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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
CSC 29

EXERCICE/EXERCISE NEW HORIZONS

**CANADA'S RESERVES ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK**

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## **Abstract**

The aim of this paper is to outline the current state of Canada's Reserves. The Communication, Naval and Air Reserves are thought to be in good shape, with worthwhile roles, equipment and personnel. The Land Reserve, or Militia has been under scrutiny and inspection for decades. Although attempts have been made to significantly change the structure and role of the Militia, following the end of the Cold War, it has only been in recent years that the "light at the end of the tunnel" has been seen. Canada's Reserves are fine, and the Militia will get there in time.

“An army’s military qualities are based on the individual who is steeped in the spirit and essence of this activity; who trains the capacities it demands, rouses them, and makes them his own; who applies his intelligence to every detail; who gains ease and confidence through practice, and who completely immerses his personality in the appointed task”.<sup>1</sup>

Carl Von Clausewitz

Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the government of Canada, like most Western World governments, wrestled with defence budgets and the maintenance of military manning levels aimed at countering the perceived threat from the east. In a special report to the House of Commons, in June 1988, the Standing Committee on National Defence noted “The Department [of Defence] has set its sight on arriving by the year 2002 at a Total Force of 180,000 made up of 90,000 Regulars, 65,000 Primary Reservists and 25,000 Supplementary Ready Reservists”.<sup>2</sup> Even following that comment, the Committee had concern over the quantity of members in the Total Force, suggesting that expected casualty rates would require an available pool of soldiers much higher in number. In addition to the debate over numbers, there was considerable discussion over the percentage of Regular versus Reserve Forces (a benchmark was established at a 50-50 mix). Although these statements are somewhat dated (a mere 15 years ago), they do serve to illustrate that force compositions are related to threats, and do change with time. More recently,

In the US, Britain, Canada and New Zealand, more emphasis is being placed on the employment of reserves, though each country continues to wrestle with the problem of how best to utilise their services. Bucking the Cold War trend, some of the most advanced and combat-capable forces are those that have made intelligent use of their reserves. All four countries have found it impossible to

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<sup>1</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *ON WAR*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) p 187.

<sup>2</sup> Department of National Defence. *THE RESERVES. A Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence.*(Ottawa: House of Commons Canada, June 1988). p 17.

sustain operations for any length of time without mobilizing their reserve combat and combat support capabilities.<sup>3</sup>

In the same era, Colonel Rohr (a Regular Force Officer attending the National Defence College) wrote a paper entitled “A Future for Canada’s Reserve Forces” where he outlined the strengths and reserve/regular ratios of selected countries.<sup>4</sup> This paper argued for the “Total Force” concept, employing regular and reserve soldiers side-by-side in the same unit. The following table, extracted from Colonel Rohr’s paper, outlined Canada’s military force in the mid-eighties, in comparison to some of its allies. It also served to draw attention to the differing percentages of reserve versus regular soldiers amongst Canada’s traditional allies. In Canada’s case, the proportion of reserve to regulars was found to be approximately 20 percent. The numbers presented for Denmark, Norway and Sweden have definitely been influenced by the national practice of conscription, but they do serve as useful comparisons. This table also illustrates the diminished role that Canada’s Reserves played during the Cold War era.

	<b>Regular</b>	<b>Reserve</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Australia	70,500	26,112	27
Britain	318,700	316,580	50
Canada	84,600	21,300	20
Denmark	29,300	74,700	72
Norway	36,900	284,600	88
Sweden	67,000	709,000	91
USA	2,158,000	1,652,940	61

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<sup>3</sup> Alan Ryan *THE WAY AHEAD? ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO INTEGRATING THE RESERVES IN ‘TOTAL FORCE’ PLANNING*. Land Warfare Studies Centre. July 1999. Duntroon ACT 2600, Land Warfare Studies Centre. p 2.

<sup>4</sup> R. Rohr, *A FUTURE FOR CANADA’S RESERVE FORCES*. (NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE. Kingston, Ontario. May 1988) p 11.

