Fyffe and produced a significant report on the results of CF Reorganization. The Fyffe Report, published in 1980, provides significant data on the original outcomes of unification. Produced 12 years after the Reorganization Act, the Report provides facts and figures that can be attributed to the immediate affects of the elimination of the three services. As will be seen, many of the conclusions of the Report remain valid today.

Amongst its numerous findings and recommendations, the Fyffe Report observed that the environmental Commanders did not have an adequate voice on defence matters. Two recommendations followed: first, the Commanders should be afforded membership in the Defence Council and second, that the Commanders should be responsible to the CDS for command of their respective service.<sup>22</sup> Acceptance of these recommendations effectively recognized the Commanders of Commands as "distinct entities, and thereby undermined the single-service concept".<sup>23</sup> Thus the three environmental commanders were again established as service chiefs. Hellyer's plan to "lop off"<sup>24</sup> the heads of the three services was effectively reversed.

The elimination of service affiliation has never been successful and servicemen have continued to associate themselves with these 'distinct entities'. By way of example,



although theoretically abolished in 1968, Canadian air force personnel celebrated the 75th anniversary of the Royal Canadian Air Force in 1998, and created a 75th anniversary pin which was worn on their official dress uniform. Additionally, army and navy units regularly celebrate their birthdays, significant battles and unit significant events. Finally, 23 years after unification, harsh feelings on attempts to abandon environmental loyalties still ran deep. In fact, a 2001 Defence analysis observed that, post-unification, "morale within the [CF] never recovered, even after several [subsequent] concessions about uniforms".<sup>25</sup> The reference to uniform concession refers to the 1985 Mulroney government decision to return the three services to their environmental uniforms. It is interesting to note Mr. Hellyer's remarks about the return of the three uniforms. He stated that the return to separate uniforms was "not well thought out and recreates some of the problems we faced at the time ... The Mulroney government's emotion-driven backward march has already resulted in some unnecessary levels of fat."<sup>26</sup> Years later Hellyer insists that all CF members both for "psychological and practical reasons" must wear a common uniform.<sup>27</sup> The tremendous resentment felt by serving members and the return to the three service identities, however, is recognition that this common identity goal could not be achieved. It is clear that the goal of foregoing unit and environmental loyalties in favour of a broad CF-wide affiliation has not been met.

The second goal of unification was the broadening of career advancement opportunities for all CF members. Hellyer proposed that "for able and highly motivated individuals, both officers and other ranks, wider, more challenging and rewarding career opportunities [would] be available."<sup>28</sup> It was clear from the outset, and highlighted in the Fyffe Report, that career enhancement opportunities would only be available to those career fields that had mobility between environments, namely the support occupations.

Operational personnel, on the other hand, saw no changes to career advancement at all.<sup>29</sup>

To compound the problem, the Report noted that "among the support services, there [was] a clear orientation away from their prime objective of support to the operational forces".<sup>30</sup>

The goal of enhanced career opportunities in effect reduced the operational efficiency of the CF by drawing support personnel away from their areas of expertise in recognition of enhanced career opportunities provided by cross-training. Compounding the career advancement problem was the fact that throughout the decade of the 1970's, the Department of National Defence (DND) had seven ministers, three in a single year.

Desmond Morton, in his book *A Military History of Canada*, writes,

Left to themselves, the services stagnated, focused on the trivia of uniforms, and cautiously rebuilt the old service identities. By 1975, it was again officially permissible to refer to "navy", "army", and "air force". An inflated rank structure became a costly solace for professional sterility: generals and colonels proliferated and privates became scarce.<sup>31</sup>

Today's military career advancement structure has not changed since the 1970's. While there remains a greater career possibility for support occupations in strategic level headquarters, operational personnel continue to compete and get promoted within their environments. Thus it would appear that unification did little to increase the career advancement opportunities for Hellyer's "able and highly motivated individuals". Today's operational officers continue to be promoted within their environments, and very senior officers compete with each other at the strategic level, the same way they did prior to unification.