Going back in time even further, the proportion of reserves to regulars utilized by Canada is grossly different to that found at the beginning of the nineteenth century. “For example, Canada’s Regular Force in 1910 was 3,000 strong, while the Militia had 57,000 personnel; in 1955 the balance had shifted to 49,500 in the Regular Force and 43,000 in the Militia”.<sup>5</sup> The numbers are skewed since the only reserves that were in place in 1910 were Militia or Army Reserve. The rationale for the shift of emphasis from Reserve to Regular Forces was that the perceived threat coming from the USSR did not leave sufficient time to mobilize reservists. Another aspect that can be drawn from the table above is that the high percentages are an indication that some countries had not yet commenced their draw-down to their post cold-war era numbers. In today’s parlance, the post-2000 era, the new threat is widely considered to be a combination of conventional forces, vis-à-vis large Cold War standing armies (like the Iraqi military) and an asymmetric component (like the al-Quaida in Afghanistan). The old stigmas associated with reserves and mobilization are not necessarily going to be relevant. This paper contends that Canada’s Communication, Naval and Air Reserves are adequately manned, equipped and tasked with worthwhile and credible roles. However, the Land Reserve, or Militia is in a state of transition, leading to a role commensurate with the threat and contributing to Canada’s defence.

To clarify the use of the term “reserves”, it is practical to start with a definition of some terms, as they pertain to Canada. Canada’s Reserves are a component of the

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<sup>5</sup> Ivar Hagenlund, *MORE RESERVES – THE RIGHT WAY AHEAD?* (Canadian Forces Command and Staff College). Toronto, Ontario. March 31. 1995. p 3.

Canadian Forces, as defined in the National Defence Act<sup>6</sup> and consist of soldiers, sailors and airmen and women who are enrolled for service other than that outlined by continuing, full-time military service. In more detail, Canada's Reserves can be broken down into the four categories<sup>7</sup> of Primary Reserve, Supplementary Reserve, Cadet Instructors List and Canadian Rangers. In brief, all of Canada's Reserves are encapsulated in these four categories. More detail on each category is presented in the paragraphs that follow.

The Primary Reserve contains those elements of Canada's Reserves that are designed for activation to full-time service should the need for mobilization arise. The Primary Reserve is a component of the Canadian Forces and consists of the Naval Reserve, the Air Reserve, the Militia (or Army Reserve) and the Communication Reserve. Naturally, the Naval Reserve falls under the purview of the Chief of the Maritime Staff, the Air Reserve is commanded by the Chief of the Air Staff and the Militia is part of the Chief of the Land Staff's structure. The Communication Reserve was formed in 1970 from those elements of the Militia of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, and is contained within the Information Management Group organization.<sup>8</sup> The current establishment of the Primary Reserve is approximately 30,000. This makes the current proportion of Reserve to Regular Force members set at a level of fifty percent, a

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<sup>6</sup> National Defence Act (NDA), Subsection 15(3), Available within the Consolidated Statutes of Canada accessed on the INTERNET at <http://Canada.justice.gc.ca/>.

<sup>7</sup> Alan Ryan, *THE WAY AHEAD? ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO INTEGRATING THE RESERVES IN 'TOTAL FORCE' PLANNING*. Land Warfare Studies Centre. July 1999. Duntroon ACT 2600. Land Warfare Studies Centre. p 15.

<sup>8</sup> R.M. Lilienthal, *RETURNING TO OUR ROOTS: The Revitalization of the Canadian Militia*. (Canadian Forces Command and Staff College. Toronto, Ontario. May 1987). p 3.

significant increase over the ratio of twenty percent reported nearly 15 years ago. Recently, elements of the Primary Reserve have come to Canada's aid in the "Manitoba floods", and the "Ice Storm", both of which were assistance to the civil authority operations. On an ongoing basis, reservists are volunteering for service both within Canada and on overseas missions. Although the government has not demanded the mobilization of these reservists, they have been there when needed and provide a substantial and worthwhile contribution to Canada's defence. A review of the statistics concerning recruiting intake of Primary Reservists supports the view that the numbers are fluid but similar, on a year-by-year comparison. For example, the intake of Primary Reservists in 2000 was 3,573, whereas in 2001 it was 4,163 and 2002 it was 4,200.<sup>9</sup> Bearing in mind the marginal increase in establishment of the Militia, these numbers make sense.

The Supplementary Reserve consists of approximately 15,000 to 20,000 retired officers and non-commissioned members who do not actively take part in training, but who have volunteered to be available in the event of an emergency. In the past, retiring members were offered a token honorarium, essentially as a gift on transfer to the Supplementary Reserve (and each year thereafter) when retiring from the Regular Force, but this practice has since stopped and the stipend is no longer paid out. Since Canada has never drawn from this pool of retired members, its effectiveness is questionable, and not measurable.

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<sup>9</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence. *AT A CROSSROADS - Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff 2001-2002*. Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters. 2002. p 15.



The Cadet Instructors List is a group of individuals who provide instruction to Canada's Sea, Army and Air Cadets. The cadet program provides an early, elemental view of the military starting at the age of twelve. As a point of interest, Canada's own Minister of National Defence has absolutely no military experience save that which he gained while serving as an Air Cadet at an early age. These cadets are often exposed to the infrastructure and equipment of the Canadian Forces that ordinary citizens have not seen. Some would say that the cadet program is an entry point into Canada's Reserves, but in truth, it is not necessary to have prior cadet experience. Cadets are also an important, visible military component of Canadian society, dispersed in towns and cities throughout Canada.

The Canadian Rangers number approximately 3,000 volunteers located in remote, sparsely populated areas, primarily in Canada's vast northern regions. The Canadian Rangers do not undergo the same degree of training as the other reserve components, but they do provide an important observation capability and "presence" in remote areas, and also act as local guides and advisors to Canadian Forces units operating in their locations. Other nations have similar reserve components where the members are effectively "coast watchers". Although the level of training and skill-sets are not high, the Rangers are an extremely effective method of watching over our desolate, sparsely populated coasts, and establish a valuable military link to communities in remote areas, at a very low cost.

As previously stated, the Communication Reserve is subordinate to the Information Management Group of National Defence Headquarters and is dispersed throughout the country in four Communication Groups, with headquarters in Edmonton,

Kingston, Montreal and Halifax. Each Communication Group consists of Communication Regiments, Communication Squadrons or Communication Troops.

The mission of the Communication Reserve is to provide combat capable information technology/management services to the Canadian Forces, and links to the Canadian military and civilian communities across the country. The Communication Reserve uses modern equipment such as digital radios, ground satellite terminals, fibre-optics and computers. Communication Reservists are trained as ground soldiers and wear the army uniform. However, they are often called upon to work and train with other elements (Army, Navy or Air Force) of the reserve and regular forces.<sup>10</sup>

The Special Commission on the Restructuring of Reserves recommended in 1995 that the Communication Reserve transfer from the Information Management Group back to the Army or Militia.<sup>11</sup> Although eight years have passed since this recommendation was made, it is still undecided whether it will ever be acted upon. Most of the recommendations that were made by the commission have been accepted, but a significant change like this may take much longer before it is enacted. The rationale for the move of the Communication Reserve back to the Militia was simply to align these units with the structure that they most often work with, the Army. The manning levels are adequate (approximate strength of 2,000 reservists) and have not changed in the past ten years. In general, the Communication Reserve is widely thought to be an organization that is “in good shape”. The Communication Reserve has a well-defined role and has played an important part in operations both in Canada and overseas.

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<sup>10</sup> Canada, National Defence Act. [[http://img.mil.ca/DGIMO/CommRes/index\\_e.htm](http://img.mil.ca/DGIMO/CommRes/index_e.htm)]. Accessed 4 Feb 03.

<sup>11</sup> R.M. Lilienthal, *RETURNING TO OUR ROOTS: The Revitalization of the Canadian Militia*. (Canadian Forces Command and Staff College. Toronto, Ontario. May 1987). p 15.

The Naval Reserve is arguably in the best shape of Canada's Reserves. It has two unique operational roles: naval control of shipping and maritime coastal defence, including the clearing of mines.<sup>12</sup> The Navy was quick to embrace the "Total Force" concept outlined in the 1987 Defence White Paper, and built on development plans that were already underway to provide the Naval Reserve with more of an operational focus. This plan saw the procurement and delivery of Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels, in service only with the Naval Reserve, providing a route survey and limited minesweeping capability that had not existed in the Navy for many years. In addition to the twelve Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels delivered by the project, there were modernization efforts for the diving teams, rigid inflatable boats and exercise mines. These developments have been a very good thing for Canada's Naval Reserve, giving it the resources and the roles necessary to assure self-identity and cohesion. It is interesting to note that the United Kingdom did not follow the same methodology with their assignment of roles and restructuring of their naval reserve. Seeking a post Cold-War dividend, the United Kingdom chopped its Royal Naval Reserve of its dedicated vessels and reduced it to a manning level of only 2400 sailors tasked only to provide individual augmentation for sea duty with the Royal Navy. Canada's Naval Reserve has an established strength of 4,000 personnel<sup>13</sup>, unchanged since the end of the Cold War.