The third goal, financial savings, is an interesting study. As was noted previously, the fiscal restraint of the 1960s had all government departments scrambling to make the most of their budgets. To satisfy budget issues, funding was generally determined by what was affordable politically, and not necessarily based on specific military requirements.<sup>32</sup> It

became critical that cost reductions brought about by unification be translated into capital expenditures. Minister Hellyer believed that the "unified force [would] provide much greater flexibility to meet changing requirements in the Defence organization made necessary by advances in military technology and changes in the international situation".<sup>33</sup> Paul Hellyer argued that the financial problems facing the department could be directly attributed to the lack of coordination of the three services. As was previously mentioned, he believed at the time that the three services had completely different concepts for fighting the next war. He thought that the only logical solution to get the three services to share a common vision and to reduce redundant overhead and unnecessary equipment purchases was through the creation of a single service. In his arguments to Parliament, Hellyer proposed that reorganization would reduce overhead costs to provide more funds for the acquisition of modern operational equipment in keeping with Canada's defense roles and commitments.<sup>34</sup> This reduction in overhead costs would be realized by reducing the manpower costs of duplication and triplication of administrative efforts and thus smaller headquarters staffs. In fact, "elimination of duplication and triplication of functions was a main theme for unification of the CF".<sup>35</sup> In analyzing the numbers it is clear that the anticipated savings have never been realized. In 1964, there were 3,261 military and 4,486 civilian personnel at headquarters; in 1979, there were 3,083 military and 4,317 civilians, a total reduction of less than 5 percent. During this same period, the overall reduction of military personnel CF-wide was 34 percent and for civilian personnel, 20 percent.<sup>36</sup> These figures remain relevant today for although Headquarters' populations continued to be revised in the 1980s and 1990s, it is difficult to argue that these adjustments could be attributed to unification. It is thus apparent that the anticipated personnel savings for the elimination of headquarters manpower costs has never been achieved. Further, the capital

spending program numbers are staggering. The anticipated savings that were going to be applied to the capital acquisition program simply never accrued. Capital expenditures dropped from a high of 16% in 1967/68 to an all-time low of 9% in 1972/73.<sup>37</sup> Today's capital expenditure program sits at approximately 14%.<sup>38</sup> Again, the Fyffe Report concluded that the financial savings that would allow for the equipping of the CF never materialized. They found it "impossible to identify the aggregate savings that may be attributable solely to unification".<sup>39</sup> In fact, no financial savings initiatives in the past 30 years have had a positive impact on the Defence capital program. Any financial savings brought about by the 1966 consolidation of support activities, the 1968 unification and even the extensive reengineering that took place in 1998 were not redistributed back to DND but were rather reapportioned to other government departments.<sup>40</sup> It is once again clear that a stated goal of unification has failed to occur. The final goal to be examined will be operational effectiveness.

Minister Hellyer believed that three independent services were ill prepared and poorly organized to meet modern day (1970s) operational challenges. "The nature of modern warfare", he argued, "has resulted in a compaction of time and distance (i.e. space) to the point where decision-making and reaction-time must be swifter than ever before in history. A unified force best meets this demand."<sup>41</sup> The minister believed that the three services were incapable of effectively working together operationally in their current independent structures, and that a unified force was required to respond effectively to modern day contingency operations. Although the services were used to working together on joint operations, the minister believed that truly successful joint operations could only be accomplished by a single service. He believed that the individual services were incapable of putting aside environmental priorities for the greater good. Unification, he

thought, would be the solution. Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case. First, the Fyffe Report observed that there was no conclusive evidence that demonstrated "...whether or not the goal of achieving swifter decision making or swifter reaction capability" had been obtained.<sup>42</sup> This initial observation has been validated by more current studies. In the 2001 "Report of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century", the Council observed that, "despite the formal unification of the Army, Navy and Air Force into the Canadian Armed Forces in the 1960s, the CF has yet to develop a truly integrated approach to operations."<sup>43</sup> Brigadier General (retired) Sharpe and Dr. English appear to agree with the Council's observations when they wrote in 2001, "the major impact [of unification] was upon the bureaucratic organization of the CF and DND, and [that it had] relatively little impact on ... joint operations".<sup>44</sup> They further observed that the CF's current structure, although somewhat joint in principle, is still seen to be on focused "more on business practices than the virtues of the warrior necessary in a military culture".<sup>45</sup> They note that although the focus for unification was thought to be on improving operational efficiency, the focus on administrative and overhead issues has significantly diluted any operational advantages. Calgary's Centre for Military and Strategic Studies suggests that it is "ironic that 'the non-unified' US and British armed forces have achieved a far greater level of integration on operations than the Canadian Forces".<sup>46</sup> History has demonstrated therefore, that unification did little to enhance the operational effectiveness of the three services and today's CF continues to struggle to achieve an efficient method of achieving joint-ness in operations.