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<sup>12</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence. *DGPA Transcripts of the Address by Vice-Admiral Larry Murray to the NOAC Annual General Meeting Seminar on "The Reserves, Society and Operational Roles : Comparative Perspectives."* Canada. Maritime Command Headquarters, 1995. p 2.

<sup>13</sup> Canada, National Defence Site. Naval Reserve. [[http://www.navres.forces.gc.ca/navres/HQ-QG/organisa/estab\\_e.htm](http://www.navres.forces.gc.ca/navres/HQ-QG/organisa/estab_e.htm)]. Accessed 5 May 03.

Vice-Admiral Murray (then Chief of the Maritime Service) proudly asserted the relevance and credibility of Canada's Naval Reserve in the address that follows:

The Naval Reserve Component of the Total Force defence team is a robust and effective one; one which is growing in professionalism and relevance, and one which has been launched on a course that should see it well equipped and trained for the numerous challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. I'm tremendously pleased that I can make an assertion like that because not so many years ago, we could not. As late as 1983, according to a senate sub-committee report on Canada's Maritime Defence, the Naval Reserve was equipped with "ancient vessels which [were] woefully inadequate", while new reserve vessels had "disappeared into the dense fog of DND's 'unfunded' list." The report indicated that Naval Reserve training was conducted in "old buildings with 'a few bits of museum piece naval hardware'"<sup>14</sup>.

The Air Reserve came into being on 1 April 1924 as part of the official inauguration of the Royal Canadian Air Force. This organization falls under the Chief of the Air Staff and includes detachments located in all parts of Canada. Air Reservists have served proudly alongside their Regular Forces counterparts from the start and are continuing to share a portion of the peacekeeping deployments. Currently, the role of the Air Reserve is to augment the Regular Force. However, in April 2002, the Chief of the Air Staff directed the Air Reserve to devise a comprehensive plan to guide Air Reserve development over the next 15 years. "While the present contribution being made by the Air Reserve is clearly valuable, the current structure and raison d'être of the Air Reserve may not be what is needed in the future."<sup>15</sup> An Air Reserve Development Plan (ARDP)

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<sup>14</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence. *DGPA Transcripts of the Address by Vice-Admiral Larry Murray to the NOAC Annual General Meeting Seminar on "The Reserves, Society and Operational Roles : Comparative Perspectives."* Canada. Maritime Command Headquarters, 1995. p 3.

<sup>15</sup> Canada, National Defence Site.

[[http://www.airforce.forces.ca/air\\_reserve/index\\_e.htm](http://www.airforce.forces.ca/air_reserve/index_e.htm)]. Accessed 5 May 03.

project is underway to identify a force structure that will optimize the contribution of the Air Reserve within the total Air Force. Although the Air Reserve is currently under-strength with 2,330 members and an establishment of 3,435 positions, the Air Reserve is considered to be adequately equipped, and tasked at this time.<sup>16</sup>

In the Air Force, Reservists serve as partners with members of the Regular Force to accomplish the Air Force mission. Air Reservists are actively involved in the vast spectrum of Air Force activities including: surveillance and control of Canadian airspace; world-wide airlift of Canadian Forces personnel and material; support to the navy and army; support to other government departments; search and rescue; and humanitarian operations.<sup>17</sup>

Before embarking on the details associated with the Militia, or Army Reserve, it is worthwhile reiterating that the other elements of Canada's Reserves described in the preceding paragraphs are essentially "in good shape". Their organizations and roles have kept pace with the changing world and in recent years they have not been the subject of intense scrutiny or inspection. In addition, there are considerable differences in the employment and comparability with the private sector between the Army Reserve occupations and those found in other areas of the Reserves. Naval and Air Force reservists are largely specialist or platform based, therefore many of the technical skills needed can be found more easily in the civilian sector. Air traffic control, or ship maintenance, does not require a large degree of military expertise. Alternatively, air weapons control and airspace battle control are functions that demand military expertise.

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<sup>16</sup> Canada, National Defence Site.