The analysis of the failed goals of unification clearly demonstrates that the opponents of Paul Hellyer's unification plan may have had legitimate concerns. The 1980 Fyffe Report that has been cited extensively in the discussion concluded that, "it is

dubious whether unification has achieved [any of] the intended goals".<sup>47</sup> 35 years after unification and 23 years after the Fyffe Report, it appears that the CF is still coping with the same problems. Many people argue that the unification of the CF was necessary to ameliorate a complicated command and control structure that included numerous committees, endless bureaucracy and redundant administration. Bill C-90 however, had already created a single Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and integrated the command structure, with relatively little opposition. Unification (Bill C-243), with the stated goals of creating a common identity, improving opportunities for career advancement, realizing significant financial savings and improving the operational effectiveness of the three services, clearly failed to accomplish that which was intended.

The first two sections of the paper outlined the historical perspective that led to unification followed by an analysis of the four goals of unification and how none of these benchmarks for success had been met. Thus having discussed why unification was required and how it failed, the final portion of the paper will discuss how today's Canadian military operates as basically three distinct services. The examination will begin with a review of current doctrine and practices and discussion on how the organization of today's CF compares with that of the US military. A comparison to the US model will illustrate how the Americans are trying to achieve joint-ness not through unification of their services, but rather by creating effective joint doctrine. It will be argued that the CF military, abandoning unification, is pursuing a similar path. To begin then, the functioning and organization of today's CF.

Canadian military operations and training are concentrated on joint and combined operations. Joint operations involve two or more services of a single country, whereas combined operations involve services of two or more countries. In creating a unified force,

the Canadian military by definition has abandoned joint operations, which is not required of a unified force. The US Marines are held out as the example of a truly unified force, effectively combining army, air force and to some extent, maritime operations. When operating independently, the US Marines do not use joint terminology because they do not have separate services. Being a unified Corps, the term 'joint' would be doctrinally inappropriate. Similarly, given that Canada's military is legally a single service, the term 'joint', used widely today to describe CF operations, appears to be contradictory. CF doctrine deals with this contradiction by stating that,

Notwithstanding the legal aspects of the NDA [National Defence Act], which describes the CF as a single service, when elements of two or more environments of the CF are required to cooperate, they will do so under a joint structure, using internationally recognized joint terminology... CF doctrine must cater to both domestic and international operations without generating confusion within a Canadian force or amongst our allies, hence the use of the joint terminology.<sup>48</sup>

Thus CF doctrine states that the use of joint terminology, although legally inappropriate, is used so as not to confuse Canada's allies. It is my contention, however, that CF doctrine uses joint terminology not because they do not wish to confuse international allies, but rather because Canada's three services continue to operate as distinct entities. A case in point would be the use of joint terminology on purely domestic operations and in Command and Staff training. Further, it is difficult to argue that the creation of the Canadian military's CF "Joint" Headquarters was so named in order that Canada's allies would not be confused. Recognizing the continued existence of the distinct services, the CF has adopted to establish a truly Joint Headquarters and concentrate on the use of joint doctrine. Finally, the 2000 Strategic Capability Planning for the CF states that the small size of the three services results in comparatively few international situations where they would operate jointly. "More frequently, however, CF units will be combined with units of

another nation of similar capabilities”.<sup>49</sup> Stating that in the future CF units would most likely be employed internationally with ‘similar’ units of other countries is implicit recognition that Canada’s three services will not be called upon to deploy with each other, but will most often deploy as separate entities working in a combined operational structure within their distinct environments.