[[http://airforce.dawn.dnd.ca/AFR\\_RGA/Organization/Estab\\_e.htm](http://airforce.dawn.dnd.ca/AFR_RGA/Organization/Estab_e.htm)]. Accessed 4 Feb 03.

<sup>17</sup> Canada, National Defence Site.

[[http://www.airforce.forces.ca/air\\_reserve/index\\_e.htm](http://www.airforce.forces.ca/air_reserve/index_e.htm)]. Accessed 16 Mar 03.

In some circles, air and sea transportation functions may even be argued as being alike. In short, the Militia is very much different than the other reserve components.

Army Reserves are by far the most numerous to be found in allied countries. The experience level of ground troops increases significantly with the amount of training and the drills practised at all levels. This training costs money, takes time, and requires the development of unique skills not found in the civilian sector. In the Chief of the Defence Staff's Annual Report for 2001/2002, discussion of initiatives for change within the Reserves focused on the Militia, with only comments on pension modernization that pertained to the Reserves in general.<sup>18</sup> This illustrates the prominence assigned to the Militia in comparison to the remainder of the Primary Reserve. When the Canadian public thinks of Canada's Reserves, most often the Militia comes to mind. The Air Reserve is less identifiable as a unique component since its role finds it immersed with the Regular Force. The Naval Reserve does have an identifiable presence, but it is not dispersed throughout all of Canada. Also, to most people, reserve soldiers in combat clothing are Militia, even though they might often include elements of the Communication Reserve. Militia soldiers are also more distinctive due to the fact that their uniforms bear a uniqueness influenced by their regimental heritage and traditions. Desmond Morton offered a sobering difference between the Regular and Reserve Forces in his words:

The sight of young people in baggy fatigues waiting for a bus to the local armouries may comfort those who believe the young could do with a dose of discipline: the sight of such youngsters deployed on a hillside in Croatia or in a jungle clearing in

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<sup>18</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence. *AT A CROSSROADS - Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff 2001-2002*. Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters. 2002. p 28/29.

Cambodia, particularly if they came under fire, would provoke a very different response.<sup>19</sup>

The Militia is a vital component of Canada's military capability. Located in communities spread across Canada, the Militia's current role fixes it as a framework for expansion should the need arise. This role is changing with time but due primarily to the Militia's long history this may take years. Its current role is primarily one of mobilization, but this has been the subject of much debate in the past ten years. The Militia has often been characterized by its role as a "footprint" in communities, fostering the values of citizenship and public service. This footprint, however, has often come under scrutiny and the threat of extinction through budget cuts or organizational change. In a 1995 edition of *Newsmagazine*, a Canadian Reservist was quoted: "It takes a hundred years to build up a regimental tradition, but you can destroy it in an afternoon".<sup>20</sup> This speaks to the relative ease with which the Department of National Defence can simply wipe out generations of history. Literally hundreds of books and review papers have been written in the past few decades with the intention of offering construction criticism of the Militia. "The major problem confronting the Militia is public apathy, almost antipathy, about Defence and this is reflected in the high attrition rates being experienced in already under-strength units".<sup>21</sup>

Despite its professed need for an integrated reserve force, there have been major problems in implementing the ideal of a 'Total Force', which was the priority established in the Canadian 1987 Defence White Paper. Although there have

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<sup>19</sup> Desmond Morton, "Our Reserves Must Be Made More Effective" *Canadian Speeches: Issues of the Day*. Volume 7. No 2, April 1993. p 27.

<sup>20</sup> Joe Woodard, "DYING AT 48% OFF THE REGULAR PRICE". *Alberta Report / Newsmagazine*, 8/21/95, Vol. 22, Issue 36. p 6.

<sup>21</sup> Dudman, M.J. A search for greater effectiveness in the reserves. & Hide Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. National Defence College of Canada. 1986. p 6.

been three major reports and a host of demi-official and academic commentaries in the last twelve years, Canada has continued to face major obstacles to utilizing its reserve capabilities fully. One of the main issues has been continuing antagonism between many senior regular officers and the militia. Like Australia's historical experience of the Staff Corps – Militia antipathy, a destructive culture of conflict has frustrated ministries' attempts to forge a unified and complementary force. Given a high level of confusion as to the role of the reserves and the general demoralization resulting from the Somalian debacle, it appears that Canada is only now creating a relevant, viable and sustainable structure for its forces.<sup>22</sup>

T.C. Willett authored "A Heritage at Risk – The Canadian Militia as a Social Institution", that provided an incisive look into the trials and tribulations of the Militia. In addition to outlining the history of organizational change (or rather attempted change) and modifications to the functional role associated with the militia, Mr Willet conducted scores of detailed interviews with reservists and regulars. These interviews provided a candid description of how the regulars viewed the reservists and alternatively, how the reservists viewed the regulars. He advocated special purpose or unique roles for Militia units, possibly in line with the skill sets available in the community.<sup>23</sup> Dr. J. L.