Proponents of the success of unification would argue that Canada’s three services do not operate today as separate entities, but rather work legally and practically as a single service. It is thus important at this stage to compare Canada’s current military structure with that of the US military. A significant restructure of the American military occurred in 1986 with the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. The reorganization was felt necessary because of the services seeming inability to work together. It was argued that a parochialism that “incapacitated coordination between the services on the battlefield” had developed caused primarily because of service-driven budget choices that resulted in the “lack of armed forces doctrine, training, familiarity, and technical ability to perform jointly”.<sup>50</sup> The Goldwater-Nichols Act had several important consequences for the US military. The Act centralized command authority through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as opposed to the service chiefs.<sup>51</sup> The service chiefs were removed from operational authority and became force providers, primarily responsible for recruiting, training and equipping their services. The Act had a significant impact on reducing the influence of service parochialism on operations.<sup>52</sup> One cannot help but be struck by the similarities between the Hellyer and Goldwater-Nichols legislations. The Goldwater-Nichols initiative and CF unification had the same goals. Simply put, they both sought to eliminate service biases from decision-making, and thereby attempted to ensure operational decisions were based on legitimate operational requirements, and not



simply based on any specific environmental issue.<sup>53</sup> The US military has accomplished this, not through unification, but through recognition that the services are simply force providers for the joint commanders. The creation of Canada's Joint Headquarters and the emphasis on joint operations are indications that Canada is now pursuing a parallel course. Unification, designed to create a single service, has been foregone in favour of the role of distinct services serving as force providers for the joint force commanders, both domestically and internationally.

A final acknowledgement that unification has failed and that Canada's three services indeed operate, not as the unified force envisioned by the 1968 Reorganization Act, but as three distinct services is provided in the 2003 "Official Opposition Defence Policy Paper on Defence". Written to address what it feels are long-standing problems within DND and the CF, the paper provides a number of recommendations to "modernize and return pride to the Canadian Armed Forces".<sup>54</sup> Canada's Official Opposition writes,

... the policy of unification of the armed forces has now been in place for nearly thirty-five years. Initially conceived as a bold innovation which other countries would emulate and which would increase resources available for capital equipment, it in fact achieved neither. No country has followed Canada's lead in eliminating the identities of its services ... If the separate identities of the three services were restored, functional integration would still be retained. Cross service commands would continue to function much as they do at present. What would change would be enhancement of pride and esprit de corps.<sup>55</sup>

The Official Opposition has in effect recognized that unification has not been successful and has recommended the formal reinstatement of the three services. It is significant to note the comment that "Cross service commands would continue to function much as they do at present". This is, in effect, recognition that Canada's services do indeed function as distinct entities and

what remains to be accomplished is formal recognition of this reality, to restore pride and esprit de corps.

This paper has discussed the 1968 unification of Canada's military and how Defence Minister Paul Hellyer's four goals for unification have all failed. Further, it is clear that the Army, Navy and Air Force continue to function as separate services both in joint and combined operations. It is also clear by examining the US military structure brought about by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, that the Canadian military largely operates today in much the same manner as the US military.

It has been argued that "inter-service rivalries and bottom-up planning, two cardinal vices that unification was meant to exorcise from the defense establishment, continue unabated and for this reason the armed forces remain divided and vulnerable in an unfriendly policy environment".<sup>56</sup> Like the Americans, Canada's three services continue to struggle to find an effective way of working together in a joint environment. The creation of the Canadian Forces Joint Headquarters (CFJHQ) is a clear example of the CF's attempt to create joint-ness in their approach to operations.

35 years after unification, the Canadian military continues to talk about the importance of joint-ness in the CF's operational focus, the need to eliminate inter-service rivalries and the requirement to foster joint-ness amongst its members. Paul Hellyer attempted to eliminate this lack of a unified approach when, in the 1960s, he virtually single-handedly introduced the 1964 Defence White Paper that emphasized the requirement for a more unified force, Bill C-90 which combined the administrative functions and created a single Chief of Defence Staff, and as a final step, the 1968 CF Reorganization Act which eliminated Canada's three services and created a single service. Unfortunately very little of what Mr. Hellyer envisioned with the sweeping changes of the 1960s has come to

fruition. None of his stated four goals of unification has been realized and Canada's three services, much like the services of the US, continue to function as three distinct entities. Consequently, today's CF is faced with the same problems that Minister Hellyer and the three services faced in the 1960s.

Instead of talk of unification, however, the leadership of today's CF sees the solution as a more definitive focus on joint operations, using the contributions of the existing three distinct services. Instead of eliminating (again) the three services, the CF has addressed the issue by recognizing the three distinct services and pursuing joint doctrine, in place of Mr. Hellyer's solution of eliminating the need for joint-ness by creating a single service.