Granatstein summed up the observed antipathy well with his comments:

As a commissioner on the Special Commission of the Restructuring of the Reserves in 1995, I watched a high school principal, the honorary lieutenant-colonel of a Windsor Militia regiment, boil over with red-faced fury at a meeting with senior and junior officers, pouring bile on the Regulars who appropriated the budget and the equipment and, worst of all, high-hatted the part-time soldiers. There are two mutually antithetical cultures at work here and there always have

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<sup>22</sup> Alan Ryan. *THE WAY AHEAD? ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO INTEGRATING THE RESERVES IN 'TOTAL FORCE' PLANNING*. Land Warfare Studies Centre. July 1999. Duntroon ACT 2600, Land Warfare Studies Centre. p 14.

<sup>23</sup> Willett, T.C., *A heritage at risk: the Canadian Militia as a social institution*. Westview Press, 1987. Boulder and London. p 158.



been, and the declining defence budgets of the last four decades have only exacerbated matters.<sup>24</sup>

Perhaps the “start” of the current cycle for change with the Militia came with the 1987 White Paper and the principle of “Total Force”. The White Paper determined that with the proper equipment, training and budget, the Militia could be used to alleviate the burden of peacekeeping deployments felt by the Regular Force. This was confirmed in the 1994 White Paper when the role assigned to the Militia was “force generation to allow augmentation of the Regular Force”.<sup>25</sup> Many Militia officers, including senior officers and prominent members of local communities, spoke out against this role stating that it ran in conflict with the historical primary function of the reserves – to provide a framework for the mobilization of the Army in case of emergency. To bolster their stand:

The Special Commission on the Restructuring of Reserves found fault with the four-stage mobilization plan outlined in the 1994 Defence White Paper. This paper had accorded the Reserve Force a major role in the first two stages of mobilization – force generation and force enhancement – but only in the context of providing individually selected reservists, rather than whole platoons or companies. The Commission identified a widespread perception that the Militia had become a ‘temp pool’, resulting in units being robbed of their best soldiers and losing their ability to prepare for their role as the basis of national mobilization.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Granatstein, Dr. J. L., *THE SEARCH FOR AN EFFICIENT, EFFECTIVE LAND FORCE RESERVE*. CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL. Department of National Defence. Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston. Vol. 3, No 2, Summer 2002. p 5.

<sup>25</sup> Alan Ryan. *THE WAY AHEAD? ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO INTEGRATING THE RESERVES IN ‘TOTAL FORCE’ PLANNING*. Land Warfare Studies Centre. July 1999. Duntroon ACT 2600. Land Warfare Studies Centre. p 14.

<sup>26</sup> Alan Ryan. *THE WAY AHEAD? ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO INTEGRATING THE RESERVES IN ‘TOTAL FORCE’ PLANNING*. Land Warfare Studies Centre. July 1999. Duntroon ACT 2600. Land Warfare Studies Centre. p 16.

In addition to the efforts undertaken by the Special Commission, a pressure group entitled Reserves 2000 was created by honorary colonels and Militia stalwarts.<sup>27</sup> This group is politically and socially well connected, and therefore very effective in getting the Minister to listen to its concerns. Based on acceptance of thirty-six (of forty one) of the Special Commission's recommendations and the Minister's Monitoring Committee, the Government adopted a policy on the way ahead for Reserve restructure. One could say that Reserves 2000 was effective in causing future changes to the Militia to be based on mobilization planning, which has been lacking in recent years. Literally the only contact that many communities had with the Canadian Forces was through the 133 Militia units in 125 cities and towns spread across the country. As a start, the Army replaced the Militia's organization of fourteen Militia districts with one of ten brigade groups falling alongside the four Regular Force Brigades and under the Land Force "four area" concept used by the Regular Force. This was a profound organizational change. It seems to suit the Regular Force structure but it is too soon to conclude whether it has been an effective change for the Militia.

The Land Force Reserve Restructure Project Office was established in 2000 with a mandate to stabilize the Army Reserve and increase its strength to 18,500 by the year 2006. This project includes the development of new roles, missions, and tasks that will be complementary to the Regular Force. The project is divided into two phases. In phase one, a stabilization phase was planned to last two years where the Army's mobilization plan and the Militia's missions and tasks were to be defined. Improvements to shorten

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<sup>27</sup> Granatstein, Dr. J. L., *THE SEARCH FOR AN EFFICIENT, EFFECTIVE LAND FORCE RESERVE*. CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL. Department of National Defence. Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston. Vol. 3, No 2, Summer 2002. p 7.

and administratively simplify the enrolment process were undertaken to include a one-time allocation of \$ 10,000 to each Reserve Brigade. It also entailed the adaptation of training courses to better accommodate Reserve soldiers who also have civilian careers that they depend on. Finally, this phase saw the delivery of new equipment, including personnel equipment, grenade launchers, ½ ton jeeps and 3 ton trucks. Although these changes may seem somewhat superficial and easily enacted, they do illustrate a first real step towards modernization, something that had not previously been taken.

In phase two of the Land Force Reserve Restructure Project, (expected to last until 2005-2006) the Militia will be re-roled to be in line with the Future Army Development Plan, designed to create a single Army, consisting of both Regular and Reserves. Although it is premature to speculate what the final structure and role of the Militia will be, it has to be in harmony with the single long-term plan guiding the Army. It is widely thought that most of the organizational change has already taken place, although some units may see their focus shift to complement perceived capability gaps in the Army. Given that the Militia is expected to grow to a strength of 18,500, there is a corresponding requirement for the provision of the necessary equipment to be able to undertake the new roles and missions that are to be developed in harmony with the Regular Force units. In addition, a performance measurement system will be in place to validate the effectiveness of all units against assigned roles, missions and tasks.

Phase II, beginning in 2003-2004, will cover a three-year period where the Army Reserve will continue to expand to its assumed critical mass of 18,500 soldiers. There will be a continued emphasis on sustaining current capability, as well as the development of new capabilities such as civil-military co-operation: chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence; information operations; and geomatics. It is recognized that, at this time, DND does not have the resources it

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needs to achieve all Phase II objectives. This will have to be resolved as part of our efforts to ensure the long-term sustainability of the CF in the context of the defence update process.<sup>28</sup>

Clearly, attempts have been made to ensure that the process of the Land Force Reserve Restructure has been done as transparently as possible. The Project Office has published key documents and even maintained a website in the interest of soliciting comments and approval from the Militia community. “The Chief of the Land Staff also opened the books to the Reserves, aiming to persuade the honorary colonels and the Reserves 2000 group that the Regulars really weren’t stealing the Reserves’ funding”.<sup>29</sup> The short-term goal of the plan is to revitalize and strengthen Army Reserve units, and although no units have been de-activated, re-rolled, or amalgamated during Phase I, the possibility exists in Phase II.

In Militia units today, individual augmentation to Regular Force units is no longer the sole focus. Where possible, formed sub-units are sent on peacekeeping missions as part of an overall ‘Total Force’. While generating these platoons and companies may have been difficult in the past for individual Militia units, they are not difficult tasks for the larger, newly formed brigade groups. In this setting, one can say that the Total Force concept is working. Alan Ryan summarized the Canadian approach to rationalizing the Militia with:

The Canadian experience has not been to question the worth of the Reserves; the experience of utilizing them on peacekeeping operations has militated against

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<sup>28</sup>Canada, Department of National Defence. *AT A CROSSROADS - Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff 2001-2002*. Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters. 2002. p 28.