So today's CF struggles with the same problems that existed in 1968: three services with differing visions, inter-service budgetary rivalries and the lack of a unified approach to operational priorities. Today's CF solution is to indeed recognize that it's too hard to be green and instead center it's efforts on unifying the contributions of the three existing distinct services through the establishment, teaching and prac

## NOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence. *Strategic Capability Planning for the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2000), p 11.
- <sup>2</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence, *B-GG-005-004/AF-000 Joint Doctrine for the Canadian Forces Joint and Combined Operations*, (Ottawa: 1995), p 1-11.
- <sup>3</sup> Address to CF Command & Staff Course, Norfolk, VA, 30 April 2003.
- <sup>4</sup> Canadian Action Party. [<http://www.canadianactionparty.ca>], 11 April 2003.
- <sup>5</sup> Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada*. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc, 1999), p 250.
- <sup>6</sup> Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes*, p 33.
- <sup>7</sup> J. Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967*, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc, 1986), p 219.
- <sup>8</sup> Harriet W. Critchley, "Changes in Canada's Organization for Defence, 1963-1983", in *Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace*, ed. Robert J. Art, et al (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1985), p 139.
- <sup>9</sup> Vernon J. Kronenberg, *All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972*. (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973), p 9.
- <sup>10</sup> Douglas L. Bland, *Canada's National Defence, Volume 2 Defence Organization*. (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, 1998), pp 269-270.
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid, p 96.
- <sup>12</sup> Morton, *A Military History of Canada*. p 250.
- <sup>13</sup> Geoffrey D.T. Shaw, "The Canadian Armed Forces and Unification," *Defense Analysis Vol 17, No 2*. (Lancaster: Franklin and Marshall College, 2001) p 168.
- <sup>14</sup> Bland, *Canada's National Defence, Volume 2 Defence Organization*, p 268.
- <sup>15</sup> Paul Hellyer. *Address on the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act*. (Ottawa: House of Commons, 1966), p 28.
- <sup>16</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence, *The Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1980), p 61.
- <sup>17</sup> Shaw, "The Canadian Armed Forces and Unification", *Defense Analysis*, p 160.
- <sup>18</sup> Bland, *Canada's National Defence, Volume 2 Defence Organization*, p 249.
- <sup>19</sup> Paul Hellyer. *Damn the Torpedoes*. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc, 1990), introduction p 'x'.
- <sup>20</sup> Bland, *Canada's National Defence, Volume 2 Defence Organization*, p 249.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid, p 250.
- <sup>22</sup> G. Fyffe, *Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces: Final Report 15 March 1980*, (Ottawa: NDHQ, 1980), p 22.
- <sup>23</sup> Bland, *Canada's National Defence, Volume 2 Defence Organization*, p 253.
- <sup>24</sup> Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes*, p 85.
- <sup>25</sup> Shaw, "The Canadian Armed Forces and Unification", *Defense Analysis*, p 168.
- <sup>26</sup> Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes*, p 'x'.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid, p 'x'.
- <sup>28</sup> Hellyer. *Address on the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act*, p 28.
- <sup>29</sup> Fyffe, *Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces: Final Report 15 March 1980*, p 60.

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- <sup>30</sup> Ibid, p 60.
- <sup>31</sup> Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada*. (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1985), p 260-261.
- <sup>32</sup> D.W. Middlemiss and J.J. Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence Decisions and Determinants*. (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989), p 195.
- <sup>33</sup> Hellyer. *Address on the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act*, p 28.
- <sup>34</sup> Paul Hellyer, *House of Commons Debates, 27th Parliament, Vol. X*, (Ottawa: Hansard, 1968), p 10827.
- <sup>35</sup> Bland, *Canada's National Defence, Volume 2 Defence Organization*, p 320.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid, p 321.
- <sup>37</sup> Fyffe, *Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces: Final Report 15 March 1980*, p 22.
- <sup>38</sup> Defence Services Program.  
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- <sup>39</sup> Fyffe, *Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces: Final Report 15 March 1980*, p 58.
- <sup>40</sup> Bland, *Canada's National Defence, Volume 2 Defence Organization*, p 97.
- <sup>41</sup> Hellyer. *Address on the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act*, p 28.
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- <sup>44</sup> Allan English and G.E. Sharpe, *Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces*. (Kingston: Report for the Department of National Defence, June 2001) p 31.
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