<sup>29</sup>Granatstein, Dr. J. L., *THE SEARCH FOR AN EFFICIENT, EFFECTIVE LAND FORCE RESERVE*. CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL. Department of National Defence. Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston. Vol. 3, No 2, Summer 2002. p 9.

that. Instead, Canada has sought to gain value from the force-in-being, while preserving the longer-term capability of the militia to respond in an emergency.<sup>30</sup>

Since the conclusion of the second world war, Canada has a proud history of participating in 72 international operations. The operational tempo experienced by the Canadian Forces entered a new phase in the early nineties with the near coincidental actions in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Somalia and the Gulf War. Since then, Canada has participated in peacekeeping and peace support operations in a measured, but deliberate manner. In January of 2003, the Canadian Forces had a total of 2,480 personnel deployed. “On any given day, about 8,000 Canadian Forces members – one third of our deployable force – are preparing for, engaged in or returning from an overseas mission”.<sup>31</sup> In an attempt to share the burden of this steady operational stress, the Canadian Forces has in recent years included a balanced measure of Reservists together with the Regular Force on overseas deployments. “The [army] estimates it costs around \$ 315,000 to prepare a soldier for service overseas”.<sup>32</sup> Other dissertations have concentrated on the financial economy of employing Army Reservists, as opposed to their Regular Force counterparts. It is obvious that the employment of Militia soldiers is more cost effective, but they deploy with far less experience, which may be particularly important in the supervisory roles. With this in mind, it makes even more sense to include a balanced composition of Army and Militia on operational missions.

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<sup>30</sup> Alan Ryan. *THE WAY AHEAD? ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO INTEGRATING THE RESERVES IN 'TOTAL FORCE' PLANNING*. Land Warfare Studies Centre. July 1999. Duntroon ACT 2600. Land Warfare Studies Centre. p 22.

<sup>31</sup> Canada, National Defence Site. Current Operations.

[[http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/current\\_ops\\_e.asp](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/current_ops_e.asp)]. Accessed 3 Feb 03.

<sup>32</sup> Paul Cowan, “FORCES ‘DUMPS’ STRESS CASUALTIES”, News, *The Edmonton Sun*, Mar 4, 2003, p 16.

The Department of National Defence now uses the phrase “PERSTEMPO” to describe the time that is spent away from home by Canadian Forces members. “Excessive ‘time away’ is an accumulation of absences from home over time due to overseas deployments, individual or unit-level training, or incremental tasking.”<sup>33</sup> Regulations now stipulate that members cannot return for another operational tour unless one year has elapsed since the last tour. The increased interest in using Reservists to offset the increased PERSTEMPO experienced by the Regular Force has gained momentum in recent years. Until it has been formally changed, the Militia’s primary role remains as one focused on “mobilization”. However, there is mounting evidence to show that they can be effective not only as providing individual augmentation to the Regular Force dominated missions, but with providing formed sub-units as well. This relationship is something that obviously benefits the Regular Force, but it is also something that strengthens the Militia. The Militia have wanted to get more involved in operations for decades. Their time has now arrived. The Land Force Commander, Lieutenant-General M.K. Jeffery emphasised this point when he addressed the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs in May 2002.

There’s a tempo issue and there’s fatigue within the army. I cannot get to the Army of Tomorrow in one step. We already have in the last couple of rotations in Bosnia made significant increases in the amount of reserves and most noteworthy the amount of foreign reserve capability we’re putting forward and it is our intent in rotation eleven into Bosnia starting this fall to put a whole reserve infantry company into Bosnia and my hope is that we will do more both domestically here in Canada and internationally to take advantages of the capability the reserves can provide us.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Canada, National Defence Site.

[[http://www.forces.gc.ca/hr/qol/engraphy/PERSTEMPO\\_e.as](http://www.forces.gc.ca/hr/qol/engraphy/PERSTEMPO_e.as)]. Accessed 31 Jan 03.

<sup>34</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence. DGPA Transcripts of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. (Ottawa: House of Commons Canada, 21 15h30 May 2002).

Arguably, the Canadian Forces has undergone a similar process in adapting its Reserves as the civilian sector has experienced with the nature of work and production. The ideal reservist is a multi-skilled individual who can be brought into an organization at short notice for a unique task and to meet a particular demand. Although the threat of general war with a large nation like the Soviet Union is no longer a possibility, the requirement for reserves has not diminished. The Canadian Forces has achieved a peace dividend and either changed or is in the process of changing its reserves to keep pace with the world situation. The present role of Canada's Reserves is one that is somewhat unique to each arm or branch of service, but it is quite different from the historical one of providing "deep pockets" of reservists in the event of mobilization.

By and large, Canada's Reserves have moved with the times. The Reserves now reflect modifications made to suit the changes in threat, and in the case of the Militia, changes to mobilization plans will be made in the near future. After decades of indecision and introspection, the Militia is in a real state of transition, apparently on track, and headed for harmonization with the Regular Force.

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